Plato`s Method of Comparative Analysis on the

Eric Teachout
Philo 235 Ancient Western Philosophy
Prof. D.M. Hutchinson
November 16, 2011
Plato Paper
Plato’s Method of Comparative Analysis on the Good and Just Life
Along with the forms and the eternality of the soul, Plato‟s argument for the just life as
the good life stands out as one of the central themes of his works. In both the Gorgias and the
Republic, Socrates, as Plato‟s interlocutor, presents a consistent account of the just life which
leads to true happiness. In the Republic, Plato expands this psychological account of the just life
to politics, demonstrating the parallel between the two. However, one might ask that if the just
life for which Plato argues is the same account in both the Gorgias and the Republic, why does
he write the two works to present his views? What distinguishes the two that might demonstrate
Plato‟s aims in each work? We observe Plato presents two individuals who oppose his account
of the good life in different ways. In Gorgias, Plato presents Callicles, a famous orator of the
time, who advocates a lifestyle of self-interested hedonism which uses political power to
maximize one‟s pleasures. Thrasymachus operates in the Republic as a raving egoist who argues
that rulers in all forms of government should use tyrannical oppression to secure their own
advantage. Noting the context of Plato‟s works, these views are likely to be representative of
other popular beliefs regarding the path to the good life which opposed Plato‟s own philosophy.
Thus, we might understand Plato as writing the Gorgias and the Republic comparatively to not
only elaborate on his account of the good life, but also to demonstrate the truthfulness of this
account over its biggest competition. In this paper, I will demonstrate how Plato uses the tool of
comparative analysis to deliver his argument on the good and just life, and how in the Republic
this device allows him to draw the parallel between individual and societal justice.
In the Gorgias, at the point in which Callicles enters the argument, Socrates has yet to
give any personal account of justice. And so, Callicles proceeds to deliver his own views:
“…nature reveals that it‟s a just thing for the better man and the more capable man to have a
greater share than the worse man and the less capable man… this is what justice has been
decided to be: that the superior rule the inferior and have a greater share than they” (484d).
“Rather, this is what‟s admirable and just by nature… that the man who‟ll live correctly ought to
allow his own appetites to get as large as possible and not restrain them” (491e).
In these passages, Callicles argues that a man is to place the unrestrained pursuit of pleasures as
most important in his life. In turn, what determine his portion of the received pleasures are his
personal ability, intelligence, and strength. Callicles makes these arguments in terms of nature, or
the way man naturally exists and behaves; he contrasts his view with those arguments made in
terms of law which he claims the weak and impotent use to unrightfully control the stronger
figures in securing their own pleasures (483b-c). Collectively, these arguments present the
parameters of a personal lifestyle that is likely to have been very popular in Greek culture, in
which the constant pursuit of sex, food, drink, and other temporal pleasures were not only
socially condoned, but encouraged. And, the way one secured these pleasures was to acquire
power over others by participating in the Athenian assembly, as Callicles repeatedly entreats
Socrates to do himself.
Thus, because Callicles formulates his argument in terms of personal lifestyle, Socrates
rebuts his account by focusing on the aspects of justice that are relevant to this subject. Firstly,
Socrates demonstrates that pleasure is not what makes the most capable and intelligent individual
(498e-499b). Next, Socrates argues for distinguishing good and bad, a task requiring a specific
craft or skill (499b, 500a). He then argues to the reluctant Callicles that certain crafts are better in
this craft than others (500e-501c), and that those of the better kind practice the virtues of order
and organization (503d-504a). Socrates concludes his argument by saying:
“And the name for the states of organization and order of the soul is „lawful‟ and „law,‟ which
lead people to become law-abiding and orderly, and these are justice and self-control.” (594d).
Here, we find Plato‟s own account of the good life. Happiness is attainable only when one
practices self-discipline and abides by the “law,” i.e. the way his soul should be ordered.
We can observe how Plato presents his account of the good and just life in a comparative
fashion by seeking to contrast his account of the good and just life with the uncontrolled lifestyle
Callicles first presented. While Callicles describes the good life in terms of man‟s unrestricted
nature, Plato demonstrates that happiness is only attainable for the one who seeks it in terms of
law. And since the popular account Callicles delivers focuses on the dynamic processes of
individual lifestyle, Plato‟s account of the just life must focus on these same processes. Thus, in
presenting his argument, Plato highlights two components – the skill in distinguishing good
pleasures from bad ones and the virtue of self-control – that constitute the lifestyle of the just
individual.
In the Republic, Plato follows a similar method of comparative analysis as the Gorgias in
exhibiting his own argument for the good and just life against the backdrop of a popular
opposing view. However, while Callicles‟ argument focuses on the lifestyle of the good and just
life, in the Republic we find that Thrasymachus‟ argument dwells on its political aspects:
“…justice is really the good of another, the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, and harmful
to the one who obeys and serves. Injustice is the opposite, it rules the simple and just, and those
it rules do what is to the advantage of the other and stronger, and they make the one they serve
happy, but themselves not at all” (343c).
Here, Thrasymachus characterizes justice and injustice as complimentary roles within a
given political system. Those who participate in justice are the subjects underneath the ruling
party, whom they serve absolutely despite any harm to themselves. The occupation of injustice is
constituted by the ruling party which pursues its advantage mercilessly to the point of oppressing
its own subjects. Therefore, Thrasymachus limits the happy life to those who hold power and
practice injustice.
In response, Socrates delivers several arguments questioning the skill and happiness of
the rulers presented in Thrasymachus‟ account. One of these arguments specifically is crucial for
understanding Plato‟s own argument for the just life as the good life in the rest of the Republic.
First, Socrates demonstrates to Thrasymachus that since injustice leads to civil war and strife, the
unjust nation is prevented from achieving any common purpose (351d-e). Socrates observes this
same effect when injustice exists in the single individual, in which…
“…[injustice] has by its nature the very same effect. First, it makes him incapable of achieving
anything, because he is in a state of civil war and not of one mind; second, it makes him his own
enemy as well as the enemy of just people” (352a).
Here, Plato demonstrates how Thrasymachus has mistaken the issue of justice for existing only
on a societal level. Thrasymachus believes the practice of injustice towards others on a societal
level is a necessity for the happy life. However, Plato demonstrates that if a person partakes in
injustice, his own constitution must be also unjust. And just like an unjust nation is at war with
itself, so is the mind of the unjust individual, negating one‟s ability to secure his own happiness.
While Socrates concludes Book I having demonstrated the ineffectiveness of
Thrasymachus‟ account of the good life, he has yet to present a solid view of his own. However,
even after Thrasymachus leaves the discussion, we can observe how Plato uses his argument to
set up the remainder of the Republic. For as Thrasymachus‟ error lay in his inability to think of
justice on both the individual and societal levels, Socrates proceeds by drawing a parallel
between these levels in presenting his own account of the good and just life. Thus, just as in the
Gorgias, we will see Plato delivering his argument by means a comparative analysis to an
opposing view.
To present his account of the good and just life, Socrates describes the existence of a
perfectly just city in Books II and III, which he then uses to infer the qualities of the just life on
the individual in Book IV. In this city, we first learn of the producers who are money-loving,
provide the basic necessities of the city. Next, the auxiliaries are honor-loving, glory-seeking,
and protect the city from outside harm. Lastly, the guardians are knowledge-loving, truthseeking, and devise the city‟s laws and help it maintain the proper relations of its classes. Plato
uses these three classes of the city to create a tripartian psychology of the soul: the producers
representing the appetitive part of the soul, the auxiliaries the spirited part, and the guardians the
philosophical part. Whenever a soul acts, it uses all parts of the soul, but specific cognitive
functions can be understood to reside in the specific parts (436b). Thus, Socrates defines justice,
both individually and societally, as the state in which all parts or classes do their own work.
Individual justice is the harmony of all parts of the soul when each part works according to its
own virtue and does not mingle with the other parts, which is injustice (433b, 434c).
Using this tripartian psychology, Plato concludes the Republic with three proofs
demonstrating how the just life is the good life. First, Socrates demonstrates the destitution of the
unjust life of the tyrannical man in comparison to the just life of the philosopher king. Socrates
draws a parallel between the effects of the erotic desires acting inside the tyrannical man to the
actions of this same man in society. For as his desires breed anarchy and lawlessness within his
soul, does he lead the mob to become war-like mercenaries within the city (574e-575d).
However, despite the forcefulness of these persons, their actions lead only to more “wailing,
groaning, lamenting, and grieving” in their city than in any other (578a). Similarly, Socrates
says this about the individual life of the most unjust man:
“In truth, then, and whatever some people may think, a real tyrant is really a slave, compelled to
engage in the worst kind of fawning, slavery, and pandering to the worst kind of people. He‟s so
far from satisfying his desires in any way it is clear…that‟s he‟s in the greatest need of most
things and truly poor” (479d-e).
While Socrates doesn‟t mention Thrasymachus here, this passage is a clear reference to his
account. For while Thrasymachus reveled in the power and privilege of the unjust ruler, Plato
demonstrates the true wretchedness and dissatisfaction, especially when compared to the life of
the most happy and just philosopher king (580b).
In his second proof, Socrates shows that among all three classes of his imagined city –
the money-loving, the honor-loving, and the knowledge-loving – each group believes that its
favored kind of pleasure is best (581c-e). However, only one group possesses sufficient
experience, reason, and argument to be good judges in their situation (582a). And since the
knowledge-loving are the only group to have experienced all three kinds of pleasures and are the
only ones to have used argument as an instrument, Socrates demonstrates that only this group has
the greatest ability to discern which kind of pleasure is best (582d). Thus, Socrates determines
that the most pleasant life is the one in which the soul is ruled by its knowledge-loving part
(583a).
Socrates‟ last proof begins by demonstrating that a person can perceive receive receiving
pleasure, when truly only an alleviation of pain was felt. However, what Socrates and his
comrades are after is an understanding of real or “pure” pleasure (584b-c). Using argumentation
from the preceeding proof, Socrates defines this kind of pleasure as that which fills one up more
really and truly, as opposed to less pleasures which fill a person up less and less truly (585d-e).
Within the former category, Socrates places those pleasures of the knowledge-loving soul, since
it is the truer and more immortal part of the soul, whereas in the latter he places the pleasures
derived from the honor- and money-loving parts (585c, e). Finally, Socrates concludes that since
these truer pleasures enable the philosophical part to have power over the others, only the pursuit
of these pleasures can lead one to a life of genuine justice and happiness (589c-d).
In both Plato‟s Gorgias and Republic, we observe Plato seeks to illustrate his account of
the good and just life by comparing it to other popular opposing views of that time. And while
Plato presents Callicles‟ argument to discuss the lifestyle of the just individual, he utilizes
Thrasymachus‟ account to introduce and provide the backdrop for his paralleled conceptions of
justice in the individual and in society. Through a comparative analysis, he leaves a stronger
impression on the reader by giving his philosophy of the good life power and cultural relevance.
In the progression of the Gorgias, we see Callicles conceding to Socrates‟ arguments gradually
more and more until finally, in his frustration, he gives up personal argumentation and allows
Socrates to take over the discussion. In the Republic, Socrates similarly rebuts Thrasymachus‟
account and presents his own account to take its place. The effect in both works is that Socrates‟
account of justice seems to emerge out of the dust of his opponents‟ crumbling arguments. In
doing so, the method of comparative analysis allows Plato to place his ideas in dialogue with
those of his time and attract greater readership of his works.
Works Cited
Cooper, John M., and D.S. Hutchinson, eds. Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hacket, 1997.
Book.