!
AUSTRALIAN
NATIONAL FEDERATION
ON
DEMOCRATIC LINES.
THE
DRAFT
CONSTITUTION
OF
THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION ' EXAMINED,
AND
AMENDMENTS SUGGESTED.
BY
ARCHIBALD FORSYTH,
AUTHOR OF
“ FREE, FAIR AND PROTECTED TRADE,”
” LAND TAXATION AND
ETC.,
EEC.,
“ FREE'. TRADE OR PROTECTION,”
NATIONALISATION, ’
ETC.
SYDNEY I
TURNER AND HENDERSON,
Hunter Street.
1891.
PREFACE.
Twelve months ago Federation was in the air
so strong that everyone declared for or against
it. A large majority declared in favour of
Federation in the abstract, but since the Draft
Bill of the Federal Convention was published it
has had the effect of turning a large number of
advocates into opponents, as if Federation could
only be carried out by adopting the Draft Bill
in its entirety. Doubtless the Draft Bill has
been condemned by a large majority of the
electors of New South Wales; and, although a few
have gone back on Federation, the great bulk of
intelligent people are still in favour of Federa­
tion on National and Democratic lines, but it is
very difficult to discover the proportions of each,
for it goes without saying that anti-Federationists
can easily hide their real sentiments by opposing
the provisions of the Draft Bill, or any other Bill
that could be drafted. As one of the majority
that desire to see the Australian Colonies
federated on reasonably liberal democratic lines,
I propose in this essay to briefly enquire
whether its provisions are calculated to effect
this object, and if found defective to suggest
necessary amendments to make it acceptable to
all resonable democratic Federationists.
AUSTRALIAN
National Federation
ON
DEMOCRATIC LINES.
■------------------- ❖--------------------
General Objections against
Bill.
the
Draft
The opposition against the Federal Bill up to
the present time amounts to declarations against
its Imperialistic and anti-Democratic spirit,
namely : placing the appointment of the
Governor-General in the hands of the Queen ;
that the Federal franchise is not confined to
a residential qualification ; that the election
of the Senate is not confined to elected
members of the State’s Legislature ; and that
it places too much power in the hands
of the Governor-General.
The provision that
the Queen shall appoint the Governor-General
is opposed by a considerable number of people,
headed by Sir George Grey; but, notwithstanding
the prestige of his name and the arguments used
by him and his followers in support of the
desirability of placing the election of the
Governor-General in the Fands of the Australian
people, the ^proposal is looked upon by all
6
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL FEDERATION
intelligent and thoughtful people as an irrational
one. It is doubtless the general opinion that
the power proposed to be given to the GovernorGeneral is too great, and requires considerable
curtailment, but that any form of Australian
Federation under the Crown must concede to
the Queen the power to appoint her own
representative; and, further, that such appoint­
ment is, and can be, the only connecting link
between England and Australia under a wise
form of Federation. These are surely strong
reasons why the appointment should vest in the
Queen, and there is another equally strong
reason why the appointment should not be
handed over to the Australian electors. It must
be evident to every intelligent person, who will go
to the trouble of thinking out the matter, that
a Governor-General, appointed by popular
election, or by the States Legislature, must
necessarily be a political partisan of one party
or the other. Such a partisan would be suitable
and appropriate for the President of an
Independent Republic (which, it desirable, is
not attainable while we remain separate
colonies) ; but it would prove both unsuitable
and dangerous for the system of Responsible
Parliamentary Government intended to be
established. It will be seeh from past dicussions,
that neither Sir George Grey, nor any of his
followers, propose to carry their scheme to its
ultimate and logical conclusion, that is : To
substitute Presidential Responsible Government
for Parliamentary.
The former system of
Government may be the best when undertaken
under necessary conditions, and may come into
ON DEMOCRATIC LINES.
7
force at some future time. At present it is
outside the range of practical politics, and
therefore the appointment of the GovernorGeneral by the Queen is, from all points of view,
a necessary provision in any form of Australian
Federation under the Crown.
The opponents of Federation are mainly
composed of four classes—first, those that oppose
it because they believe it will destroy freetrade;
second, those that oppose it because they think
it will prevent or destroy provincial protection ;
third, those that oppose it because they prefer
a Republican to aMonarchial form of government;
and fourth, those that oppose it through con­
servative provincial sentiments and prejudices.
In answer to the first, it may be pointed out that
Intercolonial freetrade would increase freetrade
to a greater extent than protection against
foreign countries would increase protection.
To the second it can be urged, that Intercolonial
freetrade, with protection against the world,
by enlarging our markets, would enable us
to produce a variety of articles that could
not be undertaken in the smaller market afforded
by provincial protection ; and further that no one
who understands the question of protection can
showany good reason why adjoining countries, on
the same plane of civilization, with similar rates
of wages and standard of living and comforts
can derive any benefit from maintaining
adverse tariffs against each other.
If one
colony laboured ten hours per day and another
eight at the same rate of wages, the latter would
have something to protect, but as similar rates
of wages and hours of labour exist in all the
8
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL FEDERATION
colonies there is nothing to protect, and, there­
fore, protective duties simply take the form of
useless restrictions on the free interchange of
commodities between the various colonies. It
may be contended that protective duties against
European countries restrict the free interchange
of goods between the colonies and these
countries ; but it must be borne in mind
that our hours of labour are shorter and
our rates of wages higher, and that restriction
under such circumstances affords protection
against destructive competition. To the Third
Class we have to point out that in opposing
Federation they are taking up the strongest
position to delay and defeat the accomplishment
of their own views. Surely it should be evident
to every intelligent Republican that Federation
must precede independence. We have no good
cause at present to make us desire separation,
but should a good cause arise while we are
divided into separate colonies we would be
powerless to carry it into effect. But under
Federation our position would be materially
altered and strengthened, so that should an
adequate cause for separation arise such as an
Imperial war, arising from European dynastic
disputes or unwarranted interference with our
domestic legislation, we would be in a position
to claim our independence and still maintain
friendly relations with England and its people.
To those who hold that our dependence on
England^ is indissoluble, the necessity for
Federation is not so great or apparent as it is
to those who look forward to the establishment
of a great Australian Republic. So that the
ON DEMOCRATIC LINES.
9
opposition of Republicans to Australian Federa­
tion is beyond the comprehension of all
thoughtful and intelligent people.
To the
Fourth Class we can say nothing likely to
change conservative sentiments or prejudices.
They are permanent opponents to Federation
in any form, and must remain so.
Appointment
and
Power of
General.
the
Governor-
The charge that the Convention Bill places
too much power in the hands of the GovernorGeneral and the Imperial Government, if judged
by the present measure of political power con­
ferred by the several Colonial Constitutions, does
not appear to be well founded. But we think
that the stage of development and population
to which Australia has now attained entitles her
people to ask for, and receive, a greater measure
of political power than they have hitherto
enjoyed as separate colonies, and when the
draft Constitution is examined under this light
the charge is fully sustained.
In proposing to enter into an Australian
Federation under the Crown, we have surely a
right to expect as full a measure of national
power and freedom on all questions of Australian
domestic legislation as England at present enjoys
under the Crown, and that the prerogatives,
functions, authority and powers exercised by
the Queen, by and with the advice of her Privy
Council and Ministers of State, should be
extended to her Viceroy, the Governor-General,
10
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL FEDERATION
to be exercised by him, by and with the advice
of the Queen’s Australian Federal Executive
Council and Ministers of State.
Provision is
made in the draft Constitution for the appoint­
ment by the Queen (or her Viceroy) of such a
Council and Ministers to aid and advise her
Majesty (or her Viceroy) on Australian affairs,
and this advice should be tendered in the
same manner, and to the same extent, as her
Imperial Council and Ministers do at present.
Under such a Constitution there would be no­
cause or necessity for Imperial Ministers
interfering with or advising the Queen on
Australian domestic legislation as contemplated
by the draft Constitution. If we are entitled to
this measure of political power in managing our
own affairs, it is made apparent that the draft
Bill approximates nearer to Imperial than to
Australian Federation under the Crown ; for, as
a matter of fact, it does not secure Government
under the Crown, but Government under the
Imperial Ministers in Downing Street.
For
it can be seen at a glance that the powers
to be exercised by the Queen under the
draft Constitution are not confined to the Queen’s
Sovereign Prerogatives, but include powers and
functions exercised under the advice of Her
Council and Imperial Ministers, so that the
allowance or disallowance of an Australian Act
would not depend on the advice of Her Majesty’s
Australian Council and Ministers but on that of
Her Imperial advisers. Doubtless questions will
arise in which Australian interests will be mixed
up with or conflict with Imperial policy on
treaties similar to the late Chinese Restriction
ON DEMOCRATIC LINES.
11
Act. When such questions arise the Queen will
have to consult both Councils and decide on the
combined advice of Her Imperial and Australian
Councils
But on all Australian domestic
legislation there are no good reasons for and
several against the Imperial Government retain­
ing the power to advise Her Majesty to refuse
assent to Bills that have been previously assented
to by Her Representative the Governor-General
under the advice of Her Australian Council, for
assuredly the latter are in a better position to
wisely advise Her Majesty on Australian
questions than her Imperial Councillors.
By the 2nd clause in Chapter I., the Queen is
empowered to appoint a Governor-General to
exercise during her pleasure Such powers and
functions as the Queen may think fit to assign
to himP Now, there can be no doubt that this
unlimited power is both excessive and dangerous.
That it is made “subject to the provisions of this
Constitution ,} in no way limits its exercise, as
no definition of the Queen’s power is contained
within the four corners of the proposed Constitu­
tion. This and several other dangerous powers
are defended by several public men of recognised
ability under the plea that, although powers are
given that could endanger home rule if they were
exercised, these powers are not intended to be
operative.
In an unwritten Constitution like
that of England, unused, or latent powers may exist
without endangering political liberty, but such is
not the case under a written Constitution, which
should contain no power that is not required and
all powers intended to be conferred under it.
During the past century, the powers of the Crown
12
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL FEDERATION
have been greatly curtailed, and the practice of
Constitutional Government under this curtailment
has become the Constitutional Law of England ;
but this Constitutional Law could not be securely
made to apply to Australia except by enactment
into a written Constitution. Under the English
Constitution the Queen has certain recognised
Sovereign Prerogatives which she can exercise
with or without the consent of her advisers.
Now, while there is no objection to the GovernorGeneral exercising such of those Sovereign
Prerogatives, as the Queen may assign to him,
there are strong objections against giving the
Governor-General power to exercise “ Suck
powers and functions as the Queen may think fit
to assign to him.” The powers and functions
so assigned to the first Governor-General of
Canada were found to be so excessive that they
required to be curtailed, and some nine years
were occupied in negotiations betvveen the
Canadian and English Governments to put
matters right.
It is therefore our duty in forming a Constitu­
tion to guard against a similar error, by
confining the personal power of the GovernorGeneral to the exercise of the Queen’s Sovereign
Prerogatives.
I therefore beg to suggest that Clause 2 of
Chapter I. be amended by striking out all the
words after the word " Constitution," and
inserting in their place <( Such of Her Majesty's
Sovereign Prerogatives as the Queen may think
fit to assign to him, together with the powers
and duties conferred on him by this Consti­
tution."
ON DEMOCRATIC LINES.
Election
of the
13
Senate.
The Draft Bill provides that the Senate shall
be chosen by the Houses of the Parliament of
the several States, but in the absence of any
provision as to how the appointments are to be
carried out, such appointments would have to be
by a Bill passed by both Houses, as the Consti­
tution of the several States will not allow the
two Houses to vote together as one body.
Surely such a mode of election would be
impracticable, and in direct opposition to
representative government. In fact it would
place the appointment of the Senate in the hands
of the Upper Houses, and give the same power
to a nominee as to an elected House. But even
if the several States procured amendments of
their Constitutions so as to permit the two Houses
to vote together as one body, the objection
against giving a nominee House a voice in the
election of members of a Senate possessed of
co-ordinate powers with the House of Repre­
sentatives would still exist, and would entirely
nullify representative government.
It is, therefore, necessary to amend the 9th
clause of Chapter I. so as to provide that only
such members as had attained their position by
popular election should be entitled to vote. I
therefore beg to suggest that the clause be
amended by striking out all the words after the
word “State,” and inserting in their place
“chosen by one elective body composed of such
members of the Houses of the Parliament of
each State as have attained their position by
popular election.”
14
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL FEDERATION
Qualification
of
of Elector for
Representatives.
the
House
The objection against not including in the
Draft Bill the qualification of electors for the
House of Representatives is held by a majority
of the people, or at all events by all in favour of
one man one vote. Now, while the Convention
were doubtless right in not attempting to
interfere with the qualification of the electors of
the States’ legislature it was undoubtedly their
duty to provide for the qualification of the electors
of the Federal Parliament, so as to insure a
uniform qualification in the various States, as it
is evident that the political opinions of members
of the House of Representatives must be mainly
determined by the qualification of the federal
electors. If a resident qualification is adopted
in one State, and a property qualification giving
a plurality of votes in another, no important
question can be settled on representative
democratic lines. It is, therefore, necessary to
amend Clause 25 of Chapter I., so as to provide
for a residential qualification, and I beg to suggest
that the clause be amended by striking out all
the words after the word “representatives,”
and inserting in their place “in each State shall
be a residential qualification only giving one
man one vote.”
Deadlocks.
The 55th clause of Chapter I. provides that the
Senate shall have equal power with the House of
Representatives in respect of all proposed laws
with specified exceptions on Money Bills of a
ON DEMOCRATIC LINES.
15
certain character, which it may reject or affirm
but may not amend. The provisions relating to
these Money Bills appears to be wisely framed
so as to give the Senate as much power as could
be given to it without danger, but the same
cannot be said with respect to the equal power
given to both Houses on all other Bills, for
doubtless this co-ordinate power is bound sooner
or later to result in a deadlock. It will no doubt
be a difficult matter to settle this co-ordinate
power of the two Houses to the satisfaction of
l)oth the large and the small colonies, but when
it is borne in mind that the duties of a second
chamber are generally held to be to prevent hasty
legislation and not to block for all time some
important measure demanded by a large majority
of the people, it can be seen that this duty can
be fulfilled and deadlocks avoided by the
provisions contained in the following suggested
new clause to follow Clause 56 :—
“ When any Bill which has been passed by
either House of the Parliament has been rejected
by the other and the same Bill or one to the
same effect has been again passed by one House
after a general election has intervened and is
again rejected by the other, the tivo Houses shall
form one body and shall vote together on such
Bill, and if an affirmative vote of two-thirds is
given in its favour the Bill shall be declared
carriedP
Royal Assent
to
Bills.
The draft Constitution provides that when a
Bill passed by the Parliament is presented to
the Governor-General for the Queen’s assent he
16
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL FEDERATION
shall declare, according to his discretion, either
that he assents to it in the Queen’s name, or
that he withholds assent, or that he reserves
it for the Queen’s pleasure.
Now, surely the
time for giving the Governor-General such
autocratic power is past. It is not carried out
now, and perhaps it is not intended to be
carried out, and both reasons are good ones
why it should not be given. The 57th c’ause
should, therefore, be amended so as to provide
that the power should be exercised by the
Governor - General - in - Council, but reserving
power for the Governor-General to reserve for
the Queen’s pleasure, with or without the consent
of his Council, any Bill that, in his opinion,
conflicts with Imperial policy or treaties.
Bv the 58th clause the Queen-in-Council is
empowered to disallow any Bill that has been
assented to by the Governor-General at any
time not exceeding two years. This is another
dangerous power, perhaps not intended to be
applied; at the same time if the power is given
it could be exercised to block any legislation
distasteful to Downing Street, and with the
present social unrest, it is probable that within
a few years several radical measures may be
passed in Australia that would be opposed by
the Queen’s Ministers. To avoid any conflict
on such a question it is advisable to excise this
power to disallow laws already passed from the
58th clause. This amendment could be made
by striking out all the words after the words
“ copy to the Queenf and insert in their place
" together
with
*
.
,, the reasons on which such
assent was given.
ON DEMOCRATIC LINES.
Appointment
17
Federal Executive
Council.
of
The Governor-General is empowered to ap­
point a Federal Executive Council to consist of
such persons as he may think fit. By a sub­
sequent clause it is provided that the members
of the Ministry shall be members of this Council,
but as the Governor-General is empowered to
appoint as many non-official members as he
thinks fit, it follows that the Ministry may be in
a minority, and the majority may decide
important questions adversely to the views of
the minority. Of course, it can be urged that
under such circumstances the Ministry could
resign. But why should a Ministry, carrying on
Parliamentary Responsible Government, be
forced to resign, and, perhaps, delay necessary
legislation, or executive action, on some
important question through the action of nonresponsible members of the Council? In answer
to this, it can be urged that the GovernorGeneral can prevent any such resignation by
placing the Government in a majority in the
Council by the dismissal of members, or appoint­
ment of additional members, but such safety
valves only show the unwisdom of following old
mouldy models that are only tolerated because
they are not carried out.
Should any Ministry
cease to possess the confidence of Parliament or
the Governor-General, the Sovereign Preroga­
tives assigned to him by the Queen will enable
him to dismiss and appoint Ministers at his
pleasure, so that the power given to the GovernorGeneral to appoint as many members of Council
B
18
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL FEDERATION
as he may desire is a bad one, and the clause
should be amended so as to provide that the
number of non-official members shall not exceed
the number of Responsible Ministers. This could
be provided for by amending the 2nd clause of
Chapter II. by striking out all the words after
the words “ Federal Executive Council ” and
inserting in their place “ and shall consist of
the Responsible Ministers of State, together
with such persons as the Governor-General may
appoint, but such non-official members shall not
exceed the number of Responsible Ministers.
They shall be sworn in as Executive Councillors,
and shall hold office during his pleasureT
Power
of the
Governor-General
Council.
in
By the draft Bill the Governor-General is
empowered, with two exceptions, to exercise all
his powers, duties and functions, including those
empowered by the " Queen’s Letters Patent
and Instructions,JJ without reference to his
Council ; but from the nature of most of these
duties, and from the practice of responsible
government in British colonies, the insertion of
this power is evidently another mistake of
inserting power not intended to be exercised.
It is therefore necessary to provide that these
duties, functions and powers shall be exercised
by the Governor-General-in-Council, which can
be done by striking out of the third clause of
Chapter II. all the words after the words
<( Governor-General,” and inserting in their
19
ON DEMOCRATIC LINES.
place " and the Governor-General-in-Council
shall both mean and shall apply to the GovernorGeneral acting by and with the advice of the
Federal Executive Council; but the GovernorGeneral may exercise such of the Sovereign
Prerogatives of the Queen as Her Majesty may
assign to him, with or without the consent of
the Federal Executive Council, namely: Ap­
pointment and dismissal of the Members of the
Federal Executive Council and Ministers of
State, granting or refusing a dissolution of the
House of Representatives, granting or refusing
a pardon to any person under sentence of
death.n
Responsible Ministers
of
State.
By the 4th clause of Chapter II., the GovernorGeneral is empowered to appoint officers to
administer the various departments of the
Government, who shall hold office during his
pleasure, and such officers, it is stated, shall be
members of the Federal Executive Council and
the Queen’s Ministers of State for the Common­
wealth. It will be seen that under this clause the
Governor-General can select persons who are or
are not members of either house of the Parliament.
Now, although the Constitution of England
practically compels Ministers of State to be
selected from Members of Parliament, it would
surely be the height of madness to accept a
written constitution for establishing Parliamentary
Responsible Government, which empowers the
Governor-General to act contrary to the intentions
and spirit of the Act. No doubt, to compel the
20
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL FEDERATION
Governor-General to select every Minister from
Members of Parliament would not be a wise
provision, as some of the ablest and most
experienced statesmen are, from the caprice of
electors and other causes, occasionally excluded
from Parliament; but this can be no justification
for empowering the Governor-General to go
outside Parliament for all his Ministers. It will,
doubtless, be contended that the practice of
Responsible Government will compel the
Governor-General to select most of his Ministers
from members of Parliament.
It is now an
unsettled question here, as well as in England,
what proportion of Ministers must have seats in
Parliament. It is, therefore, advisable to amend
Clause 4 of Chapter II., so as to provide that a
certain proportion of Ministers shall be members
of Parliament. The clause can be amended by
striking out all the words after the words “ Such
officersf and inserting in their place “ shall he
the Queen!s Responsible Ministers of State, and
shall hold office during the pleasure of the
Governor-General, and until other provisions
are made by Parliament. Not less than five,
nor more than seven, of such Responsible Officers
shall have seats in either of the Houses oj
Parliament except when the House of Repre­
sentatives is dissolved.”
Commander-in-Chief.
By the 9th clause of Chapter II. the GovernorGeneral is appointed Commander-in Chief of all
military and naval forces belonging to the
ON DEMOCRATIC LINES.
21
Commonwealth.
This appointment is both
appropriate and necessary, but its exercise
should be under the Governor-General-in­
Council, and even under this safeguard the
Soudan episode warns us that it should be
provided that the military and naval forces of
the Commonwealth shall not be employed outside
the boundaries of the Commonwealth without
the consent of Parliament being first obtained.
Even with above amendments the command
of the Naval Forces would be a mixed one. The
agreement between England and the several
colonies re the Australian Auxiliary Squadron
may not result in any difficulty or disagreement
while the colonies remain unfederated ; but on
the advent of Federation the provisions of the
agreement must produce a divided command,
which will doubtless lead to disputes between
the Federal and Imperial Governments.
The
former could not, in justice, claim the sole
command, nor could they be expected to con­
cede this to the latter. It is, therefore, advisable
that the draft Constitution should empower the
Federal Government to take over ships (of the
Auxiliary Squadron) to thevalue of the Australian
contribution.
Intercolonial Freetrade.
One of the principal reasons for Federation is
to acquire power to establish a uniform tariff
throughout the Australian Colonies, yet the
Draft Constitution makes no provision as to the
time when it shall come into force ; on the
contrary, it includes elaborate provisions to
22
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL FEDERATION
enable the Commonwealth to collect the duties
of Customs and Excise imposed by the several
colonies for an unlimited period after the
establishment of Federation. By these pro­
visions goods can be exchanged free of duty
but not free from Custom House examinations
and interference, and doubtless both the expense
and trouble on intercolonial trade, under the
proposed method, will be as great, if not greater
than it is under separate tariffs. It is therefore
necessary, in order to accomplish one of the
main objects of Federation, to limit the time
during which the Commonwealth is authorised
to collect the duties imposed by the tariffs of
the several States so as to compel the Federal
Government to pass a uniform tariff within a
reasonable time. This could be done by adding
the following proviso to the 7th clause of
Chapter IV. : “Provided that no duties of
Customs or Excise, except those imposed by the
Federal Parliament shall be collected after two
years from the date of the establishment of the
Commonwealth.,}
Pacific Islands.
In the 3rd clause of Chapter VI. it is sought
to obtain power to acquire territory in the Pacific.
Now, such a power on the surface may appear to
many to be a desirable one ; but reference to
historical records will show that it is a most
dangerous one, calculated to bring us into
conflict with European nations. Had such a
power existed during the dispute about the New
Hebrides and New Guinea, or had the Imperial
ON DEMOCRATIC LINES.
23
Government followed the cry raised in Australia,
there is little doubt that a war with France or
Germany or perhaps with both would have
ensued, and danger from this source will become
greater as we increase in population and power.
The British possessions in the Pacific is at
present a source of danger to us, and this danger
will be increased tenfold should the power we
ask for be granted. The Monroe doctrine of
America has freed that country from many
International disputes and war arising therefrom,
and it is even more applicable to Australia than
to America as our territory is cut off from foreign
nations by the ocean. On these considerations
it is desirable that the 3rd clause in Chapter VI.
should be amended by striking out the power to
acquire territory in the Pacific.
Differential Railway Rates.
It is greatly to be regretted that the spirit of
Provincialism and Localism is too strong in all
the colonies to permit the State railways, with
their debts, to be taken over by the Federation,
so as to put an end to the war of differential
rates which entails a loss on the working of the
State railways of nearly all the colonies.
It
has been contended that as differential rates
impose no tax on products they cannot be of
a protective character, as such rates offer
facilities for traffic. But surely it can be seen
that protection can be given by a bounty as
well as an import duty, and these differential
rates are simply a bounty paid out of the railway
24
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL FEDERATION
receipts to city merchants on goods forwarded
to such border districts as have cheaper
transit rates than the ordinary mileage rates
of the railway.
If this bonus out of railway
receipts were given to aid
or increase
home production, as is done with farm produce,
it would not be more objectionable than
protective duties ; but as three-fourths of
the goods carried under differential rates consist
of foreign imports, the entire gain, or profit,
arising therefrom will not amount to one-half
the cost of securing it. There are twro methods
open to do away with the loss caused by the war
of differential rates. First : That the Federal
Government should take over the State railways
with their debts. Second : That the Federal
Government be empowered to frame a propor­
tional mileage scale for all distances over, say,
100 miles, giving each State the right to charge
high or low rates as they think fit, so long as the
proportional scale is maintained. There would
be no difficulty in framing such a scale under
which each State could determine its own transit
rates, but would be powerless to impose differen­
tial rates ; but these and every other plan that
could be proposed would be useless so long as
the narrow-minded spirit of Provincialism that
now exists is maintained, as any remedy would
either prevent agreement amongst the various
colonies, or the power wmuld be refused.
However, if Federation is once established, it
will soon be seen that intercolonial trade can be
as much interfered with under a Railway as a
Customs tariff, and its evil effects will pave the
way for a remedy of some kind.
ON DEMOCRATIC LINES.
Mode
of
25
Adoption.
The Victorian Assembly has already dealt
with the Convention Bill, and amended it in
several particulars, one of which provides that
the Senate and House of Representatives shall be
dissolved at the same time.
It is generally
believed that the main function of a second
Chamber is to prevent hasty legislation. If so,
the Victorian amendment will destroy the use­
fulness of the Senate in this respect.
The
supporters of this amendment could have
attained their object better by doing away with
the Senate altogether, for it is evident that two
Houses elected at the same time, and practically
by the same electors, can offer no check on
hasty legislation. It appears that this amended
Bill is to be submitted to a plebicity vote of the
Victorian electors. If this is carried out a most
fatal mistake will be made. No uniform plan of
dealing with the Federal Constitution has been
agreed upon, but it is generally held that after
the Draft Bill is dealt with by the Parliaments
of the various colonies the several Bills will be
submitted to a special elected Convention having
power to frame a Federal Constitution, which
will then be submitted to a plebicity vote of the
electors of the several colonies. But if such a
vote is taken at this stage in Victoria it would
be useless to appoint a Special Convention, for it
must be evident that the Victorian representative
to such Convention would be bound to support
the Constitution passed by the plebicity vote of
the Victorian electors, and to oppose any
amendment proposed by the representatives of
C
26
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL FEDERATION.
other colonies. It is altogether improbable that
the Constitution, which would be passed by a
Special Convention, would agree in all its pro­
visions with the Victorian one, and consequently
there would be two Federal Constitutions and
two parties. It is, therefore, certain that should
the Victorian proposal be carried out it will
inevitably dam the federation movement for
the next ten years; but should the amended
Constitutions of the various colonies be first
dealt with by a Convention specially empowered
to frame a Federal Constitution there are good
grounds for believing that it would be accepted
on a plebicity vote by at least four or five
colonies, and that the remainder would join in
the course of a few years.
The amendments suggested in this paper
would doubtless give us greater political power
than we are entitled to claim under the strict
letter of existing Constitutions ; but they would
give very little more than the actual political
powrer w^e now enjoy. This power has been
increasing during the past decade so much that
the practice of Constitutional Government reduces
the written Constitutions almost to dead docu­
ments ; so that in framing a new Constitution
it is wiser to anticipate an increase than a
decrease of powrer. It the present movement
for Federation should fail,through narrow-minded
provincialism and political prejudices, it wdll
have to remain in abeyance until forced into life
by some great national calamity or international
dispute, w'hich its adoption now w7ould prevent.
TURNER AND HENDERSON, SYDNEY.
2j\
,#§h,
Fop.