Theme six: Democratic Distrust: Power, Paranoia and the
People.
Participants and abstracts.
Theme coordinator:
Dr. Eduard van de Bilt (Leiden University)
[email protected]
Participants:
1. ‘’, Eduard van de Bilt, Leiden University.
2. ‘’, George Blaustein, University of Amsterdam.
3. ‘Friedrich Meinecke and the Appraisal of German Culture over Democracy’, Thijs Bogers , VU
Amsterdam.
4. ‘Tensions between Secrecy and Democracy. Distrust Regarding Intelligence in French and
Dutch Parliaments, 1975-1995’, Eleni Braat, University of Utrecht.
5. ‘Distrust and Disclosure’, Joris Gijsenbergh, Leiden University.
6. ‘A New World. European Socialists and the American Democratic Experiment, 1870-1914’
Hanneke Hoekstra, University of Groningen.
7. ‘American Democracy and the World: The US Congress and the Founding of the United Nations, 1941-1945’, Antero Holmila, University of Jyväskylä.
8. ‘’, Ruud Janssens, University of Amsterdam.
9. ‘Serbian Nationalism between 1880 and 1914’, Geert Luteijn, University of Amsterdam.
10. ‘’, Mark Miller, Clark University.
11. ‘Paranoid of the People. Reining in “We the People” in Post-Revolutionary America’, Jelte
Olthof, University of Groningen.
Introduction
This workshop aims to explore the role of distrust in democratic traditions on the basis of a few of
the individuals, parties, and movements advocating it in the transatlantic world from the end of the
eighteenth century to the present.
As French political historian Pierre Rosanvallon among others has argued, distrust should be
part of democratic traditions because, next to representative bodies and parliamentary procedures,
it helps legitimize democracy. Yet Rosanvallon also warns that, in movements such as populism, po-
litical distrust negates its very usefulness because it turns simply or purely negative.
How democratic and valuable is political distrust? Next to exploring the conditions that give
rise to political distrust, this workshop aims to deal with the question when distrust turns excessive
and impracticable--when the vigilance expressed by it no longer differs from paranoia. Does especially populism represent one of these moments? Seeking to give reality to the fictional concept of the
people, the distrust against governing elites that populist movements exhibit frequently involves
glorifications of the nation that undermine, or at least shift, their democratic potential: they displace
the concept of the people by the concept of the nation. Does populist distrust undermine the very
democratic elements it aims to foster? Is democratic distrust easily tainted by these populist elements and as a result in need of being used selectively?
These questions will be explored on the basis of the transatlantic history of Western Europe
and the United States. Politically distrustful individuals and movements from the Age of Democratic
Revolutions and these countries many past and current-day populist persuasions - and those questioning their ideas should be the subjects of this workshop.
Abstracts
Bilt, Eduard van de (Leiden University)
[email protected]
(…)
(…)
Blaustein, George (University of Amsterdam)
[email protected]
(…)
(…)
Bogers, Thijs (VU Amsterdam)
[email protected]
Friedrich Meinecke and the Appraisal of German Culture over Democracy
According to Jan-Werner Müller, the European twentieth century was ‘an age, in short, when political argument was crucially about contesting the meaning of democracy.’1 Rather than presenting the
twentieth century as an age wherein democracy was advocated by some, welcomed by many and
perfected by all, Müller convincingly shows how democracy was continuously contested, albeit from
viewpoints that varied over time. By doing so, Müller aptly dismisses the notion of Europe as having
been highly favorable to liberal democracy by default, as an ‘illusion’. From this it follows that the
totalitarian and numerous authoritarian regimes, which exemplify twentieth century European politi1
Jan-Werner Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe (New Haven and
London 2013) 5.
cal history, cannot be regarded as mere aberrations. Rather, the continuity of the history of twentieth century European political ideas lies in the fact that democracy has been contested throughout.2
Especially in the Interbellum, practices and ideas of democracy were fervently contested.3
The fate of the Weimar Republic exemplifies the fragility of newly founded practices of democracy in
twentieth century Europe. Recent scholarship however emphasizes that the democratic institutions
of the Weimar Republic were in fact stronger than has long been believed.4 The dramatic collapse of
the Weimar Republic thus was not the direct result of faults in the design of its democratic institutions. Rather, due to the lack of consensus on the desired ordering of society, democracy as an idea
was continuously contested from various viewpoints. Most scholarship in this area has focused on
the works and influence of Oswald Spengler and Carl Schmitt. Each in their own way, they have been
seen as having fostered a climate wherein authoritarian rule could flourish.
However, focusing merely on radical thought in the Weimar Republic does not do justice to
the rich tapestry of ideas that existed. The historian Friedrich Meinecke has been overlooked in this
regard. After the November Revolution, Meinecke presented himself as a Vernunftrepublikaner, by
which he meant that he endorsed the republic on rational grounds, but that he also remained a
monarchist by heart. Rejecting democracy until 1916 and accepting the newly found republic with
reservations in 1919, Meinecke then set out to write what would become one of his major works, Die
Idee der Staatsräson in der neueren Geschichte (1924). Meinecke ends Die Idee with a warning for
the possibly disastrous effects of democracy.
As democracy is a contested concept,5 historians of political ideas need foremost to come to
an understanding of what democracy meant to those who used the concept. This will then enable
the historian to come to an understanding of the grounds on which both ideas and practices of democracy were contested and what was favored above democracy. According to Wolf Lepenies,
Meinecke belonged to those whom believed the Kulturstaat to be irreconcilable with the
Machtsstaat.6 The cultivation of German culture was far more important to Meinecke than popular
rule was, especially as the latter was possibly threatening the former. For Meinecke, culture was
political as German culture was perceived to be threatened by Anglo-Saxon culture, democracy being
part of the latter.
In my paper I aim to answer the following question: In what manner does Meinecke’s appraisal of German culture relate to his (lack of) appraisal for democracy, in the early phase of the
Weimar Republic? To answer this question, the following sub questions need to be answered: What
does German culture mean for Meinecke? What does democracy mean for Meinecke? In order to
answer these questions, I will set out to unravel what the illocutionary intention of Meinecke’s Die
Idee was. The two major works to date that have dealt with Meinecke’s political ideas, have omitted
2
Thijs Bogers, ‘Contesting illusions. On the past, present and future of democracy in Europe and European
integration’, in: Journal of European Integration 2015. Forthcoming
3
For the Dutch case see Koen Vossen, Vrij Vissen in het Vondelpark. Kleine Politieke Partijen in Nederland 19181940 (Amsterdam 2003); and Henk te Velde, ‘De domesticatie van democratie in Nederland. Democratie als
strijdbegrip van de negentiende eeuw tot 1945’, in: BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review Vol. 127, no.2
Vol.127,no.2(2012), pp.3-27.
4
See Benjamin Ziemann, ‘Weimar was Weimar: Politics, Culture and the Emplotment of the German Republic’,
in: German History vol.28, no.4(2010), pp.542-571.
5
Oliver Hidalgo, ‘Conceptual History and Politics: Is the Concept of Democracy Essentially Contested?’, in:
Contributions to the History of Concepts vol.4(2008), pp.176-201.
6
Wolf Lepenies, The Seduction of Culture in German History (Princeton 2006) 26.
this in their inquiry and are consequently unable to explicate what the relation between culture and
democracy in Meinecke’s thought was. In both Richard Sterling’s Ethics in a World of Power. The Political Ideas of Friedrich Meinecke (1958) and Robert Pois’s Friedrich Meinecke and German
Politics in the Twentieth Century (1972), the reader is treated to a rather personal interpretation of
Meinecke’s works. My paper thus also contributes to furthering the use of the so called Cambridge
School method, which has been predominantly applied to late medieval, early modern and eighteenth century political thought,7 to twentieth century political thought.8
Braat, Eleni (University of Utrecht)
[email protected]
Tensions between Secrecy and Democracy. Distrust Regarding Intelligence in French and Dutch
Parliaments, 1975-1995
Democracy and secrecy do not make a happy match: secret government activities cannot be fully
controlled by citizens through public scrutiny, and governments cannot fully account for their secret
activities. Consequently, public trust in secret services and the political legitimacy of these services
are inherently problematic in democratic regimes.
This paper is concerned with the recurring tensions between parliament and intelligence. It focuses
on political argumentation on secret services in French and Dutch parliaments between 1975 and
1995. This study evaluates how argumentation changed over time, from the Cold War to the ‘decade
of openness’, which was characterized by the rise of the concept of transparency. And it assesses
how argumentation differed between the French and Dutch political contexts, which were influenced
by a variety of threats to national security.
In order to analyze the tensions between parliament and intelligence and the circumstances under
which the relationship between them could improve I innovatively adapt Albert Hirschman’s categories of exit, voice, loyalty and neglect, and Max Weber’s ideal types of the ethics of conviction and
responsibility to historical research on political argumentation. Members of parliament, through
their arguments, may reject the service’s existence as a matter of principle (exit), they may either
express criticism (voice) or show support (loyalty), or they may tend to dismiss the matter of intelligence altogether, discouraged by the secrecy that surrounds it (neglect). Distrust regarding intelligence may manifest itself through both voice and neglect. The four types of arguments may either be
constructive or destructive judging from the amount of parliamentary control on intelligence they
lead to.
The nature of parliamentary argumentation on intelligence bears apparent significance for, first, the
quality of the relationship between parliament and intelligence and, second, the quality of parliamentary control on secret services. If parliament succeeds in monitoring and controlling the conduct
of secret services, it prevents services from shirking their responsibility and it avoids the development of concentrations of power in their hands. Holding secret services to account will lead to sub-
7
Melvin Richter, ‘Reconstructing the History of Political Languages: Pocock, Skinner and the Geschichtliche
Grundbegriffe’, in: History and Theory, vol. 29, no. 1(1990), pp.38-70, p.68.
8
Jan-Werner Müller, ‘European Intellectual History as Contemporary History’, in: Journal of Contemporary
HistoryVol.46, No.3(2011) pp.574-590, pp.586-589.
jecting them to certain procedures and rules of conduct – which in the long run legitimizes their existence in democratic societies.
Gijsenbergh, Joris (Leiden University)
[email protected]
Distrust and Disclosure
This paper will explore the relationship between democracy and distrust. In order to provide an historical foundation for our current debate on this topic, the paper will analyze the development of
ideas about democratic distrust since the late 1960s. The focus will be on the ideas about distrust
and transparency. More specifically, this paper will examine the political and scholarly reactions to
whistleblowing civil servants in the US, the Netherlands and Germany. For decades, their disclosure
of sensitive governmental information has sparked a public and academic debate on the level of trust
that the authorities should enjoy.
Today, whistleblowers are often applauded as heroes of democracy. Their watchful eye is
called an act of ‘healthy distrust’, since it allows the citizens to monitor the powers that be. Their
distrust of individual politicians is seen as a sign of their trust in the system. Furthermore, it could be
argued that exposing scandals engenders more trust in the long run. After all, whistleblowers force
the politicians to work hard to regain the public’s confidence. These attempts might be so successful
in restoring the citizens’ faith. Perhaps they will rest assured, now that they know that their government is under close scrutiny of whistleblowers.
However, this optimistic assessment of whistleblowers is relatively new. Until the 1990s or
even the early 21st century, they were rather branded as traitors and as dangers to democracy. They
have been accused of inducing cynicism or even paranoia in the citizenry. Following that reasoning,
whistleblowing is a destructive form of distrust that can only lead to the delegitimization of the political institutions. After all, by questioning the integrity of administrators, whistleblowers diminish the
prestige of their high office. Moreover, politicians might lose even more esteem once it became apparent that they were unable to keep their civil servants under control. That was deemed dangerous,
because the government needed and deserved the unconditional support of their servants and citizens. Based on these arguments, whistleblowing was called undemocratic.
These two opposing arguments were off course not the only points of view. In reality, there
was an range of ideas on democracy, distrust and transparency during the entire period under study.
There are a number of reasons to examine to thoughts. First of all, the history of whistleblowing
hasn’t been researched yet. Whistleblowers have received attention by legal scholars, public administration scholars, sociologists, political scientists and philosophers. Until now, historians have yet to
enter the debate. More importantly, an historical analysis of the debate on whistleblowers is relevant for our current understanding of democracy. It is important to find out where the current longing for transparency has come from, because that background helps us to understand our own views
on the relationship between citizens and their government. Furthermore, the paper will show how
distrust can be considered to be destructive. That is relevant, because some voices today already
seem to question the current call for transparency and ‘healthy distrust’. An analysis of similar sentiments from the past could teach us whether that is a valuable contribution to the current debate.
Most importantly, the analysis will confirm that democracy is a contested concept. Democracy has
always entailed a search for the balance between contrasting ideals, and it will always continue to do
so. It is important to keep that in mind when debating the future of democracy.
Hoekstra, Hanneke (University of Groningen)
[email protected]
A New World. European Socialists and the American Democratic Experiment, 1870-1914
In 1904 Henriette Roland Holst proclaimed in the Dutch socialist journal De nieuwe tijd the United
States as ‘the land of the future’. It was the first time the American Socialist Party participated in the
Presidential Elections. Eugene V. Debs won 3% of the popular vote. The 1904 election returns in
American inspired Roland Holst to predict three million votes for the Socialist Party in 1908. For a
Marxist fundamentally critical of the US as epitome of capitalist oppression and political corruption,
it may appear an odd prophecy. In general, European intellectuals seemed to fear American party
organizations as corrupt machines manipulating the masses (Te Velde 2013). Yet many socialists
sought in America, because of its founding myth and unique political institutions, a frame of reference for their own projected dream. In this paper I want to address the question of America as the
exceptional or universal nation through European socialist interpretations of the United States. Liebknecht, Bebel, Beatrice and Sydney Webb, Edward Aveling and Eleonor Marx all went to America at
some point to seek political examples and find hope. They traveled the continent and addressed the
crowd at labour rallies. They talked to miners and socialized with America’s political leadership. They
studied local government and visited slums. They documented their findings, and remarkable observations, which vastly differed, in travel journals, correspondence and journal articles. Using
sources like Beatrice Webb’s American Diary, I want to argue that despite the international orientation of European socialists, their vision of democracy in America was very dependent upon their national worries and sentiments.
Holmila, Antero (University of Jyväskylä)
[email protected]
American Democracy and the World: The US Congress and the Founding of the United Nations,
1941-1945
The Birth of the United Nations in 1945 is often seen as a watermark event denoting the beginning of
the new more peaceful and democratic world order, wherein nation-states cooperated more fruitfully at a supra-national level. After the failure of the League of Nations during the interwar period,
especially the American withdrawal from the project, both the world and Americans looked upon
their nation not to repeat the mistakes at the end of WWII. In this scenario, the role of the US Congress was crucial.
This paper will explore the ways in which the US Congress discussed American democracy visà-vis the need to secure peace after World War Two. Despite strong wartime isolationist tendencies
in America in general and in the Congress in particular, the Congressmen acknowledged that a new
postwar world order needed both, American involvement and some form of multi-lateral and supranational body, based on notions of democracy, such as freedom of people, freedom from want and
fear and free speech. It will be argued that the discussions about the founding of the United Nations
reveal not only American attitude towards international relations and diplomacy but also their own
views and anxieties about democracy.
In the wartime context, the term was fluid and shifting, depending on against what issue
“American democracy” was being defined. The wartime collaboration with the Soviet Union, in particular, led to the re-definitions of the meaning of democracy in the USA. It will also be argued that
although the debates clearly record democratic values as something universal and therefore places
the United States in the category of universal nation, the strong undercurrent within such debates
were to show how exceptional democracy was in the USA – to the extent that from time to time the
idea of creating a new world organization based on American model was espoused. Finally, by examining the US Congress’ wartime debates on the democracy and the new international organization,
the original meaning of the term “United Nations” will be re-addressed.
Janssens, Ruud (University of Amsterdam)
[email protected]
(…)
(…)
Luteijn, Geert (University of Amsterdam)
[email protected]
Serbian Nationalism between 1880 and 1914
'In its broadest sense, nationalism may come in both ethnic- and civic-oriented varieties, a
feature making it a concept considerably broader than irredentism, that is, the vision of
national integration or national unification common to Balkan national societies of the
second half of the nineteenth century. Conducting the discussion about the Balkan states in
terms of nationalism instead of irredentism entails a level of abstraction that obscures a
simple point, namely, that not all nationalists were in favor of irredentist claims.'
(Roudometof 2001: 157)
The Serbian state building project went hand in hand with the ideology of bringing all Serbs, the
nation, within the borders of the state. When Serbia first became an independent state after a revolt
against the Ottoman Empire, the territory covered less than half the nation. This is still today called
Serbia proper in contrast to Greater Serbia. Hence, this is typical irredentist terminology that is
common in South Eastern Europe. The ambitions of the state officials to attain particular areas where
Serbs live have varied as a result of the geo-political situation.9
Roudometof(2001: 174) argues that: 'The local intelligentsia developed irredentist visions
that legitimized the local states' project of nation building, and, consequently, the growth of the local
bureaucracies.' Hence, 'the peasantry had to be coached and indoctrinated to irredentism' according
to Roudometof. The parameters of the state were set by the peasantry, rather than that the state was
9 The initial formulation by Serbian interior minister Ilija Garasanin was directed at territorial accession of
Ottoman lands and excluded for example Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Clark 2012: 21)
capable of forcing an industrialization/modernisation program10 on the peasantry. Furthermore, the
Serbian state was disputed by two factions: the officer corps and the radical party.
But the irredentism that is described by Roudometof (2001) is only one current of
nationalism to be found in Serbia around 1900. In order to capture the whole nationalist project in
Serbia and describe how it held Serbian society in its grip, we need to highlight several important
issues at the time: 1) The process of state building, 2) Liberals versus conservative forces and the rise
of new elites, 3) Underdevelopment and class structure, and 4) International relations:
Russian/French vs. Austrian influences. These issues are inherently interrelated and often show the
same division lines within Serbian Society.
Roudometof (2001: 1-3) does not content that irredentism is a modern phenomenon, but at
the same time, Roudometof argues that it has been obstructing modernization in Serbia. This reflect
the ambiguity of Serbian society, Serbian society gave rise to a new political elite that articulated the
nation and state building programme. This effort in itself is a modern phenomenon. However, the
industrialization that one of the prominent scholars, Ernest Gellner (1983) sees as vital to modernity
and the rise of nationalism, was not on the table in the Balkans. The question rises, what modern
features were present in Serbian society around 1900 and how did they give rise to nationalism? The
four issues lined out above contain the answer.
The question remains how to understand nationalism in the context of the Balkans and
specifically Serbia between 1880-1920?
Miller, Mark (Clark University)
[email protected]
(…)
(…)
Olthof, Jelte (University of Groningen)
[email protected]
Paranoid of the People. Reining in “We the People” in Post-Revolutionary America
In my paper, I want to focus on how the lukewarm embrace of democracy by many of those who
stood at the cradle of the United States, turned into outright fear of active participation of “the
people” in the immediately aftermath of the ratification of the Constitution. After serving as the
founding authors of the new legal order who legitimized the overthrow of the old Confederation, “we
the people” were quickly made to withdraw from the political scene in the first decade after
ratification. The genie of "we the people," after having served its purpose by putting the Constitution
in place, was quickly ordered back into the bottle.
By taking a close look at debates around the turn of the century, in particular that on the
Alien and Sedition Acts and the ensuing Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, I want to demonstrate
that the fiery rhetoric of Congressmen like Edward Livingston and John Randolph—who were quick to
cast these Resolutions as voicing the “will of the people”—stirred up old anxieties among the
10 As is suggested by the classic theory by Ernest Gellner (1983) linking industrialization and nationalism.
Federalist majority who feared the U.S. would inherent the bloody reign of terror that France had just
witnessed. In a series of heated and interesting debates on what the role of “we the people” in post1787 America should be, the Federalists managed to cut off every attempt by their opponents
tribunes to allow a more direct role for "we the people" in politics. The Federalist victory in this
debate rested on a rationale that would later finds its legal embodiment in the famous Marbury v.
Madison decision of John Marshall.
Even though this limited idea of popular constitutionalism envisaged by the Federalists would
give out in the nineteenth century, it played an important role in sustaining the U.S. Constitution by
blocking attempts to go down the same road as the French Revolution. As such, these debates offer a
great insight into the elusive role of “we the people” in the creation of an American style of
democracy.