John Dickinson After 1776:
The Fabius Letters
M. SUSAN
reputation as a political philosopher is based principally upon
his Letters From A Pennsylvania Farmer.’
Little attention has been paid to the post1776 pamphlets, namely his first Fubius
Letters advocating the adoption of the proposed federal constitution and the second
Fabius Letters, published in 1797.2 Because
John Dickinson’s political philosophy is
generally recognized as central to an understanding of the American political tradition, the almost universal neglect of thc
Fabius Letters is, indeed, a serious matter.
A richer, more diverse view of the traditions’ content and nature may be gained by
a detailed analysis of Dickinson’s postrevolutionary writings. This analysis of the Fabius Letters will show that they should be
included in the sacred pantheon of American conservative tracts. And beyond this,
Dickinson’s thoughts will illustrate the diversity of the conservative tradition and
help us to understand more clearly some of
the essential differences of opinion between
Northern New England and Southern conservatism which have been and still are a
curious but important factor in our politics.
For, despite the many disparities between
the various conservative groups, one significant point of similarity remains : opposition
to mass, equalitarian, majoritarian democracy.
JOHN DICICINSON‘S
POWER
We readily confess that Dickinson is difficult to place on the conservativeliberal
spectrum, as that spectrum is normally conceived. He refused to sign the Declaration
of Independence, reluctantly and late in his
career supported the American Revolution,
spoke out in favor of the French Revolution and, then, later publicly recanted his
misplaced defense of the French. Moreover,
previous students of his thought have
reached different conclusions and have
placed him in various positions on this
spectrum. Vernon L. Parrington in The
Colonial Mind by slight of hand concludes
that Dickinson was a Whig.* He determines
that Dickinson was not interested in abstract theoretical issues, was not a serious
political thinker and was unconcerned with
the social implications of his ideas. On the
other hand, Charles J. Stille, Dickinson’s
first biographer concludes somewhat amazingly that he was a Burkean c o n s e ~ a t i v e . ~
But David L. Jacobson in his recent study
concludes that he was a liberal?
Our analysis of Dickinson’s Fabius Letters attempts to provide abundant contextual and specific evidence that the content
of his thought cannot be said to be either
liberal or Whig, a conclusion in diametrical
opposition to the conclusions reached by
Parrington and Jacobson. We also reject
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the evaluation of Dickinson’s intellectual
stature made by Parrington and others. We
submit that Dickinson must be considered
a conservative. And this because he accepted the Christian ontological, metaphysical and religious philosophy, supported a
balanced constitutional order containing
provisions for peaceful changes, advocated
a federal system of government, thought the
common welfare and the public good were
ends to be sought in a governmental system
and he believed individuals and nations
have rights and interests which ought to be
preserved and defended.
In order to better understand Dickinson’s
political philosophy, we should mention the
historical-political context within which he
wrote. Two recent studies of conservatism
in the Federalist and Jeffersonian-Republican parties have uncovered three different
attitude groups within each? The Federalists contained old, new, and traditional
wings, whereas the Republicans were split
into nationalistic warhawks, moderate supporters of the Jefferson administration, and
Southern conservatives. What seems clear
is that parties in our early period were not
monolithic groups confronting each other
on the basis of fundamentally different policy orientations. Curiously, the period during which Dickinson lived also evidences
the early existence of a conservative congressional coalition which was anti-executive, and anti-popularist democracy, a characteristic of our modern party system.
Therefore, Dickinson’s shift from the Federalist to Republican party did not necessarily mean a change of philosophy since
both parties contained conservatives. Dickinson was not and did not become an advocate of French enlightenment doctrines, nor
was he a Lockean Whig, a Tory or a Loyalist.? Rather his philosophy is illustrative of
a moderate, Northern type of conservatism
derived from premises essentially similar
to those of Hamilton and Madison.
Dickinson’s partisan career was devoted
to building an effective conservative partnership from contentious factions? Immediately prior to the Revolution, his energy
was directed towards convincing the Loyalists that a viable conservative , position
could no longer be based upon a broad support for the claims of the established British government? Dickinson, a respected
conservative leader, supported the revolution against the British and the status quo.
Undoubtedly the problems involved in constructing a viable conservative movement
in the midst of a developing civil war was
no small task and required great political
acumen. We suggest that its successful accomplishment, the contribution of prudent
men possessed of foresight, helped to prevent a radical democratic social, economic
and political revolution such as that carried
out ten years later in France. Dickinson’s
moderation in the midst of crisis helped
make a critical difference between the
French revolutionary tradition and the
American. Clearly Dickinson and other
leaders prior to the Revolution forged together a coalition which exerted a constant
influence throughout the entire Revolutionary-Constitutional period.
I
THE FIRST Letters
of Fabius, published in
1788, contains John Dickinson’s spirited
defense of the proposed constitution against
its assorted detractors and critics, the AntiFederalists. In the nine Letters, shorter and
more sharply focused than the lengthier,
and more diffused Federalist Papers, he
criticizes the central propositions in the opposition’s case. In Letter ZZ Dickinson states
the three key issues which he is going to refute: first, the assertion that the proposed
system will inevitably degenerate into an
aristocracy thus destroying freedom; second, the claim that the suggested system is
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too powerful and; third, the allegation that
the constitution is not democratic, not
founded on the consent of the governed.1°
We will proceed in our analysis of Dickinson’s thought by considering first and briefly his answers to the first and third questions. We will emphasize his defense of the
powers granted to the federal government.
Dickinson’s inquiry delves into fundamental questions. He asks why, for example, it makes any sense for men to live under governments. In the process he discusses the problem of individual rights,
freedom and selfishness, and their paradoxical relationship with the chief political virtues of the general welfare, the public good.
He searches for the origin of individual
rights and freedom, and considers the related problem of freedom’s preservation.
He concludes by noting a paradox: In order to best secure freedom, men must give
up some individual rights and join a union
with other individuals in order to create an
effective collective effort, a government.
Dickinson views the strategic practical
political problem in the constitutional debate to be: How to convince the supporters
of states’ rights, the Anti-Federalists, that
it would be advantageous to join the proposed federation, to voluntarily give up
some of their rights, powers and freedoms
to the new general government? In sum,
the rhetorical task was to convince a skeptical audience that a more powerful federal
government would not automatically degenerate into a corrupt tyranny, Lord Acton
to the contrary. But there are two points
with which we should be concerned. First,
Dickinson’s arguments in favor of increasing the powers of the general government
refer to the antecedent Articles of Confederation, which he helped design, and not
to the vastly more powerful present day system. Whether Dickinson would support expanding Washington’s powers today is
problematical. Second, it is beneficial to
read his theory because it provides an antidote for the recurrent illnesses of anarchism
and nihilism. Demands for extremes of
freedom and radical individualism shouted
until throats are sore and caustic, and defeatist shrieks from victims of the nihilistic syndrome were long ago noted by Plato
as systematic of a declining democracy.
The conservative now, as well as in Dickinson’s day, seeks to found and preserve a
balanced constitutional order.
We must carefully note that the theoretical problems dealt with in The Fabius Letters are different from those considered in
Farmer’s Letters because of changes from
a monarchical to republican form of government. Under the monarchical system defense of freedom required continual maintenance of and increases in the power of
popular representative legislatures in order
to counteract the royally-controlled administration. But in a confederated republic
based on popular sovereignty, the appropriate means to preserve freedom correspondingly changed. While Dickinson recognized that a new basis for defending freedom must correspond to these changed circumstances, his solution remained essentially the same ; the division and limitation
of sovereign power in order to produce a
free, balanced constitution. He perceived
the major danger to freedom in a monarchical system is that the crown and its
appointees will gradually assume despotic
power, or that the Parliament would become omnipotent within the empire. He
realized, however, that in a republic the
problem is that the mass may strive to assume dictatorial power, thus destroying the
division of power, a balanced constitution,
and hence freedom. Therefore, he deemed
one of the propositions of the Anti-Federalists invalid because it was directed solely
towards preserving freedom in a monarchical system.
Indeed, the Anti-Federalist position it-
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self becomes dangerous to freedom, based
as i t was upon an erroneous estimation of
the potential sources for the loss of freedom
and consequently inapplicable to a system
of popular sovereignty. Before he could establish the validity of this argument, Dickinson thought he had first to prove that the
proposed constitution was, indeed, based
upon popular control. This premise, of
course, the Anti-Federalists denied. Thus,
the first task was to establish the proposition that the constitution does provide for
popular sovereignty, and disprove the contention that the proposed system was a disguised aristocracy. He asks just how could
it be converted into an aristocracy? How
could a House of Representatives elected
every two years change the system into a
monarchy or aristocracy without the knowledge and consent of the people? His answers are as follows: The President cannot
be a dictator because a two-thirds vote of
the legislature can override his veto, and
because he can be removed from office; the
Senate cannot be a source of tyranny either
because the states select its members. Dickinson concluded that the will of the people
expressed in elections will provide a means
to remedy grievances, and that the popular
influence will be decisive in all parts of the
proposed constitution?l
According to Dickinson, two real problems in the new republic had to be avoided ;
the danger from contention and jealousy
between the states to be associated, and failure to protect “the worthy from the licenti0 ~ s . The
’ ~ ~important
~
questions in his analysis are: What should be the share of rights
that each state has to give up to the union,
and how can one have a popular government which will be moderate and stable
and yet provide protection for the rights of
all its citizens? The general solution for
both problems is a government strong
enough to be effective without endangering
freedom. His answer to the last question i s
based upon the premise that in republican
systems tranquility and prosperity depend
upon having a government strong enough
to protect the worthy from the licentious.
In Letter V Dickinson considers the question of how republican tranquility is to be
conserved. Freedom has been lost in other
governmental systems because of the predominance within them of “licentious” persons who are dominated by “irregular passions,” who seek the promotion of their own
self-interests, and who have no respect for
the law.13 A worthy person is one who reveres the constitution, liberties, and laws
of his country. Therefore, the worthy must
exercise a controlling influence within a
government where the reasonable, virtuous
will of the people is relied upon to preserve
freedom.
The effort to devise a solution to his second, most critical problem, leads Dickinson
into an abstract discussion of the general
benefits of society in order to construct a
theoretical foundation for his defense of the
constitution. His fundamental theoretical
axiom is that a people cannot be happy
without freedom; they cannot be free without security and the absence of fear, without living in society and under a properly
constructed governmental system. Freedom
does not mean the absence of government,
but the reverse, the existence of a well-constructed, balanced constitutional system.14
Now :
If we can determine, what share of his
rights, every individual must contribute
to the common stock of rights in forming a society, for obtaining equal freedom, we determine at the same time,
what share of their rights each political
society must contribute to the common
stuck of rights in forming a confederation, which is only a larger society, for
obtaining equal freedom: For, if the deposite be not proportioned to the magnitude of the association in the latter case,
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it will generate the same mischief among
the component parts of it, from their inequality, that would result from a defective contribution to association in the
former case, among component parts of
it, from their inequality.
Each individual then must contribute
such a share of his rights, as is necessary
for attaining that security that is essential to freedom; and he is bound to
make this contribution by the law of his
nature, which prompts him to a participated happiness; that is, by the command of his creator; therefore, he must
submit his will, in what concerns all, to
the will of all, that is of the whole society. What does he lose by this submission : The power of doing injuries to others-and the dread of suffering injuries
from them. What does he gain by i t ?
The aid of those associated with him . .
protection against injuries-a
capacity
of enjoying his undelegated rights to the
best advantage
or, in other words,
that perfect liberty better described in
the Holy Scriptures, than any where
else, in these expressions-“When every
man shall sit under his vine, and under
his fig-tree, and none shall make him
af raid.”’6
.
.. .
Therefore, when a state joins in a confederation resignation of some rights and independence must be made in order to obtain
the benefits of union. But we are still left
to ask what rights, freedoms and portion
of sovereignty remains with the states, and
what is the origin of rights anyway, and in
what cases must an individual state submit
to the will of all?
A confederation is but an assemblege of
individuals, as the rights of sovereign states
by analogy are correlated by Dickinson
with the rights of individuals. Rights of individuals should not be based upon precedent because one can produce conflicting
authorities and because the protagonists of
precedent usually do not go back to the earliest point “to the time when man came
from the hand of his Maker.”la Rights originated in the Garden of Eden, not a model
state of nature or in a social contract to
Dickinson’s way of thinking. Note that
Dickinson, unlike other theoreticians such
as Locke and Rousseau, does not utilize a
state of nature in which men are absolutely
free and equal, and then proceed to construct a society in which the giving up of
“natural rights” means a continuing loss
of freedom. According to Dickinson, freedom only becomes possible as men move
into society and live under a good government. He, consequently, has no difficulty
in trying to devise any valid reasons why
men would ever have wanted to leave the
perfectly free state of nature for civilized
life. This avoids the frequent misinterpretation of the model construct as an assertion
that barbaric, uncivilized life is more free,
and for some, therefore, preferable to associated civilized life. Natural law and
rights mean in Dickinson that nature and
ethics rooted in the Devine Will for the universe, and not nature in the sense of abstract rationalist, or physical nature. Dickinson does not view society as an artificial
man-made contrivance to restrict the freedom of “natural man,” but as a part of the
scheme of life designed by God, and, therefore, a natural part of existence.
In the key Letter ZZZ Dickinson writes
natural rights appertain to man in view of
his divinely granted existence ; civil rights
he gains as a member of society. Now: the
“undelegated rights of the several states,
in a confederation stand upon the very
same foundation with the undelegated
rights of individuals in a society. . .”17 It
will be the states’ own fault if they loose
rights because of a moral blindness and the
inability to perceive that the selfish interests of individual parts must be reconciled
with the general, common interest of the
whole community. One, he maintains, needs
to realize that the whole is interested in the
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safety of the parts. An attempt to deprive
one state of its rights should be viewed by
all the rest as a dangerous precent “SO as
trustees of sovereign states themselves
[it] would be irrational to participate in
violating independent sovereignty of the
others.”’* Quoting St. Paul, Dickinson says
all states are members of one community
and what injures a part, therefore, injures
all.
If an individual loses his independence
and rights by joining society, then, surely,
since man exists only within society, it
makes no sense to argue that he would automatically lose any additional freedoms by
joining a confederate government. Those
rights would have already been lost in the
formation of the state governments. If one
argues this way, individuals living within
society would previously have given up
their “natural rights” when they became
citizens of the state governments, and
would have no rights left to lose under the
proposed confederation of already existing
societies and states. To argue that submission of the states to the confederacy will
lead to a destruction of their sovereignty
and rights would require the same assertion in regard to an individual’s joining society and, thus, lead to the extinction of the
fundamental benefits to be derived from associated life, freedom, security and happiness. This argument is defective according
to Dickinson because it leads to absurd, unacceptable conclusion^.^^
He also notes that the possibility for the
destruction of the state’s freedom does exist, but it does not flow from the bare fact
of forming an association of states which
has sufficient power to govern. For it is the
corruption of the manners of nations that
produces slavery, not the formation of governments. Government itself does not equal
loss of freedom or slavery, rather it creates
the possibility for freedom’s existence. But
just how can freedom be obtained? The so-
lution depends upon the construction of a
good constitution defined by Dickinson as
the organization of the contributed rights
in society.*’ Just governmental power corresponds to those rights granted for the
benefit of the governed according to the
will of God and held in trust by the governors. According to Dickinson, the essential
characteristic of a good constitution is the
division, limitation and balance of governmental powers. Once freedom has been thus
established, the constitution cannot be
changed without upsetting the proper balance, a point of precarious equilibrium
which can be easily disturbed and freedom
lost or destroyed in the process.21
As long as these parts preserve the order assigned to them respectively by the
constitution they may be said to be balanced; but, when one part, without being sufficiently checked by the rest,
abuses its power to the manifest danger
of the public happiness, or when the several parts abuse their respective powers
so as to involve the commonwealth in the
like peril, the people must restore things
to that order, from which the functionaries have departed.22
The proposed constitution does reconcile
the vastness of power with safety for private persons, and provides better security
for rights and freedoms than bills of rights
or historically established precedents. Our
ancestors were not so foolish as “to refuse
blessings because they might possibly be
abused.yy23
Ultimately under a free popular
constitution rights are maintained by the
population’s soundness of sense and honesty
of heart. The preservation of the virtue of
the people ultimately depends upon religion
for it is the Bible which enjoins men to do
right.24
But it is the possibility of insufficient unity among the associated states which preoccupies Dickinson. He points to the Anaecan League whose political history was
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marred by dissensions and civil wars and
quotes Polybius to the effect that the attack
upon the common welfare was caused by
the selfishness of the separate members.*E
The central government in America must
have sufficient power to provide for foreign
defense and to prevent internal discords.
In confederated republics, he feared, freedom has been endangered because of the
inevitable animosity between the constituent states. Particular states, uncontrolled
by the union government, he observed, promote selfish, ambitious and avaricious projects, and also combined into partial confederacies. Freedom was destroyed because the
general government did not have sufficient
power to control dissident states. In order
to promote amicable relationships between
the associated states, the central government has to be able to counteract the designs formulated by selfishness in the separate units. But just as important, the central government will have to be careful to
take no actions except those which will be
equally advantageous to the whole confederacy. The interests of each part must be
consulted in order to leave no basis for contention. Prudence will be required to help
one guard against the faults to which such
a government is exposed.26
Although he has previously stressed the
need for granting the union government
sufficient power, Dickinson concludes his
first Fabius Letters with the reminder that
in a large country it is also essential for the
states to retain important powers. In so doing he counters the anti-Federalist axiom
that a free popular government is only possible in small geographical areas since popular systems cannot be extended because
representation becomes increasingly defective the larger the area encompassed. First,
he mentions that no territory has previously been governed by a “confederacy of republics.”2’ In such a system a reconciliation “of individual rights, interests and du-
ties, with the public good or general welfare of the whole country without disrupting the discharge of duties owed to the individual states” must be achieved.**Therefore, representation of the states provided
for in the Senate is an essential component
of proper constitutional balance. “The
equal representation of each state in one
branch of the legislature, was an original
substantive proposition, made in convent i ~ n . ~The
’ ~ preservation
~
of the states required their representation in a separately
organized branch of the government in
which each state had equal suffrage. Rights
not delegated to the union were to be retained by the states. Any assumption that
the size of the United States is too large for
democratic government he believed invalid
because no similar governmental form has
previously existed, because a proper distinction between ancient classical democracies and the proposed American system has
not been made, and because one has overlooked the common interests of the states
which flow from similarities in religion,
blood, language, manners, customs, and the
absence of prior conflict?O
The cultivation [of liberty] will indeed demand continual attention, unceasing diligence, and frequent conflict
with difficulties; but, to object against
the benefits offered to us by our Creator,
by excepting to the terms annexed, is a
crime to be equalled only by its
In Letter IX Dickinson concludes his defense of the constitution by suggesting that
if any other difficulties or faults than those
which he has mentioned and disposed of
should develop, the constitution itself provides the means whereby it can gradually
be improved and amended on the basis of
experience in its operation without disturbing the stability of the government. In general, the proposed constitution has succeeded in uniting and reconciling the extremes
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of private interests or rights in life, liberty,
and property with the common interests
and welfare of the public. If freedom is lost
in America, it will not be as the result of
the development of either monarchy or aristocracy but rather through despotism. The
only way that the Americans can loose their
freedom under the proposed constitution
would be if the people become depraved.
What an infatuated, depraved people
must Americans become, if, with such
unequalled advantages, committed to
their trust in a manner almost miraculous, they lose their liberty?32
Would a virtuous and sensible people
choose villains or fools for their governors?
So long as the American people are animated by moderation, Dickinson thinks,
freedom will be preserved under the constit~tion.~~
I1
IN THE SECOND Fabius Letters, published
in 1797, Dickinson explains the reasons
why he supported the French Revolution,
and expresses his general views on foreign
policy. He evidently thought that the
French were merely following the Anierican example in their revolution, that their
success in this attempt would be favorabk
to freedom, and that they had a right to
change their form of government. In addition Americans owed the French a debt of
gratitude for their help during our revolution. The change in governmental form did
not extinguish this debt because it was due
to the French pe0ple.8~His opponents were
arguing that the only reason the French
had helped us was because they wanted to
promote their own selfish interests, and,
therefore, we did not owe them any assistance either from friendship or gratitude.
According to Dickinson this proposition
amounts to a dangerous new doctrine that
no gratitude or friendship is due to any
man, if another’s conduct, no matter how
beneficial and kind towards one, is motivated by selfishness or by a regard for their
own interests.s6 Moving the whole issue into
the philosophic sphere for resolution, Dickinson says that God assigned two dispositions to men; love of self and social affections. Quoting Locke, Dickinson contends
that his position in the Essay On Understanding was wrong when he said there was
no such thing as innate ideas. According
to Dickinson, God clearly implanted both
self-love and social affections in man. It is
sufficient if man seeks the good. These God
created innate tendencies toward the good
in men correspond to laws established by
Divine Will. A reasonable man’s affections
move from his immediate family, to
friends, neighbors, and to fellow citizens.
Dickinson’s metaphysical views on the
reIationship between the individual and the
whole, or the resolution of the paradoxical
conflict between individual rights, the common good, and selfishness provides a theoretical foundation for his views on federalism and states’ rights. These second Letters
also illustrate how his theoretical case was
grounded in the Christian viewpoint, that
his political views were not suspended in a
secularized vacuum but were rather extensions of the Christian political tradition
founded by the Puritans in the earliest days
of the land and, therefore, in the deepest
sense conservative of our intellectual-cultural heritage.
Elaborating on a basic axiom of this theory, he says there is no necessary and inherent conflict between private and public
affections, or between individuals and so~ i e t y This
. ~ ~ axiom at the basis of his theory produces a philosophic outlook radically different from the atomistic individualism of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke and
also from the collectivist theories based upon the assumption of extensive individual
selfishness which lead to a justification of
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an all-powerful government in order to
make people unselfish and, consequently,
virtuous.
Dickinson defends the family and religion as the proper guardians of personal
and social morality. Since his philosophy
works from the premise of no inherent or
natural conflict between individual and
public interest, Dickinson avoids the theoretical problem of having to defend governmental powers as necessary in order to reconcile conflicting private and group economic interests as do many contemporary
group theorists. The powers exercised by
a government in the proper constitutional
arrangement do not necessarily conflict
with the private interests of the society’s individuals. Individual and political freedom
are not dependent upon either an all-powerful collectivist state, or the classical liberal state in which freedom exists only when
the government does not act.s’
His explicit rejection of Plato’s position
in regard to the abolition of the family,
which he takes to be a collectivist solution,
and Locke’s Whig-liberal stance clearly indicates his intention to develop a third alternative on this critical philosophic point.
Plat0 was wrong when he thought that the
private family affections of men were so
strong that children had to be removed
from their home environment and educated
by the public in order to overcome a family
incalculated stress upon individual and private interests. To the contrary, private affections may produce universal benevolence, and, consequently, advance public
affections. According to Dickinson, there
is a strong divinely implanted propensity
in men towards social affections and love
of others. He believed that moral virtue
produces happiness, and constitutes wisdom. Moreover, evil exists because men neglect or abuse divine gifts. To be sure, on
this analysis, there is nothing wrong in pursuing one’s own happiness, but it is wrong
to assume that men are governed by a sordid motive, if they are influenced by a regard for their own interests. Even if one
deems it a part of his own self-interest to
help others, and is motivated to do so because such attention to others makes him
happy and wise, such an act is virtuous,
not evil and
The contrary proposition leads to the
conclusion that the Christian religion,
in proposing such a motive is nothing
more than a vile contrivance to excite
the fears of men and then to rule over
them by managing their fears.s9
Since the Christian religion motivates a
man to be good and virtuous in order to
make possible his soul’s salvation, and to
be eternally happy, to assert that it is evil
to help others or to do good in order to be
yourself a good and happy man will, Dickinson thinks, undermine a basic premise of
Christianity itself. This dangerous new doctrine that it is wrong to consider self-interest in political affairs, is taken by Dickinson as a general ethical premise, is referred
to a basic religious proposition, and found
unacceptable because it is in logical conflict with it. Since one assumes that the
fundamental premises of Christianity are
good, an asserted contrary proposition is
bad. Dickinson saw that if one promoted
this new doctrine in domestic and foreign
political affairs, it would have repercussions
for religion as well as for the ethics of governmental policy.
I11
LET ME
NOW take Dickinson’s previously
stated position and provide the reader with
a logical extension of his views in order to
illustrate the ethical basis of his theoretical
premises. If the essence of evil is selfishness, if the cardinal sin is to regard one’s
self and happiness as of some importance,
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and if one is only obligated in politics when
actions are motivated by lack of concern
for self-interest, then good is to regard
one’s own self as of little or no importance,
the promotion of the abstract collectivist
good of others is the essence of all goodness, and political obligation is only due
when actions are instigated by regard for
the collective entity. But one wonders where
the locus of this unselfish collective entity
is. If it is selfishness for the individual to
consider his interests vis-&vis a particular
state, selfishness for a state to promote its
interests vis-&vis the federal government,
and selfishness in foreign affairs to promote
self-interest vis-&vis other nations, at what
point of abnegation does one reach the. depository of unselfish actions? The more a
political theorist stresses “selfi~hness’~as
the cardinal evil, the more likely he is to
support an all-powerful collectivist state as
the source of good, and to think the good
person is one whose individual will is submerged or sublimated in the general will
of all in ever increasing areas of life. If
obeying the collectivist will in order to subject one’s own evil self-interests to the interests of others is the means of becoming
virtuous and good, then obeying the teachings of those who claim that obeying God’s
will is the essence of goodness becomes an
evil, vile teaching, as Marx and others have
concluded. Both freedom and goodness are
then defined as subjection to the dictatorship of the universal will of an abstracted
humanity or the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Dickinson’s philosophy starts from the
exact opposite pole, that it is God’s will that
men, by obeying His commandments in order to be good themselves, produce a social
state in which there is a possible harmony
between individual and public good, between the interests of the individual which
overlap with the common interests. The
power of the government is limited to those
matters which are the common concern of
all so that their promotion by the public
force corresponds with the interests of the
individual. For Dickinson, civic virtue
means obeying the decisions of a government only when they are concerned with
the interests of all and promote the summation of individual interests or the common,
general interest. Dickinson says that only
if each state is consulted and thinks that its
interests are promoted by the general government, will a federal system of government work well in America. A governmental system to be good and free is based upon the common interests of its units. Recognizing that these units will also have some
interests that are not general, it is good to
have separately organized governments to
take care of the individual, selfish interests
of the confederated states. Thus Dickinson
urged his fellow citizens to support the proposed federal system. And one wonders today what Dickinson would have thought
about ever accelerating efforts to change
our federal system into either a unitary national democracy or a separate series of
communal entities unconnected by any general gorcrnmental organization.
‘cf. John €I. Powell, ed., “John Dickinson’s
Speech Against Independence,” The Pennsylvania
Magazine of History and Biography, 65 ( 19411,
468-481; John H. Powell, “John Dickinson As
President of Pennsylvania,” Pennsylvania History,
23( 1961), 254-267; H. Trevor Colbourn, “A Pennsylvania Farmer At The Court of King George:
John Dickinson’s London JAtters, 1754-1756,”
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography,
86 (1962), 241-286. Also, Thomas R. Adams,
American Independence-The
Growth of An
Idea: A Bibliographical Study of The American
Political Pamphlets Printed Between 1764 and
I776 (Brown University Press, 1965) ; Louis
Hartz, The Liberal Tradition In America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since
396
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The Revolution (New York, New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World, Inc., 1955); and Clinton Rossiter, Seedtime of T h e Republic: The Origin of
The American Tradition o f Political Liberty (New
York, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953).
‘John Dickinson, “Letters of Fabius on the
Federal Constitution” Paul Leicester Ford, ed.,
Pamphlets O n The Constitution Of The United
States, Published During Its Discussion B y The
People 1787-1788 (Brookland, New York, 1888),
pp. 165-216; John Dickinson, “The Letters of
Fabius Concerning Remarks On The Present
Situation Of Public Affairs,” The Political Vritings Of T h e Late John Dickinson, Esq. Formerly
President of the State of Delaware and of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Vol., I1 (Wilmington, Delaware: Miller Dunoit, 1814).
‘Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents I n
American Thought: T h e Colonial Mind (New
York, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company,
1927), pp. 224-237.
‘Charles J. Stille, The Life and Times of John
Dickinson, 1732-1808: Life and Writings of John
Dickinson, Val. XI11 (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania:
Publications of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1891).
‘David L. Jacobson, John Dickinson and T h e
Revolution I n Pennsylvania, 1764-1776 (Berkeley,
California: University of California Publications
in History, University of California Press, 1965),
p. 125. “He was not greatly concerned with questions of social order, nor did he share a conservative phobia of social upheaval. He thought of
political life as a process of give and take and of
continuing change.”
‘David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution of
American Conservatism: The Federalist Party I n
The Era of Jeffersonian Democracy (New York,
New York: Harper and Row, 1965) ; Norman K.
Risjord, The Old Republicans: Southern Conservatism I n The Age o f Jefferson (New York:
Great Seal Books, Cornell University Press,
1965); and cf. Leonard Woods Larahee, Conservatism I n Early American History (Ithaca, New
York: Great Seal Books, Cornell University
Press, 1948) .
‘Robert L. Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution
I n Pennsylvania 1776-1790 (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of PulAie
Instruction, 1942).
‘M. Susan Power, “John Dickinson : Freedom,
Protest and Change,” Susquehanna Studies,
(1972).
‘Remarks On A Pamphlet Entitled Plain
Truth By Rusticus, 1776, pp. 8, 6, 15. In this
pamphlet Dickinson urges opposition to the
British and defends himself against charges he
was a “Loyalist.”
”John Dickinson, “Letters of Fabius on the
Federal Constitution,” Paul Leicester Ford, ed.,
Pamphlets O n The Constitution Of The United
States, Published During Its Discussion B y The
People 1787-1788 (Brookland, New York, 18881,
p. 168.
”lbid., p. 172.
”Ibid., pp. 174, 200.
l31bid., pp. 184, 185, 186, 187, 188.
l4ibid., p. 175.
“Ibid., p. 176.
l41bid., p. 177.
”Ibid., p. 179.
7 b i d . , p. 179.
”Ibid., p. 178.
Sbid., p. 179.
nIbid., pp. 180, 181, 182. Please note that
Dickinson makes a distinction between separation
of powers and division of power. Whereas separation of powers refers to distribution of qualitatively different governmental functions between
branches of the same governmental unit, division
of power indicates the diffusion and distribution
of power among different governmental levels. I t
is my contention that whereas separation of powers may not be a necessary attribute of federalism, division of power is such.
=Ibid., p. 183.
29bid., p. 185.
“Ibid., p. 186.
=Ibid., p. 211.
=lbid., pp. 201, 202.
nIbid., p. 205. c f Alexander Hamilton, John
Jay, James Madison, The Federalist: A Commen-
tary on the Constitution of the United States
(New York, New York: The Modem Library,
Random House, 1937) and Baron De Montesquieu,
T h e Spirit of the Laws, trans. by Thomas Nugent
(New York, New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1949).
“Ibid., pp. 205-206.
9bid., p. 206.
S”lbid., p. 205.
“lbid., p. 208.
”Ibid., p. 213.
“Ibid., pp. 211, 215.
“John Dickinson, “The Letters of Fabius
Concerning Remarks On The Present Situation
Of Public Affairs,” The Political Writings Of The
Late John Dickinson, Esq. formerly President of
the State of Delaware and of the Commonwealth
Pennsylvania, Vol., I1 (Wilmington, Delaware:
Miller Dunoit, 18141, pp. 146, 174, 180, 191-200.
By 1803 Dickinson had changed his mind about
France. In An Address On The Past, Present,
And Eventual Relations Of The United States To
France, he reversed his position and advocated
of
a n alliance with Great Britain against the French.
Sbid., pp. 244, 248.
9bid., pp. 243-252.
“lbid., pp. 243-252.
=Ibid., p. 252.
?bid.
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