The Role of the Semi-peripheral States in Foreign policy of the United States. The Case
of Poland and the anti-missile defense system
Zapala, Bartlomiej - Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland, [email protected]
Batog, Wlodzimierz - Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland, [email protected]
Introduction
Post-Soviet countries from eastern-central Europe when breaking away from USSR
lead to geo-political reconfiguration within the continent. Today, those countries are
dissatisfied with changing role of Russian Federation and indications of its political expansion
which seeks new partnership within field of safety depending on United States.
Good example of this kind of behavior was aim to join NATO in 90’s , and today in
case of Poland partnership with the USA in field of armaments industry (Poland bought
fighter jet planes F16), role in fighting the global terrorism (involvement in wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq) and as well strategic partnership; the allowance for installation of
United States anti-missile defense system.
Aim of this presentation will be analysis of how much USA are willing to come
forward and fulfill expectations, and as well how much they are treating those aims as objects
which will help realize their own objectives. In this context how much anti-missile defense
system will reinforce defense systems, and how it will cause additional risk for centralEuropean countries, through maneuvering them into unpredictable and potentially dangerous
relations with Russia.
We seek answer as well on whether countries from this part of Europe stand any
chance for getting status of special partnership with the United States ( similar to those which
have: Great Britain, Japan or South Korea), or Latin America countries which are doomed to
have alliance of second category.
We want to use for this exercise the theoretical category of countries which are seimiperiphery, derived from theory of systems-worlds by Immanuel Wallerstetain, but moved
from deliberations about capitalistic economy into issues regarding national security. Helpful
in this case will be neo-realistic concept of international relations. It is concentrated on
meaning of international order’s structures and emphasizes position within countries
structures, which on one hand like United States with its actions has great influence on
behavior of other subjects, and on the other hand, countries like Poland which is trying to
improve its own position on the international arena.
Defining semi-peripheries
The category of semi-peripheral countries was introduced to social science by
Immanuel Wallerstein. American sociologist and author of world-system theory use it in
economical context. According to Wallerstein, the existence of a particular distribution of
power or capabilities within the international political system cannot be explained without
reference to the underlying economic order. “The major social institutions of the capitalist
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world-economy – the states, the classes, the peoples, and the households – are all shaped
(even created) by the ongoing workings of the world-economy” (Wallerstein, 1990, p. 508)
Immanuel Wallerstein, although he based his vision of world order on basic
assumptions of dependence theory, which criticized recognized by neo-Marxist, from
dependence school concepts bimodal periphery centre system (Goldfrank W.L., 1979 p.80). in
he’s theory assumes that world is much more complicated to be allowed to use this kind of
simplification. Because there is whole series of countries which are in the middle, which are
no to easy to categories them as centers or peripheries. In consequence the American scientist
proposes three-level approach to world-order: core, peripheries and semi-peripheries.
The middle layer of international hierarchy, semi-peripheries can be exploited and as
well they can exploit other countries. Part of accounted nations can within some time span, be
promoted into core, the other part will move into peripheries. It shows visible contrast in
relation metropolis – satellite, in example one present in Andre Gunder Frank work, where
it’s hard to see when satellite can change its status in the system.
Semi-peripheries include extremely wide spectrum of countries both in categories of
present economic power and as well political past. In this context countries which are most
commonly listed are countries like: Brazil, India, China, Malaysia and as well East-Central
European including Poland.
Wallerstein argues that the semi-periphery is important because it bridges the gap
between the rich core countries and the poor periphery countries. It provides balance and
order keeping the world from political and economic crisis in same way that the middle class
does on the national level in stable core countries (Wallerstein, 1979. p. 100). Polarized world
system with small sector of countries with high status and huge sector with low status, could
result in hurtful for everyone disintegration, hence the position of countries in middle status is
so important. They serve alongside political functions, helping in avoiding political crisis
connected with consequences of financial crisis (Śpiewak, Jelonek, 2004. P.19).
One of the most important features of this category is possibility of changing the status
– they can move both into centre and to peripheries group. We can assume that, peripherycountries and aware of its own position and some independence in taking up specified roles in
international exchange. These roles, are fulfilled with help of described earlier Wallerstein’s
three the most important development strategies, can help in improvement of its own position.
What is more characteristic it can be achieved on his own, and as well in cooperation, or even
with opposition of countries which belong to the core.
These characteristics which are assigned to semi-periphery can have influence not only
in analysis of world’s economy. As well they can become helpful in defining role of countries
in the international order, as well as in context of international safety. In theory international
relations theory this category, in spite of completely separated intellectual roots, the closest to
the neo-realistic approach would be used by Kenneth N. Waltz (similarities were observed by
C. Wright (2006) p.75-76). In Waltz’s system approach, the most emphasized thing is role of
international system structure, for countries functionality. „Structure mediates the outcomes
that states produce. As internal and external circumstances change, structures and states may
bear more or less causal weight.” (Waltz, 1990, p. 228). The place for individual political
units changes alongside with change of systems structure, and on its placement in defined
place within this structure, depends usually its independence scale, result of actions and
interactions (Waltz, 1979).
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In this theory most of the attention is focused on emphasis of functionality of the most
important elements of this structure – the superpower, less about countries which they
influence. So if we’d used category proposed by Wallerstein for analysis of international
system structure, we could have observe as well from perspective of countries which have
weaker position within the structure.
Those particular countries can play vital role especially in case of functionality of
subsystem which is “direct hegemony”, in which we don’t have to deal with hierarchical
pyramid of power, but with group of interrelations, institutions and rules created in order to
system work efficiently and simultaneously streamlining dominant role of super-power. When
maintaining this kind of relation, it is possible to maintain individual behavior, which comply
with own interest and as well as with established norms. So there is a field for countries which
are recognized as semi-equal to dominant super-power and as well to semi-periphery subjects.
Relatively there is a difference in imperial sub-system (hegemonic). It’s main
characteristic is submit ion to will of dominant state and restriction on the autonomy of
individual act on international arena. In opposition to semi-hegemony system, strength and
level of identification of countries’ individual interests with hegemony’s interest and system
as a whole, are not effects of negotiations and jointly worked out compromise, but structural
obligation which assures strength of imperial structure. It means that place of partnership like
deal for both sides interrelated with each other with different kinds of interests hold “exotic”
for many countries political contract or economical, which changes relations between
countries, ensuring the dominant state the right to control different life spheres at different
partners. (Łoś-Nowak, 2006, p.190). this relation is closer to functionality of dual-axis:
centre-peripheries.
Poland as semi-peripheral state
After this short theoretical introduction we can start to think whether Poland can be ,as
Wallerstein want to, be called as semi-peripheral state. Not only regarding the economical
sense, but as well as in field of international relations and international safety. There is no
conformity in this field even in Polish science circles.
Just after becoming in depended from USSR influence, there was a dominant opinion
about Polish capabilities for independent functioning of Poland on the international arena
during very advantageous conditions for our country: international economic and political
cycle, and as well in field of safety. Robert Kupiecki and Krzysztof Szczepanik in year’s 1995
perspective were trying to optimistically convince that main condition for Poland’s outside
activities is existence of world’s multi-polar power distribution, in which interest of countries
which are smaller can be taken into account and realized in wider spectrum, than in bi-polar
world, in which super-powers reached agreements while disrespecting basic interests its
weaker partners (…). In this case Poland is aspiring to oppose hegemony tic aspirations to
either sides.” (Kupiecki, Szczepanik, 1995. P. 50).
It was short time before we’ve recognized weaker sides and unrealistic approach of
this assumption. After Warsaw Pact dissolved the actual awareness emerged which
recognized disadvantageous for Poland, irregularities in Europe’s safety (Kuźniar, 2008,
p.44). Already first non-communist minister for international relations, Krzysztof
Skubiszewski, warned about creating in this part of Europe a buffer zone, the area of “grey
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safety” (Skubiszewski, 1993, p.16). The zone, which was not only potential place for rebuild
of superpowers with aspirations for Russian Federations, but in a great manner from within,
due to the rise of tensions within country in national capacity –ethno-nationalistic. In near
distance from Poland they resulted in bloody conflicts in Yugoslavia and in Transnistria.
In effect Poland’s international politics accepted two the most important goals: to stay
in Euro-Atlantic safety structures for good and to enter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and as well economical and political integration with European Union. In both cases it derived
from necessity of respecting hegemonic role of United States in the first case or European
institutions (foremost European Commission) in Brussels.
In spite of positive ending for both processes and accomplishment of Polish demands,
emerged comparison of Poland to periphery. The argument was brought, that transformation
in post-soviet countries is only an “imitation of westernization”, and Poland’s membership
within the European Union placed our country in Europe’s peripheries (Kransodębski, 2003,
p.197). Similar opinion has as well Jadwiga Staniszkis. Post-soviet countries were subject –
sociology writes – “structural violence” and implemented solutions which weren’t working
out for them in their phase of development. “It lead only to superficially, formal integration
with developed countries. Creative self-organization was put off and realistic integration was
made hard, which corresponded with post-communist countries during moment of
transformation in its beginning.” (Staniszkis, 2003, p.116).
Although if we were to recognize the right those criticizing opinions, which situate
Poland in the field of peripheries in today’s international relations, we cannot notice that there
are attempts which want to move country into direction of centre. An subjection of Polish
position can be called to most important goal of Polish diplomacy, at least from the beginning
of XXI century. Following this path, country which is trying to go through long road from
peripheries to centre can be treated as semi-peripheral area.
One of the strategies which were supposed to help in realization of this goal was
establishment of tight treaty with United States. In order to realize this goal Poland had to
convince Americans to realize this kind of need and convincing them that Poland can become
a country which is an equal partner and who can fulfill its promises.
United States politics regarding semi-peripheral areas.
Poland in United States international politics after 1989
The symbol of a new phase of Polish – American diplomatic relations was a visit of
Lech Walesa in the USA and a speech made November 15, 1989 before the joined houses of
the Congress. The context for those events was the fall of the Berlin Wall, changes in
Hungary, and next the Velvet Revolution w Czechoslovakia, the revolution in Romania and
the – falling apart – Soviet Union.
At the beginning of 1989 the attitude of the USA to the changes taking place in Poland
was restrained and expressed only in the form of economic promises for Polish economy and
customs facilitations. They seemed then justified not only because they were burdened with a
smaller geopolitical risk, but the expectations of Poles, being on the edge of economic
endurance. The attitude of the USA was, however, rather cold as regards the equally
impatiently awaited political decisions, making Poland a special, strategically key partner in
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this part of Europe. The decisions of president Bush from April 1989 (8 economic principles),
a visit to Warsaw and Budapest in July in the same year, the act of increasing economic aid
from November or, finally, solid support of the programme of economic reforms from the
turn of 1989 and 1990 .
The test of political cooperation became the question of unification of Germany, in
which the USA became convicted by the arguments of Poland and Czechoslovakia, so as to
take into account the position of those countries in the negotiations. The solutions found at
that time – not without a reason – were regarded as a success of a young, already independent
country.
The location of the countries in central Europe was, however, still uncertain, especially
in the light of the upheaval of Yanayev in August 1991. It led, though, to the final
disintegration of the USSR, but in the capitals of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary it was
believed that unstable Russia might be a threat for their former satellites. Partnership for
Peace, proposed by Bill Clinton, was considered to be highly insufficient, especially in the
light of the events from September 1993, when there was another rebellion in Russia, this
time against Boris Yeltsin An endeavour to admit those countries to NATO began, which to
the USA seemed then impossible in the name of keeping good relations with Russia. Over the
next two years the USA promoted the initiative of Partnership and only the electoral
campaign in the USA in 1996 and a huge mobilization of the Polish Americans led to the
admission of the solutions expected by Poland at the summit of NATO in July 1997 and the
official admission to the Pact in March 1999. However, the importance of that decision was
levelled by the fact of small, as for the Polish expectations, investments of American industry,
and the existing so far ones, like centres of concerns such as Dell, Microsoft or General
Electric are insufficient to significantly strengthen relations in the political sphere.
That is why the Polish government decided on two important steps. The first one was
supporting the American operation in Iraq in 2003, being part of the – initiated by president
Bush – war with terrorism. It was an extremely difficult decision because taken not in the
interests of directly threatened Poland, but with the aim of strengthening the strategic alliance
with the USA and at the moment admission of Poland to the European Union was being
decided. For the same reason Poland decided to take part in the stabilizing and battle
activities in Afghanistan, in fact as part of NATO forces, but in close cooperation with the
USA. The second one was the purchase of 48 F-16 fighters for the Polish Air Forces and
incorporating them in the service in November 2006. Decisions aimed mostly at keeping the
American engagement in the affairs of this part of Europe and its security.
An important role played also the activities having a typically political and diplomatic
character. In 2004 Poland got engaged – having a full consent and support of the USA – in
solving a growing conflict in Ukraine (the Orange Revolution). Most of all, the initiated in
2004 Polish-American Strategic Dialogue, for which the Polish side has high hopes, is
supposed to serve close cooperation. Its principal goal remains obtaining the status of an
important partner for the realization of American policy in the areas to the east of Poland,
being in a wider dimension part of the transatlantic policy of the USA.
How to asses Polish-American relationship? We’ll use short comparison of political agendas
which are used by United States with countries, which from international safety perspective,
have status of semi-peripheral states, which are developing treaty with Unites States not
because of their own potential, but because of other premises like: geographical position,
proximity with the rivals or rivals of the Unites states, or as well historical position. For this
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comparative analysis United States political agenda was used regarding given countries:
South Korea, Japan, and Australia.
Role of South Korea in post-war safety politics of United States
Before the year 1945 the interest in Korea was weak in the United States and limited
itself only to the social-religious sphere, though bilateral diplomatic and trade relations were
established in 1882, strengthening at the same time the position of Korea in the face of the
increased activity of its neighbours: Japan, China and Russia. While the political – economic
sphere of the arrangement awaited realization, the treaty paved the way for numerous
missions of Protestant churches, mostly Presbyterians, active especially after 1905. The role
of missionaries was to be, most of all, westernization of culture, participation in building
hospitals, schools and educational programmes, but also playing a role of unofficial
ambassadors of Korea in the USA, developing and keeping the interest in Far Eastern
partners among American elites.
The Second World War radically changed the role of Korea in American foreign policy;
especially The Cairo Conference (1943), whose final declaration promised that country
independence and placed it on the side of the allies against Japan. After defeating Japan, in
the changing political situation, Korea so to say automatically started to play the role of a U.S.
ally in the Far East, but the one not having clear and precise goals – on the one hand, it was
supposed to be a link in restraining the USSR in this part of the world, while on the other
hand, in the context of the recently finished war, Korea was regarded as a potential ally
against Japan. Yet Americans did not have precise plans concerning occupation of Korea, the
decision to divide it was made rather accidentally, and despite great military, logistic and
economic help given in 1946, more important to the USA was building military bases on
Okinawa than on the Asian continent. Such perceiving of Korea resulted from the conviction
that Korea was only a peripheral minor country (also in the region), its small strategic
usefulness, as well as fears that it might attack North Korea and lead to forceful and
unnecessary – from the American point of view – unification of the peninsula. Not without
importance was also – expressed in the „long telegram” – George Kennan's opinion
concerning restraining the aggression of communism rather in western Europe than in Asia.
The meaning of Korea changed in the second half of 1949 and resulted most of all from
the victory of the communist forces in China in October 1949 and the revaluation of
American strategy expressed in the document NSC 68. It manifested itself mostly by means of
supplies of weapon and financial aid for Seoul. The most meaningful example of American
engagement in Korean affairs was certainly the war 1950 – 1953, as well as – never seen
before – engagement of forces and military and economic measures serving equipping and
training the army of that country. Apart from the strictly military factors, the USA had also an
influence on the inner policy of Korea, playing a big, though less known role in removing the
president Rhee from power in 1960. It may be assumed that by that year Korea was perceived
most of all as an ally, needed to repulse an attack from the outside – Soviet or Chinese.
Therefore, Korea became a strategically important country
In the next decade the role of Korea changed, though still visible were some of its
features from the fifties. There was still a conviction that country might play an important part
in restraining communist influences, but because of the strengthening of American strategic
forces, great and constantly growing nuclear potential and political fight in postcolonial
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countries fighting for independence, more attention was paid to the inside threats (or a
communist upheaval) than the outside ones. An expression of those changes was the fall of
American military engagement in that country. Not without significance was also the general
change of social moods, the Cuban crisis and the problem of Vietnam, drawing more and
more attention of American politicians and army officials. The diminishing expenditure on
armament, the American help and the uncertain political umbrella, the vietnamization or the
thaw, which was in fashion, were taking place together with the increase of armament of
North Korea. In 1979 the USA were even planning a complete withdrawal of their forces
from Korea, which, however, did not take place. Trying to balance its political decisions, the
USA still equipped the Korean army with modern air, radiolocating and rocket equipment.
During the presidency of Ronald Reagan Korea became a very close ally of the USA,
mostly because of the sharp anti-communist course of the Republican president. He gave firm
support to his South Korean counterparts, Chun Doo Hwan and Rho Tae Woo, in their
international policy. In spite of the protectionist economic policy of Reagan, trade and
military exchange between both countries was also big. But the authoritarian policy of Korean
politicians cast a shadow on the mutual relations; it was especially negatively perceived in
Korea. Not wanting to let too strong anti-American moods arise, president Reagan made
president Hwan carry out elections in December 1987 and resign after the victory of Roh Tae
Woo. American policy was then driving at using South Korea to begin talks with the partner
from the north, initiate cultural and scientific exchange, departures and trade exchange. And
the policy of G. Bush aimed most of all at bettering of relations between both Koreas and
signing an agreement concerning using nuclear energy, reducing the weapon trade and
withdrawal from the supporting of international terrorism, also removing the threat of North
Korean nuclear attack on the USA. For realization of those aims Americans needed
benevolence of the president Roh and his Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
South-west foreign policy of Bill Clinton was characterized most fully by his speech
before the National Assembly in Seoul in June 1993: aiming – in the face of the ending of the
cold war – at removing its relics w (he regarded as such the devision of Korea), he stated that
it would be based on the American engagement in this part of the world, limiting spreading
mass destruction weapon, new regional dialogue and spreading democracy and the idea of
open society in the region. To achieve those goals, and especially to put pressure on North
Korea to reduce its nuclear programme, the presence of Seoul was necessary. The symbol of
the new hopes was the visit of president Kim Young Sam in Pyongyang in June 2000. And
during the presidency of George Bush South Korea was an important component of his
policy against ''the Axis of Evil'', to which North Korea was also qualified. However, bearing
in mind still fresh memories from the period of the dialogue in Clinton times, the policy of
Bush met with a frosty welcome in Korea, though the president of Korea Kim officially
supported the policy of the USA with reference to the WMD and global terrorism. The USA,
vexed at the enlargement of the North Korean nuclear arsenal, were therefore trying to use
mediation of the southern neighbour, and also China, as an element of pressure on the
communist regime and at the same time as a mediator, regardless of the fact that, that at the
beginning of 2003 South Korea distanced itself from more and more severe American
declarations, accepting owning of the nuclear weapon by North Korea. Such policy was
caused mostly by growing dissatisfaction from the policy of the USA, especially after the
outbreak of the war in Iraq and made president Roh maneuver between the faction of
adherents of a close cooperation with the USA and the adherents of a more separate and
independent foreign policy.
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So to sum up, the strategic interests of the USA in Korea may be described as: keeping the
peninsula free from atomic weapon; holding back locating long-range missiles capable of
reaching the territory of the USA; preventing spreading weapon of mass destruction on such
countries as Iran; preventing North Korea from supporting international
Place for Japan in United States politics
Just like in the case of Korea the role of Japan was changed by the end of II World War.
In 1945 the United States wondered how to prevent communist upheaval on the isles, that is
why in the first place there was efficient occupation administration, and seeing the progress of
the communist forces in Manchuria and China, it was clear for Americans that the security of
the USA would depend on how and to what extent Japan will be controlled by the future
opponent, which was seen in the USSR.
In the years 1945 – 1949 the USA used a double-track policy towards Japan – on the
one hand there were plans to strengthen the country economically, to prevent the development
of left-wing forces; on the other hand the military bases were enlarged, seeing in them an
indispensable component of American security. They turned out to be very necessary during
the Korea War, and the American engagement was crowned with signing a peace treaty
September 8, 1951, next completed in 1960 with a treaty of mutual cooperation and security.
So one can say that the decade was a time of mutual understanding, crowned with a return of
Okinawa by Americans in 1972. Nevertheless, the USA assigned Japan a strictly defensive
role, consisting in playing the role of a chain of defense before the expected Soviet invasion.
To that presumption a military doctrine and military forces and measures were applied. Also
American forces located on the isles were assigned strictly defensive tasks, their number
being reduced. It also resulted from the unfriendly attitude of Japanese people, numerous
blockades, pickets and manifestations against the enlargement of military bases, especially in
the years 1956 – 1957. It is worth mentioning that apart from military relations with Japan the
USA signed also appropriate agreements with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS, 1952), as
well as the Philippines, Australia, France, New Zealand, Great Britain, Pakistan and Thailand
within the framework of SEATO (1954).
In the seventies military relations between both countries looked correct; however, the
economic and political relations – not too well. It was the result of the so-called Nixon's
shocks that is the American president's decision to visit China without any consultations with
Tokyo and liquidating steady currency exchange rates in the trade between both countries, as
a result of which Japanese export goods became more expensive in the USA (1971). And the
result of the so-called Nixon's doctrine was partial shifting of duties connected with the
defensive system onto the Far East allies, which was connected with the increase of
expenditure on armament of those countries; what is important, at the end of the decade the
USA had to shift part of the forces in the region of the Near East.
After the end of the cold war the role of Japan changed, but that country did not lose its
significance in the eyes of the USA. It devoted 13 billion dollars to the first war in the Bay,
and next, in the face of confusion connected with the North Korean atomic programme (19931994), set up – together with North Korea and the USA – the Korean Energy Development
Organization (KEDO). Despite the worsening of relations in 1995, resulted from the scandal
connected with the conduct of the American soldiers, next year an alliance declaration for the
XXI century was signed; it included clauses emphasizing the role of Japan towards
neighbouring terrains (Taiwan). In 1997 both countries signed modified guidelines for the
military cooperation, which also spoke of potential „critical situations in the neighbourhood of
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Japan”, which in practice meant North Korean nuclear and rocket programme. That is why in
1998 both countries entered the common programme of building a system of anti-nuclear
defense. Regardless of the logistic support of Japan as for the intervention in Iraq, Japan took
part in the programme Proliferation Security Initiative, whose aim was seizing ships carrying
mass destruction weapon to countries of evil and terrorists and participated in naval
manoeuvres within the framework of the programme in October 2004.
In the latest years Japan and the USA experienced a worse period in bilateral relations,
indirectly connected with the leaving of pro-American premier Koizumi. His successor,
Shinzo Abe, suspected that the USA, China and North Korea had a deal concerning closing of
reactors in the last country behind the back of Japan, slighting its interests. Also the remarks
of the prime minister Abe from March 2007 in the subject of the so-called „comfort women”
caused a momentary worsening of relations. One can also notice a visible fall of a liking for
the USA from 2006.
Taking into account the events of the latest years one can state that from the point of
view of the USA Japan still remains an important and precious ally, though its role seems to
be the function of American – Chinese and American – North Korean relations. Beyond any
discussion remain military questions since in this field the cooperation looks very well.
Nonetheless, in Japan there are doubts that closer relations with China will lead to
marginalization of Japan and make the cooperation take on only a military cooperation form.
In this situation starting cooperation on different than hitherto existing fields, mostly nonpolitical, becomes important, to show multi-plane and multi-dimensional mutual relations.
Such fields might be for instance programmes connected with protection of the natural
environment, reducing greenhouse gases emission or preparing the technical solutions to its
realization, cooperation in the realm of health policy i reducing poverty in the regions touched
by it. Still an important question will remain spreading nuclear weapon until the situation
clears up with such countries such as North Korea and Iran. Both countries will need each
other and the strategic interests of the USA referring to Japan will be close to the presented
above interests in reference to Korea.
Position of Australia in United States politics
Another close ally of the USA in south-east Asia remains Australia. Both countries are
linked by the traditional closeness, both cultural and of civilisation, and in the political and
military sense – ANZUS. The most visible manifestation of cooperation of both countries
was recently the Australian contingent in the first war in Iraq, as well as the support given to
the USA after September 11. Also, during the second war in Iraq and lasting operation in
Afghanistan, Australian forces are engaged.
In the foreign policy of Australia, what strikes is a relatively small independence and
smaller ambitions, especially compared to the countries presented above. It is usually
explained by means of the past and historical experience of this former English colony, and
also peripheral geographical location, which makes Australia a country important only at the
moments of serious international tensions, like II World War, Korea War or to a lesser degree,
Vietnam War. The mentioned before cultural component played an important role at the time
when John Howard was the head of the Australian government. Therefore, it seems that to
Australia more important are relations that are asymmetrical, but based on the principle of
bilateralness, which makes them have a closer cooperation with the USA, visible especially
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during the cold war. That explains why Australia gave help to the USA during the Vietnam
War – according to its politicians, the fall of South Vietnam was a real threat in the region.
Greater independence characterized Australian foreign policy in the eighties, when
more attention was paid to the protection of northern outskirts of that country; that is why
there were endeavours to use the possibilities which ASEAN created. In spite of this, all the
time the United States remained unchangeably a strategic partner. A breakthrough came in the
year 1993, when the government of premier Keating announced that a strategic partner for
Australia in the realm of security will be Indonesia.
The disintegration of the USSR created, however, a situation, in which the USA had to
carry out a fundamental reorientation of its Far Eastern policy, assuming that in the changing
political circumstances China will try to strengthen its position. It was visible mostly during
the first Bill Clinton's term of office, when Australia was called ''southern anchor'' of the
security of the USA, and then corroborated in 1996. It led Australian politicians to the
conviction that the best form of relation would be, remaining in ANZUS, strengthening of
bilateral links with the USA in the realm of trade, defence and absorbing American models
and solutions on the principle of mutuality. An expression and proof of loyalty of Australia
towards the USA was the participation of Australia in Iraq operation in 2003.
Apart from the bilateral cooperation since 2002 Australia has been thaing part in
trilateral meetings with the participation of the USA and Japan, devoted to the problems of
security in the region. The fact of cooperation with Japan, corroborated also by the protection
of the Japanese soldiers in Iraq and a huge contribution in the export to that country, bears
witness to liquidating fears of Tokyo threat and suggests that all three countries saw threats
rather from China or North Korea. In the case of that first country there were doubts about its
economic position and, as a consequence, potential threats for the economic stability of the
region, which is especially important to the economy of Australia, strongly connected with
China. It is also looking for ways of intensifying trade exchange with China, on which
depends the development of Australia.
The result derived from this short comparison is that states which have semi-peripheral
potential don’t play fully independent role in international politics lead by United States. Its
significance in mainly dependent on problems defined in relationships of USA with stronger
partners, or rivals (North Korea, Vietnam). Hence great significance for military cooperation,
related like in case of Japan and South Korea to direct stationed of American army, but also
resulting in joint actions all around the world (operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq).
Nevertheless this several years experience shows us as well that these countries are
listed as countries which are close allies of United States, and relations regarding national
security, even though they are based on substantial disproportions can be regarded as equal, if
we see needs of all sides.
Coming back to Poland, this kind of assumption was motivation for Polish endeavors
for qualifying Poland in a global safety system project during unauthorized or accidental
missile attack.
Problem of construction of anti-missile defense system in Poland
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Case of installation in Poland elements of American National Missile Defense (NMD),
can be treated as a special case when considering United States politics regarding countries
which are determined to be semi-peripheral. Foremost because the system which is designed
to improve efficiency of United States defense systems on its territories, but it uses areas
which in most of the part are outside USA. It doesn’t provide protection to places in which it
is installed, what is more we can add is that it creates a threat to countries which proposed
their readiness for participation in this project. It can be used by Unites States as a strategic
and technologic advantage over countries which have long and middle range missiles, what is
more it can lead to major reconfiguration of nuclear balance system which derives from times
of “cold war”, between owners of the biggest amount of nuclear warheads.
In order to reach this goal, United States should be ready for far-reaching concessions
towards to nations which offered their cooperation. They can also use for their advantage the
situation for realization of interesting demands, without need to guaranteeing significant
concessions from their perspective. In other words they can show equal or hegemonic attitude.
It is also a good example from perspective of semi-peripheral countries. They gain
chance for tighter relationship with the centre. Although price be relatively high and may
result in lowering of effectiveness of security (terrorist attacks threats on American
installations, threat of countries which will target countries in which installations are based,
feeling threatened by Anti-missile system). But what is curious is whether they can negotiate
with stronger partners, conditions which would take into account their demands.
Both sides have equal opportunity to lead game which will take into account only their
own interest, alongside keeping its asymmetrical status.
American project of anti missile shield is officially called: Global Ballistic Missile
Defense, it is a continuation started in 1983 project, which was never completed: SDI
(Strategic Defense Initiative), and as well a bit latter NBMD program (National Ballistic
Missile Defense) from the 90’s. It is supposed to provide protection from ballistic missiles,
which are launched from air, sea and from ground. And as well it is able to destroy in any
given phase of flight, nuclear warheads.
For Poland location of American base has totally different significance. Country is not
directly under the missile threat from Iran or North Korea, the countries which are supposed
to protect US from their potential attacks. The system wouldn’t allow as well to efficient
protection of Polish territory from unofficially listed thereat by Poles which is missile attack
from Russian or Belarusian territories, where part of Russians army is stations. Antimissile
rocket launcher allows only destroying missile in its middle phase of flight. Not while its last
phase of flight when it’s approaching the target. For Poland big significance would have
presence of American troops stationing in the installation. Regardless of Poland’s
membership in NATO since 1999, it still doesn’t have any military infrastructure from
Alliance. Therefore presence of 1200 American personnel would be a symbolic way to
highlight relationship with NATO and simultaneously would increase determination of United
States to protect our countries territories. The most significant Polish demand, which could be
realized in case of antimissile shield, is getting access to the latest and most modern short and
middle range missiles defense system, which could strike in Poland.
This kind of real protection only Patriot missile batteries can provide, which are
intended for sale only to the closest allies of the United States. And those missiles became the
real objective of game conducted with Americans regarding case of Antimissile Shield.
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On 16 December 2002 President George W. Bush signed National Security
Presidential Directive 23 which outlined a plan to begin deployment of operational ballistic
missile defense systems by 2004. The following day the U.S. formally requested from the UK
and Denmark use of facilities in Fylingdales, England, and Thule, Greenland, respectively, as
a part of the NMD program. The projected cost of the program for the years 2004 to 2009 will
be $53 billion, making it the largest single line in The Pentagon's budget. In preliminary
assumptions the whole antimissile defense system would be ready by year 2035 and it’s
estimated to cost 1200 billion dollars.
The basic work regarding this project finished in 2004, but since 2002 United States
government was seeking territories in which it could place individual elements of its system.
Among potential candidates from East-Central Europe countries such: Czech Republic,
Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine and Hungary were listed. Poland was considered only in regard of
placing launcher of Ground Based Interceptors and as well as Ground Based Radar.
And during this stage, United States strategy was observed. Countries form EastCentral Europe which wanted to strengthen their relationships with the USA, were forced to
compete with each other and trying to convince Americans about their own virtues.
Simultaneously they restricted their freedom of issuing demands addressed towards United
States government.
Negotiations regarding Polish side in case of antimissile shield were conducted by five
governments: Leszek Miller, Marek Belka, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, Jarosław Kaczyński
and Donald Tusk governments. They were finalized on 20th of August 2008, by ministry of
foreign affairs Radosław Sikorski and the secretary of state Condoleezza Rice (Agreement,
2008).
Antimissile shield in Poland will be comprise of GMD (Ground-based Midcourse
Defense), which will have 10 antimissiles GBI, which will be equipped with 20 MKV module
warheads placed in silos. The personnel will comprise of 1200 people, from which 400 will be
operators and members of engineering team, 200 soldiers of USA military forces which will
secure 100 km² of base and the rest will be families of employed in the base. Around silos
with antimissiles there will be stretch of land of radiant of half of kilometer to which access
will have only several soldiers who have permission to launching of missiles. Soldiers will be
observing during long hours of duty monitors filled with incoming intelligence information.
Access the whole base and to launchers of antimissiles will have couple of Polish officers,
including commander of Polish military unit which provided safety from outside of the base.
4,5 km range surrounding the silos will be area filled with motion sensors. The area to which
civilians will have access will be place around 14km away from missile launcher. The total
cost of building base in Poland and it’s equipment in case if the project will be realized will
be 3,5 billion dollars, and it will be fully covered by Defense Department of the USA.
Before Poland reached these agreements, Polish side decided to give a try and
negotiate from Americans its bonus for making polish territory available to Americans. For
most it was supposed to me military help, including making Patriot-PAC3 missile system
available to Poland, which will protect Polish ground from attacks by missiles which could hit
Poland. In order to strengthen Polish stand, negotiators tried to use fact of similar negotiations
with Czechs regarding installation of radar. Presidents of Poland and Czech Republic, Lech
Kaczyński and Vaclav Klaus accepted on 22nd of May 2007, in Prague, common stand
regarding anti-missile system. In practice there was no such coordination, and United States
got possibility of separate agreements with Poland and with Czechs. They’ve used their long12
standing experience related with signing of similar military treaties. Several times US urged
Polish side, calling for speeding up the negotiations, competently playing with Polish disputes
between presidents and the Polish government. The other time when Polish side was lingering
with the decision to approve American demands, there were semi-official statements which
went into the media, regarding case when building of the base will be moved to a different
country, for example Lithuania.
On July 17th 2007 finally Americans convinced Polish president to deliver a speech
saying that after meeting with George W. Bush, case of installation is settled. In essence it
restricted Poland in negotiation field, leaving after political declaration only “technical
details” still to be talk about.
As well Polish side had some assets in these negotiations, which allowed Poland to
reach most of its own demands. Donald’s Tusk government used fact of inevitable end of
second term of Bush’s administration and promises of politics of Democrats Party which were
about to put halt on financing of the project. American side of the negotiations which wanted
to guide project to the end decided to allow and approve location on Patriot missiles on Polish
territories, and as well issued additional military guarantees. As well on final timing in
negotiations had outbreak of Russian and Georgian war in August of 2008. Which was treated
as return of Russian Federation to active and direct politics of having an impact on
neighboring countries.
In effect negotiations could finish on 14th of August 2008, negotiators: Andrzej
Kremer form Poland and John Rood from United States, were initiating agreement about
building and stationing in Poland antimissile base.
The agreement assumes that:
-
USA will significantly help Polish military in equipping it with latest technology.
-
America obliged to provide military security for Poland in case of attack from third
world countries.
-
There will be established Polish-American Consulting Group for Strategic
Cooperation, which will analyze and counteract to any threats from other countries.
-
Polish army will buy from USA till 2018 at least few (most probably 19) batteries
(more or less 2 battalions) Patriot PAC-3, equipped with 1800 antimissile/anti-airstike
missiles.
-
American base for antimissile system will be established in Redzikow (Baltic Sea
coast).
-
Polish Air Force will buy additional fighter jet planes (approx. 50) F-16
-
There will be established as well second base within Polish territory, in which there
will station garrison of American troops (120 people), and equipped with few Patriot
batteries which will have 96 missiles. This base will exist until Polish army will be
equipped with Partiot system.
-
Polish unit of soldiers will protect base from the outside, and its commander will have
access to all secured areas.
13
-
USA is obliged to support, train and develop opportunities for antimissile defense and
antiterrorist for Poland.
-
United States will support shared works within industrial, technological and military
sector.
Point 9.1 became point of particular significance in finally signed on 20th of August on
ministry level deal.
“Within the context of, and consistent with, the North Atlantic Treaty and the
emerging Polish-U.S partnership on missile defense, the United States is committed:
a. to the security of the Republic of Poland; and
b. to defend by means of its ballistic missile defense system the Republic of Poland
against ballistic missile attack.” (Agreement, 2008).
It another after article 5 in Washington’s Treaty, written obligation of United States for
defense of Polish territory in case of armed attack.
Weight of this agreement lowers only lack of ratification. It didn’t become binding
law. What is more after electing new president of United States, the new administration still
didn’t make decision whether to continue the project. what is more the administration even
lowered funding by 1,4 billion USD, which were allotted for this project.
It left Poland in very dangerous position in relation to incurred political cost of
agreement in the form of worsening relations with Russian Federation (decision regarding
placement of Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad Oblast), and countries from within the
European Union such as: France or Italy, which had negative opinion regarding missile
defense systems. This perspective came up while president Barrack Obama during talks with
President Dmitrije Miedwiediew on April 2nd 2009, showed second possibility which is
resignation from the project. That’s at least how Russian president reported this conversation.
American secretary of State Hilary Clinton, promised on the other hand during talks
with Polish minister for Foreign Affairs (Radosław Sikorski) on 25th of February 2009, that
regardless of decision regarding future of anti missile launchers in polish base, United States
won’t withdraw from realization of other points signed in the agreement. In order to prove
that United States will realize other points, they will send by the end of year 2009 first patriot
missile system. Nevertheless it is still unknown whether they will be fully operational and
armed.
Summary
The case of placing elements of American antimissile system on Polish territories still
hasn’t reached the end. But it shows that states semi-peripheral like Poland has to depend
their relations with stronger countries such as United States, taking into account bigger
spectrum of additional factors. Above all it has to recognize priorities demanded by
Americans and their relation with other countries. In this particular case these are
relationships between USA and Russia. In spite of ostensible tight relationship between
Poland and United States is based on strongly asymmetric basis. Poland in this case has to
wait for improvement within outside determinants. As well we can state that when Polish state
14
will see improvement within outside determinants, we’ll improve our position within
international system structure moving from periphery to the centre.
Documents:
1. “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government
of the United States of America concerning the deployment of Ground-Based Ballistic
Missile Defense Interceptors in the territory of the Republic of Poland” August 20,
2008.
2. “National Security Presidential Directive 23.” December 16, 2002
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