Deniz Togar, “Theories on the Rise of Arab Nationalism: George Antonius in
Comparative Perspective”
Presented at University of Chicago 16th annual Middle East Theory and History
Conference, May 10-11, 2001.
Each individual nationalism, its growth, and the manner of its consolidation plays an
important role in the study of other nationalisms as this type of examination allows
scholars to point out parallels, similarities and differences around the world. Upon
reviewing the facts it becomes apparent that the rise of Arab nationalism and the “Arab
Revolt” are not simple acts of treachery against the Ottomans, instead it seems that these
events occurred as a result of the consolidation of many different factors and the efforts
of many intellectuals over a long period of time. George Antonius, the author of the book
“The Arab Awakening”, is seen as the leading scholar on this subject. When his book
was published in 1938, it was considered groundbreaking work, as he was the first
scholar to use both original and secondary sources in his investigation. He was fluent in
Arabic and he himself believed that this placed him at an advantage over his peers.
It is not my intention to study the facts and the issues that played a role in the rise of Arab
nationalism in terms of a study of primary sources. I did not intend for this paper to be
such a deep and far-reaching academic study at this point. I am simply attempting a
historiographical survey of the literature concerning this issue. It is my endeavor to
examine secondary sources concerning the issue and draw conclusions from these
sources. Through the comparison of George Antonius’ works with those of other
scholars on the subject, such as Bassam Tibi, Zeine Zeine, Hasan Kayali, and C.E. Dawn
I hope to pinpoint the aspects of Antonius’ work that have come under attack and discuss
whether or not these attacks were warranted.
The manner in which Antonius conducts his inquiry into the rise of Arab nationalism
makes it possible to split his book into three basic parts. The early period or what can be
called background for the movement, the middle stage at which point actions of the
Arabs were at a standstill yet their environment was changing rapidly, and finally the rise
and consolidation of Arab nationalism. In terms of the first two parts of this chronology,
there is almost complete consensus among scholars of Arab nationalism. In addition,
they all believed that there was a period of development and growth followed by a
standstill. During these stages most of the efforts of the Arabs failed because no one was
able to unite the Arabs under one single national idea. In the historical literature one
scholar may chose to focus more heavily on a certain event or the actions of a certain
intellectual, however, the important consensus that is reached by all of the scholars,
regardless of their personal slant, is that none of these factors constituted “the factor” that
created and consolidated Arab nationalism. It is in the third period-the consolidation
period-that the scholarly consensus dissolves and George Antonius’ ideas come under
attack. He claims that Sharif Husayn of Mecca was the father of Arab nationalism and
that Husayn’s quest was to unite the Arab world and therefore he can be seen as the
consolidating factor of Arab nationalism. Numerous scholars have criticized Antonius
for these beliefs. There have been claims that in his study he overlooked some crucial
information concerning Husayn’s motives and actions and instead chose to interpret the
events in a way that would better support his own thesis. These are harsh criticisms for a
scholar whose work has often been cited as the leading English source on Arab
nationalism. In order to determine who is actually in the right on this issue it is necessary
to start from the beginning, or the early stage, and trace the growth of the nationalist
movement and then pinpoint what factor (if any one specifically) did actually result in its
consolidation.
The Early Stage
An integral aspect of the Early stage is the environment in which Arab nationalism was to
develop and grow. The area with which George Antonius primarily concerns himself,
and the area that is most notorious as the birthplace of Arab nationalism is the eastern
Arab world. The northern and southern portions of this area played different roles in the
rise of Arab nationalism, the north, or the Fertile Crescent, was closer to the central
Ottoman administration and therefore more important both politically and economically.
The Hijaz, which was further away, was less important economically, and less
controllable due to a lack of communication and transportation, it was extremely
significant for Muslims worldwide.
The differences in the ethnic and religious backgrounds of the two areas also deserve a
brief examination. The population of the Hijaz was almost one hundred percent Muslim
and lived under traditional tribal arrangements, while in the Fertile Crescent not only did
a large number of Muslim sects exist, but Christians and Jews also made up a significant
portion of the population. By the 19th century these minorities had come under the
protection of foreign powers, this served to enhance the amount of international
interference in the area. This, along with changes in Ottoman policies, was to have
profound consequences in the future in that it provided an impetus for the rise of Arab
nationalist ideas within the Fertile Crescent.
The final environmental factor that must be discussed is the Arab character itself.
According to Sharabi, all Arabs are fiercely independent and pride themselves on this
protection of their personal freedom. Sharabi sees this especially in the Peninsular Arabs.
This may have been one of the crucial factors underlying the slow development of an
overarching Arab national consciousness. In fact, it seems that only the emergence of a
common enemy was able to cause the Arabs to let go of their individualistic tendencies
and come together as a nation.
This paper is more concerned with the consolidation of Arab nationalism and I am only
going to touch briefly on the earlier movements that served to build the foundation of this
consolidation. The two earliest Arab movements identified by most scholars were
localized and individualistic in nature. The leaders of these movements were al-Wahabb
and al-Tahtawi. Both movements focused more on Islamic revivalism than they did on
true Arab nationalism. The men, living at different periods under the Ottoman Empire,
saw problems within the structure of the Empire and feared the degeneration of Islamic
traditions and values. While they called for reforms dealing with these issues, the crucial
point here is that neither man called for a complete break with the Ottomans. This can be
attributed to the fact that no Arab national consciousness existed during this period.
Second, there is never any mention of autonomy or independence. Both movements are
happy to remain under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire and Sultan. These men
simply want to improve the position of Islam within the empire.
The next significant contribution, agreed upon by most scholars, came from Egypt.
George Antonius especially focuses heavily on the importance of the Egyptian
contribution. Mehmet Ali, the governor of Egypt under Ottoman sovereignty, was the
first leader to create a type of national consciousness within the Arab world. Although
his motives were purely personal, he claimed to want to revive the Arab Empire when
what he really wanted was his own empire; he introduced the idea of a recreation of the
Arab empire into the Arab world. Following his installment as the governor of Syria, his
son, Ibrahim, adopted a different approach and helped to bring the Arab movement to a
new level. Antonius explains that Ibrahim claimed to see himself as an Arab, learned
Arabic, and said he was only comfortable among Arabs. He enacted many liberalizing
reforms in Syria and began to call his subjects “citizens”. Ultimately, the rulers from
Egypt failed because no overarching Arab national idea existed. Antonius claims that
while Mehmet Ali’s major problem was that he was not “Arab” enough to spur the
formation of an Arab national consciousness, ibrahim’s reign allowed for the laying of a
foundation for the movement.
The next crucial building block in the rise of Arab nationalism was the entrance of
missionaries into the Fertile Crescent. Both Antonius and Bassam Tibi devote long
sections in their books to the actions and roles of various missions. The missions brought
with them western ideas of the nation-state and citizenship and offered educational
opportunities that went beyond the state options of military or religious studies. Antonius
praises the actions of the Americans in particular and Tibi echoes this sentiment when he
says, “ In its early stages, Arab nationalism was apolitical and it emerged largely out of a
concern with Arabic culture and the modernization of the Arabic language which had
been encouraged particularly by the American missions”.
Two primary intellectual figures in Arab nationalism emerged at this point in time, Nasif
al-Yaziji and Butrus Bustani. Again Antonius devotes long discussions to the importance
of these men in the development of nationalism. Both men were against fanaticism and
believed that national unity and religious toleration were prerequisites for the reinvention
of Arab culture. Albert Hourani explains that Bustani also believed that in order to
survive, the Arab world needed to borrow some of the ideas from the West that were
either compatible with Arab traditions or could be adapted to fit the situation. Antonius
explains that the two men came together to form the first literary society of the Arab
world in 1847, known as the society of arts and sciences, it was located in Beirut and that
this was especially important because it marked a departure from the Arabic tradition of
individualism in favor of collective activity. This was the first step towards collective
consciousness in the Arab world. Although the society did not include Muslim or Druze
as members and died out soon after its creation, it marked an important step on the road
toward a national consciousness.
Ten years later, another society, this time the Syrian scientific society was formed in
Beirut. One of its members, Ibrahim al-Yaziji, the son of Nasif, was to read a famous
ode in front of the other members of the society. In it he called for the Arabs to unite as a
single independent cultural nation and to throw off the Ottoman yoke. The ode begins
with “Arise, O Arabs and awake!” and then continues with lengthy praise of the Arabs.
Although the poem was never printed and was simply passed along orally, Antonius
places heavy emphasis on the effect it had in opening the eyes of the Arab community.
However, at this point the movement had still not assumed a political character. As Tibi
points out that, “it is no accident that Arab nationalism was not based on political
theories…This was because neither the subjective nor the objective conditions for a
political movement existed in the Middle East in the 19th century”. Again it is important
to note that neither the common people nor the intellectuals were calling for
independence from the Ottomans. Instead, the Arabs were calling for the recognition of
their autonomy in terms of a cultural and linguistic nation.
The Second Period: A Standstill
It is at this point that it becomes appropriate to discuss the second period in the
development of Arab nationalism. Nearing the end of the nineteenth century, the Arab
movement itself more or less stood still, while environmental factors surrounding the
movement began to change quite rapidly.
Ibrahim’s reign in Syria (which had been brought to an end by the Great Powers and
resulted in the reinstatement of Ottoman authority in the area) had created a situation of
tolerance and stability that allowed Christian citizens to rise within society and opened
the door to Christian education and collective activity. This had the unwanted effect of
turning the Ottoman traditional hierarchy upside down and creating tensions and conflicts
among the different groups living in the region. The Ottomans themselves compounded
the problems when, bowing to international pressure, the instituted the Tanzimat reforms,
designed to grant more equality to minorities living within the Empire. As a result of the
explosion of tensions between the Muslims and the Christians of Syria, the Great Powers
and the Ottomans were finally forced to partition the area.
Antonius believes that the consequences of these events were very far reaching. He
claims that the clergy was discredited, the decline of the reigning feudal system began,
and the European powers found both a reason and a method to intervene in the area. But,
he also notes that the Arab world experienced an “awakening”, as people became aware
of the level of both moral and intellectual stagnation and began to demand changes in
terms of education and liberation from foreign domination, both Ottoman and now
European.
It is also during this period that Abdulhamid the Second came to power and began his
famous reform movement. What began as an attempt at decreasing the power of the
sultanate with the creation of a constitution and an elected parliament, soon reverted to an
even more oppressive, almost tyrannical dictatorship. Eric Zurcher explains that
Abdulhamid aimed to centralize the empire to eliminate any chance of succession.
According to Zurcher, he aware of the need to appeal to his Arab citizens and in order to
do so Abdulhamid focused on his role as caliph and developed a program of panIslamism.
Abdulhamid’s primary intellectual source in this program was the teachings of
Jamaluddin al-Afghani. Interestingly, in terms of a discussion of Arab nationalism, it is
very important to note that al-Afghani’s ideas were by no means political. They were
simply made political by Abdulhamid as he picked and chose from the ideas that
appealed to him. Antonius points out that in fact al-Afghani was opposed to the Sultan’s
temporal role, called for the adoption of Arabic as the key to creating a true Islamic
community, and was eventually exiled from Constantinople for his views. Antonius goes
on to explain that the Christian Arabs, like al-Afghani, were also dissatisfied with
Abdulhamid’s rule and formed a new secret society that incorporated a mix of Muslims,
Druze, and Christians. Although the society was extremely organized and even
developed a sort of political agenda, it too was ultimately unsuccessful because it was
premature. Antonius notes that as of yet no national consciousness had developed,
cooperation and organization among various segments of society was not yet possible,
and although the movement did manage to spread outside of Beirut, its spread was
haphazard and did not indicate a coming together of Arab forces.
In “The Arab Awakening”, Antonius attributes the standstill of the movement itself
during this period to the effects of Westernization and the shifting internal dynamics of
the movement. Changes in education and society resulted in rapid changes in the
positions of Chrisitians and Muslims in society. For example, while the primary
language of instruction had previously been almost exclusively Arabic, as Christians
began to look for alternative educational opportunities for their children and began to
send their children to missionary schools, Christians soon grew more comfortable in
languages such as French or English than they were in Arabic. This linguistic tie came
together with new economic ties and the focus of minority groups began to shift
westward. This caused their ties to the Arab movement to decline. The proponents of
Arab nationalist ideas and the creation of an Arab national conscience became almost
exclusively Muslim.
Abdulhamid’s reforms were to later play an indirect role in what we have designated as
the third stage in the development of Arab nationalism. It is during the last years of the
19th century that we see the results of this in rise of the Young Turks. This new group of
leaders were educated in the Western style and emerged from the petty bourgeoisie as
opposed to the aristocratic classes. The Young Turks called for changes in the type of
government in and organization of the Empire. The end result was the creation of a
Constitution in the year 1908 and the overthrow and replacement of Abdulhamid in the
year 1909. The Young Turks then formed a party known as the Committee of Union and
Progress or CUP.
Zeine Zeine demonstrates that in reality, the Arab members of the party actually played a
crucial role in the CUP’s final ability to come to power. The Arabs and the Turks were
able to unite under the common background of Ottoman citizenship and the desire to
bring Abdulhamid’s despotic reign to an end. Antonius calls this period the “Turco-Arab
Honeymoon”, and yet he believes that this period was extremely deceiving in its
portrayal of Turkish-Arab unity. During this period, the CUP declared their policy of
Ottomanism. This program was based on a non-religious, multi-national idea in an effort
to safeguard the Empire from the external threats it faced from Europe. Zeine asserts that
the CUP believed that the best way to strengthen the Empire’s internal unity through the
granting of political liberty. The Young Turks promised equality without distinction of
race, ethnicity, or religion. At this point there was even an Arab society that was formed
with the support of the government. Unfortunately, this period of cooperation was shortlived as the CUP soon began to revise their policies. Zeine explains that as calls for local
autonomy began to increase, it is more than likely that the Young Turks began to look for
a group that would be less inclined to attempt to separate from the empire. The Turks, as
Zeine explains, “had no political ideal incompatible with the Ottoman State”. Thus
began the new focus on Pan-Turanism. This policy called for a national regeneration on
“Pure Turkish” lines based on natural affinities of all Turkish-speaking peoples. By
achieving a return to pre-Islamic institutions, the goal of the CUP was to unite all
Turkish-speaking peoples both inside and outside the Empire.
In conjunction with this policy, Kayali demonstrates in his book “Arabs and Young
Turks” that the CUP instituted a program of “Turkification” which included a focus on
Turkish as the only official language, the promotion of Turkish culture, and even went so
far as to begin to force the employment of Turks in various commercial activities. Along
with these measures, the CUP also instituted harsh measures of censorship and cultural
suppression. A letter from Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey written on Sept. 6th of the
year 1910 demonstrates the situation, “To them (the CUP) “Ottoman” evidently means
“Turk” and their present policy of Ottomanization is one of pounding the non-Turkish
elements in a Turkish mortar”.
The Third Stage: Consolidation
The Arab reaction to the Young Turks policies, which marked the beginning of the third
stage and the consolidation of the movement, was predictable and swift. As Kayali
explains, the Arabs were outraged by the actions of the government and began to refuse
to implement various aspects of the Turkification program. For example, local leaders
often turned a blind eye to anti-Turkish behavior in their areas of jurisdiction. Although
the CUP quickly realized its problem and tried to return to Pan-Islamism in order to
regain the Arabs support, the inherent contradiction between Pan-Islamism and PanTuranism was glaringly apparent and thus this also proved fruitless. Zeine explains that,
“As a result of the Young Turks’ Turkifying program, the Arab leaders’ objective of
gaining full national independence received a great stimulus which consolidated it,
(and)…it can be safely asserted that it was the national and racial policy of the Young
Turks which fanned its flames.” He goes on to warn that, “Nationalist sentiments are
dangerous to play with in a multi-racial and multi-national empire.” However, at this
point the main focus of most Arabs was still cultural autonomy.
This can be seen in the Arab Conference held in Paris in 1913. Even at this conference
the Arabs stated their willingness to live within the empire as long as they were afforded
cultural and, specifically, linguistic autonomy. They demanded the creation of a “multinational constitutional monarchy”. Kayali notes that the Young Turks also attended the
conference, offered the Arabs a settlement, and through skillful negotiation were able to
convince the Arabs to agree to a new program, which would, in theory, be more open to
cultural autonomy. However, soon after the close of the conference, the Turks reneged
on their promises and a wave of arrests and executions of nationalist leaders occurred. It
was following this that the first true calls for Arab separatism began to be heard. As
Zeine explains, the Arabs simply learned from and copied the nationalist ideas of the
Young Turks. If the Turks could ask for a nation of their own, then the Arabs believed
that they too had the right to ask for the same thing.
Bassam Tibi calls this “the phase of politicization” which he claims lasted until the
1920s. C.E. Dawn explains that the major players in the movement were Westerneducated intellectuals and military officers from the petty bourgeoisie, along with a
significant number of landowners and grand bourgeoisie forces. However, Dawn also
points out that these members of society were too secular to lead a popular revolt. The
common Arab people would have trouble taking these men as their leaders.
Consequently, Dawn, Tibi, and Antonius all claim, this secular group was forced to find a
religious group to help it to pull together the various segments of society. This group was
the Hashemites.
It was during this period, World War One came to the area and the CUP entered into an
alliance with Germany. Zeine shows that although the Arabs were concerned about the
consequences of both the Ottoman entry into the conflict and the agreement with the
Germans, even at this point there is no real call for political autonomy. The British and
the French, however, predicting the imminent disintegration of the Empire, had begun to
negotiate the division of Ottoman lands among themselves. Each had strong interests
both politically and economically in the Arab region. Great Britain was especially
concerned with the road to their most important colonial possession, India. British
officials soon declared that the Arab areas were crucial in terms of the war. The British
had determined that if an ally could be found within the Arab world that would rebel
against the Ottomans, this might lead to a more rapid defeat of the Turks and create a way
for Great Britain to hold on to its possessions.
Great Britain began to increase their contacts within the area in an effort to find an ally
that was disaffected enough with the Turks to turn on them and lead a rebellion. The idea
of allying with the Entente, was extremely appealing to many of the Arabs, who hoped to
use this to their own advantage in their quest for autonomy. According to Mary Wilson,
the British soon began to focus their efforts on Sharif Husayn. Husayn, a descendent of
the Quraish tribe, had recently been appointed as the Grand Sharif of Mecca, a position
that required him to protect the Holy Cities and serve as a local spiritual leader. Husayn
was an ambitious member of the new CUP Assembly and along with his sons, Abdullah
and Faysal, wished to use his new position in order to advance his own personal power
and well being. However, the recent construction of the Hijaz railroad, along with the
government efforts of centralization presented an obstacle to Husayn’s ambitions.
Wilson shows that by the time the British began to recognize the importance of the Arab
lands, Husayn was fed up with the constant Turkish efforts to decrease his personal
power and it was actually he who first approached the British and offered his services.
At first, the British were reluctant to enter into this type of an arrangement with the Sharif
but they soon realized that he was their best option and began negotiations in the form of
the famous “Husayn-McMahon Correspondence”.
It is at this point in the discussion of Arab nationalism that the paths of historians diverge
significantly. Some scholars (specifically Tibi, and Antonius) claim that Sharif Husayn
was the crucial instigator of Arab nationalism by the role he played in the Arab Revolt.
Another school of thought, which includes Kayali, Wilson, William Cleveland, C.E.
Dawn, and others, however, holds to the idea that Husayn’s motivations were purely
personal and had nothing to do with his desire to help the growth of Arab nationalism per
se. It is obvious from the previous historical survey that Arab nationalism had existed in
many forms prior to the Arab Revolt and the rise of the Hashemites. What is left for
discussion at this point then is the extent of Husayn’s role as portrayed in the literature
which finds him to be the “father” of the movement and a comparison with the literature
that cites other factors as being equally, if not more important.
The Husayn-McMahon correspondence is a good place to begin. This exchange of letters
clearly demonstrates that Husayn did have an alternate, more personal agenda. He
demands money, goods, and arms in exchange for his agreement to lead the rebellion.
Joseph Kostiner explains that his claims of being able to unite the various tribes living in
the Hijaz under his command were exaggerations; in reality, he was forced to pay the
Bedouins to fight for him and there was a constant intertribal rivalry that he was unable to
overcome. Husayn’s main demand from the British is that he, himself, be installed as the
“King of the Arabs”. It is hard to imagine that a man who was making demands such as
these had the good of all the Arab people in mind.
One indirect criticism of Antonius comes from Hasan Kayali. He explains that the
hotbed of Arab nationalism was not the Hijaz but Syria instead. He proves this by
demonstrating the amount of Turkish suppression in the area. However, Husayn’s son,
Faysal, was in Syria and was in charge of organizing the revolt on that end. There is
proof, shown by Mary Wilson, that he was aware of the strength of nationalism in the
area and was actively exploiting the movement to help advance both his and his father’s
personal agendas. Antonius, it seems, is able to overlook some of the glaring
demonstrations of Faysal and Husayn’s personal interests in leading the Revolt and
continually focuses instead on Husayn’s role as the “father” of the nationalist movement.
William Cleveland presents a more direct critique. He faults Antonius for his ability to
overlook some of these disparities. Cleveland also agrees with the beginning points and
the historical building of nationalism in the Arab provinces, yet he believes that Antonius
was wrong to peg Husayn as the key player. Cleveland criticizes the inherent bias within
Antonius’ work in the chapter he has written critiquing Antonius. Cleveland states, “He
(Antonius) is too responsible a historian to overlook the fractious tribalism of the Arab
Peninsula and Iraq or the sectarian tensions of Greater Syria. But he is too committed to
the unifying power of language and culture to allow regional or personal differences to
dominate his discussion, and he manages to portray the Arab revolt as a unified national
movement of all the Arab regions east of Egypt.”
Mary Wilson, C.E. Dawn, and Zeine Zeine also advance similar arguments, if not directly
attacking Antonius’ work, at least presenting evidence proving that Husayn was not the
driving force behind the consolidation of the movement. Husayn’s motives were too
personal and he, himself, was simply too controversial a figure. Zeine points out that
many Arabs were strongly opposed to the idea of Husayn as supreme ruler of Arab
World. The long history of Arab nationalism itself is so involved and multi-faceted that a
single leader could not possibly hope to be the force which ended the development stage
and result in its consolidation.
While each of these arguments holds some elements of truth, the fact is that the Arab
Revolt was the event that led to the final consolidation of the Arab nationalist movement.
Before the revolt, an overarching Arab national consciousness did not exist in any form.
After the revolt, in which a common enemy was finally used as a rallying point, the Arab
World began to come together in the face of foreign dominion and declare their desires
for independence and autonomy as a nation. It seems that the common enemy found in
the Ottoman domination was the crucial turning point in the development of the Arab
nationalist movement.
Fischer explains that before Husayn’s revolt, the Arabs were too divided and diverse to
have a single common enemy. Some factions of society were content to live under
Ottoman rule and follow the Ottoman laws. However, once the Arab Revolt began and
the Arabs saw that perhaps independence and nationhood were possible, they became
unwilling to live under the control of a foreign nation. Husayn’s actions cleared the way
for the Arab national movement, that is seen today and that emerged soon after the
conclusion of World War One, and the signing of the agreement dividing the Arab World
into multiple mandates and protectorates. It is too much of a coincidence that the leader
who emerged as the champion of Arab nationalism during this period was Husayn’s son,
Faysal. Installed as the King of Iraq, yet under British control, he was the first to gain
independence for his citizens through his use of nationalist rhetoric.
Given the differences among scholarly opinions and the proof that exists to the contrary,
it would be unrealistic and historically irresponsible to claim that Husayn was the father
of nationalism in the Arab World. He was at best the instigator of the revolt that served
to consolidate the movement. The common enemy created by Husayn in his purely
selfish drive against the Ottomans gave all Arabs a new focal point. The centuries old
foundations of Arabism and Islamism were able to unite with the modern idea of
nationalism during the events of the Arab Revolt. In conclusion, perhaps the best way to
give George Antonius his fair share of credit for the extensive work he has done on the
subject is to say that he is neither completely right nor is his completely wrong in giving
Husayn’s role in the “Arab Awakening” a good share of importance. His thesis may
simply need to be modified in the light of new facts published by subsequent historians of
Arab nationalism.
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