PUBP 653 Interagency Operations in Conflict and Post-Conflict Settings
DRAFT
Instructor: Robert M. Perito
Email Address: [email protected]: 202-740-4918
Office Hours by appointment: 6:30 to 7:15 pm, Mondays
Course Description
This course examines the U.S. interagency process as it relates to peace operations. The National
Security Act of 1947 and the National Security Council system that it created remain the basic
mechanisms for dealing with foreign policy and national security challenges that reach beyond
the mandate of any single government department. The current interagency structure that
includes the president’s National Security Advisor, the White House National Security staff, and
a hierarchy of interagency working groups is the product of improvisation, experience and the
need of successive president’s to deal with an ever changing international environment.
Beginning with the intervention in Somalia, the evolution of this infrastructure was altered by
U.S. involvement in peace operations that required the National Security Council system to not
only determine policy but also to manage complex contingency operations in countries emerging
from conflict. Government agencies were required to both participate in the policy process and to
deploy personnel and conduct operations in the field. This evolution from static policy making to
active program implementation was mirrored in the development of the United Nations
Secretariat as a result of the expansion in the number and complexity of peacekeeping missions.
The result of U.S. involvement in UN-led peace operations was the creation of a new dimension
in the interagency process which involved the interaction of U.S. government agencies with
international organizations, foreign governments and non-governmental organizations in the
field. The course explores the history and the current challenges facing the NSC system and the
UN secretariat in conducting peace operations in the emerging international environment.
Learning Objectives
Students will gain:
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A practical understanding of the history, organization and culture of the National
Security Council system, the United Nations Secretariat and their interaction with
counterpart organizations in contemporary peace operations.
Classroom experience in speaking and decision making through panel presentations,
simulations, and group assignments dealing with interagency involvement in
peacekeeping.
Improved critical thinking skills through research and writing about how the interagency
process deals with foreign policy and national security issues related to peace operations.
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Readings
The course will use the following texts. The first two books are available in the bookstore. The
Rothkopf book is available on Amazon.com. The last book is available on line. All other
readings are on line (see the Course Calendar).
Roger George and Harvey Rishikof, Eds. The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the
Labyrinth (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011)
Thant Myint-U and Amy Scott, The UN Secretariat: A Brief History (1945-2006), (New York:
International Peace Academy, 2007)
David Rothkopf, Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the
Architects of American Power, (New York, Public Affairs, 2004)
Robert Perito, Ed. Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability and Relief Operations,
(Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007)
http://www.usip.org/publications/guide-participants-in-peace-stability-and-relief-operationsweb-version
Assignments
All students are required to complete the following assignments:
1. Final Research Paper (45%): Students will complete a final research paper of 8 to 10
pages in length on an issue related to the National Security Council system. A detailed
description of this assignment will be distributed during class.
2. Mid-Term Examination (35%): Students will be required to complete a take-home,
mid-term examination that will require critical thinking concerning issues covered in the
first half of the course. A detailed description of the examination will be distributed
during class.
3. Class Presentations and Exercises (20%): Students will be expected to participate
effectively in a panel presentation, in a policy simulation and in class discussions. For
the panel presentation, students will be required to submit a written outline of their
remarks at the time they make their presentation.
Class Policies:
Grading will follow the standards of the School of Public Policy and the University.
Late Assignments: All assignments must be turned in on time. Late Assignments will be docked
1/3 of a letter grade for every day they are turned in late (i.e. an A becomes an A- after one
calendar day). Students needing an extension should speak to the instructor in advance. No
extensions will be given after the due date.
All assignments, unless otherwise noted, should be completed independently and within the
academic standards of the School of Public Policy and the University. Students should properly
cite all works they reference. All citations should be consistent with Chicago Manual of Style or
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some other approved style that the student has previously discussed with the instructor. Students
who have doubts about proper citations styles should consult the School of Public Policy’s
website at http://popp.gmu.edu.
Absences: Students are required to attend all classes. Students may miss two classes without
penalty. Additional absences will count against the student’s grade. Students with more than six
total absences will fail the course. If students arrive after role is called they are responsible for
informing the professor of their attendance after class. If students arrive after role is called on
more than two occasions future late arrivals will be recorded as absences. Once attendance has
been recorded it will not be changed at a later date.
Recording: All recording or class meetings, digital, analog, audio, video (or any other type or
format, is forbidden without the express approval of the instructor. If you would like to record
any class session you must speak directly with the instructor. Lectures and other class materials
provided to you are the intellectual property of the instructor. All recordings that the instructor
may allow are expressly for the personal use of the individual student who has sought the
permission of the instructor and may not be distributed to other students either free of charge or
for profit.
Plagiarism and Academic Integrity: All work for this class, unless otherwise noted in writing by
the instructor, is the responsibility solely of the student who should undertake such work unaided
by others. This course will fully adhere to the School of Public Policy’s policy on plagiarism.
That policy states that: “The profession of scholarship and the intellectual life of the University
as well as the field of public policy inquiry depend on a foundation of trust. Thus any act of
plagiarism strikes at the heart of the meaning of the University and the purpose of the School of
Public Policy. It constitutes a serious breach of professional ethics and it is unacceptable.
Plagiarism is the use of another's words or ideas presented as one's own. It includes, among other
things, the use of specific words, ideas, or frameworks that are the product of another's work.
Honesty and thoroughness in citing sources are essential to professional accountability and
personal responsibility. Appropriate citation is necessary so that arguments, evidence, and claims
can be critically examined. Plagiarism is wrong because of the injustice it does to the person
whose ideas are stolen. But it is also wrong because it constitutes lying to one's professional
colleagues. From a prudential perspective, it is shortsighted and self-defeating, and it can ruin a
professional career.
The faculty of the School of Public Policy takes plagiarism seriously and has adopted a zero
tolerance policy. Any plagiarized assignment will receive an automatic grade of "F." This may
lead to failure for the course, resulting in dismissal from the university. This dismissal will be
noted on the student's transcript. For foreign students who are on a university sponsored visa
(e.g. F-1, J-1 or J-2), dismissal also results in the revocation of their visa.
To help enforce the SPP policy on plagiarism, all written work submitted in partial fulfillment of
course or degree requirements must be available in electronic form so that it can be compared
with electronic databases, as well as submitted to commercial services to which the School
subscribes. Faculty may at any time submit a student's work without prior permission from the
student. Individual instructors may require that written work be submitted in electronic as well as
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printed form. The SPP policy on plagiarism is supplementary to the George Mason University
Honor Code; it is not intended to replace it or substitute for it.
Resources
If you are a student with a disability, please contact the Disability Resource Center (DRC) at
703-993-2474. All academic accommodations must be arranged through the DRC. For
psychological and social services, students should contact university Counseling and
Psychological Services as Http://caps.gmu.edu/. Students who need help with academic skills
may contact the Writing Center at http://writingcenter.gmu.edu.
COURSE CALENDER
AUGUST 29, 2016
SESSION ONE: THEORY AND PRACTICE
The class will introduce the instructor and the participants, review the syllabus and discuss the
conduct and requirements of the course. It will introduce the Decision Making Theory of
International Politics and the work of Graham Allison on Bureaucratic Politics which provides a
theoretical foundation for the course. It will review current research into decision making which
shows that groups make better choices than individuals.
Readings
Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” The American Political
Science Review, Vol. LXIII, No. 3, September 1969,
http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/Allison%20Conceptual%20Models.pdf
Brent Durbin, “Bureaucratic Politics Approach” Encyclopedia Britannica,
http://www.britannica.com/topic/bureaucratic-politics-approach
Charles Duhigg, “What Google Learned from its Quest to Build the Perfect Team,” The New
York Times Magazine, February 25, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/magazine/what-google-learned-from-its-quest-to-build-theperfect-team.html?smid=nytcore-ipad-share&smprod=nytcore-ipad
SEPTEMBER 12, 2016
SESSION TWO:
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM
The class will introduce the history and structure of the NSC interagency system. The class will
explain the role of the National Security Advisor and the National Security Staff. IT will describe
aspects of the NSC that are evident in all administrations. The class will introduce the
instructions for in-class panel presentations and review student experiences with the NSC
process.
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Readings
The National Security Act of 1947-Text.
http://global.oup.com/us/companion.websites/9780195385168/resources/chapter10/nsa/nsa.pdf
Roger George and Harvey Rishikof, Eds. The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the
Labyrinth (Washington, D.C. Georgetown University Press, 2011). Chapter 1.
Whittaker, Alan G., Brown, Shannon A., Smith, Frederick C., & McKune, Elizabeth (2011). The
National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System.
(Research Report, August 15, 2011, Annual Update). Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of
the Armed Forces, National Defense University, U.S. Department of
Defense.http://www.virginia.edu/cnsl/pdf/national-security-policy-process-2011.pdf
Obama Administration, Presidential Policy Directive -1, February 13, 2009,
http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-1.pdf
SEPTEMBER 19, 2016
SESSION THREE: THE NSC SYSTEM IN THE PRE-MODERN PERIOD
The class will review the evolution of the NSC System during the Eisenhower, Kennedy,
Johnson, Nixon and Carter Administrations. This was the period before the appearance of the
modern NSC System which emerged at the conclusion of the Reagan Administration. It was a
time of experimentation with the NSC format. This period involved the evolution of the role of
the National Security Advisor and demonstrated how presidential whim could alter the system.
Readings
George and Rishikof, The National Security Enterprise, Chapter 2
Karthik Gopalan, “Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Foreign Policy Journal, August 6,
2010, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/08/16/kennedy-and-the-cuban-missile-crisis/
Jeremi Suri, “Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy,” History Now, Gilder Lehrman
Institute of American History, http://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-byera/seventies/essays/henry-kissinger-and-american-foreign-policy
H-Diplo Roundtable Review of Betty Glad. A Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His
Advisors, the Making of American Foreign Policy, http://hdiplo.org/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XII-6.pdf
Running the World, Chapter 7 A Superpower in Search of Itself
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SEPTEMBER 26, 2016
SESSION FOUR: NSC SYSTEM IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
The class will focus on the initial failure of the Reagan Administration to establish a viable
interagency foreign policy process and the downgrading of the position of National Security
Advisor. It will discuss how the resulting power struggle between Secretary of State George
Schultz, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and CIA Director William Casey led to
breakdown in the NSC system and ultimately to the Iran-Contra Affair.
Readings
Running the World, Chapter 8 Morning in America, Twilight at the NSC
The White House, National Security Decision Directive –2, “The National Security Council
Structure,” January 12 1982, http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-2.pdf
Richard V. Allen, “The Day Reagan was Shot,” The Atlantic Monthly, April 2001,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/04/the-day-reagan-was-shot/308396/
Emily Langer, “William P. Clark, Top Aide to President Reagan,” The Washington Post, August
12, 2013. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/whitehouse/william-p-clark-top-aide-topresident-reagan-dies-at-81/2013/08/12/2556f0a0-020c-11e3-96a8-d3b921c0924a_story.html
History of the Iran-Contra Affair Video, ABC News, February 26, 1987,
https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=irancontra+affair&start=40
Oliver North Shreds Documents Video, ABC News, August 27, 1986,
http://abcnews.go.com/Archives/video/nov-27-1986-oliver-north-shreds-documents-12224854
Steven Roberts, “The White House Crisis: The Tower Report Inquiry Finds Reagan and Chief
Advisors Responsible for Chaos in Iran Arms Deals; Reagan Also Blamed,” The New York
Times, February 27, 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/27/world/white-house-crisis-towerreport-inquiry-finds-reagan-chief-advisers-responsible.html?pagewanted=all&pagewanted=print
OCTOBER 3, 2016
SESSION FIVE: NSC SYSTEM IN THE GEORGE H.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION
The class will examine how the fallout from the Iran-Contra Affair led to reorganization of the
NSC staff and the imposition of top-down discipline under Reagan’s last two National Security
Advisors, Frank Carlucci and General Colin Powell. It will also discuss the NSC system
established under President George H.W. Bush and National Security Advisor Lt. General Brent
Scowcroft, a period often called the ‘Gold Standard’ for the interagency process. The instructor
will distribute written instructions for the take-home mid-term examination.
Readings
Running the World, Chapter 9 Across a Bright Line in History
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Excerpts from the Tower Commission’s Report, The American Presidency Project,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/PS157/assignment%20files%20public/TOWER%20EXCERPTS.
htm#PartIV
NSDD 266, “Implementation of the Recommendations of the President’s Special Review
Board,” March 31, 1987, http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2987a.gif
White House, National Security Directive 1: Organization of the National Security Council
System, January 30, 1989, http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd1.pdf
James Mann, “Book Review: The Strategist,” on Brent Scowcroft, by Bartholomew Sparrow,
The Washington Post, January 30, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/bookreview-the-strategist-on-brent-scowcroft-by-bartholomew-sparrow/2015/01/28/36794714-9a8311e4-a7ee-526210d665b4_story.html
“George H.W. Bush: Foreign Affairs,” Miller Center,
http://millercenter.org/president/biography/bush-foreign-affairs
George and Rishikof, The National Security Enterprise, Chapter 4 (State Department)
OCTOBER 10, 2016
SESSION SIX: MIDTERM EXAMINATION
OCTOBER 17, 2016
SESSION SEVEN: NSC SYSTEM IN THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, PART ONE
The class will trace of the evolution of the NSC system during the Clinton Administration’s
(1993-96) involvement in peace operations in Somalia and Haiti. The resulting Presidential
Decision Directives established U.S. policy and created an interagency, institutional framework
for managing “complex contingency operations.” The role of the NSC System expanded from
deciding policy to managing whole-of-government operations in conflict zones where national
security and domestic agencies had to work together.
Readings
“Bill Clinton: Foreign Affairs,” The Miller Center,
http://millercenter.org/president/biography/clinton-foreign-affairs
The White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-25, “U.S. Policy on Reforming
Multilateral Peace Operations, May 3, 1994 https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-25.pdf
The White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-56, “Managing Complex Contingency
Operations,” May 1997, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm
Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary Wheatley, (ed.) “Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions
of Peace Operations: Haiti-A Case Study,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National
Defense University, February 1996, http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Hayes_Interagency.pdf
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National Defense University, Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency
Operations, 2003, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ccoh/index.htm
George and Rishikof, The National Security Enterprise, Chapter 5 (Defense Department)
OCTOBER 24, 2016
SESSION EIGHT: NSC SYSTEM IN THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATON, PART TWO
The class will continue to discuss the evolution of the NSC system during the Clinton
Administration, the highpoint of the interagency process. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the system
established by PDD-56 was ignored despite the fact that it remained US policy for the conduct of
complex contingency operations. In the Balkans, the US military’s refusal to assist civilian
agencies in peace implementation resulted in the publication of PDD-71, which attempted to
commit DOD to supporting civilian agencies, particularly in performing police functions.
Readings
Running the World, Chapter 10 The New Improved Post-Cold War, Indispensable Nation
Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: the Making of America’s Bosnia Policy, (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2000), (Recommended, Chapter 4, pp.153-55)
Gabriel Marcella, “National Security and the Interagency Process,”
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/strategy2004/17marcella.pdf
PDD-71 White Paper—The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Strengthening Criminal Justice
Systems in Support of Peace Operations, February 2000, http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-714.htm
George and Krishikof, The National Security Enterprise, Chapter 8 (CIA)
OCTOBER 31, 2016
SESSION NINE:
NSC SYSTEM IN THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION
The class will look at the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the NSC system. It will discuss the
enhanced role of the vice president and secretary of defense. It will examine two presidential
directives that shaped the Iraq intervention: NSPD 24 that assigned responsibility for postconflict operations to the Defense Department; and, NSPD 44 that authorized the State
Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and
prompted Defense Department Directive 3000.05 that equated the importance of stability
operations with war fighting.
Readings
Running the World, Chapter 12 A Thumb on the Scales
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No End in Sight Documentary Academy Award nominated film on the Coalition Provisional
Authority in Iraq. Film is available on Netflicks and Amazon.
https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF8#q=no%20end%20in%20sight%20documentary
Victoria Holt and Michael Mackinnon, “Origins and Evolution of US Policy Towards Peace
Operations” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, No. 1, February 2008,
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/researchpdfs/The_Origins_and_Evolution_of_US_Policy_Towards_Peace_Operations.pdf
The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 1, “Organization of the National
Security Council System, February 13, 2001 https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.pdf
The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 24, “Iraq Post-War Planning Office,
January 20, 2003, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-24.pdf
Robert Perito, Michael Dziedzic and Beth DeGrasse, “Building Civilian Capacity for US
Stability Operations: The Rule of Law Component,” Special Report, No. 118, United States
Institute of Peace, April 2004, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr118.pdf
The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 44, “Management of Interagency
Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” December 7, 2005,
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.pdf
NOVEMBER 7, 2016
SESSION TEN:
NSC SYSTEM IN THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
The class will examine President Obama’s adaption of the NSC system to fit his style of decision
making while maintaining the system’s traditional organization and process. To coordinate the
conduct of peace and stability operations, the State Department QDDR established the Bureau
for Conflict Stabilization and Operations. With the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan, there was a renewed presidential interest in UN peacekeeping, and a new
Presidential Directive to increase US government support for peace operations.
Readings
Jeffrey Goldberg, “A Withering Critique of Obama’s National Security Council,” The Atlantic,
November 12, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/11/a-witheringcritique-of-president-obamas-national-security-council/382477/
Michael Gordon Jackson, “A Dramatically Different NSC? President Obama’s use of the
National Security Council,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political
Science Association, Portland Oregon, March 22-24, 2012,
http://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/meet/2012/jacksonmichael.pdf
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Karen DeYoung, “How the Obama White House Runs Foreign Policy” The Washington Post,
August 4, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-the-obamawhite-house-runs-foreign-policy/2015/08/04/2befb960-2fd7-11e5-83531215475949f4_story.html
Obama Administration, Presidential Policy Directive -1, February 13, 2009,
http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-1.pdf
The Department of State, “The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR): Leading
Through Civilian Power” http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/2010/ (Executive Summary)
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “United States Support to United Nations Peace
Operations, Memorandum for Heads of Executive Department and Agencies,” September 28,
2015, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015peaceoperations.pdf
The White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Support to Peace Operations: 2015 Leader’s Summit on
Peacekeeping, September 28, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/09/28/fact-sheet-us-support-peace-operations-2015-leaders-summit-un
NOVEMBER 14, 2016
SESSION ELEVEN:
REFORMING THE NSC SYSTEM
The class will examine various proposals for reform of NSC system that highlight how systemic
weakness inhibits U.S. ability to implement foreign and national security policy. The class will
examine a number of recommendations put forward since the end of the Bush Administration.
The class will discuss whether a redesign of the current NSC System is feasible, and, if so what
elements of the various proposals would make the new system more effective.
Readings
Michele Flournoy, “Nine Lessons for Navigating National Security,” Center for a New American
Security, March 25, 2016, http://www.cnas.org/nine-lessons-for-navigating-nationalsecurity#.VwK891QrKUk
James Locher III, “Forging a New Shield,” The American Interest, Vol. 4 No.3, January 1, 2009,
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2009/01/01/forging-a-new-shield/
Gordon Adams, “The Institutional Imbalance of American Statecraft,” in Mission Creep: the
Militarization of US Foreign Policy, Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray, Eds. Washington, DC,
Georgetown University Press, 2014. (Highly Recommended)
Stuart Bowen Jr., “No More Adhocracies: Reforming the Management of Stabilization and
Reconstruction Operations,” Prism, Vol. 3, No. 2, March 2012, Center for Complex Contingency
Operations, National Defense University, Washington DC,
http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_3-2/prism3-18_bowen.pdf
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H.R. 2606_Stabilization and Reconstruction Integration Act of 2013.Note: Bill would establish
an independent US Office for Contingency Operations that would manage US involvement in
peace and stability operations. https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/2606
NOVEMBER 21, 2016
SESSION TWELVE:
THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT
The class will examine the evolution of the role of the UN Secretariat. The UN Charter (article
99) authorizes the Secretary General to independently inform the Security Council on matters
threatening international peace and security. This authority creates tension between the
Secretariat’s role as a provider of administrative services and its responsibility to act
independently. The class will examine this and other similarities between the NSC and the
Secretariat, including the impact of peace operations and the ongoing calls for reform.
Readings
Thant Myint-U and Amy Scott, The UN Secretariat: A Brief History (1945-2006) Chapters 1-5
The Secretary General, “Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on
uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People,” A/70/95, S/2015/446, June 1,
2015, http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf
NOVEMBER 28, 2016
SESSION THIRTEEN: THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING STRUCTURE
The class will examine the departments and offices within the United Nations Secretariat that are
dedicated to peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building and their relationship with the
Secretary General. The class will analyze how competition between UN departments is reflected
in the allocation of resources, the structure of modern multidimensional integrated stabilization
missions and in the recommendations of the 2015 High Level Panel on UN Peace Operations.
Readings
Thant and Scott, The UN Secretariat Chapters 6-7
“The Security Council and UN Peace Operations: Reform and Deliver,” Security Council
Report, No.2 May 5, 2016, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/thesecurity-council-and-peace-operations-reform-and-deliver.php
The Secretary General, “The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the
Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, A/70/357S/2015/682, September 2, 2015,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/682
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DECEMBER5, 2016
SESSION FOURTEEN:
THE INTERAGENCY IN THE FIELD
The class will describe the broad range of participants in modern peace and stability operations.
UN and regional organizations are joined by US government agencies, the US military and their
counterparts from other governments worldwide. In addition, thousands of international and
national non-governmental organizations arrive to provide humanitarian relief and services
related to political reconciliation and economic development.
Readings
Robert Perito (ed) Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability and Relief Operations,
(Washington, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007)
http://www.usip.org/publications/guide-participants-in-peace-stability-and-relief-operationsweb-version Introduction to all Sections
“In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities,” Independent Task Force
Report no. 55, Council on Foreign Relations, 2005 http://www.cfr.org/conflict-assessment/wakewar/p8438
Deborah Doane, “Do International NGOs still have the Right to Exist? March 13, 2016,
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/mar/13/dointernational-ngos-still-have-the-right-to-exist
“Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” Princeton University, January 2008,
https://wws.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/news/wws591b.pdf
Andrea Barbara Baumann, “Silver Bullet or Time Suck?” Prism, Vol. 3, No. 3, June 2012,
Center for Complex Contingency Operations, National Defense University, Washington, DC.
https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/21266/uploads
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