#11
2004
ISSN 1715-0094
Streich, G. (2004). Review of America´s Forgotten Majority: Why the White Working Class Still
Matters. Workplace, 11, 231-237.
GREGORY W. STREICH
REVIEW OF AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN MAJORITY: WHY THE WHITE
WORKING CLASS STILL MATTERS
By Ruy Teixera and Joel Rogers
Basic Books, 2000
Conventional wisdom about American politics would lead us to believe that Soccer Moms, Wired
Workers, and other segments of independent-minded, economically upscale voters are the most important
voting blocs in contemporary elections. In America's Forgotten Majority: Why the White Working Class
Still Matters, Ruy Teixeira and Joel Rogers take this conventional wisdom, scratch beneath the surface,
and find that it is misleading, incomplete, and often plain wrong. Instead, they find that the white working
class has been—and will continue to be—the most important voting bloc in American national
elections. America's Forgotten Majority is an insightful, accessible, and witty examination of American
politics over the past thirty years. Moreover, the book is as timely now (as we move closer to the election
of 2004) as it was when it was originally written and published with an afterword about the election of
2000.
Why the White Working Class?
2.1 Before they begin their analysis, Teixeira and Rogers answer some questions many readers might ask
themselves upon reading the title. Why focus on white working class voters? Aren't we moving toward a
more racially diverse population, rendering such an analysis obsolete? Even worse, are Teixeira and
Rogers reactionary and racist?
2.2 Their answers to these questions result from a close reading of the socio-demographic makeup of the
American electorate. Teixeira and Rogers are neither reactionary nor racist in intent—they merely argue
that black and Latino voters combined lack sufficient numbers to elect a party dedicated to a universal,
material-based agenda (e.g. guaranteed access to health care; stronger commitment to public education
and making college more affordable; economic security; and retirement security). The authors do support
such an activist agenda, but argue that it will only be realized when black, Latino, and white working class
voters mobilize together on the basis of trans-racial economic issues. Further, while demographically the
U.S. is indeed becoming more diverse, the electorate is and will remain mostly white for the foreseeable
future. Because voter registration and turnout rates for Latinos still lag behind those for white voters,
Teixeira and Rogers point out that the "country is still mostly white (a term that describes almost three231
Workplace: A Journal for Academic Labor
© 2004 Author
AMERICA´S FORGOTTEN MAJORITY
quarters of adults and more than four-fifths of voters) " (x). And finally, despite polls showing that most
Americans consider themselves middle-class, Teixeira and Rogers point out that "over three-quarters of
American adults do not have a four-year college degree, that over seven-tenths do not have a professional
or managerial job, and that the median—typical—income of American households was actually quite
modest (in 1998, about $39,000)" (x). These figures lead Teixeira and Rogers to argue that the white
working class, since it comprises 55% of the American electorate, is and will continue to be the most
important voting bloc for most of the twenty-first century.
A New Kind of Working Class
3.1 In describing where the new white working class—i.e. the "forgotten majority"—came from, Chapter
1 presents an excellent overview of the U.S. economy over the past 50 years. Teixeira and Rogers
highlight how the working class in the 1950s-1960s enjoyed consistent growth in real wages and family
incomes, but from 1973 to the present, that same group has seen their earnings stagnate. Their analysis
also illustrates that only the upper 20% of families have reaped higher incomes in this same post-1973
era. Further, the level of educational achievement is directly correlated to these income and wage
trends. Indeed, Teixeira and Rogers argue that the difference between those with college degrees and those
without constitutes the "Great Divide" of American politics (13). They observe that on "one side of the
Great Divide, lacking a four-year college degree are the vast majority—three quarters—of whites who
have not fared well over the last quarter- century. On the other side are the quarter of white adults who
have a four year degree or more and for whom the last twenty-five years have been a time of substantial
economic progress" (15).
3.2 The "working class" typically conjures up images of blue-collar employees such as steel- or
autoworkers. These categories of labor remain important, but they have been shrinking as a percentage of
all jobs in the U.S., while service sector employment has increased (29). It is here, among service workers
and professional staff positions held by workers with some college or an A.A. degree, that the "new"
working class is located. This forgotten majority may work at service sector jobs very different from the
factory jobs of the Reagan Democrats in the 1980s, but "in economic terms, they are not so different from
the white working class of previous generations" (15, italics in original). Indeed, Teixeira and Rogers
demonstrate that the majority of suburban voters are not the upscale Volvo-driving Soccer Moms we hear
so much about, but Cavalier-driving working moms who are busy trying to make ends meet. The forgotten
majority consists of "two-earner families of low to moderate education and income, generally working in
low-level white-collar, service, and skilled blue-collar jobs. In sum, the white working class remains
numerically dominant, even if its form has changed" (18).
Why Is the Forgotten Majority the "Real" Swing Voting Bloc?
4.1 Before presenting their argument as to why the forgotten majority is the real swing voting bloc,
Teixeira and Rogers first address this question: Did the white working class abandon the Democrats in the
1980s (when "Reagan Democrats" entered our political vocabulary) or did the Democrats abandon the
white working class? One prominent theory suggests that the white working class abandoned the
Democrats, with the help of successful campaign appeals by the Republicans. In short, the Republicans
were able to peel off white working class votes from the Democrats (particularly in the South) by
appealing to their social conservatism (e.g. anti-communism as well as opposition to busing, affirmative
action, abortion rights, welfare, and gun control, just to name a few issues commonly associated with the
term). Beginning with Richard Nixon's 1968 "southern strategy"—which appealed to southern whites on
the basis of law and order—and continuing with Ronald Reagan's specious anecdotes about "welfare
queens," this strategy played to the supposed social conservatism of white working class voters, while
labeling the Democrats as soft on crime, beholden to "special interests," and wedded to tax-and-spend
programs that do not reward hard work and effort. These themes had both overt and covert racial subtexts
(Reagan's "welfare queen" was a black woman, even though at the time more white women were welfare
232
AMERICA´S FORGOTTEN MAJORITY
recipients). Such appeals helped to mobilize white working class resentment against "big government" and
programs such as affirmative action and welfare that appeared to tap into racial backlash and violate the
working class's sense of fair play. Thus, despite their economic interests, white working class men were
splintered off from the Democratic Party; and this strategy both vaulted Reagan into the White House and
helped consign the New Deal Coalition to the dustbin of history. Regarding this theory, Teixeira and
Rogers acknowledge that conventional wisdom holds there is an increasing social conservatism in the
U.S. However, they point to surveys that highlight what they suggest is a long-term trend toward
liberalism on "core values" such as fair play, racial tolerance, and equality before the law (35-37). This
leads them to reject the notion that the white working class, due to increasing social conservatism or racial
backlash, has abandoned the Democrats.
4.2 A second, and related, theory is that the white working class rejected the Democrats in the 1980s
because they embraced the Republican Party's attack on "big government," which signified an underlying
ideological shift towards a philosophical conservatism of limited government. If the American electorate
has indeed increasingly shifted to an ideology of limited government and free markets, then this reading of
history would have us believe the Democrats lost ground because they were seen as defenders of old and
outdated policies of economic regulation and income redistribution. Regarding this theory, Teixeira and
Rogers concede that while some surveys show an increasing mistrust of government (45-46), others
illustrate that strong majorities of Americans agree government should do more to ensure economic
security, a clean environment, and access to health care (50-51). Thus, any suggestion that the working
class has shifted to an ideological conservatism of limited governments is inaccurate. Instead, Teixeira and
Rogers argue that working class voters "expect a lot out of government, so they are disappointed when
they don't get it" (48, italics in original). Ironically, the white working class is liberal in their high
expectations of a proactive government that helps average Americans secure good jobs, good homes,
good schools, and good health care, but pragmatically conservative in that they are increasingly cynical
about government's ability to deliver these goods. The gap between these high expectations and
government's poor performance in the eyes of the forgotten majority is not a sign of philosophical
conservatism (which, according to Ronald Reagan's rhetoric, labels government as "the problem"), but is a
sign of pragmatic conservatism (that the forgotten majority is critical of poor governmental performance,
but not critical of government in principle).
4.3 A third theory suggests that the Democrats abandoned the white working class rather than vice
versa. This theory holds that in order to win back the White House in 1992 and 1996, the Democrats
increasingly moved to the middle of the road in an effort to mimic the Republicans' economic and social
positions. This shift to the right was seen as necessary to win over independents, Soccer Moms, and other
important blocs, and was advocated by the Democratic Leadership Council (an organization of moderate
Democrats, of which Bill Clinton was a member). However, this strategy does little to appeal to the bread
and butter concerns of the forgotten majority. In short, in order to appeal to independent voters and swing
voting blocs like Soccer Moms, the Democrats have adopted a more fiscally responsible, tough-on-crime,
family values agenda that points toward a leaner and more limited national government. Thus, the
Democrats abandoned their base: the white working class that wanted a more proactive
government. Ironically, by absorbing Ross Perot's emphasis on eliminating the budget deficit and joining
with the Republicans in the mid-1990s to call for a balanced budget, the Democrats have painted
themselves into a corner: they are unable to make bold proposals for government programs the public (and
especially the forgotten majority) wants and supports. To promote such spending programs would give the
balanced budget issue to the Republicans, and open up the Democrats to being labeled as the same old
"tax and spend" liberals. These dynamics, and how the Democrats failed to understand both the trends that
created the new white working class and their interests, are nicely analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4, which
examine the elections of the 1990s.
4.4 The Republicans, Teixeira and Rogers point out, have also misinterpreted these trends. The
Republicans have assumed that white working class voters can be won over by continuing the assault on
233
AMERICA´S FORGOTTEN MAJORITY
New Deal- and Great Society-era programs that remain very popular with forgotten majority voters. The
Republicans have not recognized that while the forgotten majority has low levels of trust and high levels
of cynicism toward government, this does not mean that the forgotten majority rejects government in
principle. In other words, what is taken to be philosophical conservatism is actually pragmatic
conservatism. Thus, the anti-Government agenda of the Republicans will not win the white working class
over as permanent constituents within the GOP, because the white working class actually has high
expectations for a proactive government to address their economic, health care, educational, and
retirement interests. Teixeira and Rogers illustrate this very nicely in their account of the rise of the
"Republican Revolution" led by Newt Gingrich in 1994—and its subsequent fall as the forgotten majority
(in part) swung back to President Clinton for the 1996 election.
How to Win the Forgotten Majority
5.1 For Teixeira and Rogers, white working class voters are the major voting bloc in American national
elections, but Democrats and Republicans alike have not recognized this. Whichever party attains a more
accurate understanding of who the forgotten majority is, what their interests are, and why they remain
the most important voting bloc in American politics will potentially piece together an electoral coalition
that could determine the course of American politics for the next generation.
5.2 The Democrats can win this majority by embracing economic populism (which they emphasize does
appeal to many of the forgotten majority) and by stressing Medicare, Medicaid, education, and the
environment (or what pundits call "M2E2"). Teixeira and Rogers note that the election of 2000 did not
entail a choice between a pro-active government and an anti-government stand, but rather a choice
about what kind of active government to have. If this continues to be the case, they argue that the
Democrats have a "built-in advantage in this debate" (183). Furthermore, they propose that the Democrats
should move away from race-based affirmative action policies toward class-based policies that have
stronger support among the forgotten majority, and thereby eliminate a wedge issue that has hurt the
Party.
5.3 While it is clear Teixeira and Rogers would like to see the Democrats embrace economic populism as
a strategy that appeals to the forgotten majority, their suggestion that affirmative-action be framed as a
class, not a race, issue is problematic. This position has gained some measure of support, and has been
recommended (for different reasons) by people ranging from the liberal William Julius Wilson to the
conservative Ward Connerly. Critics have responded to this suggestion in a number of ways. First, it risks
ignoring racial discrimination as an ongoing issue, and class-based affirmative action won't address
it. Second, it ignores how gender has been the category in which the greatest gains have been made due to
affirmative action for women. And third, it implicitly accepts the idea that white working class men are
mobilized on the basis of anti-affirmative action appeals, so the only way the Democrats can appeal to
white working class men is to "de-racialize" their political platform. I think this third issue is crucial for
Teixeira and Rogers' argument: by urging the Democrats to abandon race-based affirmative action they
may be conceding that social conservatism and racial backlash is indeed more prevalent than they
previously argued.
5.4 The Republicans, though, might win this majority by toning down their harsh anti-government
rhetoric. Teixeira and Rogers note that George W. Bush's "compassionate conservatism" tapped into the
forgotten majority's desire for a leaner, more efficient, but still active government. In addition, Teixeira
and Rogers recommend that the Republicans continue to tap into the social conservatism of the forgotten
majority. Their analysis of the 2000 campaign illustrates that while Gore did well with voters when he
stressed economic populism and the defense of popular government programs, Bush was able to blur
policy differences just enough that many voters did not see significant differences between the two
candidates (recall that in one debate in 2000, Gore supported affirmative action while Bush supported a
vaguely defined policy of "affirmative access" which he could not clearly differentiate from affirmative
234
AMERICA´S FORGOTTEN MAJORITY
action). Since Bush was able to appear more moderate than he has turned out to be, many of these voters
chose Bush on the basis of "trustworthiness, cultural values or general feelings about government"
(182). The forgotten majority—especially forgotten majority men—went resoundingly for Bush (63% of
white men without a four-year college degree voted for Bush, and Bush also won white voters with
incomes under $75,000 by 13% over Gore [177]) even though voters preferred Gore's positions on health
and economic policy matters (as illustrated in exit polls [178-179]). Again, it seems that although voters
agreed with Gore's position on key economic issues, it was the more intangible issues such as likeability
and trustworthiness that hurt Gore and helped Bush.
Three Lingering Concerns
6.1 Teixeira and Rogers' analyses of mobilizing the forgotten majority (Chapter 6) and the 2000 election
(the afterword) include very insightful and important recommendations that a smart Presidential candidate
ought to follow. Indeed, I would highly recommend this book as a must-read for any serious Democratic
contender who hopes to have a shot at defeating Bush in 2004. Specifically, they present an eight-point
program that could be the basis of a Party platform (see 155-156). In short, Teixeira and Rogers suggest
that economic populism and a national government that is proactive and helps the forgotten majority
resolve their ongoing concerns about health care, job security, educational opportunity, and retirement
savings, are all themes that appeal to American values of hard work, fair play, opportunity, and social
commitment. Such appeals would help pull together a victorious electoral coalition, of which the forgotten
majority would be an important component. However, their analysis and recommendations in the later
chapters also raise a few questions about claims made in earlier ones. Let me briefly discuss three
lingering concerns.
6.2 By suggesting the Democrats shy away from race-based affirmative action and admitting that
Republicans appeal to the cultural values of the forgotten majority, Teixeira and Rogers seem to implicitly
admit that one theory they had rejected might carry more weight than they acknowledged. As discussed
above, while they reject the idea that the forgotten majority has become more socially conservative and
motivated by racial backlash, their recommendations seem to implicitly accept that this is indeed partially
true. Indeed, their language does not clarify the issue: early in the book they suggest that the forgotten
majority is not more "socially conservative," but in the afterword they suggest that George W. Bush was
able to appeal to the "cultural values" of forgotten majority men. I would like to see Teixeira and Rogers
clarify the difference between these two terms, since my impression is that many of the cultural values
that Bush tapped into were actually quite socially conservative.
6.3 A second concern is whether the forgotten majority is pragmatically conservative, or whether it is
perhaps ideologically conservative after all. Indeed, Teixeira and Rogers note that in 1996 three-fifths of
white working class men agreed with the sentiment "the less government the better" (111). My
understanding of this phrase is that it reflects a philosophical disposition that prefers a limited, passive,
government. Indeed, this phrase is quite close to the notion that the "government that governs best,
governs least" which is associated with the classical liberalism of restrained government and free trade
advocated by John Locke, James Madison, and Adam Smith. (It should be noted that Henry David
Thoreau also supported this notion of a limited government, but one that respected the equal rights and
dignity of its citizens.) In addition, Teixeira and Rogers' own analysis shows that white working class
women support the Democrats at higher rates than white working class men (particularly non-union white
working class men). To me, this all adds up to the possibility that forgotten majority men have shifted
from a pragmatic conservatism to a philosophical and cultural conservatism that will continue to turn them
into solid Republican constituents, or at least play into a Republican strategy of appealing to angry white
men.
6.4 A third concern that flows out of the first two is the differences between forgotten majority men and
forgotten majority women. Teixeira and Rogers highlight some eye-opening gaps between men and
235
AMERICA´S FORGOTTEN MAJORITY
women when it comes to examining the swings of support for Democrats in recent election results. Their
examination of Congressional and Presidential elections illustrate that forgotten majority men are the
group where the Democrats have lost the most appeal, while forgotten majority women are the group
where the Democrats have gained the most appeal. This gender gap is even more pronounced when
comparing non-unionized men and women. For example, in 1996, 46% of non-union forgotten majority
women voted for Clinton, while only 33% of non-union forgotten majority men did so (131). This raises
the possibility that while the Democrats might appeal to the Cavalier-driving working Mom, they still
have a tougher time winning the votes of forgotten majority men.
6.5 This issue deserves more attention. It is increasingly conventional wisdom that Republicans are
courting "NASCAR Dads" as an important voting bloc. These NASCAR Dads, from the description of
campaign strategists, are a part of the forgotten majority, and are made up of working class men who are
more socially and culturally conservative. Indeed, President Bush recently welcomed a NASCAR
champion to the White House for a photo-opportunity, making him the first President to do so. Presidents
invite championship teams from baseball, football, and other sports to the White House on a regular basis,
and pundits have suggested that Bush's motives cannot be disconnected to Republican efforts to woo
white working class men—whether they are called the forgotten majority or NASCAR Dads. I would like
to hear Teixeira and Rogers' reaction to this emerging piece of conventional wisdom.
6.6 I agree with Teixeira and Rogers about the origins and importance of the white working class in the
American electorate. However, I am less optimistic than they about the Democrats' ability to win them
back as a permanent constituency. It seems to me that some of the pragmatic conservatism of the forgotten
majority—especially that of forgotten majority men—has evolved into a philosophical and cultural
conservatism more at home in the Republican Party. Thus, the same white working class men who
"should" vote for the Democrats because of economic reasons will likely vote for Republicans on grounds
of social and cultural conservatism.
6.7 It seems both parties understand the importance of the forgotten majority as we get closer to the
election of 2004. Witness Bush courting the NASCAR Dad vote. Additionally, Howard Dean's comment
about wanting to be the candidate of the Southern white male with a Confederate flag bumper sticker on
his truck reflects the reality that Southern white men are a crucial voting bloc that has shifted its loyalty to
the Republican Party ever since 1968. Dean's comments were intended to initiate a dialogue about transracial economic issues around which a coalition can be built. Due to the clumsiness of his statement, the
intent was overshadowed by two types of reactions: one by Southerners such as John Edwards, who
suggested that Dean was a bit of a Yankee elite for not recognizing that many Southern whites supported
civil rights in the 1960s; and a second by fellow Northerners such as John Kerry, which denounced the
Confederate flag as a symbol that insults black and white Americans who embrace racial equality.
6.8 If the Democrats focus on issues of economic populism, they may secure enough of the forgotten
majority to win national elections in the future. Given that the current administration has taken the U.S.
from a record budget surplus to record budget deficits in less than three years, that President Bush's tax
cuts favor the already wealthy and not the forgotten majority, and that the administration is earmarking
billions of dollars for reconstructing Iraq (and handing it out in no-bid contracts to loyal party contributors
such as Halliburton) while ignoring the need for improving the domestic infrastructure of the U.S. (e.g.
roads, schools, etc.), economic populism might be the best hope for the Democrats. Ironically, the
Democrats are now the party of fiscal responsibility, and it is the current Republican administration that
has spent lavishly on tax cuts and wars while telling Congress to restrain spending. On the other hand, the
Republicans have recently signed into law a Medicare reform bill that includes a prescription drug benefit
for seniors—along with injecting a degree of privatization into the program, thereby positioning them to
take the Medicare issue away from the Democrats in the upcoming election (recall it is part of the M2E2
equation that historically benefits the Democrats).
236
AMERICA´S FORGOTTEN MAJORITY
6.9 Nevertheless, the Republican Party's appeal to social conservatism (witness the outrage over recent
Court decisions upholding equal rights for gays and lesbians, which has led many Republicans to discuss
amending the Constitution to prohibit gay and lesbian marriage) and patriotism (witness the strategic
invocation of the memory of 9/11 by President Bush to justify anything and everything, which allows
Republican strategists to turn any criticism of Bush's policies into treasonous criticism of the Presidency
itself), plus an economy pulling out of a recession (even though very few jobs have yet been created)
appear capable of continuing to woo forgotten majority men. This strategy will be tough to beat,
especially since Democrats are internally divided between mimicking Republicans and moving to the right
or embracing the very economic populism that the forgotten majority may be waiting for them to
champion. If the Democrats want to find a way to beat President Bush in 2004, they would be wise to pick
up a copy of America's Forgotten Majority.
237