Are young people receptive to populist
and radical right political agendas?
Turning Evidence into Policy
MYPLACE Policy Forum, Brussels
20 November 2014
Hilary Pilkington
University of Manchester
What’s the problem?
• National parliamentary successes of far right/populist
radical right: Golden Dawn (7%, 2012); The Finns (19%,
2011); Jobbik (20%, 2014).
• European Parliament (2014) successes: Golden Dawn,
(10% of national vote); The Finns (13%); Jobbik (15%).
• Breakthroughs in previously impervious countries:
 Eurosceptic/nationalist parties won the European
Parliament elections for the first time in France (25%) and
UK (27%);
 In Germany: Alternative für Deutschland (7%); National
Democratic Party (1%).
Youth receptivity? The evidence
• Perception that the ‘typical extreme-right voter’ is young (Bakić 2009)
• But, existing survey data confirm only :
 support is weakest among highly educated professionals and greatest among
manual workers, small business owners, the unemployed, ‘housewives’ and
pensioners;
 support is stronger among men than women (Kitschelt 2007).
• It is argued that the young are more likely to vote for the extreme right
because ‘they compete with immigrants for scarce resources’ (Arzheimer,
2009).
• In practice the impact of age on support for the far right varies widely
(nationally and regionally):
 UK data on support for the BNP and UKIP show that these two parties are, on
the contrary, supported disproportionately by those who are over 50 years of
age.
 In East European countries support among the young is high, mirroring
evidence that younger generations are less rather than more tolerant than
older generations.
Constraints on existing knowledge
• Existing literature is based largely on past voting
patterns or general population surveys of voting
intentions in relation to formally registered
political parties.
• This constrains our knowledge since groups of the
population supporting populist/radical right
parties are small and general population surveys
also contain a relatively small sample of young
people.
• Reliable data on the strength of support for a
range of populist and radical right political agendas
among youth in Europe are thus lacking.
MYPLACE survey data
• The MYPLACE survey is youth-focused and asked:
i) For whom respondents had voted (in last national and local elections), if
they had voted);
ii) To which political party (if any) respondents felt ‘close’.
• But, the 16-25 years target range meant that many respondents had
not yet voted reducing the sample of ‘voters’ for radical
right/populist parties
• 59.1% of respondents reported that they did not ‘feel close to’ any
party. The absolute number of those reporting empathy with a far
right or populist/radical right party thus is also small.
• This interference from the broader distrust in political parties
suggests that to enhance our understanding of receptivity to the far
right, we need to switch the focus from ‘parties’ to ‘ideas’.
Exceptions to the rule
The exceptions here are in Greece, Finland and Hungary.
• Of those who had voted in the last national election in the
country:
 in Greece 16.7% had voted for Golden Dawn (more than twice
the proportion of the general population)
 In Finland, 14% had voted for The Finns (5% less than the general
population)
 In Hungary 27% had voted for Jobbik (12% more than the general
population)
• Of those reporting they felt close to any party
 In Greece 20.5% felt close to Golden Dawn
 In Finland 22% felt close to The Finns
 In Hungary 47% felt close to Jobbik (although only 19% reported
closeness to any party compared to 41% in Greece and 46% in
Finland).
Measuring receptivity: Ideas not
parties
• Greater robustness is achieved if we seek measures of
support not for parties but the ideas they propagate.
• Conceptually we adopt here Mudde’s (2007)
characterisation of ‘radical populist right’ ideologies as
combining: nativism, populism and authoritarianism.
• In the MYPLACE survey:
 Nativism is measured by: negative attitudes towards minorities,
anti-immigration attitudes, welfare chauvinism and exclusionism.
 Authoritarianism is measured by: support for autocratic
principles (strong leader and army rule).
 Populism is measured by: cynicism in relation to the current
political system.
Nativism: Restricting immigration
Should [your country] have
stricter border controls and visa
restrictions to prevent further
immigration?
Of the total survey population:
Strongly agree - 16%
Agree - 32%
Neither agree nor disagree - 22%
Disagree - 22%
Strongly disagree - 6%
Populism: Remoteness from the
political elite
Young people feel remote from a perceived
political elite.
22% of respondents agree with the statement
‘politicians are interested in young people like me’
60% agree with the statement ‘politicians are
corrupt’
69% agree with the statement ‘the rich have too
much influence in politics’.
Cynicism and receptivity to
populist/radical right
Authoritarianism
This measure is based on support
for two indicators of authoritarian
rule:
i) Having a strong leader who is
not constrained by
parliament
ii) Having the army rule
High scores indicate high support.
• In the UK locations, (mean)
support for an unconstrained strong
leader was 56.1% and for army rule
27.7%
• In the eastern Germany locations,
(mean) support for a strong leader
was 4.2% and for army rule, 2%.
‘Brussels, we have a problem’
• MYPLACE survey data cannot determine whether young people are more
or less receptive than the general population to populist/radical right
ideas and agendas. They do show that the youth sphere is not immune
from them.
• Patterns of support across locations show that support for populist/radical
right ideas is not confined to post-socialist societies and will not be
eradicated automatically with the embedding of democracy.
• High absolute levels of anti-immigration attitudes in locations in Greece
and Portugal, and for authoritarian rule in the UK show the issues span
the European political space. Young people feel remote from a perceived
‘political elite’ across all survey locations.
• Lower levels on measures of nativism and authoritarianism in some
locations (most consistently in eastern and western Germany and
Denmark) provide us with some positive models. However, cynicism
remains high even there.
What can we do? Existing policy tools
Responses to the far right/radical right populism in the political
sphere have typically followed three routes:
 delegitimizing it (due to its incompatibility with democratic
values) and excluding it from the electoral process;
 isolating it, by excluding it from electoral or executive
alliances;
 embracing (some) parties in the hope that, in power, they
will discredit themselves (Wodak and KhosraviNik 2013).
Social and psychological approaches have focused on
prevention strategies designed to combat:
 intolerant or racist attitudes
 racially motivated violence and crime (Beelman 2009)
New evidence, new policy tools?
Politically oriented policy tools work on the assumption:
This is justified because they are anti-democratic;
As long as xenophobic or populist views are not represented or heard then the problem is
solved.
Evidence from MYPLACE problematises this by suggesting that:
The movements attractive to youth are not fundamentally anti-democratic;
But disillusionment with the political mainstream may mean that these movements may
not seek an electoral route;
Exclusion from the political realm may be a cause of not a solution to the problem.
Socially oriented preventative tools assume:
 The problem is ‘racist’ attitudes based on ignorance and resolvable through education;
 Different approaches are required for ‘normal’ youth and those with extremist views.
Evidence from MYPLACE problematises this by suggesting:
The ‘targets’ of education often consider themselves consciously ‘not racist’.
There is a continuum in attitudes, rather than a sharp break, between ‘ordinary’ youth
and those actively engaged in populist/radical right movements.
MYPLACE qualitative data
Organisation
Sample (no. respondent
interviews)
Setting (context of fieldwork) Type of activism
English Defence
League (UK)
35
Participant observation and
interviews
Social movement (anti-Islamic extremism)
Golden Dawn
10
(Greece)
Latvian National
Front
Internet ethnography and
interviews
Officially registered ‘nationalist’ political party (focus on
youth pages and members)
30
Interviews and observation
National social movement with theosophic roots
30
Interviews with some
observation
Youth branch of official cultural institution promoting
patriotic values
15
Analysis of media and official
documents, interviews
Anti-immigration Facebook group
26
Participant observation and
interviews
Paramilitary association for protecting traditions
23
Participant observation and
interviews
Patriotic social movement (mainly but not exclusively
youth)
21
Participant observation and
interviews
Football supporters movement officially constituted as
an NGO and patriotic leanings
15
Participant observation and
interviews
Youth branch of officially registered political party
(Latvia)
Mladá Matica
(Slovakia)
Moral panic in
Lieksa
(Finland)
Ragged Association
(Hungary)
Russian Run
(Russia)
Torcida
(Croatia)
The Finns
(Finland)
Anti-democratic?
Democracy as the lesser evil
• Attitudes to democracy among
young activists combine profound
disillusionment with the current
democratic system with basic
support for democratic forms of
government.
• This is often articulated as ‘what
we have now is not democracy’ or
that democracy provides freedom
but not security:
‘In democracy, everyone can say
whatever he wants; we have
freedom, but what to do with it
when no one knows what is going
to happen tomorrow and is afraid?
We don’t know how to use
democracy in our favour.’ (Ďuro,
MM, Slovakia)
This characterisation of
democracy as ‘the lesser evil’
is very much in line with
‘mainstream’ respondents.
‘[…] you can never be truly
democratic because […]
people who voted for Labour
like at the last election aren’t
represented […] are they by
the government? So it’s not
democratic but […] it’s the
lesser evil really isn’t it, I think,
this system.’ (David, UK)
Democracy: ‘An organisation of the
people’
• With regard to internal democracy, classic understandings of far right
organisations as highly hierarchically structured and disciplined and
led by charismatic, strong leaders was not confirmed (except in the
case of Golden Dawn).
• In five of the cases, young people described their organisation as ‘an
organisation of the people’ (Dáša, MM, Slovakia) or a ‘leaderless
movement’ (Ivan, RR, Russia) owned by the members.
• In other cases (EDL, LNF, The Finns) there were formal ‘leaders’ but
who were ‘one of us’ (Chas, EDL, UK) and open to criticism and
challenge.
• In this sense there is significant continuity between activists in Radical
Right and Patriotic movements and those in other movements in our
study such as anti-racist or anti-capitalist movements.
Radical alternatives?
• ‘Democracy could be improved by: introducing ‘real’ or ‘direct’ democracy
(Jarkko, Tommi, Finns, Finland; Chas, EDL, UK); or through a concentration
of executive power (24, LNF, Latvia; Lisa, EDL, UK).
• Golden Dawn is the only organisation to fundamentally reject democracy. It
proposes instead a system of ‘meritocracy’ where political power belongs
to people of political virtue but implemented by a strong leader. It is
contrasted to democracy, which, it is claimed, is vulnerable to
‘demagogues, corruption, anarchy and mob rule’.
• ‘National socialism’ is proposed as an alternative to democratic societies by
three respondents on the fringe of the EDL (Infidels): ‘the successful nations
have never really been democratic’ (Nick, EDL, UK).
• Within the LNF there is a theosophic belief that democracy will be replaced
in the future by a higher state of ‘noocracy’ (‘mindocracy’).
• Monarchy is proposed as an alternative by individuals within Russian Run,
Ragged Association and the EDL.
Mainstream parties and politicians
Exclusion of populist/radical right
movements from the electoral process
is ineffective if they do not seek
election due to disillusionment with
mainstream politics.
Corrupt: ‘What came to my mind
immediately was corruption.’ (Tiago,
Portugal)
Mainstream parties and politicians are
characterised across all ethnographic
cases as:
 ‘dirty’, corrupt and self-serving’;
 deceitful and hypocritical;
 incompetent, useless or inactive;
 privileged, distant and removed
from real people.
These motifs echo exactly those found
in the follow up interviews among
MYPLACE survey respondents.
Useless: ‘It’s like talking and not getting
anywhere. You have to get out there
and say what you mean.’ (Johnny,
Denmark).
Deceitful: ‘[politicians] always hide
something from people’ (Denis, Latvia)
Removed: [there is no place in politics
for me] ‘Because […] my blood ain’t
blue [...] I think that’s something they
need to sort out ‘cause I reckon if you
could get somebody in there who’s been
to a council estate. […] I reckon a party
would go a long way, because they
know what sort of things [...] really
affect the poor. (Craig, UK)
‘Politics isn’t us’: disavowal
This conscious distancing from ‘the
political’ by young people who choose
to define their engagement as ‘not
politics’ suggests less a disillusionment
with politics than a disavowal of
‘politics’ as young activists understand
it:
CHRIS: Politics are bollocks. I don’t
know nothing about politics. I don’t
follow politics.
RAY: Ask me a question about politics,
and I’ll phone me granddad. (Ray,
Chris, EDL, UK)
But this belies a passion that signals
more than disengagement. Respondents
express anger that the ‘noble’ art of
politics has been betrayed by what
passes as politics today:
‘we don’t want to be dragged into
politics. Why? Because, politics is like, for
me, personally, the most noble thing to
do, and our politicians just destroyed
that, that sense of politics for me, they
dragged it through the mud’ (Zoho,
Torcida, Croatia)
This is often articulated by ascribing
their organisation an ‘apolitical’ or
politically neutral position:
I'm apolitical, I just don't care about
political parties […] I think it's all fairy
tales and hokum.’ (Paul Gascoigne,
Torcida, Croatia)
[…] this is what’s wrong with people like
Conservatives and Labour. […] They’re
just do-gooders. They act like they’re,
they’re so good to the public, and
everything’s for the people when nothing
is.’ (Tina, EDL, UK)
The politics of silencing: Cause not
solution
Governments and others are
said to be scared of speaking
the truth while those who
speak out are silenced by:
 Being labelled ‘racist’;
 Curtailment of freedom of
speech;
 Self censorship (‘keeping
your mouth shut’).
‘People are so scared of that word,
and being called a racist, aren’t they,
like when half the things people say
and do isn’t racist.’ (Peter, EDL, UK)
‘[…] that was the reason ‘without
censorship’ appeared [in the name of the
Facebook group] - so that everyone could
express their own views […] I wanted to
keep it public for as long as possible so
that everybody could see what we think
and we didn’t have to retreat to the forest
to discuss them in hushed voices [laughs]’
(Aleksi, MPL, Finland)
[‘[…] immigration policy […] is clearly an
issue where straight away Second World
War, Nazi talk, if you mention anything
like, I don’t know, asylum rights or
something like more control or whatever.
(Daniel, EG)
Political exclusion: An effective tool?
Attempts to work with(in) the system are perceived as being met with
silence or refusal to engage.
‘[…]when we were working in the Saeima, it was like everyone was
shouting that, see; these types shouldn’t be allowed to work in the
Saeima [...]’ (23, LNF, Latvia)
‘[...] they were elected, we had chose for that person to be elected and to
stand for our and they decided not to work, that really infuriated me. […]
It’s for us, us to put in there, to say like well this is who we believe in, do
you know what I mean? Not for them to say well we don’t, we don’t
really like them.’ (Craig, UK)
‘[…] it is not a normal party [the NPD]. But I think it is difficult to ban it.
[…] I think it is important that in a democracy, that other positions, which
we perhaps do not like, that they are able to exist. […] Banning them is
not the right answer because it will not change the political attitudes of
people.’ (Mona, EG)
Responses to silencing: ‘Telling it as it is’
• Mainstream politicians’ fear
of addressing difficult issues
is countered by attaching
particular value to ‘telling it
as it is’ by activists.
• Supporters of Golden Dawn
admire the party for
speaking ‘with clarity
without hypocrisy’ (Voula,
GD, Greece).
• EDL leaders were admired
because they ‘speak their
minds, they tell the truth. If
they think […] something’s
wrong then they will tell the
truth’. (Jason, EDL, UK)
Placard at EDL demo, Rotherham, 10
May 2014
Not far right but not far wrong’:
Problematising preventative policy
•
There are numerous examples of nuanced and sensitive educational materials and
practices. However, assumptions that we need different messages for ‘ordinary’
(ignorant) and ‘radical’ (racist) youth may ignore significant shifts in political terrain
that mean views might be more usefully viewed as on a continuum.
•
Preventative policy approaches seek to expose unrecognised racism and/or reeducate those identified as holding such views. One finding of the MYPLACE metaethnography of radical right and patriotic organisations, however, is that young
activists in these movements almost universally distance themselves from the ‘far
right’ and make explicit and empirically verifiable claims to being ‘not racist’.
•
These claims include that: ‘racists’ are not welcome and ‘kicked out’ of the
movement when encountered; ethnic (and other) minority members are welcome
within the movement; and the movement distances itself from ‘real’ racist parties
of the traditional far right.
•
It is important to recognise that members of these movements are highly sensitive
to and reflexive about external perceptions of their organisations and hold highly
ambiguous if not contradictory views that are impossible to classify simply. These
positions are illustrated in the MYPLACE documentary ‘Listening to the EDL’.
Conclusion
‘They [political opponents] don’t want to listen. They don’t
want to listen to our point of view. Then later on, they come
to you and say we don’t want you here. Why don’t you want
us here? Because you’re racist. No we aren’t racist. Yes you
are. Do you know what I mean? As soon as you start going
around trying to explain. You’re a racist. Boom. They don’t
have none of it. Get the camera. Take a picture of the racist.
Put it on the internet.’ (Chris, EDL, UK)
• Do policy tools that expose and condemn rather than listen,
understand and critically engage, fuel rather than prevent
youth receptivity to populist/radical right agendas?
• If they, do what alternatives are out there? And how can
MYPLACE research contribute to their development?