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CHAPTER – V
1857 REVOLT IN CACHAR AND THE ROLE
OF PRINCE NARENDRAJIT SINGH
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1857 REVOLT IN CACHAR AND THE ROLE OF PRINCE
NARENDRAJIT SINGH
The uprising of 1857 which had shaken the British Indian Empire had its impact on Cachar (now
in Assam), a distant north eastern region of India. There, a Manipuri prince named Narendrajit
Singh alias Sana Chahi Ahum, a son of Maharaja Chourjit Singh of Manipur (1803-13),
participated in this great uprising by joining the mutineers of the 34th Native Infantry,
Chittagong, when the latter entered Cachar. On his participation, McCulloch, the Political Agent
at Manipur, expressed, “Shortly after the mutineers entered Cachar, they were joined by the
prince, Narendrojeet Sing who was at large.” 1 In the book Takhelei also, it is written:
“The prominent example of his leadership quality was his capability of being the leader
of the peoples of Cachar in the Revolt of 1857. In the revolt, he not only was the ring
leader but also gave proper guideline for the shelter, food and traditional medical care.
His presence also aroused a new zeal to those rebel sepoys.”2
For the great role played with these mutineers in Cachar, this Manipuri prince was recorded as a
leader of 1857 with this remark, “He joined the Chittagong mutineers with his followers.”3
5.1
Cachar and the early career of Prince Narendrajit Singh
On the east of Sylhet there was the kingdom of Cachar. As Kacharis were ruling over this
kingdom it was named Cachar. It is now within the State of Assam. Cachar had an area of 3,769
square miles. On the north it is separated from the Nowgong district by the Kapili and Doyang
rivers. On the east it is bounded by the Naga Hills and the State of Manipur; on the south by the
Lushai Hills; and on the west by the Sylhet district and the Jaintia Hills. The plains included
within Cachar form the upper portion of the Surma Valley; the hill portion (area 1,706 square
miles) is a section of the Assam Range which divides the Surma Valley from the Brahmaputra
Valley. Buranjis (Chronicles of Assam) dealing with Kachari ruling families mentions that the
first king of this dynasty named Khunkara died in 1531 A.D.4 The Kacharis, before shifting their
capital at Khaspur (South Cachar), had their capital at Maibong (in North Cachar Hills). Gouri
Sen writes, “The Kacharis of Maibong shifted their capital from Maibong to the plains of Cachar
at Khaspur in the middle of the 18th Century.”5 The earliest matrimonial relationship between
Manipuris and Kacharis dated back to 1670.
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Gateway to the Capital City of Khaspur, Cachar
(Courtesy:- Gouri Sen, Life in Kachari Kingdom at Khaspur)
The protected palace complex of Khaspur, Cachar
(Courtesy:- Gouri Sen, Life in Kachari Kingdom at Khaspur)
Gangmumei Kabui also writes, “One girl from Manipur was married to a chief of Kacharis. In
June, 1670 the bride price of the girl named Mayangleima was given in a form of a palanquin.”6
From this time onwards, apparently, Manipuris had developed close relationship with the
Kacharis. A great mass of Manipuris immigrated to Cachar during the time of Garib Nawaz
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(1709-1748). Here, the Ningshing Chephong (in Manipuri), expresses, “The fact that some
people had to leave Manipur and settled in Cachar is of great significance. During the reign of
Maharaj Garib Nawas (1709-48), some of the people who are not willing to accept Vaishnavism
were driven out of land. They took shelter in Cachar.”7 During this period Burma became
powerful and thus invaded Manipur repeatedly. Indeed, “The Rajas and princes of Manipur with
their subjects had been making their settlements at Cachar in large number from the period 17091819.”8 From the time of Raja Bhagyachandra (Jay Singh) of Manipur (1763-98), Chandrapur in
Cachar, had been a part of Manipur till its British occupation in 1830.9 After the British
occupation of Cachar, Gambhir Singh also occupied Chandrapur claiming that it was his
forefather‟s land. Upendra Guha, in his Cacharer Itibritta, writes, “There was close ties between
Manipur and Kachari kings when the latter was ruling from Khaspur. With the betrothal of
princess Induprabha (daughter of Raja Madhuchandra of Manipur) to Kachari king
Krishnachandra (1780-1813) Manipuri settlements in Cachar enhanced.”10 Parbitta Singh,
brother of Induprabha (queen of Cachar), was one such Manipuri who had settled in Cachar
during that period.
By that time, in Manipur, Maharaja Chourjit Singh (1803-1813), father of Narendrajit
Singh, was the ruler. He was a very religious person. His brother Marjit Singh, feeling jealous of
the throne, connived with the Burmese, and thus, the later invaded Manipur in 1812. Ultimately,
by 1813, Maharaja Chourjit Singh was expelled by his brother Marjit Singh and the former took
shelter in Cachar with his brother Gambhir Singh. They sought the assistance of Govindchandra,
but were refused. Chourjit Singh then went to Calcutta, there also, having failed to secure the
assistance of the British, came to Jaintia, and making an alliance with its Raja Ram Singh began
to create troubles on the frontier of Cachar. Govind Chandra approached the British authorities
for 25 sepoys to help him.11 Meanwhile, Marjit Singh, having consolidated his authority in
Manipur with Burmese support invaded Cachar in December, 1817. Once more Govindchandra
invoked the intervention of the British Government, but no notice was taken of his application.
Therefore, Govindchandra requested help from Chourjit Singh and Gambhir Singh. With the
help of the two Manipuri brothers Govindchandra could expel Marjit from Cachar. Before the
engagement, Chourjit Singh got the consent from Govindachandra to handover southern part of
Cachar in the event of their success against Marjit. Hence, from 1818, Chourjit Singh and
Gambhir Singh had been ruling over some part of South Cachar independently.
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Govindachandra‟s principality was saved for the time being, but he soon found that his friends
were his worst enemies. Chourjit Singh, Gambhir Singh and Tularam (enemies of
Gobindchandra) took advantage of Govindchandra‟s troubles and
A part of Narendrajit Singh‟s birth record
(Preserved by R.K. Jitendrajit, Tripura)
plundered Cachar. Ultimately, the Cachar Raja was ousted from his Kingdom and compelled to
take shelter at Sylhet, a British Division now in Bangladesh, and Manipuris ruled over the whole
south Cachar. Here, A.C. Banerjee writes, “Towards the middle of the year 1818 the Cachar Raja
was ousted from his kingdom and compelled to take shelter at Sylhet.” 12 In Manipur, Marjit
Singh failed to satisfy the expectations of the Burmese king, and the latter, invading Manipur,
expelled Marjit Singh to Cachar in 1819 leading to the Seven Years Devastation (1819-1825) in
Manipur. It was the period during which thousands of Manipuris immigrated to Cachar. After
some time, the three Manipuri brothers living in Cachar reconciled and divided South Cachar for
themselves. Here, Gouri Sen writes, “These three Manipuri princes split the Kachari Kingdom
into three divisions and each governed one part during 1819-1823 from three new capitals;
Gambhir Singh from Gumrah; Marjit from Hailakandi; and Chaurjit from Dungurirpar near
Sonoimukh.”13 At this time, Chourjit Singh, marrying Lairikyengbam Chanu got their son
Narendrajit Singh. It is stated, “Narendrajit Singh was born on Tuesday, the 27 th April, 1819, at
Dunguripar, Sonoimukh in Cachar, but he was brought up in Jaribond, Hailakandi District. The
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prince grew up as a very capable and handsome boy. Besides his knowledge of fire arms, he was
also quite proficient in Sankritana (ritual song with percussion).”14 In the Takhelei it is also
written,
Customary dress of Narendrajit Singh
(Preserved by R.K. Jitendrajit, Tripura)
“Narendrajit Singh was a born leader endowed with alertness, patience & selflessness. Because
of these qualities he was honoured by every section of people in Cachar and praised as a divine
man.”15 Chourjit Singh, in union with another queen Khumbongmayum Ningol, got other two
sons viz., Tribhubanjit Singh and Ram Singh.
In the early part of 1823, a quarrel broke out among the three Manipuri brothers.
Consequently, Marjit Singh occupied Hailakandi and Gambhir Singh possessed himself of the
rest of South Cachar. Chourjit Singh left Cachar and took shelter in Sylhet in May 1823. Chourjit
Singh requested the British Government to recognise him as the tributary ruler of Cachar. It was
the political scenario of Cachar before the Burmese invasion and the ultimate declaration of the
First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826).
When the Burmese forces occupied Cachar later in 1823, Gambhir Singh and Marjit
Singh also fled to Sylhet. The invasion, being a great threat to the Company‟s frontier, the
British Government declared war against Burma in which those three Manipuri brothers, then in
Sylhet, proposed their willingness to join in the side of the British so that they could participate
in expelling the Burmese from the soil of Cachar and Manipur. The Supreme Government
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considered Gambhir Singh‟s request, and thus, the latter proceeded to Badarpur in April 1824,
and joined the British detachment stationed there. He was also informed that “Manipur would be
given to him if he could conquer it, and that the British Government would not ask him to admit
Chourjit Singh to any share in the Government.”16 Marjit Singh was given a vast waste land in
Cachar as it was reported that “There is a recommendation for a Jageer from the waste land of
Cachar to be given to the Mannipoor chief Marjeet and his family.”17 Hence, for Gambhir Singh
and Marjit Singh, something, either political or economic had been appropriated, but for Chourjit
Singh, the proposal had not only been refused but he was also sent to Nuddea (Nabadwip, West
Bengal) where he died discontentedly in 1828. Consequently, the early career of Narendrajit
Singh was full of sufferings and he never forgot the ill-treatment meted out to his father by the
British.
After the war, with the signing of the Treaty of Yandaboo, 1826, Gambhir Singh became
Raja of Manipur. He, knowing the wealth of Cachar and it being ruled by Manipuri brothers
(1818-1823), always tried to annex it. Manipuris who were born and brought up there in the past
many years also felt their belongingness to Cachar. After the assassination of Govindchandra in
1830, there arose the question of succession. The British Government, after rejecting the claims
from bereaved queen Induprabha (a Manipuri), 40 Sepungs (forty Dimacha clans), Tularam,
Govindaram and Raja Gambhir Singh of Manipur; annexed south Cachar in 1832. Consequently,
the political life of Manipuri princes in Cachar was shattered into pieces and they now became
British Ryots in the process degrading their social status and honour they enjoyed before.
With the British occupation of Cachar, its agricultural economy was exploited. In 1831,
the value of rice in Cachar was five times less than that of Sylhet. C. Tucker, Commissioner at
Sylhet, reported:
“Paddy was selling last year in Cachar for 16, 17, and 18 Mounds for the Rupee,
whilst in our own district the same description of grain sold at the rate of 3
Mounds for the Rupee whole sale and 2 12 in the Bazar. The district of Sylhet
exports annually a large quantity of grain to Naraingunge and Dacca.”18
Knowing this sizeable difference in paddy price and in order to extract its maximum benefit, the
Supreme Government lifted the duties in all the agricultural products in Cachar by an order, “The
duties on export of grain and other agricultural produce, and on the import of iron and
agricultural implements and cattle be abolished with all interior customs.”19 On the other hand,
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the settlement of agricultural land in Cachar was made similar to that of Sylhet as Fisher, in
charge of Cachar, reported, “A declaration has been made to the effect that the assessment will
be made on the principles adopted for new settled lands in Sylhet.20 Thus, when the price of
paddy was very low the people of Cachar had to pay the land revenue equal to that of Sylhet.
Besides, the British Government started taxation from the tax free lands given to Brahmins and
Temples of Cachar as Cracroft stated, “I look upon all Brumottur and Deourettur land and those
said to be applied to religious purposes, fair object of taxation and that this principle should be
enforced  but I don‟t think it desirable any general rule should be promulgated on this
subject”21 Lastly, the British policy of inviting land hungry people from Bengal for extensive
cultivation of Cachar also made another greater threat to its economy. Here, Lt. Fisher writes on
31st August, 1832:
“To secure a considerable influx of settlers into Cachar from the westward, it would only
be necessary to made known to the inhabitants generally of Sylhet, Comillah and
Mymensing, through the officers of the provinces in those districts, that the country of
Cachar has been permanently annexed to the British dominion, that the land tax there will
be regulated upon similar principles and will be fixed at rates analogous to such as have
been adopted in recent assessment made by the British Govt., that settlers may obtain
good jungle land rent free for one thousand days, at the end of which time a settlement
will be concluded for the portion brought into cultivation, to which the holder will
acquire a proprietary right as a Talookdar or Zemedar, subject only to the regular
discharge of the land tax, and that in case- where an outlay was made for draining or
filling marches, clearing forest or the like, the period during which the land would be
allowed to remain rent free would be extended for five years for such parts as were
reclaimed.”22
For some time, the people of Cachar remained silent as peace and tranquillity were restored by
the new Government. However, this dormant state of the people of Cachar became very active
and volatile by 1857, and ultimately, erupted in the form of a revolt.
In general, Manipuris in Cachar did not respect the profession of trade and commerce.
When there was the drain of the wealth of Cachar through free trade policy, the human resource
of the Manipuris of the place was also exploited by the British Government. At this time, the
Kukis living in the neighbouring Lushai Hills made many repeated predatory and head hunting
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expeditions on South East Cachar resulting in boundless trouble to its settlers and the cultivators.
Here, a report expressed, “The Kookies are commonly made suddenly in the night, not so much
with a view to plunder, as to kill the inhabitants and carry off their heads to be employed in
religious ceremonies.”23 If these frontiers were to be protected, many posts of sepoys were to be
established incurring heavy expenditure to the Company. Now, the authorities of the British
Government perceived to exploit the might of gallant Manipuris living in Cachar through an
advance called Tuccavi. The objective of Lt. Fisher behind this advance was “to bring under
cultivation those pergunahs which suffered in an extraordinary degree during the Burmese war,
as also those lands  to the Kooky frontiers.”24 He cleverly planned to give this advance to the
Manipuris for cultivation on the most exposed area so that they protected the area without
incurring any expenditure from the Company‟s treasury. In 1832, Fisher wrote:
“The sum of one thousand rupees which I wish to devote to this specific purpose, I
propose to advance to Purbitta Sing Rajkoomar (the brother of Ranee Induprabha) who
undertakes to establish one thousand Ryuts on the most exposed part of the frontier, and
defend the neighbourhood of his settlement.”25
After three years when the advance was very successful, Fisher again expressed, “No outrages
have been committed on this part of the frontier during the last three years and  several
Munnipoorie chiefs and others have recently offered to take advance for the establishment of
villages similar to that of Purbitta Sing.”26 Consequently, Fisher requested the authorities for
more fund for the Tuccavi loan so that the entire Kuki frontier would be protected. Responding
to it, the Government expressed:
“His Honour in Council has been pleased to sanction the disbursement of a sum not
exceeding 2000 Rupees in advance on loan to Munnepooree Chiefs for the purpose of
enabling them to settle villages on the remaining portion of the frontier, similar to the one
which has been established by Purbitti Sing.”27
Another hidden motive of Lt. Fisher behind it can be understood from his statement:
great extension of cultivation and consequent increase of revenue may be expected
“A
from it not
merely from the land which will be cleared by the Munnipoorees but from much large tracks
which will be protected by them and which in their present state of
insecurity our unwarlike
Ryuts are afraid to occupy.”28 By and by, the human resources of Manipuris in Cachar were
exploited engaging them as frontier guards just for an advance of Rupees one thousand for equal
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number of Ryuts. Tribhubanjit Singh, elder brother of Narendrajit Singh, also got the same
Tuccavi and thus, it was expressed, “Narendrajit Singh, in his early career, burnt midnight oil
guarding Konung Leikai, Jaribond in Cachar, staying in a Garud (hut for armed men) erected
near a Tera tree (Burm) just a Kilometre south to the Kalapahar (hill) to prevent from Kuky
attacks.”29 Later, Manipuris were quite aware of the British policy of human resource
exploitation in Cachar through Tuccavi. Owing to the protection given to other communities in
Cachar, the Manipuris were highly respected in Cachar. Here, Th. Madhai Babu narrated an
event which had taken place in his village Thangjam Leikai, Sonai, in the second half of the 19 th
century:
“A granddaughter of Raja Chourjit Singh married to one Thangjam Jadu Singh of
Thangjam Leikai, Sonai. This man was a Mouzadar under the British. When Jadu Singh
was out of station his wife, being honoured as a Manipuri princess, used to try petty
village cases. Once, two Muslims, who were quarrelling about their land, sought the
decision of the princess. The princess heard the case and accused both the Mulims and
then forcefully ordered both the parties to be liberal minded and to take one step
backward from their previous stand-points. On hearing it the parties accepted and the
matter was solved.”30
By this time, in Manipur, Nur Singh became the regent of Raja Chandrakirti Singh (Gambhir
Singh‟s son). Seeing it, many Manipuri princes in Cachar revolted against Manipur with the idea
that Nur Singh was a distant member of the ruling family. Consequently, Tribhubanjit Singh also
revolted in May 1841. However, he was defeated and killed in Manipur. This incident was very
painful to some Manipuri princes in Cachar like Parbitta Singh, Khoiraba (Leelumbar /
Neelumbar) and young Narendrajit Singh (brother of Tribhubanjit Singh). Later in that year, it
was reported by the Political Agent at Manipur to the Superintendent of Cachar that “a report
was abroad that another attack was almost to be made by three other princes (Pubetro Sing,
Lelumber Sing and Narendrojeet a brother of Tribowanjeet), and he requested the Superintendent
at once to place them in confinement.”31 Consequently, Captain Lyons, then Superintendent of
Cachar, arrested the three princes on 16th October, 1841, and later, they were removed to Dacca
by an order of the Government:
“H. L in Cl. (His Lordship in Council) is of opinion that the persons, Parbittar Sing,
Khairaba and the brother of the late Triboobanjeet, should be removed to Dacca and
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detained there under such precautionary surveillance as may prevent their return to the
hills without the knowledge and sanction of Government.”32
As Narendrajit Singh was not satisfied with the treatment and having suffered tremendously, he
submitted a petition on 25th April, 1842, expressing “complaints of being illegally imprisoned by
the Superintendent of Cachar & solicits Government to direct his release.”33 But, his petition was
not heeded to. Thus, the prince had to spend his youthful days with Parbitta Singh and Khoiraba
under strict surveillance “in a miserable state at Tajgong a Jungle near to Dacca.”34 Again in
1849, the three princes memorialised the Government requesting permission to return to Cachar,
but the Government responded, “They should continue to reside at Dacca, but that the
surveillance maintained over them should be made as little irksome as possible.”35 Later, Captain
G. Verner, another Superintendent of Cachar, gave this statement, “With regard to Narendrajit
Sing little is known, he is a young man and I believe his greatest crime was being the brother of
Tribowanjeet Sing, who did make an attack on Munnepore.”36 Therefore, Narendrajit Singh may
not be considered the real trouble maker of that case for which the three Manipuri princes were
removed to Dacca.
This period of surveillance in Dacca was the period during which Narendrajit Singh
attained his political maturity. There, he might have conceived the real might and nature of the
British rule in India. Hence, the prince might have conceived that unless and until a united power
confronted the British rule in India would remain forever.
Later, Rajah Chandrakirti of Manipur pleaded the Government in 1851, “The three
princes Purbetro Sing, Neelumbur Sing and Narendro Sing at present under surveillance at Dacca
may be allowed their liberty.”37 Consequently, the three princes including Narendrajit Singh
were released on 7th November, 1851, as it was reported, “The 3 Muneepore Princes named in
the margin (Pubetro Sing, Neelumber Sing, Nuraindro Sing) who were under surveillance at
Dacca were released from further surveillance on the 7th instant.”38 Coming back to Cachar
Narendrajit Singh did not join the revolts of Leelumbar, Null and Kanhai in November, 1852,
and that of Wangkheirakpa, Kanhai and Kishor Singh in January, 1856, against Manipur.
5.2
The Prince as a rebel of 1857
When Narendrajit Singh was very young his father Chourjit Singh was the ruler of a part
of Cachar. Besides, his uncles were also ruling at different places of South Cachar till the advent
of the Burmese in 1823. Therefore, Manipuris living in Cachar considered the latter as their
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territory. Besides, Narendrajit Singh also did not forget the ill treatment meted out to him and his
father by the Company. Over and above this, in the Kingdom of Manipur where Narendrajit
Singh‟s father once reigned, the British Government ceded the Kabaw Valley (resource rich
territory of Manipur), to Burma in 1834. This event was just like the snatching of a child from a
mother‟s lap. On the diplomatic policy of Burma after 1826, it was stated:
“The Ministers were paying great attention to the re-organisation of the military forces.
The Governors of Prome, Bassein, and other cities in the Delta were appointed as military
chiefs (Bo) who had „the power to call out the inhabitants of their districts to meet armed
at any point they pleased‟. The civil administration was also improved.”39
Besides, the first demand of the Burmese envoy sent to Calcutta in 1830 was “the restoration of
the Kabaw Valley.”40 On the other hand, the British Government advised its envoy at Burma,
“The Governor-General also desires, that your attention should be given to the trade of Ava with
a view to reporting to his Lordship in-Council the practicability of extending and facilitating
British commerce and the consumption of British manufactures”41 Hence, in order to avoid
another expensive war against Burma and at the same time to improve British economic
activities in Burma, the Kabaw Valley of Manipur was ceded to Burma. This heinous crime of
the British Government was a great disappointment for all the Manipuris living either in Manipur
or Cachar.
When Narendrajit Singh was at such height of anti-British feelings the Revolt of 1857
inflamed almost all the northern regions of India. The prince then considered the event most
suitable to act against the British, and ultimately, remained prepared for the right moment to
jump into the fray. At this juncture, the sepoys of the 34th Native Infantry, Chittagong, also
mutinied and fought the Battle at Latoo, 18th December, 1857, killing Major Byng in the field.
After this battle, the Chittagong mutineers entered Cachar on 20th December, 1857, and they
were joined by Narendrajit Singh and his party.
5.3
British preparations to face the challenge
In Cachar, the report of the Battle of Latoo and the real intention of the mutineer‟s march to
Manipur were received in the late night of the 19th December, 1857, as it was stated:
“Late on the night of 19th instant I received a letter from Mr. Dodd...informing...there had
an engagement with the mutineers on the morning of the 18th, in which they were
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completely routed with a loss of about 30 men. The remainder had fled, it was said, in the
direction of Pertabghur with a view to make towards Cachar and Munipoor.”42
Instantly, six Manipuri princes of Cachar viz., Sangie Thapa, Kunnai Sing, Mypha, Hawjaw,
Khem Sing and Khoirakpa were arrested as W.J. Allen reported that these princes “suspected of
hostile designs were arrested in December last by order of the Officiating Superintendent as a
precautionary measure when the mutineers of the 34th Native Infantry were marching in the
Cachar District towards Munneepore.”43 Narendrajit Singh, being absconded already, could not
be arrested. So he remained underground before 19th December, 1857.
As there was a great need of armed men, Kookies were employed paying the same salary
of sepoys. Here, it was reported, “The Kookie villagers, while so employed, I have promised the
pay of sepoys.”44 Robert Stewart (Superintendent of Cachar) also stated:
“I have also entertained a temporary establishment of 10 men as scouts, for the
procurement of intelligence and collection of supplies, and have increased the police
establishment of the 3 Thannas of my district by 8 Burkundazea, four for the Sudder
Thanna and two for each of the others for the same purpose.”45
Above all, the Superintendent declared a reward of Rs. 100/-for the apprehension of those
princes who had been arrested but later escaped from jail and Narendrajit Singh who had already
joined the Mutineers. Lastly, Stewart gave a stern warning that if anyone was found giving
shelter or food to the united party of mutineers and Narendrajit Singh he would be hanged. Here,
a folk song runs:
“Duar bandha-re sipahi aila ghate
Sheb babu-e hokum dila
Morba- ey fansir kathe
Hai- re morba- ey fansir kathe.
-Oh brother, shut your door, the sepoys are all around. The Sahib has given order, you will be
hanged, if you give them shelter.”46 When all such efforts seemed less effective, the
Superintendent sought special power to try anyone involved in such revolt against the British
Government. The Superintendent stated that a portion of his subjects in the district was in
rebellion against the Government, and thus, he solicited the Lt. Governor the expediency of
investing him with “powers under Act XI of 1837 for the trial of such as may be apprehended.”47
Hence, the British Government in Cachar took up the most possible preparations to face the
challenge of Narendrajit Singh and the mutineers.
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5.4
1857 and Chittagong mutineers in Cachar
As the Revolt of 1857 spread towards North East India, Robert Stewart took up precautionary
measures at Cachar. He stated that the popular mind in Cachar seems in no way affected by the
disturbances which were occurring in the North-West. However, apprehensions moved this mind
when he heard about the mutiny at Chittagong and the sepoy‟s march towards North East.
Stewart, therefore, posted guards at the southern part of the border and sent a small party to the
Lushai villages with this message:
“If men come to them through the jungle from the west with red coats and heavily laden,
they are our enemies and must be opposed in every possible way, if it is the wish of the
Lhoochais to endeavour to please our Government. That the men themselves are most
probably wealthy, and it will afford easy and good plunder, and that moreover I will give
Rs.50/ for each sepoy for whom they account to me.”48
Stewart felt more apprehension because of the secret activities of Manipuri princes who had
come and settled in Cachar at different stages and who also had ruled over Cachar from 1818 to
1823.
After the Battle of Latoo, the remaining sepoys from Chattagong fled towards Pertabghur
with a view to make towards Cachar and Manipur. The Daroga of Latoo informed Stewart that
the mutineers had gone eastward with a view to cross over the hills into the Pargana of Serespore
and Hailakandi. On December 21, 1857, Lt. Ross informed Stewart that the mutineers had split
into three to four different groups and all were trying to enter into the district of Cachar. Stewart
also heard that one of the three groups comprising of forty to fifty strong soldiers were
approaching towards Badarpur. The Superintendent then reinforced his strength at Panchgram.
Having hard that the Mutineers were in the village Chandpur in Serespore Pargana and were
trying to march towards Hailakandi, Lt. Ross rushed with fifty numbers of strong arm and twenty
five Kuki scouts. The troops arrived at Companyganj on 22nd morning. However, the mutineers
had crossed the valley during the previous night.
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(Sketch route of Chittagong Mutineers from Latoo to Binnacandy)
Ross then marched towards Mohanpur Mouza and intercepted the rebels. In the encounters, on
official side one sepoy was killed, three sepoys were injured and one was missing. Some dozen
of the mutineers faced heavy casualties and the remainder escaped in the dense forest to the
South East direction. According to the tradition it is stated that, “Some of the arrested mutineers
were executed hanging down from the branches of a Banyan Tree grown on the bank of the
Kathakal River.”49 At the hill-top where the engagement had taken place a war memorial known
as Rantila is now constructed.
125
(Rantila at Mohanpur, Cachar)
Since the large quantity of arms and ammunitions hampered their long march to the Bhuban
Hills, at Hailakandi, through the machination of Narendrajit Singh, some arms and ammunitions
of the mutineer‟s were apparently transported in the Katakhal River and concealed the loaded
boat in the thick forest of the Kala Pahar (Now in Jaribond, Hailakandi District, Assam). Here,
an oral tradition of Jaribond expresses,
“Narendrajit Singh fastened a boat laden with arms at the trunk of a big banyan tree at
Kala Pahar with a very heavy iron chain. The latter remained for many years firmly tied
with the tree, but it was removed later by the staff of the Gagala Chherra Tea Garden.
Sometimes at night when the weather was bad, the area where the boat was hidden
produced an unusual sound like a paddler on a Khurum (wooden slipper).”50
126
(Broken Banyan Tree at which Narendrajit had anchored a boat loaded with arms)
(The scholar at the spot of the remains of the historic banyan tree at Kala Pahar)
This aged and historic banyan tree fell down in around 2005 A.D. and its trunk nearly
50ft. long had a decayed look when it was visited on 20th November, 2009. The place where this
banyan tree grew is worshiped by the people of Jaribond today.
Because of the absence of Lt. Ross at the Sadar Station, Silchar, Stewart made
arrangements to strengthen the Head Quarters by withdrawing several guards from the North
East, and thus, the outpost of Jalenga was replaced by armed Kukis recruited from the villages in
the grant of the Cachar Tea Company. Mr. James Davidson, Manager of the Cachar Tea
Company provided sufficient help to Captain Stewart who considered him an asset during the
British campaign. The Manager not only supplied Kuki scouts from his garden but also intimated
reliable information concerning the movement of the mutineers. Earlier, the said Company
received a grant of 12,508 acres from the Government, but, owing to the valuable service
127
rendered by the Tea Company, the Government awarded a “further land grant of 160508
acres.”51
After the engagement at Mohanpur, the next encounter took place on 24th December,
1857, at Jalenga near Chatla Howar. Here the British campaign was helped by the Kukies and
Lushai tribes. About this engagement, the Superintendent reported:
“The mutineers showed no fight but fled after the first volley, our men in pursuit firing
into their rear and killing several. In their flight the enemy have thrown down several
muskets, their bags of rice and of rupees, and ran to make for the south east escaping into
the dense jungle in that direction.”52
Robert Stewart then reported on 2nd January, 1858, “After the fight at Jalinga the Mutineers
entered the heavy and dense jungles of Chuttla Howlear where they remained wandering about
for five days. During the time they did not obtain one particle of nutritious food, but were
compelled to eat of jungle roots and barries.”53 These mutineers were tracked up by the Kuki
scouts and were found not to be making more than four miles a day, that too, in a circuitous
direction. The scouts came across several of them who had died of hunger and disease, and also
on the bodies of several of their children whom they had dashed on the ground being unable to
carry them on. The scouts also killed two sepoy stragglers and made prisoners of a Chittagong
Kandie and a Seikh Faqueer of Chittagong.
According to a report, there was a separate engagement on the 28th December, between
the mutineers and the 34th N.I. under Gurkha Jemadar Ram Bist. The report expressed:
“On the 8th of February Mr. Allen reported the particulars of an engagement which took
place on the 28th Dec. last between a party of the mutineers of the 34th N.I.R and a small
detachment of our troops commanded by a Goorkha Jemadar named Ram Bist, in which
5 of the mutineers were killed and three taken prisoners and afterwards shot by the
Jemadar on their attempting to escape from the guard. Lt. Sherer being of opinion that the
party was entitled to receive a reward of Rs. 50 for each armed mutineer killed, Mr. Allen
referred the matter for the orders of Govt. And the reward claimed was allowed by the Lt.
Governor.”54
Satisfied with the excellent performances of the Sylhet Light Infantry throughout these
engagements, Stewart remarked:
128
“Distant not more than 30 yards from the enemy while firing, the latter tried to gain them
over by every art of appealing to their religious feeling as well as a nationality. Failing
this they taunted them by calling them “KRISTIAN KA KOOTA” and “GOLAMIES” but
they received answer only in bullets and abuse.”55
Being worried about the reinforcement of the sepoys, the Superintendent stated:
“The mutineers are still 200 strong with abundance of arms and ammunition and I have
not anything like equal numbers to oppose them. Superior numbers are required in order
to surround them in the jungle, else it will be nothing but a running fight the whole way
through to Munipoor....I am not even strong enough to dispatch a force after them should
they get out of my district and pursuing force would be most desirable.”56
It is also learnt that the people of the district were much alarmed, particularly, the Bengalese
were in great fear. The Kuki scouts who were organized by Mr. James Davidson, the manager of
that tea company, supplied with excellent and reliable information concerning the movement of
the mutineers. Stewart again stated, “His honour will perceive that during the time they were
thus wandering in the jungle, natural causes alone were acting so against them as not to call for
direct opposition from the small force at my disposal.”57. After Chatla, the mutineers approached
towards east and entered Pargana Bundraj. Stewart then directed Captain Stevens who was
posted with 100 men at Sonoimulk to proceed with 50 picked men to their rear and drive them
down upon Lt. Ross who had taken up a position at Nogdirgram in Bundraj where they would
have been placed between two fires. However, before the communications being received, on the
request of Lt. Ross, Captain Stevens moved down with his whole force to Nogdirgram. On the
circumstances of the move, it was stated:
“The mutineers had come across the Kheddah establishment of Major Smith in the heart
of the jungles...the exaggerated reports given by these people of the numbers and
desperation of the enemy had impressed Lt. Ross with the idea that his 75 men might not
be able to cope with them, and he accordingly sent for assistance.58
On the other side, Prince Narendrajit Singh who was guiding the mutineers towards Bhuban
Hills felt the absence of the British Army at Sonoimulk. Taking this advantage the mutineers
were led to cross the Sonoi River without any delay. On the morning of the 31st, the mutineers
debouched into the plains of Bundraj. When they were about to cross the river, the British Army
attacked them. The report of the Superintendent expressed:
129
“They did not await the assault but immediately took flight, and crossing the Sooni River
entered the jungles on the east side. The firing of our men was at too great a distance to
take much effect, but I learnt from prisoners since taken, that both the Subadars of their
party were severely wounded.”59
Had not the mutineers been well-informed through the intelligence of Narendrajit Singh they
would have been intercepted easily and most of them would have been killed before crossing the
Sonoi. Here, Stewart again reported:
“Captain Steven‟s march from Soonoimook rather disconcerted the plan I had arrangedHe had been posted there with the view of marching to Brinacandy when the rebels had
crossed the Soonai & of intercepting them there while Lt. Ross followed up in their rearWhen I requested him to move with 50 picked men to the rear of the enemy while west of
Soonai, the 50 he would have left behind at Soonaimook reinforced by Lt. Binst who
arrived with 50 more on the 31st, were ready to have taken up the same place. Now,
however, Lt. Ross and Captain Stevens with 175 men being together in the rear of the
enemy, Lt. Binst with 50 have been placed by me at Captain Steven‟s disposal to be
employed as he may direct.”60
The mutineers were now at the very jungle (Bhuban Hills) where they expected rest and
proper assistance of the Manipuris living around the area. The British Army were instructed to
follow the mutineers along the plains in a parallel direction keeping a little to their rear and
preventing them from coming out to forage within the cultivated lands. It was also
communicated to send those Lieutenants with strong parties to take up positions in the Jungles to
their front, thus bringing them between two fires. Consequently, Captain Stevens had advanced
to Gobindnagger and Lt. Ross had been sent on to Captainpoor.
Since the mutineers had been confining to the densest, they were in the lowest physical
condition reducing to living skeletons. As their main target was to reach the Bhuban Hills and
then to Manipur, they never tried to face all the challenges of the British on their way to Bhuban
Hills. Stewart also mentions that the mutineers have not been able to inflict the slightest injury
on the Government or the people. In the mean time the Raja of Manipur despatched 400 men
towards Cachar frontier to give assistance to the British Army. The Major Commanding was
directed to confine his operation solely in the Manipur territory. Ultimate, the party halted at
Nungshingbung and arrangements were made for their provisions by the British authority. Here
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Stewart stated, “I have directed the Major Commanding to confine his operations solely to the
Moonipoor territory. He has my orders to halt at Noonshaiboung and to send to Luckipoor for
provisions, where I have made arrangements to supply him.”61 Later, the Manipur force was
directed to detach 100 men to the confluence of the Jiri and the Barak rivers.
On the 9th January, 1858, Stewart reported that the 34th N.I. were still in the jungle at the
foot of the Bhuban range and it was only on one occasion where they could procure rice and this
“they did by a sortie of 50 men upon the village of Govindnugger on the skirts of the jungle
while our troops were absent in another direction.”62 It shows that Narendrajit Singh and his
followers were with the mutineers, and they were very informative about the movement of the
British army.
5.5
Battle of Binnacandy and other engagements
Although the mutineers had a plan to enter Manipur, yet the prince might have dissuaded them
telling that it would be useless to enter Manipur as its Raja Chandrakirti was a staunch supporter
of the British Government. The united party, ultimately, made the decision of a great revolt to
remove the British from the soil of Cachar. Narendrajit Singh motivated the people of Cachar to
join him. It was with the help of Narendrajit Singh and his party that those Chittagong mutineers
could reach Bhuban Hills to reorganise with the people of Cachar. Indeed, in their long and terror
stricken march to the Bhuban Hills, the mutineers guided by Narendrajit Singh successfully
passed through historic places like- Serespore Hills, Companegunge, Mohanpur, Jalinga, Chatla
Howar and Bundraj. Intermittent firing took place at various places as the British forces were
charging them. It is apparent that the followers of Narendrajit Singh assisted the mutineers with
unstinted dedication. They might have procured food and shelter for the cold winter needed by
the families of the mutineers. Without it, how could the latter would be able to march in the thick
forest during the cold winter from the last part of December 1857 to the 11th January, 1858? As
Narendrajit Singh was a great devotee of Hinduism he even sent messengers to those
Hindusthanee sepoys of the Sylhet Light Infantry to side with his party as it was reported, “That
after recruiting themselves at Luckipoor the mutineers joined by the Munnipoorie population
who were all prepared to assist, and possibly by the Hindustanie sepoys among our own troops,
should return to the station...and make themselves master of the country.”63 Hence, Narendrajit
Singh left no stone unturned in his efforts to unite all the possible powers for a great revolt
against the British.
131
The joint party of the mutineers and the Manipuris, after full preparation, came out of the
hill in broad day-light on 12th January, 1858, for an offensive war against the British to expel
them from the soil of Cachar. Here, the Superintendent reported, “The Mutineers, joined by a
Munnipoor prince and his followers, came out of the jungle into a village to the west of
Binnacandy yesterday morning at 10 O‟clock.”64 Lt. Ross was at that time stationed at
Binnacandy with 100 men and Captain Stevens at Luckipoor with 150. From the latter group, Lt.
Binst with 50 men was sent to strengthen the Sadar Station as it was likely to be attacked. This
party while proceeding along the northern bank of the river was attacked by the mutineers from
the opposite bank. Lt. Binst returned the fire and the enemy engaged in front. Lt. Ross then
advanced from Binnacandy along the southern bank of the river, and attacked the right flank of
the enemy. Captain Stevens and Lt. Binst crossing the river in rafts under cover of the attack an
action took place which lasted for two hours. The united force under Narendrajit Singh fought
bravely. Women also took part in this battle as it was a question of life and death. However, the
prince‟s party was beaten by the tactful and well-equipped British Army. Here, it was reported:
“The mutineers were beaten from home to home in the village they occupied. Seventeen
dead were counted on the field among whom a Jemadar, two sepoys taken prisoners,
were shot, and one straggler of the retreating rebels killed by the scouts making a total of
20 killed besides the numbers who must have been badly wounded in the engagement.
On our side we lost 2 men killed and two badly wounded.”65
On the women casualties, Stewart reported, “Women (two badly wounded).”66 It shows that even
the women of the mutineers took part seriously in the Revolt of 1857 in Cachar. Narendrajit
Singh also sustained a serious gunshot injury as a report expressed, “Dr. Shircore also deposes to
having heard a sepoy of the 34th N.I. mention his name before execution, and describes the
wound on his instep as a gunshot one, the Prince who joined being reported as wounded on the
foot.”67
The battle of Binnacandy was an epoch making event in the history of North East India.
It undoubtedly made Cachar a village of 1857. Had it been won by Narendrajit Singh and his
party those warlike hill tribes living in the neighbourhood and even the people of Manipur would
have been incited to a great anti-British movement resulting in a great havoc to the British
position in North East India. By 1857, may be because of the loss of Kabaw Valley and other
political and economic interferences of the British Government, the people of Manipur were
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really sick of the British. McCulloch‟s report of the response of Manipuris to 1857 justifies it.
The Agent reported, “Throughout these proceedings the conduct of the Raja has been most
praiseworthy. He and one or two of his officers were the only men in the country who seemed to
have interest in what they were doing.”68 In Assam also, even if Maniram Dewan and the
Charing Raja had been arrested then, unrest was still in existence as more European Armies were
demanded by the planters.
After Binnacandy, Narendrajit Singh fled to Manipur territory with some mutineers, but
they were arrested by the army of Manipur. The latter sent those arrested mutineers to the British
Camp in Cachar, however, Narendrajit Singh, being highly honoured, was brought to the court of
Manipur where the Raja treated him very well. The Raja really wanted to save the life of
Narendrajit Singh by keeping him in the prison of Manipur. However, owing to the repeated
appraisal of Stewart to send the prince to Cachar, the Raja of Manipur responded sending the
prince on 25th April, 1858, for trial in Cachar. Since Raja Chandrakirti was a dependable ally of
the British Government, his request for the life of Narendrajit Singh was honoured. Here,
Stewart reported, “I am of opinion that it would be inexpedient to sentence this prisoner
69
capitally-But would recommend his confinement for life as a state prisoner.” As the prince was
highly popular in Cachar the Superintendent did not like him to detain over a long time.
Therefore, Narendrajit Singh was sent to Calcutta without any proper order of the Government.
Here, Stewart again reported,
“I have taken the advantage of a large batch of prisoners proceeding to Calcutta under a
strong guard and have forwarded Norindrajeet Sing along with them. His presence, and
that of the other princes in Cachar is not calculated to allay the excitement which had
recently prevailed among the Monipoories, and I trust that his honour will approve of the
step I have taken, instead of awaiting orders upon a reference.”
70
In this way, Narendrajit Singh was delivered to the Magistrate of Allipore, and later, the
Supreme Government issued an order which expressed:
“Narendrojeet Sing having been tried under Act No. XIV, of 1857, and having apparently
been found guilty of a criminal offence ought not to be treated as a state
prisoner....Honourable President in Council agrees with Lieutenant Stewart in thinking
that it would be inexpedient to sentence the prisoner capitally. If imprisoned for life, it
can only be the transportation beyond seas.”
71
133
Thus, the prince was tried under the special act of 1857 and thereby sent beyond seas just like
other rebel leaders of 1857. Had he not been favoured by Raja Chandrakirti Singh of Manipur
Narendrajit Singh would have been in the gallows as Maniram Dewan of Assam who had been
executed on Friday, the 26th February, 1858.
After the Battle of Binnacandy, the Bengal Government‟s Special Narrative No. 10,
expressed, “By the latest accounts from Cachar the few remaining mutineers of the 34th N.I. are
still hiding in the dense jungles in the South Eastern part of the Dist. They were reported to be in
a state of great exhaustion and complete disorganization.”72
Later, two more engagements also took place in Cachar. The Superintendent‟s report
about the engagement of 22nd January, 1858, expressed:
“Authentic information having been received that the mutineers had divided into two
parties proceeding South and South-East from Beermacandy and numbering some 40
men each, and hearing of the exact portion of the party proceeding in the latter direction,
Lt. Stevens moved out at noon of the 22nd January. And after two hours march found
them located on a steep hill covered with wood jungle. There was a Nullah at the foot of
the hill, and this was surrounded with jungle. Lt Stevens crept up cautiously to the banks
of the Nullah, and giving them a volley charged up the hill. The surprise was complete &
the mutineers fled leaving all their arms and accoutrements behind. Ten of their number
was killed, and two, of whom one was a native officer, wounded. Some women and
children were also reported to have been taken prisoners, and the superintendent,
requesting orders regarding their disposal.”73
The last engagement of 1857 Revolt in Cachar, as recorded, was on the 26th January, 1858. It
was also a serious engagement in which 13 mutineers were killed. A report from the Special
Narrative expresses:
“On the 26th there was another encounter with the rebels and a party of 30 men of the
S.L.I. Battalion led by one Juggutbeer Jemadar of that Corps. A scout, having reported to
Captain Stevens, that he had discovered the position of a small body of mutineers in the
Jungle, and Cap. Stevens thinking it only one of the fragments of the body scattered on
the 22nd, a party under the Jemadar aforesaid was sent out against him to cut them up. It
turned out that...the mutineers mustered in all some 40 or 50 strong position in a hillock
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covered with thick bamboo jungles, were attacked by the Jemadar and his party and
completely routed leaving 13 of their number dead on the field.”74
This very report also expresses about the total number of casualties on the side of the 34th N.I.:
“Altogether 206 of these mutineers have been killed in the several engagements which
had taken place with them in Sylhet and Cachar, the rest were fairly caught in a trap out
of which it was impossible for them to escape. Under these circumstances the
Superintendent had directed the Munnipore force that was sent by the Raja, to fall back,
leaving only a few men to guard the passes.”75
It is also stated that “the wounded leader of Mutiny, Havildar Rajabali Khan and his wife could
not be traced. Perhaps they were given shelter by the local people and with some other fugitive
rebels allowed to escape in North Cachar, Sylhet or Jaintia Hills.”76 The Revolt of 1857 in
Cachar thus ended.
The event had a deep impact in the mind of the people of Cachar that they changed the
old names of the places, spots, and areas of old Cachar and gave new names associated with the
activities of the heroes of 1857. The place names like Rantila, Sipuinjure, Ghuramara, Biscuit,
Sipahitilla and Jangirkhal etc. still recall the love and affection of the local people for those
Indian sepoys who had fought in Cachar valiantly and laid down their lives for the freedom of
the country. The following are some of the analyses on the real nature and character of Manipuri
prince Narendrajit Singh in this Revolt of 1857 in Cachar.
5.6
Narendrajit Singh in the Revolt of 1857
The mutiny of the 34th Native Infantry Chittagong in which Narendrajit Singh and his party
participated had direct link with the Revolt of 1857. Responding to the call of Bahadur Shah
Zafar and other officers of the rebel army, sepoys who had taken to arms mostly drifted to Delhi
after killing their British Officers. P. E. Robert rightly expresses, “In almost every case the
mutineers after the outbreak set their faces towards Delhi: many murdered their officers before
doing so; some, with a curious remnant of fidelity, escorted them to positions of safety and then
after saluting them marched off to join their comrades.”77 There was a vast network of spies
which even reached Chittagong to incite the sepoys for a united war against the British
Government. In this regard a report expressed:
“Two up-countrymen were apprehended at Bograh, who, from their own accounts had
been at Moorshedabad at the time of the expected disturbances and the disarming of the
135
troops at that place, and had proceeded then via Dacca to Chittagong, and then returned
to Dacca, being present at both places when the troops mutinied,  They described
themselves to be natives of Tirhoot.”78
After inflaming Chittagong, the mutineers planned to march to Delhi for a united cause as it was
stated:
“Two of the mutineers, were captured by the police of Noacolly and the villagers, on
being interrogated, stated that on leaving Chittagong the detachment had intended to
proceed to Delhi, but hearing that the road to the north west had been closed by
Europeans, they were marching eastward with a view of reaching Munipoor, and
obtaining protection of the Rajah of that country.”79
In the mind of these mutineers, there was no stigma on account of caste, race and religion. It
seemed that they were also influenced by the words of rebel officers of 1857 as it ran, “The
Kunning of the Europeans is notorious. They will make the Hindusthanees fight against each
other and thus causing them to be slain, gain their own object and the loss will be that of the
Hindusthanees.”80 Though the idea of modern nationalism was not well developed in India by
the early second half of the 19th century, the mutineers and rebel leaders of 1857 seemed to have
fairly bound by the term Hindusthanee (Indian). Honouring this term at the battle of Malegarh
Hills (Latoo), 18th December, 1857, these Chittagong mutineers tried there level best to murder
only the British officers on one hand and on the other hand they tried to embrace the Indian
sepoys of the Sylhet Light Infantry in the name of Hindusthanee as it was stated, “The rebel
sepoys, by solicitations and taunts, tried all in their power to prevent the Hindustanis who formed
half of the small force.”81 After killing Major Byng, the Commandant, Sylhet Light Infantry
Regiment, they also shouted, “Now we have killed the Sahib come and join us.”82 In fact, this
historic wartime cry invited the Indians to get united and root out the British from the soil of
India. The anti-British feeling was also sung by the masses of Sylhet and Cachar in their folk
songs which run:
“Jaiona Jaiona Bhai re
Latur bazaar diya
Shoie Shoie Sipai aichhain ingraj khediya
haire ingrej Khediya.
(Brother, don‟t go by the Latu Bazar; the sepoys have come in hundred, chasing the
Englishmen.)”83
136
With such an intense anti-British feeling, these Chittagong mutineers arrived at Cachar
where they were joined by Narendrajit Singh and his party. Though the mutineers wanted to
enter into the territory of Manipur, Narendrajit Singh might have dissuaded them telling that it
would be useless to enter into it as its Rajah Chandrakirti Singh was a staunch supporter of the
British Government. Concerted meetings might have at last decided for a united war to expel the
British from Cachar, for which, reorganization of the fighting force might have been effected
under the leadership of Narendrajit Singh. In this way, the united force fought a fierce battle at
about 10 A.M, at Binnacandy (Cachar) on the 12th January, 1858. In this battle, they were
defeated with a loss of seventeen dead on the field and Narendrajit Singh also had a serious
gunshot injury. The prince now fled with some mutineers in the territory of Manipur where they
were arrested by Manipur Army. The latter sent those arrested mutineers to the British camp, but
Narendrajit Singh was treated generously and brought to the capital of Manipur. After some
months the prince was sent to Cachar to face trial under the British Government. Here, a report
expressed:
“Narendrojeet Sing having been tried under Act No.XIV, of 1857, and having apparently
been found guilty of a criminal offence ought not to be treated as a state prisoner 
Honourable President in Council agrees with Lieutenant Stewart in thinking that it would
be inexpedient to sentence the prisoner capitally. If imprisoned for life, it can only be the
transportation beyond seas.”84
Ultimately, Narendrajit Singh was transported like other rebel leaders of 1857. Thus, his uprising
in Cachar was a part of the Revolt of 1857.
5.7
Mutiny turned into a revolt in Cachar
In the last part of 1857, Cachar experienced a great anti British feeling of its Manipuri
population. Hence, R. Stewart, the Superintendent of Cachar, arrested six Manipuri princes viz.,
Sangie Thapa, Kunnai Sing, Mypha, Howjaw, Khem Sing and Khoirakpa in the month of
December 1857. By this time, Narendrajit Singh and his party, absconding much earlier,
successfully joined the Chittagong mutineers and reorganized a fighting force with the people of
Cachar. They also hatched a conspiracy involving the people of Cachar and its Jail staff for the
escape of those arrested princes as their presence in the camp of Narendrajit Singh and the
mutineers would be a deciding factor of the uprising. On the six princes in jail, R. Stewart wrote,
“Roma Sing the Dewan of the Rajah of Monipoor, then in Cachar, had warned me that on certain
137
day they would all make their escape and join the mutineers.”85 This warning came true and they
escaped in the evening of the 10th January, 1858, but failed to join the united front before the war
at Binnakandy.
In this event of escape, the Superintendent of Cachar stated:
“The prisoners were allowed on the evening in question to go to their dinner on the banks
of the tank at a very late hour, contrary to the standing order of the Jail and darkness
came on while they were eating. The Burkandaz who was placed over them was induced
at their request to leave them and go on a message into the jail on their account and on his
return they were gone.”86
This act of irresponsibility from the side of jail staff when Cachar was in a hot bed could
undoubtedly be a conspiracy. Immediate search was made by an order of the Superintendent
sending police parties in all the neighbouring Manipuri villages during the night but failed to rearrest them. As the nature of the escape was highly suspicious the Superintendent took up
punishing steps as he stated:
“I found the jail Darogah guilty of having allowed the prisoners to be outside the jail
precincts after dark and sentenced him to suspension from employment for 6 months and
I found the Burkandaz guilty of extreme neglect of duty in having quitted his charge and
dismissed him.”87
All these developments give a clear idea that there was a conspiracy with the jail staff of Cachar.
Besides, when the Superintendent was unable to re-arrest those princes he declared, “I have
rewards for Rs. 100/- for the apprehension or betrayal of each of the princes who have effected
their escape from us, and also that of Norindrojeet Sing, who is supposed to have joined the
rebels.”88 The Superintendent‟s idea behind this declaration could be felt from his another
statement, “I do not think it possible that they can long escape, as the rewards offered for their
apprehension will excite the cupidity of the Bengalees to give information.”89 Notwithstanding
this, none of this community responded thereby showing their support for the cause of
Narendrajit Singh. Now, being alarmed by a popular upsurge, the Superintendent decided to seek
extra powers to meet the exigencies as he expressed:
“It is now apparent that portion of our subjects in this district are in rebellion against the
Government, I have the honour to solicit that you will suggest to the Lt. Governor the
138
expediency of investing me with powers under Act XI of 1837 for the trial of such as
may be apprehended.”90
Besides, the feeling of the masses in Cachar was also reflected in one of the folk songs as it runs:
“O mon paran fante re
Chokhhe dekha dai
Kolir kope hai hai
Sipair paran jai
........................
Pathe boshi kande sati patir ashai
Putra kanya ashohai kare hai hai, (My heart goes; to stand (the sight); alas! At the curse of Dark
Age the Sepoy loses his life; the wife cries on the road, in the hope of (return of the) husband;
the helpless children lament).”91
All these source materials give us a clear understanding that in Cachar the mutiny
obviously turned into a revolt with the joining of Narendrajit Singh who was supported directly
or indirectly by the people and jail staff of Cachar. In fact, without their support how could those
Manipuri princes would be able to escape from jail and avoid re-arrest when Cachar was under
the reign of terror of the British forces?
5.8
Narendrajit Singh and the throne of Manipur
Narendrajit Singh‟s participation in the Revolt of 1857 was not for the throne of Manipur. When
the Superintendent of Cachar made an application for more troops to check the mutineers of the
34th Native Infantry, Chittagong, the Government directed, “There were none at present available
which could be sent to his assistance, but that the Lt. Governor would be glad to consider any
plan he might propose for strengthening his frontier.”92 Consequently, the Superintendent
decided to provoke Raja Chandrakirti Singh of Manipur to get his fullest support as he wrote,
“With so many ambitious Monipooree princes in the country who have their eye upon Munipoor
 I think some movement on their part imminent and trust that His Honour will agree with me,
and put into my possession the means of arresting (?) it.”93 The Supreme Government then
reported that “the arrangement made by the Superintendent for opposing the Mutineers of the
34th Native Infantry, if they attempt to pass through the district approved.”94 When the mutineers
were joined by Narendrajit Singh and his party, McCulloch, Agent at Manipur, was intimated,
“Munniporees who might guide them to this country were with the Mutineers.”95 On hearing this
139
intelligence Rajah Chandrakirti Singh, being enraged, sent 400 Manipuri sepoys under a Major
to Jiri, the boundary between Cachar and Manipur, and McCulloch informed the Superintendent
“of the despatch of those troops to the boundary and that they were placed at his orders.”96 Thus,
the Superintendent of Cachar successfully formulated this diplomacy to possess the Manipur
Army for the cause of the British Government.
After the Battle of Binnacandy when Narendrajit Singh was arrested by the Manipur
Army, the prince was generously brought to the court of Manipur where the Raja who had also
pleaded for the prince‟s release from Dacca (1851), treated him very well. Had Narendrajit Singh
designed seriously for the throne of Manipur, Roma Singh, the most faithful officer of Raja
Chandrakirti, then at Cachar, would have killed him at the time of his arrest. There in Manipur,
the Agent solicited the Raja to sent Narendrajit Singh to Cachar for his trial. Replying it in a
letter translated by McCulloch, the Raja stated, “Although what the Sahib says-send in this
brother of yours Narendrajeet Sing- is right, still he is my brother. I apprehend him for having
offended against the Sahib-Lok.”97 Since the people as well as many of the influential courtiers
of Manipur were on the side of Narendrajit Singh, Raja Chandrakirti felt insecure in his position
and decided to send Narendrajit Singh to the British Authorities in Cachar. Here, a report
expressed that “against the pressing solicitations of his numerous relatives, and of a large party
of officers and others in favour of detaining him in the country the Raja ordered Narendrajit
Singh to be removed to Cachar for delivery to the Officiating Superintendent.”98 After
Narendrajit Singh‟s disposal to British Authorities in Cachar, Rajah Chandrakriti Singh
expressed, “As the British Government has been pleased to approve of my previous conduct I
earnestly hope that in consideration for me the British Government even if his fault be  found a
heavy one may spare his life.”99
Psychologically the people of Manipur also supported the cause of mutineers as it was
reported:
“The common conversation of the Munniporee has been in a style showing they would
rather have nothing to do with the mutineers; saying that as they are coreligionists they
can meet no harm from them and that all mutineers want is the Sahibs life and why
sacrifice lives for the Ferenghees.”100
Here, Cheithrol Kumbaba (The Royal chronicle of Manipur in Manipuri) also mentions, “Phairen
Tha Thangjana Halle  Taramathoi Ni Ningthoukabada Mayambung Ibungo Chahi Ahum
140
(Sana Chahi Ahum) Mayangdagee thunglei-a (Dt. 25 Jan.1858 A.D.). Kalen Thadi
Yumsakeisana Halle. Anini Sagolsenda Ibungo Chahi Ahum Mayangda Thajinkhina-a.”101 It
means that, Phairen, a Manipuri month of the year, starts with Saturday  On the eleventh day
of it, a Monday, falling on 25th January, 1858, King‟s elder brother Chahi Ahum arrived from
Cachar. Kalen month starts with Wednesday. On the second day of it, a Thursday, falling on the
25th April, 1858, Chahi Ahum alias Ranajit Sing was sent to Cachar. Thus, it mentions as a
simple visit of Narendrajit Singh to Manipur. Above all these facts and records it is worth
knowing that Narendrajit Singh who was born and brought up in Cachar had never visited
Manipur before 1858. Therefore, his knowledge of Manipur would certainly be from those tales
told by his near relatives. Therefore, how could he aim at the highest position of a kingdom
where he had never visited before? These facts and statements lead to the understanding that
Narendrajit Singh‟s participation in the Revolt of 1857 could not have been for the throne of
Manipur.
5.9
The Prince’s uprising and National Movement
Although Narendrajit Singh‟s participation in the Revolt of 1857 with the support of the people
of Cachar turned the mutiny into a revolt, it may not be a national movement of India. For a
movement to be called national the following conditions are necessary-first, the movement
should have its aim to free the country from foreign yoke, secondly, it should have a mass
support, thirdly, the people should be inspired through phrases and slogans which instill the
sense of patriotism and nationalism. The revolt under Narendrajit Singh had its positive points in
the first two cases, but it failed in the third one. There were no comments and slogans of national
feeling from the mouth of the prince. Since Cachar was an independent principality till 1823, the
idea of Hindusthanee might not have much effect on Narendrajit Singh and his followers. So, the
binding idea between the two groups could have been their common idea of removing the British
from India in general and Cachar in particular. In one of the letters of R. Stewart, it was stated,
“When the mutineers of the 34th N. I. entered Cachar and their strength and intentions were
unknown, the agitation amongst the Munnipoorie population was extreme, and the station was
threatened each day with attack.”102 It gives a clear idea that the Manipuris were in revolt against
the British even before they join the mutineers of the 34th Native Infantry, Chittagong. Again,
when Narendrajit Singh‟s trial was going on in Cachar, one of his witnesses expressly stated,
“The purpose of Narendrojeet Sing was to take possession of Cachar.”103 Another source also
141
stated that the Chittagong Mutineers “succeeded in reaching Bhuban Hills on Manipur border
and could forge an alliance with Manipur prince Narendrajit Singh and his royal troops, waging
war against the British occupation.”104 Had the intention of the prince been only for the throne of
Manipur he would have been tried by the Raja of Manipur and Robert Stewart would have never
asked the Raja to send Narendrajit Singh to Cachar for trial under Act XIV of 1857. These facts
and statements clearly reveal that Narendrajit Singh‟s primary objective of the revolt was the
restoration of Cachar with the expulsion of the British from its soil. Besides, keeping in view of
the British policy after this revolt, a report expressed:
“It cannot be wise policy to permit those ambitious princes to keep the large & increasing
Maneepoore population of Cachar in a state of political agitation & anxiety, which is very
injurious to the prosperity & good Government of the province & which sooner or later
will lead to very evil consequences.”105
Therefore, another fourteen Manipuri princes of Cachar were also removed to Nuddea. Here, the
above source also expressed:
“Debindro Sing, Angou Raj Koowar, Doombar Sing, Jeet Sahee Koowar, Koolendro
Sing Koowar, Akanto Sing Koowar, Poorander Sing Koowar, Chinta Munny Sing
Koowar, Chourutton Sing Raj Koowar Joobooraj, Ham Raj Sing Koowar, Neeroojit
Koowar, Turjeet Koowar, Kammuljeet Koowar and Shamboo Chundro Sing Koowar
were removed to Nuddea.”106
Hence, the objective of the Revolt of 1857 in Cachar under Narendrajit Singh was mainly the
restoration of this region to its former Manipuri ruling family.
The above critical analyses give a clear understanding that Prince Narendrajit Singh‟s
predetermined joining of the party of Chittagong mutineers and their joint revolt made Cachar a
village of 1857. However, the role of Narendrajit Singh in this great uprising could neither be a
National Movement of India nor a revolt for the throne of Manipur but the expulsion of the
British from India in general and Cachar in particular so that the latter could be restored to its
former ruling family.
142
REFERENCES
1. Foreign Political Consultations (Hereafter, FPC), 12 August 1859, Nos. 127-8, McCulloch to
R. Simson,
Under Secretary, Government of India, Foreign Department, Fort William,
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Book for class V, (Tripura Madhyashikshya Parsad, SCERT, Tripura, 2005), p. 20.
3. Foreign Secret Consultations, 30 April 1858, No. 362, Letter from Officiating Under
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21 April 1858, NAI.
4. Brahamachari Mayum Haripriya, “Christagi 1819-25 Ki Manipuri Itihasta Cachargi Barak
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6. Gangmumei Kabui, History of Manipur, Vol. 1, (National Publishing House, New Delhi,
1991), p. 229.
7. Brahamachari Mayum Haripriya, op., cit., p.13.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.: pp.13-14.
10. Statement of Upendra Guha in Cacharer Itibritta, cited in Brahamachari Mayum Haripriya,
op. cit., p. 14.
11. A.C. Banerjee, The Eastern Frontier of British India, (A. Mukherjee & CO. Private Ltd.,
Calcutta, 1964), p. 214.
12. Ibid.
13. Gouri Sen, op. cit., p. 41.
14. Sharma, B.K. and Dusarigopal, “Sana Chahi Ahum Amasung Siphai Lalhou,” (Sana Chahi
Ahum and the sepoy Mutiny), Poknapham, (Manipuri Daily, 23 April, 2010, No. 75).
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for class V, (Tripura Madhyashikshya Parsad, SCERT, Tripura, 2005), p. 19.
16. A.C. Banerjee, op. cit., p. 248.
17. Foreign Political Consultations, 14 May 1832, No. 98, W. Cracroft, Officiating Agent, N.E.
Frontier to Chief Secretary, Government of India, Dated, N.E. Frontier, 22 March, 1832,
NAI.
18. Foreign Political Consultations, 14 May 1832, No. 81, C. Tucker, Commissioner, Sylhet, to
Chief Secretary, Government of India, Fort William, NAI.
19. Foreign Political Consultations, 14 May 1832, No. 98, W. Cracroft, Officiating Agent, N.E.
Frontier to Chief Secretary, Government of India, Dated, N.E. Frontier, 22 March, 1832,
NAI.
143
20. Foreign Political Consultations, 11 February 1835, No. 87, Fisher to Captain Jenkins on
special survey duty, NAI.
21. Foreign Political Consultations, 14 May 1832, No. 98, W. Cracroft, Officiating Agent, N.E.
Frontier to Chief Secretary, Government of India, Dated, N.E. Frontier, 22 March, 1832,
NAI.
22. Foreign Political Consultations, 12 Nov. 1832, No. 46/47, to T.C. Robertson Esqr., Agent to
G.G., N.E. Frontier from Lt. Fisher, Cachar, 31st Aug. 1832, para 15, NAI.
23. Foreign Political Consultations, 5 November 1832, No. 9, Letter from Fisher to
David
Scott, Agent to the G.G, N.E Frontier, 24 December 1830, NAI.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Foreign Political Consultations, 20 February 1834, No. 25, Lt. Fisher to T.C. Robertson,
Agent to G.G, North East Frontier, Dated, Cachar, 13 January 1834, NAI.
27. Foreign Political Consultations, 20 February 1834, No.26, Letter to Thomas Campbell
Robertson, Agent, North East Frontier from Political Department, Fort William, 20
February 1834, NAI.
28. Ibid.
29. Oral interview with Laishram Manglemba Singh (Librarian, Cachar College), Silchar, 21
November, 2009.
30. Oral interview with Th. Madhai Babu (ex-V.P., M.C.D. College, Sonai), Thangjam Leikai,
Sonai, Silchar, dt. 14th November, 2009.
31. Foreign Political Consultations, 23 May 1850, Nos. 118-122, McCulloch, Agent at
Munnipore to Officiating Under Secretary, Government of India, Foreign Department, Fort
William, No. 25, 8 March 1850, NAI.
32. Foreign Political Consultations, 25 October 1841, No. 85, Secretary, Government of India,
Political Department, Fort William to E.M. Gordon, Commissioner Dacca, No.2900, 25
October 1841, NAI.
33. Foreign 1842 Department, Political letters to the Secretary of state, Consultations, No. 35, 16
November 1842, NAI.
34. Pabitra Sing to J.H. Littler, Deputy Governor Bengal, Dated, Dacca, 20 May 1849, Manipur
States Archives (Hereafter, MSA).
144
35. Foreign Political Consultations, 23 May 1850, Nos. 118-122, McCulloch, Agent at
Munnipore to Officiating Under Secretary, Government of India, Foreign Department, Fort
William, No. 25, 8 March 1850, NAI.
36. Letter from Captain G. Verner, Superintendent, Cachar to I.W. Dalrymple, Under Secretary
to the Government of Bengal, No. 50, 15 August 1849, MSA.
37. Foreign Political Consultations, 14 March, 1851, No. 164, McCulloch to F.J. Halliday,
Officiating Secretary, Government of India, Foreign Department, Fort William,
Dated,
Munneepore Agency, 19 February 1851, NAI.
38. Foreign Political Consultations, 28 November 1851, No.5, Letter from R. Abercrombie,
Magistrate, Foujdary Adawlat, Zilla Dacca, Camp Moonsheegunge to R.H. Mytton Esq.
Commissioner of Revenue, Dacca, 18 November 1851, NAI.
39. A.C. Banerjee, op. cit., p. 378.
40. Ibid., p. 377.
41. Ibid., p. 376.
42. Sujit Choudhury (ed.), The Mutiny Period in Cachar, (Tagore Society For Cultural
Integration, Silchar, 1981), p. 6.
43. Home Public, 14th May 1858, Nos. 14-16, NAI.
44. Sujit Choudhury (ed.), op. cit., p. 8.
45. Ibid.
46. Subir Kar, 1857 in North East, (Akansha Publishing House, New Delhi, 2008), p. 80.
47. Sujit Choudhury (ed.), op. cit., p. 24.
48. Subir Kar, op. cit., p. 37.
49. Oral interview with Laishram Manglemba Singh (Librarian, Cachar College), Silchar, 21
November, 2009.
50. Oral interview with Laishram Taranikanta Singh (Staff, A.I.R. Silchar), Dated, Silchar, 20th
November, 2009.
51. Subir Kar, op. cit., p. 39.
52. Sujit Choudhury (ed.), op. cit., pp. 11-12.
53. Home Public, 29 January 1858, Nos. 65-67, R. Stewart to Secy. to the Govt. of Bengal, Fort
William, dt. Cachar, 2nd January, 1858, NAI.
145
54. Judicial. Dept., 27 February 1858, Special Narrative, 7-13 February, 1858, No.13, para 28,
Govt. of Bengal, West Bengal State Archives (Hereafter, WBSA).
55. Subir Kar, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
56. Ibid.: 40.
57. Home Public, 29 January 1858, Nos. 65-67, para 4, NAI.
58. Ibid., para 5.
59. Ibid., para 6.
60. Stewart‟s letter, 2nd January 1858, para 7, cited in, Sujit Choudhury (ed.), The Mutiny Period
in Cachar, Silchar, 1981, p. 16.
61. Stewart‟s letter, 2nd January 1858, para 12, cited in, Sujit Choudhury (ed.), The Mutiny
Period in Cachar, Silchar, 1981, p. 18.
62. Stewart‟s letter, 9th January 1858, para 2, cited in, Sujit Choudhury (ed.), The Mutiny Period
in Cachar, Silchar, 1981, p. 18.
63. Sujit Choudhury (ed.), op. cit., p. 43.
64. FPC, 28 May 1858, No. 139, NAI.
65. Home Public, 12 February 1858, Nos. 55-56, NAI, also see Sujit Choudhury (ed.) op. cit., p.
20.
66. Sujit Choudhury (ed.), op.cit., p. 27.
67. Stewart to Secretary, Government of Bengal, Dated, Cachar, 10 May 1858, MSA.
68. FPC, 28 May 1858, No. 139, McCulloch to Secy. Govt. of India, Foreign Dept.,
Fort
William, Munnipore, 12 Feb. 1858, NAI.
69. Stewart to Secretary, Government of Bengal, No. 113, Dated, Cachar, 10 May 1858, Para 5,
MSA.
70. Ibid., Para 6.
71. Secretary, Government of India to Secretary, Government of Bengal, No. 2272, 25 June
1858, MSA.
72. Judicial Dept., 8 Feb. 1858, Special Narrative, 17-23 January 1858, No. 10, para 27, Govt. of
Bengal, WBSA.
73. Judicial Dept., 15 Feb. 1858, Special Narrative, 24-30 January 1858 No. 11, para 17, Govt. of
Bengal, WBSA.
74. Ibid., para 18.
146
75. Ibid.
76. Shyamdas Bhattacharya & Dilip Nath, “The Spark of the Revolt of 1857 in Cachar,” in B.
Datta Ray, Bimal Deb and S. Sharma (eds.), Freedom Struggle in North East India, (Omsons
Publications, New Delhi, 2011), p. 57.
77. P.E. Roberts, History of British India under the Company and the Crown, (London, 1936), p.
369.
78. Judicial Department, 22 January 1858, Special Narrative No. 3, Government of Bengal,
WBSA.
79. Ibid.
80. Foreign Political Consultations, 29 January 1858, No. 16, NAI.
81. C E Buckland, Bengal under the Lieutenant Governors, Vol. I, (Deep Publications, Delhi,
1976), p. 148.
82. Lt.-Colonel H.J. Huxford, (compiled), History of the 8th Gurkha Rifles (1824-1949), (The
Army Press, Dehradun, 1965), p. 17.
83. Subir Kar, op. cit., p. 80.
84. Letter from Officiating Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India, Fort William to
the Secretary, Government of Bengal, No. 2272, 25 June 1858, MSA.
85. Home Public, 14 May 1858, Nos. 14-16, To W.J. Allen, Commissioner of Circuit from R.
Stewart, Superintendant, Cachar, Dated, Camp Soonapore, 27 February 1858, NAI.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Stewart‟s report, 16 January 1858, cited in Sujit Choudhury (ed.), The Mutiny Period in
Cachar, Silchar, 1981, pp. 23-24.
89. Stewart‟s report, Cited in Sujit Choudhury (ed.), The Mutiny Period in Cachar, Silchar,
1981, p. 27.
90. Stewart‟s report, 16 January 1858, cited in Sujit Choudhury (ed.),
The Mutiny Period in
Cachar, Silchar, 1981, p. 24.
91. J.B. Bhattacharjee, “Mutiny in Cachar: A Survey of Local Sources,” in Proceedings of the
North East India History Association, 4th Session, (Shillong, 1983), p. 40.
92. Judicial Department, 22 January 1858, Special Narrative No. 3, Government of Bengal,
WBSA.
147
93. Sunanda Datta (ed.), Cachar District Records, Vol. II, (The Asiatic Society, Kolkata, 2007),
p. 353.
94. Judicial Index 149 of 1857, proceedings, 31 December, Nos. 641-2. WBSA.
95. Foreign Political Consultations, 28 May 1858, No.139, McCulloch, Political Agent at
Munnipore to Secretary, Government of India, Foreign Department, Fort William, No. 13, 12
February 1858, Para 7, NAI.
96. Ibid.
97. Foreign Political Consultations, 11 June 1858, No. 109, Chandrakirti, Raja of Manipur to
McCulloch, Agent at Manipur, 11 Falgoon 1779, True translation of the Agent, NAI.
98. Letter from Major W. McCulloch, Political Agent, Manipur to Officiating Secretary,
Government of India, Foreign Department, Fort William, No. 37, Dated, Muneepore, 17
April 1858, MSA.
99. Ibid.
100. Foreign Political Consultations, 28 May 1858, No.139, McCulloch, Political Agent at
Munnipore to Secretary, Government of India, Foreign Department, Fort William, No. 13,
12 February 1858, Para 7, NAI.
101. Ibungohal and Khelchandra (eds.), Cheitharol Kumbaba, (Royal Chronicle of Manipur),
(Imphal, 1989), pp. 335-336.
102. Stewart‟s report, 17 February 1858, Para 8, cited in Sujit Choudhury (ed.), op. cit.,, p. 42.
103. Letter from R. Stewart, Officiating Superintendent, Cachar to Secretary, Government of
Bengal, Fort William, 10 May 1858, No.113, para 4, MSA.
104. Jyoti Lal Chowdhury, “Latoo the Mutiny Village: War of 1857 in Silchar,” in Organiser
the Voice of the Nation, (New Delhi, 10 June 2007).
105. Foreign Political Consultations, 18 June 1858, Nos. 12-14, Minute by the Lieutenant
Governor of Bengal, NAI.
106. Ibid., Enclosure A.