EU LEADERSHIP IN AN EMERGING NEW
WORLD ORDER
Ole Elgström
Lund University
[email protected]
Paper to be presented at the 5th Pan-European Conference on EU Politics,
Porto, 24-26 June 21010
EU LEADERSHIP IN AN EMERGING NEW WORLD ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, the European Union (EU) presents itself as a leading actor in international
trade and climate change negotiations. According to the homepage of the Trade General
Directorate (Commission 2005), the Union is ‘one of the key players in the World Trade
Organization … and is one of the driving forces behind the current round of multilateral trade
negotiations’. In the current post-Kyoto climate negotiations, it is portrayed as ‘leading global
action to 2020 and beyond’ (Commission 2009a) and as having ‘been at the forefront of
efforts to combat climate change’ (Commission 2008b). The description of the EU as a key
actor with leadership capabilities has been widely echoed by scholars (Bretherton & Vogler
2006; Meunier & Nicolaides 2005; Oberthür 2007; Vanden Brande 2008).
In the new, complex world order exemplified by the Doha Round trade negotiations and the
post-Kyoto negotiations in Copenhagen, traditional great power roles are obviously
challenged. In multilateral negotiations concerning issues of global interdependence, the role
of military might is minimal. While some observers argue that legitimacy and other soft
power resources play an increasingly important role, others point to the continued relevance
of structural power, although of a non-military kind. At the same time, ‘new’ actors like
China and India are appearing as essential players, displaying role characteristics that have
little connection to the great power characteristics of the Cold War, or even the post-Cold War
era of the 1990s.
In this fluent and changing environment, the EU’s leadership aspiration has been challenged.
This has been most apparent in the climate change arena where the EU is claimed to have
‘discarded the leader’s yellow jersey’ and to have lost its credibility in climate change policy,
primarily because of its alleged problems in forging an internally coherent, ambitious way
forward in the on-going negotiations (Kilian & Elgström 2010). In trade, the Union’s
leadership potential is diminished by perceived incoherence across issue areas and by a lack
of perceived legitimacy (Elgström 2007).
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the current status of EU leadership in these two issue
areas, which may be considered quintessential examples of issues of global interdependence,
thus typifying the emerging new world order. Drawing on recent research into internal and
2
external perceptions of the EU in trade and climate change (Elgström 2007; Kilian &
Elgström 2010), but also on documents and a review of recent scholarly analyses and
newspaper reports, I will critically assess the present leadership role of the EU in trade and
climate change negotiations. I start by discussing leadership as a theoretical construct,
differentiating between qualities and types of leadership. Next, the EU’s own role conception
is confronted with data on outsiders’ perceptions of EU leadership qualities. In this context I
also analyse what type of leadership – structural, instrumental or directional - the EU is
perceived to perform. In the following section, the impact of recent events and developments
in the two issue areas are analysed. I end by comparing developments in the two issue-areas
and by discussing implications for the future of EU leadership.
LEADERSHIP QUALITIES AND TYPES OF LEADERSHIP
There is a relatively consistent agreement among academic observers that leadership in
multilateral negotiations is of pivotal importance (Gupta & Ringius 2001; Sannerstedt 2005).
Empirical studies report of the significance of leadership in order to reach agreement (e.g.
Zartman 1994, Hampson & Hart 1999: 339-40). Sannerstedt (2005: 108) emphasizes that
leaders are needed in order to avoid or circumvent deadlocks and to push the negotiation
process to a solution. Moreover, the delegation of powers to leaders may be viewed as a
functional answer by states to collective action problems in multilateral negotiations (Nabers
2008). Our definition of leadership starts with ‘a conception of leadership as a role that a
particular country or organization can – or cannot – perform in a given negotiation’ (Sjöstedt
1999: 226-7). Underdal (1994: 178) defines leadership as ‘an asymmetrical relationship of
influence, where one actor guides or directs the behavior of others towards a certain goal over
a certain period of time’. Leadership in core is a ‘relationship between [a] leader and
followers’ (ibid., p.181). This relation is shaped by the responsiveness and the demand of the
followers as well as by the supply of leadership services provided by the leader(s). Nabers
(2008) stresses one important point that is not explicit in the proposed definition, which is that
leadership is competitive. There is a constant struggle between actors that intend to lead:
‘Leadership is always contested by challenges from those who are left out of what we will call
a “hegemonic project”, and sometimes from those who find themselves in a subordinate
position to the leader’ (Nabers 2008: 9).
Quality of leadership
3
Previous research has demonstrated that a number of specific qualities are required to ensure
and sustain leadership status. Elgström (2007) thus draws our attention to coherence and
credibility as essential ingredients of, or even preconditions for, effective leadership.
Coherence, or consistency, is often considered a sine qua non for successful leadership (cf.
Gupta & Grubb 2000). Nuttall (2005) makes a distinction between three types of coherence:
horizontal, institutional and vertical. To this can be added a fourth category, chronological
coherence. Horizontal coherence means that policies with external implications in different
issue-areas should be consistent with each other. Institutional coherence refers to consistency
of external policies emanating from the various EU institutions (Commission, Council,
Parliament). Vertical coherence addresses consistency among member states and between
member state and EU policies. Chronological coherence, finally, refers to consistency over
time.
Credibility in this context mainly refers to an assumption that in order to be a successful
leader, the EU’s external ambitions as a policy entrepreneur have to be matched by ‘domestic’
policies that demonstrate that the Union does what it preaches. The EU therefore has to set
good examples and create internal policies that are at the forefront of the combat against
climate change, but also to actually implement these policy ideas.
Coherence and credibility are in my mind strong indicators of leadership. If an actor is
perceived as consistent and credible, its potential to play a leadership role increases. More
importantly, a power that is not seen as coherent and credible is highly likely not to be
perceived as a leader either.
Types of leadership
In order to examine and evaluate the performance of a leadership role by the EU, we need to
break down the aforementioned definition into types of leadership. Existing theories of
multilateral leadership provide a fruitful basis for this enterprise. In this study, we follow a
typology, appropriate for climate change negotiations, provided by Grubb and Gupta (2000:
18-23). Accordingly, leadership is specified as either being structural, instrumental or
directional. Structural leadership builds upon a state’s material or political resources. It is
‘associated with the exercise of power derived from political strength in the global order and
the weight of an actor with respect to the problem at hand’ (Grubb & Gupta 2000: 19). In the
area of climate politics, for example, this means the amount of GHG emissions that a country
4
causes. Put simply, the more emissions a country emits, the higher the potential of decreasing
emissions. This, in turn, means more (structural) power on the negotiation table. The
instrumental mode of leadership is related to the exercise of political skill in negotiations and
the creativeness of a leader to accommodate the needs of different parties regarding the
instrumental design of a regime. Moreover, it involves fostering beneficial coalitions in order
to achieve common ends (ibid.; Underdal 1994). The directional type of leadership
emphasizes ‘leading by good example’. The core of this leadership style consists of the
combination of internal and external initiatives that aim at influencing the perceptions of
others. Domestically developed solutions, accordingly, are portrayed as good examples or as
potential standards of behaviour that may serve as a model to be disseminated internationally
(Veenman & Liefferink 2006).
THE EU AS A LEADER: SELF-IMAGES AND EXTERNAL PERCEPTIONS
EU leadership in climate change negotiations1
The EU’s role conception: a unified and credible leader
Europe’s intention to become an active and leading entity in environmental politics can be
traced back to the early 1990s with the 1990 Dublin Declaration as its probably clearest
expression. By and large, this declaration (Council 1990) formed the essence of the selfimage of the EU in international environmental matters that persists until today:
1
This section that builds on Kilian & Elgström (2010) is primarily based on twelve
interviews/questionnaires with non-EU representatives and 4 interviews with EU officials.
Our interviewees all participated or were otherwise involved in the 14th Conference of the
Parties (COP 14) in Poznan, Poland, December 2008. Interviews were carried out from
November 2008 to July 2009 with 1 Council Secretariat and 3 officials from DG Relex. 5
non-EU representatives were interviewed while 7 others answered a qualitative survey,
covering the same questions as the interviews. Interviewees were all considered to have
expert-knowledge of their countries’ climate policy. The respondents from outside the EU
represented: Argentine, Belarus, Bolivia, China, Dominican Republic, Iceland, Indonesia,
Japan, Namibia, Switzerland, the United States and the UN Environmental Program, thus
representing both great powers and small states, developed and developing countries. The
interviews were semi-structured. Respondents are referred to with the name of the country or
organization.
5
There is (…) an increasing acceptance of a wider responsibility, as one of the foremost regional
groupings in the world, to play a leading role in promoting concerted and effective action at global
level… The Community’s credibility and effectiveness at this wider level depends in large
measure on the ability to adopt progressive environmental measures for implementation and
enforcement by its Member States. The internal and external dimensions of Community
environment policy are therefore inextricably linked ...[The EU’s] capacity to provide leadership
in [the] sphere [of global environmental politics] is enormous. The Community must use more
effectively its position of moral, economic and political authority to advance international efforts
to solve global problems and to promote sustainable development and respect for the global
commons.
The Union’s leading role in climate change policy has thereafter been a recurrent theme in
official documents and speeches. As expressed by former Commissioner for the Environment
Stavros Dimas, in the eyes of the EU, ‘everyone accepts that Europe is leading the fight
against climate change’ (European Voice 2009). This self-conception is built upon two
pillars: the EU portrays itself as being both unified and a role model, or in our analytical
terms, as being both coherent and credible.
The self-image of the EU thus incorporates the assessment that ‘externally we always manage
to keep a kind of a strong and rather unified perception’ (COUN), through speaking,
negotiating and acting as a unified actor (cf. Karlsson & Parker 2008: 26). Despite the diverse
agendas of the different EU bodies, a rather homogenous discourse of the EU as being a
consistent climate leader has emerged. The EU, in other words, demonstrates a high degree of
institutional coherence. The Council (2007), the Commission (2007, 2009a, 2009b) and the
EP all uphold the image of ‘the leading role of the European Union in international fora’
(European Parliament 2009).
There is nevertheless an awareness of potential rifts in this presentation. The call for more
coherence and concerted action in foreign policy is a recurrent element in the Union’s
representation. In climate change, the EU calls upon itself to ‘organise itself so as to present a
single EU position and policy and a convincing and consistent approach over the years that
this effort will require, so that the EU pulls its full weight’ (Commission 2007).
Unsurprisingly, the EU perceives itself as being a credible leader. The basis for this selfimage is that its performance as a leader is coupled to its credibility as an environmental role
model. There is awareness that ‘the Community’s credibility and effectiveness at this wider
level depends in large measure on the ability to adopt progressive environmental measures’
6
(Council 1990). Effective domestic action increases the chance to influence third countries. It
is important to make a ‘good impression’ as ‘behaviour judged to be incongruent or cynical
can result in a loss of credibility’ (Bretherton & Vogler 2006: 40). Hence, the EP called for
the ‘urgent need for the EU and its Member States to meet the targets of the Kyoto Protocol in
order to play [a] leading role in a credible way’ (European Parliament 2009). The interviews
demonstrate a confidence in the domestic accomplishments, which facilitates international
trust in the Union’s leader role: ‘it will be no problem [for others] to accept the EU leadership
and the EU example on environmental policy because we have a quite good track record’
(COUN).
The EU – a leader in the eyes of others?
There was a unanimous agreement among third state representatives that the Union was still,
at the time of COP 14 (2008), a leader in climate change, no matter whether the interviewee
represented a developing or a developed country. Noteworthy in this context is that even the
‘heavyweights’ on the international scene, the US, Japan, and China, all affirm the Union’s
leading role. Observers underline that ‘[the EU] has been on the forefront for many years. It's
been the strongest advocate of action’ (UNEP) and has been showing ‘a number one
leadership compared to other countries’ (Japan). The Union’s rhetoric is echoed by
interviewees both from developing and developed countries who state that ‘the EU plays a
key role in the making and implementation of climate change policy’ (Iceland, cf. Indonesia;
China). What adds to this evaluation is that EU leadership is also assessed as horizontally,
institutionally and chronologically coherent (all interviewees; cf. Gupta & Van der Grijp
2000). On the question how they perceive the ‘general impact’ of the EU in international
climate policy, only two respondents state the Union’s influence to be ‘modest’ (Venezuela,
Argentina), while all other respondents find the EU to have a ‘huge impact’.
Generally, the EU is seen as a legitimate and credible actor in the negotiations. Yet, the
picture is more complex as there are deviations in perception about the credibility of the EU.
On the one hand, developed countries generally commend that the Union ‘preaches with the
good example’ and is ‘doing what it says and proposes’ (Switzerland). This holds especially
true for states that are close to the EU (Iceland, Switzerland). Observers contend that the EU
negotiates ‘credibly, faithfully and professionally’ while ‘following [the] rules of the game’
(UNEP). This reasoning thus corresponds well to the leadership perception that the Union has
of itself. On the other hand, there is a concern on the side of some developing countries that
7
the EU does not act in a credible way. The ‘EU should be as good as its words’ (China) in its
climate policy approach, indicating that the Union’s rhetoric is not followed by serious action.
This signifies the often-discussed domestic implementation difficulties of the EU (Lacasta et
al. 2007). There are ‘too little commitments’ (Namibia) from the Union. In the same vein,
Venezuela assesses the EU as ‘not reliable’. To put it somewhat bluntly, the EU is by some
actors perceived as an unreliable hypocrite that bases its leadership on mere rhetoric using
‘the luxury of being greener than it is’ (Gupta & Van der Grijp 2000: 77).
Although this result ought not to be underestimated, there are some indications not to
overvalue this finding. Firstly, the accusation of hypocrisy was voiced already a decade ago
by some less developed states without having serious influence on the leadership role of the
EU (Gupta & Van der Grijp 2000: 74). In fact, the EU apparently gained leadership during the
Kyoto negotiations and is still perceived as a leader. Secondly, the empirical data from COP
14 show that apart from China no other state regards the Union to have lost status or standing
in global climate change politics. Its leadership has been ‘strong and consistent - growing
over time’ (UNEP) despite its rather weak performance in the last COP. The leadership of the
Union is portrayed as consistent as ‘it doesn’t go up and down year by year’ (Indonesia).
Indeed, it is only a minority of developing countries that, while acknowledging the general
leadership role of the EU, place the Union in a position close to hypocrisy. All this erodes the
impression of the EU as an ‘empty-handed’ leader.
Regarding the type of leadership demonstrated by the EU, all three types in our theoretical
framework are reflected in the EU’s own role conception, as well as in outsider evaluations
(for a detailed account, see Kilian & Elgström 2010). However, directional leadership is
clearly the most prominent mode of leadership. While relying on its structural weight, the EU
needs to be a credible example in order for the Union to be a successful policy entrepreneur.
Therefore, a unified and coherent EU policy at the forefront of the fight against climate
change seems to be close to a precondition for EU leadership.
To summarize, our main finding is that the EU self-conception as an environmental leader
was at the time of COP 14 (2008) still to a large extent shared by non-EU state actors. Both
representatives of great powers and small states confirmed that the EU plays a leading role in
the post-Kyoto negotiations. In support of this general view, outsiders also shared the selfimage of the EU as a both coherent and credible actor. Most external actors agreed that the
8
EU is a role model for others, although especially officials from developing countries at times
questioned the match between words and deeds, nota bene regarding the delivery of climaterelated assistance to them.
EU leadership in international trade negotiations2
The EU’s role conception
/this section is still to be written/
The EU as a leader in the eyes of others
Outsiders are unanimous in their description of the EU as a great power in trade. It is
characterised as a ‘key player’ (ind), as ‘crucial and pivotal’ (dev) and as a ‘superpower’
(dev). Nothing happens in the WTO if the EU is not on board; ‘it cannot decide alone, but it
has to agree’ (ind). This power position is shared with the US; the EU and the US are ‘the two
major powers’ (dev; ind) and any proposed agreement has to have the support of these two
actors to stand a chance of success. Power constellations have changed over time, but the
dominance of the US and the EU remains constant. The advent of a coalition of emerging
economies at Cancun has not, according to my interviewees, altered the situation in any
drastic way. We may see a ‘different landscape’ (dev), more complex and with more relevant
actors to take into account, but the role of the EU is fundamentally the same. There is also
consensus among my interviewees on the main reasons why the EU is a big trade power. The
respondents emphasise the ‘size’ (dev) and the ‘presence’ (ind) of the EU: it speaks for 27
2
This section that builds on Elgström (2007) is based on interview data, collected in Geneva
during the time period 9-13 May, 2005. Eleven interviews were conducted with delegates
from the permanent representations of WTO member states. Interviews were held with
Permanent Representatives (Ambassadors) to the WTO or their deputies; in two cases with
embassy Counsellors. The ambition was to cover non-EU representatives from all continents
and from both less developed and developed countries. The interviews focused on
representatives from “important” and/or active actors within the area. In the end, interviews
were conducted with representatives from Australia, Chile, China, Egypt, Iceland, Japan,
Mexico, New Zeeland, Norway, Republic of Korea and Tanzania. The interviews, which were
performed under the promise of anonymity, were semi-structured. The average time per
interview was about one hour. For the sake of anonymity, respondents are referred to in the
text as either coming from a developing (dev) or industrialized (ind) country.
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member states and its volume of trade and its total GNP automatically makes it a major
power. The EU is economically so important on the world arena that its positions have to be
reckoned with. This factor is obviously closely linked to the possibility for structural
leadership.
Another way of influencing other actors lies in being a role model (cf. Meunier and
Nicolaïdis, 2006, p. 915). This mode of influence is clearly associated with directional
leadership. If others look up to you and imitate or import your political arrangements, values
and policies, this is an inexpensive way of gaining influence. The attractiveness of the EU and
the consequent wish to conclude cooperation agreements with the Union have in many cases
resulted in the adoption of the EU as a role model and in imitation of its policies, especially in
its ‘near abroad’. Maur (2005) argues that the EU has become increasingly prescriptive in its
efforts to export a European model, including its model of regulatory harmonisation, through
negotiated regional trade arrangements. The EU, however, does not seem to be a prominent
ideal in the WTO, according to my interviewees. Its ‘image as a champion of free trade’ (dev)
is tarnished by its reputation as a protectionist force in agricultural policy (see more below).
Although it is seen as a force for liberalisation in, for example, services, this is
counterbalanced by what is perceived as self-interested behaviour in other areas. And while
some delegates praise the EU’s environmental and human rights policies, the WTO is
generally not seen as an appropriate forum for ‘pushing its model to the rest of the world’
(ind).
The picture we get from the interviews regarding EU leadership in the trade negotiations is
ambiguous. The sheer size and economic importance of the EU create expectations of
leadership. The power of the Union also makes it necessary for other actors to listen to EU
representatives; whatever their position is, it will have influence on the bargaining game.
There is thus a perceived linkage between structural power and leadership, expressed by some
respondents. ‘Of course the EU is a leader’, exclaimed one of the interviewees (dev), referring
to the overall role the EU plays in the negotiations, while another respondent (dev) refers to
the ‘de facto leadership roles’ of the EU and the US, given ‘by the way in which the WTO
actually functions’.
There is also widespread agreement that the EU wants to, and tries to, be a leader in trade
negotiations. However, it is only successful to a limited extent, ‘sometimes’ (dev, ind) or ‘in
10
some areas’ (dev, ind). The examples given refer to cases where the EU has offered unilateral
concessions, for instance on export subsidies, or where the EU has acted as a champion of
liberalisation in general. Representatives from some developed non-EU states point to the
EU’s attempts to introduce human rights and environmental issues into the agenda as
examples of visionary leadership. By trying to spread such values, the EU ‘is a positive force
in the world’ (ind). However, a clear majority of the respondents think otherwise. They insist
that these issues do not belong to the WTO agenda, but should be dealt with in other fora, and
furthermore denounce such initiatives as confrontational and as potentially undermining the
WTO. The EU attempts are by many of the delegates not seen as caused by genuine moral
concern but are rather explained by reference to domestic politics and interpreted as symbolic
action done to placate domestic opinions (Zimmermann, 2008).
Most often, EU leadership attempts are dismissed as not being ‘credible’ (dev). Two problems
are particularly noteworthy in this context: alleged inconsistency and lack of legitimacy. The
most serious obstacle for EU leadership aspirations is clearly a perception of incoherence.
The EU portrays itself as a champion of free trade and liberalisation, but is in some areas
perceived to be a highly protectionist actor. Several actors characterise the EU as ‘a leader
with double-standards’ (dev; ind) that always says the right words and proclaims noble norms
– but at the same time ‘continues to deny Moçambique free access to European markets’
(ind). The EU’s agricultural policy is seen as ‘ungenerous and defensive’ (dev) and as driven
by domestic protectionist forces. According to my interviewees, it will be impossible for the
EU to play a real leadership role in the WTO as long as it carries the luggage of agricultural
protectionism.
Agriculture is the main problem, mentioned by all respondents, but there are also other fields
where the Union is seen to protect its own material interests. Protectionism on textiles is also
claimed to diminish its chance to ‘fulfil its over-all leadership ambitions’ (dev). EU attempts
to lead the debate on social issues and environment, by linking these areas to trade, are
generally viewed with deep suspicion. Many delegates seem to have difficulties in believing
that this is not done without any ulterior motives and see behind these efforts a desire to
introduce protectionism, ‘a new bias’, through the back door (ind). As a representative from a
developed country put it, ‘we do not accept the “hand on heart” approach taken by the EU
without questions’ (ind), while a delegate from a developing country expressed his doubts by
saying, ‘these initiatives /on human rights and the environment/ could be positive – but they
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could also be skewed to give advantages to the West’ (dev). Finally, the European proposal to
offer a large number of developing countries, but not all, special treatment (the so-called G-90
proposal) was by several observers interpreted as a deliberate attempt to ‘divide and rule’ the
developing world by excluding some more developed nations – and favouring the EU’s own
clients, the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries.
A second obstacle to effective leadership is the problem of legitimacy. As indicated by Henri
Vogt (2006, p. 5), ‘/t/he legitimacy and therefore the influence of this actor /the EU/ in the
eyes of others … is dependent upon the nature of its international activities and the values that
inform them’. In the WTO, the most prominent values claimed to inform EU positions are
liberal multilateralism, regulation and solidarism (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006; van den
Hoven, 2006). Among my interviewees, the one area where the EU receives most credit is as
a protagonist of multilateralism. The Union is widely praised for its strong support of
multilateral trade arrangements and is described as a key actor in this respect. A contrast is
often made between the multilateralist EU and the unilateralist US, probably then not only
referring to trade but also to other policy areas. The perceived legitimacy of EU
multilateralism is a potential asset, which could form the basis for leadership.
On the other hand, the EU’s efforts of directional leadership – based on its own history and
experiences – to create a rule-based multilateral trading system and its attempts to form the
WTO into a regulatory authority encounter considerable scepticism. The Commission’s
policy of regulating globalisation through stronger multilateral trade rules (van den Hoven,
2006) is seen as inappropriate by most outsiders. A majority of the WTO members refused to
include most of the so-called Singapore issues in the negotiations and my informants express
their reluctance to have such regulatory rules ‘imposed upon them’ (ind). Respondents from
developing countries tend to interpret the EU’s policy as a reflection of self-interests.
Furthermore, as concerns the EU’s solidarist ambitions, EU leadership aspirations in the
WTO is by many, and especially by representatives from developing countries, perceived as
illegitimate as long as the EU’s professed support for the Third World is not translated into
more manifest behaviour. This is a clear example of Hill’s (1993, 1998) ‘capabilitiesexpectation gap’; an area where EU rhetoric on solidarity and partnership has created
expectations that are not fulfilled by EU actions in the field. Many respondents seem to
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expect, or at least hope for, major unilateral concessions promoting agricultural reform from
the EU: this would be seen as a sign of leadership.
To summarize, the EU’s leadership ambitions in trade negotiations have met with
considerable scepticism. EU policies in this area are perceived as incoherent and as lacking
legitimacy. To the extent that the EU exerts leadership, this is mainly of a structural type,
relying on the Union’s economic strength. The efforts to exert directional leadership have
been less successful.
THE EU AS A LEADER IN AN EMERGING NEW WORLD ORDER
Recent developments in climate change negotiations
In brief, it has this far been demonstrated that a) that the EU was, at the time of COP 14 in
Poznan 2008, still considered a ‘green leader’ and b) that the type of leadership ascribed to
the Union was mainly that of a directional leader, an actor that leads by good example and
persuasion, although on the basis of its general economic and political weight. Officials from
both developing states and major powers shared the view of the Union as a largely coherent
and credible leader, though some observers questioned the correspondence between what the
EU says and what it does.
Much has, however, happened since the Poznan conference. The COP 15 meeting in
Copenhagen in December 2009, where expectations were high for a decisive breakthrough in
climate change negotiations, ended in what is generally described as a fiasco (Financial Times
Europe 2010, Zeit 2009a, Zeit 2009b). How do the results describing the situation in 2008
fare when compared with EU performance in Copenhagen? While no deep, systematic
research on this topic has been carried out, some conclusions are still possible to draw, based
primarily on a review of recent scholarly analyses and newspaper reports.
The Copenhagen climate summit has generally been seen as a set-back for the EU (Spencer et
al. 2010), or even as a negotiation failure (European Voice 2010b). The EU was sidelined in
the final hours of the negotiations when it was presented with a text agreed upon by the US
and the newly emerging BASIC bloc of Brazil, South Africa, India and China: ‘there was a
recognition that the EU had been upstaged at best and humiliated at worst’ (Curtin 2010). The
EU’s leadership ambition had been stunned and its ‘top-down targets and timetable’ approach
seems to have been replaced by a ‘bottom-up unilateral pledge-and-review’ approach,
13
advocated by the US and China (Egenhofer & Georgiev 2009). What went wrong?
There are three main arguments, all related to the analysis above, as to why the EU did not
play a leadership role at COP 15. First, the Union has been portrayed as an incoherent,
internally divided actor without a strong spokesperson (Curtin 2010). During her confirmation
hearings as new Commissioner for climate action, Connie Hedegaard claimed that during ‘the
last hours in Copenhagen, China, India, the US, Russia, Japan each spoke with one voice
while Europe spoke with many different voices … we are almost unable to negotiate’ (quoted
by Curtin 2010). This implies that there was a lack of institutional coherence, especially in
comparison with other actors, that weakened the chance for a decisive role in the hectic, final
negotiations (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2009).
Second, it has been argued that the EU’s pledges before the summit were not credible. While
the EU has, as we have shown above, traditionally been perceived to exert influence by
leading by example, with promises of strong reduction targets, it was – some observers claim
– coming to Copenhagen with ‘a reduction target that conflicted with its claim to leadership’
(Spencer et al. 2010). In this interpretation, the EU’s pledges were weaker and less ambitious
than those of other Western countries, in fact requiring little need for further domestic
abatement. This approach arguably alienated other countries and prevented a directional
leadership role (ibid.).
Third, the EU is a ‘relatively minor power in terms of global emissions’ (Curtin 2010), while
the US, China and other emerging economies are the countries ‘that really matter in any
lasting climate solution. There is nothing the EU can do about this’ (Egenhofer & Georgiev
2010). This could, in our theoretical language, be interpreted as a decline in the EU’s
structural leadership capacity, eroding the Union’s ability to play a leading role.
What do these reflections imply for the future of an EU leadership role? There seems, in the
post-Copenhagen situation, to exist a global leadership vacuum. China and the US could
construct an accord of their own liking in Copenhagen, but their actions could hardly be
called visionary leadership – something that many governments still look out for. The EU
does not seem to have abandoned its leadership ambitions, despite its debacle in Copenhagen.
In a letter to member state governments, Commission President Barroso argues for new EU
initiatives to demonstrate that it has not given up its aspirations (Sydsvenska Dagbladet 2010).
14
While it seems difficult and undesirable to change the declining structural power of the EU,
the Union is still in the position to present unilateral pledges that could restore its directional
leadership (for example, through a promise of a 35% reduction target; cf. Spencer et al. 2010).
Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty gives the EU a chance – but far from a guarantee - to increase
its institutional coherence at future meetings, for example by letting the new ‘Foreign
Minister’ or the new President of the Council take on the responsibility as Union chief
negotiator (Van Schaik & Egenhofer 2005). In brief, the EU’s climate leadership is closely
linked to its cohesiveness and credibility. Once outsiders start to question the unity and
sincerity of the EU, its credibility and legitimacy starts to crumble. Being a leader implies
keeping constant watch on potential internal dissent and on threats to its image as an actor that
lives up to its international policy proclamations.
The question is, however, if the profound changes in global climate politics after Copenhagen,
mirroring the altered power relations of a new world order, don’t also mean that prospective
leaders face a completely new challenge, transforming the preconditions for leadership. In a
situation without any agreed upon global model for climate change policy, and with an
unclear future balance of power, the usefulness of unilateral initiatives (to act by example)
may be limited, especially in the short run. Perhaps this is a time for bilateral alliance
building, for pursuing a policy of consolidating the few successes from Copenhagen and for
ensuring that the EU keeps the promises that it has already made. This would imply a more
long-term strategic type of directional leadership, without dramatic political initiatives.
Leadership is, as we explained in the theory section, a competitive business. Self-proclaimed
leaders are thus often challenged by other actors, which have their visions and similar
aspirations. In climate change politics, the EU was for many years considered an
unchallenged leader, mostly because the US’ own decision not to ratify the Kyoto protocol.
After the inauguration of the Obama administration, the situation has changed. Many
observers expected the US now to resume its former leadership role (Paterson 2009). At the
same time, the emergence of China and the other BASIC countries as major players at COP
15 has significantly complicated the picture. Commentators thus saw the Copenhagen climate
summit as dawn of a new multi-polar world-order, where large developing countries and the
US dominate any future post-Kyoto agreement (Washington Post 2009; Tagesspiegel 2009).
In Copenhagen, the US and China colluded to construct an accord that corresponded to their
respective national interests, leaving the EU outside. This act of co-operation does not,
15
however, amount to leadership, if this concept implies having a (joint) vision of how to solve
global problems. In this situation, the EU’s role becomes more diffuse and more difficult to
predict. It still considers itself the most progressive climate actor but acknowledges the
relevance of US and China in the global climate regime. Outsiders tend to take the same
position: the EU is still very much a potential leader, but it is assumed that the US will take on
an at least equally prominent position. They also realize the increasing importance of the
emerging economic powers. If this situation will lead to co-operation or competition is,
however, open to dispute – not to speak about its implications for the global climate regime.
There is, in the words of an EU parliamentarian a risk that ‘the climate talks will turn out as
Doha trade talks, the final agreement delayed year after year’ (European Parliament 2010). If
no party assumes leadership or is given leeway to lead, this may well be the case (European
Parliament 2010).
Recent developments in trade negotiations
During the last decade, the major Western powers have been challenged by the emerging
economies as decisive players in trade negotiations. Countries like India, South Africa, Brazil
and China managed to act as veto powers, preventing the US and the EU from implementing
their respective agendas. For example, and as indicated above, the EU’s plan to include a
plethora of regulatory issues in the agenda was refused by the WTO majority.
In the current situation, power relations in trade negotiations are diffuse and volatile.
Structural indicators, such as economic strength and shares of world trade, are changing,
creating unpredictability and potentially leading to changed preconditions for structural
leadership. Trade is also a key issue for the future of multilateralism as bilateral or minilateral
solutions compete with a global approach. While an adherence to multilateral principles may
still create legitimacy among smaller states there are growing tendencies that also the EU is
following the lead of the US by becoming increasingly committed to bilateral agreements
(ref).
What roles the US, the EU and China are to play in future trade negotiations are uncertain.
There is a strong resistance to further US concessions, and to any quick deal in general, in the
US Congress and among industry- and agriculture lobbyists. The argument is that the US is
paying too much (in form of decreased agricultural support) and receiving too little (in the
form of market openings in growth economies). The Obama administration has not made
16
trade a prioritized issue and seems to be reluctant to spend political capital in the Congress on
trade matters. In the negotiations, the US has raised demands on the emerging economies that
many outsiders have considered unreasonable, thereby undermining its credibility.
After its WTO-membership in 2001, China for a long time believed it had very little to gain
and much to lose by taking on a leadership role. China thus kept a very low profile in the
Doha Round. However, China has since 2008 taken a more active part in the negotiations and
is now part of the ‘inner negotiation circle’. This more active stance will be difficult to
abandon, given its position as the third trade nation in the world. At the same time, there are
few signs that China is willing to make any major unilateral concessions to facilitate future
progress in the Doha Round. It seems as if China may use its structural power to prevent any
agreement that may be considered negative for its interests while it is less willing to engage in
directional leadership.
The constructiveness of the EU is still constrained by its agricultural interests, delimiting its
chance to emerge as a directional leader. As long as the Member States are not willing to offer
more far-reaching reductions in agricultural duties, the chance for the EU to lead the
negotiations forward is small. Furthermore, the willingness of other actors to follow the EU’s
lead in adding regulatory issues (rules on investment, competition etcetera) to the WTO
agenda does not seem to have increased. The EU is still, however, one of the leading
commercial actors and therefore enjoys considerable structural leadership potential. One way
of using this potential would be to seek closer co-operation with the US in order to clarify the
possibility of joint constructive action.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION: THE CASES COMPARED
One first conclusion is that the two cases we have visited have been somewhat different in
terms of EU leadership. While the Union has for almost two decades (but not before that)
been perceived as an undisputed leader in climate change negotiations, its leadership claims in
trade negotiations have continuously been severely challenged. Furthermore, while its
leadership in climate has been primarily directional in its character (leading by example), the
limited leadership that the EU has exerted in trade has primarily been structurally based
(because of the size of its market).
Secondly, it has been demonstrated that the changes in the nature of usable power resources
17
and the advent of new great powers in the two areas – what we have referred to as ‘an
emerging new world order’ – constitute a challenge for the EU in both cases. This has,
however, been much more evident in the case of climate change where the Union’s leadership
capacity has been openly questioned. One main reason seems to be that the EU has not been
able to exercise coherent and uniform directional leadership in the process leading up to the
Copenhagen summit. In the case of trade, the change is less visible in the last few years, but is
still clearly detectable if one compares the role of the EU today with its importance in WTO
negotiations ten years ago.
Thirdly, the preconditions for structural leadership change in both cases as the balance of
structural power is slowly transforming. New actors (China, India, Brazil) are becoming
increasingly important in terms of trade and market shares. The same countries are likewise
becoming increasingly important in terms of their share of global emissions of hothouse
gases, linked to their economic growth. However, this increase in structural leadership
potential has not yet been translated into actual leadership (in terms of ‘guiding other
countries towards a shared goal’). Instead, China has acted more as a veto player, preventing
outcomes that it does not like.
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