C me Sk8: Discourse, technology and
bodies without organs
Book or Report Section
Accepted Version
Jones, R. (2011) C me Sk8: Discourse, technology and bodies
without organs. In: Thrulow, C. and Mroczek, K. (eds.) Digital
discourse: Language in the new media. Oxford University
Press, Oxford, pp. 321-339. ISBN 9780199795444 Available at
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/66628/
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work.
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Find your body without organs. Find out how to make it. It's a question
of life and death, youth and old age, sadness and joy. It is where
everything is played out.
-- Deleuze and Guattari!
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.C&!CB;E%!F#$')!Most contemporary debates about this relationship have been
dominated by the notion that digital technology, particularly computers and the
Internet, are somehow alienating us from our physical bodies. Some worry, for
example, that computers are turning our young people into a generation of sedentary
and dangerously obese ‘net potatoes’ who have lost all awareness of their bodies,
while others are concerned that the increased objectification and externalization of the
body made possible by technology has reduced human beings to simulacra and
human relationships to ‘figments of the imagination’ (Varga 2005:228). As Arthur
and Marilouise Korker (1987:2) put it, ‘in .&AC%#D#3-AED!+#A-&.'5!.C&!F#$'!CE+!
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To refer to this particular class of meditational means I will rather shamelessly
appropriate from the French philosophers Gille Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987) the
term ‘bodies without organs’. Deleutz and Guattari use the term to refer to the
‘virtual’ dimension of the body, the body freed from the ‘organization of the
organism’, the body outside any determinate state, torn from the here and now,
exemplified, for them, in the body of the masochist, the drug addict, the lover, and the
schizophrenic. The subject that I will be drawing upon to illustrate my analysis may in
fact have some similarities to these figures, for the bodies I would like to consider as
my exemplars are the bodies of urban skateboarders – not their physical bodies, but
the representations of their bodies they produce and consume in amateur
skateboarding videos, which they regularly spend hours shooting and editing and
setting to music and then distribute on Internet sites like You Tube and My Space.
Through examining these particular virtual bodies and the practices around producing
and consuming them, I hope to illustrate more general principles about the way I
believe technology is affecting how representations of the body are used as texts to
take social actions.
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I say I am appropriating the term ‘bodies without organs’ shamelessly because
much of what I mean by the term is not really part of Deleuze and Guattari’s
definition, and much of what they mean I am not including in mine. By bodies
without organs I simply mean all representations of our bodies that we or others make
use of to take actions in the world. ‘Bodies without organs’ defined in this way are
always the result of externalization, or what Bauman and Briggs (1990) call
entextualization, the process by which discourse (in so far as the body is inherently
discursive) is rendered ‘extractable’, able to be lifted out of its immediate spatial and
temporal materiality and inserted into another (Jones forthcoming).
‘Bodies without organs’ are characterized by five main features, which both
distinguish them from and connect them to their physical antecedents. The first is
deterritorialization; ‘bodies without organs’ can be separated from the physical space
that the body occupies and transported into different spaces. The second is
desynchronization: moments in the existence of the physical body can be captured
and lifted out of time and used in future moments, and these bodily representations
are often not subject to the same laws of time and space that physical bodies are. The
third is reproducibility: ‘bodies without organs’ can be reproduced and duplicated so
that multiple instances of the same body can exist simultaneously, a feat which,
despite advances in cloning technology, is not yet possible with the human body.
Fourth is mutability: ‘bodies without organs’ like other texts can be revised, edited,
altered and re-altered in ways that are not possible with physical bodies without
severe physical consequences; ‘bodies without organs’ always have some degree of
plasticity, depending on the media in which they are rendered and the technologies
that are employed in this rendering. Finally, the fifth and perhaps the most important
feature of ‘bodies without organs’ is mimesis; ‘bodies without organs’ are above all
representations, and their sole utility as cultural tools is based on there existing some
kind of resemblance to or connection with some actual physical body existing (or
supposedly existing) somewhere. ‘Bodies without organs’ qualify as a special class of
cultural tools precisely because of the reflexive relationship they have to the
particular, concrete human bodies that they represent.
One example of such a cultural tool is my Hong Kong identity card, on which
appears a picture of me as I appeared in 1997 when I became a permanent resident of
Hong Kong. This photograph, however, is not the only representation of my body
that appears on the card. It also contains a textual ‘body without organs’ in the form
of my name and various information about my body, and, in the corner of the card, an
electronic chip that contains an image of my thumbprint. With this tool I can perform
a whole host of actions that would be physically or legally impossible without it. I can
carry it in my pocket. I can make a Xerox copy of it and fax it to my bank when
applying for a mortgage. And I can use it to enter and leave the Special
Administrative Region of Hong Kong through a special turnstile that collects an
image of my actual thumbprint and compares it to the image embedded in the
electronic chip.
This example, in fact, illustrates a number of other important aspects of
‘bodies without organs’, in particular the fact that they are always partial, that a ‘body
without organs’ can never be a ‘copy’ of the original body and often represents the
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(&1&!-+!GC&1&!Deleuze and Guattari and their followers would no doubt
cringe, for nothing could be farther than their conception of the ‘body without organs’
as a ‘field of intensities’ than the example I have just given. In fact, they have another
term for such objects as passport photos and mug shots and other socially orchestrated
captures of the body, especially those based on categorizations like gender, race and
national origin. These they call ‘incorporeal transformations’, and their function is not
to facilitate flows of desire, but to control it, to fix it into various assemblages as
determined by institutions (the state, the church, the prison). They are operations of
discipline that aim to enforce particular regimes of representation and economies of
meaning (Foucault 1979).
The reason I have chosen to use the same term to describe both of these
phenomena is that they really do not describe different objects, but rather different
kinds of actions that can be taken with the same object. The field of possibilities
which Deleuze and Guattari image to be ‘the body without organs’ and the
disciplinary regimes of ‘incorporeal transformations’ are simply two different sides of
entextualization, two different potentials present in all representations of the body. I
will refer to these as the potential for virtualization and the potential for reification.
Reification is based on disembodiment and alienation. Its aim is to transform a
dynamic process into a fixed object: an identity, a document, a piece of evidence.
Virtualiztion on the other hand, has the opposite effect: rather than closing down
possibilities, it opens them up. It is a kind of problematization of the body. In the
words of Pierre Lévy (1998:44):
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The different kinds of technologies of entextualization which have developed
over the years have introduced new sets of affordances and constraints regarding the
processes of deterritorialization, despatializtion, reproducibility, mutability, and
mimesis which I discussed above, and these configurations of affordances and
constraints have had consequences on how the ‘bodies without organs’ that result
from these processes can be used. The degree of deterritorialization enabled by digital
technology, for example, which can send representations of the body instantaneously
across the globe is very different from that enabled by drawing or print technology,
and the degree of mimesis afforded by photography differs radically from that of
drawing or painting.
One of the most important innovations in portraiture in the seventeenth
century, for example, was the increased portability of images. With the development
of miniature portraits, representations of the body could be transported in ones pocket
or in a piece of jewelry and could be used for private rather than public viewing. An
innovation of the eighteenth century was the development of pastel portraiture, which
allowed artists to create significantly more lifelike ‘bodies without organs’, so lifelike
and seemingly touchable, in fact, that, according to art historian Shearer West (2004),
they began to take on an ‘an erotic or fetishistic quality’.
Perhaps the chief function of ‘bodies without organs’ in this era was
memorialization, a function fulfilled in the modern world with family snapshots.
People had their portraits painted to be remembered, and even miniature portraits
exchanged between lovers were often referred to as ‘remembrances’. This particular
function is important not just for individual relationships that spanned across space
and time, but also for the creation of social cohesion, as when the portraits of kings
were displayed in public places. Such bodies without organs were integral to people’s
ability to ‘imagine communities’ (Anderson 2006), whether those communities were
families or nations.
Perhaps the most significant advance in technologies for representing the
human body, however, came with the development of photography, which facilitated
more than ever before the documentary and evidentiary functions of ‘bodies without
organs’. No technology, perhaps, is more emblematic of the modern era, what
Benjamin (1969) calls ‘the age mechanical reproduction’, than analog photography,
and it was during this time that the entextualization of the body became increasingly
associated with discipline and surveillance. Whereas in the past, bodies without
organs served a primarily retrospective function oriented towards past events, in the
era of analog photography their primary function became as documents, oriented
towards their future use)!NC#.#31ERC'!F&AE;&!E!A&%.1ED!.##D!2#1!V#B1%ED-+.+5!R#D-A&!
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The rise of digital photography and video and of computers and the Internet,
of course, further increased individuals’ potential to create and control their own
bodily representations, but the more important change came with their increased
ability to alter these representations, to combine them with other representations, to
make them more immediate and interactive, and to disseminate them at an
unprecedented speed to an unprecedented number of people. The increased mutability
of ‘bodies without organs’ brought on by digital technology seriously undermined the
evidentiary function of such objects as the truth value of photographs became
compromised (Mitchell 1992). At the same time, however, it strengthened another
function, one I have not yet addressed, what I will be calling the anticipatory function
of ‘bodies without organs’.
The anticipatory function of ‘bodies without organs’ is not new—in fact it
might be the most ‘primitive’ of functions for which bodily representations are used,
associated with the sacred and the aesthetic, with myth and magic, with voodoo dolls
and religious images. It is the function by which representations are used not to recall
past bodies, nor to control present bodies, but to imagine future bodies. What I have
in mind is not much different from the way Tibetan Buddhist meditators make use of
images of the bodies of deities on tankas and on the walls of temples to imagine
themselves as enlightened beings, that is to experience themselves as they will one
day be. This function is perhaps closest to the Deleuzian definition of ‘bodies without
organs’: bodies of pure desire and potentiality.
C me Sk8
In order to illustrate this function, I would like to consider the technologies
involved in contemporary practices of skateboarding, technologies which go beyond
the boards and trucks and neoprene wheels upon which skaters traverse the urban
landscape to include technologies of entextualization like video cameras, fisheye
lenses, and software for digital editing. Ever since the early days of the sport, ‘bodies
without organs’ have played a central role in skateboarding (Weyland 2002), although
the technologies of entextualization and the uses to which these representations have
been put have changed. In a sense, the history of skateboarding in the past fifty years
mirrors the development of ‘bodies without organs’ that I outlined above. In the
sixties and seventies, skaters used analog photography to capture the ephemeral
moments of their performances in durable documents, which they would send to
skateboarding magazines for possible publication. In fact, what made early pictorial
publications like Skateboarder magazine unique was that they depended so much on
photographs taken by readers. These photographic ‘bodies without organs’ primarily
served evidentiary and memorial functions: they were used first and foremost to
document the accomplishments of particular skaters, and the reputations of many of
the early heroes of the sport were built on these often blurred and grainy amateur
photos. These pictures also, however, served to build social cohesion, which
contributed significantly to the early growth of the sport. As skateboarding historian
Jacko Weyland (2002:162) writes, ‘It wasn’t about self aggrandizement or fame; it
was about your far-flung tribe recognizing your will to exist and skate under the
toughest of circumstances.’
There has also been a long tradition of self-publication in skateboarding, as
skaters early on took control of distributing their ‘bodies without organs’ though
photocopied ‘zines’ with titles like Body Slam and Curbsnot. This early adoption of
DIY media, underlines a fundamental ideological construction of skateboarding as a
sport created and controlled by participants themselves.
When video technology came on the scene in the early eighties, skateboarders
were among its earliest adopters, although then most skateboarding videos were
commercially produced by sporting goods companies to market their products. The
fist widely distributed skateboarding video made by skaters themselves was The
Bones Brigade Video Show produced by George Powell and Stacey Peralta in 1984,
which featured such legendary skaters as Tony Hawk, and Rodney Mullen. It was in
these early videos that Powell and Peralta developed the techniques and generic
conventions that informed later amateur videos.
As video cameras became increasingly affordable, and with advances in
digital technology that made sophisticated editing and special effects more and more
accessible to non-professionals, video became a central part of the activity of
skateboarding. Learning how to shoot, perform in and edit video to some extent
became part of learning to be a skater. Skaters began to bring video equipment with
them when they skated, and to spend hours meticulously editing these videos and
setting them to music, and then posting them to sites like You Tube, My Space,
creating online digital archives of their personal accomplishments, the histories of the
social groups they were part of, and of the locales in which they skated.
The skate video is not just a random collection of shots of people skating. It is
a genre with clear conventions that have particular meaning and currency within this
discourse community. Typically these videos open with an initial narrative frame in
which the characters are introduced, characters which often include not just the
skaters themselves but also various bystanders, passers by and antagonists (usually in
the form of policemen and security guards). The bulk of course consists of skating, a
series of successive beautifully executed lines that give the viewer the impression that
the skater is travelling seamlessly through the environment, weaving a geographic
narrative, a journey in which successive architectural objects present obstacles for the
hero to overcome, rather like traditional hero narratives. Music of course is an
important feature, and soundtracks range from hip hop to punk to Billie Holiday, but
whatever track is chosen, the footage is edited so that the rhythms of the skating are
carefully entrained with the rhythms of the music. As with all hero narratives there are
inevitable setbacks, represented by what skaters call ‘bail footage’, shots of falling
down. And as with more traditional hero narratives, there are scenes of comic relief
represented through episodes of ritual insulting or horseplay.
The ‘bodies without organs’ that these videos constitute continue to fulfill the
memorial and evidentiary functions previously performed by photographs.
Within the subculture of skateboarding, in fact, these videoed documents of individual
accomplishments are extremely important tools for the ongoing and cyclical process
of verifying membership and earning cultural capital within the group (Donnelly and
Young 2001). With each new video posted online, a skater renews this membership
and revises the status associated with it.
And, of course, as with any home videos, the retrospective or memorial
function is quite important: the chance to relive the good times of past skate sessions,
to recall past skate spots which have since been re-appropriated by the authorities, and
to create a digital record of the history of the group and its members. For skaters,
however, this retrospective function has an important cognitive dimension as well.
These practices of retrospection are, in fact, integral to the process of learning to be a
skater, allowing them to reflect on past successes and dissect past failures, to
understand the motions and timing that go into performing particular tricks by
attending to what Ferrell (2001:182) and his colleagues call the ‘microphysics of
representability’ aided by their ability to freeze, slow down and speed up their
movements. Over time, these videos constitute visual records of particular skaters’
learning trajectories, allowing them understand how they have improved and what
they still need to work on, encouraging them to view their learning from a broader
temporal perspective. After the videos have been posted online, groups of skaters
engage in collective recollection through posted comments and feedback, which
facilitate not just individual learning but also group cohesion.
The most important function of these ‘bodies without organs’, I would argue
however, is documentary or retrospective, but anticipatory, their ability to help
skateboarders imagine futures and to contribute to their ongoing symbolic projects of
self-formation. The selves in these videos are not just representations of past bodies,
they are rehearsals of future ones.
To understand this fully one must consider the plight of bodies with organs
from the perspective of skaters. Anyone who has watched a lot of skateboarding
videos but not gone out skating would be surprised at how different the real procedure
is from what one sees on the screen. Far from the unbroken lines of successful tricks
that make it seem as if the skateboarder is travelling effortlessly through the city, what
actually occurs is a lot of falling down. Skateboarders do not land tricks far more
often then they do, and a successful line, an unbroken series of tricks across
sequential obstacles, is even more rare. The lived experience of an actual
skateboarding session is a tedious and painful process of trial and error in which error
is the rule.
And so what occurs in the editing process of these videos is not just a reliving
of the experience but a re-creation of it. The lines documented in skating videos, and
the chains of lines that give the impression of seamlessly traveling through the urban
landscape in a sense portray skating not as it is but as it ‘ought to be’, they are at once
documents of serendipitous moments and the compression of many hours and days of
failed attempts, at once documents of what really happened, and idealized versions of
what could happen or should happen, produced through careful selection and editing.
This is where these ‘bodies without organs’ function in particularly powerful ways for
skaters, allowing them to string together their successes into idealized portrayals that
reveal not just their past glory but also their future potential. ‘I’m really not that good,
you know,’ one skater admitted to me, ‘but if I’m good at editing, I can make myself
look like a pro.’
One important feature of digital editing which facilitates this function is the
way it amplifies the potential for desynchronization inherent in all processes of
entextualization. Digital media makes the relationship between time and space more
fluid and contingent, allowing time to be slowed down so that the brief, visceral
adrenalin intensity of a trick can be elongated into a slow, balletic dance, and speeded
up, so that the tedious and painful processes of learning, the experiences and
accomplishments of weeks of skating, can be collapsed into a single document. On
one hand, this manipulation of time helps to mediate the objective observable time of
the stationary observer with the relative psychological time of the skater in motion.
‘That’s really the way it feels when you’re doing it,’ said one of my participants, ‘like
time is slowed down and you’re aware…aware of everything around you and
everything you do.’ On the other hand, it helps skaters to reconstruct past experiences
occurring on multiple timescales (Lemke 2000) into coherent narratives -- from the
level of the micro move which skaters study to understand intricate aspects of timing,
to the discrete trick, to the line, to the session, to their skating careers, to the various
local and global histories of skateboarding, fashion and popular music within which
they situate their lives, the rhythms of all of these timescales carefully synchronized
so that the sounds of the skateboard along the surface of the ground are entrained to
the beats of the skater’s favorite song, and to trajectories of learning that have brought
him to this moment and will carry him into the future.
Skate videos, and skateboarding itself, are examples of what Lemke (2001)
calls ‘traversals’– defined as ‘temporal-experiential linkings, sequences, and
catenations of meaningful elements that deliberately or accidentally, but radically,
cross boundaries or standardized genres, themes, types, practices, or activities.’ (86)
What characterizes a traversal, writes Lemke, ‘is precisely that some kind of coherent
meaning is made in the unpredictable sequencing over “text-scales” that are longer
than the scales of the standardized elements which are strung together along the
traversal’ (89). Examples of trasversals include hypertexts, channel-surfing, mall
cruising, Djing and Mcing, and skateboarding, a practice in which skaters construct
coherent lines through navigating across disparate and seemingly unrelated features of
urban architecture, and then re-edit these lines into videos which are later embedded
into other genres like web pages. ‘Bodies without organs’ become figures in a,
mobile, reconfigurable textual field, incorporated into the structure of other texts,
pretexts, cotexts and contexts and various instrumentalities of entextualization and
interpretation, infinitely multiplying opportunities for producing meaning.
And these connections ultimately extend back out to the physical body itself.
Just because these narratives of future successes are virtual and, in some respects,
highly idealized, does not mean they have no connection to the ‘real world’. The
anticipatory qualities of the videos skaters have made in the past infiltrate their future
skate sessions, creating dynamic feedback loops. One of the most memorable lessons
I received during my fieldwork came when I asked a skater who was practicing at a
local skate park while listening to his iPod if he tried to skate to the rhythm of the
music he was listening to, rather naively assuming a linear relationship between one
mode and activity type and another on a single, linear timescale. ‘No, he said, it
doesn’t really work that way. When I listen to the music, what the songs remind me of
are the videos I made and the times I landed the trick and like how it felt.. and so I’m
thinking about the next video and the music and the editing and stuff.’
Conclusion
The effect of digital technologies on practices of entextualization seems
primarily to be to amplify those processes that I discussed at the beginning of this
chapter. The body becomes more deterritorialized, more desynchronized and more
able to be copied and multiplied. But the most important effect is that is that digital
technologies make the body more mutable, more editable, more susceptible to the
imagination, and so more resistant to the reification. They problematize the body
rather than stabilize it, and this might be in part what people find so threatening about
them. Digital technologies do not so much capture the body as set into motion new
processes of pursuing it.
One of the most important features of the digital age is the way it has created
for people new opportunities to engage in self-fashioning through narrative projects
using digital tools – projects which allow them to articulate important moments in
their lives, to reflect on life’s trajectories, and to reposition themselves as agents in
and authors of their own stories. Like Tibetan meditators, skaters use their ‘bodies
without organs’ to visualize themselves not as they are, but as they’d like to be, not
just to recount to themselves the narratives of how they got to where they are, but to
write the narratives of where they are going from here.
A number of scholars have seen extreme sports like skateboarding and
snowboarding as metaphors for the new affordances of digital virtualization.
Rushkoff (2006), for example, compares skateboarders surfing the city streets to
‘screenagers’ surfing the Internet, and Lévy sees extreme sports as physical
manifestations of virtualization, attempts to exceed physical limits, to explore other
velocities as ways of intensifying our physical presence and lifting us momentarily
out of the here and now. Like an avatar, the skater is ‘never entirely there. Leaving the
soil and its support he rises into the air, slides along interfaces, follows vanishing
lines, is deterritorialized and vectorized’ (43). And the body escapes itself, acquires
new velocities, conquers new spaces, and overflows itself.
The entextualization of the body using digital technology, for skateboarders at
least, rather than resulting in disembodiment, results in re-embodiment. Far from
alienating these young people from their bodies, these technologies have in many
cases created for them opportunities to experience their bodies is completely new
ways, ways which approach what Deleuze and Guattari might have had in mind when
they spoke of ‘bodies without organs’ as presenting us opportunities to ‘find potential
movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce
flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by
segment.’
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Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1987) A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and
schizophrenia. B. Massumi (trans.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.
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Haraway, D. (1991) A cyborg manifesto: Science, technology, and socialistfeminism in the late twentieth century," in D. Haraway, Simians, cyborgs and
women: The reinvention of nature (pp.149-181). New York: Routledge.!
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West, S. (2004) Portraiture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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