VolMUN II
February 17th- 19th, 2017
Disarmament and
International Security Topic
Guides
The Disarmament and National Security Committee
VOLMUN 2017
Delegates,
Welcome to the 2017 University of Tennessee Model United Nations! My co-chair and I
are very excited to have you in the Disarmament and National Security Committee (DISEC). As
your chairs, we want to make sure that your weekend runs smoothly as possible, so if you have
any questions please don’t hesitate to ask us. We understand that parliamentary procedure can get
heavy at times, but don’t let it hinder you from participating in debate! The best way to become an
experienced delegate (and hopefully win an award) is to participate, even if you make mistakes.
We chose these topics in hopes of generating great debate among the represented Member
States. Your position in DISEC means that you will be representing your Member State in matters
that concern global security and peace. You will address threats that States must control before it
escalates into a security crisis. Alongside the rest of the international community, you will
represent the interests and national security of your Member State to produce resolutions that
coincide with your position.
See you in committee!
Annalise Burkhart, Chair
Nash Binkley, Co-Chair
Committee Background
The Disarmament and Security Committee (DISEC) is the First Committee of the United
Nations General Assembly (GA). The General Assembly exercises representation from every
Member State, and serves as the main body for the organization. The General Assembly, which
DISEC falls under, was established in Chapter IV of the United Nations Charter. Article IV
states that “the General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the
maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament
and the regulation of armament.”
This specific committee addresses disarmament, global challenges, and threats to peace
that affect the international community. The first resolution of DISEC was produced in 1946 to
address the security implications of the discovery of atomic energy.
The committee aims to produce solutions to problems within the international security
regime. DISEC works with the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Geneva-based
Conference on Disarmament. The First Committee on Disarmament and International Security
convenes every year in October for a four to five-week session, taking place following the
General Assembly General Debate. All Member States of the United Nations are invited to
attend the session.
TOPIC A: Cybersecurity
The development of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has led to an
increase of borderless exchange and threat of a cyberattack. The underdeveloped response to this
issue is most crucial in the coming years due to the speed at which technology is being developed.
Cyberwarfare has become a major threat to the infrastructure of countries, and poses a great risk
to States with sensitive information that is vulnerable to a cyberattack. The international
community must reach a consensus on how to reduce the risks of a cyberattack, referring to
international law to prevent the destabilization of state relations in cyberspace.
States have been developing their ICTs for military purposes. The use of ICTs in conflicts
will become inevitable unless Member States establish guidelines for governments to follow. The
targeting of critical infrastructure and information systems of a State is the most harmful threat
regarding ICTs that a country could face. States are not just exclusively utilizing this ICT
technology; organized crime comprised of non-state actors has used ICTs to recruit, finance, train,
and carry out attacks. Their exercise of these systems must be controlled, or the security of the
international community could be at risk.
The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime was the first international treaty that addressed
the issue of cybersecurity. While it did not address current issues such as attacks on the critical
infrastructure and security apparatuses of a State, it did address copyright infringements, child
pornography, and minor violations of network security. The legislation aimed to set a common
ground for criminal policy that all States could adopt. States would have certain powers to pursue
prosecution of criminals that committed offenses in cyberspace. States would be able to intercept
and seize data depending on the crime. The procedural law outlined in the Budapest Convention
has continued to serve as an outline for the criminal investigations and proceedings of cybercrime.
In a 2011 study conducted by Norton security, threats to cyberspace increased dramatically
in the previous year, affecting 431 million adult victims globally, with at least a million people
become victims of cybercrime every day. Since then, technology has advanced considerably,
inevitably increasing this number. Currently, the United Nations has established a group of
Government Experts on the Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in
the Context of International Security (GGE), that convenes in New York to debate over the
application of international law to cyberspace. They also analyze how ICT infrastructure is used
by states and non-state actors. In 2013, the Law of Armed Conflict and the United Nations Charter
were recognized as legal framework that would be applied to state actions in cyberspace.
According to a study conducted by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, over 40
Member States have developed military capabilities through ICTs, and twelve of these Member
States have developed capabilities for offensive cyberwarfare. Thus, legislation must be broadened
to secure cyberspace and define what actions can be taken by States that are appropriate in regards
to international law. Cyberspace does fall under international law, and States must engage in
transparency and security building measures. The United Nations has tried to emphasize the
importance of international cooperation and information sharing to make ICT infrastructure more
secure. The United Nations must clarify international law and expand the legal framework to
encompass state behavior in cyberspace.
There are some factors that hinder the development of ICTs to counter cyberwarfare
attacks. Many developing countries lack the infrastructure to combat cyberwarfare attacks. This
lack of security in developing countries poses a global threat to cybersecurity, as these ICTs are
particularly vulnerable to attack. The measures taken to secure these systems must be congruent
with the values and principles of international law. It has been acknowledged that partnership
between developed and developing states must be established, including information sharing, to
prevent “safe havens” where criminals can utilize legal loopholes and weak infrastructure to
perpetrate cyberwarfare.
States with developed ICTs are able to carry out attacks on the control systems of critical
infrastructure of other states. With the lack of clarification on the rules that govern state behavior
in cyberspace, the risk of cyberattacks between states has increased. State behavior regarding
cyberwarfare and capabilities of performing cyberattacks must be clarified to prevent global
security threats.
The vulnerabilities to cybersecurity have been recognized by the United Nations.
Cyberwarfare is challenging to combat due to the speed of cybercrime and the difficulty in
attributing responsibility to a particular perpetrator. Proxies have been utilized to hinder the
process of determining the source of cyberattacks. States have been encouraged to assess their own
infrastructure to determine vulnerabilities, and develop personalized strategies and policies while
engaging in information sharing and partnering with developing nations to configure the best
practices for combatting cyberattacks. International cooperation on the issue must grow, with an
emphasis on the construction of a network of governments, private businesses, regional and subregional organizations in civil society.
Ban Ki-Moon appointed a group of 15 experts on the topic of cyberspace from the members
of the UN Security Council plus Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Canada, Egypt, Estonia, Germany,
India, Indonesia, and Japan. These experts were tasked with developing multilateral efforts to
address the threat of cyberwarfare. The need to establish “norms, rules, or principles of responsible
behavior of States” was emphasized. An objective that has been common in the majority of UN
legislation on the topic includes the identification of voluntary measures that States could take to
secure their ICT environment, and influence other surrounding States to adopt the same measures.
Voluntary, non-binding norms of ICT use would help reduce threats to international peace. Certain
States, including China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan have pushed for an international code of conduct on information security to be passed
though, which would not be voluntary.
In 2015, the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) released a report
entitled “Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of
International Security” (A/70/172). This report warns against the utilization of ICTs to attack
critical infrastructure or disrupt the information systems of emergency services. States should
monitor their territories to ensure that cyberattacks are not being carried out. States should also
monitor their cyberspace for any form of attack that could hinder the privacy and freedom of
expression of the people. States are urged to adhere to Human Rights Council resolutions 20/8 and
26/13 and General Assembly resolutions 68/167 and 69/166 which address the right to privacy in
the digital age with the guarantee of human rights even in cyberspace.
The first bilateral agreement on confidence building measures (urged by the United
Nations) in cyberspace was conducted by President Barack Obama of the United States and
President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation. The topics of information exchange and crisis
communication were addresses, and three types of cyber specific crisis communication channels
were created. A channel between computer emergency response teams (CERTs) to address
malware originating from each country, a channel between nuclear risk reduction centers to
identify cyberattacks that could destabilize national security, and a telephone hotline between the
White House and the Kremlin for the purpose of addressing cyberattacks were established. These
measures are examples of confidence building measures that States could establish to ensure
accountability in the global sphere over cyberspace.
TOPIC B: Combating arms trafficking to non-state actors/regulation of small arms
Small arms and light weapons have become the weapons of choice for insurgency groups,
terrorist, warlords, and crime syndicates in diverse regions of the world. Small arms are defined
by the United Nations as weapons designed for individual use, including inter alia, revolvers, selfloading pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, and light machine guns. Light weapons are
considered to be weapons designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew, though some
may be carried and used by a single person. Light weapons can include heavy machine guns, handheld under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank
guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rock systems, portable launchers
of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a caliber of less than 100 millimeters.
Countries that have been particularly affected by illicit arms trafficking include
Afghanistan, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Iraq. Illicit arms trade refers
to the trade of weapons that violates international and/or national laws. Small arms contribute to
the rise of armed crime and domestic violence in the developed world, as well as the developing
world. Unfortunately, more developing countries also face the utilization of illicit arms by terrorist
and insurgent groups. Civilians, notably including children, have suffered the worst consequences
from the illicit arms trade. Despite arms embargoes, the majority of illicit small arms trade feeds
non-state actors such as terrorist movements. The United Nations must focus on mechanisms to
halt the facilitation of such weapons, combatting the poor management that allows for the diversion
of weaponry to criminal organizations and insurgents.
The availability of light arms at subsidized prices increased following the end of the Cold
War, a product of the sales of large quantities of surplus stocks from former Soviet Union states.
It is currently estimated that 600 million small arms are in global circulation, stockpiles, and
private possession. Several million light weapons are produced every year in over 90 countries.
In 2001, over 140 Member States convened to produce a solution to the proliferation of
illicit small arms and light weapons. A program entitled “Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects” was created. Certain states
opposed future development with the program. China, Cuba, Israel, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia,
and the United States argued that previous commitments to regulate small arms should be further
developed, instead of pursuing new commitments. States have blocked developments of the
program, as they oppose a higher degree of international regulation on the grounds that it would
negatively impact the legal arms trade. They also argued that the program and future legislation
could conflict with the national legislation of States and their national security interests. The
program did commit to assessing applications for small arms exports in context to national laws
and regulations, in hopes of giving States a certain degree of autonomy under international law.
Yet the dialogue introduced by a select group of States was met with opposition from Member
States in Europe, Latin America, the Pacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
These countries argued that the current global standards on illicit arms trade were weak,
and must be intensified through new commitments and standards on small arms transfers,
ammunition, and the possession of small arms by civilians. Recognition of the link between licit
and illicit transfers of small arms and observance of the use of small arms and light weapons in the
context of human rights and international humanitarian law, public health, and sustainable
development has pushed other States to pursue a more comprehensive approach in combatting this
trade.
In May 2015, the Security Council convened to address the flow of small arms and light
weapons. The accessibility of small arms and light weapons in conflict zones has increased over
the years. Speakers during the session highlighted the need for national action, treaties to address
the issue, and international cooperation. Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein discussed the broader implications
for illicit arms trade, by saying that small arms “do not only make easy the taking and maiming of
lives, but also kill economies and the social bonds on which every kind of collective institution
and progress rely.” Access to these weapons has impacted the denial of education and health, the
illicit procurement of natural resources, violence against ethnic minorities, women, and children,
gang violence, and the rejection of legal structures.
Ban Ki-moon has raised awareness over the issue, introducing a report on the matter
(S/2015/289). This report outlines the procurement of small arms and light weapons to over 250
conflicts in the previous decade, causing more than 50,000 deaths each year and high levels of
displacement. More regulation on the illicit trade of weapons could help cut down conflict.
Weapons could be clearly identified, as guns could be licensed and marked. Ammunition could be
tracked or destroyed, and depots could be guarded, cleared, or secured. This would allow
authorities to not only confiscate illicit arms, but give them the opportunity to trace the weapons
back to the source to eliminate future risk.
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was passed and urged by Ban Ki-moon for universal
accession and genuine implementation. The treaty addresses a need for greater control over the
management of small arms, and a need for the United Nations to incorporate assistance for arms
management into their operations. This treaty enhances international cooperation and supports
mechanisms including registry and monitoring to stem the flow of illicit arms.
During debate on the issue, certain countries have stressed that authorities must be able to
differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate trade in weapons. The representative from the
United States also has emphasized the importance of protecting the rights of nations to purchase
small arms in order to defend their citizens in a lawful and appropriate measure. Steps must be
taken to prevent any of these arms to divert from their intended use, though. The representative
from the Russian Federation also voiced concerns with the ATT, arguing that it infringed on State
sovereignty by allocating power over arms control to the UN. He maintained that the control of
small arms and light weapons fell on States, not the sovereign body of the United Nations.
Yet almost all states have recognized the detrimental nature of arms being transferred
to non-state actors, such as militias or terrorist organizations. Non-state actors in Syria have
obtained shipments of small arms, escalating the violence already taking place over the country.
Some groups that receive arms operate under the guise of democratic opposition groups, but in
reality they utilize the weapons for nefarious reasons. The Security Council has been urged to
adopt a resolution that would prevent the attainment of small arms and light weapons by non-state
actors.
The implementation of the ATT provides a certain legal framework for arms transfers, but
it has only laid the foundation for the United Nations to target the acquisition of small arms and
light weapons by non-state actors. States that have ratified this legislation must ensure that their
exports do not violate any arms embargoes, fuel conflict by non-State actors, contribute to acts of
terrorism, or violate international law. Manufacturers of weapons must also brand their weaponry
with the name of their company, the country of manufacture, and the serial number. An alternative
to this would be a combination of geometric symbols and a numeric and/or alphanumeric code.
States have been urged to recognize the removal of such identification as a criminal offense.
TOPIC C: Demilitarization of the Arctic
While militaristic efforts by countries continue to expand and take new form, the United
Nations is committed to ensuring the complete disarmament of Antarctica. Along with military
presence, weapons testing as well as disposal are not tolerated by the United Nations below 60oS
latitude. Demilitarization policies were developed to ensure that Antarctica remains a place for
peace, international cooperation, and scientific research for the world community. Additional
environmental protections have been placed on Antarctica to further designate the continent as a
natural reserve entirely devoted to peace and science.
In 1959, the Antarctic Treaty was passed with twelve signatories all of which had active
presence within Antarctica. The treaty did not officially enter into force until 1961 and since then
has shaped international considerations concerning Antarctic action. Within the fourteen articles,
specific action was taken to prevent nuclear testing and disposal as well as military presence in
Antarctica in an attempt to ensure a neutral zone for international scientific collaboration. The
Antarctic Treaty is the framework on which other environmental treaties build and continues to be
the main source of policy on the topic of Antarctic disarmament.
As of 2015, there 53 states party to the treaty with 29 states having voting status. Seven of
these states claim portions of Antarctica as part of their national territory, but these claims are not
recognized by the Antarctic Treaty nor are they recognized by other member states. As there is no
standing government in Antarctica, all persons within the continent are citizens of some external
sovereignty meaning there is no Antarctic sovereignty. States party to the Antarctic Treaty enforce
the articles through national law applicable only to their citizens, which requires states to establish
military and environmental guidelines in accordance with the treaty. Military personnel are
permitted within the treaty, but only for the use of scientific research or other peaceful means.
As more military and environmental agreements were formed at the annual Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM), the collective body of these agreements came to be known
as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). This system has been specified since its creation on a variety
of topics due to over 200 agreements of which the ATS is comprised. One of the most recent and
noteworthy of these agreements is the 1998 Madrid Protocol which designates Antarctica as a
natural reserve and sets measures for all activities within the Antarctic Treaty area defined as
everything below the 60oS latitude. This designation is a key component of policy formation after
its passage as it standardizes the definition of Antarctica for all member states further ensuring
policy formed in relation to the continent take into account this definition.
Currently there are seven states that claim territory in Antarctica. For some states such as
Australia, these claims predate the Antarctic Treaty which presents a conflict for the state in which
it must choose between acting in full accordance with the treaty or acting in its own interest by
continuing to claim the territory. This choice is made trickier for states such as the United Kingdom
in which the area claimed as part of national territory overlaps with territory claimed by other
states. Since the United Kingdom has ratified the Antarctic Treaty which states in Article 4, “No
new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty shall be asserted while
the present Treaty is in force” the conflict of interests is worsened as other member states reject
all claims made by the UK as well as the six other states claiming territorial sovereignty.
Because it is up to each State to pass national laws in accordance with the ATS, regulations
regarding specific militaristic mobilization as well as environmental impact vary widely between
member states. The means of standardization of the most current information regarding military
presence and scientific research in the Antarctic is done through the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat.
This body collects, stores, and publishes information for member states to view as well as the
general public in an attempt to give states the most current information collected by state and nonstate actors. Due to the wide array of military and scientific presence in Antarctica, the Secretariat
plays a vital role in the collaboration of all active states as well as provides a common reference
for states to form policy regarding military mobilization.
Argentina:
Argentina holds a claim to 1,461,597 km2 (564,326 sq mi), of which
965,597 km2 (372,819 sq mi) is land. This claim is largely geographic as Argentine expansion
has reached into the Antarctic region since the early 20th century and islands such as the South
Orkney Islands. Permanent bases have been established by Argentina in the islands between the
state and Antarctica as well as on the Antarctic mainland. Argentina has ratified the Antarctic
Treaty, but has claims predating the treaty as well as exploration and scientific research
stretching over 50 years before the ATS.
Australia:
Australia’s claim dates back to a before the state was granted independence from the
United Kingdom. The territory was officially transferred over to Australian control in 1933 and
since then Australia has claimed 5,896,500 km2 (2,276,651 sq mi) as part of their national
sovereignty. Australia claims an exclusive economic zone in this region which is not in
accordance with the Antarctic Treaty.
Chile:
Chile’s claimed territory presents conflict as it overlaps both the UK and Argentina’s
claims. The area claimed is 1,250,257 km2 (482,727 sq mi) and several communes are
established in this area (4 permanent, 7 seasonal). The claims made by Chile are geographical as
well as historical in nature.
France:
French presence in Antarctica dates back to expeditions as early as 1840. France claims
an area of 432,000 km2 (166,796 sq mi) and is unrecognized by other states in this claim. Adélie
Land is the official title of this French-claimed territory.
New Zealand:
Ross Dependency is the name of the territory claimed by New Zealand in the Antarctic.
This claim encompasses 450,000 km2 (174,000 sq mi) and dates back to an 1841 expedition in
which the area was originally claimed for the UK and later transferred to New Zealand in 1947.
Norway:
Norway has a relatively recent claim to their territory commonly referred to as Queen
Maud Land. The 2,700,000 km2 (1,042,476 sq mi) territory was annexed in 1939 and there are
currently twelve research stations established in this area.
United Kingdom:
The British Antarctic Territory is one of the most recent claims happening in 1962 one
year after the Antarctic Treaty went into effect. The area claimed is 1,709,400 km2 (660,000 sq
mi) and overlaps with the area claimed by Chile.
Focus Questions
1. How do claims of national sovereignty present security risks for states that do not
recognize these claims? How do we mitigate these concerns?
2. Do Sates that have overlapping claims present a threat to the establishment of peace and
scientific sanctuary in Antarctica? How should we go about resolving these disputes?
3. Does each State creating standards on militaristic action give rise to a conflict of interest
in the States that view territory as part of their national sovereignty? Can stricter
international standards be passed to control these militarization practices?