Faith, Moral Authority, and Politics:
The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey
Alexander R. Arifianto
Ph.D. candidate, Political Science
School of Politics and Global Studies
Arizona State University
[email protected]
Presented at the 2012 Western Political Science Association (WPSA) Annual Meeting
Portland, OR
March 22-24, 2012
WORKING DRAFT: Please do not cite or attribute without
the written permission of the author. Comments are very much welcome.
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
Introduction, Theory, and Methodology
Could Islam embrace liberal ideas such as democracy and religious pluralism? If so,
under what conditions it will done so? How do human agents (e.g., religious leaders) and the
institutional structure of the organization affect the degree of success for Islamic groups and their
leaders to implement these theological changes?
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism throughout many Muslim-majority countries over the
past three decades, culminating in the establishment of Islamic states in Iran and Sudan, as well
terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington, DC, seems to have
confirmed the validity of this perception in the eyes of some scholars (e.g., Huntington 1996,
Lewis 1993 & 2003). For these scholars, Islamic movements are generally assumed to support
the establishment of an Islamic state as well as the institution of social policies that are supported
by Islamists, ranging from the implementation of the shari’a law as the foundation of civil and
criminal jurisprudence within an Islamic state, the exclusion and subjugation of women from the
labor force and public sphere, to the persecution of religious minorities and „heretical‟ Islamic
sects within that state.
However, these scholars tend to overlook the fact that Islamic groups do not always
promote and support religious fundamentalism, intolerance, shari’a-based Islamic state,
violence, and terrorism. In some Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia and Turkey,
Islamic social movements have helped to introduce democracy after decades of authoritarian rule
by secular military-backed regimes. Islamic groups in these countries have not only promoted
transition to democracy and participated in electoral politics. In some cases, they have accepted
and promoted new ideas that are identical with liberal political ideas, ranging from freedom of
speech and expression, human rights, state-religion separation, and religious liberty/pluralism.
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The synthesis between Islamic teachings and Western political thought that are supportive of
democracy and other related liberal values result in the creation of what I called “progressive
Islam” – an interpretation of Islam that supports, seeks to promote, and institutionalizes values
such as democracy, human rights, state-religion separation, and religious liberty/pluralism within
their respective organizations and societies.
In this paper, I argue that this ideational change occurs due to the role played by key
religious leaders of these organizations as well as the institutional structure of the organizations
that are conducive toward the spread of these ideas within these groups. I shall call these
religious leaders „moral authority‟ figures,‟ for they are responsible for introducing and
implementing the change of these groups' theology and political ideas to reflect a “progressive”
view of Islam that promotes democracy, human rights, and religious tolerance. I further argue
that „moral authority‟ figures are playing a very important role as innovators and articulators of
new religious ideas/theology. After inventing these ideas, they attempt to implement and
institutionalize them within their respective religious groups, using both persuasive as well as
coercive strategies. Some of these leaders were successful in having their ideas institutionalized
by their organizations. In the process, they were able to change their organizations‟ political
theology and political strategies in the process. However, others were less successful in
institutionalizing the reforms and their organizations remained committed to the same
conservative ideas that the reformers were trying to change.
Previous works in the field of religion and politics and Islamic politics are guided by
several theoretical approaches, such as political culture/modernization theory, social movement
theory, and rational choice theory. However, these theoretical frameworks suffer from significant
limitations. Scholars following political culture (culturalist) approach (e.g., Huntington 1996,
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Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
Lewis 1993 & 2003) tend to portray religious groups and their political theology as fixed and
constant variables that essentially determine a religious group's political action, while ignoring
the possibility that they could be changed in response of changing political circumstances and
opportunities. Their portrayal of Islamic groups tends to reinforce the popular view that tends to
consider them as fundamentalist/radical groups which are often intolerant and even hostile
toward liberal ideas such as democracy and human rights. On the other hand, scholars using
rational choice (rationalist) approach (e.g., Gill 1998 & 2008, Kalyvas 1996) are able to provide
a consistent and parsimonious explanation of the behavior of religious and political actors based
on their cost-benefit calculations and preferences, by assuming that these actors maximize their
instrumental and material interests in order to achieve their goals. Rational choice scholars tend
to have problems incorporating the role of ideas and identities into their theoretical framework.
Some of them simply dismiss them as “hooks” used to legitimize the actions of religious groups
(e.g, Shepsle 1985). Others argue that while ideas might have played some role to shape these
groups‟ interests, they only play a minor role in the formation of interests and goals of these
actors, in contrast to utilitarian/material-based calculation of preferences (e.g., Goldstein and
Keohane 1993). Thus, I argue that rational choice theory provides an incomplete explanation on
how ideas and political theology help to shape a religious group's preferences and strategies.
As an alternative to these theoretical frameworks, I develop a new theory based on social
constructivist theory, which is commonly used within the subfield of international relations.
I argue that ideas and other “social facts” (culture, identity), play an important role in politics, by
constituting, and sometimes, by causing transformative change in political goals and strategies
of religious groups. It is based on the logic of mutual constitution which attributes such change
to both the role of agents (religious leaders) and structure (internal culture of religious
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Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
organization and their relationship with the state). By adopting this logic, constructivists
improved over previous theoretical frameworks, which tend to emphasize only structure
(culturalist) or agency (rationalist) as the primary causes of political change.
My theory treats 'moral authority' religious figures as 'norm entrepreneurs' who promotes
a new understanding of existing religious ideas/theology by encouraging its proponents to
engage in „reasoned reflection‟ to convince other members of the group as well as outsiders
about the merit of these ideas. 1 These figures then institutionalize these ideas within their
organizations, using a combination of persuasive as well as coercive tactics to promote these
ideas. Eventually, these figures are able to promote change in the theological basis as well as
political actions of their groups. While this theory promotes the role of leadership and agency in
changing existing institutional arrangement within a religious group, it also recognizes that
structural factors also play an important role in increasing the likelihood that the reform proposed
by moral authority figures to be accepted and implemented by their followers.
I develop this theory based on the following propositions: ideational and political change
made by religious organizations are determined by the leadership of “moral authority” figures,
who implement and institutionalize these values within their organizations, and lead, motivate,
and encourage their supporters to institute these reforms within their respective organizations.
However, while the leaders could articulate support for the reforms and rally their supporters to
try implementing the reforms within their organization, the success of the “moral authority”
leader and his/her supporters are based conditioned on: 1) an internal organizational culture that
historically tolerates new religious ideas, customs, and traditions and helps to encourage or
discourage opposition from the status theology against the reforms, and 2) a decentralized
1
The concept of „norm entrepreneurs‟ is introduced in Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), while the concept of
„reasoned reflection‟ originates from Philpott (2001).
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Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
leadership structure that is conducive toward the reform and its supporters, and lastly 3) the statereligion relations within that particular society, which could be based on either peaceful coexistence between religion and the state or promote conflictual relationship between the two
institutions. “Moral authority” leaders used the power of their reasoned reflection and their
expertise on theological ideas and utilize their status as a source of social power within their
organizations in order to promote the reinterpretation of these ideas, implement, and
institutionalize them from within their respective organizations.
I argue that Islamic social movements do not necessarily have similar theological
foundations, political goals, and agree to similar means on achieving them. While some Islamic
activists and movements do seek an Islamic state based on shari’a law, others only wish to
promote a greater role for Islam in the political life of Muslim society. Many groups who seek to
establish an Islamic state do not necessarily endorse violent means to achieve this goal and
instead are using to achieve them via peaceful and democratic means. Lastly, there are some
Islamic groups who reject the creation of a shari’a-based Islamic state in favor of a state that is
politically secular, and are respecting the rights of its citizens to practice their own religious
beliefs, whether it is based on Islamic principles or not. They also support a largely liberal
interpretation that all citizens are entitled to have universal human rights such as freedom of
speech, expression, as well as the right to practice and choose their religious beliefs - commonly
known as religious liberty.
Individuals and groups who subscribe to this principle are followers of progressive Islam.
Progressive Islam is defined as an interpretation Islam which attempts to combine the basic
teachings of Islam (such as the Koran, the hadith, and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh)) with
intellectual ideas derived from Western social theory (e.g., democracy, human rights, and
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Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
religious liberty/pluralism). In contrast, other Muslims embrace a different path of reform by
following revivalist/conservative Islamic perspective. Revivalist Islam is an interpretation of
Islam promotes reform by either returning to the living example and the formal/scripturalist rules
formulated by Prophet Mohammed and his companions. Both progressive and revivalist Muslims
are not theologically static. Both use the process of innovation, reinvention, and reinterpretation
to “create” an ideal type of Islam that fit into their respective societies.
The primary explanatory variable for spreading these ideas is the “moral authority”
leadership of religious leaders who use their status as moral experts to promote these ideas.
These moral authority figures act as 'norm entrepreneurs' by facilitating a new political theology
to the rank-and-file members of their group. Moral authority figures, influenced by new ideas
acquired through their study of religious texts, the social networks they have acquired during
their formative years (e.g., mentors, peer groups, etc.), interactions with other actors and 'norm
entrepreneurs' both within and outside their religious group, and changing political opportunity
structures within their societies, decided to develop and propagate a new theology that enables
enable their group to meet new socio-political challenges and to ensure that their group remains a
relevant voice in the socio-political discourses of the day. They use their moral authority status
to propagate a new political theology, persuade both their followers within their groups as well as
outside actors to accept this theology, and develop new policies, rules, and laws to
institutionalize this theology.
The mechanisms by which new religious ideas are promoted and institutionalized by
these “moral authority figures” is similar to what is proposed by Daniel Philpott in his book
Revolutions in Sovereignty (2001). In this book, Philpott argues that ideas have two roles in
politics. The first role is that ideas are able to shape new identities through reasoned reflection of
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Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
actors who converted into it. Through this process of reasoned reflection, these actors then adopt
these ideas as part of their collective identities. The second role is that ideas become source of
social power that enable these actors to organize themselves into parties, lobbies, or activists
who put pressures on political leaders to adopt them into policy action (Philpott 2001: 49). The
articulation of new ideas by key figures of an organization does not automatically mean that the
organization would necessarily adopt them to become their strategy and/or policy, since often
there are proponents of the status quo who would resist the ideas from being implemented and
institutionalized by the organization. Thus, the leader and his/her supporters must convince other
group members using both persuasive and coercive means that adopting these ideas into new
policy would go in hand with their interests as well. In this case, ideas serve as sources of social
power that enable converts to the new ideas to alter the costs and benefits calculations facing
political leaders/power holders in order to promote or hinder policies inspired by these ideas
(Philpott 2001: 57-58).
To turn ideas into sources of social power, Philpott proposes two additional mechanisms
to be used by idea entrepreneurs and converts to making their ideas endure within their own
organizations. First, using their positions within the organization to promote policies that support
their ideas (e.g., by shifting personnel from their organizations and exercising the social power of
their ideas against the state). Second, by getting their ideas adopted into legal norms and rules
that bound future members of the organizations to these ideas as well, thereby institutionalizing
these ideas long after they were first propagated (Philpott 2001: 69).
By detailing these mechanisms and explaining how they work, I seek to develop a new
understanding on how the interaction between human agents („moral authority‟ figures) and the
institutional structure within a religious organization have resulted in causing significant
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theological changes within the organization. In turn, such changes have broader implications on
the organization‟s political theology – the theological frame that the guides its political
interaction and engagement with the state and its political institutions – both peaceful (through
dialogue, discourses, and other democratic means) as well as non-peaceful (violent) ones.
In this paper, I conduct a comparative historical analysis of three Islamic movements in two
countries: the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) from Indonesia, the modernist but revivalistleaning Muhammadiyah from Indonesia, and the modernist Fethullah Gulen Movement from
Turkey (see table #1 below for a comparison between the three movements). There are two data
sources that would be used to analyze the theology of progressive Islamic activists in this paper.
The first source are primary sources, which include: Islamic religious texts (the Qur‟an, the
Sunna, and Islamic legal texts (fiqh)), scholarly interpretations about these texts written by moral
authority figures analyzed in this paper, policy statements of the organizations, and other forms
of primary sources (e.g., speeches and sermons by moral authority figures, along with other
religious scholars and activists).
Using “most similar” comparison method, 2 I compare two Islamic movements based in
Indonesia, the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the modernist/revivalist Muhammadiyah.
Both of them have been around for more than eight decades, with the NU founded in 1926 and
Muhammadiyah founded in 1912, respectively. The two organizations command a large number
of following among the Indonesian Muslim community. NU is estimated to have 40 million
affiliated members and Muhammadiyah 30 million, making the two organizations as potentially
2
“Most similar” comparison (also known as Mill‟s method of difference) is the comparison of two cases which has
similarities in all potential explanatory variables, except for the independent variable of interest and the outcome
(dependent) variable, which are different from one another. For further details, see Gerring 2007: 131-134 & Van
Evera 1997: 57).
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the two largest Muslim organizations in the world (Mujani and Liddle 2009: 6). 3 Both NU and
Muhammadiyah are active participants in Indonesian politics both during the Dutch colonial
period and in post-colonial Indonesia. Both were active during Indonesia‟s parliamentary
democracy period in the 1950s, with NU functioned as both a civil society organization and a
political party and Muhammadiyah actively lent its support to the modernist Masyumi party
(Alfian 1989, Feith 1962, Jung 2009, Kadir 1999). Both of them suffered from strict political
limitations and repressions during the first two decades of Suharto's rule (from 1966 to 1986)
until his regime started to ease its restrictions against political Islam in the late 1980s. Finally,
NU and Muhammadiyah have played a major role in promoting the return of democracy in
Indonesia (1998-present). Key leaders of the two organizations have formed and run political
parties that are loosely affiliated (but not officially part of) with these organizations (National
Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa - PKB) for NU and National Mandate Party
(Partai Amanat Nasional - PAN) for Muhammadiyah). However, the two groups differ in the
primary explanatory variable studied in this paper as well as in the outcome variables: on the
independent variable, they have different theological orientations as well as institutional
arrangements and structures
3
However, these numbers only reflects the potential influence that the two organizations could command in
Indonesian politics, since both NU and Muhammadiyah do not keep an accurate and reliable records of their actual
membership rolls (Mujani and Liddle 2009: 6, fn. 5 & 6). A statistical study of Indonesian Islamic voter preferences
estimates that 48% of practicing (santri) Indonesian Muslims identify themselves with NU and 18% considered
themselves as Muhammadiyah followers (Mujani 2003, cited in Asyari 2007: 21). However, affiliations do not
automatically mean that these Muslims are registered, due-paying members of these organizations. It is estimated
that only about 1 million Muhammadiyah members are officially registered with the organization and only
registered members could be nominated as a candidate for a leadership positions with the organization and
participate in policy-making meetings within the organization (Asyari 2007: 21). Given its size, NU is likely to have
the same number of registered members as Muhammadiyah.
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Table #1: Comparison Between NU, Muhammadiyah and Fethullah Gullen Movement
Organization
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
(Indonesia)
Muhammadiyah
(Indonesia)
Fethullah Gulen Movement
(Turkey)
Year Active
1926-present
1912-present
1966-present
Leadership
Authority
Charismatic authority
dominates organization
Internal
Culture/
Status Quo
Theology
Opposition
(Independent
Variable #1)
Organization
Structure
(Independent
Variable #2)
StateReligion
Relations
(Independent
Variable #3)
Reform
Outcome
(Dependent
Variable)
Tolerant culture/
Weak opposition
Rational-legal authority
based on achievements
and intellectual talents
Intolerant culture/
Strong opposition
Rational-legal authority with
reference toward a strong
charismatic authority
Tolerant culture/
Weak opposition
Decentralized/
Non-hierarchical
Centralized/Hierarchical
Decentralized/
Non-hierarchical
Passive Secularism/
Relatively peaceful
State-Religion Relations
Passive Secularism/
Relatively peaceful
State-Religion Relations
Assertive Secularism/Conflictual
State-Religion Relations
Successful
Unsuccessful
Successful
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Reform Within the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
The NU has a history of tolerating the practice of non-canonical Islamic customs and
traditions that are not prescribed in the Qur‟an and the Hadith/Sunna4 (e.g., the cult worship of
major deceased ulama (saints), pilgrimage to religious shrines and tombs of saints, etc.) as well
as local religious customs and traditions that predated the arrival of Islam in Indonesia. 5 Many
NU members also practiced mystical Sufi rituals and it is common for NU ulama to lead the
local Sufi order (tarekat) in his religious school (pesantren).
The reformers within NU also greatly benefited from the presence of a reform champion
in the person of Abdurrahman Wahid (1940-2009), who led the organization for three
consecutive terms from 1984 to 1999.6 In addition to his specialty in Islamic scholarship, Wahid
has a strong interest beyond the study of Islamic theology and legal jurisprudence (fiqh), even
though he was considered by many NU ulama as a leading fiqh expert in his own right. During
his childhood his parents also exposed him to Western literature, history, philosophy, and
classical music.7 Thus, he grew up with a strong curiosity to learn about Western literature and
4
Muslims believe that the Qur‟an is the collection of God‟s revelation to mankind that was given to Prophet
Muhammad over approximately two decades (610-632 CE) and is believed to be the literal words and sayings of
God himself (Husein 2003: 7), while the Hadith/Sunna is the narrative account of actions and sayings of Prophet
Muhammad as told by an eyewitness, usually someone who is considered as one of Muhammad‟s first disciplines
(Companions) (Husein 2003: 11). Both the Qur‟an and the Hadith constitutes the shari‟a, which is considered by
Muslims as “the comprehensive, eternal,….and divine law of Islam that governs all aspects of the public and private,
social and economic, religious and political life of every Muslim” (Husein 2003: 13).
5
Examples of these non-canonical Islamic customs include the cult worship of major deceased ulama (saints),
pilgrimage to religious shrines and tombs of saints, while example of localized religious customs include the use of
shadow puppets (wayang) as a mean to spread Islamic teachings, previously practiced by the Hindu tradition that
used to dominate Indonesia until the arrival of Islam in 15th century CE.
6
Wahid subsequently entered politics and in October 1999 became the first democratically elected president of
Indonesia. However, his tenure as president was not as successful as his tenure as General Chairman of the NU and
was fraught by controversial policies as well as allegations of corruption. He was impeached by the Indonesian
Parlament in July 2001. For more about Wahid‟s tenure as Indonesia‟s president and its impacts on the NU and its
activists, see Barton 2002 and Bush 2009.
7
Wahid‟s biographer Greg Barton credits his exposure to Western literature and political thought to the efforts of his
father Wahid Hasjim. Hasjim‟s mother was the daughter of a Javanese aristocratic family (priyayi) who wanted her
son to become a member of the Javanese elite aristocracy rather than a rural pesantren leader. Thus, she hired a
Dutch tutor who taught her son Western literature and philosophy, as well as Dutch and English languages. In turn,
Wahid Hasjim exposed his children to a similar Western-style education in addition to giving them traditionalist
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political thought, in addition to his study of classical Islamic jurisprudence (Barton 2002: 48-49).
Wahid‟s study of Western political thought continued even during his years of pesantren study,
where during his spare time he read the works of classical and modern Western philosophers and
social theorists, from Plato and Aristotle to Marx and Lenin (Barton 2002: 59).
When he was pursuing his education at a traditionalist Islamic school (pesantren) during
the late 1950s, Wahid also read the works of revivalist Islamic reformers such as Sayyid Qutb,
Hassan al-Banna, and Said Ramadan. However, while he was initially impressed with these
revivalist works, he later concluded that they were “repetitive and superficial” and that they
“lacked the openness to truth from any [Islamic] sources other than those they defined as
allowable” (Barton 2002: 60 & 92). Wahid soon decided to reject revivalist and literalist Islamic
thought, arguing that they were “contrary to the true spirit of Islam.” Instead, he believes in
Islam that promotes freedom of thought, pluralism, and tolerance for non-Islamic religious
practices, customs, and traditions, as long as they are not directly contradicting the basic tenets
of Islamic belief in the oneness of God (tauhid) (Barton 2002: 60).
After taking over the leadership of the NU in 1984, Wahid became an influential moral
authority figure who is able to transform the NU into a progressive Islamic organization, due to
his advocacy of democratic values and institutions, human rights, religious pluralism, and most
importantly, the legitimacy of an Indonesian state which is run largely on secular nationalist
principles. Through the practice of “reasoned reflection” that started from his writings in the
1970s and lasted until his reforms were institutionalized within the NU during the late 1980s
and early 1990s,8 Wahid was able to change the theological outlook and trajectory of his
organization from one that during the late 1970s were still advocating the establishment of an
Islamic education (Barton 2002: 42; 48-49).
8
Detailed explanation on the concepts of “reasoned reflection” and “sources of social power” as mechanisms that
transformed ideas into concrete policy action could be found in Philpott 2001: chapter 4.
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Islamic state that is based on the shari’a law and rejected the Pancasila ideology as a purely
secular ideology into an organization which today publicly asserts that a just, peaceful, and
democratic Indonesian state need not to be based on Islamic principles and that practicing
Muslims have the same rights and responsibilities similar to their secularist Muslim and nonMuslim counterparts who are fellow Indonesian citizens.
Wahid was able to accomplish these reforms because he was perceived by his followers
within the NU as a charismatic moral authority figure that was able to bring the normally
decentralized and disorganized NU ulama together through his expertise on the classical fiqh
jurisprudence as well as his moral authority status as the grandson of Hasyim Asj‟ari, the ulama
who is widely considered by NU followers as the founding father of the organization. In the
process, he brought progressive Islamic ideas that have transformed the organization over the last
three decades or so. Wahid used his expertise as an Islamic scholar who also had extensive
understanding of Western socio-political thought to propagate a new political theology for the
NU community that blends the two traditions together. His status as a member of a prominent
ulama family within the NU has also helped gain support among rank-and-file ulama and NU
members. Many NU members considered him to be a living saint (wali) like his late grandfather
whom had helped founded the NU in 1926 (Kadir 1999: 229). At the same time, however,
Wahid‟s family genealogy is not sufficient in explaining the success of his reforms. Observers
within the NU credited Wahid‟s vast intellectual knowledge and his ability to reconcile classical
Islamic teachings with Western intellectual tradition as the primary determinants of him being
revered as a living saint by many rank-and-file NU members and this status has promoted the
reform causes Wahid had advocated within the NU.9
9
Both Wahid‟s brother Solahuddin (b. 1942) and his uncle Yusuf Hasyim (1929-2006) were also prominent NU
ulama in their own right, yet they never commanded the same degree of reverence and recognition as living saints
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Another factor that helps Wahid‟s efforts to transform the NU is the strong support for his
reform proposals among young NU ulama and activists. Younger NU members have demanded
theological reforms within the organization since the 1980s. They have become disenchanted
with the views of the conservative ulama who used to run the organization before Wahid took it
over in 1984, since they tended to promote a strict and literalist interpretation of classical Islamic
texts. However, young NU activists did not share their viewpoints, as they wished to have a
critical discussion on these texts and to modify their interpretations to better reflect
contemporary historical and socio-political contexts of modern Indonesian society. They also
wanted the ulama to directly address contemporary socio-political issues in Indonesia rather than
avoiding to discuss them for fear of potential reprisals from the Suharto regime (Kadir 1999:
257-258; Van Bruinessen 1994: 198-199). Wahid‟s willingness to openly question and criticize
the regime during the early and mid-1990s had helped to increase the support of his ideas from
young NU activists. Prominent members of “second generation” NU reformers are Ulil AbsharAbdalla (b. 1967), a former director of Lakspedam who in 2001 founded the Liberal Islam
Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal – JIL)10 and Imam Aziz, founder and former director of LKiS,
who was later appointed as a member of NU‟s Tanfidzyah board (Bush 2009: 88).
There was a symbiotic relationship between Wahid and young NU activists. As Wahid
institutionalized the selection of future NU chairmen through a direct election system, he relied
on the support of young activists within the NU as his primary supporters during his bid for reelection to the NU chairmanship in 1989 and 1994. Young activists‟ overwhelming support for
Wahid was credited in helping him won re-election in both years (Kadir 1999: 226-228, Van
from grassroots NU members.
10
JIL was an Islamic movement founded by a group of second-generation traditionalist and modernist reformers in
2001. The group wishes to cross the theological divisions that has often divided their respective groups to promote a
“liberal Islam” which is compatible with democracy, human rights, neoliberal economics, secularism, and religious
freedom (Bush 2009: 179-181).
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Bruinessen 1994: 169). In return, Wahid served as the primary defender of these young activists
against attacks and criticisms from more conservative ulama within the NU as well as from the
Suharto regime apparatus who often intervened and intimidated the works of these activists. 11
Thus, the alliance between Wahid and “second-generation” NU activists had produced mutual
benefits for both parties. 12
Wahid managed to combine numerous resources that were available to him as NU‟s General
Chairman, ranging from his expertise as a well-versed Islamic scholar (ulama) in his own right,
his extensive knowledge on Western social theory, the charismatic authority he had obtained as a
member of a prominent ulama family whose ancestors were founding fathers of the movement,
and his extensive communication and networking skills that enabled him to interact with young
activists who shared his reformist ideas; conservative ulama who opposed them; and secularist
allies who shared his concerns about the lack of genuine democracy in Indonesia under Suharto‟s
authoritarian rule. These strategies work together to ensure the implementation and
institutionalization of Wahid‟s reforms.
However, the most important factor that explains the lack of a strong opposition against
the reforms within the NU is because there is a relatively cohesive internal culture within the
organization, since within the NU there were few proponents of the literal interpretation of Islam
that were commonly associated with revivalist Muslims. Reform supporters and opponents were
clearly divided over issues such as how far and how fast the reform should have taken place, the
appropriate balance between classical Islamic texts and contemporary socio-cultural contexts in
11
Examples of Wahid‟s defense of “second-generation” NU activists was his support for the efforts of P3M activists
to host critical readings and discussions of classical Islamic texts that came under strong criticisms from older, more
conservative ulama, as well as his support for NU activists who protested against the construction of the Kedung
Ombo Dam that had displaced villagers living in Central Java in the late 1980s (Barton 2002: 158-159, 165-166).
12
However, this does not mean that “second generation” NU activists always march in lockstep with Wahid and
follow all his commands and instructions. As illustrated later in this chapter, they often take bolder actions that their
own mentor to advocate their agenda of democracy promotion, human rights, and religious pluralism in criticizing
the Suhato regime and in criticizing Wahid‟s action after he left the NU chairmanship to pursue his political career.
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the determination of policies for the organization and the appropriate role of the ulama under a
reformed NU. However, they generally have an agreement on the NU‟s main theological
premises and sources, which solidifies the organization‟s internal culture. For instance, NU
members (both ulama and lay activists) tend to draw their theological sources from a broader
array of texts than revivalist Muslims, especially from the works of classical Islamic ulama from
the medieval period, commonly known within the NU circle as “the yellow books” (kitab
kuning). Both reformers and their opponents used kitab kuning as primary sources for the
theological arguments they made. In addition, both reform supporters and opponents also have an
agreement on the status of syncretic rituals and customs within the organization, since both
groups tend to tolerate local religious rituals and traditions that do not originate in Islam and
often incorporate Sufi mystic practices within their rituals.
On the other hand, revivalist Muslims tends to consider many classical Islamic texts as a
heresy (bid’ah) and rejects them as authoritative texts for Islamic theology. They only accorded
that status to the Koran and the Sunnah. Revivalist Muslims also tend to condemn syncretic
customs and traditions tolerated by NU members as heresies. Thus, despite their differences,
reform proponents and opponents share a common internal culture that tolerates unorthodox Sufi
customs and local rituals and welcome their incorporation within the NU. This minimizes a
potentially deeper theological divide between the two camps that would have been made much
sharper had there been a strong revivalist faction within the organization.
The analysis of Abdurrahman Wahid‟s reform within the NU has provided us with ample
evidences to support the “moral authority” leadership theory that I developed on the first two
chapters of this paper. NU‟s internal structures, characterized by an institutional culture that
tolerates syncretic religious customs, and theological innovations and a decentralized decision-
17
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
making structure in which individual ulama has the ultimate authority to implement (or to reject)
specific theological innovation within the organization, are very conducive toward the reforms
advocated by Wahid. Under the leadership of an inspiring and effective moral authority figure
such as himself, the theological reforms were successfully implemented and institutionalized
within the NU, despite encountering a strong resistance from conservative ulama who opposed
these reforms.
Reform Within the Muhammadiyah
On the other hand, Muhammadiyah is a modernist Islamic organization that at times have
expressed some revivalist and fundamentalist tendencies as well. It has expressed much less
tolerance toward non-canonical Islamic teachings that are not prescribed in the Qur‟an and the
Hadith, as well as toward local religious customs and traditions that had predated the Islamic
period in Indonesia. Muhammadiyah‟s leadership is based primarily on rational-legal authority,
where individual leaders rose through the rank of the organization and gained influence largely
based on their talents and achievements rather than through family connections or patronage.
Because it is a rational-legal organization, Muhammadiyah‟s decision-making structure is also
more hierarchical than NU, with the central leadership board able to design and enforce most
major policy decisions within the organization and individual Muhammadiyah members at the
grassroots level have little/no power to shape the formulation of these policies or to change them
once they have been approved by the central board.
Given the strong support among the modernist Islamic intelligentsia of this period over
these progressive ideas, many were expecting that the ideas would in time gain the support of
key modernist Islamic groups in Indonesia, especially within the Muhammadiyah. However, the
18
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
dominance of revivalist theology among the ranks of Muhammadiyah leaders and activists
created a strong oppositional discourse among the revivalist who opposed these reforms, which
is sustained through a strong internal culture within the organization to oppose alternative
theological ideas that are contradictory to revivalist and Salafist theological teachings. Together,
these have prevented progressive theological ideas from being implemented by the organization.
Key reformers such as Nurcolish Madjid (1939-2005) and former Muhammadiyah Chairman
Syafii Ma‟arif (b. 1935, served from 1998 to 2005) had to pursue the Reformation From Below
strategy to try to convince Muhammadiyah members on the utility of the reform and its potential
benefits for the organization. They have used similar strategies by articulating the “reasoned
reflection of their arguments as well as using the “social power” of their moral authority status
within the Indonesian modernist community to promote these reforms. However, despite some
gains made by reformers in their efforts, the reformers were never able to consolidate and
institutionalize their ideas from within the organization.
The reformers are motivated to renew modernist political engagement in Indonesian
society in the face of authoritarianism and repression against Islamic movements during the first
two-decades of Suharto‟s rule. However, to achieve this they decided to develop a new political
theology that is different from their predecessors who were members of the Masyumi Party
during the 1950s and 1960s. Their predecessors wanted to establish an Indonesian state that
would be based on democratic principles, but would also be based on the formal rules of Islamic
law (shari’a), with potentially negative repercussions for groups who do not conform to the
dictates of the shari’a such as Islamic groups which practice syncretic rituals or non-Muslim
minorities. The reformers believe that it was this agenda that was perceived as a threat to the
integrity of a secular nationalist Indonesian state that was supported by secularist politicians and
19
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
high ranking officers within the Indonesian military had led to the repression of modernist Islam
in Indonesian politics by the Suharto regime.
Seeing the negative impact of the strategy on the modernist Islamic movement in Indonesia,
authority figures within the reform movement, such as Madjid and Ma‟arif decided to pursue a
different set of theological ideas from one that was articulated by their predecessors. They
believe that in articulating their political aspirations modernist Muslims must take into account
the specific socio-political conditions of the Indonesian state, which is characterized by the
ethnic and religious diversity of Indonesians, both within the Islamic tradition as well as outside
of it. Accordingly, modernist Muslims should abandon their ideas for an Islamic state in favor of
a state that is based largely on a recognizable distinction between state and religious realm,
despite their rejection of a strict concept of secularism. 13 This needs to be done so that all
Indonesians, irrespective of their religious beliefs would have an equal citizenship status, as well
as an equal right to participate in their country‟s public sphere. To promote this equality, the state
should also be based on democratic principles and must honor the human rights of all of its
citizens. Lastly, modernist Muslims should recognize and respect the religious pluralism of all
Indonesians, on the ground that they are all humans who are trying to follow the path to salvation
sets by a single God, even though that path might be through a different form of religious
confession.
Progressive reformers such as Madjid, Ma‟arif, and their supporters within the
Muhammadiyah, have consistently followed the ideationalist principle through their constant
promotion of their political theology that emphasizes democracy, equal citizenship, human
13
Using Ahmet Kuru‟s typology, the progressive Islamic reformers in Indonesia prefer a policy of “passive
secularism” as the foundation of state-religion relationship in Indonesia, as opposed to “assertive secularism” that
would have imposed a strict separation between religion and the state as practiced by France and Turkey. See Kuru
2009 for further details about this typology.
20
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
rights, and religious pluralism, even in the face of strong opposition from the Suharto regime as
well as from their revivalist opponents. Even during his years of close working relationship with
some groups within the Suharto regime, he had never toned down his message promoting
democratic governance, equal citizenship, and religious tolerance. Other progressive intellectuals
such as Ma‟arif have also shown the consistency of their ideas throughout the long years of
Suharto‟s authoritarian rule as well as during Indonesia‟s democratic transition after his downfall
in 1998. The one group that has practiced political opportunism which favors their material
interests over ideational ones is their revivalist Muslim opponents, working in groups such as
DDII and KISDI. These groups have traded their strong opposition against Suharto‟s rule during
his early years in power in favor of a policy of accommodation and support for Suharto during
the last decade of his rule, as he changed his policy of repression against political Islam to an
accommodative position that brought in many revivalist activists, including members of these
groups into his camp. They include hard-line revivalist activists such as the late Lukman Harun
(1934-2001) and his protégé, Din Syamsuddin (b. 1958). Thus, in the case of modernist Muslims
political engagement in Indonesia, rational choice theory best explains the actions of revivalist
Islamic groups and activists, but not that of the progressive Islamic activists. The actions of the
latter group is best explained through the lenses of social constructivist theory, given their
consistency in the promotion of their ideas and their use of “reasoned reflection” in the
discourses used to promote their ideas, despite of strong opposition from both the Suharto regime
as well as the revivalists.
Despite his popular appeals among reform activists, Syafii Ma‟arif (unlike his NU
counterpart Abdurrahman Wahid) does not possess the charismatic as well as persuasive appeals
that would have convinced rank-and-file Muhammadiyah members to change their positions
21
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
about the reforms that were promoted by the progressive activists. The prevalence of literal
interpretations of the Koran and the Sunnah among revivalist groups within the organization, and
the prevalence of revivalist-oriented leaders in the organization‟s central leadership board that
serve as counterweight to the voice of Ma‟arif and other progressive reformers within the
Muhammadiyah. The prevalence of revivalists within the organization and the lack of a
charismatic figure within the organization who could have served as counterweight to the
revivalist‟s resistance, has served as another stumbling block for progressive reformers to
successfully implement and institutionalize their reforms within the organization.
Muhammadiyah‟s reformers failure to successfully enact their reforms is also attributable to
their failure to spread their reformist message beyond the relatively small amount of supporters
who support these reforms in the first place. Unlike their NU counterparts, who tried to
popularize their messages to the rank-and-file members (through Wahid‟s numerous popular
sermons), their counterpart among the modernist and Muhammadiyah community tend to
promote the reforms among a small group of activists who were educated at Islamic universities
where progressive Islamic thought are promoted (e.g., Paramadina University founded by Madjid
and the IAIN institutions). 14 The propagation of these ideas by Nurcolish Madjid and other
modernist activists was targeted primarily among upper and middle-class Indonesians. Madjid
defends this policy by arguing that it was done because members of the upper class elite are
considered as “trend-makers” and “opinion-makers” whom have the ability and the capacity to
accept, interpret and promote these ideas to the rest of the Indonesian population. By using their
14
IAIN stands for the Indonesian Islamic State Institute (Institut Agama Islam Indonesia), It is the state-sponsored
university system for graduates of Islamic schools that was established during the 1960s. Under the leadership of
former presidents Harun Nasution (1919-1998) and Mukti Ali (1923-2004), it has a reputation as a bastion
progressive of Islamic ideas on various issues such as the interpretation of shari‟a law, Islam and democracy, human
rights within Islam, gender and Islam, and so forth, which tend to be more progressive than those shared by
modernist Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and sometimes, even surpassing those of NU.
22
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
high positions as well as their ability to influence public opinion, he hopes that the upper and
middle class elite would then propagate these ideas to other Indonesians who come from lower
income background (Kull 2005: 267).
Very few efforts were made by these activists to broaden the appeal of their messages to the
grassroots level, among low and middle class Muhammadiyah members. Other modernist
intellectuals have questioned the effectiveness and the viability of this strategy, noting that while
it has successfully won over a large number of upper-middle-class intellectuals to support the
cause, these ideas do not attract a large amount of support among the average Indonesian
Muslims. Former IAIN Jakarta president Azyumardi Azra, a former Madjid‟s student, asserts that
Madjid and other proponents of progressive Islamic ideas were not able to articulate these ideas
into formats that is easily available for the general public to access and understand. Thus, they
missed the opportunity to attract more supporters into their cause. He also considers Madjid to
have an “elitist” bias by promoting his ideas primarily to members of Indonesia‟s upper-middle
class elites, not to Indonesians from lower-class background (Azra 1999: 152-153, cited in Kull
2005: 220). Another modernist intellectual, Moeslim Abdurrahman, thinks that Madjid‟s
movement is primarily based on abstract ideas that lack solid grounding in the “real” world. He
believes Indonesian Muslims outside of the small number of elites who were targeted by Madjid
in his propagation efforts are having problems relating his theological ideas into their life
experiences. In the process, they become reluctant to adopt and accept them (Kull 2005: 223).
As a result, the attempt of progressive Muhammadiyah activists to engage in “reasoned
reflection” activities to persuade the organization to adopt their reformist theology have
encountered fierce resistance from their puritanist/revivalist rivals from within the organization,
who already dominate the internal culture and the leadership rank within Muhammadiyah.
23
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
Revivalists (represented by activists such as Yunahar Ilyas, Dahlan Rais (brother of former
Muhammadiyah Chairman Amien Rais), and Mustafa Kamal Pasha) argue that organizations
such as the Network of Young Muhammadiyah Intellectuals (Jaringan Intelektual Muda
Muhammadiyah – JIMM), which became the vehicle for their efforts to introduce progressive
Islamic thought within the Muhammadiyah, are trying to promote ideas that are not identical and
are violating the organization‟s theological principles. Specifically, they do not share the
positions taken by organizations such as JIMM that argue for equal citizenship rights
irrespective of religious belief, human rights, religious tolerance and pluralism, and gender
equality.
Revivalist critics of the reform argue that these positions represent liberal secularist
principles, which sought to separate religion and the state realm, something revivalists argue
should be rejected by Muslims who believe that there can be no separation between the two
realms. Revivalists also reject the concept of religious pluralism, by arguing that pluralism
advocates for the validity of truth for all religions. This is something many revivalists considered
as a heresy (bid’ah), since for the revivalists, there is only one religion that represents God‟s
ultimate truth for all humans, and it is Islam (Budiyanto 2009: 122-123, Boy 2009: 168-169). In
their view, pluralist supporters only weaken the faith of young Muslims, which would threaten
their salvation in the afterlife (Asyari 2007: 33). Revivalists also believe that local cultures and
traditions could not be integrated into Muhammadiyah, since so there are too many heretical and
superstitious (tahyul) elements within them that would only weakened the faith of pious Muslims
(Asyari 2007: 28, fn. 16). Lastly, they criticize progressive activists for receiving financial
assistance from international donors and foundations, which for the revivalists, prove that their
agendas constituted Westerners‟ effort to weaken and replace Islam in Indonesia. In their mind,
24
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
progressive Islam is nothing more than a Western-sponsored plot to bring Christianity, Western
capitalism, and Orientalist scholarship that would threaten the unity and cohesion of the
Indonesian Islamic umma (Asyari 2007: 29, 33).
It turns out that revivalist Muslims have more support within the Muhammadiyah
leadership, both at the national as well as regional level. Din Syamsuddin, Vice Chairman of
Muhammadiyah during Syafii Ma‟arif‟s second term, was perceived as someone who supports
the revivalists push-back against the reforms promoted by Maarif and other progressive activists.
He was considered to be close to hard-line revivalist organizations such as DDII and KISDI
during the final years of the Suharto regime and was the regime‟s chief liaison to these
organizations (Hefner 2000: 260, fn. 30; Asyari 2007: 37). He also gave support to Islamic
radical organizations such as Laskar Jihad, who was fighting a violent conflict with Christian
minorities living in the island of Maluku from 1999 to 2001 (Asyari 2007: 37). Lastly,
Syamsuddin is perceived as the person who was responsible behind the issuance of a legal
opinion (fatwa) issued by the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia – MUI)15, of
which he served as General Secretary, that considered religious pluralism, secularism, and
liberalism, as heresies that should be forbidden by Islam (Asyari 2007: 38). This fatwa was
clearly directed against progressive reformers within Muhammadiyah as well as their
counterparts within the NU and other Islamic organizations
On the other hand, despite the support from chairman Syafii Ma‟arif and other
progressive intellectuals within the Muhammadiyah, the progressive activists only have a limited
15
The Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) was the official state-sponsored Islamic organization that issues fatwas and
other legal advice that are related to Islam as well as other contemporary social problems, in the name of the entire
Indonesian Islamic community. The council appoints ulama from Muhammadiyah, NU, and other smaller Islamic
organizations, as its members. However, its rulings are not considered as binding/mandatory by these organizations,
which are concerned about losing their authorities to a state-sponsored institution such as MUI. For further details
on MUI, see Hosen 2004.
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Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
grassroots support in major urban cities such as Jakarta and Yogyakarta. Their reform ideas have
gained little attraction from other grassroots Muhammadiyah activists throughout Indonesia,
especially from those lacking their educational expertise in classical Islamic thought and Western
social theory that they have learned from their studies at progressive-friendly institutions such as
the IAIN. In addition, despite Ma‟arif enormous popularity within the progressive activists
circle, he was not perceived by most Muhammadiyah members as a charismatic ulama that could
persuade rank-and-file members to persuade the reforms he advocate simply by his charismatic
appeal and attributes alone. 16 As an institution run largely on a rational-legal basis, leaders within
the organization could only persuade other activists based on the merits of their arguments, not
through their charismatic appeal, family genealogy, or personality alone. This applies to Ma‟arif
as well as to other leaders of the organization. Due to these drawbacks, progressive reformers
had difficulties consolidating their reforms within Muhammadiyah and to keep the momentum of
their reforms going beyond their circle of intellectual supporters.
This turns out to be a very costly tactical error for the reformers, as crucial intellectual
support for their efforts eroded after Syafii Ma‟arif, their chief mentor and sponsor, retired from
the Muhammadiyah‟s chairmanship in 2005. Ma‟arif‟s retirement from the Muhammadiyah
chairmanship in 2005 left a power vacuum within the organization, which was used effectively
by the revivalist faction within the organization to seize control of the organization and expulse
progressive intellectuals from their leadership positions within the organization. A large number
of regional Muhammadiyah branches are controlled by revivalist activists oppose to the reforms
advocated by the progressive activists. Thanks to the support of these revivalist activists, Din
Syamsuddin was able to win an overwhelming support and was elected as the new
16
Observers have noted how Ma‟arif‟s speech and public appearances contains no charismatic appeals at all, unlike
the appearances of leaders such as Abdurrahman Wahid within the NU.
26
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
Muhammadiyah Chairman to succeed Ma‟arif (Asyari 2007: 36-38). Not only the revivalists
managed to elect Syamsuddin as the new chairman of the organization, but they were also in
control of the selection committee that was responsible to select members of the organization‟s
central leadership board. The end result was that board members who came from the progressive
faction within the organization, such as Amin Abdullah, Abdul Munir Mulkhan, and Dawam
Rahardjo, were removed from the leadership board. In contrast, activists representing the
revivalist faction such as Yunahar Ilyas and Goodwill Zubir were appointed to the board
(Burhani 2005: 186).
With the removal of these progressive-leaning members, the young progressive activists
within the organization not only lost people whom have been sympathetic to their cause within
the leadership board, but also lost the protection and support of these board members for the
continuation of their reformist causes, which is now has become more elusive for them to
achieve. In contrast, the revivalists felt that they have successfully vanguished the progressive‟s
threat and could now fully promote their agenda for the organization. Some of them even
proposed that Muhammadiyah reversed its two-decades old commitment to support the secularnationalist Indonesian state in favor of supporting the enactment of a shari’a-based Islamic state
(Burhani 2005: 186).
I argue that the outcome of progressive theological reforms within the Muhammadiyah and
its traditionalist counterpart, the NU, differs from one another because of several distinctive
characteristics within these organizations. First, the internal culture of the NU, which has a long
history of tolerating syncretic religious customs and theological thoughts borrowed from other
Islamic sects (e.g, Sufism and Shiite traditions), are more receptive towards the reform advocated
by progressive reformers within the organization in the area of democracy, human rights, and
27
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
religious pluralism. Revivalist theology and the practice of purifying of non-canonical Islamic
customs and traditions, are an integral part of Muhammadiyah‟s internal culture for the past
century and this would not be amenable to a rapid ideational change, either from the inside or
from the outside, anytime soon. And since revivalist theology tend to prevail among
Muhammadiyah activists and leadership, they have significant resources to counter the efforts of
the progressives to implement their reforms from within the organization and in the end, are able
to marginalize the reformers by excluding them from the organization‟s key leadership positions.
Reform of the Gulen Movement in Turkey
Like the NU of Indonesia, the Gulen Movement in Turkey has traditionalist elements
originated from the teachings of classical Sufi-oriented teachers, most importantly Beduizzaman
Said Nursi (1876-1960) as well as its founder Fethullah Gulen (b. 1941).17 However, unlike the
NU, the Gulen movement rejects the ulama authority and advocates independent reasoning
(ijtihad) among its followers. It is founded and led by a preacher named Fethullah Gulen, who
advocates progressive values such as democracy, human rights, and religious liberty, while
promoting inter-religious dialogues with both Muslims and non-Muslims. The movement based
these positions on the teaching of hizmet (altruism to promote the “common good”) as the main
principal for the group‟s modus operandi.
With a membership base of approximately 7 million Turkish citizens, plus an additional 1
to 3 million followers worldwide,18 the Gulen movement is considered as one of largest and
17
However, it should be noted that while scholars and other observers made reference to the movement by calling it
the Gulen movement, this is not its official name, as the movement has never sought to be recognized as a legal
entity under Turkish law. Fethullah Gulen himself never refers to the movement as the Gulen movement either, as he
does not approve his name to be used as the movement‟s name as well. He usually addresses the movement as
“volunteers movement” (gonuller hareketi) or as the Hizmet (service) movement (Ugur 2011: 89-90).
18
Like its Indonesian counterparts, the NU and the Muhammadiyah, the Gulen movement does not keep an accurate
record of its membership rolls. The above estimates were made as part of a series of elite interviews with key
28
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
most influential Islamic movement in contemporary Turkey (Ebaugh 2010: 4; Fuller 2008). The
movement is especially known for its network of high-quality preparatory schools that adopted a
Western-style curriculum focused on science and mathematics. It is also known for its
sponsorship of interfaith and inter-civilization dialogue both within Turkey as well as in
numerous Western countries commonly known as the “Dialogue of Civilizations.” In its
activities, the Gulen movement promotes a progressive Islamic theology that expresses support
toward democracy, human rights, and inter-religious dialogue. However, unlike many other
Islamic groups, it promotes this theology not through proselytization or other activities that
actively promotes its Islamic identity, but by promoting universal morals through its education
institutions and by doing charitable as well as other philanthropic activities (Ugur 2011: 42). The
success of the movement is also attributed to its ability to attract substantial financial
contribution from Turkish businessmen, entrepreneurs, and other upper-middle class
professionals. Over the last four decades, they have contributed billions of dollars to finance the
numerous preparatory schools sponsored by the movement as well as its numerous service
projects both within Turkey as well as worldwide. As of 2007, the movement is estimated to have
$25 billion in financial assets (Ebaugh 2010: 5), a sum that is far more substantial than many
other Islamic groups worldwide, including Indonesia‟s Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. 19
The Gulen movement originated in Turkey, a country with a long-standing tradition of strict
separation between religion and the state (laicite), that dated back from the foundation of a
secularist republic under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, in 1922. Successive Turkish
officials of the Gulen Movement (Ebaugh 2010: 9-11) and no one has independently verify the actual membership
figures of the movement.
19
Despite its claims to have up to 60 million followers in Indonesia, NU‟s financial assets (which consists of a small
number of real estate holdings, primarily its headquarter building in Jakarta) is estimated to worth approximately
$ 4.2 million (Van Bruinessen 2010: 7). This figure is a far cry from the assets of the Gulen Movement. No reliable
estimates exist for the worth of the Muhammadiyah‟s financial assets.
29
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
governments practiced a form of assertive secularism (Kuru 2009) that tends to suppress any
Islamic movements that were considered to be a treat to the Turkish state and its secularist
principles. The movement has not been immune from periodic crackdowns and repressions at the
hand of Turkish government apparatus. Its founder Fethullah Gulen had been imprisoned several
times during the 1970s and 1980s. In the late 1990s, Gulen was indicted by the Turkish state
prosecutor‟s Office on the charge of challenging the legitimacy of Turkey‟s secularist
government and to replace it with an Islamic state. While the charge was dismissed in 2006,
Gulen was forced to seek refuge status in the United States in 2000 and he continues living in the
United States to this day (Ebaugh 2010: 4-5).
The fortune of the Gulen movement also improved during the 1980s as a result of the
reforms of former Prime Minister Turgut Ozal who ruled Turkey during the 1980s and early
1990s. Ozal lifted the ban against Gulen and his movement from conducting public preaching
activities, so that Gulen could publicly promote his ideas and compete against those promoted by
more conservative Islamic groups.20 Gulen immediately went back to public preaching. In his
sermons he urged his listeners to fully participate in the economy, media, and cultural activities
in order to develop a new Turkey (Yavuz 2003a: 183). His sermons and lectures won over a large
number of followers. Gulen‟s associates began to record his sermons on audio cassettes and sold
them to prospective listeners. They quickly became a best-seller (Ebaugh 2010: 29). In addition,
as part of his policy to open up Turkey‟s economy, in 1982 Ozal ended the state monopoly of the
education sector and allowed private schools, including those established by religious groups, to
be established in Turkey. In the following year (1983), Gulen and his movement took advantage
of this opportunity by establishing the first of the Gulen schools modeled after his curricular
20
As a matter of fact, during this period the Ozal regime often called Gulen as “the Muslim preacher of liberalism”
in order to compare and contrast him from the revivalist/fundamentalist preachers (Yavuz 2003a: 183).
30
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
ideas for the “Golden Generation” that were detailed above. During the same year, Gulen
activists founded two Gulen-inspired high schools, one in Izmir and one in Istanbul. Many of the
teaching staffs and financial sponsors for the schools are devout Muslims who are members of
the Gulen movement. However, the schools used English as the primary language of instruction
as well as a curriculum that is largely secular, with primary courseworks on science and
mathematics. The only formal religious religious instructions taught in the school is a one hour
course in comparative religions that used syllabi and textbooks selected by the Turkish state
(Ebaugh 2010: 29-30). Due to their high quality instructions, success in placing its students
within the highly competitive Turkey state universities, and personalized attention by the
teachers, the schools quickly became popular among upper-middle class families from the two
cities and attracted a large number of students. The success of these schools led Gulen activists to
establish more schools throughout Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s. By 1999, the movement
had established 150 high schools, 150 dormitories (dershanes), and numerous summer schools all
over Turkey (Agai 2003: 48).
In the 1990s, the movement began to establish schools beyond Turkish‟s borders, after
Fethullah Gulen made a call for the movement to establish a presence in Central Asian nations
such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan due to their historical ties with Turkey during
the time of the Ottoman Empire (Ebaugh 2010: 43). Soon afterwards, the school system
expanded further to many other countries, including in those located the Balkans, Western
Europe, Asia and the Pacific, as well as North America. It is estimated that currently there are
over 1,000 Gulen-affiliated schools operating in over 100 countries (Ugur 2011: 86). Together,
the schools employ over 6,000 teachers (Yavuz 2003a: 193). The Gulen schools in many of these
countries often also served as institutions that promoted Turkish culture and traditions, and they
31
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
earned a special recognition from former Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit in 2000 due to
these special functions (Ebaugh 2010: 29). In addition to these educational institutios, the
movement also operates seven universities, six private hospitals, as well as numerous smaller
clinics as well as an international disaster relief organization (Kimse Yok Mu) (Yavuz 2003a: 193,
Ebaugh 2010: 4). In addition, the movement also operates a commercial bank named Bank Asya,
which is run on the Islamic principle of no-interest banking. As of 2007, the bank has an asset of
$5 billion (Ebaugh 2010: 85). Except for Bank Asya, which was established for purely
commercial purposes, all of these organizations were developed as vehicles for its members to
perform their community service (hizmet) activities.
The success of Gulen movement in establishing thousands of educational institutions
worldwide as well as strong media presence within Turkey could be attributed to the support of
upper-middle class Islamic businessmen who originated from the Anatolian region in which
Gulen and his movement originally came from. This group of businessmen is commonly known
as “the Anatolian Tigers.” It consists of self-made businessmen who developed their businesses
during the 1960s and 1970s with little or no assistance or patronage from the Turkish state
(which then concentrated its patronage chiefly among secular-minded businessmen). They tend
to be supportive of free-market economic ideas, democratic government, and a strong role for
civil society (Yavuz 2003a: 88). Many of them benefited from Turgut Ozal‟s economic
liberalization policy during the 1980s, as they bought privatized state enterprises, increased their
exports after trade liberalization, and also received other economic gains from the state‟s policy
to end monopoly, promote competition, and strengthen property rights/rule of law (Ugur 2011:
92). Members of the Anatolian Tigers were especially supportive of Fethullah Gulen and his
movement, because Gulen was one of the first Muslim preachers who fully supported the free-
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Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
market vision of these businessmen during this period (Ebaugh 2010: 28).
Fethullah Gulen encourages these businessmen to become successful in their commercial
endeavors, so that they could accumulate wealth, which in turn would be used to support
charitable service projects such as education, which would not personally benefit the
businessmen but instead would benefit the students (Ebaugh 2010: 37). In response to this
encouragement, many of these Anatolian businessmen chose to make their charitable
contribution for Gulen movement‟s education and other social projects. Some of them also
became supporters of the movement because they received their education in one of the
dershanes that was established by Gulen and his movement during the late 1960s and 1970s.
They attributed their personal success in business from the education they had received in the
dershanes. As an expression of their gratitude, they decided to contribute a significant amount of
their financial resources to support the movement and its education and media activities (Ebaugh
2010: 29).
The primary reason for the movement‟s success is the strong commitment of the
businessmen as well as other members of the movement to raise a significant amount of financial
resources to support its education and other service activities. Group members, regardless of
income level, typically gave at least 10 percent of their annual income to support the
organization‟s activities. If they could not afford to give 10 percent of their own income, they
would solicit their family members and other acquaintances for contribution in order to meet this
requirement (Ebaugh 2010: 56). Group members who become successful businessmen tend to
give away a larger percentage of their income for the movement. Many of them gave between
one-fifth and one-third of their income to support the movement‟s activities (Ebaugh 2010: 112).
Since these businessmen typically earned several million US dollars annually from their business
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Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
ventures, the amount of money they have given away to the movement is quite substantial. The
substantial financial contribution from these businessmen helps to make Gulen movement as one
of the most well-endowed Islamic organization in the Islamic World, with an estimated financial
asset worth $25 billion (Ebaugh 2010: 5).
Another reason for the rapid growth of the Gulen movement after the 1980s is the
relatively close relationship the movement with at least some political figures and officials within
the Turkish state. One of the goals of the movement is to change Turkey‟s restrictive (some calls
it assertive) secularist policy to one that is more pragmatic and tolerant toward religious
expressions and viewpoints. This is why Gulen always made references to the state-religion
relations during the Ottoman Empire, which in his view serves as a model on how state-religion
relations in Turkey could be made closer and more cooperative than it is today. However, Gulen
and his movement are always careful not to push their demand for change too far and avoid any
confrontation with the state and its apparatus. His movement usually does not pursue strategies
that involve the use of public protests, civil disobedience, or other forms of contentious politics.
It also refuses to publicly endorse any specific candidates or political parties during election
campaigns (Ugur 2011: 80, 88). Instead, Gulen and his associates engaged in developing
personal relationship with politicians and government bureaucrats, in order to educate them
about their movement and its positive contributions in the fields of education, commerce, and
other social services (Ugur 2011: 80).
Gulen held regular meetings with government officials and politicians in order to develop
close ties with them. He had a close relationship with the late Prime Minister Turgut Ozal (19271993) during the 1980s and early 1990s, that Ozal referred to him as a “Muslim preacher of
liberalism” to distinguish his interpretation of Islam from more conservative Islamic groups in
34
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
Turkey (Yavuz 2003a: 183). Gulen and his movement presented themselves as the moderate
alternative to other Islamic groups in Turkey (e.g., the Mili Gorus movement linked to former
Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan) (Yavuz 2003b: 43). Their strategy paid off as the movement
enjoyed a substantial growth and success during the Ozal Premiership, as many of the schools
that the movement founded, as well as its media outlets such as Zaman newspaper were
established during this period. During the 1990s, Gulen also had close relationships with former
former Turkish Prime Ministers Mesut Yilmaz, Tansu Ciller, and Bulent Ecevit, as well as former
President Suleyman Demirel. They expressed support for Gulen and his projects by paying visits
to the Gulen schools and attended their opening ceremonies (Yilmaz 2003: 226).
However, Gulen was not able to establish cordial relations with every member of the
Turkish political establishment. The relationship between the Gulen movement with the Turkish
military and judiciary has always been tenuous. Both institutions are considered as bastions of
Kemalist secularism in Turkey and they historically regarded all Islamic movements, even
relatively progressive and cooperative movement such as one that Gulen has established, as
potential threats to the laicite principles long held by the Kemalist to be essential for the survival
of the Turkish state. They were very concerned with the rapid growth and expansion of the
movement, not just within Turkey, but also in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. They
worried that the movement‟s expansion into these regions would bring pressure from external
actors that would not only undermine the secular Kemalist ideas in Turkey, but also create
pressure against the state further expand democracy and human rights within Turkey (Yavuz
2003b: 44).
There was an indictment against Gulen that was outstanding even as relations between
Gulen and the state improved during the 1980s. The military accused him of trying to replace
35
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
Turkish‟s secularist foundation with that of Islam. The indictment was not dismissed until 1986
and until it was dismissed, Gulen maintained a low public profile and did not personally led a
public sermon until his indictment was dismissed by the court (Sevvindi 2008: 18). After the
military staged its “soft-coup” in 1997 that toppled the Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin
Erbakan,21 Gulen once again faced an unwanted scrutiny from the Turkish military and judicial
institutions. Media-outlets sponsored by the secularists and the military began to attack him and
his movement as a “reactionary movement” that constitute a threat to the secularist principle of
the Turkish State (Yavuz 2003b: 43).22 On August 31, 2000, Gulen was again indicted by the
Turkish state prosecutor‟s office on the charge of organizing a movement that challenges the
secularist Turkish government and plans to overthrew and replace it with a theocratic Islamic
state. However, the charges were dismissed on May 5, 2006, after years of hearings and
investigations produced no clear evidence that Gulen and his movement are actually trying to
accomplish the above deeds (Ebaugh 2010: 5). Due to the constant harassment at the hand of
military officers and state prosecutor‟s office, Gulen decided to seek refuge in the United States
in 1999. After a prolonged hearing process, his request for US permanent residency was finally
granted in 2006 (Ebaugh 2010: 32). Gulen now lives in a suburb of Philadelphia.
21
The 1997 “soft-coup” was staged by the military out of concern that Islamic political parties and movements had
taken over the Turkish government and were trying to change the secularist Turkish constitution with one that is
based on Islamic law (shari’a). The Gulen movement was not the only Islamic group which faced scrutiny and
persecution from the military. During the same period, the military-backed regime banned and disbanded the Refah
Party led by Necmettin Erbakan, issued restrictions against religious (Imam-Hatip) schools and the building of new
mosques, and issued new regulations prohibiting the wearing of head scarves in higher education institutions. The
military considered all Islamic groups (whether progressive, moderate, or revivalist in theological orientation) as
potential threat against the Turkish state. It wanted to limit if not eliminate their ability to express themselves
socially and culturally in the Turkey‟s public sphere (Yavuz 2003b: 43).
22
For instance, a secularist-oriented television channel broadcasted a videotape in which Gulen was allegedly
quoted that he had wanted to challenge Turkey‟s secularist principle and wanted to replace it with an Islamic state.
Gulen supporters argued that the videotape was doctored in order to question and attack his credibility (Ebaugh
2010: 32).
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Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
Conclusion
Using these three case studies, this paper serves as a theory development exercise on the
role of moral authority leadership and its role in disseminating religious ideas that can be used by
other scholars who wish to conduct a comparative analysis of Islamic social movements in other
Muslim-majority countries or a cross-regional analysis of numerous Islamic movements that are
generalizable across the Islamic world. The outcome of the theological reforms made by the
“moral authority” leaders of within the three organizations are varied. Reform by the NU in
Indonesia and the Gulen Movement in Turkey has been successful. Under the leadership of its
chairman Abdurrahman Wahid, since 1984 the NU has embraced a policy of promoting
democracy, human rights and religious tolerance/pluralism in Indonesia. NU also distanced itself
from the promotion of Islamic state and shari’a law advocated by revivalist Islamic group.
Instead, it is accepting the secular nationalist state ideology Pancasila as the primary ideological
foundation of the Indonesian state (Bush 2009, Kadir 1999, Ramage 1995). Despite undergoing a
conservative turn under a new leadership that replaced Wahid in late 1990s, the NU does not
reverse its stand supporting democracy, human rights and religious pluralism and the
conservative leadership has been replaced by a group of progressive reform supporters in 2010,
many of them are Wahid‟s close associates and confidants. The return of progressive reformers to
the NU leadership was a sign that these reforms have gained a strong constituency from within
the NU and has been largely institutionalized within the organization. The same outcome could
be seen in Turkey as well. The Gulen movement has always been associated from its very
beginning with the progressive thought on democracy, religion-state relations, and religious
tolerance and pluralism as articulated by its founding father Fethullah Gulen and it continues to
maintain its reputation as a progressive Islamic organization to this day.
37
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
However, progressive reform within Muhammadiyah has not been successful to be
implemented and institutionalized from within the organization. Muhammadiyah is internally
divided between religious scholars and activists who continued to call for the establishment of an
Islamic state (the revivalists) and those who wish to accept and promote liberal ideas such as
democracy, human rights, and religious tolerance pluralism (the progressives). The revivalist
faction who embraces a literalist interpretation of Islam and considers any form of deviations
from their literal interpretation of Islam as a form of heresy (bid’ah) has a stronger root within
Muhammadiyah. While the organization has embraced democracy and peaceful participation via
democratic elections (something it has supported since the 1950s), its view on human rights and
religious tolerance has not been as inclusive as the NU. Many Muhammadiyah leaders and
activist are still restricting the rights to participate in politics and in citizenship for practicing
Muslims and are very critical against the progressive activists‟ efforts to promote religious
tolerance and pluralism from within the organization.
I am hoping that this paper is making a new contribution to the growing literature on
political Islam by outlining the mechanisms on how new ideas contribute to theological and
political change within an Islamic group and how the leaders of these groups operating both on
institutional as well as historical constraints could promote this change and implement them
within their respective organizations. These findings are in contrast to earlier literature that tends
to assume the theological and political preferences of Islamic groups as fixed variables that are
difficult, if not impossible, to change. The project will also make a contribution to the literature
on social movement, by highlighting how Islamic groups which generally operate under limited
political opportunity structure set up by an authoritarian regime are able to promote theological
and political change within their respective societies despite the overwhelming odds against it.
38
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
Studying these three movements also provide us with an opportunity to conduct cross-country
comparison on how the history of state-religion in Turkey and Indonesia affects the outcome of
progressive Islamic reforms in the two countries. Lastly, the project will contribute to the
literature on political leadership, by outlining how the leadership exercised by religious leaders
could influence theological and political changes both within their own organizations and their
respective societies.
Lastly, the policy implication of this paper is that it studies the potential causes of why
certain Islamic groups are adopting progressive ideas about democracy, human rights and
religious tolerance/pluralism, despite the significant opposition from numerous Islamic groups in
the Islamic world (especially those who embrace a revivalist and literalist interpretation of
Islam), whom have often discouraged progressive Muslims from openly advocating these
positions out of fear of possible persecution and violence at the hand of members of revivalist
groups. By studying successful adaptation of progressive ideas within several Islamic groups, as
represented in the cases of the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Gulen Movement, along with cases of
unsuccessful adaptation such as the Muhammadiyah, we can identify cultural and socio-political
conditions that have the reforms within these groups to succeed. By identifying these conditions,
it is hoped that we could replicate some of these conditions and encourage other progressive
Muslims to pursue these reforms within their respective groups as well so that more Islamic
groups will embrace their religious faith and modern liberal democratic values at the same time,
without seeing any incompatibility between them.
39
Arifianto – The Making of “Progressive Islam” in Indonesia and Turkey (DRAFT)
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