Governance of the Great Lakes in North America and
Transboundary Governance Capacity
DRAFT paper
by Carolyn Johns
Department of Politics and Public Administration
Ryerson University
[email protected]
to be presented at the International Conference on Public Policy,
Grenoble, France, June 2013
First Draft June 5, 2013
Introduction
The Great Lakes – St.Lawrence is the largest freshwater basin on earth. It contains
some 20 percent of the worlds freshwater and is home to 104 million people, including
more than one-tenth of the population of the United States and one-quarter of the
population of Canada (US Environmental Protection Agency 2007). Approximately 40
percent of the 8,000-kilometre border between Canada and the US is water and
collectively, the five Great Lakes and their draining river systems span more than 1,200
kilometres, two provinces, eight US states, several First Nations and hundreds of cities
and communities (Grey 2005). The basin has played a major role in the economic
development of the US and Canada, and it continues to provide water for domestic
consumption, industry, transportation, power, recreation, and a host of other uses.
Some of the world's largest concentrations of industrial activity are located in the Great
Lakes region (US EPA 1995).
These local, national, transboundary, and international uses have increased and
changed over time (Sproule-Jones 2002a). Industrialization, urbanization and
globalization have all resulted in a range in the basin that cumulatively have had
negative impacts on surface water, wetlands, and groundwater. Despite their large size,
the Great Lakes are sensitive to the effects of a wide range of pollutants from all of
these various uses and sources.
Like many of the over 264 international watercourses in the world, the Great LakesSt.Lawrence has long-standing cooperative institutions designed for transboundary
management (Wolf et. al, 2003). As a valuable resource shared by Canada and the US
complex governance arrangements involving numerous governments and a variety of
uses and stakeholders have evolved over the past 100 years. However, despite the
existence of long-standing institutions and agreements between Canada and the US and
the claim that the transboundary institutions to manage this valuable natural resource
are a model for multilevel governance and management, evidence of progress is limited
and significant governance and implementation challenges remain. Pollution and
degradation remain significant environmental problems in the basin and it is clear from
both scientific and policy research to date that bilateral and transboundary efforts to
date are resulting in only limited success.
With the internationalization of water as an industry, an increasing number of nongovernmental organizations with a global agenda related to water, new challenges such
as climate change and fracking, enduring problems of toxic chemicals and invasive
species, and the increasing pollution related to the increase number of users and uses,
new pressures have emerged to improve transboundary governance in this region.
Like other transboundary waters, effective governance and policy implementation are
critical to the current and future sustainability of the region. Policy research to date on
the management of this important natural resource indicates that while governance
arrangements have led to some successful outcomes, efforts to protect these waters
1
from a growing number of uses remains a significant challenge. Although the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement signed in 2012 re-commits governments in Canada and
the US to restoring, protecting and improving the health of this valuable resource,
significant implementation challenges remain.
The central argument presented in this paper is that new theoretical and empirical
approaches are required to understand the capacity and limitations of existing policy
regimes in order for existing governance arrangements to produce better outcomes in
the future. Although transboundary policy research focused on the Great Lakes has
contributed to some understanding of the policy challenges in theory and practice,
there is a need for new approaches to transboundary water governance and research.
This paper focuses on the multi-scale and transboundary nature of Great Lakes
governance institutions, the diverse set of policy stakeholders and the need for new
directions in applied policy research, particularly at the subnational level, to improve
governance and policy implementation. In keeping with the growing literature on
transboundary water governance, this paper focuses on the need to integrate
institutional and actor-centered approaches to advance policy scholarship on
governance of water resources. Although there are significant theoretical and
methodological challenges, the central argument is that a new approach combining the
transboundary water governance, policy network and policy capacity literatures holds
some promise for evaluating implementation capacities that need to be taken into
consideration in the next generation of transboundary efforts.
The paper is divided into three main sections. Section I outlines the enduring
governance issues in the Great Lakes and provides an overview of transboundary
environmental governance in the past 30 years. It focuses on the policy research to
date and institutional explanations of why well-defined environmental policy goals have
not been achieved after governments on both sides of the border agreed to address
them and developed numerous institutional arrangements to improve water governance
in the region. Section II highlights the limitations of the traditional institutional and
comparative policy research approaches and outlines the need for a transboundary and
multilevel research approach that integrates the transboundary water governance,
policy network and policy capacity literatures to gain a better understanding of water
governance in the Great Lakes and other transboundary water systems. The final
section outlines the contours of a new research agenda using this approach and offers
some concluding thoughts on what this approach can offer to our understanding of
governance in the Great Lakes and other transboundary water systems.
The Great Lakes Governance Challenge
Transboundary management of the vast watersheds shared by Canada and the United
States began one hundred years ago with the signing of the Boundary Waters Treaty in
1909. The treaty established the International Joint Commission (IJC) as a unique
2
transboundary institution for the resolution of binational water disputes. The IJC,
headed by six commissioners (three appointed by the US president and three appointed
by the Canadian prime minister), acts on references by both governments to
cooperatively address disputes over the use of water resources. Initially, the emphasis
was placed on water quantity impacts of industrial uses, hydro uses, and shipping and
diversions in the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence seaway (Heinmiller 2007).
According to the IJC itself:
“No other institution has the IJC’s broad mandate or its successful track record in preventing and
resolving transboundary disputes around environmental and water-resource issues, and no other
institution provides the opportunities for officials from all levels of government, scientists,
stakeholders and interested citizens to work together on these issues. The Commission’s
flexibility and historic emphasis on consultation, joint fact-find, objectivity and independence, and
its ability to engage local governments and serve as a public forum are important assets in
meeting the challenges of the 21st century.” (IJC 1997)
The history of pollution in the Great Lakes and the policy responses by governments in
Canada and the US are both well documented (Calder 1975; Sproule Jones 2002; Botts
and Muldoon 2005; Johns 2009; Krantzberg and Manno 2010). As early as 1912, water
pollution issues were referred to the IJC for study. While some studies in the 1940s and
50s indicated concern about pollution impacts such as algae-mats and declining fish
species, it was not until the 1970s that scientific research culminated in a policy push
for basin-wide efforts focused on point source controls in the form of effluent limits for
industries and municipal sewage treatment systems. Joint fact-finding and diplomatic
capacity led by the IJC resulted in the signing of the first Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement (GLWQA) between Canada and the United States in 1972 - a non-binding,
good-faith agreement between the two levels of government (McCulloch and Muldoon
1999).
The agreement committed governments in Canada and the US to take action to clean
up the lakes. It was updated in 1978 to incorporate an ecosystem-based approach and
for the following 10 years governments in Canada and the US focused on developing
policies, programs and their bureaucratic capacity to implement the agreement.
However, by the late-1980s, an estimated 57 million tonnes of liquid waste were being
poured into the Great Lakes annually by its inhabitants, their industries, and their
municipalities and the degraded state of ecosystems was well known (Colborn et.al.
1990, 64). In 1987 the two national governments renewed the agreement with a more
focused approach on 43 Areas of Concern (AOCs) that had been identified by the IJC as
particularly problematic watersheds with serious pollution and governance challenges
(see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Map of Great Lakes Areas of Concern
Great Lakes Areas of Concern
Great Lakes
Basin Boundary
Thunder Bay
U
P
E
R
O
I
R
CA
NA
DA
US
A
ONTARIO
Torch Lake
Deer Lake
MICHIGAN
Manistique
River
A
N
Severn Sound
G
LAKE
H I
M
I
Waukegan
Harbor
L A K E
Milwaukee
Estuary
St. Lawrence River
HURON
Bay of Quinte
Collingwood
Port Hope
Harbour
DA
CANA
USA
MINNESOTA
Fox River/
Southern
Green Bay
Sheboygan
River
Spanish River Mouth
MICHIGAN
C
WISCONSIN
Menominee
River
St. Marys River
Hamilton
Harbour
White Lake
Saginaw River
Muskegon Lake and Bay
St. Clair River
Kalamazoo
Clinton River
River
Detroit River
Grand Calumet Rouge River
River
River Raisin
Maumee River
ILLINOIS
TARIO
LAKE ON
Metro Toronto
Niagara River
Wheatley
Harbour
L
A
K
E
E
R
I
E
DA
NA
CA
A
US
Cuyahoga River
INDIANA
OHIO
Oswego
River
Rochester Embayment
Eighteenmile Creek NEW
Buffalo
YORK
River
Presque Isle Bay
Ashtabula River
Black River
DA
A
S
USA
L
E
K
CA
NA
St. Louis River
and Bay
Nipigon Bay
Jackfish Bay
Peninsula
Harbour
PENNSYLVANIA
Legend
U.S. AOCs
Binational AOCs
Canadian AOCs
Areas of Concern in
recovery stage
Delisted Canadian AOCs
UPDATED: FEBRUARY 15, 2013
Delisted U. S. AOCs
Source: US. EPA. 2013.http://epa.gov/greatlakes/aoc/images/aoc-glbasin-map-20130215.pdf
The AOCs highlighted various types of water pollution—heavy metals, pathogens,
contaminated sediments, and the toxic chemicals in the basin—that were impairing
various ecosystem uses, such as the health and reproduction of various species,
including fish populations; wildlife habitat; human health; and other human uses. Most
AOCs were located entirely within the United States, some located entirely within
Canada, and others shared by both countries. In each AOC multi-level and multistakeholder governance institutions were established to develop and implement
Remedial Action Plans (RAPs) to clean up and improve the human and ecological uses
in these watersheds. Although signatories to the GLWQA were the federal governments
in Canada and the US, the eight US states and the Canadian province of Ontario had
central roles in preparing and implementing RAPs, complemented by input and
expertise from other federal agencies as well as local governments, industries,
environmental groups and individual citizens (U.S. EPA 2007).The IJC’s authority was
not expanded beyond its investigative role under the GLWQA. It was, in effect, given a
“standing reference” and “permanent watchdog role” in the Great Lakes (Schwartz
2005) and the AOC approach gradually resulted in a shift in focus from IJC-level efforts
to a more decentralized approach related to RAPs.
4
At the micro level, watersheds became the natural boundaries around which networks
of state and societal stakeholders come together to address environmental problems in
the 43 AOCs. The involvement of stakeholders from all levels of government, key
government agencies and actors and key societal organizations and actors are well
documented (Sproule-Jones 2002a and 2002b; Botts and Muldoon 2005; Johns 2009;
Krantzberg and Manno 2010; Greitens et.al. 2011). Non-government actors include local
citizens, scientists, industrial and agricultural users, local environmental groups, water
system professionals, academics and scientists.
Virtually all industries and agricultural operations use water and are important
stakeholders in Great Lakes water management. There are a number of industry
associations such as the Council of Great Lakes Industries Association and other
industry-specific groups associated with shipping ports, fishing and other commercial
uses on the lakes. Although the early 1990s saw some increased activity by industry
associations, particularly related to the toxic chemicals and the debate about “virtual
elimination,” in many AOCs, industries were not active participants (Sproule-Jones
2002). Despite the IJC’s efforts, the GLWQA has been characterized by a “lack of
industry attention reflecting the sector’s limited participation in the Great Lakes
community in the first two decades of the agreement’s history” (Botts and Muldoon
2005: 101) and by the late 1990s, the general sense of community between
researchers and stakeholder groups in the Great Lakes began to decline (Botts and
Muldoon 2005, 161).
At the same time, there were clearly some success stories such as reductions in acid
rain and the return of species on the brink of extinction. The presence of some of the
most toxic chemicals, including PCBs and dioxins, dropped because of point source
controls (Botts and Muldoon 2005, 137) and some habitat restoration and protection
efforts improved the nearshore and water quality. However, by this time, the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and state governments began to scientifically
document that non-point sources constituted the major causes of water pollution in
many watersheds (US EPA 1995a) and a shift away from point source regulatory
instruments to market-based instruments became evident (Johns 2000). Policy goals of
‘virtual elimination’ in the Great Lakes Binational Toxics Strategy in 1997 existed yet
hundreds of thousands of tons of chemicals continued to be released in the Great Lakes
and concerns remained about contaminants, beach closings and fish consumption
(GLIN 2006).
By the end of the 1990s the Great Lakes fell off the agenda of governments in Canada
and the US and a period of public indifference was evident (Botts and Muldoon 2005).
Even significant water pollution events, such as those in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 1993,
and Walkerton, Ontario, in 2000, where people died from drinking water pollution did
not generate a public or policy response in connection with broader water quality issues
in the Great Lakes (Johns 2009). The IJC continued to identify issues that were
becoming more pressing in the 21st century such as water infrastructure; chemical use
5
and release, habitat loss and biological diversity, exotic and invasive species, waste
management, and impacts of climate change (IJC 1997). By the early years of the 21st
Century, over two-thirds of the basin’s original wetlands had been lost, thousands of
miles of rivers impaired, and miles of shoreline degraded (GLU 2007). Nonetheless,
transboundary and domestic efforts waned.
The lack of transboundary policy effort and the impact and concern surrounding
domestic policy effort was particularly evident in the slow progress cleaning up the most
polluted sites on the Great Lakes (Sproule-Jones 2002b). Some 25 years after various
policy initiatives, only five AOCs have been delisted, and two are now designated as
areas in recovery (see Figure 1). The progress in the remaining AOCs and many other
watersheds in the Great Lakes remains slow—and pollution continues. An increasing
number and imbalance of water uses continue to have negative impacts on water
quality and many of the indicators of ecological health are mixed, uncertain or
deteriorating (Solec 2007, IJC 2011). Pollution continues to increase along with
population growth and the increasing uses of water in the basin. Many new and reemerging issues have surfaced in the Great Lakes, including new evidence of
pharmaceutical chemicals; the enduring problem of the importation of invasive species
(Sanders and Stoett 2006); the plateaued progress in addressing the “dead zone” in
Lake Erie (US EPA 2002) and increasing concern about climate change and water levels.
Some 40 years after the first GLWQA, and the implementation of various policy
initiatives in the US and Canada, basic water quality objectives of swimmable, drinkable,
fishable waters have not been met.
It wasn’t until the mid-2000s that the Great Lakes were placed back on the policy
agenda. The US Great Lakes Legacy Act, the IJC’s 100th anniversary and the Great
Lakes Restoration Initiative introduced after the election of President Obama
invested $500 million (2010-14) and created some momentum for state and societal
actors to re-engage in Great Lakes efforts. In 2009 it was announced by U.S. Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton and Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lawrence Cannon that
the US and Canada would renegotiate the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement last
signed in 1987. After three years of renegotiation the new GLWQA was signed in 2012
renewing interest in policy efforts and policy research.
Policy Research To Date and the Need for a New Approach
As outlined in the section above, policy research has made significant contributions to
our knowledge about transboundary water governance in the Great Lakes. The policy
literature has clearly outlined that despite the fact that the Great Lakes constitute a
shared basin with transboundary governance institutions, two very distinct domestic
policy regimes have evolved to address water pollution and one cannot fully assess the
policy response at the transboundary level without also understanding the policy
regimes at the national and subnational levels in Canada and the United States.
6
Comparative research indicates that the two countries have distinct approaches and
different ‘policy styles’ when it comes to environmental policy more broadly (Hoberg
1992, Howlett 1994). Policy research also indicates that comparatively, water policy in
the US federal system has been more centralized and concerted (Hoberg 1993; Johns
2000; Montpetit 2002; Johns 2009, 2010). Although both policy regimes have been
influenced by the economic cycles and political mandates of different governments,
efforts and capacity in the US in terms of legislation and programs have been
comparatively high. US governments have exerted more effort and developed
substantial capacity in the area of scientific capacity, measurement and reporting on
water quality. This policy and technical expertise from the U.S. EPA is shared and
collaborative with subnational governments in the intergovernmental context. Some
attribute this to more adversarial policymaking focused on best-available technologies
and reporting and a demand for scientific information by non-governmental actors
(Bocking 2006).
In Canada, the federal government, while officially adopting similar goals for the Great
Lakes, does not have any “hard law”’ devoted to articulating goals and resources
related to transboundary efforts and the GLWQA. Federal involvement has been
comparatively low in the past two decades until the recent renegotiation of the GLWQA.
Although science has also been central to Environment Canada’s role in the Great
Lakes, its policy and technical capacity is more limited, the federal government’s
capacity to report on the state of waters in Canada has declined and there is less
intergovernmental collaboration on science and policy. The sustained engagement and
capacity of Canadian environmental groups in Great Lakes efforts is also comparatively
low (Botts and Muldoon 2005) making it difficult for environmental organizations to
form effective cross-border alliances (Alper 1997).
In addition to analyzing how economic and political asymmetries relate to Great Lakes
policies and outcomes, policy scholarship has focused on evaluating the central role of
institutions, international “soft” law, legislation in both jurisdictions, federalism and
policy implementation arrangements in both countries as key factors in explaining how
the state of domestic water policy partially explains transboundary outcomes and
environmental performance in the Great Lakes (Hoberg 1992; Hartig and Zarrell 1992;
Rabe and Zimmerman 1995; Rabe 1997, 1999; Sproule-Jones 2002a, 2002b; Botts and
Muldoon 2005; Hill 2006; Heinmiller 2007; Johns 2002, 2009, 2010). This institutional
approach is mirrored in the environmental law scholarship that focuses on shared
constitutional jurisdiction in both countries, asymmetrical responsibility, decentralization
of environmental policy in the past two decades, the role of subnational and local
governments (Valiante 2003, 2007) and how national and subnational efforts relate to
international levels (Lovecraft 2007; Friedman and Foster 2011).
Overall, although capacity and efforts are comparatively higher in the US than in
Canada, most Great Lakes watersheds in the United States are still not meeting water
quality objectives (US, EPA 2006b) and progress on both sides of the border in delisting
7
AOCs and addressing water pollution has been slow. An IJC report focusing on a 25
years assessment of scientific and ecosystem indicators highlights some successes,
many outstanding challenges and the absence of governance indicators highlights that
findings from policy research have not been front and centre in evaluations of progress
in the basin (IJC 2011). Although policy research has not clearly identified governance
indicators, policy research to date does indicate that a number of factors are important
in explaining the enduring challenges in the Great Lakes.
One line of research related to ‘vested interests’, argues that historical users with
embedded priority in law and policy make altering the rules of the game a fundamental
problem. Various “rules” have evolved over time related to evolving uses in the basin.
Different patterns of rules exist for commercial fishing, shipping and hydro-electric
generation with ‘nests of rules for different resource uses’ but with no hierarchy of rules
(Sproule-Jones 2008). There are many users of water in the Great Lakes that are not
legally interdependent and despite multi-stakeholder governance arrangements there is
little incentive for various users to take cumulative impacts into account with little
incentive to take other uses and users into account, particularly outside their perceived
borders (Sproule-Jones 2002b and 2008). Explicit efforts to induce collaborations of
diverse interests through the AOC and RAP process are rarely successful and across
national boundaries this problem can be exacerbated (Sproule Jones 2002b, 2008).
Extending this line of policy research are those who focus on the lack of engagement of
non-government organizations, industry and the general public. In the past few
decades there have been growing opportunities for public engagement in the
implementation of environmental policies at the international, national and local levels
particularly related to increasing accountability of the two federal governments in the
Great Lakes (Hall 2007). In theory this has helped create a more informed and engaged
citizenry and an increased role for public engagement on both sides of the border, but
empirical research indicates this engagement has been limited. Research on AOCs and
RAPs indicates local government and citizen engagement in efforts to develop RAPs but
far less in implementation, monitoring and accountability efforts (Hartig and Zarrell
1992; Davey et al. 1999; Sproule-Jones 2002b). Research shows there has also been a
greater percentage of subnational and local government participation in AOCs that
became delisted; and engagement varies by country with 78.5% of stakeholders in
Canada AOCs being government actors while only 49% in US AOCs (Greitens et al.
2011). Although there is evidence that the IJC’s review of the GLWQA re-engaged both
state and societal stakeholders (Botts and Muldoon 2005), the three year re-negotiation
of the agreement has been criticized for the lack of authentic engagement of
stakeholders (Krantzberg 2011).
Reflecting the reality that both state and non-state actors are central to transboundary
governance in the Great Lakes, most policy research now includes a focus on both state
and societal actors and their role in transboundary water governance. The focus is now
more explicitly on coordination issues and the ‘implementation deficit’ that exists
8
despite the existence of numerous institutions with policy mandates in the Great Lakes
(McClaughlin and Krantzberg 2011). Policy research indicates leadership and policy
capacity at the subnational level also partially explains the plateauing and declining
levels of progress in water policy and Great Lakes progress in the past two decades
(Rabe 1999; Botts and Muldoon 2005; Johns 2009 and 2010), despite evidence that
subnational actors are increasingly engaged in transboundary environmental policy
networks and cross-border regional activities (LePreste and Stoett 2006; Rabe and
Brooks 2010; Friedman 2011).
In summary, policy research to date clearly highlights the shortcomings of existing
governance arrangements and the institutional challenges in the basin. Given that a
central focus currently is on the ability to implement the new GLWQA and achieve
better results than the last 40 years, there is a new emphasis on transboundary
governance capacity. The new 2012 GLWQA reflects a binational consensus that
existing institutions are sufficient and that the focus needs to be on improving the
performance of existing transboundary and watershed-based institutions to improve
outcomes. The focus is on making the existing institutions at all levels work better and
increasing stakeholder and public engagement as policy makers realize that
government’s alone cannot collectively manage this complex system.
Although the 2012 GLWQA has incorporated new policy priorities and foci in its
Annexes, the focus on new approaches to governance are noticeably absent. The focus
on AOCs and watersheds remains but there is no evidence that the approach
incorporates findings from policy research to date that highlight shortcomings of
existing institutional arrangements. While the document is sprinkled with language of
partnerships, community engagement and public participation, the policy regime
remains state-centred and does not focus on the need to seriously examine changing
the behaviour of government decision makers, citizens and vested interests in the
region.
A new approach requires a shift towards more fundamental rebalancing of water uses
in the basin in which other stakeholders, for example industries and communities,
would be required to change their behavior significantly. Most agree on the
transboundary priorities for the basin but shy away from the serious rebalancing of uses
and more fundamental governance and institutional reform required to meet these
challenges (Sproule-Jones, Johns, Heinmiller 2008).
Policy research to date has clearly demonstrated the significance of institutional theory
and the focus on the role of institutions, both formal (international law and agreements,
domestic laws, regulations, and political and bureaucratic organizations) and informal
(norms, relationships and networks between individuals) (Ingraham et al. 2008), and
how they influence the behaviour of actors within and beyond them (Peters 2005, 165).
Using this approach we have gained considerable knowledge about the limitations of
existing institutional arrangements. However in order to move beyond the focus on
9
institutional arrangements at the national levels and focus on capacities at multiple
levels there is a need to look to new institutional theories, pose new research questions
and use new applied policy research approaches to improve our understanding of
transboundary water governance and improve outcomes related to implementation of
the new GLWQA and other policies.
While the policy and organizational complexity makes the overall structure and
functioning of Great Lakes governance difficult to fully comprehend (Francis 1987;
Caldwell 1994), new research approaches, tools and technologies related to
transboundary water governance, network analysis and policy capacity make this kind
of research more feasible. The next section of this paper reviews three bodies of
literature that together offer a new approach to policy research and the potential to
gain a deeper understanding of implementation and governance in transboundary water
resource management.
Transboundary Water Governance
The interdisciplinary literature on transboundary water governance has evolved over the
past few decades and includes contributions from the fields of international relations,
law, public policy, economics, environmental studies and geography. A central focus has
been on conflict and cooperation but also a need to move beyond this research foci
(Zeitoun 2008, 2011) and integrate various disciplinary approaches. For some time
analysts of these complex governance systems have argued that an integrated
approach that links social and ecological systems at various scales is required for sound
governance of these complex systems (Berkes and Folke 1998; Paehlke 2001; Young
2002). There is general agreement in this literature and the literature on integrated
water resource management (IWRM) that transboundary water governance is beyond
the ability of individual nation-states, international organizations, local communities and
individuals to solve alone and that collective decision-making and cooperative action are
required.
Water resource management research has revealed that although many water systems
have features of common pool resources, the collective use of water resources is far
from a free-for-all and a wide range of policies and institutions have evolved to
collectively govern water resources in different regions, including local self-governing
arrangements that have enjoyed some success (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994;
Sproule-Jones 2002a). However, in multiple-use, multiple-scale contexts, such as large,
transboundary basins, the limitations of more local, multiple use governance
arrangements are evident (Young 2002; Sproule-Jones 2002b). Consequently, there is a
consensus in this literature that policy-makers and policy researchers must move
beyond a focus on only one scale, policy area or resource use and move instead toward
a multilevel, networked model that focuses on engaging networks of state and societal
stakeholders and addresses the inherent transboundary features of many water issues
(Berkes and Folke 1998; Blatter and Ingram 2001; Berkes 2002; Finger, Tamiotti, and
10
Allouche 2006).
The challenges that transboundary water governance presents and the need for new
approaches is also reflected in the practitioner literature and publications by
international organizations. According to the United Nations, transboundary water
governance in the 21st century is confronted by two key challenges: 1) the ability to
move away from “inward-looking national strategies and unilateral action to shared
strategies for multi-lateral cooperation” and, 2) “to put human development at the
center of transboundary cooperation and governance” (UNDP 2006, 204). The OECD
also calls for a more ‘systemic’ approach to water policy to overcome critical multilevel
governance challenges and states that “a multilevel approach integrating international,
national and local actors can help diagnose inherent governance challenges” (OECD
2011, 18) and that “further research should study ‘micro-governance’ to identify good
local practices for managing commons (OECD 2011, 28). To address this complexity the
OECD developed a framework that focuses on analyzing seven key implementation
seven gaps.
Although there is recognition that a multilevel, multi-actor and more networked
approach is the only way to conceptualize and address transboundary water resource
issues in the future (Blatter and Ingram 2001), policy research remains primarily
focused on comparative analysis of case studies of various transboundary watersheds
(Finger, Tamiotti, and Allouche 2006) and successes and challenges in various parts of
the world.
Bressers and Lulof (2010) argue that transboundary water governance requires
cooperation through ‘boundary spanning’ strategies. They emphasize the employment
of social capital and administrative and political alliance through cross-boundary
collaboration. Boundary spanning that encompasses time, scale, and various sectors
and domains is described. They argue in-depth analysis is required to interweave
actors’ characteristics and contextual factors to understand both micro and macro-level
factors in boundary-spanning processes. Many strategies are suggested by the authors,
such as widening actor participation, encouraging new cognitions, and a greater level of
trust, influencing actor motivations, synergizing resources, acknowledging actor
perceptions, and contributions, grappling with cultural differences and language
barriers, and facilitating constructive collaboration procedures.
Earle, Jagerskog and Ojendal (2010) include various analytical approaches to
transboundary water management (TWM) in their edited book with a focus on the
water resource community (government, private sector and civil society as
implementers) along with water researchers (international and domestic) and politicians
using a cogs metaphor and argue that analysis of transboundary water management
needs to include a focus on scale, fragmentation, complexity and interests. They also
argue that there is a limit to what the water resources community can achieve in the
absence of political will and that it becomes difficult for functional cooperation at this
11
level to become more institutionalized as it is often at this level where it is driven by
and dependent on specific individuals (Earle, Jagerskog and Ojendal 2010, 4). There
work clearly calls for an emphasis on governance arrangements, actors and resources.
Other contributors to the Earle et.al. collection note that “political will and financial
resources are essential but not sufficient…and effective transboundary water
management requires developing capacities of both individual managers and the
institutions they comprise” (Salame and van der Zaag 2010, 171-2). In keeping with
this approach, there is also a call for more stakeholder engagement and development of
education systems that focus on improving communication across borders (Kranz and
Mostert 2010). This is part of a broader call to focus on international and domestic nonstate actors and ‘hybrid actors’ in transboundary water governance research
(Suhardiman and Giordano 2012).
There is also a call in this literature for the ‘need to develop more robust indicators of
transboundary cooperation’ (Ojendal, Earle and Jagerskog 2010, 247) and move
towards more ‘process-focused’ research on transboundary governance (Suhardiman
and Giordano 2012). The Asia Water Governance Index that includes 20 indicators and
is based on a survey of water experts is another model (Araral and Yu 2009).
Researches using these various approaches have done a good job of documenting and
analyzing various institutional arrangements; various forms of hard and soft law at the
transboundary and domestic levels; comparative asymmetries in effort, and the
collective action challenges at various levels of analysis. Yet there remains a need to
move beyond descriptive case studies and summaries of lessons learned towards
conceptual frameworks that provide different foundations for empirical research. Given
that the interdisciplinary literature on transboundary water governance engages a wide
range of scholars and practitioners trying move towards the development of more
complex ways of understanding the inherent complexity of transboundary water
systems, this is admittedly challenging.
As a transboundary water resource, the Great Lakes region provides an excellent
laboratory to examine these questions and contribute to knowledge related to designing
governance approaches that reflect the complexity of linked economic, social and
ecological systems (McLaughlin and Krantzberg 2011). The challenge is to move beyond
the Great Lakes as just one more case in which institutional arrangements are
documented and described and contribute to empirical research on the complex set of
institutions and actors involved in governance of this water resource at various scales.
Combining institutional and actor-centred approaches and focusing on policy networks
and policy capacity in transboundary water systems is one approach that offers
potential new insights.
What Policy Network Theory and Network Analysis has to Offer
12
It is clear in the transboundary water governance literature that multi-level, multi-actor
analytical approaches are central to improving understanding and outcomes in these
complex systems. Like other transboundary water systems, the Great Lakes contain
multiple state and societal actors that are highly dependent on subnational actors and
government-led networks for implementation (Sproule-Jones 2002a and 2002b; Botts
and Muldoon 2005; Johns and Sproule-Jones 2009; Johns 2010; Gretiens et.al. 2011).
Policy network theory has proven to be very useful for understanding and potentially
improving environmental and water policy outcomes in many jurisdictions (Bressers,
O’Toole and Richardson 1995; Berkes and Folke 1998; Blatter and Ingram 2001; Finger,
Tamiotti, and Allouche 2006; Bressers and Lulofs 2010). In the Great Lakes there is
some evidence that subnational and regional cross-border environmental linkages and
networks have become more numerous, dense and regionally concentrated over time,
but there is no evidence they are more productive in terms of implementation and
policy outcomes (Vannijnatten 2006; Friedman 2011). One central question that a
combination of transboundary water resource management, network analysis and policy
capacity approaches combined can focus on is - why.
Although there are numerous definitions of policy networks in the public policy and
public administration literature, O’Toole’s definition of policy networks as multi-actor,
multi-organizational arrangements of interdependence who share authority, knowledge
and resources is the most widely cited (O’Toole 2007). Networks are conceptualized as
“legally autonomous organizations that work together to achieve not only their own
goals but also a collective goal” (Provan and Kenis 2007, 231). Both of these definitions
highlight that network analysts include an emphasis on individual relationships between
policy actors within structured organizational relationships that are both formal and
informal and the structures of the networks are thought to influence both the policy
process and policy outcomes (Marsh and Rhodes 1992).
For many analysts, policy networks are conceptualized broadly as institutional
arrangements under new institutionalism. Depending on the researcher they can be
conceptualized as rules constraining the actions of participating actors (Blom-Hansen
1997, 669) or more sociological variants of institutionalism that emphasize group and
organizational interactions of state and non-state actors (Peters 1999). Building on the
common foundation that ‘institutions serve as the chief interface between state and
society’ (Painter and Pierre 2005, 9), the “network institutionalism” approach is based
on the assumption that network characteristics and capacities have causes and
consequences for policy action, inaction and outcomes (Ansell 2006).
This approach necessitates description in the early stages of the research
(conceptualizing, mapping and analyzing relationships) and then focusing on
explanation of policy consequences (Ansell 2006). In keeping with network theory there
are three empirical agendas: (1) determine what networks exist, (2) examine the
historical dimension of network formation and development, and (3) explore the array
13
of networks in a broadly comparative perspective (O’Toole 1997, 48). Most of this
research focuses on characteristics of networks in order to better understand why some
networks perform well and others do not and what consequences the structural form of
a network has for what the network can achieve (Kenis and Provan 2009; Friedman and
Foster 2011). In federal countries like Canada and the US, they are associate with
collaborative federalism (Cameron and Simeon 2002), intergovernmental networks
(Agranoff and McGuire 2003), “networked federalism” (Stein 2006) and attempts to
move toward “whole network analysis” (Provan, Fish and Sydow 2007, 482).
The public policy literature for some time as distinguished a wide variety of networks
and typologies using state-centred/societal-centred continuum; democratic features;
power and resource asymmetries and other distinguishing features (Coleman and
Skogstad 1990; Atkinson and Coleman 1989). The underlying premise of the policy
network approach is that networks matter and that it is in these decentralized
interactions between state and societal actors that policy making and implementation
unfolds (Skogstad 2005). While early network theory was informed by interorganizational theory, tended to focus on formal institutional arrangements and
neglected interpersonal relations (Borzel 2011, 58), network approaches now included
informal relations as well.
Isett et.al. makes a useful distinction between policy networks for policy making,
collaborative networks that are focused on service provision and governance networks
defined as “entities that fuse collaborative public goods and service provision … and
focus on the coordination of organizations towards a common goal rather than the
policies or products that networks actually produce” (Isett et.al. 2011, i158). These
authors note that the term ‘network’ is used in different ways by public policy and
public administration scholars. For public administration the focus on power is less front
and centre and the focus is more on policy implementation, program implementation
and service delivery and effectiveness of outcomes (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjam 1997;
O’Toole 1997; Mandell 2001; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Milward and Provan 2003;
Goldsmith and Eggers 2004).
Others outline that conceptually the policy network literature can be divided further into
two strands: one focuses on networks as interpersonal relationships and the other as
structural linkages between state and non-state actors (Skogstad 2005, 2). A challenge
is to determine if it is the attributes of network itself or of the actors in the network that
are the primary focus. Some recognition must be given to the agency of the individual
actors in the network yet also the network structure itself and the contextual factors
related to the interaction (Skogstad 2005). Yet, there is clearly interplay between
structure and agency and thus a need to “integrate micro-level explanations of human
behaviour with macro level accounts of the state and political economy” (Skogstad
2005, 7). Rhodes more recent scholarship on networks has also incorporated an
emphasis on ideas, by including an analysis of individuals and their ideas and beliefs
(Rhodes 2007) thus focusing on both structure and agency.
14
Critics have highlighted that this interplay however seriously limits a network approach
and analysis (Dowding 1995). Although critics have highlighted that ‘the literature is
concerned mainly with the question of whether collaboration exists and on what scale,
and not with whether the collaboration is productive’ (Bardach 1998, 23) the limitations
of network analysis are now recognized. Empirical analysis, whether focused on
description or explanation has evolved and limitations are acknowledged by those
whose deploy a ‘network institutionalism’ approach to examine complex governance
systems.
There are also some similarities with the broader network analysis approach to Ostrom’s
analysis of ‘action-situations’ as the core unit of analysis in the institutional analysis and
design framework. Defined as “the framework in which individuals (acting on their owns
or as agents of organizations) observe information, select actions, engage in patters
and interaction and realize outcomes from their interaction” (McGinnis 2011, 173).
Although the focus is more on the individual actor’s preferences and choice options,
several operational level ‘action-situations’ operate simultaneously and may be affected
by multiple processes at the collective or constitutional levels (McGinnis 2011, 53).
These inter-related action-situations have some things in common with network
analysis, although in the institutional analysis and development framework, the focus is
more on how rules and individual choice affect outcomes than how individual
relationships affect outcomes. The cross-scale social-ecological systems (SES) approach
is concerned with ‘nestedness’, and governance activities organized at multiple levels
(Ostrom 1990). It is also concerned with ‘institutional interplay’ (Young 2002, SprouleJones et.al. 2008) and ‘cross-scale linkages’ (Berkes 2002; Heikkila, Schlarger and David
2011). Using Ostrom’s eight design principles (Ostrom 1990, 90) is one way of
analyzing such linkages. Network analysis is another way.
Different theoretical taking off points can therefore lead to different units of analysis.
Like the IAD approach, network analysis places emphasis on the shape and form of
institutions as central to building or redesigning institutions, enhancing their capacity,
changing individual behaviours and improving outcomes. Like the action-situation and
SES approaches, in moving from theory to empirical research network boundary
specification is perhaps one of the most challenging methodological dilemmas.
Generally in network theory and analysis the focus can be on whole networks or
substructures, yet there are still few studies which include an analysis of the whole in
relationship to its parts (Isett et.al. 2011, i161-2) and there is a need for comparative
research on formal and informal networks and the range of functions that networks
fulfil (Isett et.2011, i162)
Nonetheless, both the public policy and public administration literatures have come to
reflect the reality that governments have become increasingly dependent on
cooperation and joint resource mobilization of policy actors outside their hierarchical
control (Borzel 2011, 51) and when combined with the governance approach (and
network analysis methods) it is not the actors in the network that are the main unit of
15
analysis but the patterns of linkages and interactions between them that are of interest
(Borzel 2011, 51). Government remains central. The public policy research in particular
conceive of networks as power relationships as networks operate in the shadow of
hierarchy cast by governments (Scharpf 1994; 38-40 and Rhodes 2007, 1253) as
governments past and present set the rules of the game (Ostrom 1990).
The network analysis approach also offers important empirical findings to build on.
Those analysts who focus on the inter-organizational level highlight the challenges of
policy networks within states, not to mention the added challenges in transnational
governance networks. Given that networks involve public sector, private sector and
non-profit sector organizations there is a ‘multisectoral’ challenge as well (Herranz
2008). And just as there are differences between various government organizations and
actors, there is heterogeneity among non-profit organizations (Boris and Steuerle 1999;
Frumkin 2002; Herranz 2008) and private sector actors.
In addition to these challenges, specification of the unit of analysis is somewhat
dynamic as the network may not be known at the time research is initiated. Sampling
individuals and collecting data are challenging and clearly must involve preliminary
research about the network’s evolution and composition. While using individual
perceptions as one source of defining network membership, structure, function and
performance, combining surveys with interviews and other sources is common. Doing
network research over time is also very helpful to analyze network members and how a
given network changes over time thus capturing the more dynamic elements of
networks.
For purposes of this paper, the Great Lakes offers a transboundary water system in
which both the whole governance network or networks related to various issues can be
examined. Like other transboundary systems, both the transboundary policy network in
the Great Lakes basin and the substructures or networks organized around various
policy issues or sectors are levels of analysis on which governance regimes currently
exist. These transnational policy networks are associated with the delegation of
authority to supranational institutions but co-exist with domestic policy networks. The
focus when combined with the transboundary water governance literature is on
identifying a basin wide network and other transboundary networks as a starting point.
This approach allows for an extension of the policy network literature that has taken the
call for more research on multi-level governance and transnational arenas (Skostad
2005) more seriously and addresses the need for more comparative research
(Isett.el.al. 2011).
In keeping with the evolution of policy network scholarship the focus is on both formal
and informal networks to further our understanding of governance regimes,
implementation arrangements and vested interests. Including This informal networks as
“emergent structures used for information sharing, capacity building, problem solving
and service delivery” (Provan and Milward 2001, Agranoff 2007; Isett et.al. 2011),
16
recognizes that there is some tendency for informal networks to formalize over time
which increases the capacity of the network and moves it beyond personal relationships
(Imperial 2005).
When combined with research on policy capacity, a network analysis approach has
more value in understanding the slow progress on environmental outcomes, the role of
vested interests and the need to better understand and possibly redesign institutions to
improve outcomes. To date, “it is unclear whether the mutual resource dependency of
government and non-government actors actually leads to a net increase in the problemsolving capacity of governments” (Borzel 2011, 56). It is this type of question that the
policy capacity literature offers some value in furthering our understanding of
transboundary water governance.
What the Policy Capacity Literature Has to Offer
‘Institutional capacity’, ‘governance capacity’, ‘state capacity’ and ‘policy capacity’ are all
concepts used in the transboundary water resource governance literature. This
literature is full of language about governance capacity that is, or should be, adaptive,
integrated and focused on human and ecological systems yet very little conceptual work
connects this to the growing literature in policy studies related to policy capacity. The
international development and comparative politics literatures have both for sometime
been concerned with state capacity and institutional capacity (Skocpol & Finegold
1982). For purposes of this paper, the focus in on the policy capacity literature in public
policy and public administration.
Like the policy network literature, the policy capacity literature is firmly grounded in the
neo-institutionalist tradition. It ‘emphasizes the institutional roots of and remedies for
policy incapacity of the modern state’ (Painter and Pierre 2005, 8). The roots of
conceptualizing governance and policy capacity stem from the practitioner and scholarly
concern since the late 1990s that governments at all levels were no longer as capable
of formulating, implementing and evaluating policy as they were a decade or two earlier
(Dror 2001). Early observers suggest that the policy capabilities of governments had
eroded and the decline in policy capacity had been the result of a more ideological and
politicized style of policy making (Aucoin 1988). Still others argued that declining policy
capacity reflects the increasingly difficult fiscal position of governments and the lack of
funds for policy initiatives and implementation (Lightman and Irving 1991). Changes to
the policy process and the shifts in sources of policy advice to non-state actors were
also indentified as important contributing factors (Anderson 1996; Peters 1996).
An early, and broad, definition of policy capacity by B.Guy Peters did conceptualize
policy capacity as being able to work across conventional boundaries and functional
definitions of policies (Peters 1996). His early work on this concept focused on policymaking and the ability of policy actors to overcome barriers to achieve policy outcomes.
Based on barriers to effective policy making adopted and adapted from Rose (1974),
the barriers Peters discusses are i) command of sufficient expertise, ii) skills necessary
17
to manage large, complex organizations and iii) “that all parts of the system work in
harmony to implement the policy” (Peters 1996, 15-16). Peters elaborated on this third
barrier by discussing the role of leadership and “the capacity to promote cooperation
across the range of organizations that have an interest in the policy area” (ibid).
Peters and others influenced some empirical work on this subject by the Canadian
federal government. A group of senior executives concerned with the state of policy
capacity, focused on measuring policy capacity more directly related to the policy
research and analysis function in the federal government (Canadian Centre for
Management Development 1996, 1-5; Canada Policy Research Secretariat 1999). This
early scholarly research also made connections to human resources and public sector
recruitment (Lindquist and Desveaux 1998) and included “the intellectual dimension of
governance, that is, the capacity of the system to think through the challenges it faces"
(Bakvis 2000, 3). However, after an early focus on understanding and explaining the
loss of policy capacity due to public sector reform and downsizing, by the early 2000s
there was an emphasis on the prospect of rebuilding lost capacity in the context of
budget surpluses (Bakvis 2000) and “the institutional ability to conduct policy analysis
and implement results effectively and efficiently" (Pal 2006, 35).
Most of these earlier studies examined policy capacity in domestic contexts and various
departments and agencies within levels of government using secondary sources.
Studies focused on case studies of specific jurisdictions or used interviews of senior
government officials to gage the state of policy capacity (Anderson 1996; Rasmussen
1999; Inwood, Johns and O’Reilly 2005). Some survey research of senior policy officials
at the national, provincial and territorial levels has also been conducted on perceptions
about the state of policy capacity in the Canadian state (Welstead et.al. 2009; Baskoy,
Evans and Shields 2011). Others have used mixed methods to examine subnational
policy capacity in Canada (Howlett and Newman 2010; Williams and McNutt 2013).
In these studies, the factors, variables or determinants of policy capacity are central.
In keeping with the approach of defining policy capacity as something that policy
systems have or lack, others have focused on "policy analytical capacity" as “a more
focused concept related to knowledge acquisition and utilization in policy processes”
(Howlett 2007, 2009). Howlett and Lindquist (2004) argue that assessing policy
capacity or the effectiveness of the policy-advising functions inside governments
requires that we consider both the “skills” of policy analysts. Others also associate the
concept with policy advice and the ability of policy makers and systems to synthesize
high-quality information (Dror 2001; Tiernan 2007).
While much of the literature has focused on policy capacity within jurisdictions, Johns,
Inwood and O’Reilly (2011) combined policy capacity and the federalism literatures to
compare jurisdictions and policy areas using the concept of Intergovernmental Policy
Capacity. They focus on political and administrative determinants of policy capacity,
both within jurisdictions and between jurisdictions, while still focusing on state capacity.
18
Beyond the domestic context and Canadian literature, perhaps the most influential work
on policy capacity is the work by Painter and Pierre and collaborators in their 2005 book
‘Challenges to State Policy Capacity’ (Painter and Pierre 2005). They define policy
capacity as “the ability to marshal the necessary resources to make intelligent collective
choices about and set strategic directions for the allocation of scare resources to public
ends” (Painter and Pierre 2005, 2) and as ‘‘the ability of a government to make
intelligent policy choices and muster the resources needed to execute those choices’’
(2005, 255). They argue that governing capacity is made up of policy capacity,
administrative capacity and state capacity while highlighting that ‘the concept of
capacity draws attention to the structural characteristics and resource stocks of a
governing system’ (Painter and Pierre 2005, 3). It is thus easy to see how these
concepts can be related to policy networks and transboundary water governance.
This explicit focus on resource mobilization in a proactive, rather than a crisis-led
manner is a common thread in the policy capacity literature (Chandler and Zollner
1989; Dror 2001; Rydin and Falleth 2006, 28; Bourgon 2010; Howlett and Newman
2010). The other common thread is the foundation in institutional theory.
According to Painter and Pierre:
“In an institutionalist perspective, policy capacity is created and sustained in two ways. On is
endogenous to government and comprising the development of a system of government that is
capable of formulating and implementing policy. The more specific building blocks in this process
are policy expertise, a professional staff, financial resources and some degree of organizational
continuity. The other aspect relates to the state-society exchange. Policy capacity in this
perspective is the result of the creation of institutions that do not become captive to parochial
political interests” (Painter and Pierre 2005, 10).
Quoting Peter Hall they note that the ‘capacity of the state to govern society depends
on the configuration of society as much as on the configuration of the state (Hall 1986,
17 in Painter and Pierre 2005, 10) and they highlight that the old concept of ‘state
autonomy’ is relevant.
Painter and Pierre identify a number of endogenous and exogenous variables related to
policy capacity. Endogenous variables include such variables as policy expertise,
financial resources, role of non-governmental organizations, administrative reforms,
centralization of political power, length of time in office, age, managerial skills quality of
personnel (Painter and Pierre 2005, 10 and 256–58). Others have focused on the
importance of personnel and institutional continuity (Assetto, Hajba, and Mumme 2003,
257–61; Cummings and Norgaard 2004) and cooperation between different levels of
government in federal systems (Inwood, Johns and O’Reilly 2011). Exogenous factors,
outside of state structures include globalization, regionalization and engagement of
transnational institutions.
19
Others have focus on the ‘performative’ capacity of governance arrangements (Nelissen
et.al.2000) and several factors have been identified related to the problem-solving
capacity of networks including hierarchical steering, managerial networking,
independent secretariats, professional full-time staff, efficient communication and
information systems, and transparent decision making rules (Beisheim and Liese 2011).
Building on the work of Nelissen et.al., Bas and Lerby 2006, focus on a ‘reflexive
approach’ specific to the institutional governance capacity of policy arrangements. They
outline that there are two types of ‘governance capacity’. First, indicative, defined as
institutional capacity and assessed based on the congruence of: the policy views of
different actors; dimensions of the policy arrangements (coherence, backing of policy
goals by adequate resources and appropriate rules); and congruence of the policy
arrangements and the broader institutional context (constitution, democratic
conventions, broader machinery of government etc.). Second, performative which
focuses on the outcomes of governance arrangements.
However, similar to the policy network approach, there are critics of the policy capacity
literature. Despite these domestic, comparative and international uses of the concept,
critics argue the policy capacity approach has not provided systematic longitudinal
empirical evidence to understand policy capacity and the concept still remains elusive
and puzzling, especially research that is more empirically based (Tiernan 2006: 124).
Williams and McNutt (2013) argue that despite some progress in defining,
conceptualizing and operationalizing policy capacity as a concept, “the concept remains
nebulous and unclearly operationalized” (Williams and McNutt 2013, 93-4). They have
tried to address these criticisms and make some useful connections to the policy
network literature relevant to this paper.
While adopting the more limited concept of ‘policy analytical capacity’ above, they argue
the concept needs to be connected to the broader congruence of certain kinds of policy
ideas and with the institutional or network context of a particular policy area and
supplemented with some attention to basic network structure and connectivity among
different actors (Williams and McNutt 2013, 94-5). Effective policy capacity requires that
there be both sufficient analytical capacity to assess the challenges confronting a policy
sector and sufficient network integration in order to ensure that governments’ analytical
capacity is well utilized (ibid, 110). They argue by connecting policy capacity and policy
network analysis to measure capacity in terms of centrality and density several
scenarios are possible.
1) In policy networks where there is either high, or increasing levels of density and high or
increasing levels of centrality, capacity is considered to be enhanced. In such instances,
governments have considerable influence over policy development, implementation processes,
and the flow of information to relevant stakeholders.
2) In networks characterized by high or increasing centrality but low or decreasing levels of density,
more effort to engage other actors may be necessary to ensure policy capacity.
20
3) In cases where centrality is low, meaning leading government agencies, with clear mandates for
a particular policy domain, are not dominant in relation to the circulation of policy ideas,
regardless of whether the density of connections is high or low, policy capacity will need
improvement if governments wish to effectively respond to problems. The concern here is that,
separate from analytical capacity, a network that lacks centrality and density in connections will
have a difficult time dealing with new policy questions, particularly new questions that are
incongruent with the existing policy responsibilities of different agencies.
They develop a typology and argue that cases having variation on the dependent
variable (policy capacity) maximizes variance which, from a comparative research
methodological perspective, provides the best conditions for producing robust
conclusions on the impact of the independent variables in small n-studies. Their own
study is based upon an in-depth case study of one policy area using interviews with
policy officials, Virtual Policy Network analysis and a variety of secondary data sources.
They highlight that comparative research could enhance this approach and that when
combined with network analysis, it is the capacity of the network that becomes the
focus.
Given the common foundation of neo-institutional theory, the common ground shared
by policy network and policy capacity researchers in interested in both state and
societal institutions, with a disproportionate emphasis on the capacity of the state and
governance. Foe sometime analysts have been interested in the determinants of state
capacity and organizational continuity (Atkinson & Coleman 1989, 51–53; Painter &
Pierre, 2005, 10). The focus on both institutions and actors comes to the fore when
policy network and policy capacity approaches are combined.
By integrating these approaches with the transboundary water governance literature,
there is much potential for deepening our understanding of governance capacity in the
transboundary context. This allows for comparison across policy areas and within and
between jurisdictions.
Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Transboundary Governance Capacity
As outlined above, the literature on transboundary water governance is vast and
interdisciplinary. For purposes of this paper the focus is on governance related to policy
networks, policy capacity and transboundary water resource management. As noted by
Painter and Pierre, “If governance is used to describe practices of consultation,
coordination and bargaining across boundaries, then it is here where we should look for
source of policy capacity” (Painter and Pierre 2005, 10). As they note, although “the
governance theoretical perspective sees the state and its institutions as they key source
of policy capacity”, “considerable policy capacity rests outside the domain of the state
and has to be mobilized in the pursuit of collective interests” (Painter and Pierre 2005,
12).
21
Governance using a network approach in public policy therefore implies a focus on state
organizations and actors but also on non-state organizations and actors in a given
policy domain. It has multilevel governance features yet when combined with a focus
on capacity focuses the institutional structures and terrains at the intersection of civil
society and the state but also on the development of the strategic capacity of agents
(Jayasuriya 2005, 32).
But, how might we conceptualize transboundary governance capacity? How would we
know it if we saw it? Moreover, how can a conceptualization of this concept further our
understanding of Great Lakes governance and governance in other transboundary
water systems?
Transboundary governance capacity (TGC) involves unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral
interactions of government and non-government actors utilizing the resources at their
disposal under limited conditions in order to address public policy problems. The focus
on TGC builds on an integration of these three strands of public policy scholarship and
is based on some fundamental assumptions derived from the theoretical and empirical
research from these three literatures. First, policy research to date has clearly outline
that there are a large number of state and non-state institutions and actors engaged in
Great Lakes governance and policy implementation. The number of institutions is not
the issue. It is clear that the significance of vested interests and engagement of nonstate actors in implementation must be a focus. Second, transboundary and domestic
policy capacity is limited and an implementation deficit exists (Krantzberg 2011).
Third, the approach has to be multi-level. There has been significant focus on
traditional institutions at the binational and national levels and there is a need to focus
on transboundary networks and the subnational level. In keeping with the
transboundary water governance literature, the approach has to include both a macro
focus (international, transboundary, federalism and related arrangements) and an
actor-centred micro focus on individuals involved in networks. The focus on TGC
emphasizes network capacity.
Network capacity is indicated by density; inclusiveness; longevity; functional intensity;
the ability to collectively mobilize resources and sustainability of the network beyond
key individuals. By combing the three literatures the focus is more explicitly on the
capacity of transboundary networks. From the policy capacity literature, five factors are
of particular interest in assessing the state of TGC. These are included in Table 1 below.
Table 1 Factors and Indicators of Transboundary Governance Capacity
Factor
Indicator
Possible Methods
Institutional
Constitutional and legal
Document collection and
Capacity/authoritative
foundations; policy goals; formal
Analysis (Laws, Agreements,
foundations
and informal; in form and in use
MOUs); Interviews
Leadership
Political (elected) Bureaucratic,
Document Analysis (political
22
(resource managers, others);
statements; speeches;
Scientific; NGOs; Industry and
newspaper coverage etc.):
Others
Voting Records; interview to
identify leaders or absence of
leadership and their level of
engagement
Inclusiveness
Diversity, Number and Type of
Document Analysis; Interviews
Actors; Necessary and Sufficient
and surveys to identify
Membership; Which stakeholders
network members and non-
are missing?
members
Mutual Understanding of
Dominant discourse; Information
Document Analysis (language,
purpose; common goal(s)
Sharing; shared discourse;
core concepts; problem
Consensus; Authentic Dialogue;
definitions etc.); Interviews;
Reciprocity; Shared Values;
surveys
Shared Ideas; Shared Discourse;
Common Sense of Identity
Resources
Budgets, Personnel, Expertise
Document Analysis (Budgets
(“Knowledge Assets”); Direct
etc.); Interviews; Surveys
(Dedicated to the network) and
(Period of Funding, Amount of
Indirect (Resources Brought
Time Allocated by Individuals
through Institutions and
to the Network); etc.
individuals)
Institutional capacity, is foundational. The focus is on constitutional authority, legal
foundations and the fundamental authority to make or implement policy. Although
traditionally a focus on state institutions, network analysis includes a focus on legal,
state-sanctioned and independent authorities delegated (formally or informally) to nongovernment organizations and actors in the policy domain. The typical indicators of
institutional include higher-order authority, the existence of formal laws in the policy
domain, formal and informal agreements; hard and soft law components; enforcement
mechanisms; and designated implementation agencies. Data includes the collection and
analysis of relevant legislation, policy directives; agreements; document analysis;
surveys; and interviews to document the governance regime and assess overall
institutional capacity.
Leadership is defined in the policy capacity literature primarily as political and
bureaucratic leadership with very little focus on non-government leadership. However it
is clear from the transboundary water governance literature that a focus on nongovernment leadership in policy networks is also important. Indicators of leadership
include the background of leaders; commitment over time; tenure of the leaders
themselves; turnover; and perceptions of leaders. Data sources include, secondary
documents such as speeches; leadership profiles; surveys of leaders; and interviews
with leaders and other members of the policy network.
23
Inclusiveness in the policy network literature is focused on the democratic features and
implications of networks. This includes an analysis of both state and non-government
actors (public, private and NGO); those who affect policy and governance and those
who affected by policies and decisions. The involvement of vested interests or key
stakeholders and the focus on the absence of key actors are equally important.
Indicators of inclusiveness are which actors are involved, which actors are not, and
some assessment of the nature of their interactions and power relations.
Mutual Understanding focuses on the ‘cognitive’ dimensions of policy networks and
policy capacity. The focus here is on the ideational, problem definitions and shared
understandings that may or may not exist in transboundary policy networks. The focus
is on the ideas that ground networks themselves rather than just the ideas of
constituent actors (Skogstad 2005), on the ‘construction of meanings’ by government
managers in policy networks (McGuire and Agranoff 2011, 266) and other nongovernment actors. Indicators of mutual understanding include an analysis of dominant
ideas; discourse and language of actors; and their perceptions. What ideas dominate
the network and is there agreement on? Possible data sources include discourse
analysis of policy documents, speeches and interviews.
Resources are central to almost all definitions of policy networks and policy capacity.
Network theorists have for sometime been interested in resources associated with
networks and organizations and individuals who comprise a given network. Attention to
the distribution of organizational and other resources such as technical knowledge
across state and non-state across is based on a premise that resources of actors or
organizations in a network define its capacity. Theoretically, networks with different
levels of resources will have different consequences for policy outcomes. Although
primarily defined as institutional resources held separately or collectively by network
organizations and actors, resources are broadly defined and include information,
knowledge assets, technical resources and the currency of interpersonal relations.
Indicators typically include budget allocations, personnel and time allocations to
network activities. Data sources include government and agency reports, audit reports;
and surveys of individuals re: resource and time commitments.
Applying a Transboundary Governance Approach
To examine such networks, the Great Lakes Policy Research Network (GLRPN) is
pursuing research on two fronts. First, based policy research to date and the
assumption that a transboundary governance regime exists in the Great Lakes related
to the GLWQA and current policy infrastructure, is first research frontier is on TGC
across the whole system. This involves developing an inventory of policy actors across
the basin at various scales using secondary sources and a basin-wide surveys of
government officials and non-government actors from organizations with Great Lakes
mandates. The survey is being designed to data collected on network structures,
24
functions, interactions, capacity and public engagement using network analysis methods
and network analysis software such as Pajek.
Second is a comparison of TGC across a set of policy cases. Like other transboundary
water systems, the Great Lakes consists of not just one large transboundary
governance network but a number of transboundary networks related to various uses
and environmental issues in the basin. Policy research to date indicates that some of
these policy domains seem to have more capacity for policy making and policy
implementation than others. If, so, the question is why? Comparative analysis can help
us extend our knowledge and possibly improve outcomes.
In order to avoid the criticism that many studies in network analysis suffer from
selection bias as there is more research on successful network governance
arrangements than there is on failure (Borzel 2011, 57), there is a need for comparative
case analysis of both successful and less successful networks. The cases selected for
this project include fisheries management and invasive species (both theorized to have
high levels of TGC); Areas of Concern (theorized to have moderate levels of TGC,
particularly those that are on the border or in close proximity); nearshore management
(moderate); irrigation (theorized to have low levels of TGC); and groundwater (also
theorized to have low levels of TGC). By applying the analytical framework, with an
initial emphasis on institutional capacity, it is hoped that the comparative TGC of these
cases will reveal why some transboundary water governance policy domains have TGC
and others do not. Alternatively, the findings may reveal why some cases have more
and others less and explorations of the implications for policy design and outcomes.
Clearly other cases could be selected for this analysis including climate change, energy,
and water quantity management. The cases selected are not random. They are based
on existing policy research and the availability of researchers with expertise in these
policy domains. While this has limitations, collectively the cases will allow for some very
interesting findings related to TGC and possible future comparison of policy domains in
different transboundary water governance systems.
Conclusion
The Great Lakes- St.Lawrence basin is like many other transboundary watersheds. It
requires transboundary governance at multiple scales to ensure its sustainability as a
water resource and protection as an ecosystem that yields many different uses. The
collective action challenge confronting this system and the outcomes to date are well
documented. A wide range of actors is involved in both using and managing the
resource.
However, policy outcomes in the past 40 years have been slow and disappointing.
There is recognition in the policy scholarship and practitioner literature to date that an
implementation deficit exists. Although well-endowed with transboundary and domestic
institutions to alter organizational and individual behaviour in the basin, serious
challenges remain.
25
While policy research to date has revealed the shortcomings of existing governance
arrangements, current policy regimes are not adapting to address the fundamental
challenges of institutional reform and vested interests. Policy research that extends
current findings using new approaches has the potential to influence change in the
future.
This paper has argued that one approach to developing new knowledge about
governance in the Great Lakes and other transboundary water governance systems is to
bring together approaches in the transboundary water governance, policy network and
policy capacity literatures to gain a deeper understanding of the state of TGC in the
basin and why policy implementation is comparatively more successful in some policy
domains and not others. While this is a challenging approach and in this case requires
a team approach, the approach has relevance for many other transboundary water
systems around the world.
26
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