'We Must Push Eastwards!' The Challenges and Dilemmas of President Beneš after Munich
Author(s): Milan Hauner
Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Oct., 2009), pp. 619-656
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Journalof ContemporaryHistoryCopyright© 2009 SAGE Publications,Los Angeles, London, New Delhi,
Singapore and Washington DC, Vol 44(4), 619-656. ISSN 0022-0094.
DOI: 10.1 177/0022009409339435
MilanHauner
'We Must Push Eastwards!1The Challenges
and Dilemmas of President Benes after
Munich
Abstract
This articlehas beeninspiredby theauthor'seditingof E. Benes'Memoirs
1938-45. One of the strongest
challengesfor the formerCzechoslovak
withtheSovietUnion.Did Benes,who
President
Beneswas therelationship
inexileintheWest,succumbto Stalin'swillduringhis
hisgovernment
formed
visitin Moscowin late 1943 or later,duringthecommunist
putschof 1948?
The authorbelievesthatBenes'decisionto pusheastwards,
forthesake of
a closerrelationship
withSovietRussia,was formulated
muchearlier,
building
as a responseto thewesternbetrayalof Czechoslovakia
at Munichin 1938.
in theprocessofrebuilding
Benes'motivation
Czechoslovakia
was
However,
three
rather
than
at
a
common
borobjectives:
ideological,
aiming
geopolitical
derwiththeUSSR (whichentailedthesacrifice
of Subcarpathian
Ruthenia);
Slovak
and
the
Czecho-Slovak
and the
link;
autonomy reinforcing
crushing
of non-Slavicminorities,
the SudetenGermansand Hungarians.
transfer
seemedto havesatisfied
Benes'
Moscow,ratherthanLondonor Washington,
on
This
Stalin
led
also
to
Benes'
objectives. pragmatic
dependence
unwavering
oftheSovietversionoftheKatynmassacre.
acceptance
Benes,Czechoslovakia,
Stalin,SudetenGermans
Keywords:
Katyn,Ruthenia,
We must push the Republic eastwards . . . Closest as possible to Russia, so as to attach
Slovakia to us forever.
(Benes,January1939)1
EdvardBenes(1884-1948),thesecondandfourth
ofCzechoslovakia
president
was
considered
the
of
trauma
Munich
hecarried
(1935-8,1945-8),
despite
This articleis based on new archivalmaterialsin severallanguages,publishedand unpublished,
whichI have scrutinizedwhileeditingthe firstcriticaland reconstructed
editionof Edvard Benes'
Memoirs,Pamëti 1938-45, vols I- III (Prague 2007) [hereafterBenes, Pamëti (2007)]. This particulararticleattemptsto bringthe controversialpersonalityof Benes into the broadercontext
of the War in the East: especiallyBenes' relationshipwith Soviet Russia, its dictatorStalin and
the new geopoliticalemplacementof Czechoslovakia. I am gratefulto the Instituteof Integrated
InternationalStudiesat TrinityCollege forhavinginvitedme to Dublin in April2006 to present
an earlierdraftof thisarticle.
1 For theoriginsof thisquotationsee note 32.
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620
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
withhim- to be one of themostaccomplished
and resourceful
European
in
statesmen
those
exiled
the
among
Englandduring secondworldwar.Because
inhispolitithelastdecadeofhislifewasmarred
contradictions
bysubstantial
theForeignOfficeconsidered
hima politicalliability,
cal behaviour,
though
itrecognized
hisformidable
whilehisCzechcontempoabilities,2
negotiating
rariessaw in Benesa reallyoutstanding
butalso controversial
Czechoslovak
statesman.
AtleastfourseriouschargeshavesincebeenlevelledagainstBenes:thefirst
concernshis surrender
to theMunichDiktat.The secondchargemaintains
thathe, firstamongEuropeanstatesmen
duringthewar,sold the country
to Stalin.The third,voicedbytheSlovaks,accusesBenesof beingthemain
'Czechoslovak'union,thereby
guardianof theartificial
effectively
blocking
his
lifetime
Slovak
towardsfullautonomy.
the
throughout
aspirations
Finally,
mostseriouscharge,fromthehumanrightsperspective,
has comefromthe
whohavemaintained
thatBeneswas thechiefarchitect
oftheexpulGermans,
sionofthreemillionSudetenGermans,
old men,womenandchildren,
mostly
ofwhoma quarterofa millionaresaidto havedied.3Thusthesamemanwho
in 1939, uponhis arrivalin theUnitedStates,was hailedas 'Europe'smost
whosecountry
had beensacrificed
democrat',4
distinguished
by thewestern
appeasersto Hitlerin Munichin 1938,endedup afterthewarbeingbranded
as a genocidalculprit.5
Andifwe add hisunwavering
oftheSoviet
acceptance
versionof theKatynmassacre,Benesseemsto havecarrieda moralburden
heavierthantheaveragedemocratic
statesman.
In thisarticle,
I wouldliketo confront
one ofthesecharges,
namelyBenes'
to Stalin,whichwas to bringaboutdireconsequences
for
allegedsurrender
and EasternEuropeunderSovietdomination.6
Most commentahiscountry
2 MartinD. Brown,DealingwithDemocrats:
TheBritish
andtheCzechoslovak
ForeignOffice
2006), 59; VitSmetana,In theShadowof
Émigrésin GreatBritain,1939 to 1945 (Frankfurt
Munich:British
totheRenunciation
fromtheEndorsement
ofthe
PolicytowardsCzechoslovakia
1938-1942(Prague2008).
MunichAgreement,
3 German
calculated
onoverallpopulation
lossesoftheSudeten
German
civilian
populafigures,
tion1945-7.SeeTheodorSchieder
etal. (eds),Dokumentation
derVertreibung
derDeutschen
aus
derdeutschen
aus derTschechoslowakei
vol.4, Die Vertreibung
Ost-Mitteleuropa,
Bevölkerung
Kucerasuggests
tentimeslower:see
CzechstudybyJaroslav
(Bonn1957-61).A critical
figures
Odsunovéztráty
sudetonëmeckého
obyvatelstva
(Prague1992),32, also quotedin J.Hoensch
andH. Lemberg
undKonflikt
(Essen2001),231-44. TheJointCzech-German
(eds),Begegnung
Commission
of Historians
agreedin 1996 on SudetenGermanpopulationlossesin 1945 at
an undetermined
levelof between24,000 and 30,000.See Konfliktni
katastrofa,
spolecenstvt,
inN. Naimark,
FiresofHatred:
uvolneni
treatment
(Prague1996),29-30.Seealsothemorerecent
inTwentieth
EthnicCleansing
MA,andLondon2001), 108-38.
-Century
Europe(Cambridge,
4 TheUniversity
November
1938,17-18.
ofChicagoMagazine,
fortheNobel
5 Thisappearsto be thesinglemostimportant
reasonwhyBenes'candidature
in 1947 bynumerous
fromGermanSocial
PeacePrizewas thwarted
protests,
comingespecially
withthe
Democrats
who had beenexiledin Swedenduringthewar (author'scorrespondence
inOslo,July1998).
NobelInstitute
6 Unsubstantiated
andquitesillycharges
havebeenmadebya former
NKVD seniorofficer
that
hisorganization
viaFrancein1938.Benes
paidBenes$10,000andhelpedhimtoescapetoEngland
infactflewto Englandquiteovertly,
inmid-October
viatheNetherlands,
1938.His journey
was
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Haunen The Challenges and Dilemmas of PresidentBenes afterMunich
62 1
torsobserved
thatitwas eitherat theendof1943,as a resultofBenes'fateful
to
1948 duringthecommunist
pilgrimage Moscow,or evenlater,in February
seizureofpowerin Prague,thattheCzechoslovak
statesman
had surrendered
to Stalin.Benes'declining
and
hence
the
health,
growingmarginof human
errorin his judgments,
have beenoftenmentioned
as contributing
factors.7
Did heerrinputting
histrustinStalin?WhenBenesnegotiated
withtheSoviet
did he succumbto Stalin'ssataniccharm,as did his successorEmil
dictator,
when
he facedHitlerduringthenightof 14-15 March1939?Whatif
Hácha,
Benesembraced
thepro-Soviet
orwitha streakof
optionpurely
pragmatically,
his
to
overcome
humiliation
from
the
ofFrance
vengeance,
resulting
betrayal
andHitler'sbeastlyverbalattacks?8
To findtheanswer,we maydrawon severalhelpfultestimonies.
Jaromir
headofBenes'presidential
and one ofhisclosestassociSmutny,
chancellery
in his diariesa rareinsightintohis master'sMachiavellian
ates,has offered
at thesametimeBenes'unrivalled
inintermind,whilerecognizing
experience
EduardTáborsky,who servedhismasterduringthewar as
nationalaffairs.9
andlegaladviser,
andwho,likeSmutny,
was also present
in
personalsecretary
MoscowwhenBenesmetStalin,has provideda comprehensive
of
description
theplusesandminuses
ofBenesas statesman
anddiplomat.
WithspecialreferBenes-Stalin
enceto theenigmatic
several
relationship,
Táborskyenumerates
suchas Benes'earlyloveaffairwithsocialism,hisinsistence
possiblefactors,
on speakingRussianwithSovietleaders(notwithstanding
hisbarelyadequate
ofthatlanguage),
hisexaggerated
hisbeliefinthe'theory
knowledge
loquacity,
ofconvergence',
hislateembracing
of neo-Slavism,
and otherpoints,adding
forgoodmeasure
the'Munichcomplex',whichledto Benes'notorious
distrust
oftheBritish.
's longcatalogueofBenes'virtues
and vices
However,
Táborsky
intheinternational
Germanpapers!See PavelandAnatoli
reported
press,including
j Sudoplatov,
- a SovietSpymaster
Witness
(Boston1994),62-3.
ofan Unwanted
SpecialTasks,theMemoirs
TheRussianversion
oftheSudoplatovs'
bookcarries
a different,
moreplausiblestory
aboutBenes,
butstillimplies
collaboration
between
theCzechoslovak
andtheNKVD, forwhichno
president
dataareoffered:
i Kreml,1930-1950gody(Moscow1997),99.
Spetsoperatsii-Lubianka
7 One ofthefirst
whoconvincingly
was causednot
politicalanalysts
arguedthatBenes'failure
butbyhisentrenched
beliefthatStalinism
and democracy
couldconexhaustion,
byphysical
wasCurtF.Beckinhisbrilliant
'Can Communism
andDemocracy
Coexist?Benes's
article,
verge,
American
SlavicandEastEuropeanReview11(3) (October1952),189-206.SeeBenes'
Answer',
ownwriting:
theexpandedCzech
(London1939),especially
Democracy
Todayand Tomorrow
in 1942 and 1946 (Demokracie
editions
dnesa ztira),247ff.In thelastchapterofhis
published
Memoirs
herepeats
thequestion:
is a transformation
ofpostwardemocracy
and
actually
possible,
is itpossibleforitto coexistand co-operate
withthesystem
of Sovietsocialism?
See: E. Benes,
Parneti(Prague1948),426-30; E. Benes:Memoirs(London1954), 182-6; ParnetiII (2007),
281-5.
8 Attacks
suchas Hitler'sNuremberg
andtheSportpalast
speechof 12 September
speechof26
1938. As forthesarcastic
comments
on Benes'tripto Moscowin 1943,see,among
September
TheTimes,20 December1943;Newsweek,
27 December1943;New Leader,15 January
others,
1944.
9 Smutny's
diarieswerepublished
as Dokumenty
ceskoslovenské
1939-1943
ζ historie
politiky
[hereafter
Diaries](Prague1966),
(Prague1966),eds L. Otáhalováand M. Cervinková
Smutny
herevol.I, nos69 and288.
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622
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
thedecisiverolewhich
theroleofideologyand minimize
tendsto exaggerate
in
Benes'
thinking.10
geopolitics
played
I am proposing
and the
a different
approach.The studyof Benes'writings
Benes'
deciofdirect
witnesses
hasledmetoa different
testimonies
hypothesis.
a commonbordertoreceive
siontoturnto Russiainordertoestablish
military
as a directconsequence
oftheMunich
assistancemusthaveoccurred
earlier,
whenFranceand Britainrefusedto defendCzechoslovakia
against
tragedy,
Benesbelievedhe had foundtheanswerto Czechoslovakia's
nazi Germany.
whichwas so nakedlyexposedunderthedravulnerable
strategic
placement,
oftheSudetencrisis.Although
onecannotexcludeBenes'
maticcircumstances
the
traumatic
emotional
involvement,
impactoftheMunich
given highly
deep
moment
was nevhis
decision
to
turn
to
Russia
at
this
Diktat,
nerve-racking
based
on
a
but
at
the
same
ertheless
rational.
It
was
perfectly
logical
deeply
of survival.During
timedesperateanalysisof CentralEuropeangeopolitics
Beneswas confronted
withtheominousperspectheSudetencrisis,President
tivethatCzechoslovakia,
whosebordershe had literally
helpedto createat
in 1919, and whichhe triedto protectagainstfascist
thePeace Conference
in CentralEurope,
encirclement
as thelast surviving
bastionof democracy
was abandonedbytheWestand sold downtheriverto Hitler.HenceBenes'
aftermath
of Munichat the
bornin theimmediate
traumatic
determination,
in
to provideCzechoslovakia
moment
ofhispoliticalcareer,
mosthumiliating
which
of Russianassistance,
thefuture
witha permanent
strategic
guarantee
intheeventofa Germanthreat.
wouldbe activated
a belatedFrenchresponseto GermanrearmaAlreadyin 1935, following
wenttoMoscowtosigna treaty
as foreign
minister,
Benes,inhiscapacity
ment,
couldbe setin motion
and mutualassistance,
of friendship
which,however,
In
first.11
onlyin theeventof Germaninvasionand iftheFrenchintervened
weremassedalongCzechoslovakia's
1938,whileGermandivisions
September
theRed Armywas about 1000 milesaway,separatedby
vulnerable
border,
refusedto give
hostilePolandand hesitating
Romania,whosegovernments
foritto passthrough.12
permission
thatduringtheagonizingdaysfollowing
not surprising
It was, therefore,
President
EdvardBenesBetweenEast and West1938-1948(Stanford,
10 EdwardTaborsky,
letter
to theeditoroftheManchester
CA, 1981),1-29; seealso an earlierdocument,
Taborsky's
'Dr BenesandtheRussians',
andhis'BenesandtheSoviets'
of10January
Guardian
1949,entitled
a
inForeign
1949).ThepopularpolemicbooksbyTomanBrod,Ceskoslovensko
Affairs
(January
svaz1939-1945(Prague1992)andOsudnyomylEdvardaBenese(Prague2002),fitthe
Sovëtsky
beenwelldocumented
has recently
samecategory.
Benes'systematic
studyof socialistliterature
and
in thenewpoliticalbiography
Dejmek,EdvardBenes,vol. 1, Revolutionary
byJindfich
Diplomat1884-1935(Prague2006),58-88.
inIzvestiiaandPravda,18 May 1935.
11 Textofthetreaty
published
12 For further
detailssee: M. Hauner,'The Quest forthe RomanianCorridor:The Soviet
Union,Romaniaand Czechoslovakia
duringtheSudetenCrisisof 1938', in FritzTaubert(ed.),
MythosMünchen(Munich2002), 39-77; HughRagsdale,TheSoviets,theMunichCrisisand
theComingof WorldWarΠ (Cambridge
2004); MarianZgórniak,Wojskowe
aspektykryzysu
1938 roku(Cracow1966); MarianZgórniak,
czechoslowackiego
Sytuacjamilitarna
Europyw
1938roku(Warsaw1979).
okresiekryzysu
politycznego
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Haunen The Challenges and Dilemmas of PresidentBenes afterMunich
623
abouthow to bringabout a major
Beneswas primarily
Munich,13
thinking
balancein
thedesperatestrategic
changebyradicallycorrecting
geopolitical
Suchradicalchangecouldnot
CentralEuropein favourof Czechoslovakia.
theexisting
bordersinEasternEurope,includbe achievedwithout
redrawing
so
as
to
allowtheSovietUnionto havea
Poland
and
those
of
Romania,
ing
thetransit
with
the
Czechoslovak
commonborder
Republicand to facilitate
A
invaders.
German
of Soviettroopswestwards
simpleglanceat the
against
of
whichwas
province Czechoslovakia,
mapwilltellus thattheeasternmost
to serveas theplatsdarmof Russiantroops,was Subcarpathian
Ruthenia,
decidedso, had forcenturies
whichuntil1919, whenthePeace Conference
Czech
withhistoric
beenpartoftheHungarian
Kingdomandneverconnected
territory.14
Munichsettlement
lessonthatfollowedthetraumatic
The secondstrategic
incarving
fromassisting
thePolesandHungarians
wastoprevent
up
Germany
to hidethathisthirdaimwas to
Benesdidnotpretend
Czechoslovak
territory.
thedeterrent
ofthe
Slovaksubjectsinsubmission
through
keepthedisaffected
theSudetenGermans,
the
in Ruthenia.Finally,
RedArmystationed
regarding
inthecountry
andhostileto theentireCzechoslovak
project,
'minority'
largest
to reducetheirnumbers
by intersubstantially
apartfroma vagueintention
Beneshad to thinkhardabouthowmuchSudeten
nal and external
transfers,
to
hewas prepared
ofuniquestrategic
German-inhabited
significance
territory
thathe would.
sacrifice
forgood.Andwe shallsee,unpredictably,
did not disintegrate
Czechoslovakia,
however,
solelybecauseof external
Beneshad to
threatsposed by German,Polishand Hungarianrevisionism.
to internal
had beenevenmorevulnerable
admitthatthemultiethnic
republic
of
two
revolvers:
the
one
held
use
the
He
would
analogy
against
disruptions.
the Czechsby the SudetenGermans,the otherby the Slovaks.'Whenwe
threatened
us theywouldjoin Germanyand
refusedto givein, theformer
thelatterthattheywouldseparate;we mustgetridofthesetworevolvers.'15
theSeptember
at first
to invitetheSovietairforceduring
Muchas hehesitated
ofthe
did
not
seem
to
care
as
a
Munich
Benes
after
that,
crisis,16
consequence
Munichand his
forBenes'mentaland physicalexhaustion
13 The besttestimony
following
on 5 October1938 arethepreserved
diaryentries
byhiswifeHana,inTheNational
resignation
MuseumArchives
papers,Box 1.
Prague,Hana Benesováprivate
thetermTranscarpathian
Ukraine{Zakarpatskaia
14 The Russians,understandably,
prefer
Rus 1918-1946(Prague2007); A.I. Pushkash,
PeterSvorc,Zakletázem.Podkarpatská
Ukraina).
Hi Varvarstvo.
Tsivilizatsiia
Zakarpatie1918-45 (Moscow2006); V.V.Marjina,Zakarpatskaia
ocherk(Moscow 2003);
Ukrainaν politikeBenesai Stalina1939-194Sgg.Dokumentalnyi
Rus i Ukraina(Uzhgorod2003); VincentShandor,
Piotrand SergeiGodmash,Podkarpatskaia
aineintheTwentieth
MA, 1997).
Century
(Cambridge,
Carpatbo-Ukr
11 April1941,
recordedbyJaromir
withJaroslavStránsky,
15 Benes'conversation
Smutny,
inSmutny
AstonAbbotts:
Diaries,no. 153.
and inadequateairfields
16 Apartfromthelackof logistical
readyto receivethe
preparations
assistance
SovietairforceinSeptember
1938,Benes'mainreasonnottoappealforSovietmilitary
ofhavingbeeninstrumental
was political.He didnotwishto be accusedbyFranceand Britain
inthe'Sovietization'
ofEastern
whathecalled'thesecondSpanishCivilWar'.
Europebystarting
in M. Hauner,
(See Benes'keyletterof November1938 to LadislavRasin;Englishtranslation
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
624
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
Sovietadvance,Polandand Romaniamightbecometargetsof Sovietization
- as longas thiscouldweakenGermaninfluence.
ifcommunism
Moreover,
as
was to comewiththeRedArmyto CentralEurope,itshouldbe considered
fortheWest'sbetrayal.
It wouldalso resultinthenecestherightpunishment
inEasternEurope.
andbackwardelements
sarysocialpurgeofthereactionary
in CentralEurope,
of a social revolution
Benesbelievedin theinevitability
thenewEuropeanwar,
which,as he predicted
manytimes,wouldaccompany
in
substance
the
of
the
Great
War of 1914-18.
and thusrepeat
experience
To him,as a social thinker
and practitioner
of powerpolitics,thecoming
war appearedas a powerful
thesolutionof manysocial
catalystexpediting
whichwouldotherwise
havetakencenturies
to solve.17
Benesmust
problems,
to as the
as one oftheearliestexponents
oftheconceptreferred
be regarded
Years'EuropeanCivilWar',whoseinterpreters
maintained
thatboth
'Thirty
in one giantsocialconflict.
Beneshad
worldwarsmustbe linkedtogether
of
embracedit considerably
earlier,beforetheconceptcaughttheattention
politicalscientists.18
There is no otheralternativepolicythantheone I pursued. . . and I am not goingto give in
evenifI becomean outcastfortherestof mylife.Eithermypolicywill prevailor fascismwill
spread.Do notworry;I shall takecare of myselfwhilein America.I shall neithergiveup nor
retreatfrommyideas. Will act as I used to withMasaryk.19
Thus spokeEdvardBenesat theend ofJanuary1939 - untilfourmonths
earlierthePresident
oftheCzechoslovak
Republic.He was nowa privateperson,livingwithhiswifeHana inpoliticalexileintheLondonsuburbofPutney,
'Edvard Benes' Undoingof Munich: A Message to a Czechoslovak Politicianin Prague',Journal
of CotemporaryHistory38(4) (October 2003), 563-77.) Two historiansof Czech descent:Ivan
der Tschechoslowakei1934-1938 (Cologne 1996),
Pfaff,Die Sowjetunionund die Verteidigung
320, 363; and, to a lesserextent,Igor Lukes, CzechoslovakiabetweenStalinand Hitler(Oxford
1996), 191, 198-201, have built theircase on the intendedSovietizationof Czechoslovakia in
1938, using as theirmain argumenta conjured speech by Stalin's chief propagandistAndrei
Zhdanov, allegedlydeliveredin Prague on 21 August 1938, and otherfabricatedevidence.My
own criticalanalysisappeared in: 'Zrada, sovëtizace,nebo historickylapsus?' Soudobé dëjiny4
(1999), 545-71; and 'Could Czechoslovakiahave been Saved in September1938 and the Myths
of Munich: New Research and Old Problems',Kosmas (Czechoslovak and Central European
Journal)(Fall 2004), 46-63.
On Red Armyoperational deploymentand Soviet railway capacity I am most gratefulto
ProfessorBruceW. Menning(US ArmyCommandand GeneralStaffCollege at FortLeavenworth,
Kansas) forallowingme to quote fromhis conferencepapers: 'SovietRailroads and War Planning
1927-1939' (1996); 'SovietRailroadsand War Planning194Γ (1995); and 'The Munich Crisisin
Lightof SovietWar Planningand MilitaryReadiness' (2000).
17 See E. Benes,Fall and Rise ofa Nation: Czechoslovakia1938-1 941 , ed. and intro.M. Hauner
(New York2004), especiallych. VIII; Pamëti(1948), 199, 218; Memoirs(1954), 136, 144; Parneti
II (2007), 145, 154.
18 E.g. Ernst Nolte, Der europäische Bürgerkrieg1917-1945: Nationalsozialismus und
Bolschewismus(Frankfurt
1987).
19 T.G. Masaryk (1850-1937), togetherwith Benes the co-founderof Czechoslovakia and its
firstpresident,from1918 to 1935. For thesourceof thisquotationsee note 31 below.
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Haunen The Challenges and Dilemmas of PresidentBenes afterMunich
625
butsharinga fewroomsin a modesthouse
notevenin hisown apartment,
rentedbyhisnephew,
BonusBenes,a juniordiplomatwiththeCzechoslovak
threemonths
Beneshad leftCzechoslovakiaafterhis resignation
legation.20
forhis firstvisitto theUnitedStatesas a
himself
earlierand was preparing
of Chicago.21
The personwho tookdown
at theUniversity
visiting
professor
a
thesenoteswasJaroslav
Drábek, younglawyerfromPragueon a legalbusiforone ofthe
nesstripto London.He servedat thesametimeas a messenger
first
resistance
groups.22
fromthe Munichtrauma,whichmusthave
Beneswas stillconvalescing
him
and
fora while.23
The Europeancrisis
paralysed bothphysically mentally
in
he wouldhavefavoured:
thatis,
was notmovingfastenough thedirection
of a 'GreatAlliance'of democratic
towardstheformation
powers,including
theUnitedStatesand,aboveall,theSovietUnion- whichofcoursewas not
buta totalitarian
likeChurchill
at
a democracy
Benes,however,
dictatorship.
themighty
humanand industhetime,was convinced
thatwithoutengaging
trialresources
ofRussiaand Americathefascistcoalitionofthreerevisionist
Italyand Japan,laterto be knownas theAxis,couldnot
powers,Germany,
be defeated.
withthefuture
ofCzechoslovakia,
Benes'mindwas constantly
preoccupied
at thePeace Conference
of
whosefinalbordershe had helpedto determine
of Czechoslovakia,
Thomas
1919. Whilehisseniorcolleagueand co-founder
Edvard
GarrigueMasaryk,receivedthe honorarytitlePresident-Liberator,
Builder(Budovatel).Hence his
Benesbecameknownas thePresident-State
ofthenextCzechoslovak
Statethat
obsessionwiththeoptimalconfiguration
afterthewar,whichhe regarded
as inevitable.
was to be reassembled
inmid-March
ofAustriabynaziGermany
After
theAnschluss
1938,Benes
to cut a deal withKonradHenlein'sSudetenGerman
appearedto be trying
thelargest
andmostmilitant
The negotiapoliticalpartyinthecountry.
Party,
tionsbetweentheSudetenGermanPartyand theCzechoslovakGovernment
Henlein
wentthroughseveralstages- withoutany chanceof succeeding.
in
to
want
he
aimed
to
Czechoslovakia.24
appeared
autonomy; reality
destroy
The collapseof the so-calledFourthPlan in earlySeptember
1938 was
20 Author's interviewsin 1992 with Bonus Benes's widow, Mrs Emilie Benes, McLeane,
Virginia.
21 The account of Benes' stayin the USA betweenFebruaryand July1939 had been originally
draftedby his archivistJan Opocensky. However,the chapter- with the exception of a few
episodes such as Benes' secretmeetingwith F.D. Roosevelt- was neverincorporatedin Benes'
Memoirs,publishedin 1947. Opocensky'smanuscriptis available in thecriticaledition:Formování
ceskoslovenskéhozahranicníhoodboje 1938-1939, ed. and intro.by M. Hauner (Prague 2000)
citedas Formation].
[hereafter
22 Author'sinterviewwith JaroslavDrábek in Washington,DC, in 1992. For his book, see
further
note 3 1.
23 Accordingto the diaries of his wife Hana, preservedin the National Museum Archivesin
Prague (Hana Benesová, privatepapers, diaries,Box 1), the physicallyand mentallyexhausted
presidentspentmostof October 1938 restingin bed.
24 Documents on German ForeignPolicy 1918-1945, series D/I, no. 107 [hereaftercited as
DGFPorADAP].
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626
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
followedin quick successionby a seriesof politicalexplosionsof varying
in theSudetendistricts;
Hitler'sspeechin Nuremberg;
theuprising
intensity:
of LordRuncimanand hismissionfromPrague;Prime
thesuddendeparture
Minister
Chamberlain's
first
visitto Germany
to meetHitlerat Berchtesgaden;
theAnglo-French
ultimatum
to theCzechoslovakGovernment
to surrender
to Germany
all borderdistricts
witha Germanmajority;
theCzechoslovak
in responseto Hitler's
and Alliedpartialmobilizations
generalmobilization
excessive
demandsat thesecondmeeting
between
HitlerandtheBritish
prime
inBad Godesberg;
minister
Chamberlain's
thirdflight
to Germany
and,finally,
to meetHitler,
DaladierandMussoliniat thecrucialMunichConference.
It was in responseto theshocking
newsthatChamberlain
tooka planeto
to
to
meet
Hitler
that
Benes
concocted
a
secret
fly Germany
highly
plan,later
referred
toas the'Fifth
tooffer
Hitlerterritorial
Plan',inwhichhewasprepared
- butonlythrough
concessions
Frenchmediation.25
Minister
Necas,
Jaromir
a SocialDemocrat,tookthishighly
contentious
and secretplan,summedup
in a dozenpointsin thepresident's
characteristic
to Parison 15
handwriting,
thesamedayas NevilleChamberlain
flewto Munich.26
Benes'plan
September,
was to prevent
theanticipated
deal callingforan amputation
Anglo-German
ofCzechoslovakia.
to Benes'highly
secretcounterproposal,
around
According
6000 sq. km.ofSudetenterritory
wouldbe offered
to Hitler,
butwiththeobligationto absorbintotheReichbetween1.5 and 2 millionSudetenGermans
fromotherdistricts.
WhenDaladierbrought
theBenestermsto Londonon 17
Chamberlain
dismissed
themas belatedandinadequate,
forhehad
September,
offer
to Hitlertwodaysearlier.27
alreadymadea moregenerous
InJanuary
whenBenesspoketoDrábek,hewentbeyondthe
1939,however,
limitsoftheearlierFifthPlan.As hisfinger
wanderedoverthemap,he now
inthe
considered
a territory
largerthanhehadsuggested
giving
upto Germany
instructions
to Necasfourmonths
earlier.
Beneswas now'offering'
up to two
und Deutsche1939-46
25 J. Kren,V emigraci(Prague1969), 460; J.W.Brügel,Tschechen
Cesia Nëmcive velkonëmecké
(Munich1974),239-40; V. Kural,Mistospolecenství
konflikt.
físia cestak odsunu1938-45 (Prague1994), 106; V. Kural,Vlastenci
protiokupaci.Ústfední
vedeníodbojedomácího1940-1943(Prague1997),37; D. Brandes,Der Wegzur Vertreibung
derDeutschenaus derTschechoslowakei
1938-1945.PläneundEntscheidungen
zumTransfer
undaus Polen(Munich2001),5-7.
thewar
26 Although
Benesordered
Necastodestroy
hishandwritten
instructions,
theysurvived
in 1957.Theirauthenticity
hasneverbeenchalandwerepublished
historians
bytwocommunist
Mnichovν dokumentech
II. Zradaceskéa slovenské
burzoasiena
lenged.FortheCzechversion:
lidu[Munichin Documents,
vol.II] (Prague1958),209-10. A verified
French
ceskoslovenském
is printed
translation
in:Documents
1932-1939,2ndseries,vol.XI (Paris
diplomatiques
français
theMunich
ofJonathan
1977),no. 192.Seealsotheanalysis
Zorach,'TheNecasMissionduring
theexistence
ofthe
neveradmitted
Crisis',EastCentral
Europe1-2 (1989),53-70. Beneshimself
The document
has
'FifthPlan',assuming
until1943 thatNecas had destroyed
hisinstructions.
I (2007),21-3;
Parneti
intherecently
critical
editionofBenes'memoirs:
beenincluded
published
III (2007),no. 52.
Parneti
of29(30) September
cededto
27 Asconfirmed
1938,Czechoslovakia
bytheMunichSettlement
- with3.4
thanBenesproposed
29,000sq. km.- a fivetimeslargerpieceofterritory
Germany
wereCzech-speaking).
million
inhabitants
(ofwhomaroundhalf-a-million
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Hauner The Challenges and Dilemmas of PresidentBenes afterMunich
627
millionSudetenGermanswithabout 10,000 to 15,000 sq. km.of territory.
inthewestfromCheb(Eger),running
Karlsbad,Ústí(Aussig),
Starting
through
in Moraviathenew map of transDëcin (Tetschen),
Libérée(Reichenberg);
ferred
territories
included
Krnov(Jägerndorf),
(Mährisch
Sumperk
Schönberg),
with
five
three
or
four
majorsalients,
plus
together
German-language
pockets,
1.4 millionGerman-speaking
inhabitants.
The restof
containing
altogether
thequotawas to be providedthrough
transfers
and byhorsecompensation
in
the
additional
half-a-million
Sudeten
Germans
trading
exchangeforterritoriesinPrussian
whereCzechused
Silesia,suchas Glatz(Kladsko)andRatibor,
to be spokeninearliergenerations.
'TheRepublic'sbordersmustbe pushedeastwards,'
in
Beneskeptrepeating
front
ofhisflabbergasted
Praguevisitor.
That's no panslavism,but a law of geography.We mustbecome [Russia's] neighbours.That
will make us strongervis-à-visGermanyand help to zip up Slovakia definitively
with us.
Thereis too muchrabbleoverthereand theyremainpoliticallyimmature... theSlovakswill
fallin our armswhentheysee thegreatbrethrenmarchingfromtheeast.
definitively
The last sentencewas added rathermischievously.
The bond betweenthe
Czechsand Slovakswas to be re-cemented
by the dominantideologyof
of whichBeneswas the mostsingle-minded
'Czechoslovakism',
champion.
was completely
brokenin lessthantwomonths.Under
(The bond,however,
directGermanpressure,
Slovakseparatists
on 14 Marchtheirfirst
proclaimed
stateinhistory;
on thefollowing
'independent'
dayHitleroccupiedPrague.)
reconstruction
Benes'further
to achievea morehomogeneous
and
fantasy
viableCzechoslovakia
was to be crownedbythecreationof a
geopolitically
newcapitalnearVelehradin southern
Moravia.Regarding
theprospectsof
theHungarian(750,000) and Polishminorities
(70-100,000) in the future
Czechoslovak
He made,nevertheless,
a fewextremestate,Benessaidnothing.
comments
aboutPoland.He couldnotforget
thehumiliating
Polish
lynegative
ultimatum
the
of
the
Tesin
(Zaolzie),
announcing military
occupation
pocket
withterms
attached
thatsoundedmorearrogant
thanthosedemanded
byHerr
Hitler.In histhoughts
Beneshad alreadypunishedthePoles.He wishedtheir
stateto be reducedto 20 millioninhabitants.
His maintargetwas thePolish
a
class
that
should
be
aristocracy,parasitic
putawayandceaseto playtherole
ofthenation'sélite.A family
whovisitedhiminChicagointhesummer
friend,
of 1939,noticedthatBenes'saversionagainstthePoleswas visiblystronger
thanagainsttheGermans:
I don't believein an agreementwiththe Poles. They will always betrayus. We cannot link
up withthemagainstthe Germans.It is useless.They will betrayus! This is a law of nature!
That does notmeanthatwe shouldplot withtheGermansagainstthePoles. Theymustsettle
it among themselves.It is Hitlerwho will help us to achieve [direct]neighbourhoodwith
Russia!28
28 Speakingto FrankMunk, who visitedhim in Chicago in July1939, Benes said that'Poland
mustbe beaten just as we have been . . . The Poles supportedMunich and carry,therefore,50
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628
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
allies
was on theupswingand Benes,abandonedby his former
Germany
and by theLeague,was a realistwho had to developnew ideas arounda
Even
certainmodusvivendiwithhis overwhelming,
aggressive
neighbour.
thereducedrump-Czechoslovakia,
aftertheannexationof theSudetenland,
with
of Hitler'sReich,stillhad thelongestfrontier
amongall 10 neighbours
The
new
which
had
its
title
from
state,
Germany. fragile
officially
changed
fromthreesidesby a
Czechoslovakia
to 'Czecho-Slovakia',
was constricted
border
was
now
The
German
less
than50 kilometres
Germany.
python-like
betweenPragueand therepublic'smajor
fromPrague.All rail connections
SincetheannexedSudetenland
contained
citiesranacrossGermanterritory.
borderfortifications,
the new countrywas in a
mostof Czechoslovakia's
seemedto be constantly
hopelessstrategic
position.Benes'mind,therefore,
in
the
of
the
future
Czechoslovakia
with
preoccupied designing optimalshape
to thefollowing
challenges:
response
Slovaktrendtowardsautonomy
and eventualsepara(1) The contemporary
linkand by
the
Czecho-Slovak
tionhadto be stoppedthrough
reinforcing
In
the
centre
of
to
the
East.
Benes'
the
thinking,
pushing country's
gravity
with
its
core
Czech
future
Czechoslovak
Republic,paradoxically,
populationof 7 million,couldsurvivewithoutmostof itsoriginal3.5 million
Germans;butwouldhavelostitsraisond'êtreif2 millionSlovakswere
leftout.
withsubstantial
of the SudetenGermans,together
(2) The transfer
pieces
Beneswas readyto
ofterritory,
wouldhaveto be acceptedas inevitable.
trimaround10,000sq. km.of historicCzechand Moravianterritories,
wouldalso take2 millionSudetenGermans:almost
providedGermany
with
two-thirds
ofthetotal.He calculatedthatthefuture
Czechoslovakia,
of 10 millionCzechsand Slovaks,could handle
a solid Slavicmajority
an extra1 millionloyalGerman-speaking
citizens,composedmostlyof
be suband Jews,who shouldfurther
Social Democrats,Communists
in
so
that
to
internal
transfer
and
redistribution,
everyconstituency
jected
'Czechoslovaks'
wouldalwaysoutvoteGerman-speakers.
(3) The easternmost
province,SubcarpathianRuthenia(Transcarpathian
offered
to theSovietUnioninexchangefora common
was
to
be
Ukraine),
assistance.The purposeof
borderand guaranteeof permanent
military
theconsent
needless
to say,without
thispragmatic
concocted,
transaction,
was perfectly
rationalfromBenes'pointofview.It was
ofitsinhabitants,
which
meantto repairCzechoslovakia's
deficiency,
strategic
catastrophic
a
the
Sudeten
crisis.
had beenso alarmingly
Byacquiring
exposedduring
fulfil
a
Red Armywouldin future
directborderwithRussia,themighty
off
and
German
doublefunction:
aggression scaring separatist
preventing
Slovaks.
in early
Czechoslovakia
on reconstructed
In summing
up Benes'thinking
forMunich': Recordof theMunk-Benesconversationin Formation^no. 60;
percentresponsibility
ParnetiIII (2007), no. 114.
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Hauner The Challenges and Dilemmas of PresidentBenes afterMunich
629
1939, one can assume,on the basis of theavailableevidence,thatbeinga
realisthe acceptedforthetimebeingtheannexationof theSudetenland
by
enforcedby at leastthreeverdicts:the Lord RuncimanMission
Germany,
Plan of 19 September
(Reportof 21 September1938), the Anglo-French
1938.29
Not surprisingly,
Settlement
of
30
and
the
Munich
1938,
September
ofCzechoslovakia
were
reconstruction
ideasfora sweeping
Benes'geopolitical
to
deal
'FifthPlan',originally
on theultra-secret
founded
exclusively
designed
Benesbecame
withtheSudetenGermanQuestion.AfterMunich,however,
withanotherradicalconcept:to 'pushtherepubliceastwards',
preoccupied
a commonborderwithRussiaandthereby
forthesakeofestablishing
gaining
optimalsecurity
againstfutureGermanattack.It wouldcost himRuthenia
- whichindenialofinternational
was
law and thepromiseoffullautonomy
fromPrague.Slovakia,on theother
the20 interwar
ruledduring
yearsdirectly
witha stronger
bondto theBohemian
core.
hand,was to be re-attached
Builder- contained,
The 'granddesign'of Benes- the President-State
Czechoslovakia's
directneighbours.
additionalflawsaffecting
nevertheless,
If the SovietUnionwas to gain directaccess to Czechoslovakiathrough
thoseareasofRomaniaandPolandthatblockedaccessto Ruthenia
Ruthenia,
fromtheeastwouldhaveto be occupiedbytheRedArmybeforeitcouldenter
it
Ruthenia.
WhileBeneswas usingtheslogan'PushtheRepublicEastwards',
werepushing
westwards.
wasinfacttheSovietswho,inrealgeopolitical
terms,
Benesindicatedthathe was readyto cede to Russianotonlythe
Moreover,
Rutheniaup to thetownofUzhorod,butalso a portion
entireSubcarpathian
ofeasternSlovakiawithmixedSlovakandUkrainian
(andHungarian!)settleas faras Presov.
ments,
intoPragueand disThe 'IdesofMarch'in 1939 - thedayHitlermarched
- shockedand surprised
solvedrump-Czechoslovakia
Benes,who was then
inChicago.Buthe immediately
seizedthenewopportunity
offered
byHitler's
A new stageof planningthe
outrageousbreachof theMunichSettlement.
of Czechoslovakia
wouldbeginforBenes,whoseunderlying
future
purpose
The firstportionof histhree-tier
was to be the'Undoing'of Munich.30
plan,
andethnographically,
would
thesolutionoftheGermanProblem,
territorially
changesuntilmid-1942, whentheidea of a
undergothemostcontroversial
transfer
with
as
few
territorial
concessions
as possiblewouldwinthe
global
in
The
second
of
hisoverallplanofreconhand
Benes'
thinking.
point
upper
theSlovakQuestion,wouldremainfundamentally
thesame- with
struction,
of theHungarianminority
theaddedprovisoconcerning
thetransfer
(which
hadto be abandonedin 1945 becauseStalinopposeditforpracticalreasons).
of Rutheniaforthesake of havinga
thethirdpoint,thesacrifice
Regarding
commonborderwiththeUSSR,Beneswoulduse as an enticement,
whenever
Andalso becausehe hadnothing
hecouldwinSovietsupport.
elsewithwhich
to bargainwithStalin.
29 Benes,PamëtiIII (2007), no. 54, no. 61, no. 62, no. 75.
3U M. Hauner, hdvardBenes Undoingor Munich: A Message to a Czechoslovak Politicianin
History38(4), 563-77.
Prague',Journalof Contemporary
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
630
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
As forthemessenger
JaroslavDrábek,afterhis returnto Praguehe paid
activities
undertheGermanoccupation.Arrested
for
his
dearly
underground
he survived
and transferred
to Auschwitz,
bya miracle.Drábekhimself
pubinwhichhe recounted
thismemorable
lisheda volumeofmemoirs
story.31
butin
Don'tbe afraidofGermany.
Shecannotwin.Sheis goingto succeedinthebeginning
Russia.32
willcomethrough
theUnitedStatesandthrough
theendvictory
ofa commonborderwiththeSovietUnion
WasBenesawarewhathispursuit
balanceinCentralEurope?Likethesorcerer's
wouldentailforthegeopolitical
in Goethe'spoem,did Benesnotrealizeearlyenoughtheriskthat
apprentice
a commonborder,
he
to theRed Armythrough
directassistance
byproviding
communist
infiltration
of
Central
the
to
wouldalso open floodgates
Europe?
He did, of course,realizethat.This is whyhe hopedthatSovietmilitary
thatwas
1938 wouldfollowa Frenchintervention
assistancein September
Benesconsidered
Sincethelatterfailedto materialize,
supposedto comefirst.
ittoo riskyto makean exclusive
appealforSoviethelp,forfearthattheWest
nazi slogan,as
wouldthenregardCzechoslovakia,
accordingto thecurrent
carrier'anchoredin thecentreof Europe.Thisis why,as
the'Sovietaircraft
Benespassionately
arguedinhisMemoirsandlaterbeforeStalinandMolotov,
and call to Moscowin
to issueordersto resistGermanaggression
he refused
and radical
commanders
1938, despiteappealsfromhis military
September
made
traumaofMunich,however,
Theshockandthesubsequent
politicians.33
to absolvetheWestfromitsbetrayal.
suchan impacton Benesthathe refused
Soviet
on exclusive
ofCzechoslovakia
to bankthefuture
He wasnowprepared
assistance
againsttheGermanDrangnachOsten.
withRussiathusappearedto be fairly
Benes'overallrelationship
complex,
of his earlysocialistidealismas well as his recent
forit containedelements
Beneshad nevervisitedRussiapriorto 1935,as a felAlthough
pragmatism.
and
lowsocialisthewas intouchwithRussianexilesfromthe1905revolution
worldwarBenesdidnotgo to Russia
Russian.Duringthefirst
taughthimself
in
homein Washington
Drábekin hisretirement
to meetJaroslav
31 I had thegood fortune
hadsurbefore
hedied.He toldmeaboutthisepisode,sinceI knewthathisreport
1992,shortly
i zlych(Prague
seeJaroslav
vivedandhadbeencitedbyseveralhistorians:
Drábek,Ζ casùdobrych
meseethefull
I am muchindebted
to hisson,JanDrábek,forletting
1992),31-45. In addition,
vol.II, ed.
Seealso Stanislav
textofhisfather's
Kokoska,Ζ druhérepubliky,
manuscript.
original
Klimeketal. (Prague1993),365-75.
Antonin
i zlych,op. cit.
32 Jaroslav
Drábek,Ζ casùdobrych
notestakeninMoscowon December
33 Benes,PamëtiI (2007),ch.1.5.6.J.Smutny's
11, 1943,
Ceskoslovensko-sovëtské
overMunich,are revealing:
aftertheStalin-Benes
vztahyν
argument
citedas CSV II], 129-32;
1939-1945,vol.II (Prague1999) [hereafter
jednáních
diplomatickych
Bahkmeteff
Archives.
No. 4894,ColumbiaUniversity,
intheSmutny
Collection,
Although
original
detailsofhowthe
heneverrevealed
toappealforSovietassistance,
StalinblamedBenesforfailing
in September
Red Armyand AirForcewouldhavereachedCzechoslovakia
1938,and whether
and
Formilitary
theSovietUnionwasthenreadytostarta lonewaragainstPolandandGermany.
seethedetailedstudiesbyHaunerandRagsdaleinnote12 above.
aspects,
logistic
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Haunen The Challenges and Dilemmos of PresidentBenes afterMunich
63 I
T.G. Masaryk,whohad spenta yeartherefrom1917 to 1918
likehismentor
the
dramatic
Masaryk'schieftaskwas to
periodof two revolutions.
during
to fightalongtheEntente
from
the
Czech
prisoners-of-war
Legion
organize
Czech state.Whenthewar ended
of an independent
fortheestablishment
ofCzechoslovakia,
one ofBenes'majortasksas thefirst
withthefoundation
Czech
to
out
the
minister
was
LegionfromSiberia,whereit had
pull
foreign
in
theBolsheviks.
Thiswas themain
beensinceMay 1918,entangled fighting
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
Czechoslovakia
relations
reasonwhydiplomatic
in
and
untilthenaziscameto power neighbouring
werenotinitiated
Germany
to lookfornewallies.
Czechoslovakia
beganeagerly
was equally
Beneswouldusuallystressgeography
first,
history
Although
ofRusso-Prussian
to him.He was wellawareofthelongtradition
important
of 1812.
backto theTauroggenConvention
stretching
military
partnership,
and the ensuing
Beneshimselfwitnessedin 1922 the Rapallo Agreement
and theRed Army.In 1935 he went
betweentheReichswehr
collaboration
Two yearslater,Benes
to Moscowto signtheTreatyof MutualAssistance.
elementsin theSovietarmedforceswereallegedly
fearedthatpro-German
he acceptedMarshal
Stalin.Withouta secondthought,
to overthrow
plotting
of theanti-German
factionled by
Tukhachevsky's
liquidationas thevictory
. . . can shake
a 'secondRapallo': 'No executions
Stalin,thereby
preventing
Butit
he toldtheSovietambassador.34
this[Soviet-Czechoslovak]
friendship,'
to thecontinuation
of
also meantthatBeneswas thereby
directly
consenting
Stalin'sbloodypurgesforthesakeofhisRaisond'Etat.
crisisreacheditsclimaxinthesecondhalfof
Thus,whentheCzechoslovak
two
1938,Benes'viewoftheSovietUnionreflected,
paradoxically,
September
attitudes.
On theonehand,heneededtheSovietsagainstthenaked
contrasting
whenit becameobviousthatbuildinga demoGermanthreat.On theother,
Bolshevik
Russiawas a delusion,
andthattheGerman
craticallianceincluding
Beneshesitated
fromattacking
dictator
wouldnotbe deterred
Czechoslovakia,
Russianofferwithoutthebackingof France
ofan unilateral
to availhimself
- forfearofstarting
a civil(i.e.,another'Spanish')warin CentralEurope.35
Even if it becameclear thatBritainwould not fightto keep the Sudeten
of theUSSR],f.48,op.43,p.252,d.37, L.35-42. The
34 AVPSSSR [Foreign
PolicyArchives
tookplaceon 3 July1937. Alexandrovsky's
diariesare citedin:
Benes-Alexandrovsky
meeting
- novaiaversiia',Novoe Vremia13 (1989), 37-9; V.A.
'Delo Tukhachevskogo
N. Abramov,
i voenno-fashistskii
'M.Tukhachevskii
Lebedev,
arkhiv,1 (1993),
zagovor',Voenno-istoricheskii
How the
3-82. Aninaccurate
translation
appearedinYuriiL. DyakovandTatyanaS. Bushueva,
1922-1933,andPavedtheWaytoFascism:FromtheSecretArchives
SovietsMilitarized
Germany
Benesboastedto Churchill
thathe
SovietUnion(Moscow1994),322-5. Although
oftheFormer
whichhehadpassedon to
German
evidence
on theTukhachevsky
hadreceived
earlier,
conspiracy
deniedthis,insisting
thattherewasno so-calledBenes
Stalin,a seniorNKVD officer
categorically
andthatno information
dossierto be foundintheSovietarchives
reported
byBeneswas included
II (2007),162;W.Churchill,
intheindictment
ofTukhachevsky
andhisgroup.SeeBenes,Parneti
TheSecondWorldWar,vol.I (London1948),225; cf.note6 above:P.andA. Sudoplatov
(1994),
op. cit.,90-3; (1997),op. cit.,136-41.
Miunkhen.
Sviditelstvo
ochevidtsa
35 S.S.Alexandrovskn,
zhizn11 (1988),
, Mezhdunarodnaia
128-42.
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632
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
GermansinsideCzechoslovakia,Benes stillneeded to convincetheworld that
defendingthe CzechoslovakCause - which,oddlyenough,also meantkeeping the SudetenGermanswithinCzechoslovakia- should be identifiedwith
thedefenceof democracyat large.36
itremainsto be conclusively
Furthermore,
provedthatthe80 Red Armydivisions deployedin the Belorussianand Kiev militarydistrictsduringSeptember
1938 weremeantfora war againstGermany,ratherthanas a deterrent
against
Poland.37In spiteof Litvinov'spressing,Stalinwould nottakea tougherlinevisnorwas thereanyseriousindicationthattheSovietswould repeat
à-visHitler;38
in EasternEurope the Kominternperformancein Spain.39The morale of the
officer
corpswas badlyshakenbythecontinuedpurges,whichat thetimeofthe
CzechoslovakCrisisreachedanotherhighpointin thepersecutionof theSoviet
Far EasternArmy,involvedin earlyAugustin thefighting
againsttheJapanese
becauseMoscow
soon
A
was
nearLake Khasan. cease-fire negotiated
afterwards,
in
in
Asia.
and
simultaneouswars Europe
had to avoid fighting
Political geographywas decisive. Benes understoodthat neitherthe Red
Armynor the SovietAir Force could have reachedCzechoslovakiato protect
allow the legend
her froma directGermanassault. He would, nevertheless,
of plausible Soviet assistanceto spread in orderto castigatethe West forthe
Yet Benes remaineda 'Westerner'at heart,in spite of the
Munich betrayal.40
to
agonyof Munich. Afterhis resignationin earlyOctober 1938, he preferred
go into exile to England and the UnitedStates.If he occasionallythreatened
thathe mightgo to Moscow in theeventof an earlyoutbreakof war,he knew
verywell thatas a fugitivewesternstatesmanhe could not functionin Stalin's
Russia.41During a secretmeetingwith the Americanpresidenton 28 May
36 As explainedby Beneshimselfin PamëtiI (2007), 352.
to prove,because the Sovietmobilizationplans had since 1935 consid37 This may be difficult
eredGermanyand Poland togetheras themainadversariesin theWest:correspondencewithProf.
BruceW. Menning(US ArmyCommand and GeneralStaffCollege at FortLeavenworth,Kansas)
concerningSovietmobilizationplans in 1938 and 1939. See note 16.
38 Zara Steiner,'The Soviet Commissariatof ForeignAffairsand the Czechoslovak Crisis in
1938: New MaterialfromtheSovietArchives',The HistoricalJournal42(3) (1999), 751-79.
39 Regardingthe largerquestion of Kominternactivitieswithinthe contextof Soviet foreign
policy and war preparations,see F.I. Firsov,'ArkhivyKominternai vneshniaiapolitika SSSR ν
1939-1941 gg.', Novata i noveishaiaistoria6 (1992), 12-35; Ν. S. Lebedeva and M. M. Narinskii
(eds), Kominterni vtoraia mirovaia voina, 2 vols (Moscow 1994 and 1998); V.V. Marjina,
'Komintern:Likvidatsiiaili modifikatsiia1939-1 943gg.', Slavianovedenie5 (1994), 14-28; N.S.
Lebedeva,'The Cominternand Poland 1939-1943', InternationalAffairs8 (1993), 83-94.
40 Erica Mann, writerand daughterof Thomas Mann, publishedan interviewwithBenesin the
Chicago Daily News, 18 April1939, whichwas reprintedin The New Republicon 3 May 1939.
Its mostconspicuousheadingswere: 'Russia FaithfulTill Last', and 'Willingto Act Alone.'
41 In the summerof 1939 Benes indicatedin his messageto supportersat home thathe might
go to Moscow first,in theeventof war. See Formation,no. 62 of 22 June1939. In October 1939
Benes was approached by the communistdeputyJan Svermato move to Soviet Russia, so as to
organizefromtherethe movementforthe liberationof Czechoslovakia underthe bannerof the
socialistworldrevolution.Benesdeclined,withan argumentthathe saw his rolepreciselyin bringing West and East togetherin the fightagainstfascism.See also Benes,Memoirs(1954), 140-3;
PamëtiII (2007), 150.
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Hauner The Challenges and Dilemmas of PresidentBenes afterMunich
633
that
1939,Benesspokeas a championof theconvergence
theory,
suggesting
inthefuture
waragainst
Russiaas a partner
theWestshouldacceptcommunist
thefascist
powers.42
shakenbythesigning
ofthe
Thisis whyBenesmusthavebeenprofoundly
Pactof23 August1939 - thoughhe had feareditforsometime.
Nazi-Soviet
social upheavalsin CentralEurope,spearheaded
theanticipated
Regarding
and Russia,he knewhe wouldbe
the
two
radical
Germany
protagonists,
by
If
were
Benesrecognized
the
sides.
such
revolutions
forcedto take
inevitable,
of
social
and
that
it
would
cleanse
RedArmyas theinstrument
progress hoped
inneighbourofdespisedfeudalism
as remnants
whathe regarded
thoroughly
shewouldhaveto sidewith
As forCzechoslovakia,
ingPolandand Hungary.
to hisSovietinterlocutors.43
'theEast',he admitted
ofspreadthatone inevitable
Benesnevertheless
fearedstrongly
by-product
in EasternEuropewiththeRed Armywouldbe theassistingcommunism
ance of the so-calledSovietGermans,actingas Red Armycommissars.44
directed
ofanother'Nazi-Soviet'rapprochement
Thisperspective
againstthe
untilhismeeting
withMolotovand Stalinin
hismind45
Westwouldtorture
whenDecember1943.46It musthavecometo Benesas a completesurprise
42 Benes,Memoirs
(1954),75-81;PamëtiII (2007),86-93.
43 Seefurther
notes74 and75 below.
ofwhomabouttwomillionlivedin theUSSR byJune
44 Sovietcitizens
ofGermanethnicity,
newethnicGermansin the
1941. Between1939 and 1941 theUSSRgainedoverhalf-a-million
to'Greater
themajority
ofwhomwere,however,
annexed
western
territories,
Germany'
repatriated
bilateral
It was assumedthatMoscowwoulduse Soviet
on thebasisofNazi-Soviet
agreements.
in East-Central
Germanminorities
Germansto influence
Europe(cf.V.V.Marjina,'Vyselenie
i modifikatsiia
3
iz Chekhoslovakii:
rozhdenie
Nemtsev
ideii,1939-1943gody',Slavianovedenie
Moscowhad an additional
advanethnicminorities,
(2003),26-7). In additionto manipulating
theKomintern,
whichwas largelyrunbyGermanthrough
tagein itscommunist
propaganda
inMay 1943,theirritation
StalindecidedtoclosetheKomintern
communists.
Although
speaking
becauseofthespreadof'FreeGermanCommittees',
Alliescontinued
on thepartoftheWestern
inJuly1943theSoviets
inmanycountries
andrunbycommunist
created
Moreover,
sympathizers.
NationalCommittee
of FreeGermany,
chairedbythewriter
initiated
thecommunist-sponsored
followedin September
FreiesDeutschland),
ErichWeinert
{Nationalkomitee
bytheFederation
vonSeydlitz.
overbyGeneralWalther
of GermanOfficers
{Bunddeutscher
Offiziere),
presided
whichhad no parallelsamongtheWestern
The existence
of theseorganizations,
Allies,only
withBerlin.
thatMoscowwas trying
to enterintosecretpeace-feelers
increased
Alliedsuspicion
- Das Nationalkomitee
in der
'Einmeisterhafter
FreiesDeutschland
See H. Bungert,
Schachzug
in
andC. Mauch(eds),Geheimdienstkrieg
der
Amerikaner
1943-1945', J.Heideking
Beurteilung
1993),90-121.Cf.Benes,Pamëti(2007),145,151.On 29 January
(Göttingen
gegenDeutschland
ofInformation,
that
1942 BenestoldH.P. Smollett,
headoftheRussiansectionat theMinistry
convinced
that
'RussiawilldefeatGermany
(1942!) . . . and thathe is absolutely
byNovember
inEurope'(quotedfromtheRussian
theaimofSovietforeign
policyis thespreadofCommunism
oftheoriginal
whichhadreachedMoscowbySeptember
translation
document,
1942,and
English
forthefirst
timeinL.F.Sotskov(ed.),Pribaltika
i Geopolitika.
Sbornik
dokumenwas published
tov1935-1945(Moscow2006),210-13.
also recentRussianinterpretation
45 See Benes'DemocracyTodayand Tomorrow;
by E.P.
razvitiia
Slavianovedenie
'EduardBenesi jegoideidemokraticheskogo
obshchestva',
Serapionova,
1 (1998),11-20.
46 Benes'conversations
withStalinand Molotovin Moscow,12-18 December1943,and his
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634
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
wheneventually
Stalinand MolotovtoldhimthattheRed Army,
reaching
would
not
revolution
the
Germanproletariat
but
Germany,
spread
among
would insteadcarryout traditional
terminated
unconditional
conquest,
by
an
surrender
and thedivisionof spoils.However,forreasonsofmaintaining
German
Molotov
the
effective
Benes,
propagandaamong
troops,
enlightened
Sovietscouldnotafford
to revealtheirgenuineplansforthetimebeing.47
Thisrestraint,
wouldnotslow downtheRed Armyfromacting
however,
as an instrument
of socialand politicalchangein bothPolandand Hungary.
andChurchill
misread
Thus,notonlyBenes,butRoosevelt
too,haddefinitively
in
Eastern
as
were
Stalin'smindandhisultimate
goals
Europe, they
gradually
theRed Armyscoredovernazi Germany
and
takingshapewitheveryvictory
in the internal
her allies. Stalin'srepeatedassurancesof non-intervention
ofPolandand Czechoslovakia
affairs
provedworthless.
to Benes'fateful
decisionto linkup thefateof
Was therean alternative
and
that
of
East-Central
hiscountry, subsequently
Europeas a whole,with
answer
was
to
follow
thefederation
Stalin'sRussia?The obvious
vigorously
thatemerged
amongtheexiledEastandSouthEuropeangovernments
projects
inLondonduring
thewar.But,unlikeinthecase oftheBeneluxcountries,
the
to becomean indispensable
EastEuropeaninitiatives,
alas,wouldnotsurvive
in theprocessofcreating
theCommonMarketand theEuropean
component
thatof thesehalf-baked
Union.Yetit is oftenforgotten
projectsencouraged
Confederation
constituted
themost
theCzechoslovak-Polish
by theBritish,
informal
brains
advanced.48
Theprojectwas developedbytheForeignOffice's
- RIIA)
of International
Affairs
trust,ChathamHouse (theRoyalInstitute
A similarschemewasproResearchandPressService(FRPS).49
anditsForeign
AsforBenes,heembraced
theConfederation
posedforGreeceandYugoslavia.
less enthusiasm
thanGeneralWladyslawSikorski
projectwithconsiderably
- theprimeminister
in exile(untilhismysterious
ofthePolishgovernment
fromMoscow,London,11 January
to theCzechStateCouncilafterhisreturn
1944,CSV
report
IL 121-89,198-229,nos58-70,no. 75.
the
togo intodetailsofhowtheSovietleadership
47 Stalin's
andMolotov'sreluctance
imagined
directed
ofGermany
intosmaller
unitshaditsreasonsintheSovietwartime
propaganda,
break-up
to undermine
and intended
at Germanarmedforcesand population
supportforHitler,notto
inCSVII, 159,no.63. See
thewar.SeenotesbySmutny
whichwouldprolong
resistance,
solidify
inDecember1943:NewDocuments',
Conversations
alsoV. Mastny,
'TheBenes-Stalin-Molotov
in:
vol.20 (1972),no. 3, 367-402;Czechtranslation
in:Jahrbücher
fürGeschichte
Osteuropas,
vol.12 (1974),467-98.
Svëdectvt
(Témoignage),
im Donauraumund in Ostmitteleuropa
48 See JoachimKühl,Föderationspläne
(Munich
collection
ofdocuments
editedbyWalterLipgens,
ch.5. Thestandard
1958),especially
Europa1940-45 (Munich1968), containsonlya small
der Widerstandsbewegung
Föderationspläne
standard
on therestofEastern
ofPolishdocuments
to reflect
fraction
Europe.In themorerecent
A History
bookbythesameeditor,
(Oxford1982),intheearlierGerman
ofEuropeanIntegration
in Stuttgart
versionpublished
(1977),thereare onlya fewpagesdevotedto theCzechoslovakPolishConfederation.
Plansfora
Wartime
49 AndrasD. Ban,Pax Britannica:
Regarding
ForeignOfficeDocuments
on the
Postbellum
East Central
Europe(NewYork1997).Seealso myreviewofthispublication
website
H-net.
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Haunen The Challenges and Dilemmas of PresidentBenes afterMunich
635
deathin the aircraftaccidentof 4 July1943).50The Czechoslovak-Polish
Confederation
was supposedto becomea testing
recongroundfora further
ofalliancesinCentralEurope.As a newspatialandgeopolitical
struction
alterthe
Confederation
looked
nativeforEast-Central
Europe,
promising but
unrealistic
topursueunderSovietdomination.51
FromtheMoscowperspective,
confederations
alongtheSovietborderwereworsethanirritating;
theywere
anathema.52
fromthedevastating
As soonas theRedArmyrecovered
defeatsofthefirst
of
the
the
Soviets
started
to
more
attention
to
the
war,
year
pay
problemofthe
future
of
Eastern
Benes
madehis
geopolitical
configuration
Europe.Although
for
the
Confederation
half-hearted
conditional
on
Soviet
support
approval,
after
thatMoscowmighttolerJune1941 theCzechswerewrongly
assuming
confederation
ate theBritish-sponsored
plans- as was reflected
by Benes'
comments
afterhis firstconversation
withtheSovietForeignMinisterV.M.
LondoninJune1942.53Evenif
Molotov,duringthelatter'spassagethrough
Benestriedduringthesubsequent
weeksto maketheconfederation
scheme
morepalatableto theSovietsbywishfully
an earlySoviet-Polish
stipulating
on thefuture
borderas a precondition,
itdidnothelp.Withinfive
agreement
weeksMoscowresponded
witha definite
Niet.™
As soon as Moscowvetoed
inJuly1942,Beneswilly-nilly
theConfederation
whilethe
acceptedtheverdict
Polesresisted.
Butforhowlong?55
The recently
releasedSovietdocuments
on restructuring
EasternEurope
and further
territorial
expansionmayoffera widercontext.These include
50 Smutny's
reflection
on Sikorski's
deathof4 July1943: He was a friend
ofCzechoslovakia,
butremained
oftheSoviets.He insisted
on therestitution
of Poland'sborder
deeplydistrustful
as priorto September
does notmention
1939,inchtheTësinregion.Smutny
Katyn(Smutny's
andJaroslav
Valenta(eds),Czechoslovak-Polish
Diaries,no.287). In IvanSfovicek
Negotiations.
and Alliance1939-1944. Czechoslovak
Confederation
DiplomaticDocuments(Prague1995)
citedas Confederation],
nos 191-2.Speculations
overtheinvolvement
ofSovietagents
[hereafter
inSikorski's
deathcanneverbeexcluded;
seetherecent
survey
byJ.TebinkainDziejeNajnowsze
3 (2001),165-85.
51 Essential
PiotrWandycz,
and theGreatPowers
Czechoslovak-Polish
reading:
Confederation
1940-1943(Bloomington
'ZSRR wobecprojektów
1956); Eugeniusz
Duraczynski,
konfederacji
1940-1943',DziejeNajnowsze3 (1997),129-53;RudolfZácek,Projekt
polsko-czechoslowckiej,
1939-1943 (Opava 2001); JanNëmecek,Od spojenectvi
ctskoslovensko-polské
konfederace
k roztrzce(Prague2003); MarekK. Kaminski,
EdvardBenescontragen.Wladyslaw
Sikorski
1939-1943(Warsaw2005). See documents
in Confederation.
WhileJ.Nëmecekdefends
Benes'
Kaminski
withbothCzechauthors,
thatBeneswas nota singoodwill,
disagrees
sharply
arguing
cerepartner
becausehesubjected
theConfederation
from
thebeginning
toSovietapproval,
project
whichofcourseturned
outto be utterly
negative.
52 Majsky'smemorandum
1944 on thepostwarorder,publishedforthefirst
of 11 January
4 (1995),124-44;andG.P.KyninandJ.Laufer(eds),SSSRi germanskii
timeinIstochnik
vopros
1941-1949.Dokumenty
vol. 1, 1941-1945
iz arkhivavneshnei
politikirossiiskoi
federatsii,
(Moscow1996),333-60,here341,no. 79.
53 Benes-Molotov
Conversation,
London,9 June1942,CSVI, no. 171.FortheRussianversion
in Englishtranslation,
see Oleg A. Rzheshevsky
(ed.), Warand Diplomacy.The Makingof the
GrandAlliance.Documents
vol.II (Amsterdam
1996),285-88,no. 113.
fromStalin'sArchives,
54 Ibid.,nos178,179; Confédération,
nos 120,121.
55 Confederation,
nos129,169; Nëmecek,
Od spojenectvi
(2003),op. cit.,181.
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636
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
betweentheSovietleadership
and theNKID's (ForeignMinistry's)
exchanges
in
the
established
autumn
of 1943. Two veteranSoviet
specialcommissions,
recalled
from
their
overseas
and promotedto deputy
missions
diplomats,
in
were
M.M.
untilMay 1939 foreign
ministers, put charge.
Litvinov,
foreign
minister
and thenambassadorin Washington,
headedthecommission
which
drafted
thefirstSovietplansfortheanticipated
talks
and
the
peace
postwar
worldorder;theformer
Sovietambassadorin London,I.M. Majsky,directed
on Reparations'.56
Theblueprints
the'Commission
drafted
and
bytheLitvinov
teams
would
have
been
used
for
extensive
the
Soviet
leadMajsky
briefing
by
- in all
A.la. Vyshinsky
ership- J.V.Stalin,V.M. Molotovand hisdeputy,
with
the
with
the
Moscow
Conference
Allies,starting
important
negotiations
in October1943 and continuing
of foreign
ministers
withthetwo visitsto
andthethreemainsummits
MoscowbyWinston
Churchill
ofthe'BigThree'.57
- despitethedisconAtthesametime,theroleofinternational
communism
in May 194358- shouldbe studiedthrough
tinuation
of theKomintern
the
nextmetamorphosis
of theKremlin's
influence
overtheindividual
European
communist
whoserepresentatives
residedinMoscow.GeorgijDimitrov,
parties
Komintern's
chiefstrategist,
continued
communist
advisingtheCzechoslovak
Gottwaldon keyquestions
leaderKlement
justas before.59
afterTeheran,
Stalinreceived
Benes.BeforeBenesevenarrived
Immediately
inMoscow,StalinandMolotovhadknowninadvancehisviewson thePolish
and thefutureof Rutheniathrough
detailedquestionquestion,panslavism
one of Molotov'sdeputies,
who accompanied
ingbyAlexanderKorneichuk,
Therewas no need fora permanent
the Czechoslovakleaderon his trip.60
In lessthantwoweeksafterBenes'departure
SovietmoleinBenes'entourage.
fromMoscow,Majsky'scommission
memorandum
on
produceda confidential
thedesirable
whichshouldhave
Sovietwaraims,specifying
frontiers,
strategic
in O.A. Rzheshevsky
'V komissiiakh
56 A.M. Filitov,
Narkomindela',
(ed.), Vtoraiamirovaia
voina- Aktualnye
(Moscow1995),54-71,166-76[hereafter
problemy
Aktualnye
problemy].
57 To understand
theSovietapproachto theGermanquestion,the following
collectionof
is essential:
to theNKID guidelines
documents
SSSRi germanskii
vopros1941-1949.According
in preparation
fortheforeign
ministers'
(no. 59), signedDekanozov,3 October1943:
meeting
in herold pre-Munich
borders.
The Sovietgovernment
'Czechoslovakia
is to be restored
agrees
to transfer
Germansafterthewarfromthe
withthedecisionof theCzechoslovak
government
Seealsonote52 above.
Sudeten
regionto Germany.'
inAktualnye
58 SeeN.S. LebedevaandM.M. Narinskii
(eds),'RozpuskKominterna',
problemy,
72-86.
59 V.V. Marjina,'Sovetsko-kominternovskaia
strategiiaν stranakhVostochnoiEvropyi
BiuroKPCH ν Moskve1939-1945gg.'(unpublished
paper,1999).
Zagranichnoe
60 No otherforeign
leadercouldhavebeenso closelyscrutinized
bytheSovietsas Beneswas.
and 1
was waitingat theRAF stationHabaniyahbetween28 November
Whilethedelegation
hisenquiries
ontheway
wouldspendhourswithBenes;hecontinued
December
1943,Korneichuk
VesluzbáchCSR,vol.II (Prague
to Moscow.See:Benes,PamëtiII (2007),257-62;Z. Fierlinger,
boxes2 and 7; CSV II, no. 57.
Collection,
1947),182-9;HooverInstitution
Archives,
Taborsky
Conversations
between
Benes,StalinandMolotovwerepublished
für
byV.MastnyinJahrbücher
butV.V.
noteshavenotbeenpublished,
Geschichte
3 (1972),367-402.Korneichuk's
Osteuropas
Marjinahad accessto them,in: Έ.Benes- Vtoroivisitν Moskvu,dekabr1943g.',Aktualnye
151-65.
problemy,
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Haunen The Challenges and Dilemmas of PresidentBenes afterMunich
637
the
overEurasia.Withregardto Czechoslovakia,
Sovietsupremacy
guaranteed
Benes'principal
wishesbyapproving
the
memorandum
camecloseto fulfilling
that'evenifborders
withRomania
transfer
andbystressing
ideaoftheGerman
should
a commonborderwithCzechoslovakia
andPolandshouldbe modified,
outthenewmap thereshouldbe leftbe secured'.Ifin thecourseofcutting
recommended
overs,theseshouldbe addedto Czechoslovakia,
Majsky,forwe
in
in
as
of
our
influence
Czechoslovakia
future
the
to
consider
forepost
'ought
centralandsouth-eastern
Europe'.61
of Subcarpathian
whichwas annexedforall intents
The sacrifice
Ruthenia,
andpurposesto theUSSR as soonas theregularand NKVD troopshad overinthelightofnew
to be reassessed
runtheregioninNovember
1944,deserves
Rutheniawent
evidence.FromBenes'perspective,
historical
Subcarpathian
the
war.
the
of
the
Nazi-Soviet
three
Throughout period
through
stagesduring
Benes
as
bait
and
a
trade-off.
Ruthenia
had
been
used
Pact, 1939-41,
by
which
had
never
thewar,
Benes'chiefgeostrategic
aim,
changedthroughout
was to securea commonborderwiththeSovietUnion.Frommid-1941 to
to therestoration
of thepre-Munich
switched
mid-1944, Benes'maineffort
oftheSudetenland,
of Slovakia,thereturn
of
borders,
i.e.,there-attachment
and ofRuthenia,
and to acquirtheTesindistrict
(Zaolzie,SlaskCieszynski),
ingfullSovietsupportfortheexpulsionofGermanand Hungarianminorities
fromCzechoslovakia.
Duringthethirdand finalstage,fromNovember1944,
Beneswas fighting
a
Ruthenia
was occupiedbytheRedArmyand thebaffled
invainon properlegislative
He would
action,insisting
rearguard
procedures.
takeoverby
losein theend,and had to agreeto itsrapidand unceremonious
theSovietUnion.62
stage,BenesconceivedRutheniaas a
Duringtheimmediate
post-Munich
corridor
kindof baitto induceMoscowto takeadvantageof theimaginary
whichtheRed Armycould marchintoCentralEuropeto prevent
through
further
GermanDrangnachOsten.Rumoursbeganto circulate
thatHungary,
takecontrolofRuthenia,
whichhadbeenfinally
Germany's
ally,might
granted
the Munichsettlement
an autonomousstatusby Praguefollowing
and the
ViennaAward.Budapestin themeantime
reclaimed
theHungarian-speaking
and townsof Slovakiaand Ruthenia.The firstautonomousgoverndistricts
VolosinacceptedGermancreditsand
mentof RutheniaunderRev.Augustin
openeda GermanconsulateinthenewcapitalChustin a last-minute
attempt
to courtBerlin's
againstHungarianambitions.63
protection
The traditional
corridorforchannelling
Russiantroopsto Europewas of
voidof efficient
coursenotthrough
butthrough
Ruthenia,
communications,
61 Majsky'smemorandum
of11 January
1944,SSSRi germanskii
vopros,here341-2 and352,
no. 79.
62 Forrecent
seenote14 above.
literature,
63 P.G. Stercho,
Diplomacyof Double Morality:
Europe'sCrossroadsin Carpatho-Ukraine,
1919-1939 (Jersey
City1971); M. Vegesand V. Zadoroznyj,Velychi trahedijaKarpatskoji
(Uzhorod1993);Svorc,Zakletázem(2007),op. cit.,237-54.
Ukrajiny
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638
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
Poland.Fromthelogisticviewpoint
thatwas theestablished
with
marshrut,
threestraight
double-track
lines
which
on
Warsaw.
railway
converged
They
had beencompleted
beforetheoutbreak
ofthefirst
worldwar,whenWarsaw
had been partof the Russianempire.The strategic
optionsas seen from
theSovietcapitalin 1938-9,64
were
less
however,
obvious,and one doubts
in
whether
transit
from
London
to
Benes,already
Chicago,hada muchclearer
picture.
What were the options?Most Sovietdiplomats,familiarwithHitler's
oftheUkrainein MeinKampfas thefoodand rawmaterialresdescription
ervoirforthefutureGreaterGermanEmpire,believedthatthemostlikely
crusadeagainstBolshevikRussia under
optionwould be a German-Polish
thesilentconnivanceof theWest.Moreover,
on a globalscale,theeastern
seemed
to
have
received
a
boost
therenewedskirmishes
major
option
through
in theFarEast between
and
Soviet
and
Japanese
troops, byManchukuoand
the
Anti-Komintern
Pact
at
theend of February1939. On
Hungaryjoining
theotherhand,rumours
abouta westernoption,in whichHitlerwouldtry
to forcethereluctant
Mussoliniintoactionbya jointItalo-German
advance
in theMediterranean
to eliminate
theAnglo-French
werealso
predominance,
Hitlerhad decidedfirstto get rid of
however,
circulating.
By mid-March,
theamputated
Czecho-Slovakia
He attachedBohemiaand
(Rest-Tschechei).65
The reluctant
Moraviato theThirdReichas a protectorate.
Slovakautonomistswereforcedat thelastminuteto proclaiman independent
stateunder
ofHungarianrule.Ruthenia,
howGermanauspicesto avoidtherestoration
ever,was to returnunderthedirectcontrolof Budapestas an autonomous
in
'Carpathian
Territory'
(Kárpátalja).In exchangeforHungary's
partnership
thedestruction
ofCzechoslovakia,
Hitlerwas apparently
readyto abandonhis
of theGroß-Ukraine.
Thus already,
vagueplansleadingto theconstruction
seemedto havestoppedworrying
byearlyMarch1939,theSovietleadership
eastwards
thatwouldhaveestablished
directGerman
abouta Germanthrust
as itsbridgehead.66
controloverRuthenia
funcAfterthesigning
of theNazi-Soviet
Pact,Ruthenia's
Non-aggression
becameevenmorepronounced
tionas a baitto attractMoscow'sattention
in Benes'initiatives.
He saw theSovietambassadorin London,IvanMajsky,
Pactwas signed.67
on 23 August1939,on theverydaywhentheNazi-Soviet
on 22 September
1939, Majskytook noticeof
Duringtheirnextmeeting,
'In future,
Rutheniashouldeitherbelongto us or to Russia
Benes'statement:
64 Formoredetailsseenotes12 and 16 above.
vol. 6
editedbyElkeFröhlich,
65 Die Tagebücher
vonJosephGoebbels:complete
fragments,
(Munich1998),here276-90.
Stalinunddie Initiative
der
Der Pakt:Hitler,
66 Formoredetailssee Ingenborg
Fleischhauer,
am Main 1990), 102-8. The authorprovidesnot
deutschen
Diplomatie1938-1939(Frankfurt
of theNon-Aggression
reactionto thepreparation
onlyan exhaustive
surveyof international
fromtheanti-nazi
to intelligence
Pactof23 August1939,butalso references
comingpresumably
andHarnackgroups.
Schultze-Boysen
vneshnei
SSSR[hereafter
67 CSV/,no.20; seeDokumenty
DVP], vol.XXII/1(Moscow
politiki
1977),no.493.
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Hauner The Challenges and Dilemmas of PresidentBenes afterMunich
639
butneverto Hungary
orPoland.'68
Forwhattheydiscussed
we have
thereafter,
twodifferent
records.According
to Benes'notes,69
was
unable
to tell
Majsky
theRed Army,
whichhad justinvadedPoland,would also occupy
whether
Ruthenia.
toMajsky'sdiaries,whicharemoredetailed,
BeneseagerAccording
with
the
of
the
Red
into
Poland
and
Army
lyagreed
entry
urgedMajskyto let
MoscowknowhowmuchhewantedtheUSSRtohave'a commonborderwith
tohim,heemphasized.
Slovakia'.Thiswasveryimportant
Evenifhecouldnot
inpostwarCzechoslovakia,
tellwhatkindofgovernment
wouldbe established
shouldbecomepartof the SovietUkraine,forhe,
Ruthenia,nevertheless,
of Czechoslovakia,
when
he
was
had in his own thoughts
Benes,
president
in
considered
Ruthenia
as
future
always
becoming
partoftheUSSR.70
in
Privately,
though,BenesfoundthebehaviouroftheSoviets,as partners
Buthewasverycareful
thegrabwiththenazis,disgusting.
nottosayso inpublic.Atthesametime,le drôlede guerre,
theAnglo-French
or
wayoffighting,
rather
madehimequallybitter.
TheFrenchcontinued
to intrigue
non-fighting,
inParis(6-20 October1939) over
againsthimduringhispoliticaldiscussions
theestablishment
oftheCzechoslovak
Czechoslovak
ArmyandtheProvisional
in France.71
Government
EdouardDaladierrefused
to
Worse,PrimeMinister
receiveBenes.72
WhileBenesnaturally
to be recognized
as thehead
anticipated
in exile,theFrenchpressedthecandidacyof
oftheCzechoslovak
government
theformer
Czechoslovak
envoyinParis,StefanOsusky,whowas an American
Slovakandan adversary
ofBenes.The Parisnegotiations
endedforBenesin a
fiasco.He couldnotwinhiscontestwithOsuskyas longas theFrenchwere
conaround,buthe was notpreparedto playsecondfiddle.'IftheFrenchies
tinueto be so nastyto me,'he confided
ina ratherdesperate
moodtoJaromir
Smutny,
'theywillforcemeto go to Moscow.'73
DuringNovember1939, afterMoscow annexedEasternPolandand was
to invadeFinland,Benesraisedthesubjectof Ruthenia
makingpreparations
the London
again. On 13 Novemberhe saw Andrei(Andrew)Rothstein,
of theSovietpressagencyTASS.Theywerespeculating
what
correspondent
68 Hungary,
whichobtaineda portion
ofRuthenia
withHungarian
intheaftermath
population
ofMunichintheViennaAwardofNovember
inMarch1939
1938,tooktherestoftheprovince
whenrump-Czechoslovakia
fromthemap.Polandwelcomed
thecreation
ofa comdisappeared
monborderwithHungary.
forhersurvival,
When,sixmonths
later,itwas Poland'sturnto fight
neither
GermannorSoviettroopspenetrated
Ruthenia.
Beneswas indeed
Hungarian-controlled
thattheSovietsdidnotadvancefurther
westandthatthenewNazi-Soviet
demarcadisappointed
tionlineacrossPolanddidnotruncloserto Slovakia.
69 CSVI, no.26.
70 'Benesmyslenno
budushchei
SSSR':DVP XXII/2,no. 625.
vsegdaschitalRuteniyu
chastiyu
71 Dokumenty
ceskoslovenske
Od rozpaduCesko-Slovenska
do uznání
zahramcm
pohtiky.
ceskoslovenské
of the
prozatimní
vlády1939-1940(Prague2002). Sixtyprotocolsof meetings
Czechoslovak
NationalCommittee
inParisbetween
October1939andJune1940havebeenpublishedas a supplement
inthesameseries(Prague1999).
72 Elisabeth
du Réau,EdouardDaladier1884-1970(Paris1993); Georges-Marc
Le
Benamou,
Fantôme
de Munich(Paris2007).
73 Smutny
withJanSverma,
note41.
Diaries,Paris15 October1939.Seealsoconversation
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
640
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
defeat.Wouldtherebe a SovietUnion
wouldhappenintheeventofGermany's
inthemidand Czechoslovakia
on
the
on onesideandWestern
other,
Europe
become
'WouldCzechoslovakia
dle?In thatcase,Benescontinued,
inevitably
Rothstein
enthusiwith
Poland?'
Russian/Eastern
of
the
sphere,together
part
becomea Sovietrepublic
agreed,addingthatPolandwouldcertainly
astically
and theSovietUnionshouldhave a commonborderwithCzechoslovakia.
withRussia'splans
thetopicofRutheniain connection
WhenBenesinserted
to Stalin
he
should
write
that
in CentralEurope,Rothstein
directly
suggested
can show,Benesdid
theissue- advicewhich,so faras thearchives
to clarify
notfollow.74
A weeklaterBenesmetMajskyagain,whomhehadnotseenfortwomonths.
theDaladiergovernHe toldhimabouthishumiliating
tripto Paris,charging
the
to restore
crime:theintention
mentwithwhatwas inhisviewtheultimate
in
the
event
of
an
Otto
Habsburg
by
monarchy
represented
Austro-Hungarian
and
in
to
Austria
addition
which
would
over
Alliedvictory Germany,
consist,
admitted
thattheFrench
He further
ofBavariaand Czechoslovakia!
Hungary,
Committee
National
him
to
lead
the
Czechoslovak
wantedOsuskyinsteadof
fromthe
he
encountered
and
further
in Paris.Theserecentdefeats,
betrayals
in his
to
throw
resolve
Benes'
Western
Allies,seemedto have strengthened
tell
he
ventured
to
But
however.
lotwiththeSoviets.He neverwentthatfar,
be
secured
could
ofCzechoslovakia
existence
onlyon
Majskythatthefuture
such
as
a fedliaisonwiththeSovietUnion,
thebasisofa closeandinseparable
in
order
to
eration(sic!).Benesusedtheoccasionto repeathisviewthat
bring
of a commonborderbetween
theestablishment
aboutthislink,he regarded
This was in
and theSovietUnionas 'absolutelyindispensable'.
his country
it would
to himthanthefutureof Ruthenia;whether
factmoreimportant
or becomea regionoftheUSSR,he did
becomeagainpartofCzechoslovakia
the
mostto him.Regarding
notcare.Itwas thecommonborderthatmattered
withtheWest
socialistrevolution,
yetto be startedin Germany,
hypothetical
Benes
andtheEastbackingtheRevolution,
thecounter-revolution
supporting
wouldjoin
thatCzechoslovakia
wantedto hearfromMajskytheconfirmation
link'
'thesideoftheEast' and thatMoscowmightevenconsider'a federative
withtheUSSRgo
NeverdidBenes'probing
withhiscountry.75
rapprochement
thatfar.
Benesobviouslywantedto hearMajsky'spositiveresponseas an indicaof Czechoslovakia.
to therestitution
tionof a possibleSovietcommitment
to a commonborderwitha non-existent
A premature
Sovietcommitment
at thetimewhenthe
CzechoslovakState,justto pleaseBenes'imagination,
theSlovakRepublicandtheGermanannexaofficial
Sovietpolicyrecognized
is intheMasaryk
ofBenes'stenograph
74 CSV /,92, notesafterno. 29. Theoriginal
transcript
inPrague,BenesPapers,EB-I,Box99.
Archives
21
75 '[FJederativnuyu
Maisky-benes,
svyaz':The Diaries of I.M. Majsky:Conversation
intheBenes
November
1939,DVT XXII/2,327,no. 802. Thereis no recordofthisconversation
papers.
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Haunen The Challenges and Dilemmas of PresidentBenes afterMunich
64 1
Wedo notknowwhatMajskymayhavetold
tionofBohemiaandMoravia?76
of
hisdiaryentryfor21 Novemberdoes not
since
the
version
Benes,
printed
Butherecorded
whatmusthavebeenBenes'
includeMajsky'sowncomments.
like
his
with
anti-western
Moreover,
previousconversation
feelings.
strongest
22
contained
an
desire
of
it
to
extract
a
unambiguous
Majsky
September,
someunpleasSovietpromiseof a commonborder.Beneswas to experience
antsurprises
at theendofthewar,whenStalinand Molotovwouldpullout
thesurrender
Majsky'sdiariesof1939 andquoteBenes'ownwordsregarding
ofRuthenia.
For thefollowing
yearand a half,untilHitler'sonslaughton the Soviet
Union,Beneswould not see Majskyagain. He remainedcautiousin his
instructions
to theunderground
movement
not to blameRussia.He would
such as the invasionof
behaviour,
imperialist
apologizeforheraggressive
of Bukovina
Poland,ofFinland,theoccupationofthethreeBalticrepublics,
Yet'Russiastillremainsa sphinx,'he wrotein February
and ofBessarabia.77
intheprotectorate,
to hisfollowers
he
addingthattheonlylogicalexplanation
in
couldfindwasthatRussiawasgathering
herstrength
forstarting
revolution
CentralEuropeafterthedefeatofGermany.78
thatBeneswas defending
the Sovietseven
Jaromir
Smutnyremembered
at timeswhentheirinternational
was at itslowest.During'their
reputation
Dr B. hadalwaysstoodfastbythem',maintained
numerous
betrayals
Smutny,
theircalumnies,
theirvillainthoughinprivatehewouldcursetheBolsheviks,
ies.Not becausetheywerevillainsbythemselves
butbecause,emphasized
the
all theseBolshevik
pragmatic
president,
perfidies
delayedRussiajoiningthe
Alliesin theEuropeanWar.Benesconsidered
thisto be themostimportant
factor
anda proofofSovietobligation
to helptheCzechsintherestostrategic
rationoftheircountry's
withinthepre-Munich
borders.79
independence
In thespringof 1940,severalmonthsbeforetheBritish
would
government
theCzechoslovak
Benessubmitted
a comrecognize
provisional
government,
memorandum
to thevisiting
US DeputySecretary
ofStateSumner
prehensive
Welles.Entitled
'ThePeaceAimsofCzechoslovakia',
itdemandedinprinciple
the restoration
of pre-Munich
Czechoslovakia,but admittedthe necessity
of borderadjustments
and populationtransfers
in orderto reducetheshare
of hostileGermanand Hungarianminorities.
But it declaredexplicitly
that
Czechoslovakia
wouldhaveagain'herGermanminority'.
ThefateofRuthenia
shouldbe decidedina postwarreferendum.80
76 Russian source quoted in V.V. Marjina, Zakarpatskaia Ukraina - Podkarpatskaia Rus v
politikeBenesha i Stalina 1929-1945gg. (Moscow 2003), 21.
77 E.g. messagesfromBenes to the Czech underground:no. 9 of 28.10.1939 and no. 14 of
8.2.1940, publishedin J. Sole (ed.), Vzkazydo vlasti(Prague 1996) [hereafter
Messages}.
78 Ibid., 47, no. 14, para. 6.
79 SmutnyDiaries, no. 193.
80 The Czech and Englishversionsare different.
Both versionsneverthelessemphasized the
restorationof pre-Munichborders. See detailed descriptionin Benes, Pamèti III (2007), no.
126. Sumner Welles refusedto receive Benes, and the document was ignored by the State
Department.The FO's reactionwas largelynegative;Beneswas ridiculedas a selfishand pompous
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642
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
theSovietshad plansto occupyRuthenia
It stillremainsunclearwhether
theRed ArmyoccupiedtheBalticStates,
summer
of
when
the
1940,
during
Bessarabiaand Bukovina.Berlinwouldmostlikelyhaveacceptedthat.The
in orderto offsetHungarianpressure,
triedon many
Slovaks,forinstance,
in Bratislavathatthe Red Army
occasionsto convincethe Sovietminister
Allinvain.After
fromtheHungarians.
shouldseizeRuthenia
June1941,Benes
on thereturn
ofRuthenia
as thefirst
trieda newtackbyinsisting
steptowards
at theposborderofCzechoslovakia,
ofthepre-Munich
therestitution
hinting
kind
of
referendum
a
the
Ruthenes
of
through
presumably
sibility allowing
- laterto join theSovietUkraine,in orderto establishthecommonborder
was: no comment.81
Moscow'sreaction
withpostwarCzechoslovakia.
historicspeechof 22 June1941, on the morrowof Hitler's
Churchill's
a turning
on theSovietUnion,constituted
pointforBenesas well.82
onslaught
He admitted
hownervoushe was all day,beforehe couldlistento Churchill's
speechon theradio.Untilthen,Benescouldneverruleoutthata negotiated
to allowthe
HitlerandChurchill's
be reachedbetween
opponents,
peacemight
weeks
earlier(11
in
six
to fight
thewar theEastsingle-handed.
former
Only
in
arrived
Scotland
byair,
deputyRudolfHess had
May 1941),theFiihrer's
musthavebeena peaceproposal.
withhimwhateveryone
suspected
carrying
invadedRussia,Benesallegedlyhad
theday beforeGermany
Furthermore,
was aboutto reach
thatGermany
a telegram
fromMoscow,warning
received
withBritainand AmericaagainsttheSovietUnion.83
an agreement
However,
fieryspeechon the followingday musthave liberated
hearingChurchill's
ofour
itis a splendid
Benesfromhisagony.'Munichisvindicated;
justification
Hitlera longtime
theywerewrong!Wecouldhavefinished
policy;I was right,
witha hardlyconcealedexcitement.84
Smutny
ago,'hewas telling
Regardingthe Russians,Benescastigatedthemas he did the Poles in
1939:
September
The Russians mustbe taughta lesson. I would not like to see themas big winners,because
thentheyand theircommunismwill become unbearable... I had to wait threelong years
. . . and had nota momentto sparein gettingtheRussiansinvolved,whilecursingthemat the
same timebecause theyhad done to me some verynastyand uglythings... I did anticipate
troublemaker:'Benes opened his mouthprettywide in thismemo',commentedF.K. Roberts(FO
371/24370,C 4305-28.3.40).
81 The newly appointed Soviet envoy to the Slovak Republic, G.M. Pushkin,who arrived
in Bratislavaon 2 February1940, was repeatedlyasked whetherthe Soviet Union intendedto
incorporateRuthenia.His replieswere evasive. See Marjina, Zakarpatskaia Ukraina(2003), op.
cit., 15-19; and her earlierarticles:V.V. Marjina, 'Brána na Balkan. Slovensko ν geopolitickych plánech SSSR a Nemecka 1939-1941', Soudobé dëjiny6 (1993-4), 827-46; V.V. Marjina,
'SSSR i chekhoslovatskii
vopros, 1939 god', Mezhdunarodnyeotnosheniiai stranyTsentralnoii
Evropy(Moscow1990),95-128.
lugovostochnoi
II (2007);Memoirs
GreatWarSpeeches
82 W.S.Churchill,
(London1965),105-9.Benes,Parneti
(1954),154-6,165-6.
Polittcke
27 June1941: L.K. Feierabend,
AstonAbbotts,
83 Conversation
Benes-Feierabend,
II
231
Feierabend].
(Brno
1994),
[hereafter
vzpominky
84 Smutny
Diaries,23 June1941,no. 193; CSV/,no. 84.
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Haunen The Challenges and Dilemmas of PresidentBenes afterMunich
643
thatRussiawouldenterthewar,butitwasnotso easyto sayevenamongourownpeopleto
ss
irredeemable
to happen.
prevent
something
Benesrevealedto Smutnythesecretwhyhis
Duringthesameconversation,
had been,as he likedto hear,so flawless
and always
politicalprognostications
on thetarget:
I nevercounton people;I aminterested
in'socialforces'
only.ThisiswhyI amnotwatching
whatordinary
ofsocialforces
areaiming.
Thisis
peopledo,butfollowwherethetrajectories
convinced
thatRussiamustsooneror laterclashwithGermany.
whyI remained
absolutely
Benes'obsessionwithhisown self-righteousness
at thecorrectmomentin
him
led
further
to
foundations
of
another
history
lay
legend,namelyone of
in
direct
involvement
Churchill's
historic
personal
speechof22 June.Churchill,
him
to
had
sent
earlier
the
draft
ofhisspeechwitha request
according Benes,
forcomments.
Benesapparently
was not entirely
happywiththedraftand
whichwerethentakenbya specialmeschangeda fewpassageshereandthere,
in Buckinghamshire,
residence
sengerbackto Chequers,theprimeminister's
notfarfromAstonAbbotts,
whereBeneslived.86
As Benesanticipated,
ambassadorMajskysoon sentforhimto proposea
Sovietrecognition
oftheCzechoslovak
withPresident
Benes
government-in-exile
as itshead,basedon thejuridicalcontinuity
withpre-Munich
Czechoslovakia
- but withoutexplicitly
the borders.87
The Sovietoffer,
nevmentioning
of the
ertheless,
appearedmoregenerousthanthe incomplete
recognition
Czechoslovak
whichtheBritish
'provisional'
government-in-exile
government
inJuly1940.88
Benesalso cleverly
usedthemeeting
to reintroduce
the
granted
issueofRuthenia,
nowupgradedfrommerebaitto a moreadvancedbargainbe first
reinstated
as partofCzechoslovakia,
ingchip.It must,he maintained,
and onlythereafter
shoulditsfuture
be decidedthrough
directtalksbetween
- butnever,
theCzechoslovak
and Sovietgovernments
as he statedearlierin
theautumnof 1939, throughPolishor Hungarianmediations.
Majskydid
Benessuggested.
This timeBenesdid not repeathis
agreewitheverything
chiefrequirement
from1939 - thecommonborderwiththeSovietUnion.
Whether
thiswas causedbytheretreat
oftheRedArmy,
suffering
devastating
lossesunderGermanattack,ortheopeningofnegotiations
between
theSoviets
and theLondonPoles,one can onlyspeculate.Benesfurther
insisted
thatthe
85 Ibid.
86 Conversation
30 June1941, in: Feierabend,
232. My inquiriesin the
Benes-Feierabend,
Churchill
inCambridge
Archives
March2006 produced
no specific
evidence
the
during
regarding
on Churchill's
draftbyBeneson thatparticular
allegedcomments
day,i.e.22 June1941.1wishto
to MrsCarolineHerbert
fromtheChurchill
Archives
forherhelp.
express
mythanks
87 MeetingBenes-Majsky,
8 July1941,CSV I, no. 88; Smutny
Diaries,no. 198; B. Lockhart
to A. Eden,9 July1941,in:British
Documents
on Foreign
and Papersfromthe
Affairs.
Reports
1940Print,PartIII (1940-1945),SeriesF,Europe,vol. 3, January
ForeignOfficeConfidential
December1941 [hereafter
Publications
ofAmerica,
BDFA](HMSO & University
1997-9),281.
88 DetlefBrandes,Großbritannien
undseineosteuropäischen
Alliierten
1939-1943 (Munich
1988),149-201;Brown,DealingwithDemocrats,
op. cit.,109-49.
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Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
644
Czechcommunist
whichhad been
groupunderitsleaderKlementGottwald,
in Moscow sincetheGermanoccupationof Prague,mustbe subsheltered
ordinated
to hisgovernment-in-exile.
GiventhefactthattheKomintern
was
in 1941, thiswas fromMoscow'sperspective
stilloperational
a trulyexceptionalgesture.89
Benesfurther
thesamesubordination
withregardto
requested
in
theCzechoslovak
units
to
be
raised
the
USSR
from,amongothers,
military
the ex-citizens
of Ruthenia.Czechoslovakofficers
appointedby the Benes
wouldbe incharge,buttheoverallcommandwouldbe underthe
government
RedArmy.
Majskyagreed.It seemedas iftheCzechoslovaks
enjoyeda special
in
which
increased
Polish
that
status Moscow,
only
suspicions Benesmusthave
Rutheniain exchangefora
signeda secretpactwiththeSoviets,sacrificing
commonborderwiththeSoviets.Benes,ofcourse,deniedthat,arguingthat
hisdedication
to theCzechoslovak-Polish
Confederation
remained
as strong
as ever.90
Atthesametime,theborderquestionsremained
unsolved.
glaringly
inPolishhands,
Benescategorically
refused
toleavetheTesin(Cieszyn)district
whileSikorski
insisted
on thereturn
ofPolisheastern
territories
invadedbythe
SovietsinSeptember
1939 andexpectedtheCzechsto supporthim.
Benes'worldviewseemedto be focusedon theoutcomeoftheduelbetween
thetwogiantlandpowersGermany
and Russia.He toldSmutny
thatin five
withFranceeliminated
at leastfor
continent,
yearsEuropewouldbe a different
fromEuropeand
thenext20 years,withBritain
withdrawing
a different
path. . . onlytwopowerswillbe leftinEurope,Russiaand
goingwithAmerica
inEastern
willbedevastated
SinceGermany
role,certainly
Germany.
bythewar,thedecisive
thatshedoesittheright
Europe,I hope,willbe assumedbyRussia. . . andI amconcerned
way!91
FromBenes'perspective,
doingit 'therightway' meantthatRussiawould
the war on the side of the Anglo-Americans,
into
be inescapably
dragged
to fightthe
evenagainstitsownwill,and evenifthePolesmightstillprefer
in spite
succeed
RussiansthantheGermans.Couldtheconfederation
project
Not onlyforthe
sucha stumbling-block?
ofthefactthatthePolesrepresented
future
northethreatofan alternative
Czechs.NeithertheissueofRuthenia's
inMoscow
nationalcommittee
setup bytheCzechcommunists
Czechoslovak
of
menaceto Benesthanthestumbling-block
a greater
couldhaverepresented
'therightway'.
Confederation
withRussiafighting
theCzechoslovak-Polish
theissueofPoland'smassacred
Indeed,itwasto bePoland,orrather
prisonersrelations.
whichwas to casta longshadowon Czechoslovak-Soviet
of-war,
89 On theKomintern
seenote39 above.
'ZSRR' (1997),op. cit.,132-3.
90 Confederation,
nos59, 62; Duraczynski,
91 Smutny
Diaries,12 July1941,no. 198; also Benes'notesaftermeeting
Majskyon 8 July
1941,CSVI, no. 88.
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Haunen The Challenges and Dilemmas of PresidentBenes afterMunich
[I]tis verynasty.
645
(Cadogan'sDiaries)
- albeita friendly
crimehas beencommitted
[T]hata monstrous
bya foreign
government
one.
(OwenO'Malley)
under
Since22 June1941,thePolesand theCzechoslovaks,92
thoughfighting
different
warswithdifferent
war aims.
thesame(British)
flag,werefighting
The Poleswerefighting
againstHitlerin theopen and continuedtheirwar
- forbothdictators
had
againstStalinin secret- at leastin theirthoughts
1939. By contrast,the Czechoslovaks
invadedtheircountryin September
towardstheRussiansand wishedto fightHitleralone. This
feltno enmity
vis-àinterests
at thetime,whereastheinbornPolishhostility
suitedBritish
RussiacausedseriousheadachesamongtheAllies.The above
vis Bolshevik
were
also helpsto explainwhytheexiledCzechoslovaks
simpledifferential
with
both
the
British
and
the
Russians
to
relations
predisposed developgood
- whereasthePoles,whostarted
as theNumberOne allyoftheBritish,
were
1941
the
on
whose
shoulders
the
main
burden
after
Soviets,
June
by
replaced
nowrested.
ofwarwithGermany
of thepreMolotov'spromiseto BenesinJune1942 of Sovietrecognition
was to causebad bloodnotonlyamong
MunichbordersofCzechoslovakia93
Edenreminded
Benesthatthis
thePolesbutalso withtheBritish
government.
wasclearly
a breachofa previous
the
Anglo-Russian
agreement, so-calledSelf'the
of
which
was
to
thegreater
Alliesfrom
Ordinance, object
prevent
denying
treaties
with
the
smaller
Allies.'94
It
was
not
until
the
Moscow
confermaking
in October1943 that,underSovietpressure,
enceofAlliedforeign
ministers
Edendecidednotto insiston theSelf-denying
Ordinance,
thereby
givingup his
the
Czechoslovak-Soviet
Benes.95
to
treaty
proposedby
opposition
SovietNieton thesubjectoftheCzechoslovak-Polish
After
theunmitigated
delivered
Confederation,
onlyseveralweeksafterMolotov'sseeming
approval
in
his
But
during stopover London,Benesappeareddepressedfora while.96
he quicklyrecoveredand acceptedthe Sovietalternative.
SovietambassadorAlexander
in England,
Bogomolov,
appointedto theexiledgovernments
assuredhimthatthedefensive
function
of blockingthe notoriousGerman
DrangnachOstencouldbe morereliably
bytheSovietUnionthan
performed
92 I amconsciousofthefactthattheSlovaksarean independent
nation.Here'Czechoslovaks'
has beenusedto designate
exiledCzechsand SlovakswhohadacceptedPresident
Benes'leaderofCzechoslovakia.
shipfortherestoration
93 As referred
to innote53.
94 Edenwriting
to PhilipNichols,British
minister
to theexiledCzechoslovak
in
government
London,25 Juneand7 July1942,in:BDFA,vol.4, 161-3.
95 See proceedings
of theMoscowConference
on 24 October1943,in: ForeignRelationsof
theUnitedStates/1943/I,
626-7; VojtëchMastny,'SovietWarAimsat theMoscowandTeheran
Conferences
of1943'JournalofModernHistory
47 (September
1975),481-504.
96 Seenote54 above.
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646
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
theSovietoffer
ofa bilateral
Moreover,
byPoland.97
pactwouldcomewitha
in
ofCzechoslovakia.
of
non-interference
the
internal
affairs
Soviet
guarantee
to
Benes' plans to
Moscow
to
be
to
listen
Furthermore,
ready
appeared
Germans
from
Czechoslovakia.
The
Soviet
the
Sudeten
approvalofthe
expel
wouldcomeone yearlater,apparently
as a reward,somehistorians
transfer
wouldargue,forCzechoslovaksupportfortheSovietversionof theKatyn
massacre.98
politicaltrips.The firstwas to
During1943 Benesmade two important
Rooseveltand gainedtheimprestheUnitedStates.He twicemetPresident
courseand approvedof
sion fromhimthathe agreedwithhis pro-Soviet
the expulsionof GermansfromCzechoslovakia.Benes'mostdecisivetrip
was thesecondone, to Moscow at theend of 1943. Havingsignedon 12
mutualaid
December1943 the Czechoslovak-Soviet
Treatyof 'friendship,
Benesappearedjubilantwhenhe leftMoscow.99
and post-warcooperation',
so fullyhisambition
to remodel
couldsatisfy
NeitherRooseveltnorChurchill
Slavicstate,protected
to suithis visionof a homogeneous
Czechoslovakia
bya commonborderwiththeSovietUnion.Beneswas able to extractfrom
theGermansand Hungarians,
Stalinsupportforhisbigschemeof expelling
the
to itspre-Munich
borders(andreclaiming
Czechoslovakia
whilerestoring
mentioned
beforeStalinand Molotovhis
'treacherous'
Slovaks).Benesbriefly
and
be restored
to Czechoslovakia
thatitshouldfirst
opinionaboutRuthenia:
to Czechoslovakia
leftto decidewhether
thenitscitizens
theywantedto return
Molotovwas overheard
or to join theSovietUkraine.100
saying'Khorosho,'
as he would
and so itwas decided- butnotin themannerBenesexpected,
He stoppedin
Benes'return
soonbitterly
learn.101
tripcamecloseto a triumph.
approvedBenes'policy
Algiersto see Generalde Gaulle,whoenthusiastically
nextdoor in
withMoscow.102
of close co-operation
Churchill,
convalescing
31 July
97 Conversation
Benes-Boeomolov,
1942,CSV I, no. 183.
StateCouncil,in sessionbetween17 and
98 DuringBenes'visitto theUSA,theCzechoslovak
forserving
thePolishgovernment
a resolution
19 May 1943,approved
condemning
unanimously
no. 181). The Sovietapprovalforthe
in theKatynAffair
Germanpropaganda
{Confederation,
fromCzechoslovakia
reachedBenesintheUnitedStateson 6 June1943,one
transfer
ofGermans
to Benes'notes- no record
Roosevelt.
to President
farewell
According
daybeforehisscheduled
of 'minority
side- Rooseveltis saidto haveapprovedthetransfer
was madeon theAmerican
ofthe
andfromus',as wellas theSovietannexation
fromEastPrussia,
Transylvania
population
no. 182;Pamëti
Poland(CSVI, nos.241,248,249; Confederation,
andofeastern
Balticcountries
on thepartof Czechoslovak
of thelack of sincerity
(1948), 330, 361-2). For fiercecriticism
EdvardBenes(2005), op. cit.,274-85; M.K. Kaminski,
see MarekK. Kaminski,
politicians,
ζ Polskai Zwiazkiem
wobeckwestiistosunków
Rada Ministrów
'Czechoslowacka
emigracyjna
1943 r.',DziejeNajnowsze1 (2007),41-59; 3 (2007),57-87; DusanSeges,'Edvard
Sowieckim
ζ 1943 r.,'
Benesa sprawapolskaw kontekscie
podpisaniaukladuczechoslowacko-sowieckiego
DziejeNajnowsze3 (2006),17-53.
99 Benes,Memoirs
(1954),239-91;PamëtiII (2007),eh.II.7.3-4;PamëtiIII (2007),documents
seehisaddressbefore
nos58-71.ForBenes'enthusiastic
nos151-4;CSVII, documents
summary,
no. 80.
StateCouncilon 11 January
theCzechoslovak
1944,in:CSV II, no. 75; Messages,
Dr.Benes(London1946),290.
100 CSV//,157,179. RepeatedinCompton
Mackenzie,
101 Seenotes131ff.below.
l'Unité1942-44(Paris1956),249-51.Littledidde
de Guerre:
102 Charlesde Gaulle,Mémoires
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Haunen The Challenges and Dilemmas of Presidentbenes afterMunich
647
also receivedBenes.Constantly
irritated
deadMarrakech,
bythecontinuing
lockin Polish-Soviet
relations
sincetherevelations
oftheKatynmassacre,he
withStalinwithout
murmurs.103
expressed
supportforBenes'arrangement
It was on theeve of Benes'departure
to theUnitedStatesthattheKatyn
Affair
and whywas its
explodedinthemedia.Whatwas theKatynmassacre,
moreimportant
than
lastingimpactuponthetwoEastEuropeangovernments
theexistence
ofmassgravesofmassacred
anyotherevent?Theaffair,
revealing
PolishPOWs,wastheworkofGermanwartime
to drive
propaganda,
designed
a wedgebetweentheAllies;whilethemassacreitselfwas theworkof Soviet
When
genocidalpracticesin dealingwithPolish'class enemies'in captivity.
of thousandsof
Germanradioannouncedon 14 April1943 the'discovery'
it also claimedthatthevictims
mutilated
uniforms,
corpsesin Polishmilitary
had beenexecutedby the NKVD, Stalin'ssecretpolice.104
Moscow angrily
inthemassacreandaccusedtheGermans
deniedanyinvolvement
ofthecrime.
thePolishgovernment
ofLondonaskedtheInternational
Red
When,however,
CrossinGenevato sendouta commission
ofexperts
to conductexhumations
at Katyn,theSovietgovernment
brokeoffdiplomaticrelations
indignantly
withtheLondonPoles,neverto resumethemagain.
WhentheKatynaffairbrokeout Beneswas preparing
forhisstatevisitto
theUnitedStates.He acceptedtheSovietversionoftheKatynmassacrewithoutvacillation.
Beneshadacknowledged
therenewedSoviet
Equally,although
invitation
to travelto Moscowat theheight
oftheKatynAffair,
hewas unable
toflyuntilthepreparations
fortheTeheranConference
werecompleted.
Under
thepretext
of'bad weather',
Benes'partywas diverted
to a British
airbasein
in Teheranwas over.Onlythendid theBenesparty
Iraq untiltheconference
receivethegreenlightto proceedto Moscow.Beneswas therefore
goingto
meetStalin,whomusthavebeeninan extraordinarily
mood,having
optimistic
returned
fromtheconference
ofhislifetime
withthetwomostpowerful
men
oftheWestern
him
who
treated
as
an
and
world,
equal
basicallyacceptedhis
territorial
demands.As theCzechsunderBenes'leadership
seemedto demonstrateto otherEastEuropeansthattheSovietswereno cannibalsandcouldbe
theentrenched
drivenintothe
trusted,
Poles,the'Betrayed
Ally',werefurther
until
abandoned
the
Czechs
as
well.105
corner, finally
by
thefuture
extension
oftheSovietborder
westwards,
Benes,implicRegarding
in
and
now
itlyalready 1939,
explicitly,
acceptedtheCurzonLinebyreiterata commonborderbetween
therestored
Czechoslovak
inghiswishto establish
and
the
Union.
Soviet
The
of
Ruthenia
anditsinhabRepublic
enlarged
subject
Gaulleknowthat12 months
laterhewouldbestanding
before
Stalinandsubjected
toevengreater
andhumiliation
thanBenes.SeeHenri-Christian
Giraud,De Gaulleetles Communistes,
pressure
vol.II (Paris1989),chs11-12.
andRoosevelt:
103 Churchill
TheComplete
vol.1,ed.W.F.Kimbell(Princeton,
Correspondence,
- Roadto Victory,
Winston
S. Churchill
vol.VI ( London1986),
NJ,1984),533; MartinGilbert,
635-6. Seefurther
note117.
104 TheGoebbelsDiaries(NewYork1948):entries
between
9 and30 April1943.
105 AnitaPrazmowska,
Britain
and Poland1939-1943.TheBetrayed
1995),
Ally(Cambridge
166-98.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
648
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
in thedetailedmilitary
itantsre-emerged
as it becameclearthat
negotiations,
thebulkofthesoldiersserving
withtheCzechoslovak
unitsintheSovietUnion
wouldhaveto be recruited
fromtheinhabitants
ofRuthenia,
whowerefound
invariousGulagor POW camps.The Sovietsallowedthemto serveunderthe
Czechoslovak
flagas longas theywerelistedas 'Ukrainians'.106
As faras theKatynmassacre
was concerned,
theaffair
hada much
however,
than
could
be
confined
to
a
theoretical
discussion
over
deepersignificance
ofPOWs. Iftheforemost
taskofthethreegreatpowerson the
thetreatment
intounconditional
howwere
was to fight
surrender,
Germany
Europeanfront
not to mentionthe representatives
of the
Britishand Americanstatesmen,
evidencecoming(through
exiledgovernments,
supposedto reactto thegrisly
in
theGerman-controlled
media!)fromthemassgravesofKatyn?Moreover,
offormer
Polisheasternterritories,
annexedto
thediscussion
overthefuture
theSovietUnionafterSeptember
Charter
couldbe invoked.
1939,theAtlantic
thatno territorial
withoutthefreely
It stipulated
changesshouldbe effected
whoshouldchooseinfreeelections
wishesofthepeopleconcerned,
expressed
2 and 3). Shouldall
thegovernment
underwhichtheywishedto live(Articles
cannotoverrun
thispaperballastbe pushedunderthecarpetbecausemorality
Churchill
to
ofmilitary
amidstwar?Although
refused
practicality
co-operation
backup thePoles,he couldnotidentify
himself
withtheSovietversioneither.
WhenMajskycameto himcomplaining
aboutthePoles,Churchill
declared:
'Wehavegotto beatHitler. . . thisis no timeforquarrelsandcharges.'107
to shuttheireyesand plugtheirears
a fewindividuals
refused
Fortunately,
whenone groupofAllieshad massacredanothergroupofAlliesin themost
memorandum
withthe
fashion.
AttheendofMay 1943 a substantial
ghastly
incaptivreconstruction
aboutthePolishofficers
mostdetailedandconvincing
began
ity,written
byOwenO'Malley,ambassadorto thePolishgovernment,
whereitwas characterized
as 'a brilliant,
tocirculate
insidetheForeignOffice,
unorthodox
and disquieting
despatch'.Outside,it was read by theCabinet
shouldreadittoo.'If,
thatPresident
Roosevelt
andtheKing;Churchill
insisted
concludes
then,'
O'Malley,
ifit be thecase thata monstrous
moralshavebecomeinvolved
withinternational
politics,
- albeita friendly
one- andthatwe,
crimehas beencommitted
bya foreign
government
validreasons,havebeenobligedto behaveas ifthedeedwas nottheirs,
forhowever
may
offalling
notonlyothersbutourselves,
itnotbe thatwe nowstandin dangerofbemusing
'andburnnot'?. . . Andso,ifthefacts
. . . underSt.Paul'scurseonthosewhocanseecruelty
106 Marjina,Zakarpatskaia
Ukraina(2003),op. cit.,30ff;CSV //,no.230.
admitted
that
thesummer
of1950,Churchill
107 InvolumeIV ofhismemoirs,
during
completed
a 'pirouette',
a clear-cut
standbyescaping
hehadaccessto'otherfacts',butavoidstaking
through
fortheKatynmassacre,
on German
totheSovietfailure
topresent
evidence
responsibility
referring
to formhisown
is therefore
entitled
conclusion:
androundsitoffbya non-committal
'Everyone
oftheKatynmassacre
see
IV,681). Formoredetailson Churchill's
cover-up
opinion'(Churchill
In Command
and
Churchill
bookbyDavidReynolds,
thesuperbly
researched
ofHistory.
Fighting
theSecondWorldWar(London2005),ch.22.
Writing
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Haunen The Challenges and Dilemmas of PresidentBenes afterMunich
649
about theKatynmassacreturnout to be as mostof us inclineto think,shall we vindicatethe
spiritof thesebraveunluckymenand justifythe livingto thedead.108
Sir AlexanderCadogan,the Permanent
UnderSecretary
at the Foreign
afterreadingO'Malley'scataclysmic
wrotein hisdiary
Office,
memorandum,
thatforyearsbeforeKatyntheSovietswerebutchering
theirowncitizensby
thetensof thousands,
whentheBritishflungthemselves
intotheirarmsin
1941.He feltthatthisactmadetheBritish
positionhardlylessdelicate:
The blood of Russianscriesso loud to Heaven as thatof Poles. But it is verynasty.How can
Poles everliveamicablyalongsideRussians,and how can we discusswithRussiansexecution
of German'war criminals',whenwe have condoned this?109
It tooktheindefatigable
Poleshalfa century
to extracta Sovietadmission
in October1992,thePolishgovernment
to theKatyncrime.Finally,
obtained
fromPresident
B. Yeltsinthekeydocument,
theactualexecutionorderof 5
March1940,whichoriginated
fromL. Beriaand was countersigned
byStalin
andhisclosestcollaborators.
It requested
to
execute
14,700Polish
permission
POWs, in additionto 11,000 so-called'civilians'- shopkeepers,
lawyers,
doctors,
priestsand others- whowereto be liquidatedas 'agents'and 'class
enemies'.110
nowto BenesandtheCzechoslovak
attitude
to Katyn:howmuch
Returning
of it was basedon ignorance
and forhow longcouldsucha claimbe maintained?Although
theCzechoslovak
inexile,alongwiththerestof
government
theAllies,was quickto condemnthe'KatynAffair'
as a Germanpropaganda
thereis ampleevidence
thatrumours
aboutthemassaploytosplittheAllies,111
creofPolishofficers
inSovietcaptivity
hadbeencirculating
amongtheCzechs
andreachedBenesandhisentourage
longbeforeApril1943,whennaziradio
stationsfirstbroadcastthenews.Severalhundreds
of Czechoslovaksoldiers
and officers
in 1939 to formthe'PolishLegion'withinthePolish
volunteered
handledbythe
Armyand fellintoSoviethandsafter17 September.
Although
sameNKVD authorities
as theunfortunate
PolishPOWs,theywereinterned
in separatecamps.Theirlivesweresparedand mostofthemwereallowedto
leaveforFrancevia Turkey.
at thesametimeas Stalinordered
Paradoxically,
108 ForeignOffice,ConfidentialPrints:C 6160/258/55,Mr. Malley to Mr. Eden, 24 May 1943
[availableon thewebsite]withtheaccompanyingminutes.Papersof SirOwen O'Malley, National
Libraryof Ireland,Ms. 21, 691-1302. O'Malley's despatchand the FO minutesare reprintedin
Louis Fitzgerald,Katyn Massacre (London 1977). See also Sir Owen O'Malley, The Phantom
Caravan (London 1954), 229-34.
109 The Diaries of Sir AlexanderCadogan 1938-1945, ed. D.N. Dilks (London 1971), 537.
110 Katyn.Dokumentyludobójstwa . . . przekazane Polsce 14 Pazdziernika 1992 r. (Warsaw
1992), 34-9; Natalia S. Lebedeva, Katyn: Prestuplenieprotiv chelovechestva(Moscow 1994),
159. The facsimileof Beria'sletterof 5 March 1940, countersignedby Stalinand his closestcollaborators,was deliveredby hand to PresidentL. Walesa on 14 October 1992 byProf.R. Pikhoia,
directorof theRussian FederalArchives.
Ill
E. Táborsky, Ά Polish-CzechoslovakConfederation.A Storyof the First Soviet Veto',
journal of CentralEuropean Affairs9(4) (1950). See note 98 above.
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Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
650
ofPolishPOWs,he agreedto thereleaseoftheCzechsagainst
theexecution
soldiers
a written
againsttheUSSR.TheseCzechoslovak
promisenotto fight
Further
inforwerewellawareofwhathadhappenedtotheirPolishcomrades.
in Sovietcaptivity
cameunofficially
mationaboutthefateof Polishofficers
Mission(Col. Pika)intheSovietUnion.112
fromtheCzechoslovak
Military
Government
andtheambasoftheSikorski
member
Professor
Stanislaw
Kot,
on
Soviet-Polish
of
the
Moscow
after
the
to
Agreement
signing
sador-designate
in
of
Polish
1941
that
thousands
told some Czechs July
officers,
Amnesty,
for,and thatGerman
1939,werein factunaccounted
capturedin September
claimedthatthePolishPOWs had beenmassacredby
broadcastsrepeatedly
MoscowvetoedtheConfederation,114
after
Fourmonths
Stalin'ssecretpolice.113
in exile,
in theBenesgovernment
thefinanceminister
LadislavFeierabend,
happenedto speak withAdam Tarnowski,the Polishambassadorto the
Tarnowskicomplainedthatthe Poles could not
Czechoslovakgovernment.
takenprisonerby the Russians.He and
findover 10,000 of theirofficers,
hadbeen
thattheseofficers
werenowconvinced
manyPolesinthegovernment
since
to comeoutin theopenwithaccusations,
killed,butthePoleshesitated
neverthebad. Tarnowski
werealreadyso appallingly
relations
Soviet-Polish
he
withMoscow.Russianpromises,
Benes'policyoffriendship
lesscriticized
be trusted.115
warned,cannotabsolutely
afterthe
Confederation
theCzechoslovak-Polish
appeareddefunct
Although
towardsthePolishally
SovietvetoofJuly1942,thereweremoralobligations
coalition.Therewere,alas,alsopowermember
oftheanti-German
as thefirst
in bothexiledcommunities.
and anti-Czech
fulanti-Polish
stereotypes
present
in
offoreigners,
the
Benesoftenairedhisanti-Polish
especially
presence
feelings
theRussians.He wouldspeakoftheneedto getridofthePolisharistocrats,
out themuch-needed
and of theRed Armyas theoptimaltool forcarrying
Benes'viewswerequiteinfectious
'Social Revolution'.
amonghiscollaborathe
40
after
even
defend
them
who
seemed
to
Katynmassacre.116
tors,
years
112 See CSV I, docs nos 24, 26, 33, 36, 38-9, 43, 49, 50, 52-3; AnnaM. Cienciala,N.S.
Punishment
LebedevaandW.Materski
(NewHaven,CT,2007),
(eds),Katyn- A CrimeWithout
withMjr.Jaroslav
andcorrespondence
conversation
docsnos 14, 63, 91. Author's
Kaspar-Páty,
Missionin theUSSRandcolleagueofCol. Pika,October
oftheCzechoslovak
member
Military
Staff
Czechoslovak
1983.One oftheinterned
officers,
CaptainJanKrcek,havingreachedFrance
withtheNKVD.
to collaborate
aboutbeingblackmailed
in May 1940,lefta written
testimony
thathisfuture
he was threatened
Whenhe resisted,
mightfollowthepathofthePolishofficers
theirhomesandfamilies':
who'wereneverto revisit
'Zprávaskpt.JanaKrckao ceskoslovenském
a vojenstvt
2/1993,134-62,at 158.
legionuν Polsku',Historie
et al. (Prague2001), 131-2,284;
ed. JanaCechurová
113 Válecnédeníky
JanaOpocenského,
FeierabendII, 180.
114 Seenotes55 and 111 above.
115 Feierabendll, 186.
116 See Taborsky,
op. cit.;Benes,BetweenEast and West(1981), 121; HooverInstitution
Box 2, Taborsky's
Diaries,vol. Ill, 218-22. In theBritish
press
Collection,
Archives,
Taborsky
similarviewsweresupported
by theleaderwriterforThe Times,E.H. Carr,and thepaper's
Moscow correspondent,
Ralph Parker:P.M.H. Bell,JohnBull and the Bear: BritishPublic
PolicyandtheSovietUnion1941-1945(London1990),124.
Opinion,Foreign
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Haunen The Challenges and Dilemmas of PresidentBenes afterMunich
65 1
Benes,whowas at thetimeon a statevisitintheUnitedStates,agreedwith
RooseveltthatthePoleshad beendeludedand thatthereactionary
President
attention
overKatynto divert
hadbeenusingtheconfusion
Polishgovernment
Line
the
Curzon
After
fromtheRusso-Polish
controversy. discussing
boundary
himthat
reminded
one of his Czechcolleagues(Feierabend)
withRoosevelt,
forsometimethattheSovietshadkilledat least10,000
thePoleshadsuspected
but
thathe had alreadyheardsuchrumours,
Benesadmitted
oftheirofficers.
Soviet
Union
should
insisted
that
the
Stalin
thathe did not believethem.117
withnazi Germany
regainherbordersof 1939-41,whichshehad negotiated
lostbecauseof thearmedaggression
and subsequently
bythelattercountry
to be pushedseveralhundredmileswestthreeyearslater.The Polesrefused
wardsfromtheirancientlandsin theeast,wherebiggertownsweremostly
Belorussians
was inhabited
andthecountryside
byUkrainians,
Polish-speaking
thatStalin'sproposal
and Benesalso thought
Churchill
andJews.Roosevelt,
to exchangeEasternPolandup to theso-calledCurzonLinefora portionof
EastPrussia,Danzigand otherGermanterritories
up to theriverOderwas a
fairproposition.
whythiskindof advantageous
Theycouldnot understand
Pole.As muchas he disliked
to anypatriotic
was unacceptable
horse-trading
on the
likedBenes'reasoning
at thatstagePolishnationalegoism,Churchill
axis
as thefuture
themeof theCzechoslovak-Soviet
geopolitical
partnership
he toldhim
inEasternEurope.'You andWilhelmina,'
defence
ofanti-German
'youaretheonlyleaderswhohavethenationbehindthem.'118
approvingly,
foolishthedisputewiththeSovietsover
Benesconsidered
The rationalist
Theirlivescould
of themassgravesof dead Polishofficers.
theownership
to getovertheloss of thepre-war
notbe saved,anyway.Was it so difficult
landand marsheswithsome15 millioninhabitterritory,
mostlyagricultural
million
werePolish,as weretheancientcitiesofWilna
whom
seven
of
ants,
thePolesin exchange
and Lwów,when,on theotherhand,theAlliesoffered
infrastructure
and proswithadvancedfarming,
Germanterritories
superior
and
assessed
first
the
'social
forces'
the
terrain
cities?
Havingmapped
perous
the
Polish-Soviet
confrontation
with
the
Benes
contemplated
presentthere,
Sincehe had alwaysanticipated
thata socialrevolucool eyesofa sociologist.
hewelcomedthe
forPoland'spathtowardsmodernization,
tionwas necessary
Poland
the
Red
as
the
instrument
inevitable
by
Army
necessary
sweepthrough
He also had to look at thePolish-Soviet
conflict
withthe
ofsocialcleansing.
whose
task
was to
of
a
'builder'
of
supreme
postwarCzechoslovakia,
eyes
the
non-Slavic
nationalities
and
andreshapehisowncountry,
reconstruct
expel
'Czechoslovak'
futureCzechoslovakiaintoa trulyhomogeneous
transform
117 FeierabendIII, 66. In Benes' Memoirs(1948), 400, Katynis mentionedin passingas a convenientdate causing the break in diplomaticrelationsbetweenthe USSR and the Polish governis providedbythe
ment.In theEnglishversionof theMemoirs,of 1954, an impartialcommentary
translator,
GodfreyLias (at 265). See also Benes,MemoirsII (2007), 25-7, 332-4.
118 Benes on the visitin Marrakech,4 January1944 (Confederation,no. 205; CSV II, 215,
no. 75). The equation of PresidentBenes and Queen Wilhelminaof the Netherlandsis truly
Churchillianand tendsto be misleading.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
652
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
nationthatwouldrequireforits protection
a stableand safeRusso-Polish
border.
It seemed,therefore,
to Benes,as itdidto Roosevelt119
andChurchill,120
thatsuchan optimalbordercorresponded
to theCurzonLine.121
No rationalization
can legitimize
the approvalof the grislymurderof
let
alone
to
on
with
theliethattheyweremassacred
25,000Poles,
carry
bythe
Germans.
Benes'avoidanceofresponsibility,
andthoseofotherCzechoslovak
has to be confronted
withT.G. Masaryk'slegacy'to livein
representatives,
evoked
Vaclav
Havel.122
Butcan we blameBenesforhis
Truth',
recently
by
failures
'to liveinTruth'instronger
terms
thanthoseleadersofthedemocratic
blocChurchill
and Roosevelt,
who led thecrusadefordemocracy
againstthe
'evilAxisempires'?
to
the
Russian
writer
Victor
Soviet
According
Zaslavsky,
in hidingthetruthabout
leaderswouldnothavesucceededforhalfa century
theKatynmassacrewithout
Western
government
complicity.123
How do thechallenges
anddilemmas
withwhichBeneswasconfronted
look
In hisrecent
fromthebroaderperspective
ofthecommonEuropeanheritage?
oftheHolocaustas
bookPostwar,TonyJudthas singledouttherecognition
for'our contemporary
thecommondenominator
Europeanentryticket'.He
Kwasniewski's
official
ofthewartime
citedapprovingly
President
recognition
of PolishJews,including
theirvictimization
at thehandsof Poles
sufferings
'to closea painfulchapterin hisnation'spastand
as an attempt
themselves,
theEU into
How aboutbringing
bringPolandintolinewithitsEU partners'.124
ofthePoles,one mightask?I wouldsuggestincluding
linewiththesuffering
to all victimsof
tribute
Katynon 'our Europeanentryticket'as a symbolic
Stalinist
terror.125
detailedinformation
aboutthemassacred
119 Although
theUnitedStatesobtainedauthentic
after
Polishofficers
eitherduring(e.g.byH. Szymanski,
J.DrexelBiddle,G.H. Earle)or shortly
Lt.Col.JohnVanVliet,whohadbeencaptured
thewarinEuropeended,e.g.from
bytheGermans
in thespringof 1943. His reportwas conto Katynat thetimeoftheexhumation
and brought
oftheSoviet
andtheStateDepartment
so as notto damagethereputation
cealedbythePentagon
refused
to listento information
thattheKatyn
steadfastly
allyneededto defeatJapan.Roosevelt
SeeAllenPaul,Katyn.TheUntoldStoryofStalin's
massacre
hadbeenperpetrated
bytheRussians.
'Stalin'sKillingField- the
PolishMassacre(New York1991), 308-15; BenjaminB. Fischer,
in
Studies
(Winter
1999-2000);GeorgeSanford,
Katynand the
KatynControversy',
Intelligence
SovietMassacreof1940 (London2005),159-66.
120 See note107 above,and Sanford,
Katyn(2005), op. cit.,166-87. The longcontroversy
whichso scandalously
aroundtheKatynmassacre,
tingedtheForeignOfficeuntilonlya few
ingreatdetailintheso-calledButlerMemorandum
of 1973 (availableon
yearsago,is contained
underthetitleKatyn
withotherdocuments,
thewebsite).
It hasbeenpublished
recently,
together
- British
Reactions
to theKatynMassacre1943-2003(PRO,Kew,2003).
121 Confederation,
nos170,172,75, 177,187.
122 Cf.VaclavHavel'sessay'ThePowerofthePowerless'
(1979).
e la menzogna
123 V. Zaslavsky,
//Massacrodi Katyn:il crimine
(Rome1998),58; 'TheKatyn
Massacre',TELOS 114 (Winter
1999),67-107.
A History
124 TonyJudt,
Postwar:
ofEuropesince1945 (NewYork2005),803.
official
to recognize
theKatynmassacreas a brutalcrimebythe
125 Despitethefirst
attempt
in 1992,thepresent
arestillplaying
a gameofhide-andRussianauthorities
Yeltsin
government
inwhichthe
oftheRussianMilitary
Prosecutor
issuedinMarch2005 a statement
seek.Theoffice
denied,accompanied
bya dryannouncegenocidalnatureoftheKatynmassacrewas explicitly
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Hauner The Challenges and Dilemmas of PresidentBenes afterMunich
653
inSocialForcesonly.'
Ί nevercounton people.I am interested
(BenesinJune1941)
As theRed Armytookphysicalpossessionof Rutheniabytheend of 1944,
theCzechoslovak
titleandclaimto the
Sovietauthorities
decidedto challenge
'reunification
to
their
strategy' bringfellowUkrainians
province
byapplying
A goodindicator
ofMoscow'sfuture
underthebanneroftheSovietUkraine.126
Ruthenia
was theplanting
ofpartisan
units.Untilthespring
intention
vis-à-vis
in Rutheniawhatsoever.
activities
of 1944 therewereno guerrilla
Gradually,
wereflownin.127
TheCzechoslovak
Soviet-trained
instructors
however,
partisan
in Londonhad no influence
overthepartisanmovement
exiledgovernment
in easternSlovakiaand Ruthenia.GeneralHeliodorPika,the head of the
MissionintheUSSR,whowas loyalto Benes,reported
Czechoslovak
Military
in additionto the Czechoslovak
Sovietarmyoutfits,
thatseveraldifferent
in
Moscow
and
the
andflying
Communist
NKVD, hadbeentraining
PartyHQ
intheirhand-picked
without
to
co-ordinate
their
subversive
teams,
bothering
on theterritory
witheitherPikaor London.128
Withthecreationof
activities
autonomousforeign
ministries
fortheBelorussian
and Ukrainian
seemingly
and theUkrainianStaffof PartisanMovement(UsPD), agitation
republics,
in Ruthenia
and easternSlovakiaamongtheUkrainian
populationintensified
conspicuously.129
was signedbetweentheCzechoslovak
On 8 May 1944 an agreement
exiled
whichanticipated
theadvanceof theRed
(London)and Sovietgovernments
thetransfer
intoRuthenia
andstipulated
ofcivilianpowersinto
Army
explicitly
administration.
Theoutbreak
oftwoimportant
thehandsoftheCzechoslovak
in latesummerin EasternEurope,in Warsawand in
anti-German
uprisings
CentralSlovakia,probably
oftheSovietleadership
vis-àchangedtheattitude
Henceforth
all indigenous
activities
hadto be understrict
visRuthenia.
Soviet
control.Meanwhile,in accordancewiththeMay Agreement,
administrative
Benesdespatched
a government
led byMinister
Frantisek
Nëmec,
delegation
whicharrivedin Rutheniain October1944.130
Theyfoundtherealityon the
Not onlywas theCzechoslovakArmyCorpsdiverted
groundverydifferent.
mentthat40 percentoftheavailabledocuments
wouldsoonbe releasedforhistorical
research,
whereastheremaining
60 percentwouldretaintheclassification
of 'statesecrets'and remain
to researchers
unavailable
{MosNews,11 March2005).
126 Usingpredominantly
and Czechdocumentation,
a promiRussian,Ukrainian,
Hungarian
in Russianhas recently
nentresearcher
results:
V.V.Marjina,'K sobytiiam
ν
writing
published
Rusi(Zakarpatskoi
Ukraine)oseniu1944 - zimoi1945 goda',Slavianovedénie
Podkarpatskoi
3/2001,27-48, at 28; V.V.Marjina,ZakarpatskaiaUkraina(Podkarpatskaia
Rus) ν politike
Benesai Stalina,1939-1945gg.Dokumentalnyi
ocherk(Moscow2003).
127 Between
wereflownintoRuthenia
toorganize
MayandOctober1944,over260 instructors
andtrainguerrillas:
Ukraina(2003),op. cit.,44-6.
Marjina,Zakarpatskaia
128 Slovenské
národné
ed. V. Precan(Bratislava
Documents,
1965),220.
povstanie:
129 Marjina,Zakarpatskaia
Ukraina(2003),op. cit.,44-8.
130 Ibid.;SvorcZakletázem(2007),op. cit.,258-62.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
654
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
and despatched
to a
fromthe18th(Soviet)Army,
advancingintoRuthenia,
where
it
was
thrown
northern
frontsegment
Slovakia,
againststrong
facing
In Ruthenia
in heavylosses.131
Germandefences
at theDukla Pass,resulting
unit
encountered
Nëmec
and
his
administrative
Minister
itself,
nothingbut
who
the
the
from
Soviet
authorities,
sabotagedthe
especially NKVD,
hostility
Czechoslovakcall-uporders.Nëmecand his powerlessteamwatchedhow
of local branchesof theNationalCouncil
activities
'spontaneous'
grass-root
anddemanded'joining
ofTranscarpathian
Ukrainesprangup likemushrooms
moment
the
RedArmy
touchedthe
the
theSovietUkrainian
SocialistRepublic'
in
men
Ruthenia
was
to
be carried
of able-bodied
ground.The mobilization
outonlybyandfortheRedArmy.132
To hisdiplomatic
Benesin Londonwas shockedbythishostilereception.
in Moscow he expressedhis outrageand demandedthatthe
representative
To no avail. Instead,on 28
Sovietsshouldadhereto theMay Agreement.133
fromStalin,theonlyonehe
1945 Beneswas handeda personalletter
January
in a rather
Stalin'scynicism
everreceivedfromtheSovietdictator.
transpired
form.EventhehardenedBenesmusthavebeentakenabackas Stalin
refined
of thelocal populationin favourof joiningthe
describedthemanipulation
SovietUkraineas the spontaneous'expressionof nationalwill'. Moreover,
ownwordsin
thelatter's
at Benes'opposition,
he expressed
recalling
surprise
Benesvoicinghisreadiness
Moscowin December1943,as he had witnessed
had
Ruthenia
to Sovietauthorities.134
to transfer
Benes,understrong
pressure,
no optionotherthanto apologizethenextdayto Stalinin a longletterthat
- aftersix
The following
borderedon sycophancy.135
day Benesrecognized
in the
monthsofvacillation thepro-Moscow(Lublin)Polishgovernment,
in
return
the
Tesin
that
he
would
region.136
regain
hope
Ruthenia
to postwar
ofSubcarpathian
thelegalrestoration
Thus,regarding
werefighting
itbecameobviousthattheexiledCzechoslovaks
Czechoslovakia,
action.Itsfatewas sealedbyMarch1945,duringBenes'finaltrip
a rearguard
in September
and October1944,the1stCzechoslovak
131 DuringtheDuklaoperation
Army
decimated
within
morethan50 percentcasualties
eightweeksandwaspractically
Corpssuffered
fortherestofthewar.
1945-1948:Národya hranice(Munich1985),23132 K. Kaplan,PoválecnéCeskoslovensko
intheCzechexile
ina popularized
42. Kaplansummed
version,
earlier,
up hisviewson Ruthenia
inZurich.Kaplan'scritical
although
passageson Ruthenia,
monthly
Zpravodaj3/1981,published
theirvalue.
inexilethreedecadesago,haveretained
published
133 Seenote138.
to Benes,23 January
134 CSV II, no. 228, Stalin'sletter
1945,and Benes'replyor29 January
1945(no.236).
135 Ibid., 129-36, no. 228 and no. 236; Benes,ParnetiIII (2007), nos 159-60: the only
thewar.Seealso Vostochnaia
StalinandBenesduring
letters
between
ofpersonal
Europa
exchange
vol.1 (Moscow1997),nos43,46, 52-5,
ed.G.P.Murashko,
rossüskikh
νdokumentakh
arkhivov,
62-7,77.
or theLublin
136 CSV II, no. 237. For moredetailedanalysisof thediplomatic
recognition
see Ivan Sfovícek,
vlády',Sborník
pozadíuznánípolskéLublinské
'Diplomatické
government,
3-64.
archivních
prací1-43/1993,
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Haunen The Challenges and Dilemmos of PresidentBenes afterMunich
655
WhentheSovietsproducedwritten
recordsof previousverbal
to Moscow.137
since
Ruthenia
be attachedto Soviet
commitments
Benes
1939,suggesting
by
a
written
to Molotov,with
he
had
to
make
Ukraine,
promise(obeshchanie)
that
Czechoslovak
would
have
to confirm
the
thenecessary
legislation
proviso
transfer
aftertheendofthewarbyan ActofParliament.138
thegainsandlossesofBenes'pro-Moscowpolicy,hisunquestionWeighing
ofSlovakiafromearlierattempts
of Slovakcomablegainwas therecapture
munists
to jointheSovietUnion.His secondgainwas a SovietpromiseinJune
minorities.
1943forthetransfer
ofGermanandHungarian
However,
although
he succeeded,withthehelpof theAllies,in cleansingCzechoslovakia
from
he failedin theethniccleansingof theHungarians.
itsGermaninhabitants,
Whether
thecreationofa commonborderwiththeSovietUnionbyforsaking
Rutheniacouldbe ratedas theultimate
geostrategic
gainmustremainopen
considerations
wouldcertainly
makeall Benes'gains
to question.Long-term
questionable.
Already,in June 1945, serious border clashes occurredalong the
border.Prague,in competition
withWarsaw,turnedto
Czechoslovak-Polish
Moscow as the supremearbiter.The Czechoslovakdelegationin Moscow
in exchangeformuchdecidedto 'deliverRutheniaas a kindof ransom',139
neededSovietpressure
appliedagainsttheLublinPoles,who didnotwantto
thestrategic
Tesinsalientas partofCzechoslovakia.
Theratification
recognize
22
transfer
the
Czechoslovak
Parliament
on
ofRuthenia's
November
1945
by
thenbecamea sheerformality.140
aftertheoccupationofRutheniabytheRed Army,
Benesbelatedly
Shortly
instructed
hisrepresentatives
notto giveinto extortion
and to followthelaw
in all conflicts
withSovietauthorities.
'The moment
we abandonthefoundain anyquestionwe willbeginour downfall
tionof law and legalagreement
in all otherquestionsas well,'he warned.141
ComingfromBenes,it sounded
The
downward
slide
had
alreadybeguna longtimeago,whenBenes
pathetic.
had approachedtheSovietswiththeintention
of makinga deal withthem
before
theothers.
His acceptance
oftheSovietlieregarding
theKatynmassacre
wastherefore
of
someone
who
to
count
on socialforces
symptomatic
preferred
rather
thanpeople.
137 E. Táborsky,
'Benesand Stalin- Moscow1943 and 1945',Journal
of CentralEuropean
XIII (July
visitν Moskvu(Mart1945g.).
1953),154-81;V.V.Marjina,'E.Benes:Poslednii
Affairs
Slavianovedenie
Ukraina(2003),
ocherk',
6/1996,77-88;Marjina,Zakarpatskaia
Dokumentalnyi
op. cit.,139-64.
138 CSV //,no. 258; Marjina,Zakarpatskaia
Ukraina(2003),op. cit.,285; Kaplan,Poválecné
Ceskoslovensko
Cabinethadalreadyapproved
oftheacces(1985),op. cit.,42. TheCzechoslovak
sionofRuthenia
to theSovietUnionon 29 June1945.
139 Kaplan,Zpravodaj(1981),op. cit.,12.
140 Kaplan,PoválecnéCeskoslovensko
(1985),op. cit.,39-42,43-66.
141 Benes'telegram
of25 November
1944,CSV //,no. 162.
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656
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 44 No 4
Milan Hauner
is a Czechhistorian
whohadto leaveCzechoslovakia
in 1968 during
theSovietinvasion.He holdsPhD degreesfromCharlesUniversity,
ofCambridge.
He hastaughtand
PragueandtheUniversity
inEngland,theUSA,Germany
researched
andtheCzechRepublic.
WhenintheUSA he is affiliated
withtheUniversity
ofWisconsinMadison.Amonghisrecentpublications
arethecritical
editionof
Memoirs1938-45 byEdvardBenesinthreevolumes(Prague2007)
andtheChronology
ofAdolfHitler(London2008).
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