PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE FRANKFURT (PRIF)
Democracy Promotion in Times of
Democratic Revolutions
Comparing US and German policies towards Bolivia
and Ecuador
Jonas Wolff, [email protected]
Paper to be presented at the ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik, 25-27 August 2011
Under the presidencies of Evo Morales (since 2006) and Rafael Correa (since 2007), Bolivia
and Ecuador have embarked on contradictory processes of political change. These selfdeclared "democratic revolutions" include a profound restructuring of the political system
through constituent assemblies that, at least in part, deviate from the mainstream model of
liberal democracy that guides North-Western democracy promotion. This poses difficult
lenges for international actors engaged in the promotion of democracy. From a comparative
perspective, the paper analyzes how the US and Germany – two leading democracy
ters with quite different profiles – have reacted and adapted to recent political changes in
Bolivia and Ecuador, and, in particular, how they have dealt with conflicts of objectives that
has challenged democracy promotion policies. By reflecting on these experiences, the paper
concludes that the specific features of the Andean "democratic revolutions" require that
mocracy promoters rethink their role: Promoting democracy, here, can only mean
nying a domestically driven and conflict-ridden search process along a path and towards an
aim nobody knows. Such a conception is fundamentally different from mainstream
es that conceive of democracy promotion as the array of measures aimed at establishing and
improving a well-known set of liberal-democratic institutions.
[1]
Democracy Promotion in Times of Democratic Revolutions:
Comparing US and German policies towards Bolivia and Ecuador
1. Introduction1
It is the declared aim of the US and Germany to promote democracy in Bolivia and Ecuador.
The current governments led by Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador have
posed significant challenges to this agenda. On the one hand, the election of Morales and Correa demonstrates the success of democracy in the two countries. In Bolivia, decades of mobilization and organization on the part of the indigenous majority of the population have, in late
2005, culminated in the first-time election of an indigenous president. In both countries, broad
discontent with the working of real-existing democracy, including with ―traditional‖ political
parties and ―neoliberal‖ economic reforms, have led to new governments that promised profound political changes in both the political system and the development model. This is, in the
end, what democracy is all about: to enable social discontent and demands for inclusion to
lead to political change without bloodshed.
Yet, on the other hand, both in substance and form, the political changes promoted by Morales and Correa since their first election are far from being perfectly in line with US and
German preferences. The ―participatory democracy‖ Morales and Correa proclaim clearly
differs from US and German conceptions of liberal democracy – as does their style of governing. The same holds true for the turning away from ―neoliberal‖ recipes that includes a much
greater role of the state in the economy, a tough stance towards foreign companies and IMF
and World Bank, and a critical perspective on free trade agreements – policy changes that
clearly deviate from US and German conceptions of ―sound‖ development policies but that
also affect US and German economic interests. Finally, as regards US-Bolivian relations, Morales‘s coca/drug policies are clearly seen as violating US security interests associated with
the ―War on Drugs‖.
As a result, US and German democracy promotion in the two countries has been confronted with a series of conflicts of objectives. The present paper analyzes the foreign and
development policies of the two ―donor‖ governments in order to see how they have dealt
1
This paper presents results of the research project ―Determinants of democratic states‘ handling of conflicting
objectives in democracy‖ conducted by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and Goethe University
Frankfurt, and supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG). It brings together results from four case
studies on US and German democracy promotion policies towards Bolivia and Ecuador including a broad range
of interviews in Bolivia, Ecuador, the US and Germany between 2009 and 2011. For an extensive account of
these results (including comprehensive referencing), see Wolff (2011a, b, 2010).
[2]
with conflicting objectives. The overall aim of the research project these case studies are part
of is to use this analysis to get a grip on the determinants that shape US and German democracy promotion policies. In this sense, the present paper starts by outlining the general features of contemporary political change in Bolivia and Ecuador (2.1) and identifies six conflicts of objectives that the US and German have to deal with in their democracy promotion
policies towards the two countries (2.2). The main empirical part presents the overall patterns
of US and German reactions to political change in Bolivia and Ecuador (3.1) and then systematically summarizes how the two ―donors‖ have dealt with the different conflicts of objectives, including a reflection on how to explain these reactions (3.2). By reflecting on these
experiences, the concluding remarks argue that the specific features of the Andean ―democratic revolutions‖ indeed require that democracy promoters rethink their role (4.).
2. Overview: Andean “Democratic Revolutions”, the US and Germany
2.1 General Features of Political Change in Bolivia and Ecuador2
In both Bolivia and Ecuador, a period of political turbulences preceded the election of new
presidents in 2005 and 2006, respectively. Following a turbulent transition to democracy, after
1985 Bolivia became a much-lauded development model that successfully followed a path of
democratization, stabilization and (neo-)liberal economic reform. Between 2000 and 2005,
however, a series of political crises erupted, characterized by massive social protests that
forced the resignation of both elected President Sánchez de Lozada (in 2003) and his successor Carlos Mesa (in 2005). In the course of this period of recurring crises, Evo Morales – a
union leader, coca grower and head of the political Movement toward Socialism (Movimiento
al Socialismo, MAS) – established himself as the leading representative of the diverse protest
movements. In December 2005, Morales was elected President of Bolivia by an absolute majority of the vote, becoming the country‘s first head of state of indigenous origin.
In Ecuador, between 1996 and 2005 no elected president was able to complete his
mandate: In 1997, Abdalá Bucaram was deposed by Congress in the midst of massive social
protests; in 2000, an alliance between the country‘s indigenous movement and rebellious sectors of the armed forces toppled Jamil Mahuad in a rebellion-turned-coup; and in 2005, Lucio
Gutiérrez was deprived of the presidency – again by Congress and in the context of massive
social protests. In all cases, the former vice presidents succeeded the deposed heads of state,
thereby securing a basic continuity in the constitutional order. Rafael Correa, an economist
2
This section draws heavily on Wolff (2011b: 4-7). For in-depth analyses of the complex processes of political
change in the two countries, cf. Crabtree/Whitehead (2008), Kohl/Bresnahan (2010) and La Tendencia (2009).
[3]
and political outsider, had participated in the urban protests against Gutiérrez and, for a short
term in 2005, served as Minister for Economy and Finance under Interim President Alfredo
Palacio. In the 2006 elections, Correa managed to present himself as the credible challenger to
the entrenched political elites and, in a runoff ballot, defeated businessman Álvaro Noboa.
Since their first election, Morales and Correa have initiated processes of of profound political change that included, as core elements, a restructuring of the political system via Constituent Assemblies (Asambleas Constituyentes) and policy changes in a series of areas (economic, social, drug, and foreign policies).
2.1.1 Constitutional Reforms
Both processes of constitutional change were based on clear-cut and repeated democratic legitimation. Repeated impressive electoral victories have demonstrated that Morales and Correa
and their political projects could rely on solid and clearly majoritarian support among the
population.3 At the same time, however, both processes of constitutional reform have been
accompanied by controversial and, in part, openly irregular procedures. In Bolivia, the draft
constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly in a highly disputed procedure: A twothirds majority of the members of the Assembly present was possible only due to the absence
of the most important opposition groups. Following some nine months of political struggle, a
two-thirds majority in Congress agreed on a detailed revision of the constitutional draft; this
procedure was crucial for enabling the constitutional reform to be accepted even by important
parts of the opposition and, thus, preventing a further escalation of the political conflict – yet
Congress lacked any legal authority to revise the draft constitution (cf. Romero et al. 2009).4
In Ecuador, initiating constitutional reform was possible only after the Supreme Electoral
Court had deposed the opposition majority in Congress in a controversial decision. It was only
in the election to the Constituent Assembly that Correa‘s political movement PAIS received
the necessary majority to push the project of change. In the ―old‖ Congress, PAIS – which
had not participated in the 2006 parliamentary elections – was not represented. Endowed with
―full powers‖ (plenos poderes), the Asamblea Constituyente, once convened, suspended Con3
In Bolivia, Morales was elected in 2005 (52%), confirmed in a recall referendum (67%) and re-elected in December 2009 (63%); the MAS won national elections in 2005 (only narrowly missing an absolute majority in
parliament), in 2006 (absolute majority in the Constituent Assembly) and 2009 (two-thirds majority in the new
parliament); in January 2009, the new constitution was adopted in a referendum (61%). In Ecuador, Correa won
the runoff election in November 2006 (57%) and was re-elected in April 2009 (52% on the first ballot); Correa‘s
PAIS received a majority in the Constituent Assembly in 2007 (61%) and in 2009 only narrowly missed an absolute majority in parliament; in September 2008, the new constitution was adopted (64%).
4
The regional autonomy movements, based in the eastern lowland departments (the so-called media luna), for
their part promoted autonomy statutes that received significant popular support in the respective departamentos,
but clearly violated the constitution.
[4]
gress and – between the adoption of the constitutional draft and new elections – established a
transitional parliament that simply replaced Congress.5
Especially in Bolivia, the process of constitutional reform was accompanied by serious political conflict. The opposition to Morales came from regional autonomy movements in the
media luna region, led by elected governors (prefectos) and ―civic committees.‖ In September
2008, protests in the opposition-dominated lowland departments peaked with cities, streets
and gas pipelines blocked, central-state institutions occupied and violence escalating between
oppositional and pro-government groups (cf. Peñaranda 2009: 152-165). By contrast, the
fragmented center-right opposition in Ecuador was not able to pose any serious challenge to the
Correa government during his first term in office.6
The new constitutions adopted in September 2008 (Ecuador) and January 2009 (Bolivia)
generally respect basic standards of representative democracy and human rights, but include
important deviations from specific liberal-democratic conceptions as promoted by, e.g., the
US and Germany. The new constitutions include the ―classical‖ series of political and civil
rights, and the new political system is dominated by ―traditional‖ mechanisms and institutions
of representative democracy. Yet, this basically liberal-democratic order is amended and modified to an important extent: Indigenous (customary) law and indigenous collective rights –
that (especially in Bolivia) enable autonomous indigenous self-government – are strengthened; mechanisms of direct democracy and social control are established that include recall
and other referendums, popular legislative initiatives and new forms of direct participation of
individual citizens or organized civil society; in Bolivia, not only parliament and president,
but also the highest branches of the judiciary are elected by popular vote; social and economic
rights are strengthened beyond anything usual in North-Western liberal democracies, while
possibilities for privatization (e.g., of public social services and strategic economic sectors)
are constrained and property rights (e.g. in land) are contained (cf. Wolff 2012).
5
In addition, during the processes of constitutional reform, existing institutional controls and procedural rules
were gradually dismantled while new ones had yet to be established. In Bolivia, disputes between the government and the highest branches of the judiciary abounded, with the latter gradually losing their capacity to act and
decide in a series of resignations that were not followed by new appointments. Regarding Ecuador, the suspension of, first, the opposition majority in Parliament and then of the entire Congress has already been mentioned;
during the transition to a new constitutional order the judiciary was also affected by controversial changes.
6
However, since 2008, conflicts between the Correa government and its original allies among the social movements, trade unions and center-left parties have increased. In early 2009, the country‘s indigenous movements led
nationwide protests against a new mining law that was perceived as ignoring the rights of rural (indigenous) communities and environmental concerns. In September 2010, police protests against a government austerity program
escalated into an attack on President Correa who was forcibly detained in a police hospital for some hours, but was
subsequently rescued by Ecuadorian military and elite police forces; at least the government saw this event as an
attempted coup with the involvement of the country‘s main opposition party Sociedad Patriótica.
[5]
2.1.2 Policy Changes
In terms of economic and social policies, both presidents had promised an end to ―neoliberalism.‖ In fact, they significantly increased the role of the state in the economy, in particular with a view to the countries‘ hydrocarbon resources. In Bolivia, Morales declared the
―nationalization of gas‖ which was followed by a series of further nationalizations. In Ecuador, Correa intensified policies initiated by his predecessor Palacio, further increasing the
state‘s share of and role in the oil sector. Both governments, at the same time, increased social
spending and public investment.
These policy changes were clearly in line with broad majorities of the respective populations. Yet, they differ significantly both from US and German conceptions of ―sound‖ development policies and from US and German economic interests. The most important example
here is the Bolivian policy of ―nationalization‖, particularly, but not only in the hydrocarbon
sector: In general, international companies were forced into new contractual relationships, the
control of the state (and state-run companies) in the respective sector was strengthened and
fiscal participation increased. Related processes involve Ecuador‘s oil sector. The interim
government of Alfredo Palacio had already cancelled a contract with the US oil company Occidental (Oxy) and handed the oil field to Ecuador‘s state company PetroEcuador. Yet, Correa, once in office, explicitly endorsed the Oxy decision and further increased the state‘s share
in petroleum revenues. In Bolivia, one German company (Oiltanking) was expropriated, but
in general it was mainly Brazilian Petrobras and Spanish Repsol-YPF that were affected by
the ―nationalization‖ policy. As concerns the US in Bolivia, it was more the change in
drug/coca policies that directly interfered with perceived national interests: The Morales government shifted away from the US-style ―War on Drugs‖ that included the coerced eradication
of coca plants to turn toward a combination of cooperative forms of coca eradication – based
on social control at the community level – and continuing counternarcotics efforts to cut down
drug trafficking. In Ecuador, President Correa denied to extend the bilateral agreement that, in
1998, had allowed for establishing a military base in Ecuador‘s Manta. The Forward Operating Location (FOL) – a vital piece in regional US counternarcotics efforts, especially with a
view to Plan Colombia – closed in 2009.
In terms of foreign policy change, Morales and Correa heavily emphasized their countries‘
sovereignty, in particular vis-à-vis the US and international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. On the one hand, this included open
criticism of external actors like the US that are perceived as meddling in the countries‘ internal affairs, to the point of expelling US officials and organizations (see below). On the other
[6]
hand, both governments have diversified their countries‘ international relations, intensifying
cooperation within Latin America, but also with emerging Asian countries such as China or
India. Bolivia (in 2006) and Ecuador (in 2009) joined the Alternativa Bolivariana para los
Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA), an explicitly anti-US alliance launched by Venezuela
and Cuba, and supported new forms of regional cooperation in South and Latin America that
deliberately exclude the US.
2.2 Conflicting Objectives in US and German Policies
From the very beginning, the ―democratic revolutions‖ initiated by Morales and Correa have
constituted a whole series of challenges to German and, especially, US policies. The turning
away from ―neoliberal‖ economic policies and, in the Bolivian case, the US-driven ―War on
Drugs‖ compromises the development strategies propagated by the US and Germany and directly affects their economic and/or security interests. At the same time, the political transformation promoted by Morales and Correa partially deviates from the model of democratic
governance the US and Germany adhere to. It actually included replacing a series of entities
of the democratic states established since the transition to democracy in the 1980s – and actively supported by both the US and Germany – with new ones. With a view to democracy
promotion, we can distinguish extrinsic and intrinsic conflicts of objectives: While in the case
of the former the declared aim to promote democracy in Bolivia and Ecuador clashes with
perceived (US, German) ―national interests‖, the latter means that different subgoals or aims
directly related to democracy clash with each other (Spanger/Wolff 2007: 267).
2.2.1 Extrinsic Conflicts of Objectives
Both Morales and Correa, with broad popular support and clear-cut democratic legitimation,
made decisions that clearly affected US and German ―national interests‖, if in different ways
and to different degrees:
Democracy promotion vs. security interests: As the ―War on Drugs‖, in the US, is considered a national security issue, both Morales‘s change in coca/drug policy and Correa‘s
decision to close the US military base in Manta pitted the respect for sovereign, democratic decisions against US security interests. For German ―national security‖, both countries in general, and counternarcotics efforts in particular, are not considered relevant.
Democracy promotion vs. economic interests: In Ecuador, US-based companies (especially Oxy) were directly affected by the new political attitude towards international (oil)
companies. In Bolivia, ―nationalization‖ did not seriously affect US or German economic
interests, but at least one German company (Oiltanking). In general, there is not much in-
[7]
vestment in the two countries by either US or German companies. Even though the two
respective domestic markets are small, the new governments‘ skeptical approach towards
trade agreements with both the US and the EU is not in line with US and German trade
and investment interests.
Democracy promotion vs. broader strategic interests: The turning away from ―neoliberal‖
economics, the increasing emphasis on sovereignty and independence from ―NorthWestern‖ governments as well as the cooperation with Venezuela‘s Chávez and extraregional countries like China, Russia and Iran – all this is generally not in line with US
and German strategic interests, even if neither Bolivia nor Ecuador are considered too
important in geostrategic terms.
2.2.2 Intrinsic Conflicts of Objectives
At the same time, the contradictory nature of political change in Bolivia and Ecuador meant
that tensions also affected the very aim to promote democracy – even if not compromised by
―national interests‖:
Respect for democratic self-determination vs. protection of liberal-democratic standards:
As seen, the overall processes of constitutional reforms were legitimized democratically
and, in this sense, expressed collective, democratic self-determination – but both the
processes and the results of constitutional change contained deviations from what the US
and Germany consider universal standards of liberal democracy and the rule of law.
Promotion vs. protection of democracy: In the same sense, the aim to support constitutional reforms (in order to promote, e.g., more inclusive democratic regimes) collided
with the objective to protect the basic institutions of the existing democratic regime.
Promotion of democracy vs. protection of peace and stability: Especially in Bolivia, the
democratic election of Morales and the subsequent political changes led to escalating political polarization and conflict to the point of bordering civil war in September 2008. By
contrast, President Correa started with an outright undemocratic move (to factually shut
down the elected Congress) but, after ten years of almost continuous political instability
in Ecuador, brought at least some macro stability to the country.
3. Analysis: US and German Reactions, Handling of Conflicting Objectives
3.1 US and German Reactions
Until the premature end of Sánchez de Lozada‘s second presidency in 2003, US and German
relations with Bolivia were characterized by good bilateral relations, as were both countries‘
[8]
bilateral relations with Ecuador until the toppling of President Lucio Gutiérrez in 2005. As
regards US foreign policy towards Bolivia and Ecuador, close bilateral relations included a
general support to democratic governments and, in particular, to elected presidents in times of
domestic political crises. US support mainly consisted of diplomatic approval, trade preferences, and financial and technical assistance – all this heavily focused on cooperation in the
US-driven ―War on Drugs‖ and characterized by a high degree of direct political involvement
in domestic affairs. Germany has been far less exposed and committed in the two countries,
but again, bilateral relations have traditionally been good and without major disturbances.
German support to the democratic governments primarily included development assistance;
German foreign policy towards these countries mainly is development co-operation, especially in Bolivia which is one of the main recipients of German development aid in Latin America. As regards democracy assistance, US and German development aid to Bolivia and (to a
lesser extent) Ecuador encompassed a range of projects explicitly intended to strengthen democratic institutions, processes, and actors. To what extent were bilateral relations between the
US and Germany and the two countries affected by the election of Correa and Morales, respectively, and how did US and German foreign and development policies (including democracy assistance) adapt to the political changes initiated by the new presidents?
3.1.1 The US and Bolivia7
Since the first election of Morales in late 2005, US relations with Bolivia went through three
broad phases. The initial period, between 2006 and 2007, was characterized by a wait-and-see
approach on the part of the US government and relatively calm bilateral relations. 8 In 2008, a
gradual increase in mutual critical statements culminated in the breakdown of diplomatic relations (cf. Gray 2009: 171-176; Ribando 2008a: 15): USAID had to leave Bolivia‘s largest
coca-growing region, Chapare, the US Ambassador was declared ―persona non grata‖, and the
US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was expelled from the country; the Bush Administration retaliated by expelling Bolivia‘s Ambassador to Washington, ―decertifying‖ Bo7
On the following analysis (including references to primary and secondary sources and a collection of data on
US foreign assistance to Bolivia), see Wolff (2011a, b).
8
The official formula was to ―congratulate the people of Bolivia on a successful election‖, but emphasize that
―the behavior of the new government‖ would determine the course of the bilateral relationship: ―It‘s important
that the new government govern in a democratic way […].‖ (White House 2005). Already prior to the elections,
the US government had taken a low-key approach – an important difference to the 2002 presidential elections
when then US Ambassador Manuel Rocha had openly threatened a possible withdrawal of US assistance if the
Bolivian people would dare to elect Morales. Now there were no negative reactions even when newly elected
Morales called Bush a terrorist, and appointed a cabinet that was widely perceived as close to the indigenous and
social movements and critical of neo-liberal economics and the US ―War on Drugs‖. The US Embassy in La Paz
even signaled its willingness to shift its policies oriented at coca eradication towards a fight against cocaine and
―surplus‖ coca only.
[9]
livia (as not meeting its counternarcotics commitments) and suspending trade preferences in
the framework of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA). In a
third phase, since 2009, both governments – now with President Obama on the side of the US
– have tried to repair diplomatic relations by means of a bilateral dialogue, but efforts to reach
a bilateral agreement that would enable the two countries to restore ambassadors and establish
a new framework for development cooperation have yet to yield results.
US foreign assistance to Bolivia has declined since the fall of Sánchez de Lozada in 2003,
i.e. throughout both the interim government led by Carlos Mesa (2004-2005) and the Morales
government (since 2006). Aid was reduced from more than $150 million per year between
2002 and 2004 to less than $100 million per year since 2008.9 In addition, Bolivia lost access
to funding from the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC): In the context of the rupture of diplomatic relations, the MCC Board of Directors, in December 2008, decided not to
select Bolivia again as eligible for compact assistance. Only the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED) has continued increasing its funding for the country program.10
In terms of democracy assistance, the US, on the one hand, reacted to the political rise of
Morales in ways that had to be read as signaling support for the opposition. On the other (and
at a later stage), USAID signaled a remarkable willingness to adjust its democracy assistance
to official Bolivian preferences. Starting in 2006, a new USAID program (Fortalecimiento de
Instituciones Democráticas, FIDEM) focused on supporting the prefecturas, the regional governments that, at that time, were dominated by the opposition. Although FIDEM was already
designed in 2005 – i.e, before the election of both Morales and the prefectos –, it meant that
USAID directly supported Morales‘s most important opponents. In addition, USAID‘s Office
of Transition Initiatives (OTI) retargeted its program in order to also support these departmental governments. At the same time, rising NED grants meant increasing US democracy aid to
support civil society. Programmatically, given the MAS government‘s ―inclinations to consolidate executive power and promote potentially anti-democratic reforms‖, USAID emphasized
the need for ―support of counterweights to one-party control such as judicial and media independence, a strong civil society, and educated local and state level leaders‖ (Franco 2006:
19).11 USAID‘s party strengthening program was explicitly intended to ―help build moderate,
9
Total US foreign assistance to Bolivia declined from almost $100 million in 2008 to $86 million in 2009 and
$73 million in 2010.
10
NED grants to Bolivia rose from roughly around $100,000 in 2003-2004 to more than $500,000 in 2006-2008
to over $1 million in 2009 and 2009. Since 2006, the most important recipient of NED grants has been the International Republican Institute (IRI).
11
In 2007, the stated goal of US assistance to Bolivia was ―closer ties between the United States, the Bolivian
people, and the international community‖. It was specified that ―partnerships will be developed with regional and
local governments and non-governmental organizations (NGO), the private sector, and other non-executive
[10]
pro-democracy political parties that can serve as a counter-weight to the radical MAS‖ (US
Embassy La Paz 2002).
Yet, overall US democracy assistance was far from explicitly oppositional. Support for the
regional governments encompassed cooperation with those governed by the MAS. In their
USAID-funded party work, the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National
Democratic Institute (NDI) had included the MAS already before the election of Morales. In
2007, USAID decided to put on hold support for single parties and limit party work to multiparty activities ―so as to ensure a clear public perception of apolitical ‗balance‘‖ (US Department of State 2007a: 13). At the same time, USAID continued to directly cooperate with the
Bolivian government, i.e. in the Administration of Justice Program. And internal documents
show that USAID had planned, since late 2007, to replace the controversial support for regional governments by a major new program to strengthen municipal governments and considered a series of activities that would respond to official Bolivian preferences.12 Given the
2008 rupture in bilateral relations, however, this willingness to adapt was not enough to convince the Bolivian government which, in 2009, demanded the closure of USAID‘s Democracy
Program. Since then, NED funding is the only type of official US democracy assistance to
Bolivia.13 Freedom House (2010: 5) has strongly criticized the Obama Administration‘s ―decision to accede to the demands of the Bolivian government to cut off all U.S. support for
democracy and human rights in Bolivia in exchange for allowing other development programs
to continue‖; if necessary, US democracy assistance should be ―administered outside the bilateral aid framework‖.
3.1.2 The US and Ecuador14
In general, the restrained US stance towards the Ecuadorian elections in late 2006 mirrored
the attitude adopted after Morales‘s victory a year before.15 But in comparison to the Bolivian
branch entities to prevent further erosion of democracy, combat cocaine production and trafficking, improve
healthcare, and increase educational opportunities‖ (CBJ 2008: 603). As regards democracy and governance
assistance, funding, on the one hand, was to ―be used to strengthen the Congress as well as state and local governments, encourage moderate national leaders, support legislation that complies with international standards to
combat corruption and money laundering, and expand public diplomacy to emphasize the positive correlation
between democracy and development.‖ On the other, US assistance was also provided ―to support an active,
credible civil society […] and to strengthen political parties‖ (CBJ 2008: 604).
12
In its Congressional Budget Justification for fiscal year 2010 (CBJ 2010: 57), the US Department of State still
requested funding for a new ―priority program‖ that would ―expand efforts to improve municipal performance‖.
13
While both NDI and IRI had to phase out their USAID-funded activities and NDI left the country, IRI continues to support good governance in four municipalities through a NED grant.
14
On the following analysis (including references to primary and secondary sources and a collection of data on
US foreign assistance to Ecuador), see Wolff (2011b).
15
The State Department emphasized that, no matter who the winner was, the course of US-Ecuadorian relations
depended only on the policies that the new government would pursue and ―whether or not those policies are
consonant with our goals‖ (US Department of State 2006).
[11]
case, bilateral relations between the US and Ecuador remained surprisingly calm throughout
Correa‘s first term in office and beyond.16 In terms of general cooperation as well as US foreign assistance, there is in fact more continuity than change.
Serious issues notwithstanding, diplomatic relations remained relatively friendly (compared to the US-Bolivia relationship). Regarding Manta, the US government stated clearly
that it would ―respect whatever the decision the Government of Ecuador makes‖ (US Department of State 2007b) and, in the end, basically accepted the closure of the military base as a
sovereign decision. Ecuador‘s treatment of foreign oil companies (including Oxy) met with
criticism in the US – and, in particular, in US Congress –, but in the end trade preferences
under the ATPDEA were continuously extended.17 Not even the expulsion of two US Embassy officials in February 2009 provoked any direct measures of retaliation.18 In November
2008 and 2009, the first two meetings of a Bilateral Dialogue were held in order to strengthen
and broaden cooperation on issues of common interest. An important difference to Bolivia
concerned counternarcotics where the Correa government, the closure of Manta notwithstanding, was judged to be relatively cooperative and successful by US government standards (adding to the fact that Ecuador is not a coca and drug producing, but only a drug trafficking country). With a view to the political changes (and turbulences) in Ecuador, the US government
stuck to a much more neutral, observing attitude than in the Bolivian case.19
US foreign assistance to Ecuador has largely been unaffected by domestic political change
in Ecuador since 2007.20 The level of US foreign assistance under Correa was a bit higher
than directly before his election, even if significantly lower than between 2002 and 2004. In
16
Only very recently (in April 2011) and provoked by very particular incidents (the cables published by Wikileaks), the Ecuadorian government declared the US Ambassador to Ecuador, Heather Hodges, ―persona non
grata‖. The US government responded by expelling Ecuador‘s Ambassador to Washington and suspended a
planned meeting of the Bilateral Dialogue (see below).
17
In February 2011, however, a stalemate between Republicans and Democrats in Congress (not related to Ecuador) prevented an extension of the overall ATPDEA. Since then, trade preferences for Ecuador – and for the
firm US ally Colombia – have been suspended. In 2006, when Ecuador‘s controversial decision to cancel the
contract with Oxy because of contract violations was taken (i.e. before Correa‘s election), the US government
had responded by ―indefinitely‖ suspending negotiations for a bilateral free trade agreement with Ecuador (Ribando 2008b: 4).
18
The Ecuadorian government claimed that the US officials had interfered directly in the internal affairs of Ecuador‘s National Police and stopped any direct cooperation between the US Embassy and special police units.
The State Department, of course, rejected any suggestion of wrongdoing by the two officials.
19
For example, when in the course of 2007 the opposition majority in Congress was deposed in a highly controversial procedure and, subsequently, the parliament effectively replaced by the Constituent Assembly, there was
no critical statement made by the US Government. Regarding freedom of speech and press, the State Department‘s 2008 Human Rights Report mentioned a series of conflicts between Correa and the private media, but
concluded that ―the government, while critical of the media, generally respected these rights in practice‖ (US
Department of State 2009). In general, it was concerns regarding freedom of the press in Ecuador in particular
that were frequently touched upon by US officials.
20
Directly following Correa‘s election, the budget (and particularly the request) for fiscal year 2008 shows a
reduction in funding for Ecuador (from $32 million in 2007 to $21 million [request] or $26 million [actual]), but
in fiscal year 2009 US foreign assistance increased again (to roughly $35 million).
[12]
line with US foreign policy priorities, USAID activities in Ecuador are focused on the region
along the country‘s northern border with Colombia. In general, US foreign assistance in the
area ―Peace & Security‖ continues on a steady level, with a clear-cut emphasis on counternarcotics.
With budget cuts for USAID‘s democracy assistance program in Ecuador for fiscal year
2008, the portfolio had to be narrowed down. The cuts – which were immediately (over-)
compensated for in fiscal year 2009 – were most probably not a reaction to Correa‘s election
but, in the end, US democracy assistance at the beginning of the Correa government focused
on political civil society aid.21 Yet, in 2010 and 2011 USAID‘s democracy program was
broadened again to (re-)include assistance to municipal governments and the justice system.
Indeed, Freedom House (2010: 3) has criticized the relative decrease in US civil-society support in Ecuador – which is, at least de facto, well in line with the Correa government‘s preferences.22 At the same time (and just like in Bolivia), NED grants to Ecuador have increased
markedly.23 In recent years, the most important grantees have been the US party institutes.
NDI opened a local office in Quito in 2006 and started work in the area of political party
strengthening.24 IRI, since 2009, has worked in four cities encouraging a debate between
groups from civil society, political parties, the media and private enterprise on the implementation of Ecuador‘s new constitution. Both US party institutes have been eager to demonstrate
a non-partisan attitude.
3.1.3 Germany and Bolivia25
Bilateral relations between Germany and Bolivia have been far less affected by the election of
Morales than US-Bolivian relations. What is more, official German reactions to Morales‘s
victory – which came from the German Development Ministry – were decidedly positive.
With the new Morales government just a few months in office, Germany and Bolivia agreed
21
In 2008 and 2009, USAID focused on civil society and electoral processes. More precisely, it supported a local
NGO (Participación Ciudadana) engaged in political advocacy and monitoring, and delivered technical assistance to Ecuador‘s electoral authorities through a regional human rights institute (IIDH-CAPEL) That being said,
it was especially the support for local governments and the justice system that was temporarily dropped.
22
In the budget request for fiscal year 2012 (CBJ 2012: 752-4), the State Department clearly focuses democracy
assistance to Ecuador on municipal governments and support for the judiciary (the latter with a particular view to
counternarcotics). The document does not request funding for democracy assistance in the area ―Civil Society‖.
23
NED grants to Ecuador per year, in 2000-2005, totaled between $50,000 and 300,000; since 2006, the amount
of NED grants per year has been above $1 million (with the exception of 2007 where it was $330,000).
24
In 2008, NDI initiated a program that supports political and civil society organization at the local level (in
three regions) with a view to supporting their participation in the ongoing reform processes. In general, NDI has
both multi-party initiatives (like workshops) and direct cooperation with a series of individual parties (across the
political spectrum including Correa‘s PAIS).
25
On the following analysis (including references to primary and secondary sources and a collection of data on
German development assistance for Bolivia), see Wolff (2011a, 2010).
[13]
to continue development cooperation in the three established priority areas, including ―modernization of state and democracy‖ (cf. BMZ 2007a). With a view to this latter area, Germany
promised direct support to the Constituent Assembly. Regarding the one German company
affected by expropriation (Oiltanking), the German Embassy continuously approached the
Bolivian government to reach a negotiated solution, and Germany in fact suspended a climate
change/ energy project as a direct sanction. But the dispute had no discernible wider implications for bilateral relations.
In terms of both the amount and the programs, German development aid to Bolivia largely
remained unchanged. In intergovernmental negotiations since 2006, Germany has even committed to gradually increasing development assistance to Bolivia.26 In terms of democracy
assistance, the principal German program was ―Decentralized Governance and Poverty Reduction Support‖ (PADEP), implemented since 2002 by GTZ. In addition, three German political foundations were – and are – present in La Paz, namely the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
(KAS), the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (HSS).27 For these
different actors (GTZ/PADEP, political foundations), continuity in their work implied adapting to the new political situation.
The adjustments to PADEP clearly reflect an adaptation to the priorities of the new Bolivian government and to the new political setting in general. Having started in 2002 as a program prioritizing the subnational level and decentralization, cooperation on the national level
and on issues other than decentralization grew in relevance, with much more work on structural political reforms than first anticipated. Most notably, PADEP directly supported the
Constituent Assembly, the most important political initiative of the Morales government.28
After the end of the Constituent Assembly, PADEP shifted its focus to support the constitutional transition process, the implementation of the new constitution and the new parliament.29
In addition, German development cooperation strengthened its work related to crisis prevention and conflict resolution.30 Within PADEP, one component centered on ―Constructive Con26
In 2007, the German government promised €52 million for 2007 and 2008, and two years later it committed to
€62 million for 2009 and 2010.
27
Other German aid agencies involved in democracy assistance in Bolivia include the KfW (financial cooperation) and the DED (personal cooperation). Since early 2011, DED and GTZ (and InWent) were merged into the
new Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).
28
This cooperation included support for the presidential entity (REPAC), established in March 2006 to prepare
the assembly, as well as direct assistance to the assembly itself, including its directorate, technical unit, and
commissions (cf. GTZ 2008).
29
Regarding PADEP‘s decentralization component, the GTZ worked closely with the Bolivian Ministry of Autonomies to support the new process of creating autonomous governments at the subnational level. Furthermore,
at the request of the Bolivian government, support to the national planning system was (temporarily) upgraded to
an independent component of PADEP.
30
This emphasis was only partially a reaction to the new government and more generally responded to conflict
escalation since 2000. It also is part of a global trend in German development cooperation.
[14]
flict Resolution and Culture of Peace‖. On the one hand, German aid, since 2007, has applied
instruments like ―Peace and Conflict Assessments‖ and ―Do no Harm‖. On the other, PADEP‘s work with political institutions – central and subnational governments, parliament, the
Constituent Assembly – shifted, at least partially, from technical advice to efforts at promoting dialogue (cf. GTZ 2008). In 2009, GTZ started a new program funded by the German foreign ministry (CONCED) in order to support dialogue processes and improve the rule of law
in the implementation of the new constitution. A further project (PROJURIDE), funded by the
development ministry, assists Bolivia‘s Ministry of Justice in establishing a new ―intercultural
legal system‖ where indigenous jurisdiction is to be given the same status as formal law as
envisioned by the new constitution.
Adaption among the German political foundations took quite different directions, broadly
in accordance with their respective political profiles. Immediately following Morales‘s election, the social democratic FES began developing relations with the governing party. Even if
this did not include explicit political support for the MAS,31 it represented a clear-cut shift
from the foundation‘s political engagement with the ―old‖ Bolivian political elite (governments, parties) and from the previous position – shared among German agencies in Bolivia –
to not cooperate with the MAS and Morales. On the other side of the political spectrum, the
Christian social HSS continued its support for the Bolivian political foundation FUNDEMOS
which is closely attached to former president Jorge Quiroga. This focus meant that HSS –
indirectly, but explicitly – aided PODEMOS, founded in 2005, which was the main opposition party throughout Morales‘s first term. Finally, the Christian democratic KAS, although
critical to Morales in public statements, adopted a relatively neutral stance in terms of its actual programs. Comparable to the work of the US party institutes, KAS, e.g., supported the
Bolivian foundation FUNDAPPAC which offers multi-party aid to parliament.
3.1.4 Germany and Ecuador32
German reactions to Correa‘s election generally parallel the Bolivian experience. But whereas
the German government – at least, the Development Ministry – saw the election of an indigenous president in Bolivia as a crucial opportunity for the country (even if with risks), the
31
FES activities, to a large part, were oriented at promoting dialogue across the MAS-opposition divide and,
thus, included a broader political spectrum. In its work with representatives of the government and the MAS,
FES – just like the GTZ – aimed mainly at engaging and strengthening those persons and groups seen as more
moderate, accessible, and democratic.
32
On the following analysis (including references to primary and secondary sources and a collection of data on
German development assistance for Ecuador), see Wolff (2010).
[15]
attitude towards Correa was somewhat more sober.33 Germany‘s overall response was, therefore, to look for continuity in both bilateral relations and development cooperation while waiting and seeing whether Correa would manage to fulfill his term (and deliver on his campaign
pledges). The factual shutdown of Congress at the beginning of Correa‘s presidency met with
marked, but mostly private criticism among representatives of both the German government
and German development agencies34 – but this had no discernible consequence for the relations between the two countries.
German development cooperation with Ecuador is characterized by continuity. The amount
of aid – which is, in general, significantly lower than with Bolivia – has not changed.35 The
priority areas continue to be ―Protection of the environment and natural resources‖ and ―Modernization of the state, decentralization, and promotion of local government‖. In the latter
area, a wait-and-see approach is the official formula. As Ecuador is not considered a priority
partner country for German development cooperation (like Bolivia), the Development Ministry aims at limiting its work in the country to one area which would most probably would be
the environment. With a view to democracy and governance assistance, the Ministry decided
to proceed with its activities ―for the medium term‖ to see whether the Correa government
achieves structural improvements that would make a further cooperation in this area promising (BMZ 2007b: 8).
Support for Correa‘s efforts at modernizing and strengthening the state was explicitly demanded by the Ecuadorian government. This mainly referred to the GTZ program ―Modernization and decentralisation‖ (PROMODE).36 While continuing its work on decentralization,
PROMODE adjusted to the new political situation. It supported the process of constitutional
reform37 and started a new component on ―state reform‖. PROMODE‘s central partner be33
An exceptional case where Ecuador under Correa has become a relevant issue in the German political debate,
concerns the ―ITT initiative‖. In 2007, Correa proposed to refrain from exploiting the Ishpingo-TambocochaTiputini (ITT) oil field in the Yasuní National Park if the ―international community‖ would compensate Ecuador
for half of the expected losses. This proposal met with broad support in Germany, initially in society, then also in
parliament (receiving support from all parties in the Bundestag) and, finally, by the government. The GTZ supported the proposal with technical advice (by compiling feasibility studies). In 2010, however, the new German
Development Minister, Dirk Niebel, unilaterally announced that the German government would not contribute to
the corresponding UNDP trust fund.
34
In a joint statement Union, initiated and presented to Correa by the German ambassador, the ambassadors of
the European Union expressed their concern about the political situation in Ecuador and called on both the government and the opposition to defend the rule of law, the separation of powers, judicial independence and pluralism (Hoy.com.ec, 11 May 2007).
35
In intergovernmental negotiations in 2008, Germany committed to €23 million for three years (2008-2010). In
comparison, commitments made in 2002 for two years (2002-2003) amounted to $16 million.
36
Additional German development agencies engaged in democracy assistance in Ecuador include the DED and
the KfW. The political foundations are dealt with below.
37
Activities included cooperation with the Constituent Assembly‘s entity responsible for international relations
with a view to support visits by international experts, advice to commissions, workshops and forums. In addition,
GTZ participated in coordinating the donors engaged in supporting the Constituent Assembly and supported
[16]
came the Ecuadorian National Secretariat for Planning and Development (SENPLADES), a
new entity founded by the Correa government in order to coordinate its efforts at state reform
and development planning.
The three foundations present in the country (KAS, FES, HSS)38 joined GTZ in giving to
the constitutional reform process. The German Foreign Office provided additional funding
especially for this purpose. Again, the social democratic FES cooperated with the governing
party. With a former FES employee (Alberto Acosta) chairing the Constituent Assembly, the
Ebert foundation established a group of experts that provided direct advice to the Assembly‘s
Presidency.39 The conservative HSS focused its work on (indirectly) 40 supporting members of
the Assembly from the center-right opposition. The Christian democratic KAS chose to further a critical coverage of the Assembly (by organizing weekly op-eds by three local experts
from the conservative political spectrum). Beyond the Constituent Assembly, the work of the
three political foundations basically corresponds to these different profiles. In particular during the first years of the Correa presidency, FES was rather close to the government, even if it
stuck to supporting a broader dialogue within the center-left. KAS and HSS, on their part,
explicitly cooperated with people and groups from the conservative opposition. KAS, in 2010,
institutionalized its cooperation with the main conservative opposition party to Correa, the
Partido Sociedad Patriótico (PSP) led by former president Gutiérrez. HSS, in its (party) political work, focuses on shifting initiatives by individual conservative politicians.
3.2 Handling of Conflicting Objectives
3.2.1 Democracy Vs. Donor Interests
Democracy promotion vs. security interests: In both Bolivia and Ecuador, it was only the US
that saw its (perceived) security interests affected by the new governments. Officially, the US
government reacted well in line with democracy promotion by respecting sovereign, democratically legitimized decisions. The Bolivian turning away from coercive coca eradication
was criticized but generally accepted, as was the Ecuadorian decision to not extend the lease
of the Manta base. In fact, the US continued cooperation in counternarcotics (as far as allowed
inputs to the Assembly by PROMODE‘s institutional partners (e.g., SENPLADES and the Ministry of Economy
and Finance as well as the associations of municipalities, provincial and village councils ).
38
In 2010, the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung – the political foundation close to the leftist party DIE LINKE –
opened an office in Quito (with responsibility for the Andean region).
39
Already before the Constituent Assembly, FES begun organizing a process of debates within the spectrum of
Ecuador‘s center-left in order to prepare and accompany the constitutional reforms.
40
Through a local partner organization with a conservative and oppositional profile: Corporación Autogobierno
y Democracia.
[17]
for by the respective governments). Given the history of US relations with these Andean
countries (and Bolivian in particular), this respect for sovereign decisions is quite remarkable.
Yet, the US made it clear from the outset that certain issues are non-negotiable because considered vital US security interests. The certification process – and the actual decertification of
Bolivia – is the best sign of such explicit limits to the principle of self-determination. The US
government clearly prioritized counternarcotics-related interests. That the US judged Correa‘s
efforts in this area as relatively successful was most probably a crucial reason for not responding antagonistically to Ecuadorian decisions like the closure of Manta and the expulsion of
Embassy personnel. Germany, by contrast, had traditionally been skeptical of coerced coca
eradication, favoring a much more cooperative stance, and had avoided to directly engage in
coercive counternarcotics policies. In any case, drug production and trafficking (not to speak
about coca cultivation) in the Andes is not considered an issue affecting German ―national
security‖.
Democracy promotion vs. economic interests: Whether seen as trading partners or targets
of foreign direct investment, the economic relevance of Bolivia and Ecuador is relatively low
for both Germany and the US. Only in US-Ecuadorian relations, some economic donor interests are involved, in particular in oil exploitation. Accordingly, US and German governments
proved rather flexible and pragmatic vis-à-vis the programmatic changes in economic policies. This changed only – but immediately – when decisions concerned US or German companies. With a view to Oxy (US/Ecuador) and Oiltanking (Germany/Bolivia), the respective
governments actively defended the interests of ―their‖ companies and proved far less prone to
accept sovereign decisions (instead emphasizing international investment rights). But still the
response remained limited. The US (already before Correa‘s election) suspended negotiations
on a bilateral trade agreement – an initiative Correa rejected anyway – while extending trade
preferences for Ecuador. Germany suspended a minor development project but left its overall
cooperation unaffected (yet, in the end, an agreement on compensation for the expropriation
was reached). Given the German emphasis on defending these rather marginal German economic interests, it can be speculated that the government probably would have reacted much
less benign and tolerant to Morales‘s claim to self-determination if there had been a significant harm to German trade or investment.
Democracy promotion vs. broader strategic interests: As outlined above, the overall
changes in Bolivia and Ecuador in terms of economic and foreign policy were generally not
considered in line with US and German interests. However, such strategic considerations generally did not clash with the normative disposition to accept these changes as expressions of
[18]
democratic sovereignty or ownership. The strategic interest, shared by the US and the German
government, to prevent Morales and Correa from moving too close to Venezuela‘s Chávez
(and other international powers perceived as ―anti-Western‖) and too far away from standards
of liberal democracy and capitalist market economy did not lead to an additional conflict of
objectives. By contrast, it supported efforts at being relatively flexible while trying to remain
somehow engaged in the two countries and to uphold dialogue with the two presidents. In the
German case, this was an explicit (strategic) goal that perfectly fitted the government‘s normative predispositions. For the US, it was also relevant (and articulated most explicitly by
Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon),41 but in the Bolivian case was counteracted by US
inflexibility in the ―War on Drugs‖, by the legacy of former US policies,42 and by the deep
mutual mistrust and antipathy between the Bush and the Morales government.
3.2.2 Democracy Vs. Democracy
Respect for democratic self-determination vs. protection of liberal-democratic standards:
Regarding the self-determined and democratically legitimized deviance (and, in part, breach
of) mainstream standards of liberal democracy and good governance, both the US and Germany officially reacted with an attitude of respect for alternative paths and models. The two
donors continued their development cooperation. Even in the case of US foreign assistance to
Bolivia, although there was some shift in priorities (away from central government support
and towards supporting ―counterweights‖), the US at least tried to maintain a rather cooperative posture and, especially after the open crisis in bilateral relations in 2008, was willing to
make major concessions to official Bolivian preferences. In any case, negative US reactions
were arguably driven not by considerations related to democracy (promotion) but by policy
disagreements in the area of counternarcotics and by what was seen as ―Bolivian government
hostility and provocations‖ (US Department of State 2008). This interpretation is confirmed
by US policies towards Ecuador where these two ―problems‖ were much smaller and, hence,
US reactions to political change much more cooperative. Germany provided direct support to
the political changes in Bolivia and Ecuador, including to the Constituent Assemblies. However, the partial deviance from what is perceived by both, German and US representatives, as
universal standards is seen as a problem, and alignment to local decisions was to a big extent
41
As Lowenthal (2010: 113-114) argues US career diplomat Shannon, in contrast to his predecessors – ―political
appointees who had pursued Cuba-centric policies redolent of the Cold War‖ – ―fashioned a carefully nuanced,
case-by-case approach to the various populist and potentially populist regimes of Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela.
42
This argument refers to both long-term legacies (the history of US involvement in Bolivia which created the
mistrust and antipathy on the part of the Morales government and broad parts of Bolivian society) and short-term
decisions (like the set up of FIDEM and OTI with a view to supporting the departmental governments).
[19]
more a pragmatic and, in fact, reluctant adjustment. It was driven by the recognition of broad
majoritarian support in the countries, the intention to have some moderating influence on the
respective government, and the strong will to remain somehow engaged (be it out of the selfinterest of the different development agencies, be it because of the general political decision
that a withdrawal from the country would be the worst option). In this sense, reactions can be
interpreted as attempts to balance the recognition of democratic self-determination with the
aim to minimize deviance from universally conceived standards.
Promotion vs. protection of democracy: With a view to this conflict of objectives, the unambiguous majoritarian support for and the democratic legitimation of every major step in the
political transformation in Bolivia and Ecuador proved a crucial factor. This made it almost
impossible for external actors emphasizing the importance of democracy to openly reject the
political projects pushed by Morales and Correa, respectively. Hence, the US remained more
or less neutral, with some explicit support for the government, some open help for political
and societal counterweights, and – in Bolivia – a possible, but obscure backup for the opposition. Germany, in both countries, openly supported the dismantling of existing entities of the
democratic state in favor or ―refounding‖ democracy. Only when the breach of the democratic/constitutional rules of the game was perceived as too dramatic, there was some critical
reaction. When the oppositional majority in Ecuador‘s Congress was deposed, the German
ambassador (on behalf of the ambassadors of the European Union) expressed concern. And in
the context of Bolivia‘s constitutional reform, the German government decided, on a few occasions, to suspend its support to the process – but temporarily and with a view to specific
projects only.
Promotion of democracy vs. protection of peace and stability: These two objectives did not
openly clash in the period under study. Neither domestic actors in Bolivia or Ecuador, nor
external actors like the US or Germany, considered an open break with democracy as a plausible solution to uphold peace and/or political stability. Quite the contrary, US and German
representatives gave Correa credit for bringing some basic political stability to the country
(and reestablishing ―governability‖) after ten years of almost continuous political turbulences.
In the Bolivian case, both US and German governments have been well aware that a collapse
of the Morales government would probably bring open chaos to the country. When there was
an immediate threat of violent conflict escalation, however, Germany de facto prioritized conflict resolution and, thus, intra-state peace over questions of due (democratic) process. In the
mentioned cases where German cooperation was temporarily suspended, decisions to suspend
or resume support were driven by considerations of empirical legitimacy or factual approval,
[20]
not formal legality of democratic correctness. Germany‘s main aim – that can be seen also in
overall democracy assistance activities in the two countries – was to help secure inclusive
processes of dialogue and concertation. In particularly in Bolivia, this can be read as going to
the expense of supporting a more profound process of empowering the indigenous and poor
majority of the population, but, from the German perspective, to moderate the process of
transformation and to include the former elites and middle sectors was considered both in the
interest of (liberal) democracy and intra-state peace. Neither in Bolivia nor in Ecuador, the US
was in a position to really contribute to domestic dialogue and conflict prevention – in Bolivia, at least part of US policies did only increase polarization because the US government was
seen as a party to the conflict. When comparing US reactions to former, US-friendly governments, like Bolivia‘s Sánchez de Lozada in 2003 or Ecuador‘s Lucio Gutiérrez in 2005, the
US propensity to promote stability (by supporting elected presidents against domestic threats)
has clearly declined since the election of Morales and Correa.43
3.2.3 A Preliminary Attempt at Explaining Reactions
How can one explain these patterns of US and German reactions? Here is not the place to develop a full-blown explanation, but a preliminary attempt at interpretation is possible.
As the literature on German foreign policy and German democracy promotion in particular
would suggest (cf. Spanger/Wolff 2007: 280-284), the German government was rather cautious to not explicitly meddle with delicate internal issues. Germany, broadly in line with
what Carothers (2009) has dubbed a ―developmental approach‖ to democracy promotion,44
tended to support inclusive processes of dialogue and reacted to the political transformations
in generally cooperative ways and by adjusting rather flexibly to changing official preferences
on the part of the ―partner governments‖. Vital ―national interests‖ were not affected by the
43
When Sánchez de Lozada and Gutiérrez were challenged by escalating mass protests, the US had stuck to their
―allies‖ until the very end. Whether – and to what extent – the US did support Bolivia‘s regional opposition in
the domestic political crisis escalating in September 2008 is impossible to say, but the US government very
clearly did not take a clear-cut position of support for the democratically elected Morales government (as, for
example, UNASUR did). During the short-term political crisis in Ecuador in September 2010, when police protests escalated into a kind of coup attempt, the US Ambassador to Quito, however, signaled explicit support not
only for Ecuador‘s democratic institutions, but for President Correa personally (EcuadorInmediato.com, 30 September 2010, 1 October 2010).
44
Carothers (2009: 5) distinguishes between two approaches to democracy assistance. The political approach is
characterized by ―a relatively narrow conception of democracy — focused, above all, on elections and political
liberties — and a view of democratization as a process of political struggle in which democrats work to gain the
upper hand in society over nondemocrats‖. Correspondingly, democracy assistance is directed ―at core political
processes and institutions […] often at important conjunctural moments and with the hope of catalytic effects‖.
The developmental approach, in contrast, ―rests on a broader notion of democracy, one that encompasses concerns about equality and justice and the concept of democratization as a low, iterative process of change involving an interrelated set of political and socioeconomic developments‖. Democracy assistance, here, ―pursues
incremental, long-term change in a wide range of political and socioeconomic sectors, frequently emphasizing
governance and the building of a well-functioning state‖ (Carothers 2009: 5).
[21]
new governments and, therefore, neither economic nor security interests counteracted the
normative preference for democracy promotion by cooperation and engagement. The active
defense of the one German company affected by Bolivian ―nationalization‖ could be read as
suggesting that the ―developmental approach‖ approach finds its limits once German economic interests are threatened (cf. Rüland/Werz 2002). Even in this case, however, the German
prioritization of economic interests over the respect for a sovereign Bolivia‘s decision could
be justified in normative terms: As in the German understanding private property rights are a
crucial element of the rule of law (the Rechtsstaat) and democracy and the rule of law are
inextricably linked, the sanction against Bolivia in defense of German economic interests, at
the same time, was presented as support for ―democracy and the rule of law‖ in Bolivia. Arguably, the ―developmental approach‖ is part of larger German foreign-policy culture (usually
called ―Civilian Power‖, cf. Harnisch/Maull 2001). It is, then, the ways in which normative
(cultural) predispositions are interpreted and applied to the specific case that enable a convergence of norms and interests in German democracy promotion.
The US pattern, by contrast, displays clear-cut clashes between norms and interests. ―National interests‖ as perceived by the US government were clearly opposed to a success of the
governments led by Correa and – even more so – Morales. In Bolivia, this had arguably some
impact on the gradual reorientation of democracy assistance activities (to support ―counterweights‖ to Morales) and on the decisions to suspend trade preferences and participation from
the Millennium Challenge Account. Yet, US moves directed against the Morales government
were taken more reactively than proactively and remained qualified by efforts to continued
bilateral cooperation (incl. continued foreign assistance). In the case of Ecuador, this cooperative side clearly predominated US policies. These limits to a confrontational stance could be
explained by (democracy-related) norms guiding US foreign policy that prevent the US government from openly ―fighting‖ democratic governments. But the observed pattern is also in
line with a slightly modified interest calculation: Given the domestic strength and legitimacy
of Morales and Correa and their external support in the region, the prospects of success of a
strategy of confrontation were low, the potential for collateral damage high. This, at least, is a
plausible lesson to be learnt from recent past, namely: from the tentative support by the Bush
Administration for the failed coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in 2002. At the
same time, ambivalent US reactions broadly correspond to the ―political approach‖ to democracy promotion outlined by Carothers (2009): Confronted with a government that was democratically legitimized but increasingly monopolized political power, the US accepted the
[22]
elected president while also supporting ―counterweights‖.45 In the end, then, both norms and
interests pointed towards an ambiguous attitude towards the Morales government – leading to
policies that proved outright contradictory. At the time of writing, the Obama Administration
still kept struggling to somehow re-engage the left-wing governments led by Correa and Morales (Wolff 2011b) while the Republican opposition appeared to be turning towards an outright confrontational approach: In July 2011, the Republican majority in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved an amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 that calls for eliminating foreign assistance to the governments of Argentina,
Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Bolivia (and US contributions to the Organization of
American States).46
4. Concluding Remarks
To what extent do the challenges, conflicting objectives and reactions analyzed in this paper
suggest that it is necessary to rethink the role of external actors in democracy promotion.
Here, the Andean ―democratic revolutions‖ – and the case of Bolivia in particular – offer
three broad lessons that refer to the conception of democracy (the aim), of democratization
(the path) and of the proper role for democracy promotion (the external contribution).47
In terms of democracy, the new political systems taking shape in Bolivia and Ecuador may
still be very much in flux. Yet, they demonstrate that there are potential models of democracy
that are quite different from the range of liberal-democratic regimes existing in the NorthWestern part of the world. Any democratic order has to balance institutions and norms that
help realize (if indirectly) the rule of the demos with others that constitutionally limit the sovereignty of the people, some that follow majority rule with others that protect minorities,
some that promote political equality with others that protect individual freedom, some that are
based on the principle of individual equality with others that rely on the recognition of cultural differences. If, then, real-existing democracy is a specific blend of contradictory democratic
principles, the contemporary transformations of democracy in the Andes can be understood as
45
There is, however, only one example where the US – as compared to Germany – stuck to a universally conceived, narrow conception of democracy as the ―political approach‖ would have it. The December 2008 decision
by the MCC Board of Directors to not reselect Bolivia as eligible for the Millennium Challenge Account was
based on an evaluation of Bolivia‘s governance performance according to fixed and universal standards (e.g., the
World Bank Governance Indicators). Even if Bolivia‘s gradual decline in some of these indicators alone would
never have caused the suspension, be it not in combination with the open crisis in US-Bolivian relations, Bolivia‘s ―violation‖ of universally conceived standards of good democratic governance was clearly important for
justifying the decision.
46
In justifying the amendment, Republican Congressman Connie Mack (2011) called for ceasing aid ―to those
countries which harm America‘s freedom and security‖: ―Let‘s engage our allies and friends, but let‘s not continue to support organizations and countries that perpetuate destruction of freedom and democracy […].‖
47
On this conceptual problematique of democracy promotion see the forthcoming edited volume by Hobson and
Kurki (2011).
[23]
attempts to readjust and rebalance these democratic elements: by strengthening the majoritarian, plebiscitary and participatory aspects of democracy as well as the economic, social and
cultural dimensions of human rights.
In terms of democratization, this implies that the linear conception of political change that
dominates mainstream thinking on democracy promotion is fundamentally flawed. Very
clearly, Bolivia and Ecuador do not follow the script of the ―Transition Paradigm‖ (Carothers
2002), i.e. a process of continuous consolidation-cum-deepening of democracy which progressively eliminates authoritarian legacies and other ―defects‖ of democracy until ―fullfledged‖ liberal democracy is reached. Experiences in Bolivia and Ecuador show that democratizing democracy is an open-ended, contradictory and potentially conflict-ridden process.
A ―deepening‖ of democracy in terms of increasing participation and improving representation may be accompanied by reduced checks and balances, and can, in fact, de-consolidate
existing democratic institutions.
As regards democracy promotion, the general lesson is, at first sight, rather simple: If external actors are to promote political empowerment – and democracy implies such empowerment –, they have to be willing to accept that empowered social groups have their own minds,
interests, norms and values. If we are concerned with societies characterized by massive inequalities, such empowerment more often than not will be turbulent, conflict-ridden and unpredictable in results. Under the conditions outlined, democracy promotion, then, can no
longer be based on fixed check lists and linear indicators that set pre-defined aims to be
reached and specific ―defects‖ to be eliminated. In contrast, promoting democracy has to be
conceived of as accompanying a domestically driven search process – a search process along
a path and towards an aim nobody knows. Shared basic principles of democracy and human
rights may define certain corridors of political development. Such ―guide rails‖, however, still
leave ample room for democratic experimentation – but this room for self-determined political development is precisely what democracy means.
[24]
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