Democracy, Autocracy, and Everything in Between:
Understanding How Domestic Institutions Affect Environmental Protection
Jana von Stein
[email protected]
Senior Lecturer, Political Science and International Relations
Visiting Scholar, Faculty of Law
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
Te Whare Wānanga o te Ūpoko o te Ika a Māui
Please print in a sustainable manner or not at all!
1. Introduction
As the ecological challenges of the 21st century broaden and intensify, which domestic
institutions will best enable countries to take decisive environmental action? This question
is all the more urgent in light of recent scientific assessments that climate change is already
exerting serious impacts that will leave some populations with no choice but to adapt (IPCC
2014). Many policymakers and scholars have long believed that “environmental issues are
best handled with participation of all concerned citizens” at the national level, in their
communities, and in judicial and administrative institutions (UN Environment Program
1992). This aligns comfortably with the view that democracy is the best – or in any case the
‘least bad’ – route to socially beneficial policies (Lake and Baum 2001).
Others disagree sharply. Indeed, a number of concerned scientists, policymakers, and
scholars now echo earlier arguments (e.g., Heilbroner 1974; Ophuls 1977) that the gravity
of many environmental problems requires the opposite of democracy. Democracy involves
deliberation, which requires time we no longer have. It also obliges leaders to be
responsive to citizen demands that might undercut environmental objectives. In contrast,
when quick, decisive, and (possibly) unpopular action is needed, autocracy might be the
best answer (Fliegauf and Sanga 2010). Some look to China’s recent climate change policies
– which involve top-down edicts, little consultation, and personal liberties restrictions that
Westerners would unlikely find unpalatable – and conclude that such a model might
provide a viable way forward (Gilley 2012).
Is there a ‘democratic advantage’ when it comes to ecological protection, or do
autocracies win out? The answer has profound consequences for our environmental future,
as democracy continues to spread and may one day take hold in major players like China. A
2
number of studies have asked this question. Results have been mixed, and more generally,
the existing literature has two chief limitations. First, it typically relies on general measures
of ‘democracy’ (e.g., Marshall and Gurr’s [2014] Polity measure), which makes it difficult to
say which causal process is doing the work. Second, the literature typically divides the
world into two camps – ‘democracies’ and ‘non-democracies’: most of our theory-building
and empirical testing has focused on what distinguishes the two groups from each other.
We have a very limited understanding of how domestic institutions drive ecological
policymaking in the autocratic world (Wurster 2013).
This article aims to overcome these limitations in the literature. I do not neglect
‘democracy’ as a concept or democracies as a group of countries worth looking at. Instead, I
parse out the mechanisms behind the idea that ‘democracy’ matters for environmental
practice. I focus on four core causal processes: free and fair elections, constraints on what
leaders can achieve unilaterally, civil society protection/activity, and whether domestic
institutional structures give a large number of citizens a say in who holds office. These can
help us to understand differences between democracies and autocracies. Increasingly (and
to varying degrees), countries within the autocratic world possess some of these features
as well. These institutions can also help explain variation within the autocratic world. I also
explore some institutional features that are unique to autocracies.
I put these ideas to the test by looking at countries’ decisions to establish protected land
areas. I find consistent evidence, among all countries and in analyses of non-democracies
separately, that institutions promoting free and fair elections and a robust civil society
enhance land protection efforts. Institutional structures that give a larger segment of the
population a say in who holds office also typically improve these protected area initiatives.
3
The effect of political constraints is more mixed, though always positive. Finally, there is
very little evidence to suggest that different autocratic regime ‘types’ act differently when it
comes to designating protected areas.
2. ‘Democratic’ Politics and Environmental Protection
Most scholars conceive of environmental protection as a public good or something close
to it (Barrett 2007; Bernauer and Koubi 2009).1 Many studies have shown that
democracies are better at providing public goods (c.f., Lake and Baum 2001). Following this
logic, it is not hard to see why one might expect democratic institutions to enhance
environmental protections. Is there a ‘democratic advantage’ when it comes to
environmental protection, or do autocracies win out?
A number of studies have explored this question. While a few find unequivocal evidence
that democracy reduces pollution and other undesirable environmental behavior
(Bernauer and Koubi 2009; Fliegauf and Sanga 2010), most find democracies to be
somewhat more eco-friendly, but lodge important caveats/qualifications. Some report that
democracies are better at reducing some pollutants/eradicating some bad behaviors but
not others (Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Barrett and Graddy 2000; Wurster 2013; Ward
2006). Others find that democratic institutions lead to eco-improvements only when
certain domestic conditions, like sufficient state capacity, are also present (Cao and Ward
2015; Farzin and Bond 2005; Fredriksson and Wollscheid 2007; Ward 2008; Ward et al.
2014). Overall, the evidence suggests that democratic institutions help promote certain
kinds of sustainability under certain domestic conditions, but that the record is still rather
mixed.
1
See Dasgupta and Mäler 1994 for a more nuanced and complex understanding.
4
There are two main limitations in existing research on domestic institutions and
environmental public goods provision. First, while many studies explore the impact of
democratic regime type, they rarely parse out the various potential mechanisms at play.
When it comes to theory-building, this can be problematic because ‘democracy’ often
means different things to different people. Are democracies better (or worse) at
environmental protection because they have free and fair elections? Or is it the limits they
place on individual leaders’ power, the participation they afford to civil society, or the fact
that most of the citizenry has a say in whether a leader stays in power? These are different
mechanisms that, in fact, might pull leaders in different directions. When it comes to
empirical testing, the literature also often falls short. The heavily-used Polity data (Marshall
and Gurr 2014) proved useful in moving a burgeoning literature forward, but they do not
necessarily test the mechanisms scholars intend them to. This article joins other recent
studies that aim to hone in on the specific causal story/ies at play, through the use of more
refined data (c.f. Bernauer and Koubi 2009; Cao and Ward 2015; Wurster 2013).
A second limitation in existing research is that it has typically divided the world into two
camps – ‘democracies’ and ‘non-democracies’ (also called autocracies, authoritarian, etc.).
Most of us now readily acknowledge that this is a gross simplification. Indeed, the reality is
that most countries lie on a spectrum of democratic-/autocraticness. While all nondemocracies have in common a lack of genuinely free/fair elections, they are otherwise a
tremendously diverse group of countries (Geddes 2003; Geddes et al. 2014). Yet, we know
little about why some of them perform so much better than others environmentally. Most
studies show that economic development is a key driver (Grossman and Krueger 1995),
5
but it does not tell the whole story (Barrett and Graddy 2000). How, if at all, do domestic
institutions in non-democracies drive ecological policy and practice?
This study does not neglect ‘democracy’ as a concept or democracies as a group of
countries worth analyzing. Instead, I aim to move the literature forward by (1) parsing out
mechanisms that underlie the proposition that democracy ‘matters’ for environmental
practice; (2) embracing a more nuanced view of the ‘autocratic’ world in order to
understand differences within it and differences between it and the ‘democratic’ world2;
and (3) conducting a series of empirical analyses that put these ideas to the test.
What do we mean by ‘democracy?’ A great deal of ink has been spilled on this question.
Rather than engaging too heavily with that debate (which would be impossible to resolve
here), I focus on the mechanisms. In the context of environmental public goods provision,
there are four core mechanisms to emphasize.
a. Elections
At the most basic level, democracies are countries that hold free and fair elections3 in
which (a sizeable portion of) the adult population can participate. The regularity of
competitive elections forces a relatively tight alignment of government policy with citizen
preferences (Fearon 2011): if leaders ignore citizens’ wishes, they will likely find
themselves replaced come election time. In contrast, the theory goes, because it is harder
for citizens who lack the electoral tool to replace leaders, autocratic leaders have less
incentive to be responsive to what their citizens want. In sum, then, countries with
elections should have better environmental policies because this mechanism makes leaders
I use quotation marks to communicate my view that these are heuristics; that countries generally fall on a
spectrum of democratic-/autocracness, with only a portion of them being ‘ideal types.’
3 The adjectives are important. Most countries in the world now hold some kind of election, but many do not
qualify as democratic.
2
6
more accountable. In support of this idea, Wurster (2013) finds that countries with
democratic elections are better at promoting ‘weak sustainability’ (use of renewable
energy, nature protection areas, energy efficiency). However, these countries fare no better
on most types of ‘strong sustainability’ (greenhouse gas emissions, energy consumption).
The main caveat or critique to raise here is that it depends crucially on what citizens
want (Dai 2005, 2006), a point that Wurster (2013) acknowledges. If citizens do not
support pro-environment policies – perhaps because they favor other goals like putting
food on the table – countries with elections should, in expectation, have less eco-friendly
policies. Consistent with this argument, Farzin and Bond (2006) find that democracy is
associated with more pollution among very poor countries, and less pollution as income
increases. Interestingly, the tipping point is fairly low in the income distribution. Most
research has not acknowledged this highly plausible contingency: elections should only
lead to better environmental practices if citizens favor pro-ecological action. If citizens
favor other goals that work against the environment – and/or the voting system empowers
anti-environmental special interests (Bernauer and Koubi 2009; Midlarsky 1998) – one
would expect elections to lead to worse environmental outcomes.
b. Winning coalition and selectorate
Where the research discussed above focuses on whether leaders are democratically
elected, other work looks at how the size of the group that chooses leaders affects public
goods provision, including environmental protection. Selectorate theory (Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2005) looks at the size of (1) the group whose support is needed for a leader
to hold office (the winning coalition – W); and (2) the subset of the population that directly
determines leader selection (the selectorate – S). When W is small in relation to S, leaders
7
have an incentive to use public resources to provide private goods to supporters. It is
cheaper to the ‘buy off’ the latter than to invest in public welfare for the entire population.
But as W increases in relation to S, the overall bill for private goods increases; at a certain
point, it is more cost-effective to provide the public good to everyone (Bueno de Mesquita
et al. 2005).
Hence, in countries where the winning coalition constitutes a large proportion of the
selectorate, there is greater incentive to invest in public goods such as environmental
protection. Bernauer and Koubi (2008) find support for this idea in the realm of sulfurdioxide (SO2) emissions. Cao and Ward (2015) attach important scope conditions, but find
similar results for a subset of countries (those with high capacity and stability). Although
selectorate theory is often used to distinguish democratic from autocratic regimes, it can
also provide insight into differences between autocracies. Although no autocrat ‘rules
alone,’ the group of people he/she must keep happy is much smaller in some autocracies
than others (Böhmelt 2014). In francophone North Africa, for example (before the Arab
Spring), Morocco’s monarchical system faced a smaller winning coalition than did nearby
Tunisia and Algeria’s party-based regimes. If selectorate theory holds in the environmental
arena, the latter should be better at providing sustainability measures than the former.
c. Civil liberties
Democracy typically involves deliberation and free speech/respect for other civil
liberties by providing information, increasing fairness, and giving a voice to the less
powerful (Bernauer et al. 2013; see also Dasgupta and Mäler 1994). Countries without
these mechanisms tend to have low input legitimization, which can lead to a distorted
sense of reality and might even be used to cover up poor ecological performance (Croissant
8
and Wurster 2013). The lack of debate and competition also tends to reduce policy
optimization (Wurster 2013) and makes it easy for administrators to lock themselves into
narrow, rigid ways of thinking (Shahar 2015). Citizens, fearful of or prevented from voicing
opinions or providing expertise, do not furnish the kind of honest, critical, feedback that
enables administrators to make informed decisions (Shahar 2015).
Consistent with these general ideas, Barrett and Graddy (2000) find that countries with
civil liberties perform better across several environmental outcomes. These results echo a
study by Torres and Boyce (1998), who find that civil and political liberties reduce
pollution, particularly in poor countries. Torres and Boyce (1998) also find that literacy is
related to lower pollution levels, particularly in poor countries. They suggest that this can
be attributed to the citizens’ improved ability to access information.
Protecting civil liberties has two main (potential) drawbacks when it comes to
environmental action. First, it can be slow. Allowing multiple ‘stakeholders’ to express
views and to be involved in the policy process takes time and coordination. Second,
although civil liberties might in some cases enhance environmental protection, there are
also reasons why they could stall the latter. For instance, several Chinese cities have
decided to combat pollution by simply prohibiting car use once per week (Gilley 2012).
Such policies would likely fall under stiff criticism (and might, as a result, be unworkable)
in much of the developed democratic world.
These are two of the main reasons why some now argue that the climate change crisis
might be easier to solve in places with fewer, rather than more, civil liberties. James
Lovelock (2010), the first scientist to discover widespread CFC presence in the atmosphere
and father of the Gaia hypothesis, recently argued,
9
“We’ve become a sort of cheeky, egalitarian world where everyone can have their say … there are
certain circumstances – a war is a typical example – where you can’t do that… I have a feeling that
climate change may be an issue as severe as a war.”
d. Non-concentration of power
Another well-known component of democracy is non-concentration of power, i.e., the
idea that no single government actor should have authority to unilaterally change policy.
Perhaps the most famous application is veto players theory (Tsebelis 2002). In the
environmental arena, the (now relatively old – c.f., Ophuls 1977) idea that we need more,
not less, concentration of power, has gained notable traction (Beeson 2010). The severity
and intractability of the climate change problem, some argue, require drastic measures that
are impossible in a system that requires the consent of multiple veto players. Hence,
Lovelock (2010) continues:
“We need a more authoritative world… You’ve got to have a few people with authority who you trust
who are running it… But it can’t happen in a modern democracy… It may be necessary to put
democracy on hold for a while.”
China’s recent successes in curbing greenhouse gas emissions suggest that
concentration of authority can have great eco-benefits: when led by a reasonably
enlightened group, the leader can simply impose politically difficult but important
policies without having to worry about gaining the approval of other government actors
or dealing with backlash from firms or certain segments of civil society (described in c.
above) (Friedman 2009; Shearman and Smith 2007).
The crucial question is whether concentration of authority typically yields such an
‘enlightened authority.’ Shahar (2015) is skeptical: leaders that insulate themselves
from the will of the populace are often infamous for their inability to produce and
implement policies that actually make the nation better-off. Sowers’s (2007) study of
protected areas in Egypt (particularly in the Sinai region) shows how this concentration
10
of power led to substantial policy pendulum swings in that country. Indeed, at first, the
concentration of state authority in a few executive institutions facilitated the creation of
very effective protection management schemes because it was easy to ‘embed
autonomy’ in the hands of provincial governors. But the absence of checks and balances
also makes reversal fairly easy: in Egypt, international funds dried up, pro-protection
leadership failed, and tourist interests exploited the void. This led to a rapid
deterioration in protected areas.
There does appear to be some systematic evidence to support the idea that
concentration of power facilitates sustainability action. Madden (2014) finds, among
OECD countries, that veto players reduce the chances that a government passes climate
change legislation. In contrast, Zheng (2013) finds, among European countries, that
states with more veto players have greater environmental policy expenditures. Beyond
Europe, there has been very little investigation of how veto players affect sustainability
measures.
3. ‘Autocratic Politics’ and Environmental Protection
The previous section discussed and scrutinized the main mechanisms behind the notion
that ‘democratic’ institutions and practices affect environmental policy. The basic point was
that we should think of ‘democracy’ as a continuum rather than a dichotomy, exploring the
causal process(es) and acknowledging that the latter can provide insight into the behavior
of all countries. While it is extraordinarily rare, for instance, for states that do not hold
free/fair elections to have a robust, vibrant, completely free-operating civil society, this
does not mean that civil society is completely barren in all of these countries. (And the
converse might be said for countries that do hold free/fair elections).
11
As Sowers’s (2007) study of Egypt (even at the height of authoritarianism) shows, local
conservation scientists and other actors were at the forefront of efforts to establish
designated protected areas. Similarly, In Iran, the government has tolerated and even
purposefully stimulated the growth of ‘civil society’ (including green NGOs), so long as the
goals of these groups coincide with government objectives (Doyle and Simpson 2006). Pretransition Myanmar stands in contrast. There, green politics was, with a few exceptions, a
form of resistance politics, and the opportunities for civil society to legitimately interact
with government environmental policy were very limited.
In (pre-transition, where applicable) Egypt, Iran, and Myanmar, even if “no public space
exists where opposition, be it green or otherwise, can be legitimately and openly voiced”
(Doyle and Simpson 2006: 752), the contours of civil society vary notably. These
differences are poorly captured by accounts that focus on a simple ‘democracy’/nondemocracy distinction. The same is likely true for the other ‘democratic’ causal
mechanisms as well. Until the Arab Spring, for instance, the constraints placed on the
Egyptian Presidency (by other government actors) were fairly notable (with the exception
of the late 1990s) and even more palpable in Iran. These contrast sharply with pretransition Myanmar, where meaningful veto players were non-existent.
Institutions and practices that we often put under the rubric of ‘democracy’ exist to
varying degrees in autocracies as well. But autocracies have their own features, too, and
scholars have only recently begun exploring how these affect their environmental practices
(Bö hmelt 2014a; Ward et al. 2014; Wurster 2013). Geddes et al. (2014) provide perhaps
the most widely used approach for understanding autocratic institutions. At the most
fundamental level, Geddes et al. (2014: 314) are interested in “the rules that identify the
12
group from which leaders can come and determine who influences leadership choice and
policy.” These rules can be formal and/or informal – the latter are particularly important in
autocracies (though not absent from democracies) because autocracies often obfuscate the
de facto rules that define political options behind a façade of democratic institutions.
In single-party regimes like that of present-day China or Eastern Europe prior to
transition, one party dominates access to office and control over policy (Clark et al. 2013;
Geddes 2003). They generate support and loyalty by providing group-specific benefits that
are tied to the regime’s survival. Faced with crisis, these dictatorships often co-opt minority
dissenters rather than risk destroying the regime through factionalization. This helps
explain why single-party dictatorships typically last so long. The drawback, of course, is
that over time the spoils have to be shared with more and more people. More so than their
counterparts, these autocracies tolerate the expression of grievances to some degree (Clark
et al. 2009).
In military regimes like those found in Myanmar or Argentina pre-transition, officers
decide who will rule and exercise influence on policy. They are the least durable, for they
contain the seeds of their own demise (Geddes 1999): most transitions start because of
factions among the ruling military elite (Geddes et al. 2014), many of whom would prefer
to return to the barracks rather than being forced out (Geddes 2003). The ruling coalition
is typically small in these systems, although this varies over time and from country to
country (Svolik 2009).
In personalist dictatorships such as the Gaddafi or Marcos regimes, access to office and
its benefits depend heavily on an individual leader’s discretion. The support coalition is
typically small, temporary, and arbitrary. The leader decides who serves, and does so
13
according to whatever criteria he/she wishes (Svolik 2009). Although parties and
militaries often back the leader, the fear of possible rivals prevents him/her from allowing
these institutions to remain/become well-developed (Geddes 2003). These regimes often
rely on tactics intended to advertise the leader’s abilities and concern for the well-being of
the populace.
Monarchical dictatorships like those in Jordan or Swaziland derive their legitimacy and
maintain their power from immutable family and kin networks. They rely on the support of
the royal family, religious authorities, and/or historical tradition (Clark et al. 2009), which
allow them to persist (on average) longer than all other autocracies, and many
democracies. Because monarchical dictatorships are very closed and rarely topple, we
know less about how they manage internal dissent than we do of other types of autocracies
(Clark et al. 2009).
One of the most obvious ways in which autocratic regime type might affect
environmental sustainability is through the winning coalition’s size and interests (Böhmelt
2014; Cao and Ward 2015; Ward et al. 2014). Among autocracies, single-party regimes tend
to have to please the largest percentage of the population.4 Based on that logic, one would
expect single-party regimes to perform better environmentally. Surprisingly, however,
Ward et al. (2014) find that these regimes have the most SO2 emissions, although the
difference is only significant in comparison to military regimes. As discussed in the
previous section, I readily acknowledge that W and
𝑊
𝑆
vary notably, in both the democratic
Böhmelt (2014) maintains that personalist regimes have the smallest selectorate and winning coalitions, but
data from Cao and Ward (2015) and Geddes et al. (2014) show that monarchies have the lowest values,
followed next by personalist and then military regimes. What is certain is that single-party regimes have
larger W and W/S values than do all other autocracies (p < .001).
4
14
and in the autocratic world. But (to the extent possible), we should measure the underlying
concept (Svolik 2012). Data from Cao and Ward (2015) make this straightforward.
Autocratic regime type might also affect sustainability through its impact on leaders’
time horizons. Environmental protection, like retirement/pension plans and many
educational schemes, often involves present-day sacrifices in order to improve future ecoquality. Leaders are unlikely to make these investments if they do not anticipate being
around in the future. For countries with entrenched democratic institutions, although the
regularity of elections means that leaders risk losing office every few years, “the fact that
the rules of the game stay the same increases their time horizon because they may be reelected” (Cao and Ward 2015, 267). This tends to afford leaders breathing space to tackle
environmental problems (Cao and Ward 2015, 395; see also Lake and Baum 2001).
For countries without a relatively easy and regular method of replacing leaders, the
picture is murkier. Insecure autocrats have strong incentives to focus on short-term
economic development to boost security and gain legitimacy (Ward 2008; Wurster 2013),
to the detriment of sustainability. But what about secure autocrats? As Olson’s (1993)
‘stationary bandit’ story reminds us, autocrats might have good reason to invest in longterm public goods if they expect to be in power for a long time. Following this logic,
monarchies might invest heavily in the eco-future, followed by single-party, personalist,
and lastly military regimes.
But the stationary bandit story only holds if the good’s provision is of some long-term
benefit to leaders. Unlike basic education or healthcare, autocrats’ long-term interest in
15
providing citizens with healthy ecosystems is more questionable.5 Perhaps for this reason,
findings have been very mixed. In support of the idea that autocrats with short timehorizons have no incentive to invest in sustainability, Wurster (2013) finds that military
regimes perform dismally on nature protection and municipal waste production. But he
also finds that monarchies – which are usually extremely long-lived – are also
environmentally irresponsible, particularly in climate emissions and energy consumption.6
And Cao and Ward (2015) find no evidence that regime duration has a meaningful impact
on SO2 and particulates pollution in autocracies.
4. Environmental Protection: The Case of Protected Areas
The arguments developed in this article are broad in the sense that they should apply to
a variety of environmental outcomes. At the same time, each ecological challenge its own
unique attributes, and the data work involved in analyzing the concepts is heavy. To make
the study tractable, I focus on land protection efforts. For centuries, communities,
governments, and other actors have been setting aside areas for the conservation of species
and ecosystems (UNEP/WCPA 2014a). In recent decades, protected areas have been at the
center of conservation initiatives, playing a crucial role in preventing biodiversity loss,
maintaining water supplies and food security, promoting resilience in the face of climate
change, and improving human health (Ervin 2013).
There are exceptions. One is environmental problems that endanger citizens’ productivity or some other
basis of revenue (e.g., tourism). Another is conservation efforts that yield a net profit in the short and/or long
term.
6 The latter finding likely owes in part to these countries’ high petroleum reserves, although Wurster did
control for energy imports.
5
16
Various international agreements emphasize the importance of protected areas, but the
most notable of these is the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and its Aichi
Biodiversity Targets. These stipulate a goal that by 2020:
“At least 17 per cent of terrestrial and inland water [be] conserved through effectively and equitably
managed, ecologically representative … systems of protected areas and other effective area-based
conservations measures” (COP of the Convention on Biological Diversity 2010).
This article explores governments’ efforts at establishing designated nature protection
areas (c.f., Wurster 2013). As of 2014, there were almost 209,500 protected areas covering
almost 20.5 million square miles (33 million km2) – almost 14% of the world’s terrestrial
areas (UNEP/WCPA 2014a, 2014b). However, protection varies substantially from country
to country, as Figure 1 shows. Many of these differences owe to underlying geographic,
economic, and perhaps even cultural conditions. This article argues that beyond these
factors, politics plays an important role as well.
-- Figure 1 about here -To gauge countries’ efforts at creating designated protected areas, I use data from the
UNEP/WPCA (2014), which indicate the percentage of total land area with protected
status. The data are available from 1990 to 2012, albeit with gaps at times. The Appendix
provides more information on this and all variables, plus any transformations performed.
One important contribution of this article is that it aims to test the underlying causal
mechanisms through which domestic political institutions affect environmental protection.
To gauge the idea that competitive elections affect environmental protection, I use V-Dem’s
(Coppedge et al. 2016) ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY index, which is superior to dichotomous
variables such as Cheibub et al.’s (2009) for two reasons. First, it covers a greater number
of years. Second, it embraces the idea that achievement of the core value of making leaders
17
responsive to citizens through electoral competition is continuous rather than an
‘either/or’ (Coppedge et al. 2016). Some countries fit quite obviously on one side of the
spectrum (e.g., Eritrea = .027 in 2012) or the other (e.g. the UK = .959 in 2012). But there is
nothing bimodal about the distribution of this variable. It is adept at gauging differences
within the ‘semi-autocratic/semi-democratic’ world (e.g., Myanmar = .314, and Lebanon =
.613, in 2012) as well.
To gauge the extent to which a single government actor has the ability/authority to
unilaterally change policy, I use Henisz’s (2013) POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS variable, which
measures the feasibility of a policy change, given “the structure of a nation’s political
institutions (the number of veto points) and the preferences of the actors that inhibit them
(the partisan alignment of various veto points and the heterogeneity or homogeneity of the
preferences within each branch)” (Henisz 2013).
Operationalizing CIVIL SOCIETY protection and activity is challenging because there are
many potential mechanisms at play (e.g., protection of free speech and association,
presence of social movements, and so on). Freedom House’s civil liberties index has been
standard fare, but it has fallen under some criticism as being arbitrary. Instead, I use the VDem data, which provide a variety of measures of interest. I employ the CIVIL SOCIETY
participation index, which aims to measure of “a robust civil society … that enjoys
autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and
civic goals” (Coppedge et al. 2016: 57). In robustness checks, I also use two alternate VDem indices – FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION and CORE CIVIL SOCIETY – and the results do not vary
notably.
18
Finally, to evaluate the impact of winning coalition size in comparison to selectorate size,
I use Bueno de Mesquita’s well known data (2005), which Cao and Ward (2015) updated.
The chief drawback is that these data are not available beyond 2005, which reduces the
number of data points.
It is useful here to compare each of the four measures. As Table 1 shows, they are all
highly positively correlated (p < .001). There are, of course, quintessential ‘types’ that have
very free/fair elections, many veto players, vibrant civil society, and large winning
coalitions (e.g., Belgium, Switzerland). There are also a number of countries with none of
these attributes (e.g., Libya under Gaddafi; North Korea), and many overall ‘middling’
countries (e.g., Comoros in the mid-1990s; Mexico pre-2000). Nonetheless, even a brief
glance at the data makes clear that they are gauging different concepts, with considerable
variability. Consider some examples.
As one would expect, New Zealand in the early 2000s is one of the most highly-ranked
countries in terms of electoral democracy (~.89). But it ranks very low in terms of political
constraints, alongside a very diverse group of countries ranging from Denmark (which of
course also has very free/fair elections) and Egypt around the same time (which fares
rather poorly on all four variables). This low POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ranking is sensible given
that New Zealand is unitary, is unicameral, and did not have a Supreme Court until mid2004.
Table 1. Correlation of ‘Democracy’ Variables
Electoral
Political
Civil
Democracy Constraints Society
Electoral Democracy
1.00
Political Constraints
.689
1.00
Civil Society
.827
.607
1.00
𝑊⁄
.773
.663
.594
𝑆
𝑊
𝑆
1.00
19
Morocco is another interesting example. Before adoption of its sixth constitution in
1996, its elections cannot be described as competitive, free, or fair.7 This is reflected in its
low electoral democracy scores (~.19; compare to .93 in its colonial parent, France). Nor
did Moroccan leaders have institutional incentives to consider the needs of the populace
𝑊
writ large ( 𝑆 = .25; compare to
𝑊
𝑆
= 1 in France). Yet, political constraints were
substantially higher in Morocco than in France at the time (.58 vs .23), owing to political
competition between parties and the royal family in the North African country. Moreover,
its civil society activism was much stronger than that of other, similar, countries (c.f., Sater
2007).
These examples are useful because they demonstrate that even if the four core variables
are fairly highly correlated, countries can vary quite notably -- and in ways that seem
consistent with political realities on the ground. (Of course, it is beyond the scope of this
article to examine whether each country’s coding for each of the four variables coincides
with the historical record). The four variables are not simply four slightly different
operationalizations of the same thing.
Turning to the other independent variables, I use the following:

GDP PER CAPITA and GDP PER CAPITA2, controlling for purchasing power parities. They test
the well-known proposition that there is a U-shaped (‘environmental Kuznets curve’)
relationship between wealth and environmental protection (Barrett and Graddy 2000;
Cao and Ward 2015; Farzin and Bond 2006; Torras and Boyce 1998). As citizens
Most agree that the 1996 reforms were a step in the right direction, but there is debate about just how free
and fair the new constitution actually made elections. See Storm 2007.
7
20
become wealthier, they initially engage in more pollution/environmental destruction.
At a certain point, however, that trend reverses and increases in wealth lead to ecoimprovements because people have disposable income to spend on such ‘luxuries.’

POPULATION DENSITY: countries with little extra space will likely find it difficult to create
designated protection areas.

YEAR: to evaluate whether protection efforts are improving (or worsening) over time,
for reasons not explained by the other variables.

ENVIRONMENT MINISTRY: countries with these institutions are likely to have more political
will to create protected areas, as well as the administrative capacity to do so.

LATITUDE: many of the world’s most diverse ecosystems lie around the equator and/or
in semi-tropical zones. These areas are also particularly at risk for biodiversity loss,
through hunting and forest product exploitation and habitat disruption (Laurance et al.
2012). For these reasons, we might expect countries at lower (absolute) latitudes to be
more heavily involved in creating protected zones.

I include the following variables in robustness checks:
o FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (Coppedge 2016), which performs in the same manner as
CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX.
o CORE CIVIL SOCIETY (Coppedge 2016), which performs in the same manner as CIVIL
SOCIETY INDEX.
o DURABLE (Marshall and Gurr), following Cao and Ward 2015. This tests the idea
that governments that have been in power longer may have longer timehorizons, and therefore may invest in public goods. I find no evidence to support
21
this proposition, but this variable’s inclusion does not affect the results. I also
estimate the models with DURABLE and DURABLE2, but the results did not change.
5. Quantitative Analyses
I follow others in using time-series-cross-sectional regression analysis with a lagged
dependent variable (Wurster 2013). I begin by analyzing all countries together. Table 2
reports regression results, but most readers might prefer the graphical representations in
Figure 2. The results clearly show that ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY and CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION
are associated with significantly higher land protection across the board. A one-unit
increase improvement in a country’s electoral system is associated with a 1% increase in
its land protection; a similar increase in its civil society participation raises land protection
by about the same amount.
-- Table 2 about here or in Appendix? --- Figure 2 about here -The impacts of POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS and
𝑊
𝑆
are a bit more complex. As Figure 2 shows,
the former falls just short of statistical significance (p = .125), but the latter’s effects are
more variable. Following Farzin and Bond (2006), I explore the possibility that the impact
of these variables depends on countries’ wealth. The basic idea is that citizens of poor
countries prefer that their governments focus on economic survival and development so
that they can feed and clothe their families – goals that compete with and may cut against
eco-initiatives. The analyses, which are graphed in Figures 3 and 4, provide some evidence
for this claim. For very poor countries– those with GDP per capita below about $1500 –
increases in POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS and Winning Coalition reduce land protection efforts,
although this impact is never statistically distinguishable from zero.
22
The analyses also show that POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS and
𝑊
𝑆
drive up land protection efforts
once countries are sufficiently wealthy. The turning point is at about $8000 (e.g., Belize) for
𝑊
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS and about $6500 (e.g., Guatemala) for 𝑆 . There is some question of
whether POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS increase these eco-efforts among the very wealthy, i.e., those
in which the average citizen earns more than $22,000 per year.8 In contrast,
𝑊
𝑆
drives up
land protection more and more as countries become wealthier and wealthier.
The other variables perform as expected, for the most part. There is firm evidence of an
environmental Kuznets curve, consistent with what others have found (Barrett and Graddy
2000; Cao and Ward 2015; Farzin and Bond 2006; Torras and Boyce 1998). The turning
point is relatively low: at about $6000 per capita, land protection efforts start to improve.
Countries with dense populations and at higher latitudes also have less land protection, as
expected. And these eco-efforts are becoming more common over time. Environment
ministries are also associated with more land protection efforts, but this finding is not
always statistically significant.
In summary, then, the analyses show that (1) free/fair elections and civil society
protections consistently increase land protection efforts; and (2) political constraints
and/or larger winning coalitions drive up land protection efforts once countries are
sufficiently wealthy. These findings are important and show at very least that these causal
variables help us understand differences between countries typically characterized as
‘democracies’ and those normally classified as ‘autocracies.’
8
On the global and historical scale, these countries are small in number, making up about 15% of the dataset.
23
The next question is whether these factors also help us to understand differences within
the autocratic world. I put that question to the test in a series of analyses of autocracies
only (as defined by Geddes et al. 2014). The results appear in Table 3 and Figure 5. They
provide strong evidence that ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY and CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION
significantly enhance land protection efforts in autocratic states.
𝑊
𝑆
is positive and
significant at p= .064, so we can be reasonably confident that increases in the winning
coalition’s size also drive up autocracies’ land protection initiatives.9 The effect of POLITICAL
CONSTRAINTS is less clear. Although positive, it falls short of standard levels of statistical
significance (p = .138). Among autocracies, there is little evidence of an interaction with
wealth.
-- Table 3 about here or in Appendix? --- Figure 5 about here -Overall, there is consistent evidence that ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY10, CIVIL SOCIETY
PARTICIPATION, and
𝑊
𝑆
contribute positively to autocracies’ land protection efforts. The
impact of POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS is more questionable, although in most cases it is probably
positive. I now introduce into the models Geddes et al.’s regime type categories: MILITARY
REGIME, PERSONAL REGIME, and MONARCHY. The excluded category is therefore SINGLE-PARTY
REGIME. The results appear in Table 4, and Figure 6 provides a graphical representation of
the ‘autocratic institutions’ dummy variables.
𝑊
In contrast to the analysis of all countries, I did not find evidence that has an interactive relationship with
𝑆
wealth.
10 It is hard to understand how a country can be classified (by Geddes et al. 2014) as an autocracy and still
rank highly on a scale of electoral democracy. On average, these countries in fact do not rank highly: their
mean electoral democracy value is .298, vs. .738 among countries categorized as democratic. Nonetheless,
there are a few countries that have relatively high scores (>.7) while still being classified as autocratic. They
are all in the midst of a transition to democracy, but that transition was not successful in all cases.
9
24
Two things are of note in this set of analyses. First, none of the findings (regarding the
impact of ‘democratic institutions’) changes.11 Second, there is little evidence that land
protection varies by autocratic regime type, all else equal. Single-party regimes appear to
be the most eco-friendly (c.f., Böhmelt 2014a), but in no case is this difference significant
enough to pass standard threshold tests. Overall, the evidence to support the notion that
‘democratic’ institutions matter for land protection is far stronger.
6. Conclusion
Around the world, policymakers and analysts have taken note of China’s massive
strides on climate change.12 The Communist party’s ability to take quick, decisive, action
with little public consultation stands in stark contrast to the fractious, sluggish, process we
observe in the US. It is not difficult to conclude from the experience of these two countries
that democracy has considerable drawbacks when it comes to taking meaningful action to
protect the environment. However, this article’s findings suggest that we should be careful
about inferring too much from these two high-profile cases.
Although ‘democratic’ institutions are slow and cumbersome, there is good reason to
believe that they lead to better environmental outcomes. Competitive elections and the
protection of civil society give citizens a greater say in the formulation of environmental
policy. When it comes to designating protected areas, the evidence strongly suggests that
these institutions are of net benefit to the planet. Placing constraints on what leaders are
Hence I do not include a graphical representation of those variables in Figure 6.
Paula DiPerna. 2016. China’s Carbon Markets: How Beijing is Leading with Cap-and-Trade. Foreign Affairs,
August 18.
11
12
25
empowered to do, and giving a larger segment of the population a say in who is in charge,
also help.
Of course, it is important to note that this article focuses on but one area of
environmental protection: the designation of protected areas. I did this in order to make
the project tractable (given space constraints), specifically choosing an area where
governments are reacting and adapting to the symptoms of environmental problems – i.e.,
‘weak sustainability.’ In some ways, this is an ‘easier test’ as compared to ‘strong
sustainability’ measures such as cutting climate emissions and reducing energy
consumption (Neumayer 2002; Wurster 2013). There, the required actions are deeper and
have more fundamental implications for people’s livelihoods and for how societies
structure their economies. This does not imply that the paper’s findings have no relevance
beyond land protection. Rather, the point is that the findings are supportive in one area of
sustainability (perhaps an ‘easy’ one – that is largely an empirical question, to be explored
in future research), but that as we begin to explore additional areas, including those that
involve strong sustainability, the picture may be more complex and nuanced.
Finally, this article also pushes the literature forward in terms of how it thinks about
‘democracy,’ ‘autocracy,’ and environmental policy. Rather than thinking of ‘democracy’ as
a dichotomy or even as a spectrum, the present research urges scholars to unpack
countries’ domestic institutions. V-Dem’s rich data make this possible. Importantly, doing
so helps us to understand differences between countries typically characterized as
‘democracies’ and countries often called ‘autocracies.’ This approach also enables us to
understand differences within the ‘autocratic’ world.
26
Figure 1. Percentage of Land Designated ‘Protected’ as of 2012
100
14.6
8.5
8
10.4
8.4
17
12.7
1.8 17
7
17
14.7 17
13.7 17 14.7 5
5.7
8.4
8.6
7.6
16.3
1.3
2.3
17
17 0.6
1.4
3.4
6.3
0.1
10.7
2.5
16.4
15.2
5.1 13.7
13.1
1
9.4
16.9
6.8
17
1.8
9.9
16.1
4.7
14.2
17 11.3
0
15.8
12.9
16.5
9.4
100
6.1
16
10.9
11.2
14.5
0.6
1.8
3.1
17
17
4.8
15 13.2
9.3
15.6
11.5
1.9
12.9
0.6
4.8
14.9
10.5 16.1
10.5
2.4
6.2
10.9
11.2
0.5
13.6
2.2
3.4
4.1
0.4
6.9
17
17
13.8 12.9
15.7
2.2
3
10
0
6.3
13.6
15.5
11.8
2.4
3.4
6.8
10.7 13.2 17
14
10.2 5.1
17
13.8
2.4
8.7
14
11.1
17 16.1
16.3
17
17
5.3
17
1.4
0
15.4
3.2
4.1
4.8
2.8
3
6.5
12.2
0.5
10.3 4.9
= no data available
14.3
Source: author’s calculations, based on UNEP/WCPA 2014.
Figure 2. ‘Democratic’ Institutions and Land Protection: All Countries
(Visual Representation of Table 2 Results)
Results obtained by interacting POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS with GDP PER CAPITA and including it in
model 2 (from Table 1). Results available upon request. There was not substantial evidence that
an interaction of POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS with GDP PER CAPITA2 should be in the model.
29
Results obtained by interacting WINNING COALITION/SELECTORATE with GDP PER CAPITA and
including this in model 2 (from Table 1). Results available upon request. There was no evidence
that an interaction of POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS with GDP PER CAPITA2 should be in the model.
30
Figure 5. ‘Democratic’ Institutions and Land Protection: Autocracies Only
(Visual Representation of Table 3 Results)
31
Figure 6. ‘Autocratic’ Institutions and Land Protection
(Visual Representation of Table 4 Results)
32
Table 2 (Appendix?) ‘Democratic’ Institutions and Land Protection, All Countries
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Electoral
.175*
Democracy
(.080)
Political
Constraints
0.085
(.055)
Civil Society
Participation
.199*
(.085)
Winning Coalition/Selectorate
.106
(.107)
GDP per Capita
-.705**
(.236)
-.756**
(.265)
-.788**
(.239)
-.943*
(.378)
GDP per Capita2
.042**
(.014)
.044**
(.015)
.046**
(.014)
.055**
(.021)
Population
Density
-.464*
(.194)
-.072*
(.034)
-.468*
(.194)
-.093
(.049)
Latitude
-.410*
(.163)
-.558**
(.192)
-.364*
(.165)
-.485*
(.198)
Environment
Ministry
.050
(.046)
.105*
(.048)
.052
(.046)
.148**
(.055)
Year
.748**
(.245)
.751**
(.263)
.672**
(.235)
.885**
(.294)
Lagged DV
.666**
(.062)
.642**
(.064)
.665**
(.062)
.656**
(.062)
Constant
-12.758*
-12.598*
-10.948**
-14.517*
(4.657)
(5.050)
(4.447)
(5.882)
# Observations
1195
1184
1183
904
# Countries
145
146
144
150
ρ
.568
.594
.567
.535
2
Wald χ
1493.3**
1053.1**
1597.5**
589.54**
Overall R2
.703
.827
.863
.822
** p < .005. * p < .05. Dependent variable is the percentage of total land area given
protected status (using the logistic transformation for proportions). Robust standard
errors clustered on country appear in parentheses.
33
Table 3 (Appendix?) ‘Democratic’ Institutions and Land Protection, Autocracies Only
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
.437*
Electoral
(.187)
Democracy
.188
(.127)
Political
Constraints
Civil Society
Participation
.358*
(.149)
Winning Coalition/Selectorate
.410§
(.225)
GDP per Capita
-.636
(.574)
-.401
(.340)
-.656
(.567)
-.288
(.412)
GDP per Capita2
.036
(.035)
.022
(.020)
.038
(.035)
.013
(.024)
Population
Density
-.423
(.247)
.037
(.029)
-.449*
(.229)
.027
(.036)
Latitude
-.708**
(.264)
-.624**
(.230)
-.596*
(.239)
-.810**
(.293)
Environment
Ministry
.092
(.076)
.112
(.078)
.099
(.081)
.113
(.082)
Year
1.483**
(.546)
1.040*
(.473)
1.215*
(.503)
1.620*
(.647)
Lagged DV
.582***
(.122)
.612***
(.102)
.581***
(.120)
.587***
(.108)
Constant
-27.919*
-19.863*
-22.550*
-31.950*
(11.276)
(9.528)
(10.577)
(12.976)
# Observations
306
321
294
263
# Countries
72
76
71
72
ρ
.297
.189
.294
.147
Wald χ2
382.0**
364.7**
381.6**
351.89**
2
Overall R
.732
.883
.877
.713
** p < .005. * p < .05. §p < .10. Dependent variable is the percentage of total land area given
protected status (using the logistic transformation for proportions). Robust standard
errors clustered on country appear in parentheses.
34
Table 4 (Appendix?) ‘Democratic’ Institutions, Autocratic
Institutions, and Land Protection, Autocracies Only
Model 1 Model 3 Model 2 Model 4
Electoral
.392*
Democracy
(.172)
Political
Constraints
.183
(.132)
Civil Society
Participation
.347*
(.147)
Winning Coalition/Selectorate
.320
(.196)
Single-Party
Regime
omitted
category
omitted
category
omitted
category
omitted
category
Military
Regime
-.059
(.096)
-.117
(.104)
-.085
(.094)
-.021
(.116)
Personal
Regime
-.181
(.126)
-.173
(.119)
-.199
(.132)
-.172
(.131)
Monarchy
-.048
(.228)
-.150
(.199)
-.130
(.230)
-.072
(.196)
GDP per Capita
-.726
(.595)
-.623
(.452)
-.786
(.608)
-.410
(.493)
GDP per Capita2
.040
(.036)
.034
(.026)
.044
(.037)
.019
(.028)
Population
Density
-.550*
(.251)
.026
(.038)
-.541*
(.237)
.030
(.041)
Latitude
-.629**
(.243)
-.544*
(.221)
-.522*
(.223)
-.661*
(.262)
Environment
Ministry
.090
(.075)
.105
(.078)
.095
(.080)
.121
(.083)
Year
1.862**
(.702)
1.371*
(.613)
1.637*
(.675)
1.999*
(.793)
Lagged DV
.578***
(.125)
.605***
(.106)
.574***
(.124)
.582***
(.112)
Constant
-34.949*
-25.433* -30.273* -38.891*
(13.420) (13.830) (11.732)
# Observations
306
321
294
263
# Countries
72
71
76
72
ρ
.282
.173
.281
.136
Wald χ2
441.7**
372.5**
445.4**
323.1**
2
Overall R
.742
.731
.745
.718
** p < .005. * p < .05. Dependent variable is the percentage of total land area given
protected status (using the logistic transformation for proportions). Robust standard
errors clustered on country appear in parentheses.
35
Table X
Variable
Percentage of
total land area
with protected
status.
Source
www.protectedplanet.net
Democratic
elections index
Coppedge et al. 2016:
www.v-dem.net
Political
constraint index
Henisz 2013:
whartonmgmt.wufoo.com/f
orms/ political-constraintindex-polcon-dataset/
Coppedge et al. 2016:
www.v-dem.net
Civil society index
Winning coalition
Selectorate
GDP per capita
GDP per capita2
Population
density
Environment
ministry
Latitude
Freedom of
expression
Core civil society
Durable
Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2015; Cao and Ward 2015
Feenstra et al. 2015:
www.ggdc.net/pwt
http://data.worldbank.org
http://www.isanet.org/Pub
lications/ISQ/ReplicationData
https://developers.google.c
om/public-data/docs/
canonical/countries_csv
Coppedge et al. 2016:
www.v-dem.net
Coppedge et al. 2016:
www.v-dem.net
Marshall and Gurr 2014
Notes
Transformed using simply logistic
transformation
𝑦
ln(
)
1−𝑦
Because dependent variable is a
proportion
AKA v2x_polyarchy
AKA v2x_cspart
Logged because highly right-skewed
Aklin and Urpelainen 2014
Absolute value taken
(Robustness checks)
AKA v2x_freexp
(Robustness checks)
AKA v2xcs_ccsi
(Robustness checks)
36
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