Publishing house of the Matej Bel University
in Banská Bystrica
Belianum
Rastislav Kazanský
The Theory of Conflicts
Banská Bystrica
2015
This textbook is a result of the Innovative Steps in University Education
in the 21 Century project (ITMS: 26110230109) in compliance with the
Operational Programme Education. The project is co-funded by the European
Union. Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica is the grant receiver.
This textbook is a result of the Innovative Steps in University Education in
the 21 Century project (ITMS: 26110230109) in compliance with the
Operational Programme Education. The project is co-funded by the
European Union. Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica is the grant
receiver.
Title:
The Theory of Conflicts
Author:
© Assoc. Prof. PhDr. Rastislav Kazanský, PhD
Reviewers:
prof. Ing. Pavel Nečas, PhD.
Security Management College in Košice
Assoc. Prof. PhDr. Jana Lasicová, PhD.
Science Editor: prof. PhDr. Peter Terem, PhD.
Approved by:
Textbook approved January 13, 2015 by the Editorial
Board of the Faculty of Political Science and International
Relations, Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica
© Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, 2015
ISBN 978-80-557-0970-3
© Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, 2015
ISBN 978-80-557-0970-3
Contents
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................7
1 THE CHARACTERISTICS AND DEFINITIONS OF THE TERM
'CONFLICT' ...............................................................................................9
1.1 SELECTED DEFINITIONS OF THE TERM 'CONFLICT'
IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ................................... 9
1.2 CONFLICT ANALYSIS ..................................................................................... 13
1.3 CONFLICT TYPOLOGY ................................................................................... 19
1.4 ANALYTICAL LEVELS OF CONFLICT CATEGORIZATION .............. 22
1.5 EXAMPLES OF SUPRANATIONAL PARTIES INVOLVED IN
CONFLICT RESOLUTION .............................................................................. 28
1.6 METHODOLOGY OF CONFLICT DATABASE CREATION................. 36
2 SPECIFICITIES OF CONFLICTS AND CRISIS RESEARCH .................42
2.1 CAUSES OF CONFLICTS AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON .................... 42
2.2 CAUSES OF POLITICAL CONFLICTS ........................................................ 44
2.3 CONFLICTS AND NATURAL RESOURCES ............................................. 50
2.4 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONFLICTS ................................................... 52
2.5 APPROACHES TO ETHNIC CONFLICT RESEARCH............................ 59
2.6 CAUSES OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS .............................................................. 64
2.7 CAUSES OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS ........................................................ 66
3 CONFLICTS RESOLUTION WITHIN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS74
3.1 METHODS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION ................................................ 76
3.2 ALTERNATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION .............................................. 85
3.3 IMPORTANCE AND STATUS OF THE UN AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION WITHIN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS .................. 93
3.4 ISSUES OF THE DEFINITION AND CONTENT
OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ........................................................... 96
3.5 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS ........................... 114
3.6 NATO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS .................................................. 125
3.7 EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS ............................................. 129
4 CONFLICT PREVENTION WITHIN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS...........................................................................................133
4.1 AREAS UTILIZING CONFLICT PREVENTION ................................... 136
4.2 APPROACHES TOWARDS CONFLICT PREVENTION ..................... 137
4.3 PERSONS INVOLVED IN VIOLENCE PREVENTION ....................... 140
4.4 METHODS EMPLOYED BY PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY ................... 145
4.5 EARLY WARNING METHOD ....................................................................... 147
CONCLUSION..............................................................................................154
List of abbreviations
AMIB
ARF
ASF
ASEAN
AU
CEWARN
CEWS
CIFP
COW
DDA
DESA
DPA
DPI
DPKO
EASBRIG
ECOBRIG
ECOMOG
ECOWARN
ECOWAS
ERRF
ESDP
EU
EWR
FAST
FEWER
FSI
GTZ
HIIK
ICG
IGAD
ILO
NATO
OAU
OAS
African Union Mission in Burundi
ASEAN Regional Forum
African Standby Force
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
African Union
Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
Continental Early Warning System
Country indicators for Foreign Policy
Correlates of War project (University of Michigan)
Department for Disarmament Affairs
Department of Economic and Social Affairs
Department of Political Affairs
Department of Public Information
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Eastern Africa Standby Brigade
ECOWAS Standby Brigade
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring
Group
ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network
Economic Community of West African States
European Rapid Reaction Force
European Security and Defence Policy
European Union
Early Warning and Response
Early Recognition and Analysis of Tension
Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
Fragile States Index (Index of State fragility)
German Technical Assistance Corporation
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research
International Crisis Group
Intergovernmental Authority on Development
International Labour Organization
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Organization of African Unity
Organization of American States
OLA
OMC
UN
PEO
PIF
PITF
PRIO
PSC
SADC
SADCBRIG
UCDP
UNCTAD
UNDP
UNESCO
UNHCR
UNICEF
USAID
WANEP
WARN
WHO
Office of Legal Affairs
Observation and Monitoring Centre
United Nations Organization
Peace Enforcement Operations
Pacific Island Forum
Political Instability Task Force
Peace Research Institute Oslo
African Union Peace and Security Council
Southern African Development Community
SADC Brigade
Uppsala Conflict Data Program
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
The United Nations Children's Fund
United States Agency for International Development
West African Network for Peacebuilding
West Africa Early Warning Network
World Health Organization
Introduction
Conflicts within the environment of international relations,
whether these are domestic or interstate, have become one of the most
intensely perceived security problems of the contemporary world. Their
nature is usually violent, accompanied by human casualties, which may
escalate to humanitarian crises and may cause enormous material,
population and ecological damage. Regions in conflict are the source of
population migration, increasing pressure and they become a suitable
environment for the formation of radical and terrorist groups. The
destructive force of conflicts causes an economic decline of countries and,
thus, increases the differences between stable regions and countries and
those regions and countries with ongoing conflicts. The resolution and
prevention of conflicts within international relations is a multidisciplinary
approach, which draws on psychology, sociology, mass communication,
development studies, studies of international institutions and political
science, security studies and, in particular, on the study of international
relations.
The resolution and prevention of conflicts is most commonly
understood as a part of the study of international relations, which touches
upon the aforementioned disciplines. The study, analysis, and research of
the theory and practice in the field of conflict resolution and prevention
has had its place within the framework of international relations on a
global scale for several years now. However, inside of the Slovak academic
and professional environment, these issues have been established only
recently. This fact made us choose these issues as the subject of our work.
This work may be used in the study of several scientific disciplines but
mainly when studying the issues of conflict prevention and resolution
within the context of international relations.
The goal of this publication is to provide a basic synthetic
theoretical analysis of conflicts, methods employed to resolve them and
the ways in which they may be prevented. The work is an introduction to
these issues. It attempts to include a wide range of topics dealt with by the
study of conflict resolution and prevention. The included deeper analysis
of the issue of conflict prevention is a key part of the work. Emphasis is
put on the theory and practice of conflicts, due to the importance of
conflict escalation prevention in the pre-conflict phase, the phase of
conflict transformation and during the process of post-conflict
reconstruction. Conflicts became more dynamic in the 21st century. This
change occurred not only with the parties directly involved in conflicts,
but also the parties involved in the resolution of conflicts, where we can
find many different units, in addition to states. Because of this, the bulk of
the work is focused on conflict prevention and resolution with the use and
participation of national, regional and supranational parties involved.
However, the current dynamics of international relations moves the
examined issues forward too rapidly, which is why the work is a reflection
of the state of events, which were current during the preparation and
implementation of submitted facts.
During the course of preparing the publication, we faced a
problem with terminological definition and a problem during translation.
Many of the terms used are known under different names in various
countries, which is why we have, in some cases, added foreign-language
terms to their English counterparts. The chosen terms and phrases have
been added to avoid confusion and specify the meaning of the terms in an
international context. The work has been created using the knowledge
collected from the works of several domestic and foreign authors and also
during the time spent cooperating with colleagues and students of the FPS
IR MBU (Faculty of Political Sciences and International Relations of the
Matej Bel University) in Banská Bystrica. Given the scope of the work, the
chapters do not contain complex comprehensive explanations of all the
issues related to the theory of conflict within international relations. The
publication, instead, has the ambition to contribute to the development of
security science in current international relations.
Lastly, the author of the publication would like to thank its
reviewers for their valuable comments, which helped increase its quality.
8
1
THE CHARACTERISTICS AND DEFINITIONS
OF THE TERM 'CONFLICT'
Most theorists and experts in the field of conflictology agree that
it is necessary to define conflicts -- that is to exactly and precisely
determine the type of conflict. This definition is the prerequisite for the
study of conflicts. Thanks to this, we can study them further and
determine the causes of conflicts, the development and goal of the parties
involved and the progress and a possible solution of conflicts. The first
chapter of the publication focuses on the characterization and definition
of the term 'conflict'. A conflict, as a multidimensional phenomenon, may
be classified into several groups according to its examined properties. The
following part of the chapter deals with the various phases of the conflict,
from its beginning to its end. The last part of the first introductory chapter
is a list of conflict databases and projects, which examine, categorize and
divide conflicts.
1.1
SELECTED DEFINITIONS OF THE TERM 'CONFLICT'
IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
The term 'conflict' accompanies the human race and society from
their very origins. Conflicts are present in the entirety of human history
(Ivančík, Nečas, 2012). We can find a number of different approaches to
the definition of conflict in available contemporary professional literature.
A conflict is a social phenomenon and its definition is quite complex.
During the examination, analysis and creation of specific definition, it is
necessary to take into account the structure, diversity and complexity of
this concept. In general, we can characterize a conflict (lat. conflictio, ger.
der Konflikt) as a dispute, discrepancy, disagreement, armed encounter or
war (Kačala, 1997). A situation where people, groups or countries enter
into serious dispute, may be an alternative definition. Basic meanings of
the term 'conflict' include: a situation in which violence is used, a struggle
between two countries or a situation in which thoughts, feelings, opinions,
ideals, etc. are in contradiction (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary,
2005).
9
Several authors deal with the definition of the term 'conflict'. O.
Krejčí defines a conflict as a situation, in which a certain group (tribe,
ethnic group, ideological group or state) or an individual is in a purposeful
dispute with one or more groups or individuals. A conflict is a struggle for
values relating to the maintenance or increase of welfare, status or power.
Opponents of these values try to neutralize, hurt or remove their rival or
rivals (Krejčí, 2007).
According to Š. Waisová, a conflict is a social reality, in which at
least two parties (individuals, groups, states), with a different outlook on
certain facts or different, contradictory interests, stand in opposition
(Waisová, 2002). According to her, a conflict represents a situation in
which, at the same time, a minimum of two parties are striving to obtain
the same goods, which are deficient and cannot satisfy the needs of both
(all) parties (Waisová, 2005).
D. Kusá defines a conflict as a state in which one or two (or more)
people and communities feel that their interests are incompatible. They
usually have an antagonistic approach towards each other, which they
show by trying to cause the other party harm. They seek to assert their
own interests by influencing the other party (Kusá, 2006).
F. Glasl provides a more specific definition of a conflict, as an
interaction between agents (individuals, groups or organizations), where
at least one agent understands that their thoughts, ideas, perceptions
and/or feelings are incompatible with the will, thoughts, feelings, etc. of
another agent (or agents) and s/he feels limited by their activities
(Mischnick, 2007).
According to L. Hofreiter, a conflict represents a certain quality of
relations between units of a social environment (parties involved, which
may be individuals, social groups, states or a coalition of states), which are
manifested in the efforts of certain parties involved to promote their own
needs, achieve their own interests and objectives at the expense of and
against the wishes of their opponents, or which are contradictory to the
interests of their opponents (Hofreiter, 2008).
The number of definitions of the term 'conflict' depends on the
complexity of its concept. Some definitions define a conflict in general and
only create basic starting points from which we may further explore this
concept. On the other hand, other definitions deal with certain, particular
and specific, characteristics of conflicts based on their typology. To
10
analyse a conflict from the point of view of international security, it is
necessary to lay down those properties and elements which are, in
general, common for all conflicts, regardless of their specificities. While
exploring this concept, we may use two basic models, which occur during
conflicts in natural environment as well as those in social environment.
The static and dynamic model.
The static model examines a conflict as a social complex, which
consists of two elements. Parties participating in the conflict (people,
animals, objects, theories, etc.) and the relations between them.
The dynamic model draws on the behaviourist theory of
psychology. According to this theory, the 'stimulus-response' principle
affects the behaviour of a person. A person reacts to the stimuli from the
external environment.
If these impulses are in contradiction with the interests of the
object (person or group), their reaction to the situation is adequate and a
conflict arises (Hofreiter, 2008). It is these relationships that have an
impact on the dynamic aspect of the conflict.
However, the concept of 'conflict' cannot be put into contrast with
'competition'. During a conflict, the parties involved seek to strengthen
their position and status at the expense of the others. One of the parties
may even attempt to remove or destroy their opponents. Compared to
this, competition means that even though the parties involved are trying
to achieve the same goal at the expense of other parties, their mutual
relationship is not as critical as to warrant a fear of elimination of one of
them (Krejčí, 2007).
Equally, we cannot identify 'conflict' with 'tension' because
tension means a hidden hostility, fear, suspicion, a perception of the
divergence of interests and perhaps also a wish of superiority, or the wish
of gaining independence. In this case, fear does not usually escalate from
attitudes and perceptions to mutual hostile acts (Krejčí, 2007).
When characterising and examining political conflicts, it is
necessary to define the term 'political crisis', which represents the
beginning of military solving of conflicts of interests and powers. The
word crisis, in post-modern terms, expresses restlessness and chaos
within international politics and it also defines the concept of disorder
and non-compliance on a global scale.
11
Not every conflict is a political crisis, but every crisis includes the
state of conflict. The crisis is usually a conflict which stems from a dispute
about a certain issue. In this phase, stability transforms into instability, or
certainties into uncertainties in certain processes of development. A crisis
is a particular moment or a period of time, after which a significant twist
in the evolution or a change of the system may occur (Crises, crisis
situations and crisis conditions..., 2005).
A crisis is more than simple tension, restlessness or separation
within international relations. O. Krejčí defines a crisis as a type of conflict
which is typically represented by a sudden outburst of unexpected events
and hostilities, caused by existing conflicts (Krejčí, 2007). A crisis in
international politics is characterised by unforeseen and unexpected
reactions from opposing parties, a feeling of great danger, a sense of a lack
of time to come to conclusions and decisions and by the feeling that
inactivy will have horrific consequences.
Conflicts and crises, which the human civilization faces today,
become increasingly complex and harder to resolve, as a result of growing
globalization (Ivančík, Jurčák, 2013a). Within international relations of the
21st century, conflicts are characterized by four basic components: a) the
parties involved, b) the issues causing the conflict, c) attitudes, d) actions.
a) the parties involved in conflicts are usually the states. However,
international
organizations,
non-state
organizations,
revolutionary movements and ethnic groups may also become
involved. For illustration, in the period from 1818 until 1996,
states participated in 41% of all conflicts. They were some of the
decisive factors in the initiation of conflicts and belonged to the
most active parties involved in international conflicts (Krejčí,
2007). Presently, the number of states involved in conflicts is
decreasing while the number of non-state parties involved is
rising.
b) the issues causing the conflict are the objects and/or the
position the persons involved want to achieve. The parties
involved in the conflict (e.g. states) attempt to gain assets which,
on one hand, strengthen their power and/or their potential to
obtain power and, on the other hand, take some of their power
away. These are, e.g. territories, safe areas and regions, control
over resources, a world revolution or dissolution of certain
12
c)
d)
1.2
states, etc. The conflicting behaviour of the parties involved
implies their attitudes and actions. Such behaviour is caused by
the fact that Party A has or gains a certain status, which opposes
the wishes, ideas and interests of Party B.
attitudes represent the behaviour which may be expected from
the persons involved. They are associated with hostility,
distrust, stereotyping and a sense of justice. They also represent
a source of tension and help the leaders of revolutions and
citizens to become committed and to act in the conflict.
actions that occur during conflicts may be diplomatic,
commercial, serve as propaganda or other. The parties involved
tend to use them against each other (Krejčí, 2007).
CONFLICT ANALYSIS
Conflict analysis is the examination of the nature, causes,
dynamics and parties involved in a conflict. Exploration of these elements
allows us to better understand specific conflicts and to provide
appropriate and accurately targeted means by which to deal with them.
On the other hand, it is necessary to realize that the dynamics of conflicts
is extremely complex and we often need to use different processes to
analyse them.
An analysis of a conflict happens on multiple levels (e.g. local,
regional, national or global). One of the objectives of this analysis is to
define the links and relations among the given levels of conflict. It is
necessary to correctly identify the point of view for the analysis on
different levels. For example, the dynamics and issues of a given dispute
may be different on one level than the dynamics and process on another
level and they may have a different intensity curve. Understanding these
links creates prerequisites for a comprehensive and explicit examination
of the intervention and dynamics of conflicts. All of these levels affect one
another.
Conflict analysis aims to define how it is possible to transform
conflict situations and settle disputes among the parties involved. It is
necessary to understand the context of the conflict, as well as the
interactions between intervention and context, in order to understand its
transformation.
13
This interaction is the basis for the following process, which is
designed to prevent unwanted effects and, conversely, to maximize
positive effects on the conflict itself.
The basic points of conflict analysis are:
a)
the profile of the conflict,
b)
the parties involved in the conflict,
c)
the reasons for the conflict,
d)
the dynamics of the conflict.
The conflict profile defines a brief characterization of the context
unique for the given conflict. When defining the conflict profile, it is
necessary to answer a few basic questions which would help determine
the nature of the conflict's environment more precisely. R. Mischnick
defines the initial questions:
 What is the geopolitical, economic, political, and sociocultural context of the security situation? Geographical
localization, political, economic and social structure, history,
composition of the population, geostrategic location,
environment, etc.
 What are the acute social, economic, political and
environmental issues in the country? Destruction of social
sphere, new infrastructure, decentralization, elections,
reforms, issue of refugees, military and civilian victims or
presence of armed forces.
 Which dispute-affected areas may be present within this
context? Area under the influence of individual parties
involved, close proximity of battle fronts to natural sources or
strategic infrastructure, population exiled to the edge of
society.
 Is the history of the conflict present? Key events, attempts at
mediation, external intervention (Mischnick, 2007).
The term 'causes of conflicts' comes to play here. A cause, in a
broader sense, is a phenomenon that gives rise to another phenomenon’s
appearing. It is necessary to realize that conflicts are multidimensional
phenomena without a single explicit cause. They have several causes, the
conflict-generating potential of which is combined. On the other hand, we
14
also have to consider the fact that the stimulus (the cause) which causes a
conflict in a certain group, may remain without response in a different
environment.
Generally, we can divide conflicts into the following basic
categories, based on their causes:
 conflicts over identity and self-determination, which are
characterized predominantly by ethnonational and
ethnocultural conflicts;
 economically motivated conflicts, during which a specific type
of conflict emerges solely to gain profit, a so-called "war for
profit";
 conflicts based on political basis, due to the poor functioning
of the government, the inability to ensure primary function of
the state (Tomeš, 2007).
Some of the main causes of conflicts are: a) structural causes of
conflicts – illegitimate government, lack of government power, low
political participation, unequal political and social opportunities, unequal
access to natural resources, etc.; b) events which are the immediate
causes of conflicts – e.g. uncontrolled security services, human rights
violations, destabilizing situation in neighbouring countries, increase in
the ownership of light weapons, etc.; c) the so-called "conflict defractors"
(conflict triggers) which may cause an outbreak of violence and a
subsequent escalation of conflicts. Such triggers are, for example, elections
in the country, a collapse of local currency, an enormous increase in
unemployment, an increase in prices or a shortage of basic commodities, a
leak of state capital, the imprisonment or assassination of a key political
leader; d) factors which prolong conflict dynamics – e.g. opposing parties
becoming more radical, the development of war economy, the availability
of weapons, etc.; e) factors which contribute to establishing peace – a
dialogue between the parties involved, the process of demobilisation,
reforms, anti-discrimination measures, the commitment of the civil
society to maintain peace.
The parties involved in conflicts may be individuals, groups or
institutions, organizations or, in the context of international relations,
explicitly defined states, which are immediately (positively or negatively)
affected by the conflict, which create a conflict or work with a conflict in
15
the process of managing or transformation of its dynamics. Parties may be
directly or indirectly involved in a conflict. Parties directly involved in a
conflict are those participants, who are in a direct, immediate dispute –
they are the so-called subjects of the conflict. Parties indirectly involved in
a conflict are the so-called third parties. They play a secondary role in the
course of the dispute. We distinguish parties involved on the basis of their
relations towards the opposing parties, their interest, goals, positions and
strategies. According to R. Mischnick, the main parties involved may be:
national government, political parties, the security sector (police forces,
the army), the private sector, local military leaders and armed groups,
neighbouring states, donor organizations and foreign embassies,
multilateral and regional organizations, political and religious groups, the
civil society, peace groups, trade unions, refugees and others.
The parties involved may pursue global interests, political
ideologies, political participation, political commitments, economic
activities, resources or religious ideals (Mischnick, 2007).
We can understand the dynamics of a conflict as a result of the
interaction among the conflict's profile, the parties involved and its causes
(Hofreiter, 2008). All conflicts and disputes within international relations
go through certain developmental stages and levels of intensity, during
their course. Research and correct understanding of these development
stages are a necessity if we wish to effectively interject, appropriately
solve and prevent the escalation of conflicts. Understanding the relations
between the parties involved in the dispute is a key factor when
determining the way in which to solve a conflict. A change of the code of
conduct, goals, interests or the way in which the parties involved
negotiate can change the dynamics of the conflict.
Every conflict has certain phases (stages), which follow one after
another. Long-term studies have shown that not every conflict necessarily
needs to go through all of the stages. These may be interrupted during the
course of the conflict (e.g. after negotiations or mediation by a third
party), they may be repeated after a certain interruption or return to a
stage of lower intensity. In some cases, conflicts may stagnate at certain
points for decades. Experts look at phases of a conflict in different ways.
They approach the stages of conflicts differently but the evaluation of the
level of intensity of violence over a period of time is key. In general, we
16
can summarize these studies into the following phases (stages) of
conflicts:
 the pre-conflict phase,
 the confrontation,
 the crisis,
 the consequences,
 the post-conflict phase.
Chart 1 shows the aforementioned phases.
Chart 1 PHASES OF CONFLICTS
Source: Mischnick, 2007
There is always a potential for the existence of a conflict when the
parties involved have identical objectives, needs, interests and values, the
achievement and satisfaction of which is limited. This latent phase is the
phase before the conflict itself, when the dispute is not yet shown openly.
It is characterized by tension between the parties involved in the conflict,
or by the effort to avoid mutual conflict. The dispute may not occur at all,
if there is no "trigger event" or "incident", which leads to the opening of
the conflict and then to the second phase – the confrontation. At this point,
the opposing parties begin to accumulate resources and, possibly, search
for allies in case the dispute will escalate. The crisis is the peak stage of
the conflict, in which tension and violence are the most intense. At this
stage, the opposing parties usually cease all communication. The next
stage of the development of the conflict is the consequences which every
crisis inevitably leads to. One of the parties involved may defeat the
17
opponent, back down and accept the terms of the opposing party or
surrender. In this stage, there is a possibility to settle the dispute. During
the stage after the conflict, a situation which allows a non-violent settling
of the dispute, may occur. On one hand, there is a possibility to settle the
relations between the parties involved, on the other hand, things may
return to the pre-conflict phase, if the causes of the conflict have not been
adequately resolved.
A more specific definition of the various stages of a conflict may
be found in the study of Š. Waisová, who divides conflicts into seven
phases, displayed in Chart 2.
1)
latent conflict,
2)
manifestation of the conflict,
3)
escalation of the conflict,
4)
a stalemate in the conflict,
5)
de-escalation of the conflict,
6)
resolution of the conflict,
7)
post-conflict settlement of relations – peace-building
Chart 2 - DYNAMICS AND STAGES OF A CONFLICT
Source: Waisová, 2005
18
1.3
CONFLICT TYPOLOGY
We may find many divisions, typologies and classifications of
conflicts in contemporary professional literature. Several factors play a
part in the genesis of conflicts and the behaviour of the parties involved. It
is, in particular, the history of the parties' mutual relationship, their
nature, their perception and explication of the conflict situation. When
examining conflicts, it is necessary to delve into their essence and to
understand their basic nature. We may then divide conflicts into multiple
groups according to multiple criteria. These divisions will depend on the
common features and criteria which we will consider essential and crucial
to express the main basis for the conflict. According to L. Hofreiter, such
features and criteria are:
 the parties involved in the conflict (intrapersonal,
interpersonal, between an individual and a group, between
groups, between states or groups of states);
 the level of the conflict (horizontally or vertically oriented
conflicts);
 the nature of the needs that caused the conflict (material,
immaterial, spiritual);
 the duration of the conflict (short-term, quick, long-term,
etc.);
 the consequences of the conflict (constructive, destructive)
(Hofreiter, 2008).
Social nature affects the investigation of conflicts. According to Š.
Waisová, during classification, it is necessary to include (Waisová, 2005):
1. research of the background of conflicts (the geopolitical and economic
status of the parties involved, the history of their mutual relations and the
history of the conflict itself), 2. the type of parties involved (states, nonstate organizations, international organizations, movements for
independence, revolutionary or insurgent groups, etc.), 3. research of the
character and nature of the opponents of the conflict, 4. research of the
causes of the conflict (the subject of the dispute), 5. research of the
environment and the context of the conflict (who is involved in the
conflict, who is supporting the opposing parties, which party is seeking a
solution).
19
By investigating the aforementioned characteristics of conflicts,
we can get a comprehensive image of the nature of the conflict, the stages
of its future development, the strategies and means of the parties
involved, etc. Based on the definition of these properties, it is possible to
define the causes of the dispute, the parties involved in the conflict and
how we can specify conflicts.
When analysing a conflict, we may use the following classification:
a) natural or physical conflicts, when an individual stands in opposition
with nature; b) social conflicts, when a person (social groups) stands in
opposition to another person (social group); c) internal or psychological
conflict, when an individual is in conflict with themselves, their desires are
in conflict with their options and their conscience (Hofreiter, 2008).
L. Hofreiter also distinguishes the following types of conflicts
(Hofreiter, 2008): conflict of relations (an aversion toward another
person, etc.), conflict of interests (the clash of different interests and
needs), conflict of values (the dispute about what is right or wrong,
correct or incorrect), a structural conflict (organisational structures with
an imbalance of power), a conflict of information (different sources and
interpretation of data).
Classification according to interests is another possible division:
The interests of the parties involved differ and they depend on several
factors (needs, desires, concerns, etc.). Conflicts take place when these
factors clash. They relate, in particular, to the areas of a) resources
(territorial, financial, personnel and material) and their distribution,
which means the contribution to the process of fund and resource
distribution and to the process of political decision-making; b) identity (of
social, religious, cultural and political communities and of communities
with which individuals identify); c) values (specifically those that stem
from religion, ideology or the system of government); d) status (relating
to individuals or social groups and their status in society, their compliance
with and respect towards values and traditions) (Kusá, 2006).
The current conflict theory within international relations
recognizes two types of conflicts, the symmetric and asymmetric conflict.
A symmetric conflict is a conflict of interests between relatively similar
parties involved, for example, between states, political parties, etc. An
asymmetric conflict is a conflict between different groups, for example,
between a minority and a majority, employees and employers, the
20
government and rebels, etc. During such a conflict, the dominant party has
better conditions to assert its interests, values and needs, because it has
the means and resources to do so. The proportionality of power and a
change of the status of the parties involved is a solution to an asymmetric
conflict (Hofreiter, 2008).
We may also define a symmetric armed conflict as a large-scale
armed military confrontation of the armed forces of the participating
states, coalitions or other integration groups (alliances, pacts, etc.), the
result of which is usually easily measured, e.g. by freeing or occupying a
certain territory, by the destruction, defeat or elimination of a known
adversary, by achieving set objectives, etc. Unlike the symmetrical armed
conflict, an asymmetrical armed conflict is a relatively small-scale and
low-intensity military confrontation, in which the parties involved differ
by their strength and tactics. It is mostly a conflict, in which a superior
external military force, represented by a state (alliance, coalition, group),
enters into a military confrontation with an inferior internal military
force, represented by a state or non-state party, the territory of which is
where the conflict takes place. Since the "weaker" party cannot succeed in
an open military confrontation, because its capabilities, capacities and
resources are incomparably smaller, it attempts to succeed by using
asymmetric operations and forms of struggle (Ivančík, 2013a).
The 2005 Human Security Report used the following division of
conflicts for the first time: state-based armed conflicts – if two states are
involved in a conflict, or if there is a conflict between a state and a nonstate party (rebels, an uprising, etc.); non-state armed conflicts – when
non-state groups are involved in a conflict; one-sided violence – violence
(genocide1, politicide2 and other violent assaults) committed by the
government or political groups against civilians (Human Security Report
2005).
Genocide – is an act carried out with the intent to destroy the entirety or a part of a
national, ethnic or racial group. It is also a crime against humanity (Tusičisny, 2007).
2 Politicide – is a more neutral term, used for the murdering of groups which are not included
in the 1984 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Tusičisny, 2007).
1
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1.4
ANALYTICAL LEVELS OF CONFLICT CATEGORIZATION
We may divide conflicts based on several categories, such as
essential or accidental, controlled and uncontrolled, ones that can or
cannot be solved. In conflict theory, we most commonly encounter the
following categorization: 1. According to the "position" of the conflict
within the system of international relations: a) system conflicts, b)
interstate conflicts, c) domestic conflicts; 2. According to the means used
in the conflict: a) armed, b) unarmed; 3. According to the causes of the
conflict, in other words, the conflicting interests: a) power struggles, b)
constitutional, c) ideological, d) economic, etc. (Waisová, 2005). When
defining conflicts according to the "position or location" within the system
of international relations, we may use three analytical levels.
(1) The first level is the international system, the largest set of
interacting and interdependent set of particles, which are not under any
sort of influence and are not subjected to supremacy and inferiority. It
creates space for the persons involved in international relations to
communicate, negotiate and act. Their interests, goals, needs, and
behaviour are largely influenced by the general distribution of power,
structure and rules of the system. System conflicts are those, which
change and affect the aforementioned elements and aspects. In principle,
system conflicts change the relations and context among most of the
parties involved in international relations and establish new standards,
norms and institutions of the international system. These mostly
historical-power disputes are, essentially, about creating coalitions or
alliances, the primary objective of which is to change the system balance
and tilt it towards their own side of the dispute and their favour, dividing
the profit in the end. Such conflicts were, e.g. the Thirty Years' War, First
and Second World Wars and the conflict between the East and the West
(Waisová, 2002).
(2) The second level is determined by the specific parties
involved. These parties involved are interdependent and, at the same
time, independent enough to stand out among other parties. Disputes
within international relations, that take place among the parties involved,
are referred to as international, or inter-state conflicts. The persons
involved in inter-state conflicts are individual states or groups of states,
alliances, pacts, transnational corporations, international non-government
22
organizations, etc. An interstate conflict 3 is, basically, a conflict of interests
in the sphere of national values and themes (borders, territory, resources,
independence, sovereignty and international distribution of power). This
type of conflict has a certain length, intensity and depth, and it takes place
between at least two parties (states, groups of states, international
organizations or organized groups). The goal of the individual parties
involved is to advance their interests and to win the dispute. Such a
conflict is conditioned by the fact that one of the parties involved in the
dispute is the state. Inter-state conflict doesn't need to escalate into war, it
transforms into a military conflict as a result of the behaviour of the
parties involved.
Inter-state conflicts may be:
 bilateral (two-sided) – between two sovereign states, or
where the state is one of the two parties involved in the
conflict;
 multilateral (multi-sided) – between multiple parties
involved. When this type is concerned, the variety of the
combinations of the parties involved depends on the nature
of the dispute and on the relations between these parties
(Bátor, 2006).
Some of the causes of international conflicts may be, e.g. a wish to claim
territory or material goods (resources, assets). Such conflicts usually have
a historical background. These conflicts may be expected from states
which have, in the past, had strong influence (superpowers and former
superpowers) and a dominant role within international relations –
conflicts due to losing their influence, status, territory or resources.
Another group of causes of interstate conflicts is an effort of the parties
involved to gain a dominant status on a global or regional scale, in the
form of a unilateral position or a position in the power hierarchy of states.
Examples of international conflicts: The First World War between the Triple Entente and
the Central Powers (1914-1918), the Second World War, initiated by Germany (1939-1945),
the war between Paraguay and Bolivia in the area of Gran Chaco (1932-1935), the Falklands
War between Argentina and Great Britain (1982), disputes between Vietnam and China for
the Paracel Islands, the conflict between the Republic of South Africa and Namibia for the
border on the Oranje River (since 2000) (Waisová, 2005).
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23
Factors, which are a prerequisite for the creation of this type of conflict
are e.g. a sense of grievance or scarcity, a sufficient quantity of resources
to initiate and lead the conflict and an idea and vision of a potential
victory in the end of the dispute. Examples of conflicts with enormous
consequences were the two world wars, started by Germany with the
intention to gain a dominant position in the contemporary international
political system. Economic reasons may also be the cause of conflicts
among states, for example, the effort to achieve a strong economic
influence or to strengthen their economic situation by gaining the
resources of another state.
The basic critical factor of international conflicts is the possibility
that they'll gradually escalate. The escalation may be vertical (increasing
the intensity of the conflict) and horizontal (extending the conflict to other
countries of the region). It is also necessary to include inter-state armed
conflicts as part of the characteristics of interstate conflicts. Wars among
states may arise, provided that there are interests which explicitly need
military intervention to be achieved. The conditions for the emerging of an
armed conflict include: a) a favourable ratio of the armed forces, b) the
belief of military-political elites that the armed conflict is needed, c) a
good degree of support from the population for the conduct of an armed
conflict, d) the existence of potential allies and a favourable attitude of the
international community, e) sufficient economic potential, f) building the
infrastructure necessary to lead an armed conflict (Hofreiter, 2008). The
potential for a military conflict can proportionally increase with the
concentration of risk factors, deepening of crises and disputes, tension
between the parties involved or with a cross-border transfer of the
conflict from a neighbouring country. The presence of war or an armed
conflict in a neighbouring country largely increases the likelihood that the
state in question will get involved in the military conflict. This fact is not
even affected by the degree of the involvement of the state in the
globalization processes (Kahler, Walter, 2006). In the recent period, the
number of inter-state conflicts is decreasing and they rarely reach their
peak stage – a military conflict.
(3) The third analytical level is determined by subunits. Political
parties, opposition groups, lobby groups, the mafia, rebel movement, etc.
may all be subunits. They are organized groups of individuals inside of an
organisational unit, which have the ability to affect the existence and
24
behaviour of the units themselves. We define conflicts which take place
inside these units as internal4 (or domestic). They are currently the most
common and dominant form of conflicts. Internal conflicts take place
inside of the territory of a certain state between certain parties, which
may be e.g. social groups, political parties, ethnic, national or religious
groups, interest groups, etc. These parties have irreconcilable,
contradictory objectives and interests. The parties in conflict wish to
purposefully remove the opposing party from the political struggle, even if
it means using violence. In addition to this objective (eliminating the
opponent), they also have the potential to do so. Internal conflicts may be
violent or non-violent.
Internal (especially violent) conflicts are characterized by human
casualties, material losses, disruption of state infrastructure, enormous
violations of basic human rights and civil liberties. The consequences of
this type of conflict may also have a negative impact on the environment
in the state, the disruption of the social and political system of the state or
the moral degradation of its population. These conflicts also cause a
number of secondary problematic factors, such as poverty, diseases,
hunger and health care which is insufficient, of poor quality or nonexistent. States with internal conflicts tend to decline economically,
because of hard or non-existent economic activity and economic
development, suspended production or an economic isolation of the area
of the conflict. The decline is also influenced by the loss of human
resources, the so-called "intellectual genocide". It occurs when labourers,
experts in economy and state management, educators, doctors and
medical staff leave the country in conflict. Due to conflicts, a large number
of citizens is in the position of refugees, or are displaced to live in different
locations within the country (Hofreiter, 2008).
The threat of domestic conflicts exists, in particular, in the socalled dysfunctional states. This type of conflict occurs mostly in poorer
countries with weak or undemocratic governments. As in the case of
international conflicts, domestic conflicts also pose a threat to the
Examples of domestic conflicts are the wars for independence (Algeria – France, Ireland –
United Kingdom, Basque Country – Spain, Chechnya – the Russian Federation, East Timor –
Indonesia, Katanga – Zaire/Congo), autonomistic conflicts (Uyghur – China, Abkhazia –
Georgia, Adjara – Georgia, Corsica – France, Guerrero and Chiapas – Mexico) and civil wars
(Somalia, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia) (Waisová,
2005).
4
25
surrounding states. The occurrence of conflicts within states has a
devastating impact not only on the states themselves, but it also
contributes to an overall regional instability. In the case of such states,
governments are unable to, or do not address the real problems in their
countries, do not ensure the basic human needs or guarantee the basic
human rights and civil liberties. The majority of these countries do not
have the relevant political institutions and lack legal elements of the
political system. The course of the conflict is worsened by the absence of a
leader, or a central authority, and it allows an extreme escalation and
increases the number of human victims of domestic conflicts. Not only
horizontal and vertical escalation, but also its long duration, intensity,
mobilization of forces and resources and great emotional exertion, are
some of the dangerous aspects of domestic conflicts.
The causes and the trigger mechanism of national conflicts may
be based on various factors, or may be a combination of more than one of
them. Such factors may be, e.g.: 1) restoration of an old conflict which
happened in the past, 2) low income of the population tends to be a result
of poverty (poor citizens are more prone to illegal activities and often
become members of terrorist organisations and organised criminal
groups), 3) dependence on the export of a single kind of material (the
fluctuation of its price or problems with export may greatly destabilise the
state's economy, increase tension and provoke conflicts), 4) high
dependence on the import of materials and energy), 5) disproportionate
allocation may result in the deepening of disparities within regions, 6)
resistance of the population against reigning elites (authoritarian or
dictatorial rulers and undemocratic governments), 7) limitation of
fundamental human rights and civil liberties, 8) enormous militarization
of the state and society, 9) migration, which can disrupt the homogeneity
of the indigenous population (ethnic, national, religious or cultural), 10)
repression of the rights of ethnic, national and religious groups in the
country, 11) separatist and irredentist tendencies, which may evolve into
breaking away from the original parent state, 12) disturbance of the
stability of a state, or its entering into conflict because of a conflict taking
place in the neighbouring state, 13) radicalization of youth, due to high
unemployment and impossible personal realization, 14) penetration of
organised crime into government structures (Hofreiter, 2008). Most of
26
these examples may be applied to current conflicts in North Africa and
Middle Eastern countries.
A civil war5 is the most extreme form of domestic conflict. It
remains the most radical form of such conflict even despite the fact that, in
modern times, fewer and fewer disputes escalate into an armed conflict.
Currently, the following workplaces lead complex studies, for the
purposes of a deeper analysis of database creation and a comparison of
the methodologies of conflicts within international relations:
 Bonn International Center for Conversion
 Freedom House
 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research
 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
 International Crisis Group
 International Energy Agency
 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance
 International Relations and Security Network
 Political Terror Scale
 Reporters without Borders
 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
 Swedish Defence Research Agency
 The Fund for Peace
 Transparency International
 United Nations Development Programme
 United Nations Statistics Division
 Uppsala Conflict Data Program
 Vision of Humanity
 The World Health Organization (Ramsbotham, 2010).
5 There are several definitions of a civil war. We can, generally, define it as the result of a
domestic conflict (Hofreiter, 2008). The US military uses characterisation of the civil war,
based on the following criteria (Patten, 2007): a) the challengers in the conflict must have
control over (at least some) territory, b) there must exist a functioning government, c) each
of the parties involved must have some recognition from abroad, d) the parties must have
identifiable and proper armed forces, e) the parties involved meet in major armed
operations.
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1.5
EXAMPLES OF SUPRANATIONAL PARTIES INVOLVED IN
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
International crisis management operations, led by transnational
parties, represent one of the most important instruments of the
international community, used to defuse crises and centres of tension,
consolidate or stabilize the situation in crisis areas and to help countries
recover, especially after armed conflicts (Ivančík, 2013c). The United
Nations Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the
European Union are among the most important supranational parties
involved in the field of conflict resolution.
The United Nations Organization
According to Škvrnda et al. (2010), the UN is, in terms of the nature of its
members and the range of its competences, a universal and versatile
organization. In fact, it is the only organisation of its kind in the
contemporary world. It has 193 member countries from all continents,
with the exception of Antarctica, and a virtually unlimited range and scope
of competences, which include both economic and social development and
the protection of human rights, peace and security (Ivančík, 2012a).
The Charter of the United Nations was signed at the United
Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco on the
26th of June 1945 and came into force on the 24th of October 1945. The
Slovak Republic entered the UN on the 19th of January 1993. According to
the Charter of the United Nations, the main goals of the organization is the
preservation of international peace and security by means of collective
peace-keeping measures in accordance with international law, the
development of friendly relations among nations based on their mutual
equality, dealing with international issues with cooperation and the
endorsement of human rights and freedoms, as well as being a place
where these objectives are achieved. The main bodies of the UN are the
General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council,
Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice and the Secretariat
(Charter of the United Nations..., 1945).
The UN peace-building activities affect a wide range of areas, such
as military security, in which it involves the disarmament, demobilisation
and reintegration of combatants and the demining of territories. The UN
28
humanitarian activities involve caring for and repatriation of refugees
affected by conflicts, providing health care and food. Activities such as the
support and rehabilitation of public institutions and public
administration, reforms and elections are related to the area of politics.
Activities such as the ensuring of human rights, reforms of the judiciary,
security and the investigation of crimes, fall under the field of human
rights. The economic and social areas include activities such as helping
with rebuilding destroyed infrastructure, creating conditions for public
administration and economic growth, as well as the elimination of social
and economic inequalities (Jurčák, 2009).
These and many other peace-building activities are conducted by
the UN peace-keeping missions. According to the UN main doctrine from
2008, peacekeeping missions are divided according to their objectives and
the means used to prevent conflicts, keep the peace, enforce peace (the UN
may designate regional organizations to enforce peace) and build peace,
on the principles of consent of the parties involved, impartiality and by
not using force, except in self-defence or to protect the mandate of the
mission (UN, 2008).
The legal basis for the conduct of missions is anchored in Chapter
VI and VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Based on it, the UN
Security Council may decide on the conduct of activities necessary to
maintain and restore international peace and security (Ivančík, 2012a). As
is apparent from the aforementioned facts, the relevant bodies of the UN
for the resolution of conflicts are the Security Council and the Secretariat,
in particular its specialized branches:
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of the
Promotion of Peace and the UN Peace-building Commission, a subsidiary
body.
The missions are made of voluntary military, police and civil
contributions from the member countries (because the UN does not have
its own army and police forces), which are controlled by the SecretaryGeneral and the relevant departments of the Secretariat. Peacekeeping
missions, according to their type, usually begin within 30 days (a
traditional peacekeeping operation), or within 90 days (a
multidimensional mission) after they have been approved by the General
Assembly. The request to begin a peacekeeping mission is the resolution
of the Security Council, which is based on the initiative of the Secretary29
General. This initiative comes in the form of information analysis (Jurčák,
2009).
The overly long and cumbersome decision-making process of the
UN, which applies not only to conflict resolution, is a problem in this
respect. Therefore, the discussion about the need of institutional and
procedural reforms of the UN is absolutely justified. The same applies to
the efforts for uniform, commonly acceptable and respected conflict and
crisis resolution procedures.
The Slovak Republic is engaged in the following UN missions:
UNPROFOR, UNATES, UNAVEM II, UNOMIL, UNOMUR, UNAVEM III,
MONUA, UNAMSIL, UNMEE, UNTSO, UNDOF, UNGCI, UNFICYP, UNTAET
and UNMISET (Straka, Klavec, 2007).
North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is a regional military-political
intergovernmental organisation. It was established on the 4th of April
1949 with the signing of the North Atlantic (Washington) Treaty in
Washington and, to this day, has 28 members. It has its headquarters in
Brussels. The Slovak Republic became a member state of NATO on the
29th of March 2004.
NATO's main objectives, according to the North Atlantic Treaty,
are the collective protection of the safety and the freedom of their
members by political and military means, in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations (NATO, 1949). The collective and individual defense
of the members of the UN may be found in Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations (Charter of the United Nations..., 1945).
The North Atlantic Council, Secretary General, Defence Planning
Committee, Nuclear Planning Group and Military Committee form the
basic organizational structure of NATO. The authorities relevant to
conflict resolution are embodied within the structure of NATO crisis
management (Otřísal, et al., 2011), which includes the North Atlantic
Council, Secretary General, Military Committee, Political Committee, Civil
Emergency Planning Committee, Group of Policies Coordination, Situation
Centre and, possibly, other committees. The process of crisis management
is divided into five phases. In the first phase, indication and warning, the
potential crisis area is monitored by the Situation Centre, which reports
its findings to the North Atlantic Council. The Council may react by
30
sending relevant organs to assess the situation. This is the second phase –
assessment of the crisis situation. Based on the results of the assessment,
the North Atlantic Council may entrust the authorities of crisis
management with the task of drawing up possible variations of crisis
response. This is the third phase – development of crisis-response
variations. Individual variations are the subject of the Committee's
consultations. Their consolidated form is, eventually, discussed by the
North Atlantic Council. The output of this process is a preliminary
proposal for a directive of NATO, which is handed out to all of the relevant
authorities in the fourth phase – planning and implementation. Its content
includes a response strategy, goals and a vision of the final outcome. An
operational plan is created on its basis. The headquarters and Office of
Crisis Management carries out the supervision of the implementation of
the operational plan. The fifth phase is a return to stability and it means
that the required state has been achieved (Jurčák, 2009).
Apart from the threats that relate directly to the collective
security of NATO members, there are also other relevant threats and risks,
to which NATO should be able to respond, in order to maintain
international peace. Responses to such threats, however, do not fall under
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which deals with the collective
defence of its members (NATO, 1949).
The operations of crisis-management, which are not included in
Article 5 of the Treaty, are meant to respond to crises... which may
threaten the security and stability of the Alliance's member states and
lead to a conflict on NATO's periphery (Jurčák, 2009).
Peace-supporting operations also belong to the operations
outside of Article 5. By means of such operations, NATO wants to
contribute to international peace and security, to the strengthening of
stability in the world, to the prevention of conflicts and, in the event of a
crisis, to its efficient and effective solving, in accordance with
international law (Ivančík, 2012b). Peace-support operations serve to
prevent conflicts, create peace, keep peace, enforce peace, build peace and
also as a humanitarian aid. Except for the humanitarian aid, the
characteristic of these operations may be found in a separate chapter.
Humanitarian aid is an operation aimed to eliminate human suffering in
places where the state fails to care for its citizens. It may occur in the form
of dropping down food and other useful materials and it may occur
31
together with other operations. The main principles of peace-support
operations are: impartiality, consensus and limiting the use of force
(NATO, 2001).
Impartiality is both the behaviour of units and also the perception
of both sides of the conflict. A consensus should occur both between the
units taking part in the operation and also between the parties involved in
the conflict. The success of the operation largely depends on it. In the case
of the restriction of the use of force, we can speak about an adequate, but
reasonable use of force.
The Slovak Republic has engaged in the following NATO
operations: IFOR, Operation Allied Harbour (AFOR), participation in the
SFOR and KFOR operations (Straka, Klavec, 2007).
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE
The OSCE is a regional security organization which initially functioned as
a series of conferences, under the name Conference for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. The first conference was held on the 3rd of June
1973 in Helsinki, Finland. The name and status was changed from
conference to an organization during a summit in Budapest at the end of
1994. The Secretariat and the Secretary General ofOSCE are based in
Vienna. Today, OSCE has 56 members. The Slovak Republic became a
member of OSCE on the 1st of January 1993.
The Final Act of CSCE is the most important document. It was
adopted on the 1st of July 1975 in Helsinki, Finland. The main principles of
the activities of the CSCE Member States are sovereign equality and
respect for the rights stemming from sovereignty, not using force or
threats of force, inviolability of borders, territorial integrity of states, a
peaceful settlement of disputes, not interfering within internal affairs,
respect for human rights and freedoms, equality and the right of nations
to self-determination, the cooperation among states and the fulfilment of
commitments in accordance with international law (OSCE, 1975).
The OSCE institutions are divided into political and executive. The
political ones are the OSCE Summit, the Ministerial Council, the
Permanent Council, the Forum for Security Co-operation and the OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly. The executive ones are the OSCE Chairmanship,
the acting Chairman, the Secretary-General, the Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National
32
Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Secretariat
and the High-Level Planning Group. The OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre
is the relevant authority for dealing with conflicts. It is a part of the
Secretariat and is managed by the Secretary-General (Jurčák, 2009).
Conflict resolution within OSCE takes place not only by means of
diplomatic measures and negotiations, but also through field operations,
the main agenda of which is early warning, conflict prevention and postconflict rehabilitation of areas. These missions are led by the Permanent
Council. Civilian experts from different regions of the OSCE Member States
constitute the personnel of OSCE field operations. Cooperation with other
international organisations, as well as the ability and willingness to
quickly and adequately respond, are an important part of OSCE field
operations. Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Team(s) (REACT)
have been formed for this purpose. They should be able to intervene
before conflicts escalate. Among the tasks that these operations should
fulfil are, help, advice and recommendations for the hosting country,
monitoring of the implementation of OSCE commitments, observations of
elections and assistance with their organization, promoting and
maintaining legal order by democratic institutions, peaceful resolution of
conflicts by means of preparation of the appropriate conditions for
negotiations, verification and support of the implementation of peace
agreements, assistance in the post-conflict reconstruction of society in
various areas (Charter for European Security).
The Slovak Republic participated in the OSCE Kosovo Verification
Missions and the OSCE Mission to Georgia (Straka, Klavec, 2007).
European Union – EU
The European Union is an economic and political partnership of 28
democratic European countries, which have voluntarily joined into a
political and economic alliance, in order to achieve common objectives,
using a single foreign and domestic policy for its sovereign Member States
(Ivančík, Jurčák, 2013a). The Slovak Republic became a Member State of
the EU the 1st of May 2004. The European Council, the European
Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union
and the European Court of Justice are the main institutions of the EU.
Three main pillars formed the basis of the EU during the validity of the
Treaty on European Union (the so-called Maastricht Treaty, which entered
33
into force on the 11th of November 1993): 1. the Economic and Monetary
Union, 2. the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 3. cooperation
in the field of justice and internal security. The Lisbon Treaty entered into
force on the 1st of December 2009. It amended the Treaty on the
European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
which simplified the overall structure of the European Union and
cancelled the three aforementioned pillars, though the CFSP retained its
specific nature.
The reason why the CFSP was created had been, in particular, the
necessity to represent the Union within the sphere of international
relations because, even though the EU is not subject to international law, it
is still an important institution which aims to defend its interests within
these relations (Jurčák, 2009).
The aim of the CFSP, covering all areas of the EU's foreign and
security policy, is:
 to protect the common values, fundamental interests,
independence and integrity of the EU, in accordance with the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
 to strengthen the security of the EU in all regards,
 to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the UN, as
well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the
objectives of the Paris Charter, including those at its external
borders,
 to promote international cooperation,
 to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, the
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 6.
The Member States play a crucial role in the formulation of the
CFSP, while the institutions of the EU only enforce the policies agreed
upon by the Member States, which do not give up the right to pursue their
own independent foreign policies. They do, however, promise to take into
account the jointly agreed approaches and actions of the EU in their
policies. This is why they are able to speak as a single voice at
Title V, Article 11, Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the EU, C321 E/13 of 29th
December 2006. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa. eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=OJC:2006:321E:0001:0331:SK:PDF
6
34
international conferences or in the institutions of international
organisations. Another advantage is the ability to benefit from the joined
political, economic and defensive weight of all of the EU Member States
during negotiations (Ivančík, Jurčák, 2013a).
The CFSP covers all of the questions concerning the safety of the
EU, including the progressive definition of a common defence policy,
which may lead to a common European defence, if decided by the
European Council. In that case, it shall recommend that the Member States
adopt a resolution, in accordance with their respective constitutional
requirements. The EU's policy, in accordance with this article, does not
affect the specific characteristics of the security and defence policy of
certain Member States and it respects the obligations of certain Member
States, which share a common defence within NATO and which are in
accordance with the CFSP ( Treaty on EU, Article 17). The questions
referred to in this Article of the Treaty include humanitarian and rescue
roles and missions aimed to keep the peace and tasks of the combat forces
when dealing with crisis situations, including the establishment of peace
(Jurčák, 2009).
The Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU (hereinafter
referred to as "CSDP") is an integral part of the CFSP and, together with
other instruments, forms a part of the EU's external relations. It is a means
of support of the CFSP, which grants the EU the tools and capacity needed
to carry out crisis-management operations (hereinafter referred to as
"OKM EU") outside the territory of the EU.
Through the CSDP, the EU has the ambition to strengthen its
ability to respond to world crises without geographical limitations and,
thus, fulfil the key requirement defined in the European Security Strategy
– to strengthen the EU's role in ensuring global security in accordance
with its potential.
Through the CSDP, the EU is becoming an important tool in
ensuring global security and stability, together with NATO. According to
the statement of the European Council of December 2008, over the past
ten years, the EU has established itself as a global political entity. It has
adopted an increasing responsibility, as proven by its increasingly
35
ambitious and diverse civilian and military operations in the name of
effective multilateralism and peace7.
The main purpose of the CSDP is to provide military and other
(police and civilian) means of preventing and resolving international
conflicts and managing crises. During the last few years, the CSDP has
seen a shift. This was reflected through the number of military and civilian
operations and missions (Ivančík, Jurčák, 2013b).
1.6
METHODOLOGY OF CONFLICT DATABASE CREATION
The definition and categorization of conflict is associated with
certain methodological problems and, therefore, is constantly the subject
of discussions among the professional public. During its research, it is
necessary to clearly and precisely determine which conflict may be
defined as a crisis, armed conflict or war, and which may not. The
differences, which arise among individual categorizations, are caused by
specific approaches, different use of definitions, analytical methods and
criteria, as well as subjective views of experts. Conflicts are categorized
and assigned to specific datasets based on specific criteria.
The political status of the parties involved in a conflict is one of
the fundamental criteria of conflict (particularly armed) and war division
and typology. It leads to different international-political, geopolitical and
legal consequences, as well as different levels of interest of politicians,
experts or the general public. All of the following cause different reactions
of the (international) public: aggression of one state towards another;
international intervention under the Un or without it; domestic national
conflicts (civil wars); conflicts within a certain community (Tomeš, 2007).
Several projects deal with the division of conflicts. In our work we
name a few of them. The most commonly used conflict database is a
project created by two institutions, which work in the field of security
studies and research conflicts – Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and
the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala University with
Declaration of the European Council on the strengthening of the European security and
defence policy. The conclusions of the meeting of the Bureau in Brussels on the 11th and
12th of December 2008. Available at: http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material
.nsf/0/EA3B35FD1F564915C1257544003DE252/$FILE/priloha_1.rtf
7
36
its Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP). This research studies armed
and violent conflicts and uses a quantitative approach. The project
specifies factors, which are characteristic for this type of conflict.
Among them are: a) the government or the territory, which are a
source of incompatibilities, b) at least two parties must participate in such
conflicts, c) one of the parties is represented by state power, the other by
opposing organization, d) the use of armed forces has caused at least 25
combat victims per year; a conflict with at least 1,000 combat victims per
year is considered a war (Definition of Armed conflict..., 2001).
According to this methodology, armed conflicts are divided into
three basic groups, according to the intensity of violence, which means
according to the number of victims:
 a minor armed conflict is a conflict with at least 1,000 victims
overall and, at the same time, at least 25 per year,
 an intermediate armed conflict is a conflict with over 1,000
victims overall,
 a war or armed conflict is a conflict with over 1,000 victims
per year during the entire duration of the conflict.
The University of Uppsala in Sweden uses the following division
of conflicts: a) conflicts with state participation, in which the opposing
parties are either two states, or a state and a non-state party (rebels,
mutineers, rioters, etc.), b) conflicts without state participation, in which
the parties involved are non-state groups, c) one-sided violence,
committed by the government or political groups, against civilians.
Genocide, politicide and other violent attacks belong to this category
(Human Security Report, 2005). The dividing of conflicts according to
their political status has spread thanks to the aforementioned projects of
the PRIO/UCDP8. This dividing is easier and it divides conflicts into: a)
inter-state (international), b) domestic (national) – these can be divided
into civil wars and others, and c) armed separatism, which means conflicts
that occur during the establishing of states.
Certain problems arise with this simplified definition.
The UCDP program, for example, indicates that in 2009, there were 29 national and 7
international conflicts. Appendix 2 compares the development of conflicts, according to the
way the UCDP divides them, in 2009 and 1999.
8
37
E.g. according to this division, there were no conflicts in the world
during 2004 and 2005 because not even the conflicts in Afghanistan or
Iraq fall under the above mentioned categorization.
The HIIK (COSIMO)9 database is another project, which deals with
the classification of political conflicts from the year 1945 until present. It
currently works with over 500 conflicts, which are then distributed
according to the phases which they happen to be in at the moment. It
employs the qualitative approach of categorizing conflicts, which means
that it doesn't use the criterion of the amount of victims, but divides
conflicts based on the significance or intensity of violence. This division
has a five-level scale, which is then divided into two subcategories. The
first category is an unarmed conflict (non-violent conflict), in which there
is the possibility of using natural violent means, but they are not directly
used. Non-violent conflicts may be a) latent conflicts, b) manifested
conflicts. The second category is an armed conflict (violent), which is
divided into a) a crisis, b) a serious crisis and c) a war. During their course
armed conflicts occasionally, periodically or systematically and in an
organized manner, use arms and other violent means (Methodik ab...,
2003).
A latent conflict is defined by the existence of a conflict, dispute
and disagreement about certain values, among the parties involved. One
of the parties makes certain demands, which the other party radically
rejects. It is possible to predict the behaviour of the parties in conflict and
an escalation of the conflicts may not happen at all, if the parties are
willing to negotiate concerning the issues causing the conflict and find a
solution that would be accepted by both.
A manifested conflict is characterized by an escalation of the
intensity of the conflict and by an increasing hostility between the parties
involved. The mutual relations between the parties are based on the use of
threats, verbal coercion of the opponent or the implementation of various
sanctions and restrictions (diplomatic, political and economic). In such
cases, the likelihood of an outbreak of physical violence increases.
According to the HIIK method, there are currently 365 active conflicts in the world, 108 of
which are latent, 114 are manifested, 112 are crises, 24 are serious crises and 7 are wars.
Localization according to region: 113 conflicts take place in Asia and Oceania, 66 in Europe,
85 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 46 in America and 55 in the region of Maghreb and the Middle East.
9
38
A crisis within international relations, as a specific category, is
characterized by the fact that there is a strong tension between the parties
involved and they mobilize their armed forces. Occasionally, there may be
some less serious armed military clashes, or the use of armed violence.
During a crisis, in the case of domestic conflicts, revolts and coups
orchestrated by the citizens or social groups may break out in the country
(Hofreiter, 2008).
A serious crisis is a type of conflict characterized by a reoccurring
and organized use of armed violence by the parties involved in a dispute.
There may also be serious armed clashes. In this case, extensive and
numerous terrorist attacks and guerilla fights are typical.
A war is characterized by a systematic and purposeful use of
armed violence by armed military components of national power or other
parties or groups. Such violence is used on a large scale and with a great
destructive effect. The consequences of war may result in the breakup of
society, the destruction of the socio-economic system of the country, the
disintegration and change of the government, annexation of the territory,
taking over the territory, resources, etc.
The HIIK (COSIMO) database allows for a detailed description of
the development of specific conflicts in their specific stages (violent or
non-violent). A systematic documentation of individual conflicts, detailed
information about the parties involved, etc. is based on this. This
information is the basis for follow-up measures and suggestions of conflict
resolutions, the means of intervention in specific disputes (Das HIIK
erfasst..., 2011).
The University of Michigan and their project Correlates of War
(COW)10 systematically deals with databases and conflict distribution. The
project is dedicated, in particular, to armed conflicts. The main subject of
its interest is states or inter-state conflicts, which is why the project
focuses on understanding the root causes of armed conflicts, based on
national interests and geopolitical rivalry. The basic criteria for the
definition of war are – the participation and status of organised forces and
the number of casualties. In the framework of the COW project, we may
distinguish three types of war (The COW Typology..., 2010):
According to the COW database, there were 231 armed conflicts in the period from 1964 to
2005, which were then divided into three basic types: domestic, international and
internationalized.
10
39




interstate war – at least 1,000 casualties from the ranks of
armed forces is a criterion,
extra-system war – 1,0000 casualties a year from among
soldiers on the side of a member of the international system
(usually anti-colonial wars or wars for the freedom of
countries),
civil war – 1,000 victims of the fighting.
It can be assumed that surveying casualties (usually soldiers)
is easier and more efficient than the demographic methods
used to estimate indirect victims (mostly civilians) (The COW
Typology..., 2010).
Civil wars present a specific category of armed conflicts.
The COW project defines the criteria which must be met, in order
for a war to be characterized as a civil war. 1) organised military action, 2)
at least 1,000 victims per year, 3) participation of state (government)
armed forces, 4) effective resistance from the opposing forces (the
proportion of casualties on the side of the stronger party, usually the
government's armed forces, must be at least 5% of the total number of
victims).
The COW project also deals with the examination of the process of
the transformation of conflicts. According to the project, it is impossible to
accurately and precisely determine conflicts, because every conflict is
specific, has certain characteristics, and its progression may be different
from others.
This, in particular, may be the cause of the metamorphosis or
transformation of a conflict from one stage to other stages of the phase
process.
As an example, we may mention the change of domestic conflicts –
civil wars to interstate conflicts, if another state or security organization
chooses to intervene (The COW Typology..., 2010).
Approaches to the definition, analysis and typology of conflicts
may differ. There are quite a large number of definitions of a conflict and
they all are significantly different. These differences depend on the point
of view through which we look at particular conflicts. Generally, we may
define a conflict as a dispute among the parties involved in the conflict,
which may be individuals or groups. In such a dispute, the parties
40
involved attempt to enforce their objectives, interests and requirements
and use certain (violent or non-violent) means to fulfil these objectives.
As is the case with defining conflicts, conflict analysis also has
several approaches that depend on specific factors and characteristics of
specific conflicts. Every conflict is a specific phenomenon and may have
different attributes and properties, which is why the analyses may differ
significantly. According to the elements of the analysis, categorisations
and conflict databases are created. They either research individual specific
properties or compare several properties. Currently, several institutions
deal with conflict databases. We have already mentioned them in the
previous chapter. Their methodology and findings form an exceptional
concept of the use of a multidisciplinary synergy of natural and social
sciences, and their application not only into the theory, but also into the
practical aspects of decision-making within the field of international
relations. Major differences in the various databases occur when
comparing individual studies, because of many different approaches and
examined properties. It is, therefore, necessary to take into account the
individual aspects, on the basis of which we define, explore or categorize
conflicts.
It is necessary to include the fact that conflicts are a
multidimensional social phenomenon, which is quite complicated and
volatile. Because of this, individual definitions and divisions are very
different and must be assessed individually. The result is a simpler
overview, which is not always completely accurate and relevant.
Correct research, definition and typology are the key for other
issues of conflict typology, such as the causes, resolution and prevention
of conflicts. We will deal with these concepts in the following sections of
our work.
41
2
SPECIFICITIES OF CONFLICT AND CRISIS
RESEARCH
2.1
CAUSES OF CONFLICTS AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON
In the broadest sense of the word, a 'cause' is a phenomenon,
which is a prerequisite for the formation of another phenomenon.
However, from our own experience we know that the same phenomenon
may lead to a conflict among one group of people, while at the same time
it causes no response in a different environment. Why is it so?
Any phenomenon becomes a cause of a conflict if it can satisfy the
needs of one or more social subjects.
In general, the term 'need' means the state of a person, social
group, community or society, which emerges as a display of natural or
social necessity and which the participant perceives as a feeling of a
shortage of items, means or conditions necessary for normal life activity,
self-realization, development or as a feeling of shortage of the life activity
itself. A need is then everything necessary for ensuring life, functioning
and satisfying interests of social subjects (persons, groups, nations, states,
etc.). Satisfying the needs of social subjects becomes an initiator of their
activity. Only those needs, that are not satisfied, can influence the
behaviour of the parties involved and motivate them to actions, which can
ensure the satisfying of their needs (Černík, 2005).
The existence of a need (needs) alone is not an adequate cause for
emergence of a conflict. If satisfying the needs of one party does not lead
to endangering the needs of another party, a conflict will not arise. The
problem of water supply can serve as an example. If there is enough clear
water for everybody, there should be no conflict originating from this
subject. However, a conflict may arise if there is a shortage of water, that
is, if the needs of every subject are not satisfied. A conflict can emerge if
parties involved lay claims to the same thing, willing to use force. It is a
clash of two or more social subjects with opposing or contradictory
efforts, forces, needs, interests, feelings, values or tendencies.
Conflicts between social groups are an expression of a dispute or
clash of interests between the parties involved – individuals, social
groups, states, groups of states.
42
Disputes which arise between the subjects of a conflict are not
always clear-cut. They can be economical, political or ideological or they
can be given by the social position or status of a social group. Interest
means the focus of a conflict participant on values, items or activities of
political, social, economic, biological, cultural or emotional importance.
An interest is what the conflict participants really want, what
motivates them to act.
For example, when considering ethnic groups, it seems that ethnic
or group interests are the priority. But if material resources become the
ethnic groups' object of interest, the economic interests and economic
conflict arise. If gaining power or territory is in question, the political
interests prevail, thus a political conflict emerges.
The course of a conflict is determined rather by the conflict's
object, than by the parties involved. According to generalized definitions,
the objects of conflicts are usually resources, power, status, identity and
values and the causes of conflicts are:
 unsatisfied needs (existential, security, social needs),
 identity (ethnic, racial, religious...),
 moral aspects (religion, ideology, moral values),
 justice (perception of injustice, inequality before the law),
 rights,
 distribution of privileges (power, money, employment, land,
social status),
 division of resources and access to them (finances, water,
energy, food, etc.).
These factors may occur as the cause of a conflict either
separately, or, and what is more probable, in mutual combination. The
importance and nature of causes often change during the course of a
conflict. For example, if a conflict party gains political power in a political
conflict, it also gains the position to implement ideology, religion and to
control resources. This goes for both internal and international conflicts.
We can say that causes are a certain form of an independent
variable, which under certain circumstances, influenced by causal
mechanisms or a mediating variable, changes the independent variable
and produces a specific consequence (positive or negative, intended or
unintended). (Drulák, 2008)
43
It is also important to understand another form of conflict causes
typology. Causes of conflicts may also be defined as factors, which
contribute to social subjects' discontent, and can be described as:
 structural causes – factors which gradually penetrate into
politics and structures of society, raise discontent and create
conditions for violence;
 cultural causes – factors which contribute to formation of
environment suitable for violent conflict and encourage the
conflict escalation.
We will clarify how these causes manifest themselves in major
types of conflicts.
2.2
CAUSES OF POLITICAL CONFLICTS
While respecting the variety of inter-group conflicts, most of them
have a tendency to be related to political power, i.e. state power. That is
because political subjects try to gain the biggest share of power possible,
i.e. gain the possibility to influence its distribution, achieve certain goals
and advance certain interests against the will of others. These efforts are
common for individuals, groups within states, or among states. Clash of
interests and opposition of goals occur and lead to a political conflict.
A political conflict is characterized by the clash of political
subjects, who struggle to enforce their interests and goals usually aimed at
gaining, controlling and distributing power, and changing their political
status within the society.
The cause of political conflicts is universal – satisfying those basic
needs of social groups and individuals which cannot be implemented
otherwise than by gaining control over the state’s power.
The object of political conflicts is political power – the most
important display of state power. It represents an actual ability of a
certain social group or its representative – a political party or movement,
elected bodies (parliament, government, etc.) to implement its will by
means of politics and legal standards.
Common objects of conflicts are also political status of social
groups (their position in relation to state power; either they have the
possibility to influence the function of government or not) and political
values (patriotism, human rights, civil liberties, democracy, etc.).
44
Advancing political goals even against the will of opponents is
often a tool for implementation of political power and also, to some extent,
the object of a conflict. To achieve this, ruling groups use certain coercive
forms, either physical (violence), or economical, associated with the threat
of material losses if the opponent does not surrender, i.e. does not accept
the decisions and goals of the political power holder.
Legitimacy and legality of political power is an important conflictcausing factor. If the holder of political power has not gained his position
in a democratic way, does not have the support of the majority of citizens
and does not use political power according to the laws of a given state,
then his goals contradict the will and interests of the citizens and a
political conflict arises.
It is nowadays the most common kind of conflict, either within
states, or internationally (struggle for regional domination).
As the picture shows, the question of power is relevant in most of
the contemporary conflicts.
Specificities of objects and subjects of conflicts can be seen in a
number of peculiarities, by which political conflicts differ from other types
of conflicts.
Specificities of political conflicts
Basic specificities of political conflicts are:
 Open character, open displays of the participants' clash of
interests.
 Continuous publicity of the conflict's course, influencing and
forming of public opinion, gaining allies by means of mass
media, defamation of opposition, etc.
 High incidence of political conflicts. Non-political conflicts
(labour-law, ecological, cultural, etc.) often become political,
because they are frequently controlled by political subjects,
or because the opponents seek the solution from the state
authorities or political subjects.
 Political conflicts are usually of general importance, their
course and solution influence and have impact on the whole
society.
 The basic principle of political conflicts is the "superiority –
inferiority" principle, which is often shown in strong
45

antagonism between the ruling power and the dominated
party. The results are frequent government changes using
radical means – coups, revolutions, uprisings, rebellions,
overthrows, etc. Coups often occur in countries with weak
governments and unstable political regimes. The more stable
the countries are, the less probable such conflict is.
Possibility of using force to solve a political conflict, most
often used by government to suppress opponents. However,
political opponents can also take control of force departments
and use them to achieve their own goals. The possibility of
using force makes political conflicts very dangerous, with a
potentially destructive impact (consequences) on the whole
society.
Political conflicts in democratic and totalitarian regimes
We must distinguish between political conflicts in democratic and
totalitarian, authoritarian political systems. In democratic systems we can
find tools and institutions, which allow regulainge and solving existing
political conflicts according to the laws, standards and rules of
parliamentary democracy.
 In totalitarian regimes the possibility to advance different
political opinions is limited, any different political attitude is
sanctioned and considered to be a violation of law, an attack
on national and state interests (while the so called national
and state interests are identified with the interests of the
leader, ruler, dictator, etc.).
 Conflicts within totalitarian regimes, which, among other
things, also cause deformation of economy and culture, have
several main characteristics:
 Legal opposition is restricted or banned from the access to
sharing political power.
 Conflicts have hidden, suppressed character, because the
ruling power does not allow conflicting relations within the
society. Public presentation of different interests of social
groups is suppressed by violence. In the case of regime
breakdown, disputes which have been suppressed may
46




become a reason for violence, in the extreme case even for a
civil war.
Political conflicts in a totalitarian society tend to be overly
ideologized.
In totalitarian society, all the conflicts or problems are
presented as political. For example, reading "forbidden
literature" or pointing at ecological problems are political
conflicts with the ruling power. In Islamic theocracy, breaking
the standards of clothing is a severe violation of law.
There is a strong tendency to seek and present the enemy,
who is the cause of the unsatisfactory development of the
society. In Nazi Germany it was the Jews, or other "inferior"
races, in countries of the Eastern Bloc it was kulaks,
saboteurs, bourgeois elements, later dissidents. The enemy of
radical Islamists is the Great Satan – Israel.
Totalitarian regimes tend to internationalize political
conflicts. They unite with like-minded regimes against the
common enemy. Radical Muslims call all the devoted
believers into the fight against the Great Satan, in the past it
was the uniting of socialists against imperialism, nationalists
and fundamentalists conjoin against liberals, and so on.
Political conflicts also arise within democratic societies. However,
their character and the approach to solution is different from totalitarian
regimes.
The main characteristics of political conflicts in democratic
regimes are:
 Open, clear nature. They are perceived as a normal part of
social life, emerging from the structure of society and natural
contradictoriness of relations and interests of social groups.
 In democratic societies political conflicts take place only in
the political sphere of social life. They are not a long-term
feature of citizens' lives; they do not limit the development of
economy or spiritual development of society.
 As there is a permanent space for presentation of interests
and needs of political opposition, these conflicts tend to be
less aggressive, and violent social disorders are less probable.
47


The possibility to express different standpoints and the
plurality of views create options for discussion and nonviolent problem solving in the political sphere.
The system of government in democratic societies is based on
the division of power into legislative, executive and judicial,
and thus it is not concentrated into one centre. Each branch of
power can represent different opinions and political
interests.
Causes of national and ethnic conflicts
A widely presented belief states that the cause of ethnic conflicts is a
continuous and escalating "ethnic hatred" or "age-long wrongs", which the
conflict participant struggles to redress.
Another point of view is based on a claim, that hatred, ethnic
oppression or suppressing ethnic identity are not the true causes of
conflicts. It is the interest of "rebels" in controlling the country's wealth,
selling it and usurping the profit. A conflict creates conditions appropriate
for uncontrollable plundering and illegal trade conducted by "wartime
entrepreneurs".
However, the outbreak of an ethnic and national conflict is caused
by the concurrence of various causes, which are reflected in the system of
national and ethnic relations (Šmíd, Vaďura, 2009).
In the hierarchical, vertically integrated system of relations,
members of different ethnic groups live together and meeting one another
is a part of everyday life. A cultural division of labour is used between the
ethnic groups. Individuals are assigned certain occupations or social roles
according to their ethnicity. Such labour division is conflicting, because it
denies access to equal opportunities, prestigious professions, political
power, education, etc. The social status of an individual corresponds to his
nationality and ethnicity. In such system, one group is always superior to
the other from the point of ethnicity (leading positions are occupied only
by members of the ruling group, etc.) The stability of such system depends
on the dominant group's ability to handle power and use it to control
inferior groups. Social conflict is continually present within societies
based on institutionalized inequality (Tesař, 2007).
The conflict arising as a result of this system of relations is always
of extremely violent nature and progresses as a social revolution aimed
48
against the ruling class. Members of the dominant ethnic group identify
themselves with the representatives of government, which is why they
tolerate collective guilt and are victims of violence. If the conflict is armed,
it is usually a civil war, because the goal is to take power (Tesař, 2007). In
non-hierarchical, horizontally integrated systems of inter-ethnic relations,
the members of particular groups live separately, often in separate
territories. A model of the so called competing ethnicity is formed, where
resources, control over state institutions, force departments, and
positions in state administration are the objects of competition. Conflicts
do not arise if particular groups have equal access to state power and the
equilibrium of representation in government structures is maintained.
In this case, the social status of an individual does not correspond
to ethnicity and social stratification is formed within each group,
independently from other ethnicities. The possibility of social mobility is
not limited by the ethnicity.
A conflict can emerge if one ethnic group enforces privileged
status at the expense of others. As a result, the discontent ethnic group can
claim independence from the former country. Such a dispute may escalate
into an armed conflict.
Assimilation as a cause of conflicts
The possibility of an ethnic conflict is increased by a particular group's
efforts to force assimilation11 of other groups aiming to create a united
political nation identical to the state. Using different forms of forced
assimilation, such as restricting national education, inability to study in
native language, suppressing ethnic culture, discrimination within state
administration, are all conflict-causing factors, which can develop into a
social conflict.
Diaspora as the cause of a conflict
Ethnic diaspora12 (also cultural or religious) is one of the current conflict
causes. Over the last decades, technologically and economically advanced
Western countries have experienced intense migration waves from less
Assimilation – gradual fusion of one nation with another one.
Diaspora – scattering of a religious or ethnic group outside the area in which they had lived
for a long time.
11
12
49
developed countries. Existing ethnic diasporas have considerably
strengthened.
Diaspora usually emerges in the "immigrant-host" model conflict,
as we can see in the case of Germany and the Turkish immigrants. But if a
number of different ethnic diasporas or opposed cultures coexist in the
host country (Muslim and Jewish diaspora, Armenian and Azerbaijani
diaspora, Albanian and Serbian diaspora, Kurdish and Turkish diaspora,
etc.), the problem grows and the conflicting relationship develops in
numerous directions. The mutual conflict of diasporas within the host
country may take place as a war between organized crime groups with
various national attributes (e.g. Kosovan mafia, Chechen mafia, etc.) and
potential escalations of racially motivated violence (e.g. between Turks
and Kurds in Germany).
Ethnic diaspora may emerge also as pressure from interest
groups either towards the government of a host country or against one
another. The last form of the activities of diaspora can affect the interests
of the host country. If the host country engages in a crisis area where two
strong opposed diasporas come from (e.g. the Middle East and opposed
Muslim and Jewish diasporas), interest groups from both diasporas can
endanger the country's internal stability by means of violent (terrorist)
activities, or jeopardize the state's foreign interests in the given region
(financial and material aid for the rival groups, illegal transit of refugees).
We can take Kosovo as an example. Here, the Albanian diaspora, which
also causes considerable problems in the field of organized crime,
managed to affect foreign parties' decision-making and also destabilized
the region. Armenian and Azerbaijani diasporas are involved in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and also in the disputes with Turkey.
2.3
CONFLICTS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
The exact definition of the term "natural resources" in
international relations and security science highly depends on the context
of the subject matter the term is used in and which is applied in analyses.
In some cases, this definition deals only with renewable resources – those
that can be renewed either by human intervention or by natural process.
Into this category belong trees and woods, water, wild animals, plants,
soil, grazing land, etc. In different context, the stated term includes only
50
non-renewable resources – oil, gas and mineral resources. This definition
is however used most often.
One of the main questions concerning this problem deals with the
time in which these resources can be renewed. Renewable resources such
as trees can be planted and agricultural crops grow every year. Nonrenewable resources such as oil and gas are limited, because it takes
thousands of years for them to restore and once they are depleted, they
are not available any more.
There is also a causal relationship between the fact that most of
the natural resources are administered by identical or similar
governmental institutions, but various combinations of state power can be
used in order to profit from these resources.
The most common approach claims that the issue of natural
resources does not include problems associated with pollution of the
environment, defined as discharging a group of products into the
ecosystem (Vaughn, 2007), which is, however, not true anymore because
of the environmental problems of humanity.
Here we must provide a broader context about the use of natural
resources. In literature, two rather different terms are often confused –
conflicts over resources and conflicts over raw materials. Both of these
phenomena are usually referred to by the term "resource conflicts", which
only adds to an ambiguity of terminology. Renner recognizes this
dichotomy in a way, which helps us better understand the issue. In the
first case, conflict arises because of a shortage of resources necessary for
life and an escalated dispute over these resources; in the second case, a
conflict emerges because of disputes over the possibility to control any
abundance of highly valued natural resources (Renner, 2009).
As examples of "raw material wars" we can use the civil wars in
Sierra Leone, Angola or the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), where
the fighting groups maintained the state of war mainly to control diamond
mines and other raw material deposits, which they could use for profit
and gain money to lead the conflict. The parties involved were motivated
by the possibility of enrichment. "Resource conflicts" are, for example, the
disputes over the drying Lake Chad, which separates Chad from Niger,
Nigeria and Cameroon, conflicts over regulation of Euphrates' and Tigris'
water flows between Iraq, Turkey and Syria, or the contemporary conflict
in the Western Sudanian province of Darfur, which is to a considerable
51
extent motivated by desert widening and fertile soil decline caused by the
need for pasturages, while being accompanied by an escalated clash
between ethnically different farmers and herdsmen of Arabic origin.
Raw material conflicts mostly involve non-renewable resources
(oil, gas, precious metals), although sometimes it is not always strictly the
case (conflicts in Burma or Liberia also dealt with renewable resources,
such as precious wood). On the other hand, a resource conflict is almost
exclusively related to resources that are renewable, but hardly portable,
or bound to a given area – i.e. water resources, soil cultivation and fertility
problems, etc. (e.g. conflict over energy and water sources between postsoviet Central Asian countries in the Fergana Valley, conflict over the use
of Mesopotamian rivers between Syria, Turkey and Iraq).
2.4
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONFLICTS
The political economy of a conflict is the key theoretical approach
to the "aspect of natural resources" forming foreign and security policies
of a state. Political economy is a sub-branch of security studies, and
contemporary types of crises and conflicts lead to new impulses to enrich
this field. The main subject of enquiry is studying the influence of mineral
resources (their presence and availability for government or nongovernmental entities, trade and organized crime related to it), while it is
just a specific part of a wider field of the political economy of conflict (it
also deals with social issues, poverty, etc.). In general, we define political
economy in relation to conflicts as:
 an analysis of power distribution, wealth and need during an
armed conflict, trying to implement motives and
responsibility of persons involved into appropriate context
(Le Billon, 2001).
 a complex system of motives and interactions, originating
from mutual influence of economic agendas, long-term
interests in prolonging the war, widely spread poverty and
economically-motivated violence.
 an approach to civil wars research, aimed at the possibilities
and profits emerging from the conflict (Keen, 1998).
52
When dealing with the question of conflict solving in international
relations, the political economy of conflicts is based on the theses of
globalization, weak countries, failing countries, collapsed countries and,
on the other hand, economic agendas and the armed conflict itself.
Approaches to the research of material-motivated conflicts
In the academic environment, the knowledge of mineral resources
limitedness had already become a problem back at the end of the 18th
century. In 1798, the economist Thomas Malthus raised concerns about
exhaustion of resources and associated this problem with rapid
population growth. His vision of an overcrowded planet without resources
became one of the impulses for colonial competition at the end of the 19th
century. Findings of new mineral resources deposits turned the attention
of the public into a different direction and the market converted to the
idea of "laissez-faire", where there was no place for environmental policy.
Malthus' thesis laid foundations for neo-Malthusianism, concept
of which associated the environmental shortage directly with the
possibility of an armed conflict. Neo-Malthusianism widens the range of
resources within its concept, which includes not only food, but also other
renewable and non-renewable resources.
The renaissance of environmental approach followed in the
second half of the 20th century, when scientists started to deal with the
market laws dominance in all areas of economical, but also political life.
Restoration of a universally recognized exploitative economic market
model was made possible thanks to the establishment of new social
sciences and thus greater room for environmental argumentation was
created. The contemporary scientific exploration agenda in security
science includes highly topical questions of sustainable development, e.g.
ozone hole expansion, greenhouse effect, pollution, etc. It is also because
of these global threats that natural resources and the question of their
depletion are once again in the centre of attention (Hagmann, 2005).
In the 1990's, two major theoretical methodology schools were
established as a reaction to the 1980's oil shocks and bipolar world order
breakdown, both dealing with the relationship between the environment
and conflicts: The Toronto School and ENCOP (Environment and Conflict
Project).
53
This trend is followed by many contemporary researchers and
scientific approaches. Their perceptions of the problem of depletion differ.
PRIO (International Peace Research Institute), residing in Oslo, is in its
approach towards the environment and its effect on international conflicts
perhaps one of the most sceptic of all the institutes devoted to this topic. It
is a rather heterogeneous group of experts focused on examining and
validating previous research by other institutions, aiming to create a
database of conflicts. PRIO tries to upgrade formulas by putting in more
variables, such as poverty, regime change or cultural disputes. These
variables should play the role of "converters" between environmental
degradation and armed conflicts. But economic and political dimensions
have not been stressed in these researches so far, mainly because of the
fact that most conflicts somehow include both of these dimensions and
labelling any conflict as "environmental" could be then rather problematic
(Gledtisch, in Crocker 2007).
Scarcity as a cause of conflicts – the Toronto school
Of all the concepts re-implementing the question of relationships between
natural resources and security, great attention was attracted by the model
of the Toronto school's main character Thomas Homer-Dixon (1998).
According to his theory, worsening the access to renewable resources is
escalating frustration of wide groups of population, which creates hatred
against the state, deteriorates the relationship between government and
society, and increases the possibility of an armed rebellion. In many
studies, resources scarcity was mentioned as one of the main causes of
internal conflicts – e.g. in Rwanda, Senegal (Homer-Dixon, 1994), Sudan
or, nowadays in Egypt or Libya. Homer-Dixon distinguishes three basic
types of environmental scarcity:
 Supply-induced – decreased accessibility to renewable
resources caused by their increased consumption and
degradation.
 Demand-induced – result of the population growth or
increased per capita resource consumption.
 Structural scarcity – caused by an unbalanced distribution of
resources in the society (Homer-Dixon, 1994).
54
These three components in mutual interaction lead to the
emergence of a violent armed conflict in two possible ways:
1) Resource capture – individual groups' elites use their power
to capture the biggest portion possible of those resources
they anticipate shortage of in the near future. Their actions
involve manipulating with governmental institutions in their
own favour, which causes hatred among ordinary inhabitants,
who, as a result of these actions, find themselves in an
existential crisis. Consequently, the probability of an armed
conflict increases.
2) Economical and ecological marginalisation – groups of
inhabitants affected by resource scarcity migrate into
different areas of the country, which is thereby exposed to an
increased social, economic and environmental burden.
Migrants usually become unemployed, which undermines the
economic stability of the country and escalates tension
between them and old residents.
Mineral resources abundance and preciousness as causes of conflicts
Development of approaches towards the relation between an abundance
of precious materials and the state's internal security is different. As an
example, we can mention "ethnic violence" in South Sudan, where it is
allegedly just a conflict between Arabic Muslims and non-Muslim tribes.
Real causes are much more complicated. Structural complexity is
illustrated by a bloody conflict, which took place between two groups of
Nuer people during the course of this war. The reason was oil and its local
deposits.
The mineral resources as the ultimate goal of internal conflicts'
participants appeared in literature in the mid- 1990's. Before that, the
studies on civil wars had underlined the huge supporting factor of mineral
wealth, but had not recognized it as a cause and motive for action by the
rebel groups. Attention was focused on long-term conflicts in Sub-Saharan
Africa, which resembled a complex mixture of different, mutually
supportive influences, and the solving of which was a tough assignment
for both the international community and local authorities. In countries
such as Angola, Sierra Leone or Liberia, the income from mineral
resources (diamonds, oil) became not only the means of financing the
55
rebel combat, but also a reason for fighting as such. Control over the area
gained more economic dimensions, not only military-political
connotations, and war became a highly rational process, allowing
particular fractions the access to unimaginable wealth.
David Keen was the first to bring attention to this new type of
dynamics.
His ground-breaking work The Economic Functions of Violence in
Civil Wars includes a key thesis, according to which war is not a simple
failure of an existing system, but a creation of an alternative way to profit,
power and protection of one's interests (Keen, 1998). Keen comes to the
conclusion that in many civil wars a specific mechanism occurs, where the
sides of a conflict rather fight for short-term profit, than for finishing the
war and defeating the opponent. However, this is not possible to apply to
a majority of ongoing conflicts.
This mechanism was later called "war economy" and the term
came to be used to clarify a whole range of different phenomena – from
the outbreak of rebel combat and organized crime to degradation and
collapse of governmental institutions (Poro, Reno, 1998, Humphreys,
2002, Collier, 2004, Fearon, 2005, Rotberg, 2007). Keen observes that
conflict-solving tools must adapt to this change and create surroundings
where neither side will consider continuation of the conflict as a better
option than peace talks (Keen, 1998).
The World Bank’s economist, Paul Collier, can be said to have the
biggest impact on the formation of political economy as a sub-branch of
security science. He reacted to the widespread simplified explanation of
conflicts emerging in third world countries after the Cold War, which
defined them as an outcome of "ethnic hatred" and "age-old injustices"
committed by particular ethnic groups. This approach was widely used in
the media, because it offered an easy explanation of such different
conflicts as, for example, the war in Bosnia, genocide in Rwanda or
activities of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. One of the advocates of this
approach, Robert Kaplan, in his article The Coming Anarchy (1994),
describes the region of Western Africa as a place of "pointless violence",
suffering from overpopulation, tribalism, organized crime and
degradation of the environment. Kaplan is one of many analysts, who in
this context point at the expansion of "tribalism", i.e. ethnic allegiance as a
dominant form of a population's identity. In his study Kaplan came to the
56
conclusion, that little can be done with these phenomena, and it can be
said that his work influenced Clinton's administration when forming
foreign policy of the US towards the Balkans and other regions.
A different interpretation approach used by Collier focuses on
describing negative economic, humanitarian, social and political
consequences of engagement in a conflict. War is described as an
extremely negative phenomenon for all the parties involved and thus the
only rational step should be trying to end the conflict as quickly as
possible and restoring peace. The goal of the international community
(UN, non-governmental organizations, etc.) is to contribute to the
country's renewal and development of constitutional and democratic
principles, because such situation is for the good of everyone involved.
However, this assumption turned out to be problematic and it was
Collier's work that pointed to the fac, that some conflict participants can
profit from the state of war, and so they are not willing to end it.
Experience from these approaches cannot be pushed aside, but none of
them could provide a detailed explanation of most ongoing conflicts,
regardless of the fact, that in majority of them "age-long wrongs" and
inter-group hatred played significant roles.
Collier and Anke Hoeffler distinguish 4 basic factors of hatred,
used to explain the existence of conflicts:
 outcome of age-long wrongs committed particularly by ethnic
groups on each other,
 economic inequality and resulting frustration,
 poor legal protection and law violation,
 inadequate economic policy of the government (Collier,
Hoeffler 1998).
Collier and Hoeffler back then refused the idea that armed
violence could be primarily motivated by any factors of hatred. They
claimed that these theories did not take account of the so called "collective
action problem". For everyone, justice, punishing of injustice and a
functioning, competent government are values to benefit from. Based on
the results of their econometric research, Collier and Hoeffler deduced
that there is no satisfying support for the claim that only "hatred" is the
driving force of internal conflicts. Neither unequal status of different
groups, nor political discrimination increases the risk of a conflict, with
57
the exception of "ethnic dominance", which is a situation when 45-90 % of
the population is of the major ethnic group. As well as later works by
other authors, they offer a radically different explanatory model. Instead
of an easy "grievance-based" model supposing that ethnic hatred is the
main cause of inter-group violence, they present a "greed-based" model,
based on an assumption, that the condition necessary for emergence of a
conflict is not an adequate motive, but the opportunity for one’s own
enrichment and gaining control over an area, which is given by a number
of specific factors. Collier thus distinguishes three basic factors that
rapidly increase the probability of conflict emergence:
 high rate of government's dependence on export of primary
commodities, including minerals and agricultural production,
 great number of young unemployed men, who do not have a
chance to find qualification in a given social-economic
environment,
 rapid decline of the country's economic productivity (Collier,
Hoeffler 1998).
Although the orientation on natural resources was first perceived
only one-sidedly, the category itself proved to be far too wide and
heterogeneous. The biggest problem was caused by the variety of
products which could be labelled as "natural resources". Collier's and
Hoeffler's study does not distinguish between different types of materials.
It includes a whole range of resources, e.g. oil, which rebels cannot freely
plunder during the conflict, and does not single out some of the most
easily resources to be plundered, for example, smuggled precious stones
and drugs. It is therefore not possible to find out which rebels really have
an access to resources.
Specialized studies which emerged at the same time as the
Collier's work and partially reacted to it, started focusing on particular
commodities such as oil, diamonds, drugs or precious wood. Special
attention is therefore paid to the so called "conflict commodities". At
international level, this phenomenon was stressed, for example, by
detailed analyses of the political situation in Angola, the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone, provided by the United Nations
Security Council Sanctions Monitoring Mechanism.
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2.5
APPROACHES TO ETHNIC CONFLICT RESEARCH
Ethnic conflicts can be defined as conflicts between ethnic groups
within a multi-ethnic state which often take place as a consequence of
ethnic nationalism and the parties involved may perceive them as
unsolvable. According to Michael E. Brown, an ethnic conflict is a dispute
over important political, economic or territorial questions between two or
more ethnic communities. Many ethnic conflicts lead to heavy casualties,
severe denial of human rights and material destruction, some of them
even escalate into an inter-ethnic or internal war (Brown, 1993).
The issue of ethnicity-based conflicts has dominated the
foreground of world politics since the period of the Cold War. They attract
high attention especially because they often lead to grievous war crimes
such as genocide.
The academic definition of the term ethnic conflict falls in general
within one of the three scientific approaches: primordialism,
instrumentalism or constructivism (Šmíd, 2007).
The scientific debate is centred around the question how to
handle conflicts as effectively as possible, using tools such as consocialism
or federalization, and around the question whether the phenomenon of
ethnic conflict has really gained importance since just at the end of the
Cold War (Turton, 1999).
Primordialist approaches13
Primordialists define ethnicity as an inborn attribute. They claim that
ethnic groups and nations exist thanks to the traditions of religion and the
incentives towards primary objects, such as biological attributes and
territorial allocation (Šmíd, 2007).
The primary view is based on the concept of an affinity within the
ethnic group. Donald L. Horowitz claims that this affinity allows the
members of ethnic groups to think in conditions of familial context
(Horowitz, 2000).
Many politologists consider the concept of ethnic wars to be a
myth, because they advocate that the original causes of ethnic conflicts do
not involve ethnicity, but rather institutional, political and economic
13
Certain politologists substitute the term "primordialism" with "essentialism".
59
factors. They say that the concept of ethnic wars is misleading, because it
leads to a rash conclusion that some groups of individuals are doomed to
fight amongst each other, while reality is that wars between them are
results of political decisions. Researchers holding the opposite opinion
might substitute ethnicity for basic factors aiming to simplify
identification of friends and enemies (Wolff, 2011).
The philosophical background of primordialism is related to
names such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte or Johann Gottfried Herder. The
term itself was used for the first time in the 1940's by Clifford Geertz, in
the context of prevailing and indescribable relations between individuals
and social groups (Šmíd, 2007). Walker Connor, who is considered to be
one of the leading personalities of the primordialist school, claims that
human beings are nationalists, not rationalists. The using of myths, images
of family, etc. plays the key role when creating ethnic awareness. An
intuitive acceptance of common origin causes that ethno-national identity
to be rooted deeper and has a greater mobilisation potential than other
non-relational bonds (class, religion, territorial affiliation, citizenship,
etc.). However, each of the stated identities can bring out ethno-national
feelings (Conversi, 2004). To summarize the above mentioned, we can say
that essentialism is based on the idea that the type of social organization
which is based on ethnic bonds is more natural and easier than other
models, and the tendency to create ethnic communities is innate in all
human beings.
Instrumentalist approach
As the name implies, supporters of this approach think that ethnic identity
is a result of social construction. Anthony Smith observes that
instrumentalism emerged in the 1960's and 1970's as a part of the debate
about white ethnic persistence, when philosophizing about the political
impact of ethnicity (Smith, 2001). This new theory sought an explanation
of the persistence as a result of activities of community leaders, who used
their cultural groups as a place of mass mobilization and competing for
power and resources, because they found it more effective than social
classes. From this point of view, ethnicity and race are perceived as
instrumental identities organized as tools for accomplishing certain
conclusions (Smith, 2001).
60
In the instrumentalist approaches it is not important whether
ethnicity is associated with a fixed perception. Instrumentalists, in
general, do not oppose the ideas that ethnic diversity is a part of many
conflicts and that many aggressive individuals believe that they fight
against such diversity. These scientists simply claim that the ethnic
diversity itself is insufficient for an explanation of conflicts.
Constructivist approaches
Constructivism can be partially understood as a continuation of
instrumentalist doctrine and partially as an effort to bring in the
contribution of other schools. We can say that it is a synthesis of various
approaches. The formation of the theory of constructivism is generally
associated with Jean Piaget, who expressed a mechanism according to
which a finding is internalized by the explorer. He said that by the
processes of assimilation and adaptation, individuals create new
knowledge from their own experience. If there is a process of assimilation,
new experiences incorporate into an already existing system of
knowledge without changing its scope. This can happen if the experience
of an individual is in compliance with their internal presentation of the
world, but they can also occur as the failure of change or
misunderstanding14 (Turton, 1999). Adaptation is a process of
reformulating mental representation of the external world so that it is in
compliance with new experiences. Adaptation can be understood as a
mechanism, according to which failure leads to a lesson: if we expect that
the world functions in one way and this approach disrupts our
expectations, we often fail, but by adapting this mechanism to new
experiences and reformulating our model to the one in which the world
functions, we learn a lesson from experience or failure, or the failures of
others.
This theory stresses the importance of the socially constructed
nature of ethnic groups, giving attention to Benedict Anderson's concept
of imagined community. Advocates of this approach use the example of
Individuals may overlook a particular event, they might misunderstand the contribution of
other individuals, or the understanding can become a decisive fact, and thus the event being
a coincidence becomes then redundant as information. On the other hand, if individual
experience contradicts one’s internal representation, it can change one’s perception of
reality.
14
61
Rwanda, where the inhabitants were divided into Tutsi and Hutu by the
Belgian colonial government in the 1930's, on the basis of cattle
ownership, physical attributes and interests of the Church. Based on this
principle, identification cards were issued and these documents played a
key role in the genocide of 1994 (Turton, 1999).
It could be said that the dispute between members of the schools
mentioned ended in a draw. Ethnicity was recognized as a special
category, which is dominant over other types of group identification,
especially in moments of danger. On the other hand, the possibility of
ethnicity change was proven – despite the primordialist belief, that it is
not possible to change this innate attribute. In conclusion, we must note
that contemporary politologists rarely advocate opinions of a particular
theoretical school. On the contrary, we recognize many attempts to
combine both theories, as they do not necessary need to be in opposition.
Their use in empirical practice is, however, disputable (Šmíd, 2007).
Some of the ethnic conflict and civil war researchers have
introduced theories which describe inner views on the issue of ethnic
conflicts from the perspective of all three traditional schools. For example,
Monica Duffy Toft in The Geography of Ethnic Violence points out how the
models of settlement, socially constructed identities and charismatic
leaders of ethnic groups demonstrate the indivisibility of these elements
and their mutual inherent connection. This research, however, addresses
empirical concerns which can hardly be explained using instrumentalist
or constructivist approach, such as: Why do some ethnic disputes escalate
into violence, while other – despite originating in the same geographic
region – do not? (Duffy, 2003).
Although studying ethnic conflicts has a long history, real interest
in this field outside comparative political science dates back to the
collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In both examples mentioned,
the break-up was followed by ethnic conflicts which escalated into the use
of violence and a civil war. One of the most discussed questions about
ethnic conflicts is whether they occurred more frequently in the periods
before or after the Cold War. However, the academic public (including
Samuel P. Huntington and Robert D. Kaplan) predicted the spreading of
62
conflicts invoked by civilization clashes, tribalism15, overpopulation and
shortage of natural resources by the end of the Cold War.
The period after the Cold War has already witnessed formation of
numerous ethnic separatist movements, particularly within the former
communist states. Conflicts included separatist movements in former
Yugoslavia, the Armenians in Azerbaijan, the Abkhazians and the
Ossetians in Georgia, and the Chechens in the Russian Federation.
However, certain theoreticians claim that this fact does not represent the
rise in impact of ethnic conflicts, because many of the proxy wars 16 taking
place in the period during the Cold War, were in fact ethnic conflicts
camouflaged as hot spots of the Cold War. The research shows that the
collapse of communism and increasing amount of capitalist countries
were accompanied by a decline in war danger, international wars, ethnic
wars, revolutionary conflicts and the number of refugees and displaced
persons (Šmíd, 2007).
Certain scientists questioned the usefulness of the concept of
ethnic conflict as a whole. Others tried to test the theory of civilization
clashes coming to the conclusion that its usage is to some extent relative,
and that since the end of the Cold War we do not register the increased
intensity of civilization conflicts in relation to other ethnic conflicts.
Many political scientists tried to synthesize available methods to
solve the management or transformation of an ethnic conflict. For
example, John Coakley developed a methodical typology of solving
conflicts, which was integrated by the states. He uses terms such as
assimilation, adaptation, acculturation, population transfer, boundary
alternation, genocide and ethnic suicide (Coakley, 1992). John McGarry
and Branda O'Leary developed a taxonomy of eight macro-political
methods of conflict regulation, which are often applied by states in
various combinations. They involve numerous methods which are
described as morally unacceptable.
Tribalism – tribal consciousness, consciousness of belonging to a certain tribe
The proclaimed goal of a proxy war does not correspond to the real goal which stays
hidden in the interest background of the fighting superpower.
15
16
63
2.6
CAUSES OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS
What are the real causes of ethnic conflicts? Ethnicity itself is not
a cause of violent conflicts known from the 2nd half of the 20th century.
They are not directly caused by inter-group differences, because the
majority of ethnic groups follow their interests in a peaceful way most of
the time, using functioning political channels. Some researchers explain
the reasons for ethnic conflicts in connection with collapses of
authoritarian regimes. As an example, we can use a claim, that one of the
reasons why ethnic conflicts emerged in Eastern Europe and not
elsewhere is that after a collapse of authoritarian governments the space
for the existence of such conflicts was created. However, this argument
offers just a very vague and not really adequate explanation of ethnic
conflict causes. Scientists have yet to explain the connection of ethnic
conflicts and the place of their occurrence, and so the reason why certain
ethnic conflicts become more violent than others.
Despite this scepticism, we can divide the theoreticians focusing
on this sphere of relations into supporters of two different levels of
analysis: systemic and inherent (internal) level.
Systemic explanations
They focus on the nature of ethnic groups' security concerns, and the
nature of security systems that these groups function within. The first and
the clearest systemic precondition for an ethnic conflict arises when two
or more ethnic groups function geographically close to each other. A
conflict emerges in a mixed ethnic community within the area of one state.
The ethnic conflict is thus based on a struggle for power and status in the
country between different groups. The potential of this explanation is
almost universal as there are very few states with just one ethnic group.
The second systemic precondition is that national, regional and
international authorities are too weak to maintain peace, not to mention
the security of particular groups. In systems where anarchy prevails,
individual groups must ensure their own defence. These groups fear for
their safety and survival – especially if the rival sides are more or less
evenly matched and not one of them is able to gobble up the other –
politically, economically, or culturally. Fears of the future grow, if the
governments lose their ability to arbitrate between the groups or secure
64
reliable safety guarantees for individual ethnic groups. If a neighbour
ethnic group presents a security threat and this threat is increasing, fears
of the other group grow proportionally. In this case the threatened groups
begin with actions to defend themselves by means of military mobilization
and dispatching armed forces. This encourages the other group to
undertake its own actions focused on decreasing the security of the first
group, and thus a security dilemma arises. However, the groups seldom
realize the impact of their actions on their surroundings and the overall
security situation. These preconditions usually emerge in a situation when
former countries collapse and ethnic groups must secure their own safety
alone. Such situation can be observed in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union. The collapse of ruling regimes can be perceived as a
problem of emerging anarchy. An authoritarian system collapsed in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and individual groups had to
secure their own defence and safety (Montserrat, 1997).
According to Posen, instability arises if two conditions exist: first,
if it is hard to distinguish between offensive and defensive forces of a
particular group. In this case, a group cannot clearly signalize attacking or
defensive intentions. One party is thus unable to recognize the intentions
of its rival. However, forces dispatched for the purpose of defence have
offensive capabilities and so will always be perceived as a threat. Second,
if offensive military operations of one group are according to the nature of
military technology or available possibilities more effective than defensive
operations, then, as long as this group wants to preserve its existence, it
will always choose the option of attack. The advantage of attack then may
cause preventive war, because the superiority of offensive abilities
considerably improves the prospect of military success (Ismailov, 2011).
Inherent explanations
Different explanations of causes of ethnic conflicts focus on factors which
function primarily at domestic level: effectiveness of states in terms of
naming their primary security concerns and the influence of nationalism
and democracy on inter-ethnic relations. Individuals wish the states to
exist, because they secure people’s safety as well as economic prosperity.
Nationalism reflects the need of creating countries capable of achieving
these goals. Intensive nationalism and increased danger of a national
conflict arise if countries fail in confrontation against military and
65
economic threats and if they are not able to develop effective functioning
of institutions for the purpose of coping with an increased level of political
participation. For example, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern
European communist states caused a new wave of nationalism.
The emergence of ethnic nationalism makes certain types of
ethnic conflicts almost inevitable. An increase of ethnic nationalism in one
group can be perceived by the other groups as a threat. On the other hand,
this would lead to development of similar elements in any other area.
Ethnic nationalism also forces groups to dispatch large, highly motivated
armies. This leads the other group to a greater awareness and to building
its own military forces. This can again lead to stronger preventive attacks
from the other party or a preventive war between the groups.
Another factor which has an impact on ethnic conflicts is
democratisation. In fact, democratisation has the potential to help reduce
ethnic tension by creating an inclusive means of government so that it
could satisfy the needs of all the ethnic groups within a country.
Nevertheless, democratisation is problematic in multi-ethnic societies –
especially in its primary stage when the old regime changes to a new,
democratic one. This process may influence an existing ethnic problem.
The process of democratisation depends on two factors. First is the level
of ethnic tension. If the old regime used forced assimilation, relocation, or
deportee camps to solve ethnic problems, the democratisation process
will be very problematic and in such situation lots of future ethnic
disputes can be expected. A different case is, if the old regime aimed its
policies in favour of ethnic groups –in this case, ethnic questions will be
less important and even less problematic for the agenda.
The second factor is the balance between the groups in terms of
quantity. If one group is bigger than the other groups, the majority group
is given a dominant position when negotiating a new political
organization. In this case, interests of the minority are ignored. If two or
more groups are similar in quantity, all the parties involved usually feel
threatened (Montserrat, 1997).
2.7
CAUSES OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS
Religion is often labelled as a primary cause of a conflict, both on
internal and international levels.
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A definition of "religion" which would be accepted by the wider
scientific community has not yet been created. That is because religion is a
highly abstract term which can be understood on the ground of many
mental operations. Religion can be regarded from different, even
opposing, points of view. Literature gives us a great amount of various
definitions. We could almost say that each researcher has their own
definition. Religion is man's relationship to the sacred, by means of which
a person transcends their experience with the outer reality. In a narrow
sense, a religion means to believe in one or more gods. Individuals create
this relation within the geographical and cultural space they belong to.
The diversity of religions is proven by countless religious concepts
throughout the whole world. Nowadays, religious beliefs are not as bound
to the geographic location or tradition as they used to be. That is because
religious ideas can spread worldwide easily.
A religion is generally defined as a system of symbols and
principles including narratives, scripts, rituals and sacrifices based on the
tension between life and death, transience and eternity, perfection and
imperfection, by means of which people explain the meaning of their own
existence. Such a broad definition of religion can also involve other
symbols, which sacralize partial realities such as nation, class, race,
ethnicity, etc.
Each religion wants to have the exclusive right to define what is
right and what is wrong, justice and injustice. Religions demand
exclusivity for the unequivocal interpretation of truth which in many
cases leads to fundamentalism and blind fanaticism. Then the situation is
just one step from the use of violence as the means of defeating what
followers of the given religion consider being evil, unjust, or contradicting
the "laws of god".
Securitization of religious identity
Religion is also one of the sources of defining human identity. Religious
identity is perceived at three levels:
 as self-identification of an individual,
 as self-declaration of an individual,
 as simplified "assignment" of an individual or group to a
given identity by an outside factor.
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Religious identity is a frequent cause of conflicts as a result of
inappropriate securitization of this problem. Religious identity can
become a security risk not because it represents an existential threat, but
because it is presented that way. To promote particular interests
(political, economic, etc.), the participant of securitization can artificially
convert religious identity into a security issue, hyperbolize it in media,
and thus impose the feeling of existential danger on the referential object.
Securitization of the religion and religious identity represents a
considerable problem particularly if there is no distinction made between
religion and an ideology developed from some of the religious values
transformed according to its needs and goals. The issue of religious
securitization is not a new one. It happened many times in our history.
The clearest example for Europe is probably Medieval Spain where under
the influence of this factor thousands of Muslims were killed, expelled, or
forced to convert to Christianity. In Nazi Germany and its satellites, Jews
were the victims of the holocaust. In the Balkans, this problem is alive
even today.
Conflicts within religions
The connection between religion and conflicts has always been apparent.
We can find many examples of internal conflicts in the history of religion.
Within the Christian Church, it was e.g. the Great Schism of 1054, which
led to division into Roman and Eastern Church, later the excommunication
of Luther and Calvin, which resulted in even more splits and the
emergence of Protestant churches. Another monotheistic religion, Islam,
also could not avoid internal conflicts. It was divided into two basic
orientations – Sunnism and Shiism, later into Sufis and Wahhabists, which
represent two basic dogmatic interpretations of Islam. However, the
conflict, which arose immediately after the death of the Prophet in 632,
was the essential one. The war of succession to Muhammad divided Islam
into two groups - Sunnis and Shias - and this schism influences regional
and worldwide politics even after almost 1400 years.
Conflicts between religions
68
The present day, just like history, has been affected by inter-religious
conflicts. The world's history is full of conflicts between the three
"religions of the book".
The conflict between Christianity and Islam is the longest lasting
one. It began in 622, when the prophet Muhammad, following the Hijra
(migration) to Medina, founded the Ummah community with the Muslims
of Mecca. After initial problems, a strong opposition for the Christian
world arose and started expanding the scope of its influence. Although
some islands of peaceful coexistence during the course of conflicts
between Christianity and the Muslim world existed, more often than not,
the relationship between the two religions was characterized by intense
rivalry and wars. They were rivals in the struggle for power and territory.
The Jihad and crusades were common parts of religious life. Both religion
would alternately gain control and dominance, then lose it and both
declined making space for the opponent. This rivalry between Christian
Europe and the Ottoman Empire culminated in 1683 with the defeat of the
Ottomans near Vienna. Thus the downfall and retreat of the Ottoman
Empire began, and it de facto ended by defining Turkey's new border after
the end of WWI.
Contemporary relations between Islam and Christianity are still
affected by the aggressive perception of their shared history (via the
prism of "sacred" victories and "ignominious" defeats), despite the fact
that not all of the history was negative. Unfortunately for humanity, we
often forget that the period of religious tolerance between Jews, Christians
and Muslims brought the opportunity for European science and culture to
flourish.
Fundamentalism as a cause of religious conflicts
Religious fundamentalism is considered to be the basic cause of all the
religious conflicts.
Religious fundamentalism (lat. fundamentum: base, foundation;
fundamentalis: basic) is a radical religious movement, which, as a reaction
to modernity, refuses adaptation, plurality, or rationality and selectively
returns to realistic or fictional fundamentals of its religion. Its main
characteristics are reactivity, arrogating the possession of the universal
truth and emerging Manichaeism, Messianism and conflicting nature. The
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common ideological characteristics of various kinds of religious
fundamentalism are:
 the primary motive is the erosion of religion and its social
influence, fundamentalism only chooses certain elements of
modernity it reacts to; similarly, it selectively chooses the
sources of doctrines and traditions, accepts a certain form of
dualism,
 it emphasizes its absolutism and infallibility in questions of
revelations, faith and often also in questions of proper way of
life
 it leads to some form of Messianism.
The typical characteristics of the fundamentalist movements are
reactivity, negative approach and refusal of adaptation to changing social
and cultural conditions and rejecting pluralism. For the objectiveness’
sake, we must say that fundamentalism is present in all the major
religions – Islam, Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism.
Islamic fundamentalism represents a political and ideological
phenomenon, the dynamic display of Islamic reformism, or the struggle
for cultural and political emancipation and self-identification of Islamic
society. Individual orientations of fundamentalism differ in partial
questions of doctrines and in opinions about the means of gaining power.
Possible ways of taking power are the following:
1. gradual infiltration into social and governmental structures,
2. creating exemplary religious communities, which should
revive the declining society,
3. radical, violent acts, physical elimination of political
administration and a coup d’état, followed by declaration of
an Islamic state.
Christian fundamentalism is an unconditional and uncritical
advocacy of the respective religious doctrine. The fundamentals of
Christianity are the beliefs in dogmas and miracles (enumerations of them
differ).
There is a general concordance that reforming the fundamentals
of Christianity, e.g. by means of transformation of different scientific
findings into theology, is unacceptable.
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Jewish fundamentalism has lately been demonstrated by two
basic tendencies:
1. Increased political influence of the Haredim – ultra-orthodox
Judaism. The Haredim, in general, perceive the Torah and
some parts of the Hebrew Bible as an unquestionable source
of legitimacy and statehood of the people of Israel in the land
of Israel.
2. A younger offshoot of Judaism is represented by Zionists, who
are, unlike passive Haredim, close to secular Zionist ideology
and declare themselves as its main representative.
A dramatic increase of Hindu extremism has been observed. It is
accompanied by violent acts against religious minorities and lower castes
(Muslims, Christians and Dalits). An extremist Hindu organization known
under the collective name Sangh Parivar (Hindu Fundamentalist Family of
Organizations), uses the religion to encourage communal violence and
tries to aim all the activities at ultra-right, non-secular and nondemocratic nationalism in India. Hindu extremism, as another xenophobic
movements, functions according to carefully created exclusive principles,
which label all the non-Hindus or renegades as traitors and low-grade
citizens.
The fundamental cause of conflicts between religions lies in the
question of power and culture. We must search for the cause in answers to
the questions: Who will be the ruler? Who will be the dominated? What is
right and what is wrong? Who is right and who is wrong? These issues and
these key questions are parts of the relationships and thus also conflicts
between all the major world religions.
Specificities of religious conflicts
The basic specificities of religious conflicts are:
 Religious conflicts present some sort of "identity" wars, and
these identities are perceived as implacable, radical and
fundamental. For example, an English citizen can have a
multiple nationality, but a Christian cannot be a Muslim at the
same time.
 We can see a clear "them against us" structure, which causes a
high level of group compactness and devotion. A simple idea of
an enemy denying and fanatically fighting against everything
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








that is sacred to "us" has a high mobilization effect and is a
source of rich political capital.
The leaders emphatically demand devotion to the nation and
religion.
The parties of a conflict exaggerate the differences between
religions, and use it to provoke animosity and hatred.
The parties of a conflict also reserve exclusivity to impose good,
justice, universal truth and dogmas (perceived through the
vision of their religion) on non-believers and infidels.
Fundamentalist movements, often the main participants in
conflicts, have a tendency to create their own interpretation of
the enemy, and provoke a reaction as blind and irrational as
their action was.
Sides of a conflict label themselves as protectors of the "true
faith", demonize their opponents and often picture them in a
way that gives the right to kill.
Religious symbols are common targets of attack – churches,
monasteries, chapels, cultural institutions, religious leaders and
authorities.
Religious conflicts have the potential to cross the state or
regional borders and become conflicts with a global impact. The
conflict in the Balkans, the war in Afghanistan and the
intervention in Iraq made radical Islamists, who lead the
worldwide Jihad against the "Great Satan", gather together.
The existence of religious differences increases the probability
of war’s emergence and the intensity of ongoing conflicts. As a
result, the more religiously diverse the country is, the more
violent the religious conflicts. If the question of religion plays its
role in an ethnic conflict, danger of political, economic and
cultural discrimination rises.
Religious differences also influence the dynamics of conflicts. In
the case where religious disputes are a part of ethnic conflict,
the possibility of disorder increases. If the religion plays a
significant role in a country, it can be expected that in political
discussion, religious problems will be stressed more intensively
than others.
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The religion often becomes an institution giving excuses to
violence.
Other causes of conflicts can be:
 Globalization
 Clash of cultures
 Poverty and social differentiation
 Ecological problems
 Influence of new – non-state parties in international relations
 Non-military aspects of security (demographic development,
environmental changes, migration, etc.).
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3
CONFLICT RESOLUTION WITHIN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The main subject of this part is to briefly outline how conflicts are
solved within international relations. When considering conflict
resolution as an individual branch, we proceed from various scientific
disciplines such as international relations, peace research, security
studies, etc. The main objective of conflict resolution is a purposeful,
constructive and productive transformation of conflicts, aimed at
minimizing the use of violence, overcoming antagonisms between the
sides of conflicts and maintaining the conflict solving in a long-term
perspective. Conflict resolution also involves creating short-term and
long-term strategies, studying the interests and goals of the participants,
their behaviour, way of negotiating, their surroundings and the
environment of the conflict, third parties involved, etc. Other studied
factors are the way agreement can be reached and realized, and also longterm maintenance of the agreement. An important feature of conflict
resolution is also creating ways and methods of effective prevention of
conflicts, both violent and non-violent. The starting point for an effective
prevention and resolution are the research and analysis of conflicts, their
characteristics and individual phases that are defined in the first chapter.
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Diagram 3 CONTINUITY OF ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
Source: Personal elaboration according to Hofreiter, 2008
To analyse conflicts correctly we must recognize differences
between the terms ending the conflict and resolving the conflict. Not all
the ended conflicts can be considered resolved. From the standpoint of the
conflict solving process, we must determine all the actions and processes
that are part of ending and resolving. Actions that take place within the
development of conflicts are shown in Diagram 3. In course of the conflict
development phases, we can identify and define these actions:
1) conflict transformation,
2) conflict prevention,
3) conflict management,
4) conflict resolution,
5) conflict reconciliation,
6) building peace (Hofreiter, 2008).
Conflict transformation is a complex term representing activities
and processes that lead to changes of various typical attributes of conflicts
by means of solving the original causes of a particular conflict during a
longer period of time. This term is used to determine both the process of
conflict and its ending. It includes processes such as conflict prevention,
conflict resolution and it is also related to conflict reconciliation.
Conflict prevention represents the activity before the formation of
a conflict. Its goal is to identify the situation and circumstances which
75
could escalate into a violent conflict, reduce the amount of emerging
disputes, prevent escalation into violence and eliminate the causes of
disputes before there is a possibility for an armed encounter. In the next
chapter, we will discuss these actions and processes in more detail.
Conflict management includes actions, which lead to limiting,
moderating and suppressing an open conflict, so that negative and
disruptive displays can be prevented. Its goal is to end the conflict in a
way that prevents escalation or repeated violence (Mischnick, 2007).
Conflict resolution can be generally characterized as an activity,
which is primarily oriented on defining and studying the causes of a
conflict. Another goal of conflict resolution is an examination of progress
of the relationships between the parties involved. The goal is to reach
agreement between the sides of the conflict and settle the problem, so that
it would not become a basis for new disputes in the future. Š. Wais defines
conflict resolution as a social situation, in which the participants of an
armed conflict voluntarily choose to coexist peacefully or to solve the
basic causes of incompatibility of their interests so that the violence can
be stopped. This definition only concerns armed conflicts (Waisová,
2005). Hofreiter defines conflict resolution as a complex term indicating
the fact that deeply rooted causes of a conflict have already been
identified and transformed. As a result, the behaviour of the parties
involved is not violent any more, the views are not hostile and the
structure of the conflict has changed (Hofreiter, 2008).
3.1
METHODS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
There are various approaches to conflicts, but only 4 basic ways
of conflict resolution at the level of behaviour:
1) escape, which represents passive approach towards the
conflict,
2) attack, which can be verbal, but might escalate into physical
aggression,
3) manipulation, when participants try to influence their
opponent by various means,
4) non-violent way of satisfying the participant's needs, which is
straightforward and open.
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The concept of conflict resolution prefers the last, non-violent
possibility. The goal is to solve the conflict constructively, so that the
requirements of all the parties involved are met. In this context,
psychology recognizes the cognitive approach and works with functions
such as the thought process, will, memory, rational choice. It is based on
the fact that in social society conflicts do not occur. Philosophical
approach prefers the idea of non-conflictual coexistence. In the case
where a conflict emerges, the parties involved should not avoid and deny
it, but at the same time, they shouldn't escalate it into a higher level.
Conflicts should be dealt with in the early stages and an appropriate
method of solving them must be found (Labáth, 1997). Kusá defines five
basic conflict resolution methods and dependent resolution approaches:
Figure 1 BASIC METHODS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Kusá (2006)
The goal of each conflict resolution method is to allow the
participants to eliminate their emotions, rationally consider the situation,
decide on certain steps and approaches and make a particular,
measurable and realistic agreement with their opponents. Agreement is
the basic goal for each of the conflict resolution methods.
Negotiation
The use of a conflict resolution method depends on the particular
conflict stage. In the initial stage, parties involved are willing to come to an
agreement and solve the conflict by means of negotiation17.
Negotiation represents an informal process, during which the
sides of a conflict voluntarily hold talks about the possibility of its
17
Negotiation means parley, bargaining; mediation (Brukker, Opatíková, 2006).
77
resolution. Mutual agreement about the suggested solution is needed. The
process can be formal in some cases. This depends on the approach of the
parties involved. A typical feature of negotiation is the absence of any
judge, mediator or a third party. See fig.
Figure 2 NEGOTIATION
Source: Mischnick, 2007
Negotiation is an interpersonal or inter-group approach, which
can function on multiple levels: personal level, organization level or
international (diplomatic) level (Kusá, 2006 ).
The goal of the negotiation process is to create and build
relationships, by which the participants try to come to an agreement
about the issues of individual or mutual interests. Conflict participants
create a direct connection – verbal, written or using a negotiator. The
sides to the dispute define the subjects of discussion and decide how the
dialogue will run. They also hand each other information and messages,
discuss their goals, interests, possible needs and demands, create
possibilities for conflict resolution and analyse their practicability.
Negotiation is a communication process and one of the participants' goals
is to influence the opponent and gain benefits. The force of negotiation is
defined by the ability to influence the other side's decision. The
negotiation process is divided into three basic stages (Mischnick, 2007 ):
1st phase: Preparation. In this stage, it is essential to analyse the
conflict situation and summarise all the information. The object of the
analysis is also to determine interests, goals and needs of the parties
involved. The next step is to consider possible results of negotiation and
pick the best option available. The last part of the preparation stage is to
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establish contact with the opponent and mutually agree about the place
and process of negotiation. This agreement involves basic rules and the
object of the negotiations.
2nd phase: Interaction. In this stage, the key is to analyse the
situation from various points of view and agree about an accurate
definition of the problem. Interaction also represents evaluating and
defining the priorities of different possibilities according to the interests
and needs of parties involved, and a choice of the best alternative or
combination of alternatives that satisfy the interests and demands of the
parties involved.
3rd phase: Conclusion. The main goal of the negotiation process is
to achieve a binding settlement between the parties involved, which
would satisfy their legitimate needs. The goal is not to come to a state in
which one side adjusts to the demands of the other, but to achieve a
willingness of the participants to combine possibilities trying to find an
adequate solution. In the case where a negotiator represents a large
group, he or she must have an unequivocal mandate from this group and
also the conditions of their mutual communication must be clearly stated.
The conclusion stage also involves creating an action plan for the parties
involved and a plan of evaluation, control and agreement (Mischnick,
2007).
We must stress that negotiation is considered to be one of the
basic tools of international conflicts and disputes resolution.
Contemporary processes of globalization affect the density of interactions
between countries and societies. The frequency and depth of these
interactions are causes of conflictual relationships' emergence. Subjects of
negotiations are, e.g., the questions of trade policy, economic policy,
investments, natural resources, environment, etc.
An effort to solve the questions of war in a peaceful way, by
means of international negotiations and diplomacy, has been a
characteristic feature for the period since WWII. The quickly increasing
number of international institutions in the 20th century was another
impulse for the development of negotiations. The talks between these
institutions were also essential for the development of this process.
We must also stress the fact that a main correct approach does
not exist. There are just less effective and more effective approaches,
which differ according to different factors of the context. The importance
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of negotiations when solving international conflicts (inter-state, internal
or civil) has been apparent in the last decades. It follows that an increased
interest for this conflict resolution method is shown among the experts
(Webel, Galtung, 2007).
Facilitation
If the conflict is not being solved and the participants insist on
their standpoints, being unable to reach appropriate communication, the
conflict escalates and its resolution is impossible without the entry of a
third – neutral party. In this stage of a conflict, an appropriate tool is
facilitation, i.e. creating conditions that allow the participants to
communicate. Successful facilitation means the negotiating environment,
rules, time horizon and process of discussion, so that it is possible to
overcome opinion, interest or value barriers between the parties involved
(Kusá, 2006). Facilitation is a process, which creates an environment for
an effective and secure dialogue about complex issues. It is a structured
method, which should simplify the negotiations despite polarized
standpoints of the participants. A basic principle is to use mutual
consensus in each step. Its goal does not have to solve all the disputable
questions. It is considered a success is if the opponents are able to listen to
each other, understand the position of one another, openly showcase their
interests and describe their views of the situation. Facilitation is used in
different environments, e.g. local communities, educational institutions,
corporations, etc. (Mischnick, 2007). Facilitation is a controlled
negotiation with the presence of a neutral expert, who helps the
participants coordinate the dialogue. The facilitator is a part of the system
the conflict emerged in. He helps the sides to analyse problems, find
solutions of disputes and ways of using them. The facilitator tries to make
the dialogue more effective and helps find consensus, without using
ultimatums. A good facilitator does not solve conflicts, but simplifies the
communication. He does not intervene in the subject of discussion, but
ensures its fluency and direction, allowing all the parties involved to have
equal opportunities to influence it. The presence of a facilitator can be
enough to direct the dialogue so that it could be successful. Facilitation
can help solve the conflict or make it just a "disagreement". Then
negotiation can then follow (Labáth, 1997).
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Mediation
When a conflict is dynamically developing, strong polarization
may occur, one side refusing to communicate with the other. In such case
we distinguish separation (partial contact interruption) and isolation
(complete contact interruption). In this situation, negotiation is
impossible as the sides refuse to communicate. Facilitation is not possible
either, because an environment for communication between the
participants cannot be created. Disputes between parties that refuse to
mutually negotiate can be solved by mediation. An effective solution is to
involve a mediator in the talks (Labáth, 1997). The scheme of mediation
can be seen in Figure 3. The term "mediation" originates from Latin
mediato – arrangement.
Figure 3 MEDIATION
Source: Mischnick, 2007
Mediation represents an assisted negotiation. It is an organized
process in which a third party with no decisive authority helps the sides of
a conflict to negotiate a mutually acceptable agreement. The basic goal of
mediation is creating or re-creating communication channels between the
conflict participants using a mediator. This means a systematic
emphasizing of communication by means of the mediator and not directly
between the sides of a conflict, at least in the stages focused on history.
This approach crates a communication interstage, and the opponents can
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then seek solutions via the mediator. If the conflict is in a stage of
isolation, parties involved do not need to meet at all (Mischnick, 2007).
Mediation functions strictly according to the principle of having
permission from both sides for each step of the process. A mediator does
not make individual decisions on participants' behalf, but helps the
opponents find a solution on their own. In certain cases the mediator gives
impulses, propositions or formal suggestions for reconciliation of the
dispute. First of all, the mediator is a "procedural expert" who helps the
parties involved determine the program of negotiations, define and reframe ideas, lead the dialogue more effectively, find a common interest
and, of course, reach a mutually acceptable agreement 18.
The mediator also has to be able to create a more productive
dialogue than the conflict sides can. To achieve this, mediators help the
participants with mapping the facts, show empathy and impartiality to
both sides and help them create new ideas. Mediators also apply strategic
abilities and use persuading to achieve a state, when the participants
moderate their extreme positions (Mischnick, 2007).
The result of a targeted and successful mediation is a consensus,
which the participants accept explicitly and which is satisfactory for each
one of them. One of the goals of mediation is to make the individuals or
groups involved in a conflict active participants of negotiations. All the
sides should actively seek agreement, which is acceptable for everybody
and which satisfies the goals, needs and interests of all the participants.
The goal of active contribution to the mediation process is to divert
attention of the participants away from other impulses, which could lead
to escalation of conflicts, e.g. strikes, armed attacks, legal disputes, etc. The
goal of mediation is to allow the parties involved to meet, to try to
improve mutual relations and understand problems, which should lead to
avoiding polarization and creating space for more discussions and
negotiations. The result of a successful mediation is an agreement,
From the historical point of view, the original and "natural" mediators were priests,
shamans, elder members of the tribe, etc., because they had the trust of the community,
which is an important feature even in today's use of mediation. A mediator takes action in
situations of disagreement, misunderstanding, armed attack and other disputes where
considerable mistrust exists between the participants. That is why it is important for the
mediator to represent a trustworthy link between the opponents. Another important feature
of successful mediation is the ability to persuade (Webel, Galtung, 2007).
18
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confirmed by all the parties involved. The agreement should also specify
the ways of how given goals have been accomplished (Kusá, 2006).
Mediation is widely used in all kinds of discussions considering
complex problems of public policy or international conflicts. In case the
conflicts are seemingly unsolvable, there is still a possibility of solving
them using mediation. Mediation is extremely important in long-term,
deep-rooted conflicts, because solving such conflict is not possible without
external help. Even in situations when it is impossible to right all the
wrongs, mediation is useful for solving individual aspects of a wider
conflict.
Mediation is a highly effective method used for conflict resolution
achieving a high success rate in particular cases.
Arbitration
Arbitration is an alternative, traditional way19 of dispute
resolution. An arbitrator is named – either by a court, or by other
adjudicative authority. The main task of an arbitrator is to hold an
interlocutory hearing of a case, evaluate the evidence, arguments and
testimonies, and deliver a verdict within given competences. The
arbitrator can be generally authorized to investigate, mediate, make
recommendations, etc. Letting an independent, third party decide about
the subject of a conflict is a tradition older than the law itself. Arbitrational
lawsuits exist in all communities and civilizations. The final verdict of an
arbitration is obligatory, but in some exceptional cases may just have the
nature of a recommendation. A characteristic feature of an arbitration is
its voluntariness. This means that the participants should agree about the
means of solving the dispute. Another typical feature is the greater
possibility to influence the sides' decisions by means of a higher level of
informality in front of the court of arbitration. The approach towards
conflict resolution is directive. The arbitrator hears the sides of the
We divide the sides of conflicts to the winning and losing ones. Historically, disputes were
most often solved by a directive approach – based on using power or authority. The
resolution principle has been the same whether it was a tribal meeting of council of elders,
decision of a reeve or a king. The third neutral side always used its authority to pronounce
obligatory verdicts. It decided how the case would be solved according to the subject of
dispute and evaluation of evidence and witnesses. It all works the same way until today.
Traditional conflict resolution methods are nowadays represented by legal system, including
the activities of police department and the institute of imprisonment (Kusá, 2006).
19
83
dispute and decides the most effective possibility. Arbitration is used in
different sectors, mostly in the commercial sphere, but it is also
institutionalized at courts. At the international level, arbitration is a
commonly used conflict resolution method, e.g. in situations after civil
wars20 (Kusá, 2006).
Obligatory and most often used arbitration mechanisms are:
a) Ombudsman – public human rights protector. The foundations
for this institution were laid in Sweden, back in the 18th century. Since
then, it has spread into more than 70 countries around the world. The role
of an ombudsman is not only administrative. The institution of
ombudsman serves as a tool to solve conflicts in other than judicial way
(Kusá, 2006). "The Public Protector of Rights is an independent body which,
protects basic rights and freedoms of natural and legal persons in
proceedings before public administration bodies and other bodies of public
authority, if their conduct, decision-making, or inaction, is in conflict with
the legal order" (Constitution of the Slovak republic, 1992, art. 151a).
b) Court of arbitration -- Arbitration represents an out-of-court
settlement of disputes assisted by judicial officials. The goal of the
arbitration courts concept was to decrease the number of lawsuits and
accelerate the decision-making process in particular cases. Before the
beginning of arbitration the opponents sign an arbitrational contract,
where competences of the court of arbitration are defined. Courts of
arbitration use a combination of both public and private law. The final
verdict is obligatory and in this case no corrective devices are permissible.
The nature of arbitration is voluntary and it represents an alternative
method of conflict resolution.
The institute of ombudsman along with the courts of arbitration
represent a relatively respected authority in democratic countries. Both
institutions are consensual methods of conflict resolution, where the final
decision is pronounced by a third party (Kusá, 2006).
20 Arbitration tribunals were established e.g. in the countries of former Yugoslavia (The
Badinter Arbitration Committee, which consisted of five constitutional court judges from the
countries of the European Economic Community. The committee decided about the accession
of successor states to the EEC), in cross-border disputes, e.g. between Eritrea and Ethiopia
(Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The
Hague), or between Slovenia and Croatia (about the Slovenian corridor to open sea) (Kusá,
2006).
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Adjudication
It represents a form of conflict resolution with the highest
obligation level. It involves deciding about the subject of dispute by a third
party, which has the competence to deliver obligatory verdict.
Adjudication can take place in an out-of-court way, but a judicial lawsuit is
its most common form. It is a structured and formal process, which is not
based on voluntary participation. It is a situation, when one side is the
winner of the lawsuit, and the other loses. Adjudication is based on
competition between the opponents.
It represents one of a few involuntary forms, where the opponent
cannot choose a different way of dispute resolution, neither avoid it. In the
stage of a higher conflict escalation level a lawsuit can be unconditional
and beneficial. Adjudication is a legal process, in which the lawsuit is
judged according to the evidence and argumentation of advocates, while
the rights and obligations of the sides of a conflict are taken into account.
The trial is highly structured and it follows the law and exact
procedural rules. The plaintiff, who initiates the lawsuit, demands legal
rectification of the situation. If successful, the judge decides in favour of
the plaintiff and pronounces a verdict, which contains exercise of the law,
right for compensation, punishment and sanctions of the opponent, and a
court order prescribing or forbidding particular action or declarative
approach of the opponent, all to prevent the emergence of more conflicts
(Kusá, 2006).
3.2
ALTERNATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Based on conflict research, it is obvious that disputes are best
solved during their latent phase, if there is no escalation. However, it is
not possible to do in all cases. Because of this, it is also necessary to define
alternative methods of resolving conflicts that have already erupted. The
methods of dealing with conflict situations, as well as individual conflicts,
differ. We can split them up into several groups.
1. The method of violence – violent suppression of conflicts
2. Escaping or avoiding the conflict
3. Game theory, as a way of resolving conflict situations
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The method of violence
This is an extreme way of conflict resolution where one of the
parties involved in the conflict shows an evident high degree of
preparedness. The basis is the determination or belief that force or the
threat of force needs to be used in order to achieve one's interests and
needs. The objectives of violent conflict suppression are, for example,
(Hofreiter, 2008): a) forcing conflict resolution, if the parties involved
don't address it themselves, b) preventing or punishing aggression against
a sovereign state, c) restoring a legitimate government, which was illegally
overthrown, d) preventing the supplying of weapons to the conflict region,
e) protection of the population against genocide and other violent acts,
committed by their own government or as a result of an internal conflict,
f) restricting the access of the parties involved to resources that would
allow them to continue or escalate the conflict, g) protecting the
democratic regime against internal and external threats.
It is necessary to lay down certain conditions for using a method
in which a conflict is violently suppressed. If one party has more resources
and a decisive superiority of forces, it is possible for them to use this
superiority to their advantage when dealing with the conflict. The need for
an immediate solution to the dispute, in the event of an emergency
situation, may be another case (e.g. the deployment of the armed forces
and the police in situations where it is necessary to separate the opposing
parties). Another example is the need to adopt and enforce an
unexpectedly violent (but necessary) resolution of the dispute, which the
opposing party will see as negative. The condition in the choice of a
violent conflict resolution occurs in the case of a conflict situation which
could cause significant material or humanitarian damage, or in the event
that the measures are associated with the provision of vital interests. In
this case, a violent settlement of the dispute is seen as legal and in
accordance with applicable law. In the case of obvious destructive
activities which threaten a party involved (e.g. the state) and its interests,
the method of violence is adequate (for example during violent
demonstrations of anti-globalists, eco-activists, during riots, violation of
public order, destroying or damaging of property).
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The deployment of regular armed forces, during Peace Support
Operations21 (PSO), to areas with conflicts may also be considered as a
violent solution to violent domestic and international conflicts (Hofreiter,
2008). It is the violent resolution of a dispute by a third party, which is
usually represented by the international community, which has an armed
military force with an appropriate mandate to settle the conflict.
Another category of operations which use the deployment of
military forces are the so-called Peace-enforcement operations (PEO). The
consent of the parties involved in the conflict is not required to begin this
type of operation. Such activities represent violent operations, consisting
of the deployment of armed units in a direct struggle to protect the civilian
population affected by the conflict. Its goal is to eliminate armed violence
and establish peace. Within the framework of the measures defined in the
Charter of the United Nations, peace enforcement is the highest form of
involvement of international peace-enforcement units in conflicts. More
on this topic in a separate chapter.
If the situation is sufficiently stabilized, peace-enforcement
activities are replaced by a peacekeeping activities. This category includes
peacebuilding operations and peacemaking operations . The mandate of
the units used in such operations contains provisions identical to those of
peace enforcement because, in the case of stabilisation it is, in some cases,
necessary to use force in order to maintain a peaceful situation. These
units have a mandate under Chapter VI, and VII of the Charter of the
United Nations. In some cases, their mandate is defined in international
agreements (Hofreiter, 2008).
The use of force or the threat of its use is an extreme, though not
always effective, final solution to the conflict. Coercion of the opponents in
the conflict to end their violent acts against each other does not mean the
removal of the subject of the conflict and the causes of the dispute. It is not
impossible for the conflict to begin anew, if the power causing its forced
cessation stops being active.
21 PSO are multifunctional operations, co-ordinated by military and also civilian
organisations on the basis of impartiality. They are divided into: operations for conflict
prevention, peace-enforcement operations after the emerging of a conflict, peace-keeping
operations, peace-building operations and humanitarian operations (Hofreiter, 2008).
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Escaping – avoiding the conflict
If one of the parties involved in the conflict is not sufficiently
prepared and does not have the ability or the means to solve the dispute.
They then usually use the method of escaping or avoiding the conflict. In
this case, the party involved is not able to deal with the situation and
communicate with its opponent about the possibilities of settling the
dispute. From the perspective of one of the parties involved, escaping
from the conflict is a relatively easy way of resolving it. The essence is
ignoring the conflict situation, denying it exists or leaving the area where
the conflict takes place. A party involved in the conflict decides not to take
any constructive steps towards resolving or changing the situation.
In the initial stage of the investigation of this alternative of
conflict resolution, it may seem negative because of the parties' passive
approach. With a deeper analysis we can also define some positive aspects
and advantages. For example: escaping or avoiding the conflict is a quick
way of dealing with the situation, and it does not require intellectual,
material or large financial resources; this method makes it possible to
avert or delay the conflict, if it's irrelevant to or not interesting enough for
one of the parties involved. The downside of this approach is that an
escalation of the conflict may occur because the root cause of the conflict
is not removed but preserved. Delaying the resolution of the dispute may
lead to a deepening and escalation of the conflict, instead of its resolution.
The use of the method of escaping or avoiding a conflict is subject
to a number of factors. The method is justified if there is another relevant
and constructive conflict that needs to be addressed as a priority and, if
not solved, does not result in negative consequences. If the party fails to
address (or avoids) the unimportant causes of existing conflicts, it allows
the party to save their resources and strength and focus on important
issues and disputes. The method of escaping is also used in a situation
where the opponent does not have sufficient information and, given the
seriousness of the conflict, acquiring it would be extremely complicated
and disadvantageous in terms of cost and resources. Another example of
this method's use is when the opponent has great superiority, which he
can use to achieve a quick victory in the open rivalry.
Certain features of behaviour and specific activities of the parties
involved are typical for this method. They include, for example, hiding
information necessary to resolve the dispute in order to prevent the
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escalation of the conflict as a result of a leak of sensitive, strategic
information. Another typical feature is the use of a variety of arguments to
delay the resolution of disputes and problems that are the causes of the
conflict. A characteristic manifestation of behaviour is refusing to
acknowledge that the causes of the conflict truly exist and relying on the
dispute being resolved without the active presence of the parties involved
(Hofreiter, 2008).
The Game Theory
It represents a formal, rational, mathematical method of the study
of decision-making in conflict situations. It analyses the communication
and decision-making of the parties involved in negotiations and the
conflict itself. It applies the "MINIMAX" principle (minimizing costs and
maximizing profits) into the theory of decision-making. The basis of this
principle is that every party has correctly defined objectives, will act
according to the rules and means given, and will not wrongly choose their
goals. There are two approaches in the game theory: a) cooperative
games, where the parties involved communicate and make agreements
relating to choosing their strategies, b) non-cooperative games, where
reciprocal agreements are not possible and communication may or may
not exist (Drulák, 2003).
The game theory is divided into three basic models:
1) a game with opposing interests,
2) a game with identical interests,
3) a game with mixed interests.
1) In case of games with opposing interests, we can talk about a
zero-sum game. The parties involved mobilized their resources and forces
in order to enforce their interests and goals and to prevent their own
defeat and failure. The interests of the opponents in the conflict are in
contradiction and each opponent tries to gain absolute superiority over
the others, and seeks to force them to deal with interests, which are
contrary to their own. In the game with opposing interests, the result
must be a complete defeat of one of the parties involved. One party may
profit only at the expense of the other (Krejčí, 2007). This non-cooperative
strategy is shown in Chart 4.
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Chart 4 - VECTOR OF PROFIT OF THE GAME WITH OPPOSING
INTERESTS
Source: (Krejčí, 2007)
This strategy is used in conflicts, where the parties involved aim
towards a confrontation and are in a conflict to gain specific positions and
maintain them. The characteristics of this approach are (Hofreiter, 2008):
- the opposing parties in the conflict seek to maximize the
realization of their objectives, regardless of the objectives and
interests of their opponent,
- the goal of the parties is to uncompromisingly refrain from any
concessions, or to hinder the loss of their gained position,
- opponents wish to remain on their achieved or gained
positions and aim to defend them without compromise,
- the conflicting issues form the borderline factors of the
conflict, differences between the opposing parties (there is no
willingness to change these differences),
- the behaviour and activities of the opposing parties are aimed
at the opponent, his discredit, elimination, and not towards
the resolution of the dispute.
2) The second model of the game theory is the game with
identical interests, the non-zero-sum game, which is a cooperative way of
resolving conflicts. In this case, the parties involved are open and willing
to accept unilateral concessions or to adapt. Adapting does not mean a
clear victory for the opposing parties, but neither is it a loss. A party that
retreats from its position will partially be subject to loss, but it will also
90
gain values, or keep its positions which it maybe would have lost during
an ongoing dispute. A graphical representation of the game with identical
interests is shown in Chart 5.
Chart 5 - VECTOR OF PROFIT OF THE GAME WITH IDENTICAL
INTERESTS
Source: Krejčí, 2008
The following types of conflict situations typically use the game
with identical interests (Hofreiter, 2008):
- An obvious error committed by one of the parties involved in
the conflict becomes apparent during the conflict. Escape is
impossible, as is using force to solve it. For an opponent who
has committed the error (such as incorrect, incomplete or
misleading information), it is an alternative, which they can
use to end the conflict with honour.
- If the planned concessions are too severe for one of the parties
involved and is incomparable with their relevance to the
second party, it is possible to adopt smaller, less significant
concessions. This will eliminate the possibility of the conflict
escalating and also saves the strength and resources of the
opponents.
- If there are other major crisis situations which may occur in
the near future and which will require the parties to conserve
strength and resources. Partial concessions allow the diverting
of attention from solving irrelevant problems, saving
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resources and focusing on averting a possible danger or
expected crisis situation (e.g. in anticipation of a war, it is
beneficial to solve smaller conflicts, even at the price of having
to take concessions and, thus, gain the support of potential
allies for the next conflict). Concessions should be taken
whenever their refusal could lead to bigger losses and damage,
or other disadvantages for a party in the conflict.
3) The third method of the game theory is the game with mixed
interests, or a non-zero-sum game, which is a cooperative method. This
method is one of compromise during conflict resolution and of mutually
advantageous cooperation. When using this method, the parties involved
will have their interest and needs satisfied adequately and will gain the
same benefits and the same losses. This method is displayed in Chart 6.
Chart 6 - VECTOR OF PROFIT OF THE GAME WITH VARIED INTERESTS
Source: Hofreiter, 2008
A compromise represents a kind of mutual consent, based on the
mutual correction of the positions of both parties in relation to solving the
issue and on finding a mutually advantageous position against the issues
in question (Hofreiter, 2008).
The above described method may be a reliable basis for a longterm cooperation. It is most commonly used in democratic societies and it
is considered to be a classic and model way of resolving conflicts. It
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satisfies the needs of both parties, due to a series of mutual concessions
and mutually beneficial agreements.
Mutual conversations, discussions or negotiations, which aim to establish
the common interests of the parties involved, are important when using
this method. The negotiations conducted in order to reach a mutual
agreement or compromise of opinions about solving the disputing issues,
are conducted while respecting the interests of the parties involved. This
method assumes that the parties involved in the conflict will show a
mutual openness toward positive cooperation. Prerequisites for a
successful compromise solution to the conflict are, for example (Hofreiter,
2008):
- The parties involved analyse the issues and seek solutions and, at
the same time, demonstrate partnership instead of rivalry.
- The parties involved in conflicts search for mutually beneficial
variations of dispute resolution.
-
-
3.3
In order to achieve a compromise, it is necessary to understand
the opinion of the opposing party and accept alternatives in the
search of a compromise solution.
The final consensus must respect and meet the interests and
requirements of all parties involved in the conflict to a maximum
extent.
IMPORTANCE AND STATUS OF THE UN AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION WITHIN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The United Nations Organization (UN) and its establishing were a
significant change in international relations. The Charter of the United
Nations is the establishing agreement of the UN. It was signed in October
1945 by fifty states. The main idea of the organization was to ensure the
non-violent resolution of conflicts among its member states and to secure
political and economic stability in the international system. In the early
1950's, the UN had become not only an organization that could guarantee
the security of states and their leaders, but also guaranteed the security of
the population in the area of international relations. The basic structure of
the institutions and the objectives of the UN are laid down in the Charter
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of the United Nations. The institutional system of the UN includes
(Waisová, 2005):
a) the main bodies of the UN are the General Assembly, the Security
Council, the Secretariat, the Economic and Social Council,
Trusteeship Council and the International Court of Justice.
b) specialized agencies – e.g. The International Labour Organisation
(ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
c) programmes and funds – Development Program (UNDP), the
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and
others.
The General Assembly is made up of representatives of all the UN
member states. States, regardless of size or economic power, have one
vote (the principle of one state – one vote). The General Assembly acts in
the form of resolutions, which do not have a legally binding character,
which means that they are not enforceable. It represents the broadest
forum of member states which participates in the resolution of conflicts
within international relations. It offers institutional support to the
services of the Secretary General and provides the member states space
for negotiation, the achievement of agreement, the articulation of interests
and the creation of coalitions, standards and rules, and the creation of
norms to govern the behaviour of the member states (Peace and security
..., 2005).
The UN Security Council (UNSC) has fifteen members, five of
which are permanent and ten are not. The permanent members have the
right to veto. According to the Charter of the United Nations, the Security
Council is responsible for maintaining world peace and international
security. Primarily, it deals with conflicts and conflict situations, in
particular those that are likely to lead to international tension and
outbreaks of violence. It specifies whether a particular situation has been
a threat to peace or an act of aggression and recommends measures that
should ensure peace or the adoption of the agreement between the
opposing parties. The Security Council is the only body of the UN which
can use Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations on actions that
94
may be taken when peace is endangered, on a breach of peace and assault
operations. On their basis, the UNSC can decide to enforce peace (peace
enforcement), sanctions or embargo, the interruption of diplomatic and
economic relations and on the use of force. It can decide to send troops to
support peacekeeping, carry out the investigation of disputes, give
recommendations to the parties involved, etc. The Security Council may
establish international criminal tribunals 22 (UN information centre in
Prague, 2005).
The Secretariat of the UN is made up of the Secretary General and
his subordinate administrative staff. The Secretariat is responsible for the
coordination and management of the institutions of the UN,
administration of peace operations, intermediary activity in international
disputes, organising international conferences, etc. Among the
fundamental parts of the Secretariat, which have an impact on the solution
to the conflict situations, are: The Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), the
Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department for Disarmament
Affairs (DDA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), the Department of
Public Information (DPI) and the Office of the Security Coordinator and
the Regional Commission. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is
the central point for all peace operations. It plans, directs, administers and
coordinates the implementation of the mandate of the peacekeeping
missions, as has been established by the Security Council. It maintains
contact with the parties involved in the conflict and tries to get their
consent to the peace activities of the UN
(Waisová, 2005). In this context, it is necessary to emphasize that the UN
does not have its own combat units or its own army and, therefore, the
peace-keeping units fulfilling individual missions consist of voluntary
contributions from member states (Ivančík, 2012a).
The International Court of Justice has been a part of the UN
system since 1946. It can settle disputes among states (if it is asked to do
so by the parties involved in the dispute) or may issue advisory opinions
22 The goal of international criminal tribunals is to prosecute persons who have seriously
violated international humanitarian law or are responsible for widespread violence, murder
and genocide. Another subject is to deter similar activities in the future, achieve justice for
the victims of violence and support the process of national reconciliation and maintaining
peace in the region (Waisová, 2005).
95
for the main bodies of the UN and some of its specialized agencies. It has
the ability to instruct an individual, a body, a commission or other
organization to carry out an investigation or to issue an expert report
concerning every dispute.
The Trusteeship Council has five members that are the same as
the permanent members of the Security Council. It was originally formed
as a body to manage the eleven areas, which did not received the status of
separate independent territories after WWII. The Council formally ended
its activity in November 1994, when the last territory under its care
gained its independence – the Palau Island Chain (Waisová, 2005).
3.4
ISSUES OF THE DEFINITION AND CONTENT
OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
The current problems with a conceptually clear definition of UN
peacekeeping operations is largely the result of the fact that the key
concept of peacekeeping is not precisely present in the Charter of the
United Nations, although it is one of the most significant activities of the
UN. The reason is the absence of a definition in the main document of the
UN – the Charter. The term was quite simple when the UN was created – in
an atmosphere of cooperation and newly-established peace after WWII,
nobody foresaw that the UN will also have to deal with peacekeeping
operations. Peacekeeping or the preserving of peace and the expanding of
this concept of security, developed in response to the hostility between
the two main parties involved in the Cold War, the USA and the Soviet
Union. Its principles were defined during foreign-political practice. The
concept "peacekeeping" came into use for the first time in connection with
the operation of the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) after the
Suez Crisis of 1956. The term was formalized in February 1965, when the
UN General Assembly established a special commission to discuss issues
relating to peacekeeping. It was named the Special Committee on
Peacekeeping Operations (Rikhye, 1984). However, the UN had later
decided that first peacekeeping operation had been the United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization (UNTS) in the Middle East, which started
its activity in 1948.
96
Based on the principles established during the Cold War, Marrack
Goulding defined peacekeeping as the keeping of peace, which is seen as
traditional, or first generation operations which are operations launched
by the UN, with the consent of the parties involved, in order to help
control and resolve problems among them, carried out under the direction
and control of the UN, financed equally by all member states and with the
military and other personnel provided voluntarily by these states, while
this personnel must be impartial and use force only in the smallest
possible extent (Goulding, 1993).
The definition of peacekeeping had expanded after the Cold War,
because the nature of the UN operations changed. Michael W. Doyle and
Nicholas Sambanis state that UN peacekeeping is currently a multidimmensional management of complex peace operations, usually
following the end of civil wars, proposed to provide temporary security
and to help the parties create institutional, material and ideological
changes that are necessary to ensure a lasting peace (Doyle, Sambanis,
2007). Therefore, the concept of peacekeeping doesn't currently refer
only to military-related activities, but it also includes civilian aspects of
multi-level diplomacy, such as political mediation and assistance in the
area of national reconciliation, reintegration and demobilization of excombatants, elections support, police reform and the protection of human
rights (Ahmed et al., 2007).
Sorenson and Wood describe the shift in definition in a similar
way. According to them, the concept of peacekeeping operations has
spread so that it includes peacemaking operations, peace building
operations) and peace-enforcement operations – often named as the
second generation of peacekeeping operations, because they contain
military, political, social and humanitarian aspects and are rarely present
in traditional peacekeeping operations (Sorenson – Wood, 2005, p.3)
Roland Paris also uses the concept of maintaining peace in the broadest
sense, covering traditional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, as well as
post-conflict peacebuilding. (Paris, 2003).
The authors Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin also
use a similarly broad meaning of the term peacekeeping. They also
distinguish five distinct types of peacekeeping operations, based on what
objectives the particular operation should achieve. These types are not
mutually exclusive – one peacekeeping operation may freely move from
97
one type to another and may attempt to carry out a number of objectives
at the same time. Based on this, traditional peacekeeping operations
attempt to create a political space, which is essential, in order to achieve
agreements between enemy states. The second type of operations,
transition management, encourages the creation and implementation of
agreements, which the opposing parties have agreed upon. These
operations take place within the boundaries of one state. The aim of a
broader understanding of the concept of peace-keeping is to fulfil the role
of traditional peacekeeping and the tasks that come with it, in an
environment of an ongoing conflict. The original task of UN is to provide
peace operations and when it comes to a conflict, also to implement the
decisions of the Security Council. Last but not least, we have to mention
that peace-support operations are geared towards the creation of a
liberal-democratic society which, according to the authors, presents the
most effective way of maintaining international peace and security
(Bellamy et al., 2004).
According to the aforementioned authors, we use the term
"peacekeeping" as a general concept, which includes all variations of first
and second-generation peacekeeping operations (Sorenson-Wood, 2005).
With respect to this, authors such as Salman Ahmed, Paul Keating and Ugo
Solinas, notice that many authors reflect the large range of activities of the
UN current operations by implementation of a uniform term of "peace
operations". However, because of tradition, a wide recognition and many
implications, there is still a tendency to keep using the concept of
peacekeeping, despite of the diversity of content (Ahmed et al., 2007).
Despite these problems with definitions and inconsistent
terminology of peace operations, we will continue to use Zůna's extended
categorisation of peace operations. He claims that peace operations may
be divided into six basic types, regardless of which party carries them out
– peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacebuilding, peacemaking, conflict
prevention and humanitarian operations. Every peace operation is usually
the combination of these six types (Zůna, 2010).
We must keep in mind that the UN, in particular, uses the breakdown to
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations (or others, such as
peacemaking and peacebuilding) (Závěšický, 2006).
Despite the complications relating to the definition of peace
operations, it may be generally said that their policy framework is
98
determined by the main parties involved in the process of making political
decisions on their execution. These parties are national states,
international organizations, regional organizations, non-governmental
organizations or other entities within the system of international relations
and politics. The strategic framework of national approaches to peace
operations is defined by their national interests, political-military
objectives, methods and instruments used to enforce them (diplomatic,
military, economic, information) (Zůna, 2010).
The UN uses the term "peacekeeping" in the broader sense of the
word.
Peacekeeping operations are traditionally associated with
Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, which regulates the socalled peaceful settlement of disputes. However, in the current doctrine of
peacekeeping operations (the Capstone Doctrine) the UN states that in
recent years, the United Nations Security Council began to apply Chapter
VII of the Charter in the authorisation of sending peacekeeping operations
into hostile conflict environments, where the state is not able to maintain
security and public order (UN, 2008). This formulation makes it clear that
the UN itself uses the term "peacekeeping operations" for operations
under Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the Charter. This concept has also
found its way into specialised literature. Andersson, for example, states
that he uses the term peacekeeping in the general sense of the word,
regardless of whether or not the operation has a mandate under Chapter
VI or VII (Andersson, 2000).
At the end of 1990's there had been a change in the requirements
of the UN peace operations, so that they‘d become functional, flexible and
effectively respond to existing crises and conflicts. During this time,
peacekeeping operations went through a period of introspection – it was
obvious that it is, partly, necessary to return to the traditional peace
operations of the UN and, also, that the Western States cannot have an
entirely dominant role within these operations. The period culminated in
the year 2000, when the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, assembled a
panel of experts, under the leadership of Lakhdar Brahimi, which was
meant to determine where the UN should head from there (William
Bellamy – Griffin, 2004).
UN third generation operations are based not only on the idea of
structural prevention and post-war reconstruction of areas, but also on
99
the idea of the need for an effective implementation of the mission's
mandate, despite the difficult conditions of national conflict (Waisová,
2005). Therefore, in connection with this change, some authors talk about
the third generation of UN peace operations. They are often understood as
operations with a mandate under Chapter VII and often not adhered to the
principle of consensus among the parties involved (Doyle – Sambanis,
2007).
These operations are applied when not states, but groups within a
state, are involved in conflicts. They usually take place in states where the
state has no control over its territory. They tend to be spread across the
territory of one state and focus on long-lasting, low-intensity conflicts.
Their task is to bring about peace and not just keep it. They are often sent
out without the consent of the parties involved, when the consent of the
national government is enough. Their goal is to prevent further violence
on civilians and to ensure help, economic reconstruction and a complete
reconstruction of the country Dragoun, 2009). This includes operations
with a low level of involvement of military components in order to protect
the distribution of humanitarian aid, but also to enforce ceasefire and, in
some cases, act as an authoritative entity in rebuilding failed states (Doyle
– Sambanis, 2007).
In the context of the third generation operations, we are talking
about the hybrid operations. These are missions where individual
elements of the UN and regional organizations are part of one mission and
under the joint command of the UN (DPKO, 2008). Thanks to this
cooperation, hybrid missions often tend to be more successful in
achieving their mandate. An example is the political mission UNAMA in
Afghanistan, where UN and NATO troops cooperated with the local forces
(Kobelková, 2010).
The Brahimi Report (2000) has been an important document,
which relates to this generation of the UN peacekeeping operation. Based
on the experience from the operations in the Balkans, it made
recommendations toward their reform and fundamental changes in the
approach. A major recommendation was that peacekeeping forces must be
involved only in cases of a realistic and achievable mandate. The main
effort of this new concept was also to break the traditional impartiality of
the peacekeeping forces involved in operations, if one of the parties
clearly violates the framework of the peace agreement. It also
recommends the establishment of investigative commissions during the
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outbreak of a conflict, the deepening of cooperation across institutions,
governments, international and regional organizations, it emphasizes the
strengthening of the role of civilian police, the assistance with postconflict reconstruction of the region and, in particular, the creation of
units that can be deployed quickly and efficiently in case that the mission
requires it, and at the latest within 30 days from the adoption of the
resolution (Kabeleová, Blančilová). The report then recommended to
introduce a new type of operations, so-called robust operations and, in
connection with their implementation, to establish sufficient capacity for
the conduct of peacekeeping operations.
The concept of the state's participation in peace operations
contains the activities of military units in the UN peacekeeping operations;
marginal attention is also devoted to the contribution of the police to the
operations. Peacekeeping operations are, thus, limited to military, maybe
even military-political activities, but never political. "UN peacekeeping
operations" are those that fall under the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (UN DPKO) within the framework of the General Secretariat of
the United Nations. For example, from 1948 until the end of 2011, 66
peacekeeping operations were established. As of December 2011, 15
peacekeeping operations were active around the world (UN DPKO,
2011b). The following peacekeeping operations fall into the time-frame of
the years 1990 – 2011, on the basis of the definition of the UN DPKO:
Table 1: UN peacekeeping operations, taking place in the years 1990 – 2013
Abbreviation
Name of the operation
Location
Start
End
UNTSO
United Nations Truce
Supervision Organization
United Nations Military
Observer Group in India and
Pakistan
The United Nations
Peacekeeping Force in
Cyprus
United Nations
Disengagement Observer
Force
United Nations Interim
Force in Lebanon
The Middle East
5/1948
-
India/Pakistan
1/1949
-
Cyprus
3/1964
-
The Syrian Golan
Heights
6/1974
-
Lebanon
3/1978
-
UNMOGIP
UNFICYP
UNDOF
UNIFIL
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UNGOMAP
UNIIMOG
UNAVEM I
UNTAG
ONUCA
MINURSO
UNIKOM
UNAVEM II
ONUSAL
UNAMIC
UNPROFOR
UNTAC
UNOSOM I
ONUMOZ
UNOSOM II
UNOMUR
UNOMIG
UNOMIL
UNMIH
UNAMIR
23
United Nations Good Offices
Mission in Afghanistan and
Pakistan
The United Nations Iran-Iraq
Military Observer Group
The United Nations Angola
Verification Mission I
United Nations Transition
Assistance Group
United Nations Observer
Group in Central America
United Nations Mission for
the Referendum in Western
Sahara
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait
Observation Mission
United Nations Angola
Verification Mission II
United Nations Observer
Mission in El Salvador
United Nations Advance
Mission in Cambodia
United Nations Protection
Force
United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia
United Nations Operation in
Somalia I
United Nations Operation in
Mozambique
United Nations Operation in
Somalia II
United Nations Observer
Mission Uganda-Rwanda
United Nations Observer
Mission in Georgia
United Nations Observer
Mission in Liberia
United Nations Mission in
Haiti
United Nations Assistance
Mission for Rwanda
Afghanistan/The
5/1988
Islamic Republic of
Pakistan
Iran/Iraq
8/1988
3/1990
Angola
1/1989
6/1991
Namibia
4/1989
3/1990
Central America23
11/1989
1/1992
Western Sahara
4/1991
-
Iraq/Kuwait
4/1991
10/2003
Angola
6/1991
2/1995
El Salvador
7/1991
4/1995
Cambodia
10/1991
3/1992
ex. Yugoslavia
2/1992
3/1995
Cambodia
3/1992
9/1993
Somalia
4/1992
3/1993
Mozambique
12/1992
12/1994
Somalia
3/1993
3/1995
Uganda/Rwanda
6/1993
9/1994
Georgia
8/1993
6/2009
Liberia
9/1993
9/1997
Haiti
9/1993
6/1996
Rwanda
10/1993
3/1996
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua
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2/1991
UNASOG
UNMOT
UNAVEM III
UNPREDEP
UNCRO
UNMIBH
UNTAES
UNMOP
UNSMIH
MINUGUA
MONUA
UNTMIH
MIPONUH
UNPSG
MINURCA
UNOMSIL
UNMIK
UNAMSIL
UNTAET
United Nations Aouzou Strip
Observer Group
United Nations Mission of
Observers in Tajikistan
United Nations Angola
Verification Mission III
United Nations Preventive
Deployment Force
United Nations Confidence
Restoration Operation in
Croatia
United Nations Mission in
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Chad
5/1994
6/1994
The Republic of
Tajikistan
Angola
12/1994
5/2000
2/1995
6/1997
Macedonia
3/1995
2/1999
Croatia
5/1995
1/1996
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
12/1995
12/2002
United Nations Transitional
Administration for Eastern
Slavonia, Baranja and
Western Sirmium
United Nations Mission of
Observers in Prevlaka
United Nations Support
Mission in Haiti
United Nations Verification
Mission in Guatemala
United Nations Observer
Mission in Angola
United Nations Transition
Mission in Haiti
United Nations Civilian
Police Mission in Haiti
United Nations Civilian
Police Support Group
United Nations Mission in
the Central African Republic
Croatia
1/1996
1/1998
The Central African 4/1998
Republic
2/2000
United Nations Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone
United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in
Kosovo
United Nations Mission in
Sierra Leone
United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor
Sierra Leone
7/1998
10/1999
Kosovo
6/1999
-
Sierra Leone
10/1999
12/2005
East Timor
10/1999
5/2002
Croatia/Yugoslavia 1/1996
12/2002
Haiti
7/1996
7/1997
Guatemala
1/1997
5/1997
Angola
6/1997
2/1999
Haiti
8/1997
12/1997
Haiti
12/1997
3/2000
Croatia
1/1998
10/1998
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MONUC
UNMEE
UNMISET
MINUCI
UNMIL
UNOCI
MINUSTAH
ONUB
UNMIS
UNMIT
UNAMID
MINURCAT
MONUSCO
UNISFA
UNMISS
MINUSMA
United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
United Nations Mission in
Ethiopia and Eritrea
United Nations Mission of
Support in East Timor
United Nations Mission in
Côte d'Ivoire
United Nations Mission in
Liberia
United Nations Operation in
Côte d’Ivoire
United Nations Stabilization
Mission in Haiti
United Nations Operation in
Burundi
United Nations Mission in
the Sudan
United Nations Integrated
Mission in Timor-Leste
African Union-United
Nations Hybrid Operation in
Darfur
United Nations Mission in
the Central African Republic
and Chad
United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of
Congo
United Nations Interim
Security Force for Abyei
United Nations Mission in
the Republic of South
Sudan
United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Mali
DR of Congo
11/1999
6/2010
Ethiopia/Eritrea
7/2000
7/2008
East Timor
5/2002
5/2005
The Ivory Coast
5/2003
4/2004
Liberia
9/2003
-
The Ivory Coast
4/2004
-
Haiti
6/2004
-
Burundi
6/2004
12/2006
Sudan
3/2005
7/2011
East Timor
8/2006
-
Sudan
7/2007
-
Central African
Republic/Chad
9/2007
12/2010
DR of Congo
7/2010
-
Sudan
6/2011
-
South Sudan
7/2011
-
Mali
3/2013
-
Source: UN Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet 30th of September 2013
The development of UN peacekeeping has always been
determined, to a large extent, by the evolution of the international
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political and security environment. The contradictions growing among
powers on the premises of the Security Council, shortly after the
establishment of the UN, made it impossible for the United Nations to
work as a strong and effective organization (Bureš, 2007a). The member
states were asked to provide the United Nations permanent national
contingents, which would have created a sort of army of the UN for
collective security. This has not been fulfilled. The UN has then found itself
without tools it could use to face aggression and to maintain peace
(Krasno, 2004). The concept of peacekeeping emerged under these
conditions – improvisation and as a response to the crises that needed to
be addressed.
Peacekeeping in its classical form has been introduced for the
first time in relation to the Suez crisis. After the death of J.V. Stalin, the
Soviet leadership seemed more realistic towards foreign policy, the Cold
War was less intense and the current Secretary General of the UN,
Hammarskjöld, managed to create a decent base from the increasing
number of members of the UN. In addition, the Secretary General had the
active support of the USA and, temporarily, also silent consent of the USSR
(Segal, 1995). France and Great Britain had vetoed the resolving of the
Suez Crisis by the Security Council, so it was necessary to come up with
something completely different. Together with the Lester B. Pearson, who
was the Canadian Foreign Minister and the former ambassador to the UN
at that moment, Hammarskjöld created the idea of armed UN troops,
made up of voluntarily provided soldiers from the member states, which
would be tasked with securing a buffer zone between the parties involved
in conflicts (Krasno, 2004).
In the course of the Cold War, peacekeeping operations were
significantly limited by the status of the UN in international relations, the
events within the international system and, in particular, relations among
superpowers (Segal, 1995).
The end of the Cold War brought a new, optimistic outlook on
international relations. The paralysis of the UN peacekeeping operations
has ended and the number of operations has been growing since 1988.
While between 1948 and 1978, 13 operations were sent out and, in the
next decade, there were none, from May 1988 to October 1993, 20 more
operations were suddenly approved. The main reason for this expansion
was the increased capacity and, in particular, the willingness of the
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Security Council to agree on the procedures during a security crisis. The
lessening ideological clashes between the USA and the USSR could be seen
in the decline of the use of the veto in the Security Council – between June
1990 and May 1993, there was only a single veto by Russia, in connection
with the financing of the UN operation in Cyprus. In the years 1945 –
1990, the USSR exercised a veto 114 time and the USA did so 96 times
(Yilmaz, 2005).
However, the qualitative and quantitative increase in
peacekeeping operations brought the UN into a deep crisis, because it was
not able to meet the expectations that were put on it, due to its limited
capacities. Many of the operations in the first half of the 1990's ended in
tragedy and the faith in the UN was shaken. The "new world order" had
proven to be inadequate. However, the UN did not have different strategy
prepared (Nicklisch, 1995). The failure and medialization of deaths of
American soldiers in Somalia in October 1993 symbolized the end of this
hopeful period, and was the beginning of the downturn of UNs activities
on the field of peacekeeping. Since then, only a small number of
operations was approved in the "new" crisis countries; those that have
been approved were either intensely backed up by one of the
superpowers (the case of the UN Mission in Haiti, UNMIH) or have been
severely limited by their size (the case of the UN Observer Mission in
Georgia, UNOMIG), or duration (the case of the UN Aouzou Strip Observer
Group, UNASOG) (Kovanda, 1996).
Regional organizations tried to fill the vacuum created by the
withdrawal of UN units after the debacles in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Somalia and Rwanda. One of these initiatives, the ECOWAS Monitoring
Group (ECOMOG), which has been trying to ensure peace in Liberia and
Sierra Leone for over eight years now, has become a symbolic
embodiment of the lack of logistical and financial support for the
intervention in civil wars at a regional level in the operations conducted
by less economically prosperous countries. The efforts led by South Africa
to restore order in Lesotho have been marked by similar military and
political problems (Adebajo – Landsberg, 2000). A result of the experience
with the regionalisation of the concept of peacekeeping was, in particular,
the realization that regional initiatives are facing the same problems as
the initiative of the UN and that subregional organizations might not be
106
appropriate for dealing with local conflicts, as they are often part of them
(Guéhenno, 2002).
At the end of the 1990's there was a re-establishment of the
traditional concept of peacekeeping, along with the launch of four complex
operations, in East Timor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra
Leone and Kosovo. During the course of twelve months, the number of
staff of the existing peacekeeping operations more than doubled. Authors
like Bellamy, Williams and Griffin offered a number of factors, which
helped revitalize peacekeeping. Western countries became more
interested in humanitarian issues or their neighbours and, in a few cases,
they even assumed the role of leading states within the UN, as well as
outside it. Activities of countries such as Nigeria or South Africa and the
development of regional capacities, such as the African Crisis Response
Initiative project, have helped the rebirth of peacekeeping on African soil.
In addition, the second half of the 1990's has seen an increased interest in
humanitarian issues, in particular in linking the agendas of international
development and security; peacekeeping has become an integral part of
humanitarian and development programmes. The development of new
practices in the area of peacekeeping has made this technology more
accessible to state superpowers such as the USA, which helped ensure it.
Finally, the UN peacekeeping operations have been restored partially by
the implementation of the lessons from past operations and the
development of new national security institutions and procedures
(Bellamy et al., 2004).
Despite all expectations, the events of the 11th of September 2001,
although they meant a change in the perception of security and brought
about the rethinking of relations within the international system, did not
have a major impact on UN peacekeeping operations. The ensuing "fight
against terrorism" has not become a new dimension of peacekeeping
operations and so those were not altered – the UN is still continuing its
neutral activities based on the consent of the parties involved and with a
limited use of force. There has been no obvious change to the mandate of
peacekeeping operations. However, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, as one of the key activities of peacekeeping operations, have
become a welcome contribution to the efforts to eliminate terrorist
groups in weak, failing or failed states (Urbanovská, 2010).
107
What are the current basic principles of UN peacekeeping? The
definition was based on the experience from the first classic UN
peacekeeping operation, UNEF, in the Suez Canal. There was the principle
of consent of the parties involved in the conflict with the deployment of
the operation, the principle of prohibition of the use of force, except in
self-defence, the principle of voluntary contributions from small neutral
countries, the principle of impartiality and the principle of controlling the
operation by the Secretary General of the UN (Ramsbotham – Woodhouse,
1999). Three major principles emerged from the five basic ones. They
were referred to as the "holy triangle of peacekeeping": consent of the
parties involved in the conflict with the operation, impartiality and the
minimal use of force.
The original concept of the principle of the minimal use of force
was in accordance with the limited tasks which most peacekeeping troops
fulfilled. They were not intended to win wars but to maintain peace (Doyle
– Sambanis, 2007). The parties involved in the conflict have agreed to the
presence of the UN and its mandate and, therefore, there was no need to
use force. The majority of operations have been authorised in accordance
with Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, characterised by
focusing on the peaceful settlement of disputes. Prior to the year 1988,
more than half of UN peacekeeping operations consisted of unarmed
military observers; if they were armed, they used force only to a minimal
extent for self-defence (Goulding, 1993). However, the scope of UN
peacekeeping operations has been increasingly characterized by the
presence of militias, criminal gangs and other parties that threaten civilian
population and actively undermine the peace process. The concept of selfdefence has then gradually expanded to include defence against violent
attempts to hinder the performance of duties given by the mandate of the
Security Council (UN, 2008).
From the beginning, the concept of peacekeeping has included the
condition that the operation may be sent and carried out only on the basis
of the consent of the parties involved in the conflict. This fact can be seen
from two points of view: as its advantage and, at the same time, its
weakness. Due to this condition, the warring parties perceive
peacekeeping as an acceptable way of resolving conflicts, not as an
undesirable intervention into their own affairs. For the countries that
provide troops, this defined condition means a reduction of the risk of
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casualties and an increased chance to succeed. However, the giving of
consent also presents itself as problematic. The declared acceptance may
later be taken back by one or more parties in conflict and, thus,
peacekeepers may find themselves in the midst of renewed fighting,
without the opportunity to react in an adequate and flexible way
(Goulding, 1993). Despite these difficulties, consent remains a key
principle of the UN peacekeeping operations to this day. In the case of its
absence, the UN would become just another party involved in the conflict.
This would hinder the achievement of its goals, given its small capacity –
that is, the attainment of negative (lack of open violence) but, in
particular, positive peace (the absence of structural and cultural violence).
Finally, the last of the three principles, on which UN peacekeeping
is based, is the principle of impartiality of the United Nations.
Peacekeepers must not promote the interests of either of the
parties in conflict, otherwise it would lead to violation of the conditions
under which they were accepted in the country (Goulding, 1993).
Impartiality was originally connected with neutrality; these concepts
were, at first, seen as inseparable, later as synonymous. In the second half
of the 1990's, Kofi Annan began a process of conceptual review, which has
emphasized impartiality and strayed from the concept of neutrality, since
it was obvious that these terms are, in fact, not synonymous concepts and
activities in political practice. An impartial entity is active, its actions are
independent of both sides of the conflict, they are based on the
assessment of the situation. A neutral position is much more passive; the
limited action of the operation is within the limits imposed by the parties
in conflict. (Donald, 2002). However, Annan failed to follow through with
this process and the connections between impartiality and neutrality
persist, as well as the ongoing conceptual ambiguity of what these terms
truly mean. This partially undermines the efforts of the UN to adapt to the
current international political and security environment (Donald, 2002).
The characteristic of UN peacekeeping is also depicted by the
functions of the UN peacekeeping operations. The role of traditional
operations, typical for the Cold War period, were limited to observing,
monitoring, reporting, supervision of ceasefire, support of verification
mechanisms and the creation of buffer zones (UN, 2008). By contrast, the
function of complex peacekeeping operations after the end of the Cold
War has become significantly more diverse. The following was a part of
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these operations: creating a secure and stable environment, strengthening
of the capacity of the affected state to ensure security, promotion of a
political process with the help of dialogue, reconciliation and assistance,
support of the creation of legitimate and effective government institutions
and establishment of an overall framework, which ensures that all
international parties involved in the reconstruction of the country will
proceed in a coherent and coordinated manner (UN, 2008). Thus, military
functions of traditional peacekeeping operations gained new functions
which can be identified as political and humanitarian, and their
importance is growing at the moment.
The UN has no permanent army, so all of its military and police
personnel for peacekeeping operations must be provided by its member
states. The legal basis of this process is in Article 43 of the Charter of the
United Nations. It states that “to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security, all members of the United Nations Security
Council promise that they will grant their armed forces, their assistance, and
their services needed to maintain international peace and security to the
Security Council, based on its call, in accordance with a special agreement or
agreements.“ (UN Charter, Article 43).
In December 2011, 114 from a total of 193 UN member states,
were involved in peacekeeping operations (UN DPKO, 2011b). Since the
end of the Cold War, the number of countries involved in peacekeeping
operations has been on the rise: while in 1990, 46 countries participated
in peacekeeping operations, a decade later the number had almost
doubled. Until today, the peak was reached in 2008, when 120 members
of the UN took part in peacekeeping operations (UN DPKO, 2012b).
This is a very high number at first glance, but the volume of
contributions of the individual states varies greatly. While some states
contribute significantly, the contributions of other states are on a
symbolic level. Of the total 114 contributors, as to December 2011, only
one of them (Bangladesh) exceeded the threshold of 10,000 soldiers and
policemen. The contributions of 26 states ranged in the thousands, while
35 states sent hundreds of soldiers and policemen. 16 states contributed
with less than ten people (UN DPKO, 2012b). To illustrate, we present a
graph of the number of soldiers in the UN SR OS missions.
110
Chart 7
Source: www.mosr.sk
After the end of the Cold War, superpowers began to get involved
in peacekeeping operations. In the case of the European powers, this
reflected most notably in the operations of the United Nations Protection
Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia, in which France and the
United Kingdom deployed substantial numbers of their troops. The most
prominent trend of the 1990's was the increase in the number of
peacekeepers from less developed countries. While in 1993, the 13 richest
countries of the world contributed 57% of the world's peacekeeping
operations' staff, their share had decreased to 36% a year later. On the
other hand, in the same period of time, poorer countries (that is countries
with an average per capita income of under 700 USD per year) have
increased their participation from 28% to 42%. The increase was mainly
from Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Jordan, Malaysia, Egypt, Botswana,
Zimbabwe and Ukraine. Malaysia was exceptional among the countries of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, in 1994,
2,844 of its soldiers were in the service of the UN. While Africa is usually
seen as the one which receives aid, some of its states – in particular Ghana,
Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia – have established themselves as
111
providers of permanent units. From the countries of Latin America,
regular contributors are especially Argentina, Chile and Brazil
(Ramsbotham – Woodouse, 1999). As of December 2011, Bangladesh
stood on the peak of top providers with 10,394 soldiers and policemen,
followed by Pakistan (9,416) and India (8,115) (UN, 2012b). As of
December 2011, countries involved in UN's peacekeeping contributed
with almost 99,000 people, forming the military and police personnel of
the ongoing operations (UN DPKO, 2011b).
Overall, since the year 1990, we can see an approximately tenfold
increase. As is evident from the chart, the evolution of the number of
military and police personnel during the two observed decades has not
been linear, but overcame many major twists and turns. The evolution of
the volume of personnel during the period from the end of the Cold War to
the present day, copied the changing number of peacekeeping operations.
A sharp increase in the number of staff in the first half of the 1990's was a
reflection of the end of the Cold War and the newly acquired ability of the
Security Council to take measures in response to security crises, as was
shown in the previous section. In addition to the atmosphere of
cooperation within the framework of the UN Security Council, another
reason for the significant increase of peacekeeping operations' personnel
in the first half of the 1990's was an increased demand for peacekeeping
forces, due to many new conflicts. The collapse of the two federal
communist states, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, brought about many
ethnic conflicts, which called for the active intervention of the UN. The
peace agreements concluded in Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia, Central
America and Cambodia also demanded the presence of international
forces which would help with the implementation of positive
peacebuilding (Yilmaz, 2005).
The second half of the 1990's saw a dramatically reduced number
of peacekeeping operations' units. This was the reflection of the
contraction stage after a series of unsuccessful UN operations in Somalia,
Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since the end of the 1990's, we can
again see an increase of the volume of personnel in peacekeeping
operations. The United Nations could, thus, respond to a wide range of
conflicts, such as those in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DR Congo – ex. Zaire), East Timor, Liberia, the Ivory Coast (Côte
d'Ivoire), Haiti, Burundi and Sudan. In addition, a combination of several
112
other factors helped bring about the revitalization of peacekeeping. Plus,
the increasing volume of peacekeeping operations' personnel after the
end of the Cold War had much to do with the expansion of the functions of
peacekeeping operations. More personnel was needed because, while
performing traditional military functions, they also had to
comprehensively perform numerous political and humanitarian functions.
The research into the area of state participation in peacekeeping
operations offers many interesting insights in terms of the profiles and
characteristics of individual contributors. Andersson researched the
relation between the level of democracy and the inclination of a state to
engage in UN-authorized peacekeeping operations. While measuring the
level of democracy, he used the so-called Freedom House Index, which
divides states into liberal (democratic), partly free and not free
(undemocratic). By examining the states involved in peacekeeping
operations between the years 1990 and 1996, it was found that of the 51
states classified as democratic, 42 participated in these operations; of the
45 partly free states, 27 participated; and of the 45 non-free states, 22
participated. The number of democratic states involved in peacekeeping
operations is significantly higher than the number of states from the
remaining two categories. Based on this, Andersson finds that
a democratic state is more inclined to participate in peacekeeping
operations than non-democratic states (Andersson, 2000).
Other authors who focus on the profiles of contributors to
peacekeeping operations are Daniel and Leigh Caraher; who, in particular,
deal with the question of whether the majority of the countries that
participated in peacekeeping operations in the years 2001 to 2004, show
certain common characteristics. In contrast to Andersson, they focus on a
significantly higher number of factors, compare contributing and noncontributing countries in terms of the size of their ground forces in active
service, the regional distribution and societal signs such as legitimacy of
the government, per capita income, internal stability and the level of
development of the economy. With respect to the previous factor, the
authors found that the size of active land forces is a weak indicator of
willingness to contribute to the active operations, but a strong indicator of
the size of the contribution. Regional distribution shows that the region of
South Asia and Europe/Eurasia is much more committed to the concept of
peacekeeping operations than other regions of the world. And finally,
113
societal signs helped the authors determine that the majority of states
contributing to peacekeeping operations are democratic, stable,
developed and less-developed states and states with a high and middle
income (Daniel – Caraher 2006).
3.5
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF UNO PEACE OPERATIONS
During the course of several decades after the first peace
operation of the UN was established, the basic principles of the UN were
formulated. UNO's peace operations are built and maintained according to
these principles. The authors of the first generation of principles of UN
peacekeeping operations were the Secretary General of the UNIO, Dag
Hammarskjöld, and the President of the General Assembly of the UN,
Lester Pearson. Together they had, for the first time, formulated the basic
principles, in relation to the first peacekeeping mission of the UN – UNEF
on the Sinai Peninsula in 1956. These were (1) the principle of
impartiality, (2) the principle of non-use of force, except in self-defence
and the defence of mandate, (3) the principle of consent of the parties
involved with the deployment of peacekeeping personnel, (4) the
principle of voluntary contribution to the UN forces, from small, mostly
neutral countries and (5) the principle of the Secretary General of the UN
controlling peace operations (Urbanovská, 2010a, Hansen – Ramsbotham
– Woodhouse, 2004).
The first three of the above-mentioned principles are referred to
as the so-called the "Holy Trinity" of traditional peacekeeping (Bellamy –
Williams, 2004). It can be said, that they are the basis of UN traditional
peace operations during the Cold War, more specifically, for operations
ranging from the 1950's to the 1980's (Yilmaz, 2005). The purpose of
these principles is to help create and sustain conditions that would, in the
long run, promote the interest of the parties involved to resolve the
conflict (Bellamy – Williams, 2004).
The principle of impartiality
Basic definitions define impartiality as the absence of bias towards one of
the conflicting parties (Donald, 2003). This means that traditional peace
operations of the UN must implement the mandate of the mission without
prejudice toward any of the conflicting parties. UN traditional concept of
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impartiality is that the rights or claims of the parties in conflict should not
be taken into account. This means that none of the parties should gain
benefits or be preferred by the peace operation (Urbanovská, 2010a).
During the Cold War, however, this principle was often poorly interpreted
and confused with neutrality. Both concepts were understood as
synonymous. In this regard, Donald notes that the principle of impartiality
in the traditional sense, has never been real impartiality. This is because
real impartiality is active, independent and based on the evaluation of
individual situations. According to Donald, traditional impartiality was
passive and caused a series of misunderstandings, which is why it is often
confused with neutrality (Donald, 2003).
Impartiality was seen as a key element, that helped maintain the
consensus among the main parties involved in the conflict. During the
Cold War peacekeeping operations, smaller states and not the "big five"
provided peace personnel, because smaller states were, in any event,
involved in the conflict (Zůna, 2002). This system was meant to support
the principle of impartiality and to help ensure that the parties in conflict
would not see the peacekeepers as biased or backing up one of them.
Impartiality was also closely linked with the principle of the minimal use
of force. Essential elements of maintaining this principle were also gaining
the trust of all parties, clear and transparent negotiations of the peace
units and open communication. However, the nature of this principle
according to the UN peace operations, did not forbid the peace personnel
to criticize one of the parties in conflict, to pressure or to mobilize
international support (Goulding, 1993).
The principle of non-use of force except in the case self-defence and
defence of mandate
Prior to 1988, UN peace operations had been composed mostly of
unarmed military observers. When these units became lightly armed, it
became necessary to correct and limit the use of force (Goulding, 1993).
Traditional UNO peace operations use force only to a limited extent and
these operations represent the moral authority of the UN, rather than the
force of arms (Urbanovská, 2010a). Under no circumstances should the
use of force be seen as a way to achieve the objectives of the mission (UN
DPKO, 1995). However, this principle works only if the parties involved in
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the conflict are willing to and want to maintain the peace process without
the use of military force.
UN peacekeepers may use force in cases of self-defence, as an
absolutely necessary and last way of defending themselves and always
with regard to the scope of the threat (Findlay, 2002). What could have
been considered self-defence and what could not, depended on specific
missions (Durch, 1993). As the theorist Yilmaz indicates, these restrictions
had soon proven to be inefficient, for example in the cases of Cyprus
(1974) and Lebanon (1982), where not even the presence of UN
peacekeepers could prevent the collapse of internal structures and a
foreign military invasion (Yilmaz, 2005). Since 1973, the use of force has
been extended to situations when the mandate of the mission has to be
defended (Goulding, 1993). In relation to the principle of the non-use of
force, except in self-defence and defence of mandate, it should be noted
that the use of force during a peacekeeping operation is authorized by the
UNSC, according to Chapter VI of the Charter of the UN; under normal
circumstances, it is possible to use force only with the consent of the
parties involved in the conflict. A resolution of the UNSC states what type
of operations are authorized to use force and in what way. In addition to
the cases in Chapter VI, military actions can be used only if they are
authorised by the UNSC under Chapter VII and, further, in the case of a
regional organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the UN. In these
cases it is no longer seen as the use of force to help settle disputes
peacefully. The principle of non-use of force except in self-defence and
defence of mandate (along with the other two fundamental principles) is a
key criterion that distinguishes peacekeeping operations from peaceenforcement operations (Findlay, 2002).
The principle of the necessity of consent of the parties to the
deployment of units
Traditional UN peacekeeping operations were sent out with the approval
of the parties involved in the conflict, or with the consent of the country to
which the peacekeepers were deployed. This is how the UN attempted to
gain the trust of the parties in conflict. Most activities were then carried
out on the basis of a favourable attitude of the parties involved. If the local
parties stopped supporting the operation, it was no longer able to fulfil its
original function (Durch, 1993).
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As it is with the principle of impartiality, the principle of consent
of the parties arose from the situation during the Suez Crisis. During this
operation, impartiality was explicitly linked to the approval of the parties
involved because it was stated that the use of military force outside of
Chapter VII requires the consent of the states on the territory of which the
units operated (Donald, 2003). With traditional UN peacekeeping
operations, it was also assumed that the operation can only be successful
if it keeps building up the support of the warring parties and puts great
emphasis on cooperation (Goulding, 1993).
The principle of voluntary contribution of forces mostly comes from
small neutral countries.
At the moment there is a general consensus in the international
community, that it is not effective for the UN to keep its own stable army.
Thus, the armed forces made up of the national army and police forces are
the sole source of uniformed forces of the UN. The personnel and
equipment that the member states provide is voluntary and the personnel
is selected with regard to regional representation in the operation
(Goulding, 1993). In order to strengthen the principle of impartiality
during the Cold War, the participation of the "big five" states was only
exceptional. Most personnel came from the capacities of "middle powers"
and neutral countries (Zůna, 2002). The principle of operation control by
the UNO's Secretary General. Peace operations must operate as an
integrated unit, which expresses the will of the international community
as a whole. This means that the command of units participating in the
mission should not be divided among the leadership of individual nations
and, at the same time, by the UN. Therefore, the Secretary General of the
UNO and his subordinate bodies within the framework of the Secretariat
are entrusted with the management and control of UN peacekeeping
operations (Urbanovská, 2010a). The Secretary General shall act within
the authority delegated to him by the UNSC. He shall regularly present
reports on the activities and progress of the operation to the UNSC
(Goulding, 1993).
The basic principles of multidimensional (hybrid) operations
The effort to improve peacekeeping operations became apparent with the
end of the Cold War. In relation to this, the principles mentioned above
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began to be seen as restrictive in certain aspects. The principle of
impartiality became particularly debatable because, in practice, it often
meant passivity (Urbanovská, 2010b). It turned out that traditional
peacekeeping operations are confronted with huge difficulties, risks and
human losses while trying to fulfil their mandate – peacekeepers had to be
able to deal with genocide, ethnic cleansing and the protection of civilians.
Thus, it was obvious that some principles are outdated and, in the new
security environment, they endanger the missions and interfere with its
mandate, especially during the implementation of the principle of the nonuse of force and impartiality (Waisová, 2005b). And so peacekeeping
operations often ended in failure. One of the reasons was, also, the lack of
capacity of the UN – it was not able to conduct operations on a large scale,
the so-called robust operations, which are required in this type of conflict
(Urbanovská, 2010a).
The scope of several UNO peacekeeping operations after the Cold
War, such as UNPROFOR in Yugoslavia, UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II in
Somalia, UNMEE in Ethiopia or UNMIL in Liberia, are getting closer to the
functions of operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This means
that, in this context, it wasn't possible to fully take into consideration the
principles of consensus among parties and of the non-use of force with the
exception of self-defence and defence of mandate (Yilmaz, 2005).
In multidimensional UNO peace operations, units must be able to
act even in cases, when the identities of the parties involved in the conflict
are uncertain (especially the issue of separating civilians from
combatants, complications arise even in the case of identification of the
warring parties with the help of clear geographical lines, etc.). Units
involved in peace operations are also often seen as the enemy by one or
more of the warring parties. UNO's peacekeepers must be able to respond
even in cases where the central government has lost control of the
situation in the country (e.g. Somalia) and, thus, the principle of consent of
the parties involved in the conflict can no longer be applied (Lebovic,
2004). Then the inadequate training and preparation of units and their
equipment for the conduct of such operations began to pose a problem.
However, despite all recommendations, the following missions
(such as the UNMEE in Ethiopia or MONUC in the Congo) did not show a
new paradigm for peace operations, and was led by the traditional
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definitions of the principles of the UN peacekeeping operations (Bellamy –
William, 2004).
The principle of impartiality
In UNO's peace operations of the second generation, especially in missions
which required humanitarian intervention, the sovereignty of states and
the principle of UN operations not interfering with domestic affairs, began
to be perceived as smaller obstacles than they were during the Cold War
(Urbanovská, 2010a). An expert discussion began about the principle of
impartiality and it being wrongly merged with neutrality. From the first
half of the 1990's, it became clear that the two concepts should be strictly
distinguished (Yamashita, 2008).
Two years later, the Brahimi report had already demanded that
the principles of peacekeeping operations be redefined, especially in
terms of their extension. The report already mentions impartiality,
however, with regard to the mandate of the mission and the principles of
the Charter of the UN. This step broke the traditional understanding of the
connection between impartiality and neutrality. The doctrine on
multifaceted UN peace operations, from the year 2003, states that
impartiality does not mean inaction and simply observing violence. Forces
involved in peace operations must be impartial when dealing with the
parties involved in the conflict, but not neutral in defending the mandate
and its implementation (UN, 2003).
The principle of non-use of force and its exceptions
An extensive discussion about the principle of the non-use of force also
arose over time. The necessity to transform this principle had come to be
discussed mainly on the tactical and operational level. In 1995, the UN
issued the UN General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, which
extended the principle of the non-use of force except in self-defence and
defence of mandate. It now also included the defence of convoys, vehicles,
equipment; defending positions, entrusted persons or members of the
mission in the battle, while the mandate for the use of force is always a
major mandate of the mission and the specific terms and conditions (UN
DPKO, 1995). This principle has been further specified in the Doctrine on
multidimensional peace operations (2003), which mentions the use of
force in the case of self-defence, defence of another person involved in the
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mission, protection of property and of other persons under the protection
of UNO (UNO, 2003).
In this context, Stephens (2005) states that one of the many
problems with the application of this principle is the fact that, even though
the command of peaceful forces in UNO's peacekeeping operations
(excluding those with the authorisation of the UN) falls within the
competence of the Secretary General, who is, for this purpose, appointed
by the Special Representative, the military regime (management and
control) remains under the responsibility of the country of the
contingent's/unit's origin (Stephens, 2005). In the end, this may result in
small but significant nuances in the way this principle is perceived and
applied in the mission. Some authors point out the fact that this principle,
and any associated changes, is closely related to the perception of
peacekeeping forces as a neutral party in the conflict, and of their
trustworthiness (Yilmaz, 2005).
The principle of the necessity of consent of the parties to the
deployment of units
This principle has also recorded changes. It is practically impossible to
uphold it in new types of conflicts (civil war and ethnic conflicts).
Therefore, the UN began to gradually move away from the strict
enforcement of consensus of the parties with the deployment of
peacekeepers in UN operations. As the UN peacekeeping operations
evolved, other principles were defined to reflect the experience gained
from the individual operations. For example, in the General Guidelines for
Peacekeeping Operations (1995) we can find some principles added after
the basic ones. These added principles are: the principle of the legitimacy,
the principle of the continuous and active support of the UN Security
Council and the principle of a clear and achievable mandate.
The principle of legitimacy
The success of an operation also depends on a single point of view on its
legality and its rightness, which is supported by an expression of a
common will of the international community to carry out the operation.
The highest legitimacy derives from the mandate of the operation and the
authorisation by the UNSC which, in this case, de facto represents all those
who have signed the Charter of the United Nations. Legitimacy of the
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operation must be declared and understood on all levels of decisionmaking (UN DPKO, 1995).
The principle of the continuous and active support of UNSC
It is assumed that when a peace operation is approved, the members of
the UNSC and other UN member states will carry out the necessary
diplomatic and political activities aimed to support the UN Secretary
General and the UNSC's decisions. The UNSC will reflect and promote
common will, particularly, if the peace operation gets into a difficult
situation.
The principle of a clear and achievable mandate
The mandate of the operation is determined by the UNSC and must be
based on an explicit basis and realistic goals. Only then can the peace
operation, including its political and material support, effectively achieve
its primary goal.
The Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping
Operations also deals with the principle of unity and the international
nature of the operation, the principle of respect for international
humanitarian law and for local customs (UN, 2003). However, not these
three principles, nor those in the General Guidelines for Peacekeeping
Operations (1995) appear in any other documents about UN
peacekeeping operations.
The principle of applying unity and international character
In order for the operation to be effective, it must function as an integrated
whole and reflect the will and the support of the international community.
This is especially true in cases of military components, which are
composed of several national contingents. Coordinated and
comprehensive cooperation between the military and civilian components
is important. All units must respect the international character of their
involvement in the operation and they must not represent any national or
other interests (UN, 2003). This is also one of the reasons why the units of
multidimensional UN peace operations consist of contingents of several
UN member states which are not involved in the crisis – we then refer to
the multinational nature of forces. The principle of accepting and
respecting international humanitarian legal forces of the operation must
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behave according to the standards and norms of international
humanitarian law. Peacekeepers must not use certain weapons and
methods, which are outside of the allowed scope of instruments. In
situations where this right is violated by other parties, peacekeeping must
prevent such behaviour, in accordance with their own national system of
military law (UN, 2003).
The principle of respect for local laws and customs
Persons involved in peacekeeping operations must respect local laws and
customs. This includes the requirement to maintain the highest standards
of professional integrity, impartiality, behaviour in relation to the local
population. The principle involves an active effort to maintain cooperation
and consent of the local population with the operation. The persons
involved in peace operations under the UN mandate have certain
privileges and immunity. However, this does not change their duty to
respect local law and social, cultural and religious standards (UN, 2003).
The final document that deals with UN's peace operations and the
specification of their basic principles is called the Capstone Doctrine from
2008. It recognizes the validity of the so-called "holy trinity". It's
interpretation, however, recorded a number of changes, with respect to
the experience the UN has gained during the decades of practice in the
management of peacekeeping operations. Here impartiality is defined as a
procedure without prejudice and without favouritism toward one of the
parties involved in the conflict. Emphasis on the principle of impartiality
has remained intact, but it now includes a proactive approach. It points
out that the principle of impartiality should not be confused with
neutrality or inaction. Units and members of peace operations should be
independent in their negotiations with the parties involved in the conflict,
but not neutral in the exercising of their mandate.
Units cannot overlook negotiations, which would hinder the
progress of the peace process or violate the international standards and
principles which the UN supports through its peacekeeping operations
(Yamashita, 2008). Operations must avoid negotiating against any of the
parties involved in the conflict, because this would undermine the
credibility and the legitimacy of the mandate of the mission. The operation
must be transparent, open, with effective communication and with the use
of a rational and adequate level of resources (UN DPKO, 2008).
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In relation to the principle of the non-use of force except in selfdefence, the Capstone Doctrine states that the UN peacekeeping
operations may also use force on a tactical level, with the authorisation of
the UNSC, for the purpose of self-defence and defence of mandate,
especially in situations in which the state is not able to ensure security
and maintain order. It is, therefore, a use of force in proactive defence
mandate (Urbanovská, 2010b). This means, for example, the use of force
against criminal gangs, battle groups and similar groups which actively
interfere with the peace process or pose a threat to the civilian population.
In such cases, the UNSC can grant the so-called "robust mandate" to the
operation (it then becomes a robust use of force). It allows the use of all
necessary means to stop efforts to breach the political process, leading to
the protection of civilian population and maintain law and order.
Therefore, the concept of self-defence also applies to the protection of the
civilian population. There are complications even in this case, which occur
when many national contingents of UNO's peace operations are forbidden
to use force, except in self-defence in the traditional sense which, of
course, affects their role in the operation (Holt-Berkman, 2006).
The doctrine further states that the "robust mandate" should not
be confused with peace-enforcement operations under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the UNO – a robust operation involves the use of forces on a
tactical level, with the authorisation of the UNSC and provided that
consensus between the host country and/or the main parties involved in
the conflict has been reached, as opposed to peace-enforcement
operations, which do not require the consensus of the main parties and
allow the use of military force on a strategic or international level, which
is otherwise forbidden without the consensus of the UNSC, as stated in
Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the UN (UN DPKO, 2008). The UN, thus,
continues to see the use of force as the last resort when other methods are
exhausted. However, this does not mean that operations conducted under
Chapter VI cannot gain a mandate to use force in accordance with Chapter
VII. Other options for the use of force are regulated in accordance with the
ROE (Rules of Engagement), created by the UN DPKO and which specify
the way in which the units in UN peacekeeping operations must act
toward enemy units and the population (Holt-Berkman, 2006). The UN
does not have its ROE standardized, but the majority of them include a few
basic situations when force may be used to resolve them (self-defence,
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protection of civilians and others – listed above). These rules may be
extended and additional options may be derived from the nature of
missions.
If there is a consent among the parties on the deployment of
peace units, it is important that the UN reacts to every change opposed to
consensus and adapts the parameters of the specific operations to the
particular circumstances. In comparison with the original character of this
principle in the UN peace operations it is, currently, not entirely
impossible for the principle of consent to be achieved by means of force,
when appropriate (UN DPKO, 2008). The UN further states that
peacekeepers are being currently deployed and facing threats where the
consent of all parties with the deployment of troops may not be given (UN,
2009b).
The principle of voluntary contribution to the contingent
remained almost unchanged. However, if we look at countries that
currently provide their units for peacekeeping operations, we find that
they are mostly developing countries. It, thus, became an unwritten rule
that developing countries provide personnel for operations, while
developed countries care about financial support (Kobelková, 2010).
In addition to the basic principles of the Capstone Doctrine, there
is also mention of three other important factors which the UN does not
refer to as basic principles of peace operations, but they are still
significantly involved in the success or failure of the operation. These are:
the principle of legitimacy, the principle of credibility of the operation and
the principle of the support of national and local ownership and capacity
building (UN, 2008). The legitimacy of operations on an international level
is derived from the mandate of the UNSC. Factors such as the level of
command of the military, police and civilian units, respect of peacekeepers
to the local custom, law and institutions all have an impact on the
maintenance of the operation. The credibility of the operation consists of
the ability to act as quickly as possible by using appropriate means. The
principle of the promotion of national and local ownership and capacity is
the assistance in preventing the renewal of inter-state conflicts and
includes support for the restoration of the fundamental principles of the
state. Especially in cases when the state power is weak and the mission
also temporarily fulfils some of its functions.
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In addition to the above information, it is necessary to indicate
that even though the UN believes in upholding the "holy trinity" of basic
principles in its peace operations conducted under Chapter VI of the
Charter of the United Nations is the basic building block of their
operations, these principles have not always been and will not always be
upheld as an inseparable whole (Ivančík, Jurčák, 2013a).
3.6
NATO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
The nature of NATO PSO (PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS)
The term NATO Peace Support Operations is used within the framework
of NATO to describe peacekeeping operations. The use of this term is
reflected in the traditions of the USA where this concept is longestablished.
During the Cold War, the NATO focused almost exclusively on two
main issues, the protection of Western Europe from USSR aggression and
preventing an attack on the USA. In the 21st century, the Alliance takes a
broad approach to security, including building security through
cooperation with other parties. In order to ensure world peace, prevent
war and strengthen security and stability, as is laid down in its
fundamental security tasks, NATO, in cooperation with other
organizations, plans to pursue conflict prevention or, in case of a crisis, to
contribute to its effective handling in accordance with international law,
including the leadership of NATO PSO (Horák, 2000). The catalyst for
these changes were, in particular, the wars in the Balkans, and culminated
with the operation in Kosovo in 1999.
NATO PSO represents a qualitative change and a completely new
concept of peace operations, significantly different from the UN. They are
the response of the Alliance to changes in the security environment, which
occurred after the collapse of the bipolar arrangement of the world after
the Cold War. During the war, NATO focused mainly on the defence of its
member countries from a possible attack by the former USSR and other
Warsaw Pact countries. After the Cold War, it began to promote wider
access to ensure defence and security through closer cooperation with
other organizations and countries (Ivančík, 2012b). They also represent a
different philosophy, a different way of military and political thinking,
because of the different nature of the organization itself. The differences
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between the UN peace operations and NATO PSO are clear, especially
when we look at them through the principles on which these operations
are based (Zůna, 2002).
NATO PSO stand between operations of the second generation
and peace-enforcement operations. Thus, they can be placed between the
actions undertaken as if half-way between Chapter VI and Chapter VII of
the Charter of the UN. They fall into the category of other operations,
which the UN refers to as war (MOOTW – Military Operations Other than
War: AJP 3.4) and, in practice, they settle a wide range of cases of the use
of force in peace, conflict and post-conflict situations (Zůna, 2002). They
are carried out on the basis of a request and mandate of an international
authority (UN/OSCE, etc.) and on the basis of the decision of the North
Atlantic Council (NAC). NATO PSO are multifunctional. They cover a wide
range of activities, from classical UN peacekeeping to activities falling
within the scope of peace enforcement (NORDCAPS, 2007b).
NATO PSO employ a Peace Support Force – PSF. Intervention in
the form of NATO PSO can be performed at any stage of crisis
development. The structure of the forces and their capabilities must be
proportional to the degree of risk and the needs of the military. PSFs
usually have an all-military character in the form of Joint Task Forces
(JTF) (Zůna, 2002).
Based on the experience that NATO had gained in the wars in the
Balkans, a consensus was reached in 1999 in the form of the doctrine for
NATO peace-support operations. This led to the adoption of a revised
strategic concept of NATO. It states that military capabilities, effective
across a wide range of foreseeable circumstances, are also the basis of the
Alliance's ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis
management through operations outside of Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty. While furthering the policy of maintaining peace, preventing wars
and increasing security and stability, according to the basic safety tasks,
NATO, in cooperation with other organizations, will seek to prevent
conflicts. If the crisis has already started, NATO will contribute to its
effective termination in accordance with international law, including the
possibility of using crisis-response operations outside of Article 5 (NATO,
1999).
This concept divided military operations into Collective Defence
Operations – NATO-CDO which are in accordance with Article 5 of the
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Washington Treaty and which are associated with the traditional
conception of war and into Crisis Response Operations – NATO CRO which
stand outside of Article 5 (NATO, 2001). NATO PSO are part of the MC
327/2 – Non Art – Crisis Response Operation, which include Support to
Civil Service Agencia, peace-support operations (PSO) and Military
Combat Operation. Within the framework of CRO, the NATO can carry out
operations, which will primarily serve to support non-governmental,
regional and international organizations during conflict resolution. Within
the CRO, sanctions, embargoes, threats of force, peace-support operations
or military combat operations may be used as tools to solve conflicts.
Humanitarian operations, disaster relief and other operations fall under
the CRO. NATO PSO are political, multifunctional, multinational, they make
use of integrated military structures and current military tools (Zůna,
2002). It should be emphasized that, from the very beginning, NATO PSO
have been conceived primarily as peace-enforcement operations, which
best reflect the military capabilities of the Alliance. The largest part of
NATO support is aimed at the UN in operations meant to enforce peace
(Henning, 2005).
The Military Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept
was created and adopted in 2002. It no longer reflects the current
situation and the use of military force outside of the framework of Article
5 of the Washington Treaty (Zůna, 2002). Zůna also states that in a
relatively short time, NATO successfully solved the creation of a common
doctrine and principles for planning, preparation and use of forces in
peace support operations (Zůna, 2002).
According to NATO MC 327, NATO PSO include peacekeeping and
peace-enforcement operations, conflict prevention, peacemaking,
peacebuilding and humanitarian relief (NATO, 2001).
NATO PSO cover a wide range of tasks. It is, for example, the
control and verification of the peace agreements/truce; efforts to make
the parties negotiate peacefully by using the procedures of negotiation
and mediation we have already mentioned; they further contribute to
preventive strategies for dealing with conflict through security sector
reform programmes; ensure military support in cases of sanctions or
embargo, on an operational level, and ensure the delivery of aid on a
tactical level; supervise and support the "cleaning" of mined areas;
supervise demilitarisation of territories and arms control; contribute to
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the training of future military forces of states; support humanitarian aid –
in particular assistance for civilian agencies of humanitarian activities;
support human rights organizations and eliminate the violation of these
rights; assist with planning and monitoring of elections; support the
restoration of civil order and the rule of law, including bringing war
criminals to justice; assist in operations leading to economic recovery and
reconstruction of the country (Wilkinson, 2000).
If we look at the principles of NATO PSO and briefly compare
them with UN traditional principles, it may seem that they are almost
identical. However, the basic principles, although they are referred to by
the same series of terms, they are perceived quite differently.
During the 1990's a discussion took place within the framework
of NATO PSO. It was on the transformation of the basic principles of NATO
PSO. Thus, the character of these principles shifted significantly from the
traditional UN peace operations. Consensus has transformed into an
operating agreement, neutrality has moved towards impartiality and then
towards active impartiality, the non-use of force shifted towards a
minimum use of force and then towards the use of minimum necessary
force (Henning, 2005).
Currently, there are three basic principles defined for leading
NATO PSO. These are the principle of impartiality, the principle of
consensus and the principle of restrictions of the use of force. In addition
to these three fundamental principles, additional principles were defined
for NATO PSO. They are the principle of the priority of political and
military objectives, the principle of unity of effort, the principle of
continuous efforts and long-term perspectives, the principle of flexibility,
the principle of legitimacy, the principle of the security, the principle of
credibility of forces, the principle of mutual respect, the principle of
transparency, the principle of freedom of movement, the principle of CivilMilitary Cooperation – CIMIC (Ivančík, Jurčák, 2013b). The NATO PSO
doctrine states that not all of these additional principles need to be
applied to the same extent (Čech, 2009). This means that they may not be
applied at the same time.
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3.7
EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS
The nature and development of EU crisis management operations
In June 1992 the Council of Ministers of the Western European Union
(WEU) during the Ministerial Conference, held at Petersberg near Bonn,
approved the so-called Petersberg tasks. WEU member states declared
their willingness to provide military forces from the entire spectrum of
their conventional armed forces for military tasks which were to be
carried out under the responsibility of the WEU. A possible list of the
types of crisis-management operations such as ones "out of area", under
the authority of the WEU, was also a part of the Petersberg declaration
(Závěšický, 2006). Since the end of the 1990's, the EU began to form its
own European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It has lead to the
creation of the EU's own military and civilian capacities for the prevention
and resolution of crises within EU's structures, in other words, forces for
crisis-management operations. From the beginning, it was intended that
these capacities were to be used, in particular, in the area of peacekeeping
operations in close cooperation with NATO. However, each of the EU
member states had its own view on this concept, which was reflected in its
own security and defence policy.
The next step was a joint initiative of the United Kingdom and
France from Saint Malo, which became the basis of building structures for
the implementation of peace operations. This concept was taken in by the
European Council at the Köln Summit in 1999 and it launched the building
of capacity, instruments and institutions at a national, multinational and
European levels (Závěšický, 2004). The process reached its peak in 2003,
when the European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted. It meant the
declaration of a separate security policy and operations which would be
less dependent on the support of the USA and, in particular, NATO (EU,
2003). Thus, the ESS became a harbinger of the EU's own peacekeeping
operations, namely those of EU crisis-management operations. We must
increase the effectiveness of our operations by building military and
civilian capacities (EU, 2003).
The CMOs are legislatively anchored in the Treaty on European
Union, in Title V – Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy.
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) changed the Treaty on European Union
and this led to the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks into Article 17 (2) of
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the Treaty on European Union. Thus, the EU declared the implementation
and management of its own peacekeeping operations, which were
previously under the UN. In contrast to the Petersberg tasks from 1992,
which only worked with a limited range of operations (such as peace
support operations, police and monitoring missions), the new concept
meant the extending of the range of the activities and tasks, in particular
peace-creating operations. These were initially short-term operations
with a duration of 3 – 24 months (Attina, 2008s).
Unlike NATO or the USA, the EU has always relied on broader
approaches to safety issues. The EU does not find it useful to have its
security policy based on precisely defined outlines of military involvement
in crises. Thus, the nature and scope of future EU missions and operations
was, from the beginning, left to a process of assessment of the current
situation. This means that the EU prefers approaches based on crisis
management, and so anything may be a peace operation, if it is marked as
a peace operation during the decision-making process (Zůna, 2010).
The concept of crisis management operations within the
framework of the EU is not a set term. Some authors work with the
concept of Petersberg operations, others use the term ESDP operations or
EU peace support operations (in parallel with NATO PSO). Whatever
terminology is used, peacekeeping operations of the EU are multilateral
operations, in the sense that they may be carried out under the
supervision of or in cooperation with the UN, which is a key partner for
the EU and other organizations, such as NATO / OSCE, and in cooperation
with other states/organizations. In particular, the EU speaks of effective
multilateralism (Cameron, 2005). EU crises-management operations
include both military and civilian components. Eight years later, after the
adoption of the ESS, EU CMOs represent comprehensive and integrated
operations, which are the basis for robust EU interventions (Attiná,
2008b).
In terms of functions, we can distinguish the following two
operations within EU CMOs: humanitarian and rescue tasks, which are
aimed to protect persons, security of supplying and protection of the
population in crisis situations, the protection and evacuation of persons of
any nationality from the field of danger; peacekeeping tasks, which
include traditional and multidimensional operations, according to the
typology of the UN and involve a complex of peacebuilding missions. The
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last type are combat forces in crisis management. Operations to create
peace and peace-enforcement operations are a specific part of crisis
management. In its documents, the EU operates with these three
categories. However, Zůna, for example, further categorizes crisismanagement operations. His categorization of EU CMOs is the following:
humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement operations,
evacuation, peace-enforcement operations – military intervention.
Operations are covered by Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN.
which means peace-enforcement operations are, according to the EU
Treaty, excluded from the list of Petersberg tasks (Závěšický, 2006).
However, it's a little different in practice. Peace-enforcement operations
have become an integral part of military activities in the framework of the
implementation of the Petersberg tasks. The EU distinguishes between
three kinds of operations within the ESDP, which differ in their function
and the nature of the deployed personnel (military, police, civilian
officials). These are military operations, police operations and monitoring
and assistance missions/missions to support the rule of law. The EU has
already undertaken CMOs in the Middle East, Europe, Africa and Asia.
These missions had different functions – peacekeeping, border control,
rescue operations, humanitarian assistance, political, social and
administrative reconstruction. Since the adoption of the ESS in 2003, the
EU has led 22 separate operations, which consisted of 6 military
operations and 6 civilian missions, involving the deployment of 16 civilian
experts, police, border guards and customs service and other experts in
the field of civilian administration (Zůna, 2010).
The EU does not have a stable military – the military personnel in
missions consists of ad hoc groups of forces from the capacity of EU
member states. For a rapid response to a crisis, however, the concept of
EU BG (Battle Groups) has been created. It became fully operational in
January 2007. It is the concept of building a fighting force for emergency
cases of crisis management. EU BG are to become the core of operations
which carry the need for a rapid solution to crises, under the mandate of
the UN, the EU alone or other organisations (Ivančík, 2013b).
The basic principles of EU crisis-management operations
Unlike the UN and the NATO, the European Union does not include the
specifications of its fundamental principles, according to which the EU
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CMOs are led, in any of its documents. Von Kielmansegg states that EU
peacekeeping operations are defined in a very abstract way. They are
based on a few specific aspects of operations conduct, thus they are given
responsibility, but another legal framework, such as e.g. general ban on
the use of force is, in some cases, no longer part of them, and is defined
individually for every situation Kielmansegg, 2007).
The issue of defining the principles of EU CMOs stems from the
very nature of the EU which, as a whole, brings dozens of different
countries with different culture and traditions under one flag. This is also
reflected in the implementation and management of EU CMOs, where each
participating country has its own national doctrine, practice and
instructions which are, in some cases, less and, in other cases, more
applied to the situation and the requirements of the operation (HoltBerkman, 2006).
CMOs are governed by a set of principles, based on which UN
peacekeeping operations are guided.
As stated by Zůna, this falling back to the principles of UN stems
from the foundations of its security strategy, which considers the
international security system to be the basis for addressing security risks.
It also enhances the need for building effective international institutions,
processes and security culture, based on the rules and the international
order and a new strategic partnership with the leading international and
regional parties (Zůna, 2010).
It stands that EU operations are conducted on the basis of
established principles and normative rules, which are applied in the
international debate on intervention. It is, therefore, the principle of good
intentions, respecting human rights, using force as a last resort and the
proportional use of force with regard to the situation, in respect to specific
international legal standards during the operation (Bailesová, 2008).
In general, it can be said that the EU applies the principles of the
Charter of the UN, the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and those of the
Charter for European Security of the OSCE – the so-called Paris Charter,
while protecting and strengthening international security and while
conducting crisis-management operations (Bailesová, 2008). However, it
must be noted that the official documents of the EU only mention the need
to, but not a requirement to act in accordance with principles of the UN
Charter.
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4
CONFLICT PREVENTION WITHIN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
This part primarily deals with preventing conflict formation
within international relations, which is also one of the possibilities for
conflict resolution. Prevention of disputes represents preventive
programs, policies and strategies, aimed to prevent conflicts from
escalating into a stage when the participants consider using force as an
adequate solution. Prevention as a way of conflict resolution has been
used to a greater extent since the end of the Cold War 24. When comparing
the number of casualties caused by natural disasters and violent conflicts,
on a global scale, the number of conflict casualties is evidently higher. The
goal of the international community was therefore to define tools, which
would decline or eliminate the probability of emergence of violent
encounters, humanitarian disasters and instabilities in various regions of
the world.
Diagram 8 NUMBER OF CASUALTIES CAUSED BY NATURAL
DISASTERS AND VIOLENT CONFLICTS BETWEEN 1991 – 2000
Source: Personal elaboration according to Wais, 2005
Countries and international organizations started using the
possibility of preventing the emergence of violence in disputes within
international relations. This usage was conditioned especially by postwar
reconstruction, enormously expensive humanitarian aid, and
destabilization of a great number of regions.
Examples of conflicts during the Cold War are: conflicts in former Yugoslavia, genocide in
Rwanda, Somalian civil war, Arabic-Israeli conflict, etc.
24
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The goal of the international community is to prevent the
emergence and extension of violence, eliminate the suffering of civilians
and potential casualties, and prevent damages.
One of the primary tasks is to find an effective conflict resolution
in its initial stage, i.e. in the stage that does not include violence (Waisová,
2005).
This chapter includes the development of the view on politics,
preventive programs and strategies. It also analyses particular
mechanisms and tools used by conflict prevention participants and
defines an early-warning system, which represents the searching for a
mechanism that specifies in which stage of a particular conflict preventive
measures should be implemented.
The concept and practical use of violence prevention started to
widely develop after the WWII, mainly within the United Nations. During
the Cold War period, bipolar confrontation was evident even within the
UN (particularly by Security Council's inability to come to a clear-cut
decision). Dominant for this period were ad hoc short-term preventive
actions, which were used just before the conflict formation or after its
emergence. Their disadvantage was that they only conserved the conflict,
but could not prevent or resolve it (Waisová, 2005).
In the early '90s, the approach towards the theory and the
practical use of conflict prevention changed. The UN defined prevention as
one of the main points of its agenda. In 1992, the annual report on
functioning of the UN was released by the then-Secretary General. This
report was called An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy,
Peacekeeping and Peacemaking. It said that since the establishment of the
UN, i.e. since 1945, more than a hundred armed conflicts took place
worldwide, causing more than 20 million casualties. During the Cold War,
activities of the UN and the Security Council were limited because their
members often used the power of veto. After this period, the situation in
international relations changed rapidly. The UN should become a
perspective and contributive organization. Its main goals should be early
recognition of conflict situation and appropriate and purposeful reaction.
Means of prevention should primarily be preventive diplomacy and other
tools of violent conflicts prevention. Peace enforcement, which is the
subject of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (Action with Respect
to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression), is
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also an important possibility. Another goal of the organization should be
post-war reconstruction of affected areas and regions, which is a decisive
condition for perspective and long-term maintenance of peace and
stability (Hofreiter, 2008).
Some unsuccessful UN missions aroused discussion about the
significance of preventive diplomacy and the UN's ability to perform
preventive activities. The second half of the '90s represented a reform of
preventive diplomacy and greater efficiency of its practical use within the
UN. Conflict prevention within the international community represents
one of the conditions for ensuring individual security. K. Annan, UN
former Secretary General, characterized the shift from a culture of
reaction to a culture of prevention as considerably more effective both
from the humanitarian and financial perspectives. In the initial stage of a
dispute, participants and their standpoints are less polarized and more
flexible than after the outbreak of violence. This fact is fundamental for
the willingness to solve conflicts in a peaceful way. Conflict prevention is
the most effective means of identifying the causes of a conflict, not only its
consequences, which creates realistic conditions for permanent peace
(Annan, 2000).
Various international and regional organizations have
implemented violence prevention into their agendas. As an example, we
can mention the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), which created an early-warning system, including e.g. the High
Commissioner on National Minorities and the so called human dimension
mechanism. Other examples are the World Bank groups, which use a
similar early-warning system, or the Organization of American States,
which uses the system of non-violent dispute resolution among the
members of the organization.
In the last decade of conflict prevention, a complex interactive
approach has been advanced (abandoning the term preventive diplomacy,
which is too narrow for this new approach), which tries to minimize the
suffering and losses of inhabitants and the risk of destabilizing the area.
This approach uses long-term multi-discipline activities (Waisová, 2005).
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4.1
AREAS UTILIZING CONFLICT PREVENTION
One of the basic conditions for conflict prevention is choosing
appropriate tools and mechanisms. When studying these tools, we must
take into account that international and internal conflicts differ from each
other, and that is why, in a particular situation, different tools and
mechanisms must be used for their prevention.
The basic framework of tools and mechanisms is stated in
Chapter VI of the UN Charter – Pacific Settlement of Disputes. It includes
various programs, approaches, proposals and policies. The goal of all tools
is to influence particular situations and displays, so that the outbreak of
violence is avoided. Methods used as a part of prevention try to make the
participants find a non-violent resolution of the dispute, and offer material
or political help. Their use changes depending on a particular type of
dispute, type of parties involved and possibilities of their success.
Governments are able to implement some of the mechanisms using own
sources, but other mechanisms depend on international co-operation.
Tools of conflict prevention can be divided into seven functional
areas (Waisová, 2005):
1.
Official diplomacy – negotiation, mediation, conciliation,
good offices, peace conferences, informal consultations, conflict
prevention centres, one-sided goodwill gestures, diplomatic
sanctions, special envoys, international appeal, crisis and coercive
diplomacy and diplomatic recognition or non-recognition.
2.
Unofficial diplomacy – peace committees, civilian
observers, supporting traditional conflict resolution methods (e.g.
council of elders), testimonies of important personalities, nonviolent campaigns, round-table talks, workshops, civil
investigating missions and cultural exchange.
3.
Politics – democratization of political system, creation of
political parties and institutions, securing the position of
minorities or particular groups in a political system, monitoring
elections, development of civil society, supporting human rights,
anti-corruption measures, battle against human trafficking
(Průcha, 2011), decentralization, protectorates.
4.
Army – professionalization of armed forces,
restructuring, preventive deployment of armed forces, military
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aid, demobilization, non-attack agreements, security regimes and
arrangements instigating confidence, organizations of collective
security, deterrence, no-flight and demilitarized zones, blockades
and embargoes on import of weapons and military material,
restricted military intervention, coordinated reduction of military
expenses.
5.
Economic and social sphere – economic reforms and
supporting economic development, development aid and simpler
access to the world market, diversification of industry and trade
structure, economic co-operation and economic regimes or
organizations, economic sanctions, common projects, relocating
refugees, suppressing the negative influence of diaspora,
decreasing unemployment, international agreements adjusting
and simplifying trade with strategic resources including
verification measures, rationalized flow of financial sources.
6.
Legal system – war crime tribunals, police reforms,
arbitration, adjudication and investigating process (Adašková,
2010).
7.
Media and education – extending access to education,
multicultural and national education programs, international and
multi-ethnic broadcast, existence of alternative information
sources (Adašková, 2009).
The above mentioned tools and mechanisms can be combined in
various ways, depending on the particular conflict, nature of its
participants, and environment it takes place in.
4.2
APPROACHES TOWARDS CONFLICT PREVENTION
The term "conflict prevention" is perceived and interpreted in
various ways both in theory and in practical use, and there is no clear-cut
formulation for an exact definition of this phenomenon. Most conflict
prevention theoreticians agree that the term "preventive diplomacy" is
too restricted and does not satisfy contemporary requirements for conflict
prevention. Prevention also contains foreign policy, intervention,
development aid, creating and enforcing international standards, etc.
137
There are many definitions from various authors, but the most
general was given by the former UN Secretary General Butrus ButrusGhálí in „An Agenda for Peace“. Conflict prevention is an activity focused
on preventing creation of disputes and their escalation into armed
conflicts, and restricting their expansion in case they have already
emerged (Hofreiter, 2008). This definition emphasizes the necessity of
preventing all disputes, because that is the best way of eliminating the
probability of their escalation into a destructive conflict.
Conflict prevention is neither a specific political sector on its own,
nor a simple intervention method. It is a political and bureaucratic
"cultural prevention", which advances with different force on a wide scale
of major political areas and organizations, such as diplomacy and
interactive conflict resolution, economic development, development of
democracy, human rights, military relations, environment, education,
health, agriculture, commercial activities, international trade, financial
sources, and natural resources development (Lund, 2002).
The goal of conflict prevention is to prevent international
conflicts, internal conflicts and tense situations from resulting into greater
violence and usage of armed forces.
Conflict prevention is an activity, which is aimed to prevent the
outbreak of armed conflicts and mass violence (Miall, Ramsbotham,
Woodhouse, 2011).
Conflict prevention is a constructive procedure, which tries to
decrease the probability of threatening, using or deploying armed forces
by participants of a political dispute (Wallersteen, Möller, 2003).
L.Hofreiter defines prevention as a purposeful action focused on
eliminating preconditions and causes of conflicts. It expresses both direct
and indirect conflict participants' abilities to generalize existing
theoretical and empirical data about possible disputable questions, and on
the ground of that to anticipate, predict and influence the future
development (Hofreiter, 2008).
More suitable terms are violent conflict prevention, or crisis
prevention, because we speak rather about an effort to prevent violence
than the conflict itself. According to the UN, conflict prevention consists of
long-term activities focused on structural causes of conflicts, aiming to
build strong foundations for peace. On the other hand, EU institutions
emphasize the use of short-term activities to reduce and eliminate open
138
tensions, or prevent the outbreak or re-emergence of a violent conflict
(Mihálik, Ondrušek, 2009).
In contemporary international relations, theoreticians distinguish
between two basic approaches towards conflict resolution (Waisová,
2005):
1. Direct or "light" prevention, which is aimed to prevent violent or
armed escalation of conflicts and to reduce greater polarization.
Basic tools of direct prevention are mediation, long-term
missions, diplomatic intervention, and coercive devices
(embargoes, sanctions, etc.)
2. Structural or "deep" prevention represents the classic approach
towards conflict prevention. Its goal is to permanently eliminate
conflict-causing factors and to create conditions suitable for
minimizing conflict occurrence and the risk of conflict escalation.
It tries to directly affect the key causes of conflicts and influence
the opponents' contradictory interests. Structural conflict
prevention in international relations involves solving recurring
ideas and problems, which create the foundations of conflicts in
international system. Some of the structural prevention devices
and strategies are: economic, technical, development, political,
cultural cooperation and long-term support of civil society
development, preventing poverty, respecting human rights and
civil liberties, good relationships between countries, permanent
dialogue, international and interstate cooperation.
One of the important preconditions for emergence and escalation
of conflicts is the existence of causes and conditions for a dispute. From
the point of view of prevention, it is necessary to (Hofreiter, 2008):
- Constantly evaluate the relevant environment,
- Identify possible conflict causes and conditions,
- Make timely steps towards eliminating or limiting the possibility
of conflict causes emergence.
Conditions for an aimed and successful conflict prevention.
To reach success in conflict prevention, several basic requirements must
be met; first of all being the knowledge of complex principles, functioning
and managing social units (organizations, social groups) and the ability to
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use them within the process of conflict situation analysis. The second
condition is achieving a high level of general-theoretic knowledge about
the primary nature of conflicts, their causes, types and course dynamics.
Inevitable are also: the ability to deeply analyse a particular situation and
ability to identify conflict-causing phenomena, which represent a unique,
creative and unrepeatable process, because each situation is unique,
unrepeatable in time, space, participants and other conditions. The extent
of adaptation, or the choice of correct methods is equally important. It
eliminates the causes and preconditions of conflict-causing factors
depending on a specific situation. Another condition for successful
prevention is a sufficient amount of material, military, human and other
resources, which are inevitable for a particular realization of preventive
actions. Last but not least, the parties involved must actively participate in
the process of negotiations and accept the decisions of international
authorities (Hofreiter, 2008).
4.3
PERSONS INVOLVED IN VIOLENCE PREVENTION
The beginning of the chapter is focused on a wide scale of
mechanisms, devices and factors, which influence and participate in
conflict prevention. Persons involved also form a large group. Preventing
the outbreak of violence represents an area of multilateral relations,
where none of the participants (countries, international governmental or
non-governmental institutions and individuals) have an exclusive
possibility to intervene (with a certain exception of the UN Security
Council). A wide scale of participants take part in this action – parties of
international system (world powers, UN), regional (neighbouring states or
regional organizations) and local partakers (local non-governmental
organizations and important individuals). The proportion of their
participation in conflict prevention and crisis diplomacy depends on their
interests, goals, involvement in disputes and mainly the capacities they
have at their disposal.
The most common partakers in international diplomacy are
international and regional organizations (both governmental and nongovernmental). The special function of the United Nations in preventive
diplomacy was already defined in Chapter II. Activity of regional
organizations within preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution is
140
specified mainly in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter about Regional
Arrangements and by statutes of particular organizations, which define
the member duties, conflict resolution mechanisms, sanctions, etc.
Mechanisms of conflict prevention and management were created e.g.
within OSCE, Organization of American States, African Union and
Economic Community of West African States. Other regional
organizations, such as ASEAN, were able to create ad hoc initiatives for
crisis situations and conflicts resolution (Waisová, 2005).
The advantage of regional organizations is that because of their
geographical scope of activity and detailed information about the region
they function in, the situation and relations in it, they are able to identify
the dispute in a short time margin and react to it faster and more
effectively. They dispose of a framework of experts, who know the
environment and problems of the region and who are able to accept
political, cultural and other specificities of the area in diplomatic talks.
International organizations function as distributors of information
between their members, they create standards and rules for behaviour
and negotiation, represent a place for socialization of countries, allow
creation of coalitions, aggregate and articulate interests of member
countries and last but not least, allow space for negotiations and nonviolent conflict resolution (Waisová, 2005).
Regional and international economic organizations play a specific
role. When applying activities of conflict prevention, they use economic
devices, such as technical aid, advantageous access to the market, support
of trade liberalization, etc. The strategy of supporting economic
development is nowadays used by the European Union.
International non-governmental organizations (INGO‘s) also take
part in conflict prevention. Their impartiality is the main advantage. While
regional organizations are sometimes perceived as tools of enforcing
policies and interests of countries, particularly regional powers, nongovernmental organizations do not fall into this characteristic. When
compared to international governmental organizations, they are in
advantage. INGO‘s have good knowledge of local problems, because their
representatives are actually present in the conflict area. Regional
organizations are also more trusted by the inhabitants then
representatives of distant governmental organizations. In contrast to
governmental organizations, which are limited by a complicated system of
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approvals and decision-making, INGO‘s are able to take action quickly and
more effectively in case of urgency. An important part of regional
organizations' agenda is participation in post-conflict reconstruction
along with preventive activity, which is aimed to prevent recurrence of
conflictual situations.
A disadvantage of non-governmental regional organizations is
that their usage of specific mechanisms and tools of prevention is limited
in terms of a real scope of activity. Their activity is focused on sub-state
prevention, e.g building relations between different countries' societies,
cultural and scientific contacts, and subvention of economic development.
In terms of devices, non-governmental organizations are limited by own
abilities, resources and international regulations (e.g., INGO‘s cannot use
coercive devices). They play important role in (Waisová 2005):
1. prevention and early warning, particularly when collecting
data,
2. monitoring observance and violations of human rights and
civil liberties,
3. return of refugees and supporting economic development,
4. arranging negotiations.
Table 2: Selected preventive activities of international and regional organizations
Conflict
Incompatible
interests
Period
Intervention
International conflicts
1993 - 1995
UN Secretary
General
Eritrea
Yemen
-
borders
Hungary
Slovakia
Guatemala
Belize
-
minorities
1993 - 1996
EU
-
borders
2000 2002
OAS
Lesotho
government
National conflicts
1998 - 1999
SADC
Fiji
government
2000
UN, EU,
Commonwealth
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Prevention
Decision of the
International
Court of Justice
Negotiations
within OSCE
Negotiations
SADC
peacekeeping
units
Special Envoys,
sanctions
Estonia, Latvia
– the Russian
minoriy
Minority rights
1992 -
OSCE
Pressure from the
High Comissioner
on National
Minorities
Source: Waisová, 2005
Non-governmental organizations are often first to get to the area
of conflict in its initial stages. Nowadays, they represent an important part
of conflict prevention and many of them have an affiliated or consultative
status in the UN system25.
Individuals also play an important role in preventive diplomacy.
These are usually representatives of a country or government. However,
they do not represent their government or its official policy, but offer
personal abilities and knowledge. The UN Secretary General takes
significant action in preventive activities. This post is a guarantee of
impartiality, expertness and great personal prestige and confidence.
Competences of the Secretary General are: providing the so-called good
offices, where he can act as a mediator and proposer between the
opponents, arranging investigating missions and allowing the possibility
to inform the UN Security Council about a particular conflict.
Besides the UN Secretary General, an important role in preventive
diplomacy is played by political powers' elites, respected representatives
of cultural sphere, or personalities whose position guarantees certain
approach and values, e.g. important representatives of churches.
European Union as a participant in preventive diplomacy
The problems of early reaction or preventive intervention in conflictaffected regions are dealt with by the EU within European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP). The goal is to create and provide European Rapid
Reaction Forces (ERRF) for preventive actions in international conflicts
and crisis management (European Security and Defence Policy, 2010).
ERRF should consist of approximately 60,000 members with a sixty day
stand-by period, who could be maintained in the area of deployment for
one year. In November 2004, secretaries of defence agreed on creation of
thirteen battle groups as basic units of the ERRF. A battle group can be
25 Organizations most commonly involved in post-conflict regional reconstruction are:
International Committee of the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, OXFAM, WorldVision,
Care, Save the Children Found, Refugees International, etc.
143
created by one country or a group of states. These battle groups can cooperate in five types of operations (Hofreiter, 2008):
- averting the conflict,
- separating the sides of a conflict (using force),
- stabilization, reconstruction and military help for third
countries,
- evacuation operations in hostile territory,
- providing assistance to humanitarian operations.
EU battle groups are being created to take action in conflict
resolution or humanitarian aid at the request of the UN. These battle
forces should be able to solve crisis situations of both military and nonmilitary nature, as well as engage in war. The goal is not to create a
European army. National armed forces stay under control of their national
commanders – democratically elected bodies of member countries. They
would come under a higher military commander only during a particular
EU mission (European Security and Defence Policy, 2010).
Despite overall optimism and determination of EU member states,
there exist also doubts about the whole realization of the ERRF concept.
Main problems are (Hofreiter, 2008):
- it is not sure if European countries will be able to provide
strategic transporting capacity needed for the transport of forces
into the area of deployment without help of the USA, the question
of cooperation between EU and NATO response forces, consensus
in questions of time and manner of using the battle forces is yet to
be found,
- opinions on their deployment vary from using only in lowintensity conflicts to intervention in wide-scale operations,
- the system of military command in UN operations must be
specified; whether they will act autonomously, or under
international command along with the UN peacekeepers.
In any case, the effort of EU members is an expression of the need
for an integrated approach towards conflict prevention and crisis
management in accordance with the European Security Strategy.
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4.4
METHODS EMPLOYED BY PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY
Within preventive actions, various methods are used, aiming to
achieve peace and maintain peace situation in long-term perspective.
These are:
1) Peacekeeping operations – preventive operations for
maintaining peace. They are perceived as last-resort conflict
prevention possibility and represent deploying third-party
military forces in crisis areas. These operations are provided
in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter – Pacific
Settlement of Disputes. For this kind of operation, agreement
of all sides of the conflict is necessary. Their goal is to
discourage the opponents from creating a conflict, or to
prevent the outbreak of violence by the presence of
international forces. Monitoring teams are sent into the area to
report on the current situation while the dispute is not
considerably polarized and permanent armed encounters do
not take place. Their competence is to assess whether there is
a need for further intervention. As an addition to observation
missions, special troops protect civilians from danger, which
threatens them in particular environment. In case of an
observation mission, use of weapons is forbidden except in the
case of self-defence, and such forces do not have a mandate to
intervene in ongoing conflicts. Deployment of military forces
within peacekeeping missions creates conditions for political
conflict resolution, allows the parties involved to seek
reciprocally acceptable options and minimizes the possibility
for the conflict to escalate into destructive phase (Hofreiter,
2008).
2) Peacebuilding – building peace according to the original
concept of Johan Galtung represents one of the three pillars of
peace activities (along with peacekeeping and peacemaking).
The goal of peacebuilding is to identify key causes of the
conflict. Some theoreticians link it with the stage of postconflict reconstruction. However, key factors of the conflict
can be analysed in any of its stages. Understanding this term,
commonly used in the EU, is close to Galtung's definition. He
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defines peacebuilding as activities of medium-term and longterm nature, aimed at the key causes of a violent conflict
(Mihálik, Ondrušek, 2009).
3) Peacemaking – creation of peace. Various meanings are
attached to this term. Galtung has defined peacemaking as
activities aimed to intervene and to mutually influence
conflictual standpoints. The United Nations uses this term in
its agenda and understands it in connection with the activities
described in Article 33 of the UN Charter (negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort
to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means). As a synonym, the term "peace enforcement" is used.
It is used to describe armed, military operations, the main goal
of which is to force the opponents to agree to peaceful, nonviolent conflict resolution. Peacemaking is often used in
relation to negotiations. It extends beyond peacekeeping
because it deals with particular disputable subjects, but does
not reach as far as peacebuilding, which makes efforts for
actual reconciliation and therapy between civilians and not
just for a written agreement (Mihálik, Ondrušek, 2009).
Limitations of conflict prevention
When analysing preventive diplomacy and the activities aimed at
conflict prevention, we must also define some limitations that complicate
the course of the preventive actions as such. These are (Hofreiter, 2008):
- The existence of legal regulations which guarantee human
rights and civil liberties and which must be observed even if
considering a reaction to behaviour evidently focused on
provoking a conflict (e.g. the need to restrict registration or
activity of groups and movements which support or propagate
racial, religious or ethnic hatred collides with the protection of
freedom of speech, association, assembly, etc.).
- International law, including international military law
stagnates because of the needs and demands of the modern
world. This problem is most apparent if there is a need to
react to internal conflicts where human rights are being
seriously violated, humanitarian disaster is taking place, or
146
-
4.5
when dealing with non-governmental participants (terrorists,
religious radicals, political extremists), and thus it is hard to
determine how big a threat they represent. Contemporary
definitions and opinions on preventive and pre-emptive action
are in conflict with regulations and enactments of the Hague
Convention. According to this agreement, such actions are
considered an aggression, as it refuses the possibility of
making preventive intervention against a sovereign state.
Inconvenient system and structure of global security
organizations, such as the UN and its Security Council.
Contradictory interests of its permanent members decrease
the ability to precisely, accurately and effectively react to
emerging conflictual situations and to take appropriate
actions. Reaching agreement is usually problematic in cases
when the conflict area is in the interest or under the influence
of one of the world powers, who are also members of the UN
Security Council.
EARLY WARNING METHOD
In international relations, there is no authority that would be able
to coordinate, manage and sanction the behaviour and approaches of
parties, and that is why conflicts represent a common phenomenon.
During last decades, the destructive force of conflicts has been gradually
increasing, as well as the number of casualties, suffering of civilians,
material damage, etc. This caused a noticeable reform of the international
relations agenda. Many countries and international organizations
emphasize the need for conflict prevention, aiming to decrease material
and civil losses in a long-term perspective. Early prevention of violent
conflict escalation requires the international community to be able to
identify conditions and situations which could lead to escalation of a
dispute and outbreak of violence (Waisová, 2005).
The goal of such early conflict prevention was to create an early
warning system. The early warning system is now in the stage of
development and so far has neither an exact institutional nor procedural
structure. The basic task for this system is to analyse a wide range of
various signs and indicators which could evoke a shift in conflict
147
environment and cause violent escalation. An early warning system
should consist of experts, politicians, international governmental and nongovernmental organizations, able to identify and evaluate the change of
specific indicators and bring it to attention.
There is no single system approved by international relations,
neither there is an agreement on who and how should create it. Various
scientific studies and programs deal with this issue. As an example, we can
mention the project of The University of Maryland – Minorities at Risk.
International organizations, such as the UN, OSCE, The World Bank, OAS
and ECOWAS, are interested in implementing early warning system into
their conflict prevention agenda. The need for such system was declared
by representatives of the UN, particularly by the Secretary General, the
General Assembly, the Security Council and the Department for
Peacekeeping Operations. As a part of cooperation between the UN and
regional governmental and non-governmental organizations, a conflict
prevention coordination program was created. In 2000, this program was
followed by formation of a UN conflict prevention team, which analyses
and evaluates the situation in unstable regions on a regular basis. Aiming
to simplify the communication within conflict-prevention oriented
departments and agencies of the UN, the Framework for Coordination was
created (Annan, 2000).
Currently, the most important activity considering conflict
prevention and creating early warning system is the cooperation between
the UN and the World Bank. Cooperation between these two institutions
originates from a basic concept of security. These institutions associate
the state of civil security and possibility of conflict escalation with the
level of economic development. They assume that in societies with poorly
developed economy, the situation of individuals is unsatisfactory (limited
access to education, healthcare, food, drinking water, etc.). Such situation
destabilizes the society, and thus the tendency to use violence when
solving conflicts is higher. The World Bank intends to use its devices
supporting economic growth, development and reducing poverty, aiming
to minimize the amount of possible causes of conflict. For this purpose, it
created a framework of conflict analysis and determined the signs and
indicators of environmental change and conflict escalation (Waisová,
2005).
148
Early warning factors
Signs and indicators of environmental change and conflict escalation are
used in the risk screening process. This process is based on nine basic
factors (Conflict Analysis Framework, 2003):
1. A violent conflict in the last decade – if in the last ten years there
was a conflict in the country, there is a big probability of its
recurrence. Such country is usually economically unstable and
exhausted, thus the economic, social and ethnic tension or
discontent with the past conflict resolution is present. As an
example, we can mention some African states, such as Congo,
Sudan, etc.
2. Low income – countries with low income per capita (less than
745 USD yearly) represent a higher risk of violent conflict
emergence, because the shortage of financial means creates
possibilities for the inhabitants to seek alternative or illegal
income, such as drug trade, weapon and human trafficking.
Members of this group are e.g. Mali, Ethiopia, Tajikistan, etc.
3. High reliance on exporting one commodity – states which depend
on export of one material represent a higher risk of conflict
occurrence, because even the slightest price change on the world
market affects economic situation in the country, which
contributes to economic and social destabilisation.
4. Destabilisation of economic system, increase of poverty, and
economic polarization of society lead to destabilisation of the
state and increase the risk of conflict outbreak or escalation. Such
countries are e.g. oil-exporting states, coffee or cocoa bean
exporters.
5. Political instability – political instability could be a result of
system transformation in the country (frequent changes of
political or electoral system) or a collapse of legal system. In this
case, the government is unable to rule the country effectively 26.
Examples: Sudan and Somalia.
6. Suppression of civil and political rights – systematic suppression
of human rights and civil liberties increases the possibility of
In countries with medium income per capita (745 - 1100 USD yearly) political institutions
represent a more important element of conflict prevention, than in countries with low yearly
income per capita. In more economically developed countries, democratic regime represents
the best mechanism of conflict prevention.
26
149
conflict emergence. The reason is, that groups of inhabitants are
struggling to express their discontent with the country's policy
(even by violent means). For example, the policy of apartheid in
South Africa.
7. Militarisation – countries with high armament expenses and a
developed culture of weapon ownership have a greater tendency
to engage in armed conflicts. Strong militarisation of a country
can lead to higher militarisation of inhabitants, who often own
lots of weapons and are willing to use them. Such countries are
Croatia, Iraq or Macedonia.
8. Ethnic dominance – in countries, where one of the ethnic groups
controls state institutions or economy, and other ethnic groups
demand the same share of power, the risk of conflict emergence
or escalation considerably increases. E.g. the genocide in Rwanda.
9. A conflict taking place in the area – in regions, where internal or
international conflicts take place, the probability of their
expansion increases. That is because particular conflicts can flow
from one state to another. The bordering states could become
embroiled in a conflict because of influx of refugees or weapons
from conflict areas (The genocide in Rwanda destabilised Congo
and Burundi).
10. High youth unemployment – shortage of working opportunities
and possibilities for self-realization is frustrating for young
people and contributes to their radicalisation. Particularly men
become easy targets for militant organizations, which offer them
money and personal fulfillment.(For example, FARC and ELN in
Colombia, Palestinian militant organizations, but also SS and SA in
inter-war Germany.).
The influence of individual factors can vary depending on a
particular country. A factor which causes destabilisation and polarization
of a conflict in one country does not necessarily have to have the same
impact in a different country. In many cases, the outbreak of violence
depends on the profile and nature of a society, its traditions, pressure of
environment, geopolitical conditions, etc.
Besides these factors, the process of risks research involves six
basic categories mentioned in the World Bank report back in 2003. These
150
allow specifying particular situations, environments and causes of conflict
in more detail (Conflict Analysis Framework, 2003):
1. nature of social and ethnic relations,
2. nature of government and political institutions,
3. state of human rights and security,
4. state and nature of economic structures and economic
performance,
5. state of environment and access to natural resources,
6. external factors.
Individual categories involve particular variables, which specify
them. The first category is represented by social and economic disruption,
ethnic dissociation, regional inequality, different social possibilities,
creation of social capital, creation of social identity and culture, more
precisely, a culture of violence. The second category is characterized by
justice of government and political institutions, equality before the law
and relations between the government and citizens. The third category
involves variables such as freedom of speech and the role of media,
importance of human rights, level of militarization of society and security
of civilians. The fourth category consists of the level of economic growth,
inequality of income per capita, trends of inflation, dependence on export
of one strategic commodity, employment rate and access to sources of
production, and poverty caused by conflict. The fifth group involves access
to natural resources, more precisely, internal or international competition
for these resources. The last category includes the role of diaspora in
regional conflicts (Conflict Analysis Framework, 2003).
The basic idea of the World Bank's early warning system is the
relationship between economic development and the level of security.
According to this theory, the probability of violent conflict escalation and
recurrence increases with poverty, shortage of strategic resources,
dependence on export of one commodity, unequal resource distribution
and other economic factors. However, some theoreticians do not believe
the relationship among individual economic factors and the level of
security is that significant.
As an example of such extra-economic research, we can mention
works by Walter and Snyder, who studied civil wars taking place recently
in different regions, possibilities of violence prevention and conflict
151
resolution. According to this research, civil wars represent a specific
conflict type, where non-governmental or opposition groups fight with
governments or other groups to gain power or access to high functions,
while there is no external force engaged. Authors define four basic factors,
which increase the possibility of outbreak of a conflict (or a civil war)
(Waisová, 2005):
1) A break-up of the government or state – in case of central
control disruption or collapse of state apparatus, majority of
inhabitants find themselves in situation of insecurity. A
country which does not function as a protector and distributor
of public goods, most of all security, often becomes a threat for
its own inhabitants. In case of collapse of state structures and
institutions, it is not certain how power will be distributed in
the next government, what the relations between social,
political or ethnic groups will look like, whether they will
accept the status quo, or use the situation to ensure their own
status, if peace will be maintained or a violent conflict will
emerge. The reaction of civilians and different social groups to
such destabilisation may vary in particular cases. There can be
mass intra-state migration to unaffected or ethnically
homogeneous regions, emigration, or outbreak of a conflict.
The goal of these groups is to secure their own existence and
privileges. Examples of such scenarios are the collapse of
political system in Somalia leading to a civil war, or the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early '90s, which caused battles
for political power in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and
Tajikistan.
2) Geographic isolation of minority groups within a larger ethnic
community – minority groups, which, as a result of territorial
or demographic changes, get into geographic isolation within
the country and their status is not secured (e.g. a federal
system with two-chamber parliament), feel threatened by the
majority. This majority uses geographic isolation to suppress
the rights of the minority, e.g. using ethnic cleansing.
Minorities, which aim to eliminate such disadvantageous
status, have a tendency to solve the situation using violence,
e.g. by armed attacks, struggling to improve their position (e.g.
152
3)
4)
achieving constitutional guarantee of rights for minorities,
gaining autonomy, secession, etc.). Examples of internal
conflicts caused by geographic isolation are the conflicts in
Northern Ireland (Protestants against Catholics), Sudan (nonArab versus Arab inhabitants), or Bosnia (Muslims and
Bosnians versus Serbians versus Croats).
Requests for a change of power distribution in the country – in
democratic multinational, multi-ethnic and religiously
heterogeneous countries, the state power tends to be divided
among individual groups according to the number of members
of a given group. From a long-term perspective, a change in
relations between social groups can occur; it can be for
example a change of demographic structure due to high
natality or immigration, which may cause that an up-to-now
majority group becomes a minority. If this change is not
reflected and the power stays in hands of the previously
dominant group, the new majority group often tends to start a
violent conflict. Examples of such conflicts: civil war in
Lebanon in 1970's, conflict between Israel and Palestine in the
Near East and the Kosovo conflict in the late '90s. The
situation has been developing similarly in the last decades in
Macedonia, but here a conflict was prevented with the help of
neutral third parties – by preventive deployment of armed
forces and an observation mission.
Unequal distribution of resources within the country – if
resource distribution is designed in favour of one group, the
tension leading to violent polarisation of a dispute may
increase. Such state is common after a break-up of a country,
when particular groups try to strengthen their position by
means of gaining control over strategic sources of material
and finances, strategic industry and military material. As an
example, we can mention the approach of former members of
Yugoslavia during the country's collapse. Their goal was to
gain as much of the common military equipment as possible. A
similar conflict emerged between Slovenia and Croatia. It was
caused by disputes over Krško nuclear power plant and the
access to the Adriatic.
153
Conclusion
For a long time, states played a dominant role in the system of
international relations. Among the main goals of the states was to ensure
their own security and existence, and to strengthen their power. Security
and power of countries were threatened by goals, intentions, activities
and behaviour of other countries, which aimed to maintain or increase
their own power and security. Activity and behaviour of states in the
international system had the nature of individual and independent units.
There was no superior institution which could solve internal or
international conflicts. The area of intra-state relations was ordered
hierarchically and it set rules and standards for possible conflict
resolution between intrastate subjects. Creation of primary principles of
the international system (sovereignty, territoriality and non-intervention)
and their acceptance allowed only exceptional interventions into internal
affairs of individual states. Observance of agreements between the conflict
sides usually depended on a self-imposed approach of the opponents
themselves.
Resolution of violent disputes and conflicts in human society is
one of the most important and most complex mechanisms which take
place within international relations. As we have pointed out, each conflict
situation represents a unique and specific event, which requires an
individual approach. At the same time, these are neither static, nor
monocausal phenomena. Particular conflicts have their own dynamics of
development and evolve through different stages. These stages are then
the main determining elements for the choice of methods, strategies,
mechanisms and devices for conflict resolution. We must take account of
the environment, in which the conflict takes place, the number of sides to
the dispute, their geopolitical placement, history of mutual relations, and
last but not least, the will of the parties involved. Although intervention of
third parties (individuals, countries, governments, or regional and
international organizations) may help solving the conflict, it becomes
ineffective as long as the participants reject it.
In this work, we have dealt with theoretical definitions of terms
which are the subject of our enquiry, individual stages and intensity of
conflicts, and studied particular devices, strategies and mechanisms,
which are used for conflict prevention and resolution within the
154
international system. We have observed the change, which the system of
conflict prevention and resolution in international relations has got
through in last decades. After WWII, in the period of the Cold War, a
specific conflict resolution device called peacekeeping was created.
However, practical use revealed that peacekeeping forces of the UN were
not able to solve some of the conflicts, mainly because they were few in
number and their competences allowed only restricted activity in certain
directions. The development was very slow and complicated, and it lasted
as long as until the end of the Cold War for dynamic system changes to
come. These changes included the UN's strategies, mechanisms and
conflict prevention and resolution devices. As it proved later, the new
situation in international politics required transformation in approach
towards conflict resolution. Several civil wars and internal conflicts, which
had been suppressed for decades, emerged with great intensity. The
results of these disputes were enormous suffering of people, waves of
migration and unimaginable material damage. Many countries and
international organizations focused on conflict prevention and cultivation
of conflict resolution between the opponents, aiming to decrease human,
material and economic losses. New institutions and legal regulations are
created in the international system, allowing space for non-violent conflict
resolution (e.g. international arbitration bodies, the International Criminal
Court, etc.). They take into consideration that parties involved within
international relations tend to get into conflict situations more and more
often. In the recent period, not only states, but also non-state parties take
part in these conflicts. While older international agreements and contracts
(UN Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice) allowed space
for conflict resolution exclusively to the states, contemporary institutions
and international regulations also reflect the need for conflict resolution
between states and non-state participants, as well as between the nonstate parties on their own.
The research also pointed out the fact that post-conflict
reconstruction is an equally important part of conflict resolution. Its goal
is to overcome the state that arrives after the ending of a conflict, that is,
the participants' discontent with the result. The post-conflict
reconstruction allows prevention of conflict recurrence on a long-term
perspective. The area of conflict resolution thus includes not only
prevention, but also devices and mechanisms reacting to the outbreak of
violence (UN peacekeeping forces, UN coercive forces, etc.) and post155
conflict reconstruction. As the number of devices used in the system of
conflict resolution increased, the spectre of parties involved broadened,
too. After WWII it was usually states and the system of the UN who
actively participated in conflict resolution. In the last decades, number of
regional governmental and international, regional and local nongovernmental organizations involved has also increased considerably. The
activity of non-governmental organizations in this area is, however,
restricted to post-conflict reconstruction.
It is not easy to characterize the contemporary situation and
security environment in the world politics. It is full of disputes, conflicts
and contradictions, which are social-economically, or geopolitically
determined. It is a fact, that in global understanding, the world has never
been as developed as it is nowadays. The level of advancement of
developed countries is in contrast with the backwardness of third-world
countries. The world has never been as wealthy as it is now. However,
wealth on one side is confronted with poverty in other regions. We must
realize, that almost three billion people (which is nearly a half of the
world's population) struggle with less than two euros per day. Many
people die annually as a result of starvation and malnutrition.
The modern world is characterized as safe, because the
probability of a global war has decreased, but on the other hand, new
global security threats occurred. They are less predictable, and strongly
diversified. From this point of view, we could claim that world is stable
and organized, but from a different perspective, it is unstable, anarchic
and fragmented.
The evolution of civilization has not brought only success in the
technical development and progress making life easier, but also many
problems, which, in some cases, threaten our lives. These are mainly
inequality in global development, destruction of ecological stability,
effects of globalization, regional conflicts, wars, etc. These influences affect
each one of us, and their resolution will not be easy if the international
community does not focus on prevention.
We have tried to elaborate the key issues related to contemporary
theory and practical use of conflict prevention and resolution in
international relations. As we mentioned in the introduction, this is a very
complex subject, and because of the work's extent it was not possible to
include all the factors directly related to it. As a conclusion, we offered a
156
general theoretical analysis of conflict prevention and conflict resolution
within international relations.
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Title:
The Theory of Conflicts
Author:
© Assoc. Prof. PhDr. Rastislav Kazanský, PhD
Publisher:
Publishing house of the Matej Bel University
in Banská Bystrica - Belianum
Number of pages:
186 (10,80 authorial sheets)
Edition:
first
Published in:
2015
Number of copies: 100 copies
Format:
Print:
A5
EQUILIBRIA, s.r.o.
© Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, 2015
ISBN 978-80-557-0970-3
EAN 9788055709703
186