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Journal of Global Ethics
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In defense of a regulated market
economy
a
Jukka Mäkinen & Eero Kasanen
bc
a
Department of Management Studies, Aalto University School of
Business, Box 21210, Helsinki 00076, Finland
b
Department of Finance, Aalto University School of Business,
Helsinki, Finland
c
ESADE Business School, Ramon Llull University, Barcelona, Spain
Published online: 23 Jan 2015.
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To cite this article: Jukka Mäkinen & Eero Kasanen (2015): In defense of a regulated market
economy, Journal of Global Ethics, DOI: 10.1080/17449626.2015.1004464
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Journal of Global Ethics, 2015
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2015.1004464
In defense of a regulated market economy
∗
Jukka Mäkinena and Eero Kasanenb,c
a
Department of Management Studies, Aalto University School of Business, Box 21210, Helsinki 00076,
Finland; bDepartment of Finance, Aalto University School of Business, Helsinki, Finland; cESADE
Business School, Ramon Llull University, Barcelona, Spain
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(Received 12 December 2014; accepted 2 January 2015)
The dominant understanding of political corporate social responsibility (CSR) suggests new,
broader political roles for businesses in the globalized economy, challenging the classical
liberal social order (where business firms’ task is to focus on economic issues and the
government’s role is to take care of political responsibilities). In this paper, we show how
the major framing of the political CSR discussion not only challenges the classical liberal
social order but also goes against the more general political economic perspective of the
regulated market economy (where strict and [in most cases] strong boundaries exist
between business and politics). We argue that this latter tendency of the political CSR
discussion is its main weakness. We introduce a Rawlsian reframing of political CSR that
is in line with the idea of a global-regulated market economy and compatible with some of
the basic global ethical aims of the political CSR movement.
Keywords: globalization; classical liberalism; corporate social responsibility; political
corporate social responsibility; regulated market economy; division of moral labor
1. Introduction
The current political corporate social responsibility (CSR) discussion focuses critically on the
classical liberal social order, which advocates economic responsibilities and apolitical roles
for private firms in a fair society. In this way, political CSR tries to produce a paradigm shift
in CSR studies where the economic conception of CSR is replaced by the political conception
of CSR (Scherer, Palazzo, and Baumann 2006; Scherer and Palazzo 2008, 2011).
When talking about CSR studies, we refer to the academic debate that addresses the existence and management of firms’ social responsibilities (Scherer and Palazzo 2007; Matten and
Moon 2008). Within CSR studies, political CSR refers to the rapidly growing discussion on
the new political roles of businesses in the global economy (Scherer and Palazzo 2011). In
the political conception of CSR, private firms start to operate as major political actors in the globalized world and take on traditional public sector tasks, such as the regulation of businesses,
and assume major political responsibilities in society as the providers of basic rights and
public goods (Matten and Crane 2005; Scherer, Palazzo, and Matten 2009; Scherer and
Palazzo 2011, 3). This suggested change in the political balance between public and private
responsibilities in the context of global governance is arguably one of the major issues of
global ethics. In this paper, we question the functioning of oversized moral responsibility for
companies and instead advocate a more balanced division of moral labor and development of
governmental social responsibility (GSR) globally.
∗
Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
# 2015 Taylor & Francis
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2
J. Mäkinen and E. Kasanen
In classical liberal social order (represented in CSR discussions by Milton Friedman,
Michael Jensen, and others), the regulatory powers of the state should be separated from the
business interests of private corporations. In this political setting, the task of business firms is
to orient all their activities, including CSR, to value creation for their shareholders within the
background institutions provided by the limited state. The classical liberal state has the
narrow functions of protecting private property, enforcing voluntary contracts, minimizing
externalities, promoting competition, and providing a monetary system. Thus, the central aim
of the state in this setting is the protection of individual freedom and the promotion of the efficient use of resources in society (Friedman 1962; Jensen 2002, 2008). Although the classical
liberal state is minimalist, it is assumed to have efficient mechanisms for taking care of its
basic political tasks.
From the perspective of the dominant understanding of political CSR, the classical liberal
business – society relations are no longer valid in the contemporary global world. It is argued
that, in the global setting, the regulatory powers of the states are seriously weakened, boundaries
between the political and economic spheres of society are vanishing, and businesses gradually
take on traditional governmental tasks, such as the political and social regulation and provision
of public goods. From the perspective of political CSR, CSR studies should forget the classical
liberal political assumptions – that support an apolitical and economic understanding of
businesses’ roles in society – and accept the new political role of corporations in a global
world (Scherer, Palazzo, and Baumann 2006; Scherer and Palazzo 2007, 2008, 2011; Scherer,
Palazzo, and Matten 2009).
If the current argumentation put forward by the proponents of the political CSR movement is
not a satisfactory way to challenge the existing business–society relations, what could be an
alternative path? In the following argumentation, we sketch some of the basic elements of an
alternative route. At the same time, we offer a defense of the idea of a regulated market
economy and argue in favor of the reframing of political CSR to be in line with this political idea.
We introduce a Rawlsian alternative to the dominant understanding of political CSR. In this
alternative version of political CSR, the classical liberal social order is assessed by and competes
with other versions of regulated market economies. In this way, we show that the normative idea
of a regulated market economy is stronger than the classical liberal interpretation of it. The
dominant framing of political CSR is not really able to challenge the need for a moral division
of labor between business and politics, and especially not by only challenging it within the classical liberal concept of society.
To make our point, we first introduce the basic idea of the regulated market economy and
introduce some of the major versions of it (i.e. ideal types of regulated market economies).
After that, we show the way in which the dominant framing of the political CSR discussion
focuses on one particular variant of regulated market economies (i.e. the classical liberal
variant) when trying to produce a paradigm shift in CSR studies, shifting from the economic conception of CSR to the political conception of CSR.
As a critique of political CSR, we show that classical liberalism is not the only relevant version
of a regulated market economy that is in line with the economic conception of businesses’ role in a
fair society. Indeed, there are other social orders that need to be taken into account in political CSR
discussions. In this setting, we suggest that within the group of the regulated market economies we
can find, e.g. a Rawlsian version of a regulated market economy (property-owning democracy) and
Scandinavian style states (welfare-state capitalism) that could also be in line with some of the basic
global ethical inclinations of the political CSR movement.
Our main point in this paper is to suggest that the political CSR discussion could be redirected to be in line with the idea of a globally regulated market economy and with the economic
understanding of businesses’ role in a fair society. Redirected CSR could then better address
Journal of Global Ethics
3
issues of global regulation and assess various models of GSR from a global ethical perspective.
This paper is taking a step forward in the line of the argumentation started earlier on the challenges of political CSR (Mäkinen and Kourula 2012; Mäkinen and Kasanen 2014).
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2.
The notion of a regulated market economy
According to Jukka Mäkinen and Eero Kasanen (2014), who draw on the Rawlsian political framework (Rawls 1996, 2001; Freeman 2007), the notion of a regulated market economy refers to
the social system wherein the political and socio-economic responsibilities are divided between
the public sector of society and economically oriented businesses operating within the public
sector institutions of society. In this type of political economy, there is a relatively clear separation between the political sphere of society (involving the public institutions taking care of political and social issues) and the economic sphere of society (comprising the competitive markets
and economically oriented market actors such as private corporations).
Not all political economies are regulated market economies however. This can be seen in
Figure 1, which illustrates the basic pluralism of political economies. We can have social
orders where there are no separations between the different spheres of society (like in the communist and anarcho-capitalist utopias), going beyond the whole idea of the division of moral
labor. Furthermore, there are also political economies where the boundaries between the different spheres of society are highly blurred, like in the extensively privatized libertarian social
scheme and in the highly democratized market socialist social order.
In the following, we will focus on the regulated market economies since these systems are
highly significant when assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the political CSR discussion.
Our political culture involves the competing conceptions of regulated market economies. We
can find versions of market economies where the public sector of society is relatively narrow and
where it is combined with the extensive private sector of society, comprising the competitive
markets and market actors (see classical liberalism in Figure 1). Alternatively, there are versions
of regulated market economies where the market actors are operating within the relatively robust
Figure 1. Political economies.
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J. Mäkinen and E. Kasanen
and extensive public sector of society (a property-owning democracy and welfare-state capitalism in Figure 1).
Furthermore, the political aims of the public sectors of society may differ significantly in
different versions of regulated market economies. We can have economically oriented regulated
market economies, like that of classical liberalism, where the major aim of the political sphere of
society is to take care of the efficient use of resources in society and the protection of basic capitalist rights (like private property and freedom of contracts). Alternatively, we can have regulated market economies, like property-owning democracies and welfare-state capitalism,
where the central aim of the public sector of society is to focus on the issues of political and
socio-economic justice.
Before discussing the different conceptions of GSR in different versions of regulated market
economies, we will briefly introduce the way in which the dominant framing of the political CSR
discussion goes against or challenges one version of the regulated market economy, namely classical liberal business – society relations.
3.
Classical liberalism versus political CSR
The classical liberal variant of the regulated market economy (promoted in CSR discussions by
Friedman and Jensen among others) has been an influential justification for the apolitical and
economic understanding of business firms’ roles in society (Scherer, Palazzo, and Baumann
2006; Scherer and Palazzo 2007, 2008, 2011). According to this traditional idea of proper
business – society relations, the task of businesses is to orient their CSR and other activities to
value creation for shareholders (the search for the business case of CSR) within the frame provided by the institutions of the limited state.
Milton Friedman, who famously thinks that the social responsibility of private firms is to
focus on economic issues and the maximization of their own profits (1970), explains the basic
idea of the classical liberal regulated market economy by saying that:
First the scope of government must be limited. Its major function must be to protect our freedom both
from the enemies outside our gates and from our fellow-citizens: to preserve law and order, to
enforce private contracts, to foster competitive markets. Beyond this major function, government
may enable us at times to accomplish jointly what we would find it more difficult or expensive to
accomplish severally. However, any such use of government is fraught with danger. We should
not and cannot avoid using government in this way. But there should be a clear and large balance
of advantages before we do. By relying primarily on voluntary co-operation and private enterprise,
in both economic and other activities, we can insure that the private sector is a check on the powers of
the governmental sector and an effective protection of freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought.
(Friedman 1962, 2–3)
According to financial economist Jensen (2008), this type of system aims at a state of affairs
where society uses ‘its human and non-human resources most efficiently’. In it, the power of
the government sector of society should be separate from the private interests of firms. In this
setting, the public sector of society has the limited functions of protecting people, enforcing
voluntary contracts, and minimizing externalities. On the other hand, the role of businesses is
to concentrate on the maximization of the long-run total value of the firm (Jensen 2002,
2008; Mäkinen and Kourula 2012).
Political CSR discussion aiming to challenge the economic understanding of businesses’ role
in society focuses on the classical liberal social order. According to Scherer, Palazzo, and
Baumann (2006, 508):
the position of mainstream neoclassical economics is based on a distinct theory of society and a strict
division of labor between the private and public domains: business firms should focus on profit
seeking, while the state’s role is to take care of issues of public concern.
Journal of Global Ethics
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However, from the perspective of political CSR ‘the division of labor between business and the
state, as suggested by Friedman (1962) and others, is highly problematic at both national and
international levels’ (Scherer, Palazzo, and Baumann 2006, 512)
From the perspective of political CSR, the old-fashioned nature of classical liberal social
order and the politicization of corporations are linked with the empirical description of the globalization processes (which makes territorially bounded nation states the impotent regulators of
the business sphere of society and undermines the traditional separations between the political
and economic spheres of society). In this setting, it is stated that:
Under the conditions of globalization, the strict division of labor between private business and
nation-state governance does not hold any more. Many business firms have started to assume
social and political responsibilities that go beyond legal requirements and fill the regulatory
vacuum in global governance. (Scherer and Palazzo 2011, 899)
Unlike national governance with its monopoly on the use of force and capacity to enforce regulations
upon private actors within the national territory, global governance rests on voluntary contributions
and weak or even absent enforcement mechanisms. (Scherer and Palazzo 2011, 900)
In this global setting, the new political role of corporations (where firms enter the regulation processes of businesses voluntarily and start to operate as the new providers of basic rights and
public goods in a society) seems suitable to the proponents of political CSR (Scherer,
Palazzo, and Baumann 2006; Scherer and Palazzo 2007, 2011; Scherer, Palazzo, and Matten
2009; see also Matten and Crane 2005; Crane, Matten, and Moon 2008).
Mäkinen and Kasanen (2014) have provided a critique and doubted whether the argumentation put forward by the proponents of the political CSR movement is quite enough to challenge
the classical liberal conception of the proper business – society relations.
By appealing to the blurred boundaries between business and politics, the extensive role of
private firms in political governance, and the narrow basic structure of society (and the lack of
background justice) in global settings, political CSR is putting forward the basic features of the
libertarian conception of society. However, libertarian political CSR is at odds with the basic
aims of the political CSR movement. This is because the libertarian political setting does not
offer space for the democratic political processes emphasized by the political CSR discussion.
Furthermore, libertarian political CSR does not go beyond the mainstream instrumental understanding of CSR since there already is a libertarian theory of political CSR within mainstream
CSR studies (Freeman and Phillips 2002; Mäkinen and Kourula 2012).
Furthermore, political CSR goes against classical liberal political doctrine based on the
empirical interpretation of globalization processes. This type of argumentation is not enough
to challenge the normative political position put forward by Friedman, Jensen, and others in
the classical liberal camp. What is needed is a relatively robust normative political argument
challenging classical liberal political economy, but this kind of argument is lacking from the
dominant political CSR discussion. In addition, it has been argued that classical liberalism is
not the only relevant version of a regulated market economy that deserves recognition in political CSR discussions (Mäkinen and Kasanen 2014).
Empirical observations on the weak position of governments versus multinational companies
have led political CSR to deem the division of moral labor between business and government
old-fashioned, and to advocate a larger moral role for companies. However, from the same
observations we can derive a drastically different conclusion on the need to strengthen the
moral division of labor between global society and governments versus multinational companies. Instead of increasing the moral burden of companies to construct legislation, we can
argue in favor of improving GSR, at both global and national levels. We recommend the
latter direction for CSR as it leads to a larger set of realistic political environments, helps to
correct the observed imbalance, and avoids the risk of ending up with a marginal role for
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J. Mäkinen and E. Kasanen
citizens’ free political deliberations. The fundamental solution to globalization challenges, as we
see it, is not so much strengthening political company-level CSR but developing smart and efficient global GSR. The sources of ethical codes and hard rules should reflect a broader circle of
deliberation than companies alone can provide. Governments and global institutions need help
and better tools in the design of proper rules for businesses.
In the following, we show how political CSR could be reframed to take the idea of a globally
regulated market economy seriously. In other words, we introduce a Rawlsian understanding of
political CSR. This Rawlsian interpretation of political CSR takes the idea of GSR more
seriously than the dominant framing of political CSR (put forward by scholars such as
Scherer and Palazzo). At the same time, the Rawlsian understanding of political CSR offers a
critical analysis of the classical liberal business – society relations suggested by scholars such
as Friedman and Jensen. Proponents of various forms of a regulated market economy challenge
the competing conceptions of government and CSR normatively and politically. A Rawlsian framework puts political CSR on the same normative level of political argumentation as other theories of political economy.
4. The Rawlsian reframing of political CSR
We start with some of the basic ideas of the Rawlsian approach and continue with its critical
perspectives on the classical liberal version of a regulated market economy. This critique
focuses on the classical liberal conception of GSR. After that, we introduce the main alternative
conceptions of GSR that come from the camp of regulated market economies. In this way, we
show that the political idea of a regulated market economy is larger and stronger than the classical liberal interpretation of it and that there are strong reasons to reframe political CSR to be
compatible with the political idea of a regulated market economy.
The Rawlsian reframing of political CSR supports the idea of a regulated market economy,
the separation between the business and political spheres of society, and an economic understanding of the business firm. In the Rawlsian political setting, the basic idea is to outline a
public political structure to offer just background conditions for economic actors so that these
actors can focus on their ends more effectively within the framework of the basic structure of
society (Rawls 1996, 266 – 267). Furthermore, the separations between the public and private
spheres of society are needed since, in contemporary political settings, people have different
and opposing ends of life and without this separation there is no real way to respect this
ethical pluralism (Rawls 1996, 2001).
In the Rawlsian political setting, private firms are supposed to be voluntary organizations for
their members. Due to their voluntary nature, businesses are allowed to have their own economic
aims and they can assess and reward their members on the basis of their contributions to the ends
of the firm. These meritocratic practices are not acceptable in the context of the basic political
structure of society since this structure is based on the idea that citizens are free and equal and
should be treated as such (Rawls 1996; Phillips and Margolis 1999).
However, from the Rawlsian perspective, the problem with classical liberalism seems to be
that it is too weak a member of the group of political economies called regulated market economies. Seen from the Rawlsian position, the conception of GSR endorsed by the classical liberalism is too limited and economically oriented – at least in a highly globalized economy where the
power of economic actors is increasing relative to the political spheres of society (as pointed out
by the proponents of political CSR). On the other hand, the Rawlsian reframing of political CSR
goes beyond the dominant understanding of political CSR by focusing on the different versions
of GSR in a global setting (and not only focusing on classical liberal GSR).
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Journal of Global Ethics
7
From the Rawlsian perspective, the main weaknesses of classical liberalism are the fact that,
even though it argues for the boundaries between business and politics, it does not suggest a
robust institutional mechanism or incentives to protect or maintain these boundaries. It can be
argued that political CSR’s description of the globalization scene (with the blurred boundaries
between business and politics, the extensive role of private firms in political governance, and the
lack of background justice) is related to the inability of classical liberal political doctrine (i.e. the
neo-liberal model of global governance) to maintain the boundaries between business and politics. In contrast with political CSR, the Rawlsian view leads to the conclusion that the division of
moral labor in classical liberalism is too weak and should be strengthened, instead of being seen
as old-fashioned and soon to be phased out.
In classical liberal social order, the balance between the limited public sector of society and
extensive private spheres of society is relatively fragile. The classical liberal public sector of
society is economically oriented. The classical liberal state is not toothless in protecting the
basic economic and political rights of citizens but its coverage of moral and social issues is
limited by design. Its main aims are the efficient use of resources in society and the protection
of basic capitalist rights (like private property and freedom of contracts). Since these aims are
not very far away from the dominant aims of the private spheres of society, there is, in this
sense, plenty of room for the phenomena of blurred boundaries between business and politics
within the classical liberal scheme. For these reasons, it seems that in this political economy
the needed separation between business and politics is too easy to bypass.
In addition, the classical liberal context lacks robust public sector institutions that are needed
to redistribute economic power over time and safeguard equal political participation for all citizens in society. From the Rawlsian perspective, it can be argued that the limited background structures suggested by classical liberalism are not enough to level the playing field in the global
economy and that (in the global setting) there is an urgent need for the egalitarian background
structures to stop the concentration of economic power and its transformation into political power.
4.1. Alternative conceptions of GSR
The Rawlsian understanding of political CSR focuses on the different conceptions of GSR that
are in line with the economic conception of the business firm (business case of CSR). From this
perspective, the classical liberal idea of the public sector of society emphasizing the issues of the
efficient use of resources in society is only one (and in many ways a too limited) conception of
GSR in a global economy. Somewhat surprisingly we may claim that, in the current global
economy, not even the limited state of classical liberalism is present in all parts of the world.
Free competition, free speech, the economic freedom to set up enterprises, property rights,
the enforcement of contracts, and rule of law are threatened by corruption, organized crime,
incompetence, deficient legislation, and a lack of an independent judiciary.
However, the Rawlsian reframing of political CSR not only focuses on the weaknesses of
classical liberalism. It also tries to offer alternatives to the traditional classical liberal conception
of GSR. These alternatives take into account that, in the global economy, there is a need for the
robust institutional mechanisms to maintain ethically significant boundaries between business
and politics.
One interesting alternative to the classical liberal conception of government responsibility is
offered by liberal equality. The major political aim of this version of a regulated market
economy is to offer equal opportunity for all people in society. This conception of GSR is
worried about the cumulative effects of free economic transactions over time on peoples’
equal chances. To counterbalance the negative consequences of free markets undermining
peoples’ equal and fair chances, the idea is to set markets within the framework of egalitarian
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J. Mäkinen and E. Kasanen
social background structures. These social structures are ‘designed to even out class barriers’ and
to maintain equal opportunities for education and health for all (Rawls 1971, 73; Freeman 2007;
Mäkinen and Kourula 2012).
The second major alternative to the classical liberal conception of GSR coming from the
regulated market economies camp is welfare-state capitalism. According to this conception of
GSR, the proper aim of the public sector of society is the increasing of the general level of
welfare in society. To achieve this political aim, the egalitarian social structures suggested by
liberal equality are needed. In addition, there is plenty of room for the egalitarian work done
by the socio-economic basic structure institutions (like progressive income taxes and income
transfer programs) redistributing economic resources over time, reducing disparities between
people, and assisting those who lose out in economic competition (Krouse and McPherson
1988; Rawls 2001; Freeman 2007; Mäkinen and Kourula 2012).
The third major alternative to the classical liberal conception of GSR is offered by propertyowning democracy. This conception of GSR aims at democratic social justice. It sees that the concentration of economic power over time undermines peoples’ democratic control of their own
social life. This version of GSR takes on board the social and economic basic structure institutions
suggested by liberal equality and welfare-state capitalism (like egalitarian education, health care,
and taxation systems). However, from the perspective of property-owning democratic GSR, these
egalitarian structures are not enough to prevent the control of the economy and politics by the
economic elite, since these systems focus on the symptoms of capitalism and not enough on the
background structures causing the concentration of economic power over time. To achieve democratic social justice and to limit the concentration of wealth, it suggests egalitarian inheritance
laws and progressive gift taxes, robust public policies to boost the savings levels of poor
people, and public institutions separating business and politics, such as the public financing of political parties and institutions supporting free public discussion (Rawls 1971, 2001; Krouse and
McPherson 1988; Freeman 2007; Mäkinen and Kourula 2012).
Compared with the classical liberal scheme, in all of these alternative versions of a regulated
market economy there is clearer separation between the conceptions of GSR and CSR. In this
sense, there is more effort required to maintain the ethically significant boundaries between
business and politics than in classical liberalism. In addition, these alternatives suggest institutional structures that work against the concentration of economic power over time. Thus,
these alternative conceptions of GSR work against the dominance of the economic sphere of
society over the political sphere. Trying to achieve this type of balance between business and
politics is urgently needed in the global setting where the economic sphere too easily dominates
the political sphere.
The practical examples of global moral codes and hard enforceable rules for the business
sector can be found in private and public institutions. Although not perfect, code and rule
setting global institutions – like the IASB (accounting), BCBS (The Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision), the WTO (trade), the IMF (financing), the ILO (labor), the UN Global
Compact (business practices), climate agreements, and maritime law – provide global regulation and arbitration for businesses. In a balanced global moral division of labor, we need
both rule setters and market actors. Redirected CSR could take the development of global governance and GSR as their next goals.
Another practical observation is that more regulation does not equal better government.
Arguably, in Europe and the USA there is overregulation and red tape, stifling growth and
employment. Similarly, in developing countries like India and China there are perhaps too
many bureaucratic rules and procedures, which lead rather to corruption than to background
justice. Solid rules and referees are needed, who create a good playing ground for companies,
not unlike in popular global sports like soccer.
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Journal of Global Ethics
9
5. Conclusion
Political CSR is addressing a serious issue in the global economy. It seems that national governments are in a weak position versus multinational companies. To solve this imbalance, political
CSR has proposed a larger moral and social role for companies in building the ethical codes of
conduct and legislation for global businesses. On a conceptual level, political CSR has challenged classical liberalism in general and its division of moral labor between business and political responsibilities in particular.
We argue that political CSR should be redirected to take GSR and different models of a regulated market economy seriously. The Rawlsian view opens up a new perspective to the globalization challenge. An ethically sustainable solution is to create a proper division of moral
labor and enough background justice mechanisms to provide a more competent and public
sector, free of corruption. Redirected CSR could concentrate on issues like how to support
the development of responsible governments and smart global regulation. The promotion of
good business practices and punishment of the worst offenders are also in the interests of socially
responsible companies. Conceptually we argue that, instead of drifting towards libertarian
models where companies have oversized moral responsibility, it is more fruitful to debate
what moral and social boundary conditions are needed so that companies can concentrate on
economic value creation.
The political aims of the alternatives to the classical liberal limited conception of GSR
are very similar to the democratic and ethical aims of the political CSR movement
(Scherer and Palazzo 2007). All these alternative versions of regulated market economies
present some of the major institutions that could be used to preserve the background
justice needed for democratic deliberation (Richardson 2002, 88; Crocker 2006). Furthermore, Scherer and Palazzo (who appeal to the republican notion of society when arguing
against the classical liberal version of a regulated market economy) may welcome the fact
that the contemporary republican political philosophy seems to support the version of a regulated market economy that is called a property-owning democracy (Dagger 2006; Thomas
2012; White 2012).
Our argument – defending the idea of a regulated market economy and suggesting the
reframing of political CSR to be compatible with this idea – tries to be in line with John
Rawls’s understanding of the practical role of political philosophy as part of society’s public political culture. According to Rawls (2001, 2), ‘one task of political philosophy – its practical role,
let’s say – is to focus on deeply disputed questions and see whether, despite appearances, some
underlying basis of philosophical and moral agreement can be uncovered’.
Acknowledgements
The authors are indebted to Guest Editor Professor Matti Häyry for his insightful comments.
Funding
The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Liikesivistysrahasto – The Foundation for
Economic Education, Jenny and Antti Wihuri Foundation, The Finnish Cultural Foundation, and Helsinki
School of Economics Foundation.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
10
J. Mäkinen and E. Kasanen
Notes on contributors
Jukka Mäkinen, Ph.D., is Adjunct Professor (Docent) of Business Ethics at the Department of Management
Studies, Aalto University School of Business. He approaches the political and socio-economic roles of
businesses in a society from the perspective of the contemporary theories of social justice. His research
has appeared in journals such as Business Ethics Quarterly, Journal of Business Ethics, and Utilitas.
Eero Kasanen is a Professor of Finance at Aalto University and a Visiting Professor at ESADE. His current
research interests include banking crises, financial ethics, and university management. His research has
been published in Journal of Business Ethics, Accounting, Organizations and Society, and Journal of
Accounting and Economics. He has served as Rector of Helsinki School of Economics and on several
company boards.
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