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Yakuza (Criminal Gangs) in Japan:
Characteristics and Management in Prison
Elmer H. Johnson
ABSTRACT
The Yakuza, organizedcriminal gangs in Japan, engage in
stimulant-drug traffic, illegal gambling, prostitution, and
extortion. Suppression has increased their share of the
prison populationfrom21 percentin 1975 to 30percent in
1986. This articleoutlines thenature andsubcultureof the
Yakuza, distinguishes their characteristics from those
other inmates, and analyzes their management by the
prison administration in the Japanese style.
Paper delivered at Annual Meeting of
Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Denver, 1989
The Japanese gangsters meet the criteria of organized crime, but their
organizational structure and criminal subculture are distinctively Japanese.
Revision of laws and a vigorous police campaign have led to progressively
greater representation of convicted gangsters who have been sent to prison.
This article focuses on the significance of the development for the Correction
Bureau. The gangsters-inmates differ from usual Japanese prisoners i n their
commitment to a criminal subculture and career histories of dedicated
criminality. Official data demonstrate that they raise unusual custodial
difficulties. Finally, the patterns of the management of them by prison
authorities will be reviewed.’
Criminal Gangs: Past and Present
“Organized crime” is employed specifically to denote certain analytical dimensions: a hierarchical organizational structure, restricted membership, a criminal subculture, use of violence or threats of violence, a drive for
profits from traffic in illicit goods and services in public demand, and
immunity from law enforcement through political corruption and intimidation (Hagan, 1983; Albini, 1975, p. 297; Abadinsky, 1981, pp. 38-39;
Herbert & Tritt, 1984, p. 10; Albanese, 1985, pp. 6-10; Bynum, 1987).
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Yakuza (Criminal Gangs) in Japan:
Characteristics and Management in Prison
Although absolute transfer of the western model is not appropriate, the
patterning of Yakuza activities shares general similarities. A period of social
chaos favored the emergence of organized crime. Illegal grouping must
develop internal discipline and anear-monopoly of an illicit market. Organizational continuity has been assured by recruitment and socialization of
members to a distinctive subculture. Public tolerance and insulation of the
Yakuza from vigorous counter-measures have been sufficient to assure
systematic illicit transactions.
More, specifically, the YakuzaZare creatures of the peculiar Japanese
history. Predecessors can be traced to thechaos previous to the consolidation
of political power in the Tokugawa period (1603-1868) and its immediate
aftermath. Some of the retinue of feudal lords (samurai) were unemployed
and turned to banditry, creating a folklore of defenders of the underdogs in
spite of their violence against ordinary people (DeVos & Mizushima, 1976,
pp, 292-293). Similar turning of military groups to pillage is found in
European history (Bequai, 1979, pp. 9-10).
Contemporary Japanese gangs somewhat resemble feudal gambling
gangs (the Bakuto) and street traders (theTekiyaor Yashi) who sold, among
other items, incense, drugs and other pharmaceutical products. The two
groups were tightly knit under a single leader. Constant conflicts over
territory resulted in brawls and sometimes death. They were bound by fictive
kinship ties, behavioral codes, and specialized argot (DeVos & Mizushima,
1967, pp. 292-296; Iwai, 1986,pp. 208,213). In feudal times criminals were
tattooed as a mark of punishment; tattoos became a symbol of resistance to
political despotism and manliness. The custom of tattoos from shoulder to
knee survives among contemporary Yakuza (Rome, 1975, pp. 54-55).
In contemporary gangs, the leader (Oyabun in the status of “father”)
receives the absolute obedience of subordinates (Kobun in the status of
compliant “child”). Admission of recruits is by sponsorship and symbolized
by a loyalty pledge cemented by the “rite of exchanging cups”; the Oyabun
and recruit drink sake (Japanese rice wine) ritualistically from the same cup.
The “apprentice” learns basic criminal techniques and is tested before
gaining full membership (Iwai, 1986, pp. 214-222). The gangs specializing
in gambling and drug traffic exhibit a firmer organizational structure and
subculture adherence than a third type. Hoodlum gangs (theGurentai) come
closer to the stereotype American gangsters by heavy involvement in
violence (Iwai, 1986, pp. 214,226-228).
Socio-Cultural Factors in Persistence
Japanese gangs enjoyed a degree of tolerance in the 1920s and 1930s
when they engaged in strike-breaking and ultra-conservative politics, but the
post-war chaos brought them to the fore. They served sometimes as
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contractors for the American military who were unaware of their background
(DeVos & Mizushima, 1976, pp. 299-300), and widespread petty crime
favored their operations (Iwai, 1986, pp. 208-209).
In the 1945-1949 post-war chaos, the traditional gangster groups were
supplemented by new gangster groups composed of former soldiers who
were e m p l ~ y e d .In~ the years 1950-1964 the Japanese economy recovered.
The Yakuza reaped profits from construction and providing labor for
seaports,gambling, prostitution, liquor bars, andillicit drugs. Seven Yakuza
“families” (Yamaguchi, Honda, Sumiyoshi, Inagawa, Kokusai, Kyokutou,
and Matsuba) absorbed smaller groups into nation-wide organizations that
were in conflict with one another (Yokoo, 1986, pp. 38-39). Intensive prevention and control campaigns reduced gang membership in the years 19651969. The campaigns and the effects of OPEC manipulation of oil supply on
the Japanese economy eliminated many smaller criminal organizations in the
1970s. The Yamaguchi, Sumiyoshi, and Inogawa families became more
dominant and introduce modem management techniques.
The police report five trends since 1980. First, the death or retirement
of aged leaders has stimulated struggles for dominant positions. The number
of intergang wars had dropped from 115 in 1960 to 16 in 1979 but increased
modestly and irregularly to reach 32 in 1988. Second, the unsavory reputation and severe discipline of the Yakuza have deterred younger men from
joining gangs. In 1966 persons less than 30 years of age comprised 56.1%
of the 147,171 members. In 1987 they were 30.4% of the 86,287 members.
Third, thousands of weapons continue to be confiscated from the
gangsters, with guns becoming more prevalent in spite of severe restrictions
on gun possession. Of weapons seized in 1960,5.6% were guns and 29.8%
were swords. In 1988 guns made up 39.3% and swords 9.3%.
Fourth, the gangsters have accelerated their involvement in coercive
resolution of civil disputes. The police report 9,665 instances in 1981 and
20,303 instances in 1988 of “mediation” in such situations as collection of
debts, loan negotiations, discounting bills and banks drafts, bankruptcies,
real-estate transactions, commodity transactions, and private settlement of
traffic accidents. Arrest data suggest greater involvement qualitatively in
loan negotiations, real-estate transactions, and private settlement of traffic
accidents. Fifth, the Yakuza are cooperating with organized gangs of other
countries in drug traffic; importation of guns; forging international driver
licenses, passports, and visas; and illegal immigration.
Certain Parameters of Gang Participation
Clues to the sociopsychological attractionsofYakuzamembership were
offered by a sample survey of 996 prisoners considered dangerous and
habitual and housed in 37 class-B prisons (those for inmates with “advanced
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Y akuza (Criminal Gangs) in Japan:
Characteristics and Management in Prison
criminal tendencies”). They had been admitted to prison in 1976, and survey
sheets were completed at the end of 1978 by correctional offices (Iwaski,
Okusawa, Saisho, Okuide, & Watanabe, 1980a, 1980b). Selected conclusions are as follows: The reported motives for crimes lend themselves to
categorization for this article: violent emotion and enjoyment of crime, undisciplined (sex, whim, indecency), economic gain, and deprivation (poverty, drunkenness). The subjects were classified as gangsters, former
gangster, or non-gangsters. For all categories, former gangsters deviate from
gangsters in less emphasis on violence and more on economic gain and
deprivation. Perhaps the difference reflects less commitment to Y akuza
values among those who abandoned gang affiliation. The gangsters are
heavily represented by violent emotion and enjoyment (44.1%) compared
with non-gangsters (20.0%). The difference was less for deprivation: gangsters 15.4% and non-gangster 11.3%. The non-gangsters were more prone
than gangsters to the motives of economic gain (39.4 and 29.5%) and deprivation (29.2 and 10.9%) (Iwaski et al., 1980b, p. 63).
The childhood of most gangsters, Hoshino (1988, pp. 3-4) report^,^ is
marked by socio-economic deprivation. Two-thirds come from broken
homes; 57% had fathers in low-status occupations and hadno more thannine
years of schooling. However, they qualified economically as middle class
(56%) to a greater extent than the former gangsters (48%) and the gangster
inmates (36.8%). Upper-class status was nearly non-existent (Iwaski et al.,
1980b, p. 73).
To the extent that marriage is related to stability in life, the gangsterinmates provided appropriate evidence. They were most likely to be married
(54.6%) than former gangsters (38.7%) and non-gangsters (25.7%) (Iwaski
et al., 1980b, p. 73).
Nevertheless, the gangster-inmates were marked by persistent lawbreaking; 54% had been exposed to the juvenile justice system as youths,
62.0% of the former Yakuza, and 34.0% of the non-gangster prisoners.
Gangster-inmates averaged 2.67 previous prison terms, 3.95 for the former
gangsters, and4.53 for thenon-gangsters. Yakuzaprisoners weremost likely
to have associates in the crime resulting in their incarceration. Collectively,
they averaged 2.28 associates, 1.48 for former Yakuza, and 1.41 for nongangsters (Iwaski et al., 1980b, p. 63-64).
An earlier study tracedelements of the previous participation of Yakuza
inmates in organized crime. Data were collected on all 6,527 male gangsters
in Japanese prisons at the end of 1963 (Hashimoto, Sato, & Tachibana,
1965). Gang bosses were found to exceed the ordinary members (kumiin)in
having derived a share of income from Yakuza organizations and in being
committed to the organization. Further, they averaged more years of
membership (12.3) than the members (7.1). The bosses collectively had
derived 59.4% of their income from criminal organizations, 24.5% from
legitimate activities; the remainder had either unstable or no sources of
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income. The gang members collectively were reported to have had predominately unstable or no sources of income (46.1%); Yakuza organizations
provided 34.6% and legitimate jobs 19.3% (Hashimoto et al., 1965, p. 127).
Why had inmates chosen to join the Yakuza? Among the specific
reasons reported, 49.4% of the bossed craved membership in its own terms
as evidence of psychological commitment, compared with 10.1% of the
Kumiin. Other specified reasons were more characteristics of the Kumiin:
tempted by perceived benefits (34.8% versus 19.3%), alienation from
society (30.2% versus 18.5%), supporting needs for life (10.6% versus
7.4%),andintroducedbyaYakuzamember( 14.3%versus5.4%)(Hashimoto
et al., 1965, p. 127).
Although socioeconomic deprivation may would appear to favor the
transformation of juvenile delinquents into adult professional criminals,
most juvenile offenders in Japan do not become involved with adult criminals. The linkages that do occur, Iwai (1966, p. 212) says, are through the
Chimpira, a delinquent youth of about 20 years of age, who take advantage
of the relative leniency accorded juvenile offenders. Some older delinquents
mature into Yakuza membership. Recently juveniles arriving at training
schools have hadconnections with andexpress acceptanceof Y akuza values.
The limited recruitment of delinquents in Japan resembles the “bonding
links” Ianni (1974, pp. 282-294) describes for American gangsters: childhood friendships, the experienced criminal’s recognition of a certain
“talent” in a boy, acquaintanceships in courts or training schools, and joint
participation in offenses.
Actions Against Gangster Groups
The insulation of the Yakuza from prosecution has deteriorated, Iwai
(1986, p. 211) says, by the limitations on political connections to small
,;ectionsof local areas and“a strong tradition and history of incorruptibility”
mong the police.
The national Diet enacted laws and regulations that included criminal
J , ganizations among the targets.
The Stimulant Control Law (1951),
amendedin 1954,1955, and 1973, increasepenalties. TheNarcotics Control
Act also was amended (A Brief Account of Drug Abuse and CounterlMeasure in Japan, 1979, pp. 2-6). Other relevant legislative measure were:
Assembling with Dangerous Weapons (1958), Intimidation of a Witness
(1958), and the Exception for Release on Bail (1958) (Iwai, 1986, p. 228).
Police have employed two general strategies: direct control operations
and attempts to isolate the Yakuza social-psychologically from ordinary
citizens. Mass arrests and imprisonment, especially of bosses and their
lieutenants, are intended to weaken criminal organizations. Gang revenues
are to be curtailed by cutting their supply-line for illicit drugs, interrupting
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Yakuza (Criminal Gangs) in Japan:
Characteristics and Management in Prison
gambling operations, and controlling the importation of guns. The shortage
of regular guns motivatedgangsters to modify toy guns that was made illegal
in 1979. Criminal gangs openly operate their headquarters and wear badges
of affiliation. The police publicized their activities in trying to strengthen
public opposition of the Y akuza and offered assistance in coping with gangster intimidation of citizens and communities (Miyawaki, 1979, pp. 168169).
In trying to evade imprisonment, the Yahuzause tactics, as described by
Iwai (1986, pp. 229-231), that resembles those of American professional
criminals. The gangsters rely on witnesses’ fear of reprisal, doubt that the
police can help, or belief that losses are small. The gangsters choose victims
who also are vulnerable to arrest. Delaying tactics help avoid successful
prosecution. Usually, the gang leaders are insulated from prosecution by
their followers’ willingness to accept blame and the bosses’ avoidance of
direct involvement in criminal incidents.
Nevertheless, the police strategy of singling out the bosses for special
attention has resulted in imprisonment of a large number of them. Of all
Yakuza arriving in prisons in 1987, 34% were bosses or their lieutenants.
They were especially represented among crimes of violence; their rate was
33.60per 100imprisonedbosses orlieutenants comparedwith24.56per 100
“soldiers”. For crimes associated with illicit enterprises, the difference in
rates was minor-49.49 for bosses and 50.05 for members. The Yakuza were
less involved in crimes more characteristic of “ordinary criminals,” but the
numbers of gang members (rate of 30.20) exceeded that of the gang leaders
(rate of 22.99) for other selected crimes.
Yakuza Prisoners: Numbers and Sentences
The campaign against the Yakuza has increased progressively their
representation among prisoners: in 1975 21% (7,931 in absolute number)
and 30.5% in 1988 (13,954). Although Japanese prisons for males continue
to avoid overcrowding5, the increase in number of Yakuza (75.9% increase
in 1988 over 1975) exceeded that for non-Yakuza males (7.7% increase in
the same years) (Summary of White Paper on Crime, 1984, p. 120; 1988, p.
151). Changes in the number of prisoners came from fluctuation, first, in
prison admissions and, second, in the length of sentences. Comparing
admissions in 1983 and 1987, thegangsters’ shareincreasedfrom25 to27%.
Their average length of sentences rose from 18.33 months to 21.49 months
(a percentage increase of 17.2). Average sentences of the non-Yakuza rose
from 18.11 to 20.23 (a percentage increase of 11.7) (Annual Report of
Statistics on Corrections for 1987, Vol. 1, 1988, Tables 15 and 34).
Based on admissions in 1987 of the Yakuza and non-Yakuza respectively, the rates per 100 men forgangsters were higher for those crimes most
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related to the activities of organized criminal group. For violent crimes, the
Yakuza had a rate of 26.8 per 100 men and the non-Yakuza a rate of 8.2 to
produce a ratio of 3.27. Only for the relatively few bodily injury incidents
resulting in death did the non-Yakuza have the greater rate.
Illicit enterprises brought about imprisonment for stimulant drugs,
extortion, intimidation, gambling and lottery, and prostitution. The gangsters always had the higher rates, but stimulant-drug sentences had limited
difference between the Yakuza and non-Yakuza. The net consequence was
that, in spite of a very high rate of 49.9 for all illicit-enterprise crimes of
gangsters, the ratio was reduced to 2.04. With the stimulant-drug admission
removed, theratio forillicitenterprises wouldrise to4.13; that is greaterthan
for violent crimes.
For those crimes for which ordinary offenders were sent to prison, the
Yakuza had lower rates than the non-Yakuza: 61.9 for the non-Yakuza and
18.5 for the Yakuza to produce a ratio of .30. Although they trailed the nongangsters in all those crimes, the Yakuza were more prone to robbery, rape,
and traffic offenses than common property offenses. The serious crisis of
traffic accidents has increased the use of criminal sanctions since 1970,
incidentally also affecting some gangsters.
Although prison sentences in Japan are usually shorter than those in the
United States, the gangsters received longer sentences on average than the
other Japaneseprisoners. The pattern was especially characteristic of violent
crimes except for assault and unlawful assembly with weapons and the
special law against using guns andswords. The exceptions may be attributed
to law enforcement directed against politically extremist groups. For crimes
associated with illicit enterprises, the Yakuza consistently drew longer
sentence on the average. “Other crimes” usually resulted in longer sentences
for the gangsters.
Persistent Criminality of Yakuza
Adherence to a criminal subculture appears to be less common in
Japanese prisons than in the West, but the gangsters are a highly visible
exception. Involvement in those offenses characteristic of organized crime
suggests a career commitment. The organizational structure of gangs and
desire for later economic gain through gang membership induce continued
loyalty to thevalues andinterests of colleagues still in the community. Intergang rivalries hold prospects for conflict within prison walls.
The public ritual for welcoming the released Y akuza prisoner illustrates
gangster solidarity. Colleagues come to meet him ceremoniously at the
prison gate. When he is a boss, the welcoming party comes in scores of
vehicles to form an honor guard and demonstrate Yakuza power. Usually,
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Yakuza (Criminal Gangs) in Japan:
Characteristics and Management in Prison
release is timed early in the morning to avoid traffic congestion (Johnson &
Hasegawa, 1987, p. 72; Rome, 1975, pp. 115-118).
Official data lend further support to doubts that imprisoned gangsters
will change their criminal behavior (Annual Report of Statistics m Correctionsfor 1987,Vol. 1,Tables 17,21,23,24,35,36, and41). First,theYakuza
admitted to prisons in 1987 had been previously incarcerated more frequently on average (2.36 times) than the non-Yakuza (2.20 times). Of the
gangsters, 28.1% were imprisoned for the first time and 42.6% of the
“ordinary criminals.’’ The non-Yakuza compare well with the 2.21 previous
imprisonments and 38.1% of first admissions of Americans in state prisons
in 1986 (Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1987,1988, Table 6.28).
Second, the Yakuza tend to enter prison at a younger age (36.4 years)
than ordinary criminals (39.4 years) but are more likely to have served
previous sentences. The differences of the Yakuza and non-Yakuza in agespecific rates are greatest in the youngest age group and decline consistently
with greater ages.
Third, the gangsters exceed other prisoners in having been exposed
previously to the operations of criminal justice agencies. They are more
likely to have been in juvenile training schools: 28.0% versus 17.4% of other
inmates. Of all the Yakuza arriving in prison in 1987,70.9% were reentering
again for a crime committed after release from a previous confinement and
another .99% for a crime perpetrated previous to that confinement. The
length of time between the earlier confinement and the new arrival at prison
wasless thansixmonthsfor22.8% andless thanayearfor44% oftheYakuza
prisoners. Comparable data for ordinary prisoners are not available.
Particular Challenges to Prison Control System
Japanese prisons record remarkably few escape attempts (an average of
9.5 for the years 1982-1987) and relatively infrequent incidents of violence
(an average of 5,262 for those years) in a prison system averaging about
45,000 inmates. The control system of the Japanese prisons has least effect
in managing gangster-inmates, especially those whocling to Yakuzavalues.
The aforementioned research reports offer evidence in terms of staff evaluations of general conduct, patterns of behavioral change, attitudes toward
prison work, frequency of changes in prison work positions, and difficulties
raised against efforts to alter behavior.
Iwasaki and his associates (1980b, Tables 17 and 18) askedcorrectional
officers to rate inmate conduct. Although all subjects were considered
dangerous and habitual prisoners, the non-gangsters drew the most favorable
and the Yakuza the least favorable assessments. The intermediate position
of the former gangsters suggests that abandonment of Yakuza affiliation was
related to somewhat more positive conduct in prison. Further, when the
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Yakuza inmates were distinguished by age, the gang bosses and gang
members were perceived as better behaved if they were at least 30 years of
age than if younger.
Tocompute scores for this article, the ratings were weighted: very good,
4; good, 3; acceptable, 2; bad, 1, and very bad, 0. The average scores were:
gangsters, 1.66 (short of acceptable); former gangsters, 1.99 (acceptable);
and non-gangsters, 2.38 (more acceptable but short of good). Gang bosses
and gang members were compared according to age categories. The
weighted scores were: bosses less than 30 years of age, 1.08 (bad); bosses 30
years and more of age, 1.91 (acceptable); members less than 30 years of age,
1.51 (between bad and acceptable); and older members, 1.76 (nearer acceptable).
In the same study the fluctuations in prison conduct were measured
(Iwaski et al., 1980b, Table 17). For this article the patterns were further
categorized and weighted for scoring: consistently good (weight of 3),
erratically good (weight of 2) erratically bad (weight of l), consistently bad
(weight of 0). Again, the non-gangsters had the superior score (2.89,
approaching consistently good); the former gangsters were in the intermediate position (1.8 1, approaching erratically good); and the gangster-inmates
exhibitingthemostnegativepatterning(l.70, mostshortoferratically good).
Prominent in programming in Japanese prisons are the prison workshops where75 percentof allinmates areemployedfora40 hoursaweekplus
fourmore hours on alternatesaturdays. Taskperformanceis amajorelement
in the prisons control system and evaluation of inmate conduct. Iwaski and
associates (1980b, Tables 17 and 18) included attitude towards work and
frequency of changes in work position in evaluation of inmate conduct. The
data on attitudes were weighted for scoring in this article: very good, 4; good,
3; acceptable, 2; bad, 1; and very bad, 0. The gangsters were evaluated as
having the least favorable attitude (score of 1S9); score of 1.82 for former
gangsters, and 2.13 for non-gangsters. The average changes in work
positions also indicated the least favorable conduct for the Y akuza inmates
(4.53), compared with 2.97 for the former gangsters and 2.09 for the nongangsters.
Theearlier study (Hashimoto et al., 1965,pp. 130-131)provides dataon
the difficulties raised for treatment efforts. When the reasons for joining the
Yakuza were considered, the greatest difficulty was reported for those who
craved membership or were alienated from society. The greatest difficulty
was seen for men who had derived income from Yakuza organizations or had
unstable sources. Those depending on legitimate jobs were least likely to
raise difficulties. Duration of participation in gangs appeared to be related
toopposition totreatmentefforts: 8.69 years for thevery difficult group, 7.87
years for the difficult group, and 7.55 years for the “normal” group.
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Yakuza (Criminal Gangs) in Japan:
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Concentration in Security Prisons
Management of Yakuza inmates is complicated by these gangs in the
community that try to continue inter-gang wars within the prison, that prefer
to have their members be together while in prison, and that strive to recruit
non-gang inmates. The Yakuza especially try to manipulate prison staff to
gain advantages. Those traits, in addition to the symptoms of dedicated
criminality reviewed above, persuade prison authorities to define most
Yakuza as appropriate candidates for class B prisons that receive persons
with “advancedcriminal tendencies”. Their share of allclass-B prisoners has
risen from 28.2% in 1975 to 43.8% in 1988 (Summary of White Paper on
Crime, 1982, p. 9; 1989, p. 151).
Concentration of Yakuza in certain prisons appears to dampen their
seriousruleviolations. Iwasaki andhis associates (1980b,p. 139)considered
the relationship between“custodia1 density” and the rate per 100inmates for
“defiance” and “physical violence” rule violations by “dangerous” and
“habitual” inmates at B-class institutions. Custodial density was measured
by the percentage of Yakuza among inmates present. Miyayayaki Prison at
that time (1963) had 56% Yakuza and arule-violation rate of 39.8. Other Bclass prisons were grouped according to custodial density and had the
following rates: high density (15% and more), rate of 64.6; intermediate
density (10 to 15%), rate of 72.7; and low density (less than lo%), rate of
74.1.
Japanese policy expects a prison to manage its own problematic individuals. Thereby, the Yakuza are distributed among the eight correctional
regions as received from the courts. Prison intake is subject to thecontingencies of law enforcement and court dispositions that distinguish the distribution of Yakuza among communities from their distribution among prison
admissions. Certain regions must manage disproportionate shares of the
Yakuza: Takamatsu (the islandofShikoku), Sapporo(theis1andof Hokkaido),
and Osaka (including the metropolises of Osaka and Kobe). Further, those
regions have high rates of Yakuza per 100 total inmates in regular assignments to prisons and heavy concentrations of the gangsters in B-class
prisons. However, all regions experience sizable numbers of gangsters and
their disproportionate representation in security institutions.
The management of the Yakuza proceeds within the contours of the
prisons’ general control system. Within the prisons the gangsters are
dispersed among the industrial shops and cells with the intention of dampening prospects for intergang conflicts and intragang solidarity. They akuza
are not assigned the status of workshop monitors who have limited supervisory responsibility. When gangs are not at war with one another in the
community, members of several gangs may have the same workshop andcell
assignments. However, prison officers are on alert for development of undesirable associations in recreational and similarcontacts. Inmates and staff
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JOHNSON
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are cautioned not to reveal gang identifications. The Yakuza are urged to
abandon gang activities, but the efforts are seldom successful. Yakuza who
present particular custodial difficulties are limited to labor within single
cells.
CONCLUSION
The qualities and aperations of the Yakuza conform broadly to the
theoretical dimensions of the organizedcrime concept, but more specifically
the gangs are creatures of the Japanese history and sociocultural context.
Also the reactions to them by the criminal justice system, including the
prisons, have been in the Japanese style.
The Yakuza’s deviation from the central Japanese values has been
expressed in violence, illicit enterprises, and, especially in recent decades,
traffic in stimulant drugs. Their threat to the peace and well-being of
communities has generatednew laws andvigorous police reactions that have
sent greater numbers of gangsters to prisons. The usual correctional
strategies of Japanese prison rely on basic values of the Japanese culture that
press offenders to abandon criminality. The Yakuza are committed to a
criminal subculture, loyal to gang organizations, and exhibit criminal career
orientations. Those characteristics oppose those correctional strategies and
have led to their growing assignment to security prisons. There they are
managed through Japanese-style control methods that explain the internal
orderliness of the prisons.
NOTES
1. This paper stems from research conducted in Japan, including field
visits, in 1988 through sponsorship by the Correction Bureau and a
grant from the Takeuchi Foundation of Hitachi, Ltd. The translation
of documents in Japanese by Koichi Hamai, Satoru Ohashi, and Kenji
Teramura is appreciated.
2. DeVos andMizushima (1967, p. 293) explain that the term “Yakuza”
originated from the word signifying eight-nine-three, a useless sum of
cards in gambling. Gradually, the work came to denote outlaws as
being good-for-nothing. Japanese police prefer the term boryokudan
that refers to organized groups prone to criminal violence.
3. The review of the post-war Yakuza is drawn from the White Paper on
Crime (1989, pp. 338-356) as translated from Japanese.
4. Kanehiro Hoshino, chief researcher of the National Research Institute
of Police Science in Tokyo, has specialized in studies of the Yakuza.
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Yakuza (Criminal Gangs) in Japan:
Characteristics and Management in Prison
5 . Female Yakuza inmates have been few (13 admitted in 1983 and 3 in
1987) and have been excluded from this analysis. However, admission of women offenders has escalated 75.1% in the 1945-1987 period
to produce a problem of overcrowded women’s prisons, largely
because of imprisonment for stimulant-drug offenses. A sixth facility
for women prisoners was opened in 1988.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Elmer H. Johnson is Distinguished Professor Emeritus in the Center for
the Study of Crime, Delinquency and Corrections at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. Dr. Johnson is the author of two widely praised
college texts, Crime, Correction,and Society and Social Problems of Urban
Man as well as the two-part volume, International Handbook of Contemporary Developments in Criminology. He has received a 1990-91 Fulbright
Award to conduct a study of Japan’s correctional system.
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