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“This program will not be a threat to
them”: Ballistic Missile Defense and US
relations with Russia and China
a
Nicholas Khoo & Reuben Steff
b
a
Department of Politics, University of Otago, 95 Albany Street,
Dunedin, Otago 9016, New Zealand
b
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), 195
Lambton Quay, Wellington, New Zealand
Published online: 20 Dec 2013.
To cite this article: Nicholas Khoo & Reuben Steff (2014) “This program will not be a threat
to them”: Ballistic Missile Defense and US relations with Russia and China, Defense & Security
Analysis, 30:1, 17-28, DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2013.864869
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2013.864869
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Defense & Security Analysis, 2014
Vol. 30, No. 1, 17–28, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2013.864869
“This program will not be a threat to them”1: Ballistic Missile Defense and
US relations with Russia and China
Nicholas Khooa* and Reuben Steff b**
a
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b
Department of Politics, University of Otago, 95 Albany Street, Dunedin, Otago 9016, New Zealand;
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), 195 Lambton Quay, Wellington, New Zealand
Although the Obama Administration has differed from its predecessor in a number of respects,
on the specific issue of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), there is a striking continuity. The
Obama Administration has remained committed to the BMD project, even as it has modified
the schedule of deployments and prioritized different systems from the Bush Administration.
Significantly, this has led to Chinese and Russian balancing in the nuclear sphere. As a
result, there is evidence of a security dilemma-type dynamics in US relations with China
and Russia. At present, there is no study that analyzes Russian and Chinese hard internal
balancing against the USA in the sphere of missile defense during the Obama
Administration. This article fills this gap.
Keywords: US Ballistic Missile Defense; Obama Administration; China; Russia; internal
balancing; security dilemma
Introduction
The election of Barack Obama in late 2008 was well-received internationally, in large part
because it held out the promise of the USA playing a less unilateralist and more collaborative
role in world affairs. A case can be made that clear, if qualified progress has been made in
respect to the Administration’s overall foreign policy. However, as analysts have pointed out,
on the specific issue of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) there is a striking continuity between
the Obama Administration and its predecessor.2 Thus, the Obama Administration has remained
committed to the BMD project, even as it has modified the schedule of deployments and prioritized different systems from the Bush Administration.3
This article contributes to this debate, focusing on the international reaction to US BMD
policy. Specifically, the author’s contention is that by continuing long-standing US policy on
BMD, the Obama Administration has contributed to balancing on the part of China and
Russia. Conceptually, these states’ reactions are an instance of hard4 internal5 balancing.
Chinese and Russian balancing against the USA has involved: (1) fielding new strategic
nuclear and conventional weapons equipped with BMD countermeasures and (2) making
changes in military doctrine. As a result, security dilemma dynamics are increasingly in evidence
in US relations with China and Russia.
The article is divided into four main sections. The first section chronicles US moves to
develop BMD during the Obama Administration. The second outlines Russia’s balancing
*Email: [email protected]
**Email: [email protected]
© 2014 Taylor & Francis
18
N. Khoo and R. Steff
against the USA in the realm of BMD. The third section explicates US BMD policy and its
relationship to China. The fourth and final section outlines China’s response to BMD. At
present, there is no study that analyzes Russian and Chinese hard internal balancing against
the USA in the sphere of missile defense during the Obama Administration. This article is
designed to fill this gap.
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US BMD and Russia during the Obama Administration
In 2008, as a presidential candidate, Barak Obama suggested significant changes to America’s
BMD system, pledging to “cut investment in unproven BMD systems” and “not weaponize
space.”6 Given the much publicized problems highlighted in testing of US BMD systems
during the Bush Administration, he appeared to be adopting a rigorous standard when he
stated in December 2008 that as President he would “make sure any missile defense … has
been proven to work and has our allies’ support before we deploy it.”7 Citing nuclear proliferation
as a grave threat, he further stated that his Administration would seek the “active cooperation of
Russia”, as US–Russian relations were “reset” in early 2009.8
Once in office, Obama’s basic posture was arguably little different from Bush’s. In an interview in September 2009, he expressed the view that on BMD “Russia has always been paranoid
about this, but George Bush was right. This was not a threat to them. And this program will not be
a threat to them.”9 The Administration outlined its approach in a Ballistic BMD Review Report
(BMDR) on 1 February 2010.10 Tactical adjustments were made and in canceling Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) systems slated for deployment in Poland, and the X-band radar in the
Czech Republic, the Report cited changes in the USA’s assessment of the nature of the Iranian
missile threat and concerns over the “Third Site” GMD systems’ technological capability. Alongside this, a number of experimental BMD systems were also canceled.11 The Report committed
the USA to pursuing multinational and integrated BMD systems, rather than the Bush Administration’s preference for bilateral agreements. It also stated that the USA would not expand its
national GMD systems in continental USA, at least for the time being.
Despite these adjustments, as far as Russia was concerned, there were strong elements of continuity in US policy in the Report that adversely affected them. The BMDR stressed the need for
increased flexibility to address threats as they evolved and emphasized maneuvrable BMD
systems that could be rapidly “surged” to parts of the world in times of crisis. In place of the
“Third Site”, the BMDR announced the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) that
would be deployed in four main phases from 2011 to 2020 and which, if greatly expanded,
could threaten Russia’s ability to overwhelm the system.12 Alongside this, BMD continued to
reinforce the USA’s European alliances, as states once skeptical of America’s BMD plans
signed on to the project through a number of bilateral deals and as part of NATO (with stage
one of a European shield declared “provisionally operational” on 21 May 2012).13 Phase I of
the EPAA involved the deployment of 23 Aegis BMD ships and 111 Standard Missile-3
(SM-3) Block IA missiles.14 The number of Aegis BMD ships will grow to 41 and SM-3 interceptors to 341 by 2016.15
Both President Obama and former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, stressed that although
Russia played no role in the decision to modify its BMD systems, they also said if it was viewed
favorably by Moscow that would be welcome.16 This was also consistent with a stipulation in the
BMDR that “one of the benefits of the EPAA is that it allows for a Russian contribution, if political circumstances make that possible.”17 At the extreme, this suggested that significant co-operation on joint BMD systems could, in theory, eliminate the security dilemma dynamics.
Initially, Russian President Putin praised his American counterpart’s decision to eliminate the
Third Site, calling it a “very right and brave decision.”18 But other officials, such as Russia’s
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19
Ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, were unimpressed, stating that the US BMD policy
“shows to us that the US continues to be a rather difficult negotiating partner, a partner who is
loaded in many wars by a Cold War mentality.”19
Significantly, US BMD has continued to be a core point of contention as the Obama Administration has refused to place limits on future deployments.20 Russian officials have stated that
nothing less than concrete guarantees that the new BMD systems would not be aimed against
Russia’s nuclear arsenal is acceptable, and that Russia must be made a full-partner in a joint
BMD system.21 Indeed, Putin’s initially favorable view of Obama’s BMD strategy appears to
have changed over time because although the Bush-era GMD systems in Central Europe (in
Poland and the Czech Republic) have been altered, phase II of the EPAA will still place
ground-based SM-3 interceptors (dubbed “Aegis-ashore”) in Romania by 2015, followed by
the deployment of more advanced IB SM-3 interceptor missiles in Poland and Romania by as
early as 2018. Recent statements from the US government make clear that Turkey and Spain
will also be involved.22 Russian (and some American) analysts believe that these latter interceptors will be capable of defending against Russian Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).23
The Obama Administration is also continuing research into improved GMD interceptors – the
very systems that were at the heart of US–Russian discord during the Bush Administration.24
Additionally, the National Research Council recently released a Report (partly funded by the
US BMD Agency) that called for decreasing investment in boost-phase technology and increasing
investment in Aegis, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot system alongside deployment of a third GMD site on the US East Coast to supplement the Alaska- and
California-based interceptors.25 This proposal is designed to counter Iranian moves to deploy
an ICBM by 2015, although the Russians are concerned that any US missile defense system
will also undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Finally, the flexible and surge capability of the
new systems also creates strategic ambiguity in Russia’s eyes. On the one hand, it is clearly
preferable to the fixed GMD systems of the Bush Administration; while on the other hand it
suggests that out-of-area naval BMD systems could rapidly be surged to Russia’s periphery
during future crises.
Russia responds
Given the foregoing, it is not surprising that Russia has responded by engaging hard internal balancing. This is evident in: (1) fielding new strategic and conventional weapons equipped with
BMD countermeasures and (2) changes Russia made to its military doctrine.
The first prong of Russia’s hard balancing response has involved fielding new strategic and
conventional weapons equipped with BMD countermeasures. In this respect, Russia’s strategic
forces were tasked with developing new strategic forces equipped with BMD countermeasures.
A substantial missile upgrade program that was announced in 2008 has been intensified. In
this upgrade, Russia is to replace half its nuclear arsenal by 2015,26 upgrade all nuclear
systems by 2020 and initiate research into low-yield nuclear weapons.27
These increases have been complemented with the development and deployment of new strategic and conventional weapons. One of the most significant new missiles deployed was the roadmobile Topol-M (SS-27) IBCM. It represented a qualitative advance over its predecessors, adding
a Maneuvrable Re-entry Vehicle (MARV) capability, increasing its capacity to evade US BMD
systems. It was first tested on 29 May 2007 and entered service in 2010. A MARV Sea-Launched
Ballistic Missile, the Bulava, equipped with BMD countermeasures was deployed into service in
June 2012.28 A more advanced version of the Bulava, equipped with Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) missiles and electronic BMD jammers, known as the Liner, was
also successfully tested in 2011 and is set to be deployed in the near future.29
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N. Khoo and R. Steff
Other notable missile developments included the announcement in 2011 that a new MIRV
ICBM was in development and slated for deployment by 2016,30 and an unnamed “fifth-generation” liquid-fuel heavy MIRVed ICBM (10–15 warheads) slated for deployment in 2018.31
This latter missile represents a technological upgrade from the Topol-M missile and was
tested in May 2012. The test was highly symbolic, occurring just days after NATO announced
that the first leg of its BMD system had been activated. Thus, former strategic forces director
Viktor Yesin stated that, “this is one of the … measures being developed by Russia’s military
and political leadership in response to the US deployment of a global anti-missile system.”32
These developments and deployments have been buttressed by investments in a new nuclear
bomber, upgrades to Russia’s current TU-160 and TU-95 MS bombers, deployment of a new
long-range nuclear cruise missile and development of a “fourth generation” command and
control system.33
Increases in resources to strategic weaponry designed to hard balance the US BMD have also
been evident in Russia’s reinvigoration of its own BMD program. First, Putin chose to improve
Moscow’s already established BMD (the A135) surrounding Moscow, comprising 68 53T6
nuclear-tipped short-range missile interceptors. Funding for this system increased in 2007. It is
now being modernized with a new system (A235) set to be built by 2015 that will be armed
with conventional warheads.34 Second, Russia announced that the Army will acquire new maneuvrable S-500 systems in 2013, two years ahead of schedule.35 Specific details of this system are
scarce, with some independent analysts suggesting it will not be a significant advance upon
Russia’s S-400 systems. Others, however, claim that it is a game-changing transition from an
“air defense system” to an “air/space defense system”, as its capabilities will allow it to intercept
medium-range missiles and ICBMs at speeds of seven kilometers per second, and have an antisatellite (ASAT) function.36 Finally, Russia has started developing sea-based BMD interceptors,
similar to the US naval Aegis system.
As part of Russia’s first comprehensive military plan since 2000, the State Armament Program
2020 was announced in 2010. It outlines plans for an additional US $770 billion to be spent over
the next decade on Russia’s armed forces, in addition to the current level of proposed defense
spending.37 Clearly reflecting the priority of maintaining and enhancing Russia’s nuclear deterrent, approximately 42% (US $242 billion) of this will be spent on Russia’s strategic missile
troops and aerospace defense forces.38 Signaling his intention to continue hard balancing
against American BMD with strategic weaponry, in March 2012 Russia’s then Prime Minister,
Vladimir Putin, declared that “our number one priorities are nuclear forces [and] aerospace
defence” and that Russia would “under no circumstances surrender our strategic deterrent capability, and indeed, will in fact strengthen it.”39 Putin directly linked these moves to BMD, claiming that Russia was being “pushed into action by the US and NATO BMD policies”, requiring
Russia to invest in measures to “overcome any BMD system and protect Russia’s retaliation
potential.”40 Putin also added: “Whatever you call it, this has some elements of an arms
race”,41 maintaining that in Russia’s strategic calculations there is an “inseparable link between
BMD and strategic offensive weapons.”42
The second prong of Russia’s hard balancing involved changes to its military doctrine. Alongside the changes described above, they provide the broader context to view Russia’s response to
US BMD. In 2008, Russia announced that it would no longer be reporting its missile launches
under the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.43 This was part
of a broader assertion by Russia that continued into the Obama Administration. On 5 February
2010, President Dmitry Medvedev formalized Russia’s new military doctrine, which was
reflected in its National Security Strategy.44 Although earlier wordings of the document reportedly included the option of preventive use of nuclear weapons in a conflict scenario,45 its final
incarnation suggested Russia had become more confident in its relative military position.
Defense & Security Analysis
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The doctrine raised the threshold for using nuclear weapons; outlined a proactive agenda that
emphasized the role of international law; rejected unipolarity and American primacy; and emphasized Russia’s right to intervene regionally on behalf of Russian peoples and Russian interests.
Although the doctrine declared nuclear and large-scale conventional war unlikely, US BMD
was again identified as a vital threat to Russia. Indicating its ongoing balancing efforts, Russia
activated its S-400 strategic air defense system in Kaliningrad on 6 April 2012,46 and has threatened to deploy new short-range “Iskander” mobile missiles to Belarus and Kaliningrad by the
end of 2012.47 Furthermore, although the 2010 doctrine eschewed nuclear pre-emption,
Russian General Nikolai Makarov has suggested the deployment of BMD systems in Romania
and Bulgaria could alter this, stating in May 2012 that “a decision to use destructive force preemptively will be taken if the situation worsens.”48
US BMD and China during the Obama Administration
The Obama Administration’s policy on BMD has extended to China and, more specifically, its
sphere of influence, the Asia-Pacific. Here, a serious complicating factor in the USA–China
relationship has been US BMD assistance to its allies in Asia. Although the USA has sought
to reassure China that BMD will pose no threat to its security, its actions suggest otherwise to
the Chinese. These include expanding and deepening BMD in its incarnation as Theater
Missile Defense (TMD) cooperation with its East Asian allies Japan and South Korea, and discussion of integrating these systems into America’s global system.
These developments are not entirely new, and were highlighted as early as China’s 2000
Defense White Paper.49 Since the August 1999 USA–Japan agreement to conduct joint research
on TMD,50 Japan has fielded three destroyers with Aegis BMD and a number of Lockheed Patriot
Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) systems. An X-band early-warning radar was stationed in
Aomori Prefecture in Northern Japan in 2006. Washington and Tokyo agreed in August 2012
to station a second X-band radar in Japan.51 These capabilities will inherently have the capability
to counter Chinese missiles and monitor Chinese territory. The aforementioned BMDR also identified South Korea as a priority for increased BMD cooperation, and Seoul deployed its second
Aegis destroyer in June 2012 to buttress its PAC-2 capabilities, creating a two-tier system.52 In
the same month, Seoul and Washington committed a bilateral Korean Air and BMD system
which Seoul has stated is solely intended to cover the Korean Peninsula.53
China is invariably concerned that this co-operation can be incorporated into a region-wide
system. Luo Zhaohui, Director-General of the Department of Asian Affairs in the Chinese
Foreign Ministry, commented in April 2012 that US efforts in building a regional missile
defense system “will have negative effects on global and regional stability.”54 Recent comments
by US officials also suggest this to be the case.55 Even if the current US strategy is not intended to
target China, China simply cannot assume that this situation will not change in the future. China
would be myopic not to believe that these developments cannot be targeted at it.
As Steven Hildreth of the US Congressional Research Service has explained: “The focus of
our rhetoric is North Korea. The reality is that we’re also looking longer-term at the elephant in
the room, which is China.”56 He commented that these efforts were “laying the foundations” for a
region-wide BMD system that will incorporate Japan, South Korea, Australia and Taiwan.57
Putting it succinctly, one senior US official stated that “physics is physics … . You’re either blocking North Korea and China or you’re not blocking either of them.”58 A number of Chinese experts
and official news outlets have criticized this growing cooperation, arguing that it has already
emboldened Japan in its territorial disputes with China.59 Indeed Shi Yinhong, Professor of International Studies at Renmin University in Beijing, has stated that “the joint missile system objectively encourages Japan to keep an aggressive position in the Diaoyu Islands dispute, which sends
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N. Khoo and R. Steff
China a very negative message. Japan would not have been so aggressive without the support and
actions of the US.”60
Of concern from a Chinese perspective, BMD cooperation between Washington and its East
Asian allies can be expected to increase, as part of the Obama Administration’s rebalancing
policy. A 2012 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, commissioned by
the Defense Department, makes clear that America and its allies “must demonstrate a readiness
and capacity to fight and win, even under more challenging circumstances associated with
Anti-Access Area-Denial (A2AD).”61 The report noted that China’s capabilities in “areas such
as the East, Philippines, and South China seas” could soon “pose a significant potential military
threat to the United States and allies and partners.”62 Towards this end, it states that “US forward
deployed forces and allied forces could benefit from additional missile defense capabilities – both
batteries and reloads.”63
Specifically, it notes that increasing investments in THAAD and PAC-3 systems are essential
to hedge “against uncertainties regarding longer-term Chinese intentions.”64 The report also recommends that both Japan and South Korea increase their BMD investments. It further observes
that Japan is “eager for greater dialogue with the United States on the emerging US AirSea Battle
concept,” and that increasing US–Japanese inter-operability, which has been “driven by BMD
requirements,” has “essentially created a joint command relationship between the United States
and Japan from the perspective of any possible adversary.”65 Rounding out its BMD recommendations, the report calls for “full Australian participation in US theater BMD, including an Australian decision to equip its new air warfare destroyers with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)
missiles.”66
China responds
The task of all military planners is to plan for worse-case scenarios, and like Russia a key Chinese
fear is US military encirclement. BMD is viewed by the Chinese as a critical aspect of any such
US strategy. For example, Chinese Air force Colonel Dai Xu stated that BMD was becoming the
“technological glue” for ensuring US pre-eminence, forming a “missile blockade” in East Asia,
underpinning what he views as a neo-containment strategy of China.67 A China Daily opinion
piece posited that “the ring begins in Japan, stretches through nations in the South China Sea
to India, and ends in Afghanistan. Washington’s deployment of anti-missile systems around
China’s periphery forms a crescent-shaped encirclement.”68 Looking around the region, the
Chinese could be excused for making such an interpretation. In the context of the Obama Administration’s late 2011 “pivot” (later re-branded as a “rebalance”) even moderate voices in China
such as that of Professor Zhu Feng of Peking University see US policy as targeting China.69
It can be argued that this is a misperception on China’s part, even while seeing how the
Chinese might think this way. Given the foregoing, the Chinese reaction to the Obama Administration’s BMD program and its regional incarnation was, therefore, predictable. They began to
adopt a posture of hard internal balancing against US BMD. Like the Russians, they did so in
two ways. This included: (1) the fielding of new strategic and conventional weapons equipped
with BMD countermeasures and (2) changes made to China’s military doctrine.
In terms of new strategic and conventional weapons, as early as February 2009, the second
month of Obama’s Administration, Qing Zhiyuan, Commander of China’s Strategic Missile
Force, called for further improvements and expansion of China’s nuclear deterrent. He stated
that the arsenal “is now at a new historical starting point” and “will evolve onto much higher
levels.”70 The subsequent 2009 Perry–Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission stated that
“China may already be increasing the size of its ICBM force in response to its assessment of
the US BMD program,” and was being accompanied by a shift to sea-based and land-based
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23
mobile systems to increase its second-strike potential.71 As the research of a variety of specialists
has argued, US BMD has now become China’s central referent point for its own nuclear weapons
program.72
China’s People’s Liberation Army clearly desires to maintain a capability to penetrate US
BMD systems following a US first strike, and is determined to strengthen its second strike
forces, effectively balancing the USA in the nuclear realm. In fact, a major study of China’s
nuclear capabilities has found that Chinese strategists are confident that they can overwhelm
US BMD systems.73 In any case, a shift in Chinese strategy has been underway for some time,
from a posture of minimal deterrence, which only provided assured retaliation, to one that that
would allow assured destruction.74 The 2010 Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China recognized this, stating that “China is
also currently working on a range of technologies to attempt to counter US and other militaries’
ballistic BMD systems, including maneuvring re-entry vehicles [MIRVs], decoys, chaff,
jamming, thermal shielding, and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.”75 As noted in its 2012 report,
this trend has continued.76
More recently, reports estimate that the number of Chinese ICBM missiles capable of hitting
the US mainland is less than 50 but will probably double by 2025.77 However, this projection is
conservative in light of Qing Zhiyuan’s statement above and the trajectory of China’s nuclear
efforts outlined in subsequent paragraphs. Indeed, China is making strides on various fronts. It
successfully conducted a missile interception test on January 2010 and tested a stealth aircraft
in January 2011.78
There is further evidence that hard internal balancing is occurring against USA’ BMD. China
is developing a new nuclear bomber.79 Meanwhile, research has intensified on improvements to
China’s long-standing road-mobile ICBM, the DF-41, which can contain up to 10 warheads,
giving China the ability to increase the annual growth rate of missiles capable of hitting
America from double to triple digits.80 The DF-41 is China’s first MIRV-capable missile and
equipped with improved countermeasures to penetrate US BMD systems.81 In August 2012,
China reportedly tested a fourth new MIRVed submarine-launched ICBM, the JL-2.82 Major
General Zhu Chenghu of China’s National Defense University tied the above developments to
American BMD, stating that BMD “reduce[d] the credibility of its [Beijing’s] nuclear deterrence.”83 Deployment of BMD countermeasures has become a significant element of China’s
nuclear balancing effort, as every new ICBM is equipped with this capability.
The recent announcement by the Obama Administration of a new strategic concept known as
Air Sea Battle (ASB)84 appears to confirm Chinese fears, even if it is also a US response to
China’s deployment of A2/AD capabilities. ASB is intended to maintain US freedom of action
in A2/AD environments. For example, a recent Department of Defense report titled Sustaining
US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense includes “improving BMDs” under
the heading “Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges.”85 Tellingly, a senior
Obama Administration official confirmed with Bill Gertz of The Washington Times that: “Air
Sea Battle is to China what the maritime strategy was to the Soviet Union … It is a very
forward-deployed, assertive strategy that says we will not sit back and be punished … We will
initiate.”86 ASB foresees a future US–Chinese conflict fought with long-range precision weaponry over vast distances in which Navy Aegis ships supplement other BMD assets across
the Pacific. Escalation pressures would easily arise in such a conflict in which intra-war deterrence
and BMD would play a pivotal role. Viewing all this activity, the Chinese have to assume
the worst. Thus, with an air of inevitability, as Professor Sun Zhe of Tsinghua University
recently noted, “We have again and again said that we will not be the first country to use
nuclear force … We need to be able to defend ourselves, and our main threat, I’m afraid,
comes from the United States.”87
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N. Khoo and R. Steff
The second prong of China’s hard balancing response to US BMD has involved changes to its
military doctrine. While China’s basic view of nuclear weapons since 1964 has been consistent
with nuclear deterrence, the fact remains that it was not until 2006 that it formally accepted deterrence as a doctrine.88 In its 2006 Defense White Paper, it was explicitly stated that the “fundamental goal” of the Second Artillery (which is the designated unit in charge of China’s nuclear forces)
is “to deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China … it
endeavours to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible
nuclear deterrent.”89 At the same time, while China has held a policy of No First Use (NFU) since
its acquisition of a nuclear capability in 1964, its endorsement no longer appears to be unqualified.
Recent research has documented instances of Chinese officials signaling that China’s long-held
NFU policy could be altered and/or the threshold for a nuclear response lowered during a regional
crisis.90
A second change in military doctrine relates to the increasingly problematic intertwining of
conventional and nuclear forces in China’s view of deterrence.91 A strong strand in Chinese strategic thinking has been an emphasis on conventional weapons in bolstering nuclear deterrence. As
China’s nuclear doctrine evolved, China’s leader at the time, Jiang Zemin (1989–2002), viewed
conventional and nuclear weapons as “combining multiple means” to strengthen deterrence.92
Under Hu Jintao (2002–2012), the doctrine was further adjusted to reflect a streamlining of
China’s nuclear and conventional capabilities. The so-called “three doubles” concept was developed. Accordingly, China sought to achieve “double (nuclear and conventional) deterrence,
double (nuclear and conventional) operations, and double (nuclear and conventional)
command.”93
A more recent component was Hu’s March 2012 emphasis on “systems confrontation” with
potential enemies.94 However, it is the “third double” command that raises troubling questions in
a crisis scenario. As Lewis and Xue note:
the basic dilemma stems from the deployment of two types of missiles on the same Second Artillery
bases with fundamentally different capabilities and purposes. In the practice of double deterrence and
double operations, the nuclear missiles’ essential mission is to deter a nuclear first strike on China, and
they are only to be used in extremis. However, at the same time, the conventional weapons on the
formerly all-nuclear bases must be ready to strike first and hard.95
The foregoing is particularly troubling since it blurs the line between conventional and nuclear
warfare.96
Conclusion
As analysts have pointed out, there is a strong strain in American elite (and arguably also popular)
thinking that has historically only reluctantly accepted balance of power and deterrence thinking.97 This explains the fact that whenever the USA has had the ability and resources to do so,
it has attempted to transcend the restraints of the balance of power and deterrence, in favor of
missile defenses. The irony in pursuing this course of action is that such behavior is a catalyst
for balancing and deterrence.
This article has examined the reaction of Russia and China, in the structural context of the
post-Cold War era of unipolarity, to the deployment of BMD during the Obama Administration.
It has been argued that Moscow and Beijing’s response is a demonstrable instance of hard internal
balancing in the nuclear sphere, activating security dilemma dynamics. It is possible that the reactions of Russia and China could have been avoided, or their intensity reduced, but it would have at
once required more restraint and a more comprehensive strategic vision on this issue on behalf of
Defense & Security Analysis
25
the Obama Administration. Russian and Chinese officials repeatedly stated that balancing would
be their inevitable reaction to the US pursuit of missile defenses. Moreover, Moscow and Beijing
responded even though they believed it was undermining their own and America’s security,
leading to a net decrease in security. As this article has shown, the danger is that internal balancing
has become self-reinforcing, thus facilitating the emergence of an increasingly conflictual international system in which heightened security dilemma dynamics characterize great power
relations.
Notes
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Associated Press, ‘Obama Rejects Missile Criticism’, Daily Herald, September 21, 2009.
Andrew Futter, ‘The Elephant in the Room: US Ballistic Missile Defence Under Barack Obama’,
Defense & Security Analysis 28, no. 1 (2012): 3–16.
See then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ comments in Peter Baker, ‘White House Scraps Bush’s
Approach to Missile Shield’, New York Times, September 18, 2009.
Following Pape, hard balancing is defined in this article as ‘military buildups, war-fighting alliances,
and transfers of military technology to US opponents’. Robert Pape, ‘Soft Balancing Against the US’,
International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 9.
Following Waltz, internal balancing is defined as states ‘relying on their own capabilities rather than
the capabilities of allies’. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1979), 168.
Barack Obama, YouTube Video, December 8, 2008, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7o84PE871BE&
feature=related (accessed October 13, 2012).
‘Presidential Q&A: President-Elect Barack Obama’, Arms Control Today 38, no. 10 (2008): 31–6.
Barack Obama, ‘Renewing American Leadership’, Foreign Affairs 84, no. 4 (2007): 3.
Associated Press, ‘Obama Rejects Missile Criticism’.
Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of
Defense, 2010).
This has included the cancelation of the Kinetic Energy Interceptor, the Multiple Kill Vehicle and the
Airborne Laser.
Dean A. Wilkening, ‘Does BMD in Europe Threaten Russia?’ Survival 54, no. 1 (2012): 31–52, at 34.
Deutsche Welle, ‘NATO Launches BMD Shield’, May 21, 2012.
Fred Weir, ‘NATO: European Missile Shield “Provisionally Operational”’, Christian Science Monitor,
May 21, 2012.
Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Aegis Ballistic BMD (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,
Congressional Research Service (April 26, 2010): 7.
David J. Kramer, ‘Resetting US-Russian Relations: It Takes Two’, The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 1
(2010): 61–79, at 66.
Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, 34.
Anatoly Medetsky, ‘Putin Links “Brave” US Shift to Trade’, Moscow Times, September 21, 2009.
‘Obama Accused of Cold War Outlook’, Moscow Times, September 23, 2009.
Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,
2010). The QDR states that “America’s interests and role in the world require armed forces with
unmatched capabilities”, iv.
Nikolai Sokov, ‘NATO-Russian Disputes and Cooperation on BMD’, Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, May 14, 2012, http://cns.miis.edu/stories/120514_nato_russia_missile_defense.htm (accessed
November 5, 2012).
See http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/197547.htm (accessed October 31, 2012).
Theodore Postol, ‘The Proposed US Missile Defence in Europe: Technological Issues Relevant to
Policy’ (presentation given at the American Association for the advancement of science, Washington,
DC, August 28, 2007), http://www.aaas.org/cstsp/files/BriefDefense.PDF (accessed November 7,
2012).
Department of Defense, Ballistic BMD Review Report, iv.
National Research Council, Making Sense of Ballistic BMD: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems
for US Boost-Phase BMD in Comparison to Other Alternatives (Washington, DC: National Academies
Press, 2012).
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N. Khoo and R. Steff
John Feffer, ‘An Arms Race in Asia?’ Asian Perspective 33, no. 4 (2009): 5–15.
This would be accompanied by new “warships, primarily nuclear-powered submarines carrying cruise
missiles and multifunctional submarines as well as a system of aerospace defence.” This would “guarantee” its nuclear deterrent and conventional war-fighting capability. BBC News, ‘Russia to Upgrade
Nuclear Systems’, September 26, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7638356.stm (accessed
November 5, 2012); Former Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov stated in a 2002 Izvestiya interview that Russia was working on a low-yield warhead to penetrate 30–40 meters into rock and
destroy a buried target. Mark B. Schneider, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, and US House of Representatives, ‘The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine
of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China’, October 14, 2011, http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/.../CHRG-112hhrg71449.pdf (accessed November 5, 2012).
Schneider et al., ‘The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine’.
Russia Today, ‘New Submarine Supermissile can Pierce ABM Shield’, August 10, 2012, http://rt.com/
news/new-nuclear-submarine-missile/ (accessed November 5, 2012).
Podvig Pavel, ‘New ICBM Contract Reportedly went to Makayev Design Bureaum’, Russian Strategic
Nuclear Forces Blog, May 14, 2011, http://russianforces.org/blog/2011/05/new_icbm_contract_
reportedly_w.shtml (accessed November 5, 2012).
Schneider et al., ‘The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine’, op. cit.
Daily Telegraph, ‘Russia Tests “Fifth Generation” Missile that can Penetrate Nato Defence System’,
May 23, 2012.
Marc V. Schanz, ‘Out of Hibernation’, Airforce-magazine.com, February 2012, http://www.airforcemagazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/February%202012/0212Hibernation.aspx; Podvig Pavel,
‘New Command and Control System for the Rocket Forces’, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Blog,
December 16, 2011, http://russianforces.org/blog/2011/12/new_command_and_control_system.shtml
(accessed November 5, 2012).
Ruslan Pukhov, ‘Joint Missile Defense is Limited to Data Sharing’, The Moscow Times, May 3, 2012,
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/joint-missile-defense-is-limited-to-data-sharing/
457902.html (accessed November 5, 2012).
Oleg Nekhai, ‘S-500 – A Miracle of a Weapon’, Voice of Russia, July 5, 2012, http://english.ruvr.ru/
2012_07_02/80032342/ (accessed November 5, 2012).
Carlo Kopp, ‘Almaz-Antey S-500 Triumfator M Self Propeller Air/Missile Defence System/SA-XNN’, Air Power Australia, July 17, 2012, http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-S-500-Triumfator-M.
html (accessed November 5, 2012)
CBS News, ‘Putin: Russian Military to get $770B Upgrade’, February 20, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/
8301-202_162-57381212/putin-russian-military-to-get-$770b-upgrade/ (accessed November 5, 2012).
Stratfor, ‘The Future of Russia’s Military: Part 4’, August 30, 2012, http://www.stratfor.com/sample/
analysis/future-russias-military-part-4 (accessed November 5, 2012).
‘Being Strong, National Security Guarantees for Russia’, The 4th Media, March 2, 2012, http://www.
4thmedia.org/2012/03/02/being-strong-national-security-guarantees-for-russia/ (accessed November
4, 2012).
Ibid.
Reuters, ‘Putin Assails Missile Shield before Obama Meeting’, June 14, 2012, http://uk.reuters.com/
article/2012/06/14/uk-russia-usa-missiles-idUKBRE85D18W20120614 (accessed November 2, 2012).
Aleksey Nikolsky, ‘Russia and the Changing World’, RIA Novosti, February 27, 2012 http://rt.com/
politics/official-word/putin-russia-changing-world-263/ (accessed November 5, 2012).
Wade Boese, ‘Russia Halts Missile Launch Notices’, Arms Control Today 38, no. 2 (2008): 46.
See text of doctrine located at: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2010/02/05/text-of-newly-approvedrussian-military-doctrine/l8t (accessed October 28, 2012).
Pavel Podvig, ‘Instrumental Influences—Russia and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review’, The Nonproliferation Review 18, no. 1 (2011): 39–50.
Lithuania Tribune, ‘Russia Deploys S-400 Missile Defence in Kaliningrad’, April 9, 2012, http://www.
lithuaniatribune.com/2012/04/09/russia-deploys-s-400-missile-defence-in-kaliningrad/ (accessed November 5, 2012).
Ilya Kramnik, ‘The Iskander: A Story of a New Face-Off’, Ria Novosti, November 19, 2008, http://en.
rian.ru/analysis/20081110/118218596.html (accessed November 5, 2012).
Bruno Waterfield, ‘Russia Threatens NATO with Military Strikes over Missile Defence System’, Daily
Telegraph, May 3, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/9243954/Russiathreatens-Nato-with-military-strikes-over-missile-defence-system.html (accessed November 5, 2012).
Defense & Security Analysis
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27
See Arms Control and Disarmament section of China’s 2000 White Paper, http://www.china.org.cn/ewhite/2000/index.htm (accessed October 28, 2012).
Kori J. Urayama, ‘Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense: Policy Implications for Japan’,
Asian Survey 46, no. 2 (2000): 591–621.
Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, ‘US Plans New Asia Missile Defences’, Wall Street Journal,
August 23, 2012.
See http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/south-korea-says-not-joining-us-antimissile-program/ (accessed
November 5, 2012).
See http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/538054.html (accessed November 5,
2012).
Cheng Guangjin, ‘US Plan to Build Missile Defense System Criticized’, China Daily, April 12, 2012.
‘US Expects South Korean Role in Global Missile Defense’, Korea Times, September 11, 2012.
Entous and Barnes, ‘US Plans New Asia Missile Defenses’, op. cit.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Thom Shanker and Ian Johnson, ‘US Accord with Japan over BMD Draws Criticism China’, New York
Times, September 17, 2012.
Ibid.
David J. Berteau and Michael Green, US Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), 6.
Ibid., 13.
Ibid., 21.
Ibid., 14.
Ibid., 26.
Ibid., 33.
Luo Gang of the Chinese Armament Command Department wrote that missile defense was creating a
‘missile blockade’ along China’s eastern flank that “directly undermines our defensive military capability and constitutes direct threats to our defence posture.” Quote cited in Eric Hagt, ‘China’s ASAT
Test: Strategic Response’, China Security (Winter 2007): 45.
Qin Jize and Li Xiaokun, ‘China Circled by Chain of US Anti-missile Systems’, China Daily, February
22, 2010.
Cited in Keith Richburg, ‘US Pivot to Asia Makes China Nervous’, Washington Post, November 17,
2011.
Baohui Zhang, ‘U.S. Missile Defense and China’s Nuclear Posture: Changing Dynamics of an
Offense-Defense Arms Race’, International Affairs 87, no. 3 (2011): 555–69, at 555.
William J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger, America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington, DC: United States
Institute for Peace Press, 2009), 33.
Thomas J. Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Modernization and
U.S.-China Security Relations’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 4 (2012): 447–87, Zhang, ‘US
BMD and China’s Nuclear Posture’, 555–69; M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, ‘China’s
Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure’, International Security 35, no. 2 (2010): 68.
Andrew Erickson, ‘Chinese BMD Countermeasures: Breaching America’s Great Wall in Space?’, in
China’s Nuclear Force Modernization, ed. Lyle Goldstein and Andrew Erickson (Newport: Rhode
Island, 2006), 77–86.
Zhang, ‘US Missile Defence and China’s Nuclear Posture’, 555–69, at 564.
Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of
China 2010 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense, 2011), 34.
Ibid., 24.
Hans M. Kristensen, ‘No, China Does Not Have 3,000 Nuclear Weapons’, Federation of Atomic
Scientists Strategic Security Blog, December 3, 2011, http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/12/
chinanukes.php (accessed October 31, 2012).
‘China’s Successful Anti-Missile Test’, Strategic Comments 16, no. 2 (2010): 1–3; ‘China’s J-20:
Future Rival for Air dominance’, Strategic Comments 17, no. 1 (2011): 1–3;
Schneider et al., The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine, op. cit.
Estimates are based on MIRVs containing 5–10 warheads so that one brigade of 12 ICBMs would
contain 60–120 warheads. See Richard D. Fisher and Testimony before the House Armed Services
28
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85.
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90.
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93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
N. Khoo and R. Steff
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, ‘Nuclear Weapons Modernization in Russia and China: Understanding Impacts to the United States’, October 14, 2011, http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/
hearings-display?ContentRecord_id=798a4a17-2a63-45b7-ae79-4629c32dfdd7 (accessed June 20,
2013).
Armed Forces International, ‘China Reports DF-41 ICBM Test Launch’, August 29, 2012, http://www.
armedforces-int.com/news/china-reports-df-41-icbm-test-launch.html (accessed November 5, 2012).
William Lowther, ‘China Held Secret Missile Tests: Report’, Taipei Times, September 7, 2012.
Jorge Benitez, ‘Chinese General Warns that New Missile Shield May Spark China Nuclear Upgrade’,
July 18, 2012, http://www.acus.org/natosource/chinese-general-warns-new-missile-shield-may-sparkchina-nuclear-upgrade (accessed November 5, 2012).
ASB is a successor to the Air-Land Battle concept of the 1980s, which sought to contain the growth in
soviet military capabilities in Europe.
Department of Defense, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 4–5.
Bill Gertz, ‘Pentagon Battle Concept has Cold War Posture on China’, Washington Times, November
9, 2011.
Keith Bradsher, ‘China is said to be Bolstering Missile Capabilities’, New York Times, August 24,
2012.
John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, ‘Making China’s Nuclear War Plan’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68, no.
5 (2012): 49.
See Section II of the document, State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National
Defence in 2006 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2006), http://www.china.org.cn/
english/features/book/194485.htm (accessed October 29, 2012).
Michael Chase, Andrew Erickson, and Christopher Yeaw, ‘Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile
Force Modernization’, Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 1 (2009): 95–8.
Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution’, 454, 474–81.
Lewis and Litai, ‘Making China’s Nuclear War Plan’, 50.
Ibid., 53.
Ibid., 53.
Ibid., 60–1.
Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution’, op. cit.
John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 402; Henry
Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 221, 431.