PENNSYLVANIA:
THE NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932
BY E. JEFFREY
LUDWIG*
IN
THE Presidential election of 1932, Pennsylvania had one
of its closest elections, with the Democrats garnering 1,295,948
votes and the Republicans maintaining their traditional dominance,
but with only 1,453,540 votes.' Even with this narrow victory,
on the surface the strength of the Republican party seemed to
be assured. Yet the event of the Republican party's victory was
accompanied by another apparently strange phenomenon-that is,
the total number of votes cast in the Presidential election declined
from 3,159,612 in 1928 to 2,858,968 in 1932. Although Maryland,
Alabama, and Virginia also showed a decline in total votes cast,
Pennsylvania's decline was by far the largest of any state (approximately 300,000), and was the only state that went Republican
to show such a decline.2
To approach an understanding of the election, it seems appropriate to begin with a glance at the interrelation between the
changing nature of the county votes in this election and that of
1928, and the associated increase or decrease in votes of the
counties. First, let us note that of those counties which went Republican in 1928 and Democratic in 1932, sixteen showed a decrease in the total numbers of voters participating.. Of these
sixteen, in the years between 1920 and 1940 Adams, Clarion, and
Sullivan went Democratic only in 1932. Twelve counties-Allegheny, Northampton, Schuylkill, Westmoreland, York, Berks,
Cambria, Clearfield, Fayette, Lehigh, Montour, and Northumberland-were to remain in the Democratic fold through the thirties
and at least up to 1940. Only Erie, of the counties with a decreased vote, went back to the Republican fold after voting Demo*Mr. Ludwig has done graduate work at the University of London and
dur'ng the past year at Harvard University.
'Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Presidential Vote, 1,896-I932 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1934), p. 308.
2Ibid., pp. 131-378.
334
NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932
335
cratic in 1932 and 1936. Now let us look at those counties which
went Democratic and increased in total vote cast in 1932. Of the
eight such counties, Columbia, Greene, and Monroe had gone
Democratic every year since 1920 except 1928. Fulton, another
county that increased in 1932, had previously voted Democratic in
1924. Washington and Beaver Counties went Democratic from
1932 to 1940, while Pike County went Democratic only in 1932
and 1936 in the years between 1920 and 1940. Lastly, the three
counties which had gone Democratic in 1928 and remained Democratic-Elk, Lackawanna, and Luzerne-all showed a marked
decline in their total number of voters. 3
It is often asserted by political scientists that a dissenting or
protest vote brings a higher election turnout. In Pennsylvania in
1932 a protest vote would have been a vote for the candidates of
the Democratic party. One political scientist has suggested that
the "Democratic percentage [in Pennsylvania] was in part the
result of a rise in the general interest in voting." 4 Yet, in Pennsylvania in 1932, the opposite seems to have been true. Those
counties which went Democratic, and in which the total vote decreased, had a percentage decrease greater than the percentage
increase shown by any of those counties which showed an increase.
For example, Pike, which was to go Democratic in 1936 as well
as in 1932, did show a small voting increase, from 3,395 to 3,558;
but Erie, which also went Democratic in 1932 and 1936, showed
a sharp decline, from 50,097 votes cast in 1928 to 40,442 in 1932.
Although the three counties that went Democratic in 1932 after
having done so in 1928 also showed a voting decline in 1932, this
decline came in the wake of a startling increase in voting in
those counties between 1924 and 1928-Elk had gone from 9,352
to 13,009, Lackawanna from 62,401 to 99,269, and Luzerne from
87,396 to 141,411.5 The suggested reasons for this increase will
be noted later in this article. Further, it should be noted that of
those counties which showed an increase and also went Democratic,
four had gone Democratic in 1920 and/or 1924, and therefore did
Harold F. Alderfer, Presidential Elections by Pennsylvania Counties,
(State College, Pa.: Pennsylvania State College, 1941), pp. 14-15.
Hereafter cited as Alderfer, Presidential Elections, 1920-1940.
4Harold F. Gosnell and William G. Colman, "Political Trends for Industrial America: Pennsylvania an Example," Public Opinion Quarterly,
IV (1940). p. 482. Hereafter cited as Gosnell and Colman, "Political Trends."
5Alderfer, Presidential Elections, I920-1940, pp. 17-19.
3
1920-1940
336
PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY
not have as strong a tradition of Republicanism as did the other
counties that voted Democratic in 1932.
Of the seven counties that stayed in the Republican ranks and
showed an increase in total votes cast in 1932, three went over
to the Democratic fold in 1936. Furthermore, the increase in total
votes in these counties was quite small; however, in 1936, all
seven showed a great increase in the number of ballots cast. In
the thirty-three remaining Republican counties, the percentage decrease in total votes was greater than the percentage increase
shown by the other seven Republican counties. But, as with the
other seven counties, all showed a marked increase in the 1936
electionY
Harold F. Gosnell suggests that "the Catholic, foreign-born,
wet elements have tended to support the Democratic candidates,
while the dry, rural voters have tended to turn against them with
the exception of 1932, when the general protest against the depression conditions tended to obliterate these particular relationships." 7 We might, however, examine the economic scene to see
if it really did "obliterate" other socio-political issues. Of the
twenty counties having an unemployment percentage higher than
30% in May, 1932, thirteen went Democratic in the November
elections. However, of the twenty-five counties showing an unemployment percentage between 25.0 and 29.9 per cent, only six
went Democratic in the Presidential election. 8 Thus, although
there is a very high correlation between those counties having
the highest rate of unemployment and the Democratic vote cast
in those counties, there is a very low correlation between those
counties with the second highest rate of unemployment and Democratic predominance in 1932. Although the statistic gathering section of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry did
not have the efficient fact gathering methods found after the reorganization of the department in 1933, we can probably assume
that while the percentage of unemployment given is inaccurate,
the relative unemployment situation of the respective counties is
depicted with general accuracy.9
'Alderfer, Presidential Elections, 1920-1940, pp. 20-22.
and Colman, "Political Trends," p. 476.
'Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, Labor and Indvstryv,
XIX (August 1932), p. 1.
'Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, Pennsylvania Labor
and Industry in the Depression (Harrisburg, 1934), p. 19. Hereafter cited as
Labor and Industry in the Depression.
7Gosnell
NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932
337
The relief efforts of the early depression years in Pennsylvania,
while resulting in a flurry of activity, did not really do the job
that needed to be done."' Throughout the state, depression conditions continued unabated until the year 1932, at the end of
which one can discern signs of a lessened severity (e.g., unemployment declined). In a study by Harold F. Alderfer, certain
correlations are made between the industrial character and the
number of wage earners in the state and the Democratic or Republican votes cast between the years 1920 and 1940. Industrial
character was determined by three factors in this statistical survey:
the value of products, the amount of primary horsepower, and the
number of wage earners:
VOTING BEHAVIOR AND
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT".
1924
1928
1932
1936
Republican
.04
.43
.30
.61
Democratic
-. 31
.40
.22
.59
Minor
.00
.16
.40
.47
"lOAt first Governor Gifford Pinchot established labor camps to construct
highways and dams. In 1931, the Talbot Bill provided $10,000,000 for
"food, clothing, fuel, and shelter for residents . . . without means of support," while at the same time reducing other state appropriations by $10,000,000. "Prosperity Bonds" to the amount of $35,000,000 were to be sold
to Pennsylvania's wealthy at 4% interest, but the proceeds were not to be
used for doles. Furthermore, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh were permitted
to make loans up to three million dollars to be a liability in the following
year's budget. Charitable donations were also encouraged, with employees
of the Department of Labor and Industry taking the lead by pledging
$34,420. Lastly, in order to increase revenue, a sales tax of 1% went into
effect on September 1, 1932, expected to bring in a gross revenue for the
state of $12,000,000. For more detail on the above see Labor and Industry
in the Depression, pp. 27-28; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Laws of the
Gcneral Assembly of the Coininonwea'th of Pennsylvania, Passed at the
Session of igpi, Act 7-E, 1503-1505 (Harrisburg, 1931) ; Isidore Feinstein
"Gentlemen in Politics: Honorable Gifford Pinchot," American Mercury,
XXIX (1933), p. 84; Pennsylvania Denartment of Labor and Industry, Labor
and Industry, XIX (July, 1932), 8; and, Harrisburg Telegraph, September
7, 1932, p. 1.
' Counties are ranked according to their industrial development and then
according to their Republican and Democratic votes. These rankings are
then correlated using the correlation formula r = 2 sin !7 rho where
66
d'
rho - I
n'
n .Alderfer, Presidential Elections, 1920-194o, p. 28.
PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY
338
VOTING BEHAVIOR AND WAGE EARNERS 12
Republican
Dentocratic
Minor
.09
-. 43
-. 33
-. 64
-. 21
.40
.31
.58
.45
.15
.14
.37
1924
1928
1932
1936
These charts seem to show that, in spite of the industrial blight
and the difficulties of workers, the depression apparently did not
have a significant new impact (in fact, the correlations are less
significant in 1932 than in 1928) on the voting habits of the
people living in the state in 1932." We may note, however, that
by 1936 the "New Deal .
.
. turned politicians to those very wage
earners whom Penrose [political boss and Senator, who died in
1921] had despised."':4
In the state of Maine, unemployed citizens who used municipal
aid within ninety days preceding an election in 1932 were disfranchised.' 5 Since permission to vote is decided at the time of
registration, the question may be raised whether there were special
factors at work preventing registration in 1932; and if there
were, whether this loss of registration was aimed at, or responsible for, the loss of the Democratic candidates in the 1932 election in Pennsylvania. As a beginning we might do well to chart
the basic registration satistics:
REGISTRATION 1928-193416
Year
% Potential
No.
Voters
Registered Registered No. Voting
1928
1930
1932
1934
3,971,876
3,522,510
3,912,671
4,192,441
78%
67%
72%7,
75%o
3,150,612
2,105,445
2,859,177
2,950,296
o Potential Potential
Voters
No.
Voting
Voters
62%
40%
53%
53%
5,085,750
5,258,817
5,413,282
5,567,767
`2Ibid., p. 29.
"A significant correlation is to be defined as any coefficient greater than
.50 or -. 50.
" Gosnell and Colman, "Political Trends," p. 475.
""As Maine Went: Unemployment Disfranchised," Survey, LXVII (October 15, 1932), p. 499.
"fHarold F. Alderfer and Fanette H. Lukes, Registration in Pennsylvania Elections, 1926-1946 (State College, Pa.: Pennsylvania State College,
1941), p. 15. Hereafter cited as Alderfer and Lukes, Registration int Penna.,
1926-1946.
NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932
339
REGISTERED VOTERS BY PARTIES"
Year
1928
1930
1932
1934
Republicans
2,861,919
2,659,850
2,911,068
2,624,386
% of Total
70.7%
72.1%
75.5%
74.4%
Democrats
867,391
675,584
833,977
1,401,005
%oof Total
21.8%
19.2 %
21.3%
33.4%
What can we say about the above statistics? First, it can be
noted that there was a six per cent decline in the number of
potential voters that registered between 1928 and 1932, and, in
absolute numbers, this decline amounted to 50,000 voters.
If we examine the registration for individual counties, we generally find that the greater the unemployment the lower percentage of those registering." With this in mind, it might be wise
to see if there was anything in the voting laws which was responsible, as were laws in Maine, for the low registration in the high
unemployment counties.
Before November 7, 1933, the voting qualifications section of
the state constitution read as follows:
Section 1: Every male citizen, twenty-one years of age,
possessing the following qualifications, shall be entitled
to vote at all elections subject, however, to such laws
requiring and regulating the registration of electors as
the general assembly may enact.
First, He shall have been a citizen of the United States
at least one month.
Second, He shall have resided in the State one year
(or having previously been a qualified elector or native
born citizen of the State, he shall have removed therefrom and returned, no less than six months) immediately
preceding the election.
Third, He shall have resided in the election district
where he shall offer to vote at least two months immediately preceding the election.
Fourth, If 22 years of age and upwards, he shall have
paid within two years a state or county tax, which shall
have been assessed at least two months and be paid at
least one month before the election [Italics added].1
"Alderfer and Lukes, Registration in Penna., 1926-1946, p. 22.
"18
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Manual of the Commonwealth of
Pemnsytvania (Harrisburg, 1933), pp. 400-401. Hereafter cited as Manual
of Pennsylvania (1933).
"19Ibid.,Footnote 1, p. 4S.
340
PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY
The taxes were to have been paid on real estate in all counties
except Philadelphia, which charged a fifty cents poll tax. Therefore a meaningful correlation might be established if we consider
the ten highest and ten lowest registration counties, and compare
the median values of their respective owned and rented non-farm
values. 2 0 They are listed from highest to lowest "median owned"
values.
Io Counties
Lowest
Registration
-1932
Median Value ($)
Owned
Rented
non-farin
Allegheny
Lehigh
Erie
6,658
6,384
5,933
Philadelphia 5,705
Northampton 5,534
Lawrence
5,128
Lackawanna 5,038
Mercer
4,762
Fayette
3,841
Cambria
4,149
33.03
28.73
28.32
36.81
25.49
25.05
26.12
24.02
11.05
18.79
AVERAGE $5,331.44 $25.74
io Counties
Highest
Median Value ($)
Rented
Registratio? Owned
non-farm
-I932
Delaware
Monroe
Pike
Cumberland
Wayne
Wyoming
Adams
Bradford
Tioga
Potter
7,674
5,729
4,171
4,157
4,153
3,204
3,040
2,900
2,305
1,702
38.75
24.31
19.15
18.86
16.12
13.69
14.55
15.49
10.51
19.10
AVERAGE $3,904.50 $19.05
Before noting anything more than that the ten lowest registered
counties are also those counties with the higher median value for
owned and rented non-farm real estate, it is necessary to consider
another set of statistics.
If the Democrats lost votes because of registration requirements,
then we should expect to see a correlation between the counties
going Democratic and a lower registration. We should also expect
to find that counties which went Republican would have a higher
registration rate. In the following chart this is exactly what
we find. 21
Lowest ro
Registration
I932 Vote
I tighest I0
Rt ?gistration
1932 VOte
.613% Republican
.292% Republican Tioga
.593% Republican
.308% Democratic Delaware
Philadelpl iia .320% Republican Cumberland .590% Republican
Mercer
Erie
"Mfanual of Pennsylvania (1933), pp. 400-401; Leon E. Truesdell, ed.,
Fifteenth Census of the U.S., £93o, Population, Vol. VI, Families (Washlington, 1932), pp. 1137-1140.
"Mlanual of Pennsylvania (1933), pp. 400-401.
NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932
Lowest io
Registration
Cambria
.330%
Lawrence
.339%
Lehigh
.345%
Lackawanna .348%o
Allegheny
.350%,
Fayette
.353%
Northampt'n.372%7
1932
Highest IO
Registration
Vote
Democratic
Republican
Democratic
Democratic
Democratic
Democratic
Democratic
341
Wyoming
Bradford
Pike
Monroe
Adams
Wayne
Potter
.580%
.571%o
.571%o
.571%,
.567%o
.567%,
.564%,
1932
Vole
Republican
Republican
Democratic
Democratic
Democratic
Republican
Republican
As we can easily note above, seven of the ten lowest counties
in registration were Democratic and seven of the ten highest
counties in registration were Republican. Generally, then, those
counties with the lowest registration went Democratic; and thus
the Democrats were not getting as many of the potential votes out
of the counties they won, since fewer were voting, as were the
Republicans from the counties they won.
In looking at the last two charts, we might be led to ask if
rather than the poorest counties not being able to register, the
wealthier counties did not register because of complacency, and
went Democratic because not 'enough people registered to prevent
the Democrats from carrying them. This reasoning, however, does
not help explain why the total number of votes decreased among
those Republican counties which showed a high registration. For,
if a county had shown an increase in registration (and therefore,
by the above reasoning, a lack of complacency), it should have
shown an increase in the number of votes as well as a Republican
victory.
Only the low registration and high registration counties which
went Democratic were consistent, to the extent that the former
showed a decrease in the total number of votes cast, and of the
latter, two-Pike and Monroe-showed an increase in votes. Since
this correlation (a higher registration showing a higher vote and
vice versa) was consistent only within the Democratic party, we
must see if there was some other factor affecting the higher or
lower registration of the counties mentioned. If we look at the
ten lowest registration counties in 1926, 1928, 1934, and 1936,
we note they were the following:22
1926
Lycoming
Delaware
Berks
1928
McKean
Venango
Berks
1934
Berks
Lawrence
Montour
1936
Blair
Crawford
Union
"2Alderfer and Luhrs, Registration in Pennsylvania, 1926-1946, p. 28.
342
PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY
I926
Lawrence
Venango
Lehigh
Lackawanna
Allegheny
Erie
Philadelphia
1928
Dauphin
Lawrence
Lehigh
Montour
Philadelphia
Allegheny
Erie
1934
Allegheny
McKean
Lycoming
Blair
Philadelphia
Lehigh
Erie
I1936
Lycoming
Cambria
Berks
Philadelphia
Erie
Montour
Lehigh
In all these cases, as well as in 1932, the low registration
counties were generally urban.23 This would seem to indicate that
regardless of party affiliation, urban counties registered in a
smaller percentage. Thus, even if the Democrats began to make
encroachments in the urban areas, they still were not getting as
big a number of the potential voters as were the Republicans ill
rural, high-registering areas.
Summing up, just as there was a decrease in voting, so there
was a decrease in registration in 1932. The low registration
counties tended to be counties that went Democratic. No statement can be made here with assurance, however, concerning the
effect of the tax requirement in curtailing registration. What is
clear is that low registration areas tended to be urban areas. But
since low registration characterized urban areas even if they voted
Republican, low registration was not of itself the deciding factor
in the election, except to the extent that it reflected, as did the
election results, other underlying factors.
We might now consider some of the ethnic influences on this
election. In doing this, we should consider the following: first,
whether the Democratic counties in 1932 showed a particular
ethnic orientation as opposed to the Republican counties; second,
whether this orientation was the same or different from that of
1928; and, third, whether these ethnic factors held true in the
1936 election.
The three counties which went Democratic for the first time
in 1928 all show a high percentage of foreign born, foreign parents, or mixed parentage. Of the seven counties that stayed
Republican in 1932 but which showed an increase in votes-Bedford, Cameron, Centre, Cumberland, Dauphin, Montgomery and
"3Throughout this article, urban counties will be those counties having
more than 52% of their populations living in towns of 2,500 or more people.
See Fifteenth Census of the U.S., 1930, Population, VI, Families, pp. 11411145.
NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932
343
Wyoming-only a small proportion of their populations were
within one generation's attachment to foreign-born people. 2 4 Of
those eight counties that went from Republican to Democratic
and showed an increase in votes between 1928 and 1932, only
three-Beaver, Pike, and Washington-had at least 40%o of
their populations foreign-born or children of foreign born people.
And, lastly, of those counties which went Democratic but which
showed a voting decrease between 1928 and 1932, all except
Adams, Clarion, Montour, Sullivan, and York had substantial
foreign populations. In all counties that had significant foreign
populations, the dominant foreign ethnic groups were the Italian,
German, Yugoslavian, Czechoslovakian, Irish, Polish, and Austrian.
With the exception of the Germans, these groups were all from
strongly Catholic countries. 2 "
Until now, we have not been able to establish a significant
correlation which has been able to account either for the direction the election took in 1932 or for the diminished number of
votes in that year. In considering the facts of the ethnic composition of the varying counties, however, we may find a clue to account, at least, for the rising and falling of total votes cast. In
1928, all counties showed a sharp increase in voting (1,000,000
more than in 1924), with the predominant increase in the individual counties coming in either the Democratic or Republican
party, depending on the composition of the population (whether
or not it was "old stock"). In 1932, however, no ethnic issue was
so clearly focused, because neither of the candidates had Al
Smith's Catholic origins. So we find that many of those who had
voted Democratic in 1928, but who no longer felt ethnic ties with
their 1932 candidate, voted Republican; and many more, who had
voted Republican in 1928, and who no longer felt an ethnic
antagonism towards the Democratic candidate, with the reinforcement of other anti-Republican issues, voted Democratic. Many
from both parties, however, voted in 1928 only because of
enthusiasm wrought by ethnic bias, and, as such, in 1932, faced
with an election that had no "racial" implications, did not vote at
24That is, "foreign-born, foreign parentage, or mixed parentage." Terminology from Fifteenth Census of the U.S., 1930, Population, III, Table
14, pp. 680-684.
25 Fifteenth Census of the U.S., 1930, Population,III, Table 14, pp. 680-684,
and Table 1&, pp. 703-705.
344
PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY
all. In 1936, although the same counties that were Democratic in
1932 stayed in the Democratic ranks, the addition of new voters
and the gaining of fourteen new counties all seem to point to
other new, and more important, correlations. 2 6 Thus, between
the elections of 1928 and 1932, it would seem that ethnic affiliation
(and its concomitant-religious affiliation) was the chief element
in the rising and falling of voting between the two elections.
Although statistics are extremely useful in helping us form
judgments about elections, it is perhaps wise at this point to
consider some of the non-statistical factors-e.g., the campaign
issues, newspaper editorializing, political maneuvers.
As the campaign began, five issues were spotlighted by the
Democrats and Republicans in their platforms and in the speeches
of their respective candidates-prohibition, tariff needs, the budget, the bonus to veterans, and economic recovery. On the first
issue Roosevelt wanted repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment,
while Hoover was ambiguous. On the issue of the tariff, Hoover
insisted on "protecting" American markets and producers, while
Roosevelt, although noting the dire effects of a protective tariff,
equivocated about how far we should go to remedy the situation.
Both agreed wholeheartedly on the need for a balanced budget,
and because of this opinion on the budget, neither would commit
himself definitively to the giving of a bonus to veterans. As for
the area of economic recovery, the Republican platform asserted
that the President had indeed initiated "a constructive program"
through the Railroad Credit Corporation, the Federal Land Bank
Fund, and The Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 2 7 At the
same time, the Democrats were offering economic suggestions
which were later implemented by New Deal legislation under
Franklin D. Roosevelt.
With the above issues in hand the campaign was underway.
The Republicans surprised many by sending Charles Curtis, the
Vice-Presidential nominee, into Pennsylvania to open the campaign. As one analyst suggested, "The state has been gyrating in
a queer way for several years, and this Republican anxiety about
"6 ee page (6): VOTING BEHAVIOR AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND VOTING BEHAVIOR AND WAGE EARNERS.
"' Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson, National Party Platforms
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956), p. 340. Hereafter cited as
Porter and Johnson, National Party Platforms.
NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932
345
it caps the climax."'2 8 The Curtis visit initiated a generally high
paced campaign by the Republicans, and according to the Literary
Digest, "The Republicans profess great confidence that they will
win some important states by their whirlwind campaign of recent
weeks, and they expect especially they say to carry Pennsylvania."29 Part of this "all out" campaign called for rallies on the
Saturday before the election in the county seats of each of the
sixty-seven counties in the state, with 1,000 smaller rallies to be
held between Saturday and Sunday, all of which would utilize 500
speakers throughout the state.2 0
At the same time, some more "aggressive" Democrats were
circulating hard-hitting campaign books, such as the Hoover
Scandal Book which claimed that Hoover was not an American
citizens Furthermore, the Democrats suggested that business
interests were coercing many of their workers, with veiled threats,
not to vote for the Democratic party. Julius Bux was said to have
warned that if a low tariff man were elected, 100,000 men might
be laid off. 2" This statement was offered as a "joint issuance of
a statement of individual opinions . . . of a non-political nature." 2"
Although the newspapers noted that 100,000 persons cheered
Hoover on October 31, 1932, in Philadelphia's Reyburn Plaza,
they also noted that "unusual precautions were taken by the police
to safeguard Hoover in Philadelphia. . . . [Most of the] main
disturbances [were] from Communist groups."' 4
Although the campaign was spirited, the cost was considerably
less than that of the 1928 campaign. In 1928, the Republicans
reportedly spent $4,911,744, and the Democrats $4,088,932. In
1932 the Republicans reportedly spent $960,290, the Democrats
$1,261,412."5 In spite of the lowered costs, charges were hurled
regarding the acquisition of these funds. John R. Collins, chairman of the Democratic State Committee, said that a " 'voluntary'
contribution is being strong-armed" from state employees to aid
"21
Charles Willis Thompson, "The Campaign and its Meaning," Commonweal, XVI (October 5, 1932), p. 524.
" "Our Poll is O.K., What Price Pennsylvania?" Literary Digest, CXIV
(November 26, 1932), 6.
"Philadelphia Inquirer, October 30, 1932, p. 20.
'3 Hazleton Plain Speaker, January 2, 1932, p. 4.
"33
Philadelphia Inquirer, November 2, 1932, p. 9.
"Ibid.
"Ibid., November 1, 1932, pp. 1, 15.
"Hazleton Plain Speaker, November 5, 1932, p. 1.
346
PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY
the candidate supported by Governor Gifford Pinchot.36 T. E.
Williams suggested that Pinchot was not permitting state officials
to be assessed, even though $300,000 was collected from them in
1928.3T Certainly the Republican strength was not hurt by the
vast corps of appointed and elected county officials. With the
decline in income in all walks of life, noted earlier, the fees and
salaries paid these officials showed an increase between the years
1929 and 1931. In 1929 this figure amounted to $1,269,818, while
in 1931, it was $1,406,940, an increase of $37,022."' This increase
might be defended on the ground that it represented an increase
in personnel hired to cope with the depression. But if we look
at the per capita costs, we can see that they also increased. 3 0
The G.O.P. also hurled charges, claiming that bankers were being offered federal receiverships in return for campaign funds.4 0
Further, the Republicans produced a letter from A. P. Homer of
the Democratic National Committee offering G. C. Eddy, a Chicago industrialist, favors in return for funds. James Farley,
Democratic National Chairman, denied any knowledge of this
letter and disavowed its authenticity. 4 1
Having considered the charges and countercharges, we might
turn to a discussion of the internal political machinations of the
state of Pennsylvania at this time, and their impact on the outcome of the election. Since the political situation of Pennsylvania
in the 1920's is beyond the scope of this article, that period will
be considered only to the extent that its activities are relevant to
understanding the election of 1932.
With wonderful ease the Republican forces in the state had
coalesced in the senatorial and gubernatorial election of 1926 to
elect John S. Fisher to the governorship and William S. Vare to
the Senate. But Gifford S. Pinchot, then governor, refused to
certify Vare after he won. Furthermore, after the report of the
Reed Committee on Campaign Expenditures the United States
" Ibid., April 1, p. 1.
"4'T. E. Williams, "Will Pennsylvania Go Democratic?" Nation, CXXXV
(November 9, 1932), p. 452.
"SFrederick P. Weaver and Harold F. Alderfer, County Government
3
Costs iiv Peinsylvania, Bulletin 287 (State College, Pa.: Pennsylvania State
College, 1933), p. 29.
39Ibid.,
p. 30.
40Philadelphia Inquirer,
November 3, 1932, p. 3.
Philadelphia Public Ledger, November 1, 1932, p. 9.
NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932
347
Senate refused to seat Vare.4 2 This outcome did not endear Hoover
to Vare, since Vare received no aid from the President.4" The
event marked the beginning of decline for the Vare machine.
Further, in August, 1928, there was a grand jury investigation
of racketeering in Philadelphia, which also hurt Vare's position.
In 1931 Vare suffered another setback when he nearly lost the
"preprimary" mayoralty campaign in Philadelphia.44 At first
Charlie Hall, president of City Council, picked a vulnerable
mayoralty candidate in George H. Biles. He was backed by 32
of 42 ward leaders, but powerful State Senator Sam Salus refused
to back this candidate. Senator Salus then went to see the vicepresident of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and threatened to support
Pinchot in his drive for more utility regulation, if the Pennsylvania Railroad executives did not tell Hall to withdraw his support from Biles. Vare and his confederates finally supported the
compromise candidate J. Hampton Moore. 4 5
The other two principal factions in Pennsylvania Republicanism
were the Mellon family and the Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association. The Mellon family of Pittsburgh was abetted by the
Leslie Coyne organization of Allegheny County and United States
Senator David Reed.4 6 The PMA commanded the respect of the
citizens of the state, had access to funds from manufacturers, and
was supported by the organizational skills of Joseph Grundy, its
president. These forces had agreed on the Fisher-George Wharton
Pepper ticket of 1926, but they were not to have this unity in the
early thirties.47 With the rejection of Vare by the Senate, Governor John S. Fisher appointed Grundy to Vare's Senatorial
Seat.4 8 This combination of Grundy and Fisher united to defeat
such measures as the old-age pension bill, which was supported
by the Vare machine and the Democrats.4 '
Gifford Pinchot, a "dry," "reform" candidate, however, was to
" Samuel J. Astorino, "The Contested Election of William Scott Vare,"
Pennsylvania History, XXVII (1961), 187-201.
"T. E. Williams, "Will Pennsylvania Go Democratic?" Nation, CXXXV
(November 9, 1932), 451.
"John F. Salter, "End of Vare," Political Science Quarterly, L (June,
1935), p. 220.
" Ibid.
"46Jesse Roff e Wike, The Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), p. 228.
" Ibid., p. 220.
"Ibid., p. 222.
"4Ibid., p. 223.
PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY
348
receive support from Grundy in 1930, as he did in 1923. J. Roffe
Wike suggests that this support by Grundy came because "if
you cannot obtain sufficient support from other organizations
in the party for your desired 'friendly' candidate, support an
independent whom no one else is supporting, whether you agree
with his political and economic views or not."5 0 In 1930, Grundy
and the Mellons had originally intended to support Samuel S.
Lewis. The Vare group made several overtures for compromise,
but these were rejected by the Grundy and Mellon factions. Despite the support of the latter factions, Lewis decided not to run.
This was probably because, as state treasurer, he had made the
mistake of opposing any bond issue, saying that there were enough
funds available for special state expenditures. 5 1 Unable to settle
on a candidate, Grundy decided upon Gifford Pinchot as opposed
to the Vare candidate, Francis S. Brown. Pinchot was a "dry,"
a popular issue in up-state rural areas from which came most
of his support; and, Grundy knew that at least Pinchot paid his
patronage debts.5 2 Therefore, Grundy and Pinchot ran against
James J. Davis and Francis S. Brown in the Republican primary
of 1930. In a raucous primary campaign, Grundy made such
vicious attacks as: "The Philadelphia gang and the Pennsylvania
Railroad are attempting [to] . . . dominate all the important relationships of this great state. . . . 53 In spite of these accusations,
Grundy lost to Davis while Pinchot won, with Davis finally beating the Democratic candidate Joseph Hemphill in the election.
Pinchot's leadership, while it meant expansion of the facilities
of the state Department of Labor and Industry, road building
measures, and new dams, did not, however, really mark a sharp
departure from bossism politics, but only a realignment with
Grundy forces ascendant. The position of all the bosses in the
state, however, was never again to be the same. Vare was ill, and
rival factions competed for control in Vare's own Philadelphia. 5 4
Grundy's position had been weakened by his activities in the pri6Ibid.,
p. 225.
"William A. Cornell, The Political Career of John S. Fisher, Governor
of Pemisylvania,
1949), p. 97.
1927-1931
(Pittsburgh:
PMA, pp. 230-232.
Ibid., p. 231.
University of Pittsburgh Press,
2Wike,
6
"A
John F. Salter, "End of Vare," Political Science Qzuartcrlv, L (June,
1935), pp. 230-232.
NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932
349
mary. By 1932, Pinchot, although Republican, left some doubt as
to his position in the national election, and participated very
little when he finally did come out for Hoover. 5 5 In that same
election, Grundy, who usually collected money, stayed in the background. 5 6 All these factors worked to the detriment of the Republican party, which accounts to some degree for the loss of
Republican votes. But at the same time the Republican tradition
in the state, as well as the considerable if diminishing influence of
the old factional leaders, helped keep the Republican party on the
winning side of the ballot in 1932. Walter Davenport was correct
when he predicted that, in spite of Pinchot's claims of distress and
the "low estate of the Mellon-Kline and the Vare Machines," the
state, and particularly Philadelphia and Pittsburgh would go
Republican. 5 7
As election day drew closer everyone was making predictions,
with a mock election at Drexel Institute of Technology showing a
Hoover victory. 5 5 Organization leaders in all counties claimed
victory. Montgomery County said that it would be helped by the
neutrality of a wet group known as "the Crusaders." 5 " The
Literary Digest gave Roosevelt all states but Maine, Vermont,
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and
New Jersey.6 6 Men such as George Wickersham, attorney general
in President Taft's Cabinet, claimed that a "serious-minded electorate" had brought a surge to President Hoover.6 " County chairmen were wild with predictions. Through Republican cries of
"victory" came cries of "foul." Warren Van Dyke, Democratic
state chairman, fearing a ballot plot, secured Congressional investigators, who were sent into the anthracite regions "to investigate election irregularities."6 2 There had been talk circulated that
mine workers had been unduly threatened by veiled threats contained within Republican circulars.' 2 In addition to the Farm
55
" PhiladelphiaInquirer, October 31, 1932, p. 1, and T. E. Williams, "Will
Pennsylvania Go Democratic?" Nation, CXXXV (November 9, 1932), 452.
'T. E. Williams, "Will Pennsylvania Go Democratic?" Nation, CXXXV
(November 9, 1932), 452.
' Walter Davenport, "Hoover-Roosevelt Fight in the East," Collier's, XC
(November 5, 1932), 11.
' Philadelphia Inquirer, November 7, 1832, p. 4.
' Ibid., October 30, p. 20.
'Ibid.,
November 3, p. 13.
12Ibid.,
November 7, p. 2.
51
Ibid., November 5, p. 14.
Ibid.
"G.
350
PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY
Journal poll, which showed that a sample of Pennsylvania farmers
gave Hoover a 305 to 187 vote edge over Roosevelt, the Republican state chairman predicted that Hoover would capture the
agricultural counties of "Cumberland, Juniata, Northumberland,
Adams, Lebanon, and Montour." 6 4
Election Day, Pennsylvania, November 8, 1932. . . . Only
Cumberland, Juniata, Northumberland, Adams, Lebanon, and
Montour went Democratic. The Literary Digest was wrong. Some
were gleeful; others were dismayed. Yet all confirmed the need
for unity under the new President, to "help" him lead the country
out of distress. Perhaps the most acute new distress was that of
William S. Vare. Why? The people had voted to continue the
use of election machines-the era of the stuffed ballot box in
Pennsylvania was over.65
Gosnell suggests that "the proportion of registered voters who
participate in a given election varies with the closeness of the
struggle, the dramatic quality of the election, and with the efficiency
of the local party organizations."66
If by "closeness of the struggle" and "dramatic quality of the
election," he means the nature of the issues and their importance
to the electorate, we might glance once again at the issues of 1932.
Although generally ignored by post-election political analysts,
the tariff issue was often discussed in Pennsylvania newspapers
during the campaign. Although there was some equivocating by
Roosevelt, it was generally believed that he was opposed to the
high tariff, implemented during the Hoover administration.
While we are not able to show any state-wide correlation between economic depression and voting results in 1932, in certain
areas of the state a correlation could easily be made. In the Southwest Soft-Coal Region, the Northeast Hard-Coal Region, and the
Eastern Middle Region (highly industrialized), most of the
counties went Democratic in 1932.67
Many writers believe that Prohibition remained an issue of
" Farm Journal, November, 1932, p. 6; Philadelphia Public Ledger, November 1, p. 9.
"Philadelphia Public Ledger, November 10, p. 4; M. C. Krueger, "Election Frauds in Philadelphia," National Municipal Review, XVIII (1929),
294-300.
"Harold F. Gosnell, Getting Out the Vote (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), p. 107.
'7 Harold F. Alderfer, Presidential Elections, 1920-1940, pp. 38-41.
NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1932
351
great importance in 1932.65 Although Hoover made certain concessions to the "wets," Roosevelt took the much stronger stand
in favor of repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. If, as some
claim, the national victory was a "landslide against Prohibition,"
then the loss of the Democrats in Pennsylvania might be interpreted as reflecting the state's desire to continue Prohibition. 6 9
But this hypothesis must be rejected. Not only is it difficult, if
not impossible, to separate one issue from so many other factors
operant in Pennsylvania, but also in Pennsylvania newspapers
the "wet-dry" issue was mentioned less frequently than any other
issue. There are too many other variables to permit these observations.
The political "efficiency" of the Republican party in Pennsylvania was in fast decline by 1932. With its disintegration, however, there is nothing to indicate a simultaneous buildup of the
Democratic party organization. The only non-Republican buildup
to be found in the five years preceding 1932 was that of the
Socialist party in Reading. 7 0 Thus, while Republican organization
was disintegrating, that disintegration was not being encouraged
significantly by a rejuvenated Democratic organization.
While we already noted that the ethnic factors were partly
responsible for the diminished registration and vote in the state,
we have not been able to note any group of factors which in
themselves were responsible for the Republican victory. In fact,
it is this inability to focus upon any set of issues that clearly
points up the political and economic dislocation which was really
responsible for Republican victory. Thus, while there was a
multitude of issues upon which victory or loss might have been
hinged, none were effectively utilized because the political
machinery of the state was not in a position to co-ordinate them.
The state had a Republican governor, who was not a "regular"
Republican; the Republican machine organization was not working with "machine-like" precision; and the Democrats, demoralized
by many previous years of Republican dominance, did not capitalize on enough of the many issues that were open to them. Thus,
the real margin of Republican victory was the margin of habit.
""Election in Retrospect," New Outlook, CLXI (December, 1932), 9;
"Election Results," New Republic, LXXIII (November 16, 1932), 1.
0
9
Ibid.
"Henry G. Hodges, "Four Years of Socialism in Reading, Pa," National
Municipal Review, XX (1931), pp. 281-288.