INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
IDE Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated
to stimulate discussions and critical comments
IDE DISCUSSION PAPER No. 394
A Note on Ethnic Return Migration
Policy in Kazakhstan: Changing
Priorities and a Growing Dilemma
Natsuko OKA*
March 2013
Abstract
This paper offers a brief analysis of the legal aspects of the ethnic return
migration policy of Kazakhstan, a post-Soviet Central Asian state that has been
active in seeking ties with its diaspora since independence. This paper examines the
definition of oralman (repatriates) and the establishment of a quota on the number of
Kazakh immigrants who are eligible for government funds to show how the rationale
and preferences in repatriation policy have changed over the years. By focusing on
changes in migration-related legislation in the late 2000s and early 2010s, the paper
notes that two key goals of Kazakhstan’s migration policy are not necessarily
consistent with each other: the promotion of an ethnically based nation-building
project by encouraging the “return” of co-ethnics living abroad, and building a
workforce that is best suited for the development of the state’s economy.
Keywords: ethnic return migration, migration law, quota system, Kazakhstan
* Area Studies Center, IDE ([email protected])
The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) is a semigovernmental,
nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute, founded in 1958. The Institute
merged with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) on July 1, 1998.
The Institute conducts basic and comprehensive studies on economic and
related affairs in all developing countries and regions, including Asia, the
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does
not imply endorsement by the Institute of Developing Economies of any of the views
expressed within.
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (IDE), JETRO
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©2013 by Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO
No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the
IDE-JETRO.
The end of the Cold War and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union brought
both the reunion and division of ethnic communities residing within and beyond the
borders of the Soviet state. On the one hand, ethnic groups within the Soviet territory
came into long-awaited contact with their co-ethnics abroad, from whom they had been
separated for decades. On the other, the borders between nominally sovereign Soviet
republics turned into international borders, and persons who were not living in “their
own” ethno-national republic suddenly found themselves on the “wrong” side of the
border.
Kazakhstan is one of a few post-Soviet republics that have been keen to seek
contact with its diaspora. Since the last years of the Soviet era when “repatriation” of
ethnic Kazakhs began, according to official statistics, more than 860,000 Kazakhs have
moved to Kazakhstan, mostly from neighboring states such as Uzbekistan, Mongolia,
China, and Turkmenistan. 1 With a total population of 16 million and 10.1 million
Kazakhs in Kazakhstan (the 2009 national census), these “repatriates” (oralman) form
an essential part of contemporary Kazakhstani society and the Kazakh community in
particular.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan’s political elites sought to build a
state truly of and for the titular ethnicity by urging Kazakhs abroad to “come back home”
and granting them full citizenship of the newly independent state. The aim of this policy
was to overcome negative legacies created under the Soviet regime, namely: the
minority status of the Kazakhs in Kazakhstan and the linguistic as well as cultural
russification (though in some aspects, it may be more precise to say sovietization)
among the Kazakhs themselves. The “homecoming” of Kazakhs from abroad was
expected to contribute to the growth of the Kazakh population, which had declined
sharply in the 1930s because of death and out-migration caused by forced
sedentarization, mass collectivization, and famine. It was also hoped that the oralman
would promote a revival of the Kazakh language and culture, as the Kazakhs in the
diaspora, in particular those in the “far abroad,” were not affected by the strong trend
toward russification and thus were in a relatively better position to maintain their
ethno-cultural characteristics.
In independent Kazakhstan, the relevancy of the migration policy encouraging the
return of Kazakhs to their ethnic homeland has rarely been questioned. The inclusion of
foreign or stateless ethnic Kazakhs into Kazakhstani society was placed as part and
According to a report by the Commission on Human Rights under the President of the
Republic of Kazakhstan (2012), 860,400 Kazakh individuals, or 221,300 households,
immigrated to Kazakhstan from 1991 until October 1, 2011. Of this amount, 127,700
households (57.7% of total) were provided assistance under the quota.
1
1
parcel of the state’s nation-building project, and thus was politically justified. Also,
unlike in the cases of other states that have promoted the homecoming of the diaspora,
repatriating Kazakhs from abroad are not necessarily viewed as having lost their ethnic
purity. Indeed, it is the local Kazakhs, many of whom are linguistically and culturally
russified to varying degrees, who are considered by repatriates as having lost contact
with their ethnic and cultural past.
Nevertheless, social integration of Kazakh immigrants is indeed a serious challenge
for Kazakhstan. While some managed to adapt to the local community and successfully
started new careers, a majority of them have faced serious problems in areas such as
housing, employment, and education of children. Despite publicly expressed—and
politically correct—support for the solidarity of the Kazakh nation, local people do not
necessarily welcome their co-ethnics at any cost. A recent analysis of public discourse on
the issue of Kazakh return migration shows that the open-arm welcome and initial
excitement toward returning Kazakhs have been replaced by warnings that repatriates
should not expect too much from the state. Increasingly, Kazakh elites now emphasize
that repatriates should contribute to the homeland instead of becoming a burden
(Bonnenfant 2012).
This paper is a brief analysis of the legal aspects of the repatriation policy of the
Republic of Kazakhstan. In particular, it examines the definition of oralman
(repatriates) and the establishment of quotas on the number of Kazakh immigrants who
are eligible for government funds to show how the rationale and preferences in return
migration policy have changed over the years. By focusing on changes in migration
related legislation in the late 2000s and the early 2010s, the paper notes the dilemma of
pursuing purposes that are not necessarily consistent with each other: promotion of an
ethnically based nation-building project that encourages the return of co-ethnics living
abroad and building a workforce that is best suited for the development of state’s
economy.
Who are to be invited to “home”?
According to Tsuda (2009), more than 20 countries sponsor ethnic return migration in
the world, with the specific reasons and purposes behind such policy differing by region.
Broadly speaking, ethnic preferences in immigration policy and citizenship law in
European countries and Israel are based on the idea that state has responsibility for or
obligation to their co-ethnics abroad, who are considered as an integral part of the
de-territorialized ethnic nation. As such, members of diaspora are essentially granted
the right to return to their homeland. In contrast, in East and Southeast Asian
2
countries (including Japan) members of the diaspora are expected, first and foremost, to
make an economic contribution to their homeland by providing labor, professional skills,
or investment. This difference is reflected in the legal status of immigrants: while most
European states and Israel grant co-ethnic immigrants citizenship upon return, or
allow them to recover the citizenship of ethnic homeland and become dual nationals,
Asian states usually limit the mode of immigration to preferential visas for the ethnic
brethren.
Kazakhstan’s migration and citizenship policies are based on its self-definition as
the one and only ethnic center for Kazakhs in the world. The policies also seek to restore
historical justice for those who were forced to leave homeland under “colonial” rule and
their descendants. Kazakhstan’s state-sponsored repatriation program most resembles
the prototypical ethnic return migration policies of Israel. Both Kazakhstan and Israel
accept co-ethnics solely on the basis of ethnicity without setting other conditions such as
language proficiency or country of residence. As stated below, however, in recent years
more emphasis has begun to be placed on the possible economic contribution by Kazakh
immigrants to homeland rather than the state’s obligation toward them.
Next we outline the changes in the definition of the target of ethnic return
migration in the official documents. 2 The 1993 Constitution, the first adopted in
independent Kazakhstan, allowed “all citizens of the republic who were forced to leave
its territory, and all Kazakhs residing in other countries” to obtain Kazakhstan’s
citizenship without relinquishing one’s current passport (Article 4). The 1995
Constitution, however, denied dual citizenship without exception. Meanwhile, the 1992
Migration Law conferred the rights of return to all “compatriots” (sootechestvenniki)
residing abroad (Article 1). In this context, the term “compatriots” appears to apply to
all of former citizens of Kazakhstan, including persons of non-Kazakh ethnicities. 3
Despite the formal bestowal of rights to repatriation on former citizens of
Kazakhstan irrespective of ethnicity, these policies seem to have had little impact on
non-Kazakhs. With massive out-migration from Kazakhstan in the 1990s, primarily of
ethnic Russians and Germans, it was generally presumed that those who would return
to Kazakhstan were Kazakhs. Thus, it is no surprise that the law was soon amended to
specify that the ethnic background of returning immigrants must be Kazakh. Article 1
For a more detailed analysis of documents related to Kazakhstan’s ethnic return
migration policy, see Oka (2010).
3 Article 17.3 of the 1992 Migration Law defines “refugees-repatriates”
(bezhentsy-repatrianty) as compatriots and (emphasis is mine) “persons of native
nationality” (litsa korennoi natsional’nosti, i.e. Kazakhs) who left Kazakhstan because
of mass repressions and other reasons, and come back to their homeland. This wording
suggests that “compatriots” here includes both Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs.
2
3
of the 1997 Migration Law stated that a repatriate (repatriant in Russian, oralman in
Kazakh) is “a person of native ethnicity (litso korennoi natsional'nosti) who was
expelled from the historic homeland, deprived of citizenship due to the acts of mass
political repressions, unlawful requisition, forced collectivization, and other inhumane
acts, and voluntarily moves to the Republic of Kazakhstan for permanent residency, and
his descendants.”
The Migration Law Amendment of March 27, 2002, redefined the term oralman 4 as
“foreign or stateless citizens of Kazakh ethnicity, who permanently resided outside of
the Republic of Kazakhstan when it obtained sovereignty, and have arrived in
Kazakhstan for permanent residency.” Thus, the amended definition does not take into
account whether an immigrant had lived in Kazakhstan in the past. We should note,
however, that the change in the definition of oralman in the 2002 amendment did not
affect migration trends, as the amendment did not so much change the migration policy
itself as conform the law to actual practices. Even before 2002, Kazakh “repatriates”
immigrating to Kazakhstan were not asked whether they or their ancestors had been
deported from Kazakhstan. 5
Not all ethnic Kazakhs currently residing beyond the borders of the contemporary
territory of Kazakhstan are former refugees (or their descendants) who fled homeland
to avoid political turmoil, repression, and famine under the Tsarist or Soviet regime.
There are also Kazakhs who had lived on their land outside of the current borders of
Kazakhstan for generations, long before Soviet times. If the government had limited the
right to “return” to only those who had had lived in Kazakhstan (if technically possible
at all), a substantial number of ethnic Kazakhs abroad would have been denied such
opportunity.
The 2011 Migration Law stipulates that the ethnic affiliation of a claimant for the
status of oralman is determined by the information in the person’s identification
4 Oralman means a repatriate in Kazakh. By this amendment, repatriant (repatriate in
Russian) was replaced by oralman in the Russian text of the law.
The 2011 Migration Law made the definition of oralman more rigorous. Article 1.13
stipulates that an oralman is an ethnic Kazakh who permanently resided outside of the
Republic of Kazakhstan when it obtained sovereignty as well as his children of Kazakh
ethnicity who were born after the acquisition of the sovereignty by the republic, have
moved to Kazakhstan for permanent residency, and obtained the status of oralman by
the procedures established by law. “Ethnic Kazakhs” is defined by Article 1.28 as foreign
or stateless citizens of Kazakh ethnicity permanently residing abroad.
5 Commenting on this point, Bolat Tatibekov, an expert on migration issues in
Kazakhstan, explained that it was practically impossible to check whether an
immigrant (or his/her ancestors) had been forced to leave Kazakhstan in the past
(interview, March 8, 2009).
4
document (Article 20.2 and Article 21.2). Judging from this provision alone, in order to
become an oralman, a candidate must present an official document that certifies that
the person is Kazakh. 6 In the case of Israel, a well-known example of ethnic return
migration, one is entitled to citizenship of the ancestral homeland if one of the
grandparents is Jewish. This principle contributed to the diversification of the ethnic
background of repatriates, which, in turn, raised the question in the local population,
“Are they really our co-ethnics?” In Kazakhstan, there are reports that some
non-Kazakh immigrants procured a certificate of oralman by presenting fabricated or
illegally obtained documents. These unlawful cases aside, the “authenticity” of the
ethnic background of Kazakh immigrants is rarely questioned.
The quota system
Kazakhstan in principle receives all Kazakhs who wish to move to their historical
homeland, without setting a limit of the maximum number of acceptable immigrants.
The government should, according to migration law and other related legal documents,
provide citizenship and a variety of assistance to all Kazakh repatriates. In addition, a
quota is set each year on the number of households entitled to financial benefits such as
compensation for travel costs, financial assistance for obtaining housing, and one-time
cash assistance.
When the quota for Kazakh immigrants was introduced in 1993, 10,000 households
were allocated funds for adaptation by the young state, which was struggling with
severe economic crisis itself at that time. However, such a level of assistance could not
be sustained and the government began to decrease the number of households eligible
for assistance within the framework of the quota system to as low as 500 households in
1999 and 2000. Afterward, likely because of the remarkable economic development of
Kazakhstan, the quota was raised and has varied between 10,000 and 20,000 since 2004
(Diener 2009: 227).
If the quantity of the quota has continuously fluctuated since its introduction, a
qualitative transformation was brought by the amendment to the Migration Law as of
July 6, 2007, which stipulated that inclusion of Kazakh families into the quota system
In migration laws prior to 2011, no description was included that specified the
procedures to determine ethnic background of repatriates. In my interviews with
migration committee officials in Almaty (in October 2008) and Pavlodar and Shymkent
(in December 2007), they testified that the ethnic affiliation of immigrants from the
former Soviet republics and China was determined using the record of ethnicity in the
identification documents issued by these countries. In other cases, the Embassy of
Kazakhstan in each country checked ethnicity using a birth certificate or other
documents.
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was to be decided by “taking into account criteria” (s uchetom kriteriev) (Article 14.2).
The 2007 amendment, however, did not specify the content of these criteria. Since 2008
preferences in the quota system have been given to those with higher education and
families having many children.
Furthermore, in December 2008 the government adopted the Nurly Kosh (Bright
Move) Program with the aim of properly situating immigrants (as well as internal
migrants) in Kazakhstan and to address their problems in the spheres of employment
and housing. It is worth pointing out that the program was targeted at not only ethnic
Kazakhs but also former citizens of Kazakhstan, irrespective of ethnicity, who had left
the country in the past and returned for the purpose of “carrying out working activities”
(Section 1). These former citizens, together with Kazakh immigrants, are entitled to
Kazakhstani citizenship (Section 5.3.2). By implementing this program, it was expected
that the highly skilled workers who had previously left Kazakhstan would be
encouraged to come back (Section 1). Also, all participants in the program were required
to meet certain educational, qualification, and work criteria (Section 5.4).
The trend toward placing greater importance on the skills of immigrants is clearly
revealed in the Migration Law enacted in July 2011. This new migration law stipulates
that the following categories of people are to be given preference in the quota for
financial assistance for Kazakh immigrants (in descending order): (1) those with proper
education, qualifications and experiences in a certain area of expertise; (2) families with
many children; (3) adult youth who are able to study in institutions of higher education;
and (4) immigrants from countries under unstable political, social, and economic
conditions (Article 20.4). While categories of (2) and (4) are based on humanitarian
grounds, the emphasis on professional skills (and the potential to learn such skills)
suggest that 2011 Migration Law as a whole follows recent trends that attach more
importance to the economic value of immigrants than to their ethnicity.
The factors behind these changes are the diminished significance of the struggle for
ethno-demographic superiority of Kazakhs and the growing demand for workers in
Kazakhstan’s thriving economy. At the time of independence, the reestablishment of
majority status of the core ethnicity was an important political agenda. However,
large-scale out-migration of non-Kazakhs, primarily Russians and Germans, in the
1990s brought victory for Kazakhs in the demographic competition by default. Also, the
higher birthrate among Kazakhs than among Slavic communities means that
demographic superiority of the former is almost guaranteed. Now, economic factors are
more relevant than political ones in Kazakhstan’s migration policy: the government
emphasizes the necessity of attracting highly skilled workers who are suited for its
6
industrial development policy. 7
As mentioned above, Kazakhstan’s migration policy resembles that of Israel as both
states set a criterion for repatriates only on the basis of their ethnic background without
linguistic or geographic conditions. In the early years of independence, Kazakhstan, as
Israel did and continues to do so, sought to make use of its co-ethnics abroad as a
demographic tool to increase the share of the core ethnicity. For Israel, constitutionally
defined as a Jewish state, but with a growing Arab minority and surrounded by hostile
Arab states, the maintenance and increase of the Jewish population is a critical security
issue. Israel’s policies have not changed after the Cold War, even when religiously and
culturally diverse immigrants of Jewish decent came en masse and calls for the revision
of migration policy mounted. 8
In the meantime, the importance of demographic politics continues to diminish in
Kazakhstan. The share of Kazakhs as a percentage of the total population of the
republic (63.1% according to the 2009 national census) still falls below that of the
Jewish population in Israel (75.6% according to the 2008 national census). 9 However,
Kazakhstan has managed to co-exist with neighboring states in peace, if not without
conflict. With minority elites in Kazakhstan having been suppressed or put under
control, there is little risk that they would serve foreign states as a “fifth column.” Thus,
for Kazakhstan it is no longer necessary to give highest priority to the repatriation of
co-ethnics as in the case of Israel.
Revision of ethnic return migration policy after the Zhanaozen incident
In April 2012, the Kazakhstan government decided to suspend the allocation of the
quota for 2012 “until further order of the government.” 10 Although this does not
necessarily mean the complete abolition of the quota system, there has been no move to
resume the allocation of the quota as of the end of 2012. Commenting on the necessity of
a new program targeted at Kazakh immigrants, Internal Affairs Minister
Kalmukhanbet Kasymov stated that the government had lost track of immigrants
Low-skilled and unskilled jobs are increasingly fulfilled by migrant workers from
neighboring Central Asian states, a majority of whom often work illegally in
Kazakhstan because the procedure for obtaining a work permit is too complex, and also
there are many ways to stay and work informally, evading the strict legal provisions
(Dave: forthcoming).
8 For more on the migration policy of Israel, see, for example, Joppke and Rosenhek
(2009).
9 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics [http://www1.cbs.gov.il/census/].
10 “V Kazakhstane priostanovlena kvota na immigratsiiu oralmanov,”
[http://tengrinews.kz], April 23, 2012.
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7
under the current scheme and implied that controls on them must be strengthened.11
Indeed, cases of misuse of privileges intended for Kazakh immigrants who seek
permanent residency in Kazakhstan have been reported. A typical pattern is that an
immigrant acquires a Kazakhstani passport, receives government funds, and then
returns to a previous country of residence. This problem, however, had been pointed out
long before 2012.
The decision to suspend the quota in 2012 appears to be related to a different
factor—the tragic incident in Zhanaozen, a small city in the Mangistau oblast in oil-rich
western Kazakhstan. On December 16, 2011, Kazakhstan’s Independence Day, clashes
broke out between striking oil workers, police, and possibly others in the central square
of the city, where official ceremonies were organized to commemorate Kazakhstan’s 20
years of independence. Official reports state that civilians were fired on by local police
and outside security personnel: 12 people were killed, with dozens more wounded, and
three other people died in related violence. For several months prior to the tragedy,
thousands of workers employed in oil and gas sector demanded higher wages and
improved working conditions in three separate labor strikes against their employers.
Without trying to resolve the disputes effectively, the oil companies dismissed hundreds
of their employees who participated in the strikes, which only aggravated the
grievances of the workers (Human Rights Watch 2012).
The alleged relationship between this incident and Kazakh immigrants was most
explicitly indicated by Timur Kulibaev, then the Chairman of the Board of the National
Welfare Fund Samruk Kazyna which is the sole owner of the state oil and gas company
KazMunaiGas, an important shareholder of two of the three companies affected by
labor disputes. In September 2011, Kulibaev publicly stated that these strikes were
plotted by oralman from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The oil workers who
participated in the strikes in turn accused Kulibaev of defaming their dignity, while
Kazakh nationalists attacked him for oralman-phobia.12 It is possible that there were
some immigrants among the strikers, but Kulibaev’s statement was a clear
exaggeration of their role in the labor disputes. However, Kulibaev was perhaps not
completely wrong in saying that the government should limit immigration to Zhanaozen
as the social infrastructure of the town was not suited to accept a large number of
people. Indeed, the influx of immigrants appears to have been a serious burden for the
local authorities. According to official statistics, every fifth resident of Mangistau oblast
“Novuiu programmu po pereseleniiu oralmanov razrabatyvaet MVD Kazakhstana –
Kasymov,” [http://www.zakon.kz], April 25, 2012.
12 “Timur Kulibaev nazval zabastovku neftianikov proiskami repatriantov,”
[http://rus.azattyq.org], September 30, 2011.
11
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is a Kazakh immigrant, which is the highest share of all regions in the republic. 13
On December 20, 2011, First Vice Prime Minister Umirzak Shukeev, who headed a
government commission on the investigation of the incident, declared that no more
immigrants would be settled in Zhanaozen, and referred to the possibility of moving
those who had lived in the town to other areas of the republic. 14 The subsequent
reduction in the quota also appears to have been affected by the unrest in Zhanaozen: a
resolution of December 22, 2011, cut the quota in half to 10,000 households for 2012;
whereas from 2009 to 2011 the quota had previously been set at 20,000. 15 As stated
above, the allocation of the quota was completely suspended four months later.
The measures taken by the government of Kazakhstan after the Zhanaozen tragedy
revealed that it failed to create an effective scheme for utilizing labor and satisfying the
needs of Kazakh immigrants, who were officially invited to come to their homeland.
Needless to say, it is not only immigrants in Kazakhstan who face a variety of social and
economic difficulties such as unemployment. In addition, the problems confronted by
immigrants vary, depending on their professional skills, educational background,
knowledge of the Russian or Kazakh language, kinship network, personal connections,
the time of arrival, and other factors. In general, however, it is perhaps fair to say that,
compared with the local population, immigrants generally encounter more difficulties.
Kazakhstan has been promoting repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs under the slogan
that it is the obligation of the state to grant its co-ethnics the right to return to their
historical homeland. Yet at the same time, by failing to provide enough support for
immigrants and making them feel abandoned by their homeland, the Kazakh
government in fact continues to create people who are not necessarily loyal but rather
disappointed with and critical of the government. On the other hand, the complete
abandonment of the long-standing ethnic return migration policy would put the ruling
elites in a difficult position, as such a change would mean that the state had moved
away from its self-definition as an ethnic center for Kazakhs, which, in turn, would
inevitably invite severe criticism from Kazakh nationalists and immigrants.
Mangistau oblast is now home to the third largest population of Kazakh immigrants
after South Kazakhstan oblast and Almaty oblast. If we assume that all of the
immigrants (107,500 persons) have settled in Mangistau oblast, their share amounts
to 20.1% out of the whole oblast population. See Commission on Human Rights under
the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2012).
14 “Programmu po rasseleniiu oralmanov v Zhanaozen sleduet ostanovit, schitaet
Shukeev,” [http://www.zonakz.net], December 20, 2011.
15 “V Kazakhstane priostanovlena kvota na immigratsiiu oralmanov,”
[http://tengrinews.kz], April 23, 2012. This article says that the quota set in December
2012 was meant for the years 2011-14, but it appears that it was for 2012-14.
13
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A dilemma of ethnic migration policy
Immigrants of Kazakh descent were expected to become politically and culturally ideal
citizens of their ancestral homeland following Soviet rule. In practice, however,
integration of Kazakh immigrants into the local community has not been easy, and their
repatriation has created new divisions and exacerbated social problems in Kazakhstani
society.
Migration policy that encourages the return of co-ethnics, in particular, policies
that provides citizenship and financial assistance to make repatriates a full-fledged
member of the state (the Europe-Israel model noted above), typically encounter the
following challenges from the receiving community. First, the local population often
considers these immigrants as the “other” and “not authentic” co-ethnics, as those who
have lived under the influence of different cultures for generations naturally adopt the
dominant language and culture of the receiving community. Second, local residents tend
to complain that they are treated unfairly in relation to immigrants, as the latter are
allocated government funds for their needs. In the eyes of the locals, immigrants enjoy
too many privileges that are not available to local taxpayers, and this feeling of
unfairness is further strengthened by the belief that immigrants share ethnicity in
name only. The third criticism comes from the point of view of minorities, non-co-ethnic
immigrants, and civil liberty advocates who argue that the state should guarantee
equal rights to all people irrespective of ethnicity, and thus should not privilege
co-ethnic immigrants at the expense of others.16
The complexity of the issue of cultural assimilation in Kazakhstan lies in the fact
that both the Kazakh diaspora in foreign lands and also Kazakhs in their homeland
during the 70 years of Soviet rule experienced linguistic and cultural transformation.
For some Kazakhs, primarily in urban areas, Russian became their first language as
they received education almost exclusively in Russian. This shift led to a linguistic and
cultural cleavage between Russian-speaking and Kazakh-speaking Kazakhs (Dave
2007).17 For the former, co-ethnic immigrants, in particular those from outside of the
former Soviet Union, are the cultural “other,” and it is not easy to accept them as “us” on
In their comparative analysis of the cases of Israel and Germany, Joppke and
Rosenhek (2009) categorized the first and second arguments as a “restrictive challenge”
and the third as a “liberal challenge.”
17 Needless to say, the Kazakh population cannot simply be divided into
Kazakh-speaking and Russian-speaking. Many Kazakhs speak both languages, and the
difference of individual language proficiency is great. Also, language proficiency does
not necessarily correlate with ethnic identity: a Russian-speaking Kazakh may be an
eager advocate of the Kazakh language and culture.
16
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the ground of the shared ancestry. However, in the eyes of immigrants, even the rural
Kazakh-speaking brethren are quite russified as they still cherish classic Soviet values
such as “the friendship of peoples” and the “approach to the civilized world through the
Russian language” (Sancak 2007). After encounters with such co-ethnics in their
ancestral homeland, immigrants often boast that it is they who managed to sustain
“genuine” Kazakhnesss (Diener 2009: 272-286). Such self-identification by immigrants,
in turn, serves as a factor that alienates repatriates from the locals.
In addition to the conflict over Kazakhness, the sense of unfairness in the local
population as to the allocation of government funds for repatriation also draws
antipathy toward Kazakh immigrants. With the backdrop of the growing gap between
the rich and the poor, the opinion that the interests of locals should be given preference
over those of immigrants may continue to grow in the future. The amount of financial
assistance to repatriates in Kazakhstan is rather modest in comparison with those
given by the governments of Germany and Israel. Nevertheless, many locals feel that it
is not fair that those who just arrived enjoy privileges not available for the local
population who, they argue, remained in Kazakhstan even in difficult times and have
contributed to the motherland for generations.
Discontent
with
the
state-sponsored
ethnic
return
migration
project
notwithstanding, public protest against this policy has rarely occurred in Kazakhstan to
date. This is because the invitation of co-ethnics from abroad was authorized within the
framework of a decolonization project aimed at redressing the wrongs of the past and at
reviving the Kazakh nation. Also, in the course of Kazakh-oriented state building
process, non-Kazakh minorities in Kazakhstan rarely objected to the repatriation policy
of the state. In the early 1990s there was strong criticism against the allowance of dual
citizenship for Kazakh immigrants, but this criticism focused not on the return
migration of Kazakhs per se, but on the fact that only ethnic Kazakhs were allowed to
hold two passports (this dispute ended when the 1995 Constitution banned dual
citizenship). Indeed, many minorities themselves left Kazakhstan for their ancestral
homeland, if such opportunities were available.
The absence of political forces against repatriation provides the ideal condition for
its continuation and promotion. However, the invitation of ethnic Kazakhs from abroad
lost its priority in the political agenda after the majority status of the titular ethnicity in
Kazakhstan was regained. In recent years, the assistance to immigrants has become a
social and economic burden to the government. It is unlikely, however, that the
Kazakhstan government will completely abandon its ethnic return migration policy.
Having defined itself as the state for all Kazakhs of the world, Kazakhstan has entitled
11
co-ethnics with the right of return to their ancestral homeland to become full-fledged
citizens. If the government declares that the state cannot accept ethnic brethren any
more, such a decision will surely invite severe criticism from Kazakh nationalists as
well as immigrants, who will readily cast the ruling elites as traitors to the Kazakh
nation. On the other hand, instability in the society will only grow worse if new
immigrants continue to arrive while the integration of those who already have settled
barely proceeds, and their social problems remain unsolved. Kazakhstan finds itself
caught in a dilemma: because of its ethnic roots and de-colonization agenda, Kazakh
repatriation policy cannot be easily abandoned even if it creates more problems than
benefits.
References
Bonnenfant, Isik Kuscu 2012. “Constructing the Homeland: Kazakhstan’s Discourse
and Policies Surrounding Its Ethnic Return-Migration Policy.” Central Asian
Survey 31(1): 31-44.
Commission on Human Rights under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2012.
“Special Report on the Situation concerning the Rights of Oralmans, Stateless
Persons and Refugees in the Republic of Kazakhstan.” Astana.
[http://unhcr.kz/uploads/Special%20report_English_June%202012.pdf]
Dave, Bhavna 2007. Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language and Power. London: Routledge.
―Forthcoming. “Informal Practices and Corruption in Regulation of Labour
Migration in Kazakhstan.” Interim Report for “Exploring Informal Networks in
Kazakhstan: A Multidimensional Approach” (IDE-JETRO Research Project for
2012-14).
Diener, Alexander C. 2009. One Homeland or Two?: The Nationalization and
Transnationalization of Mongolia’s Kazakhs. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Human Rights Watch 2012. Striking Oil, Striking Workers: Violations of Labor Rights
in Kazakhstan’s Oil Sector. [http://www.hrw.org]
Joppke, Christian and Zeev Rosenhek 2009. “Contesting Ethnic Immigration:
Germany and Israel Compared.” In Diasporic Homecomings: Ethnic Return
Migration in Comparative Perspective. ed. Takayuki Tsuda. 73-99. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Oka, Natsuko 2010. “Douhou no ‘kikan’: kazafusutan ni okeru zaigai kazafu jin yobiyose
seisaku” [The ‘Return’ of Co-ethnics: Kazakhstan’s Migration Policy toward Ethnic
Kazakhs Abroad]. Ajia Keizai 51(6): 2-23 (In Japanese).
12
Sancak, Meltem 2007. “Contested Identity: Encounters with Kazak Diaspora Returning
to Kazakstan.” Anthropology of East Europe Review 25 (1): 85-94.
Tsuda, Takeyuki ed. 2009. Diasporic Homecomings: Ethnic Return Migration in
Comparative Perspective. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
13
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296
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289
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287
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286
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285
Ikuo KUROWA, Kaoru
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TANAKA
284
Hitoshi SUZUKI
283
Kozo KUNIMUNE
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Michikazu KOJIMA
Kazunobu HAYAKAWA, Fukunari
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KIMURA, and Hyun-Hoon LEE
290
282
281
Innovation Networks among China, Japan, and Korea: Evidence from
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Preliminary Discussions on the Urbanization of Rural Areas in
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A Model of Economic Growth with Saturating Demand
2011
2011
2011
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2011
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2011
2011
2011
2011
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2011
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2011
No.
280
279
278
277
276
275
274
Author(s)
Kazunobu HAYAKAWA and
Nobuaki YAMASHITA
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Yoko ASUYAMA
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Yoko ASUYAMA
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Colin WEBB
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Kazunobu HAYAKAWA
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Myopic or farsighted:
Kenmei TSUBOTA,
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Yujiro KAWASAKI
symmetric countries
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011