Nicolas Moll
“Will Marseille become another Sarajevo?” The memory of the First World War and its
impact on dealing with the European crisis after the assassination of King Alexander in
1934
I would like to address the following question: How present were the memories of the First
World War during political crisis situations in Europe in the decades after 1918, and how were
these memories used in dealing with these crises? To discuss this topic, I will analyze the
assassination of King Alexander in 1934 and its aftermath, which offers a particularly interesting
case study in raising the more general question about the impact of memories of the Great-War
in the political culture in Europe. When King Alexander of Yugoslavia, at the beginning of his
official visit in France, the 9th October 1934, was assassinated in Marseille, this dramatic and
spectacular event immediately provoked comparisons, in many European countries, with the
murder of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914. An international crisis, lasting two months, got
underway when the police investigations revealed that the Croatian Ustaša had organized the
murder. The Ustaša were based in Mussolini’s Italy, and had training camps in Hungary, two
countries with whom Yugoslavia had very tense relations. The crisis saw Yugoslavia, supported
by its allies of the Little Entente, Czechoslovakia and Romania, opposed by Hungary, supported
more or less by Italy and Austria. Other countries were also involved in the crisis, among them
Great Britain and France, which was an ally of Yugoslavia, but simultaneously was anxious to
avoid Italy’s exposure in the dispute. The crisis reached its peak when Yugoslavia, in a
memorandum addressed at the League of the Nations, officially accused Hungary as responsible
for the murder, and it came to an open dispute around this accusation in Geneva in Decembar
1934.
Not only directly after the assassination, but during the whole crisis, we can regularly find
references to Sarajevo 1914, in diaries, in diplomatic reports, in the press and other publications.
But these references appeared in various forms, and I will now distinguish four areas, in order to
better analyze by whom, in which ways and for which purposes these references to Sarajevo
1914 were exactly used in the Marseille-crisis.
First area: the establishment of direct parallels and also direct links between the two
assassinations themselves. In different sources, public or private, observers underlined striking
similarities between the two murders, for example that Ferdinand and Alexander were both
killed by a revolver in a open car during an official visit, and that in both cases the security
measures had failed, and also seemingly anecdotal similarities were noted: for example that
Franz and Alexander both died wearing an admiral’s uniform, and that both victims “left behind
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three orphans”. These similarities were especially emphasized by opponents of the
Karađorđevic-regime for whom 1934 appeared mainly as a “reversed situation” for 1914: in
1914, a Serb or Serbia as a whole had killed Franz Ferdinand, now it seemed only logic and fair
that the Serb king had been murdered in a similar way. We can find this attitude in Austria, we
can also find it in Croatia, where several persons were sentenced to prison terms because they
openly draw a parallel between both murders. A striking example from Croatia is the case where
a peasant from Varaždin used a “number’s game” through which he associated the dates of both
assassinations. Quotation 28/06/09/10. This may appear as anecdotal, but it summarizes an
attitude among opponents of King Alexander for whom the parallels between the two murders
were the expression of a direct link between both events, what appears also in comments
qualifying the murder of Alexander as “the price paid for Sarajevo”, “the vengeance of the
providence”, “Gods punishment for Sarajevo”, or the “revenge for 1914”. - The reminder of the
Sarajevo murder and the assumption that Serbia was behind it became also an argument, used in
diplomatic circles, but also publicly, to counter the accusations of Yugoslavia against Hungary,
and which can be summarized as follows: you committed a murder yourself, 20 years ago, that
means that you don’t have the right to complain when your own King has been murdered. This
was often completed by a second argument which referred to the fact that Gavrilo Princip was
commemorated and glorified in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. One Hungarian newspaper for
example addressed Belgrade with the following question: « Can the Yugoslav government deny
that a commemorative plaque has been put to the memory of Gavrilo Princip, the assassin of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand and of his wife, and that the Skupstina has voted a national donation of
500.000 Dinar to the father of the murderer?“ Also personalities who were sympathetic towards
Yugoslavia, as Robert Seton-Watson, openly stated that the Sarajevo murder constituted a
handicap for Yugoslavia’s accusations against Hungary: „The government in Belgrade is in a weak
position to press very strongly for inquiries beyond it‘s territory.(…) In the critical period of July
1914 it did nothing to elicit the full facts.(…) There is the still more awkward fact, that in all-toowide Yugoslav circles (...) there has been a glorification of Gavrilo Princip as a national hero. (...) I
have more than once put it to my Yugoslav friends, and I repeat it now, that this attitude to the
crime of 1914 was a direct incitement to similar crimes for similar objects.“
Second aspect of the Sarajevo-analogy in the post-Marseille-crisis: to what extent was the
context, in which the murder took place, seen as similar to 1914, and would therefore the
murder lead to similar consequences, concretely: a new war? This is an apprehension that seems
to have been widespread; for example, the French Ambassador in London noted that after
Marseilles many people in England were “asking themselves if Europe is not, like in 1914, on the
eve of bloody conflicts”. How strong the fear, or at least the public nervousness in various
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countries must have been, is illustrated by several public declarations emphasizing the
differences between Marseille and Sarajevo, sharply insisting that Marseille is NOT Sarajevo. The
most striking example is the public speech made, the 19t h October, by the British Foreign
Minister, John Simon, where he said: “I cannot too strongly insist that the two cases do not provide
a parallel, but a contrast”. Simon evoked mainly two differences: that the relations between the
states were not as bad as they had been in 1914, and that all the countries had undergone a
horrible experience from 1914-1918, which they didn’t want to repeat. Similar and other
arguments were used by others, and they were not just used in a tactical way, many seemed also
to be convinced that the situations were indeed different. Goebbels for example wrote in his
diary: “I don’t fear a Sarajevo.”, and summarized the main reason in his eyes as follows: “The
world is tired of war”. Related to Germany, which remained more or less neutral in the YugoslavHungarian dispute, we have also another, very interesting, and this time, public declaration,
from Goering, who declared: “The new Germany only knows its own interests, and the year 1914
will never happen again, when Germany had to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for others.” This
was a clear allusion to Germany intervening on behalf of Austria in 1914, and obviously Goering
felt obliged to state this in order to prevent any wrong expectation from Hungary related to
Germany.– All this does not mean that the situation was reduced to a debate between “it is
similar” and “it is not similar”-tendencies, as we have also voices which explicitly state that 1934
and 1914 are different, but that the current situation could nevertheless become dangerous. A
Belgian diplomat for example noted the 19th October: „The incidents of Sarajevo have shown us
that with one month of distance, Austria-Hungary had not hesitated to accuse formally and
officially Serbia to have stirred up the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. History might repeat
itself.“
This leads us directly to a third aspect of the Sarajevo-reference which appeared during the
Marseille-crisis: Is Yugoslavia about to act as Austria did in 1914 after the assassination? It
seems that this was a perception and an apprehension which existed for example in French
political circles after Marseille. In Paris the Austrian Ambassador was informed that the French
government would certainly exercise pressure on Yugoslavia in the sense of moderation
towards Hungary, Paris being“too much aware about the possible consequences of a possible
Yugoslav ultimatum, on the model of Austria-Hungary in 1914, in order not to make every possible
effort to prevent such a development”. It is also an apprehension and an argument which was
articulated through voices in neutral countries. A Swiss newspaper wrote: « We cannot repeat it
often enough, what must be prevented at any price is that the mourning of Yugoslavia triggers a
series of diplomatic incidents which could result in a war... or the war. You can't possibly evoke
memories of the murder in Marseille without referring to the one in Sarajevo.(...) Remember the
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indignation aroused among all the righteous people of Yugoslavia by the ruthless ultimatum
delivered to the government of King Peter by fatal Count Berchtold!” When Belgrade accused
Hungary in Geneva, opponents of the Kingdom presented this a peace-threatening provocation,
and combined this with the reminder of the Sarajevo-assassination ; a Hungarian newspaper for
example wrote that “Yugoslavia, the same which already in 1914 triggered the worldwide fire, is
blowing on the flames”. – Now, how did the Yugoslav Kingdom, and those supporting its position
against Hungary, react to this use of the 1914-analogy and to the different accusations
associated with it? There have been only few attempts trying to defend the Sarajevoassassination itself. For example a Polish newspaper replied to Hungarian accusations that it is
important not to obscure the difference between Marseille and Sarajevo: “The murder in
Sarajevo partially resulted from a provocation, while the one of Marseilles did not”, referring to the
fact that Franz Ferdinand had decided to visit Bosnia on Vidovdan-Day. But the Belgrade
political elites did not really refer to the Sarajevo assassination itself, even if it was for them a
positively connoted memory, knowing that this would give too many arguments to their
opponents. Now, concerning the analogy with Austria’s attitude in 1914: It seems that
immediately after Marseille, in some circles in Belgrade, the idea circulated that if AustriaHungary had pressed charges in 1914, why shouldn’t we be allowed to do it now? But actually,
there has been much more emphasis put to contrast the attitude of Austria in 1914 and of
Yugoslavia in 1934, and therefore to refute the parallels between the behaviour of both
governments. In particular, when the crisis went to Geneva and the accusations against
Yugoslavia strengthened, many emphasized that the decision to go to the League of the Nations
and not to act unilaterally illustrated all the difference with Austria’s behaviour in 1914, and
couldn’t in any case be assimilated with a provocation or an ultimatum. The newspaper Novosti
for example opposed the violence of Austria Hungary in 1914 to the moderation and the respect
of the law by Yugoslavia in 1934, and the Slovenec wrote:“20 years ago, it was an ultimatum.
Today, it is a memorandum. The people of Yugoslavia, relying in spiritual arms, submit their
complaint to the institution that wishes international relations to be promoted by law and not
endangered by the cannon.“
This brings us to the fourth and last dimension I wish to focus on: the reference to 1914 in
combination with the role of the League of the Nations in the Marseille-crisis. It is interesting
that the idea to involve the League was first dismissed by the Great Powers who would have
preferred to bury the whole dispute and feared that the League would not be able to handle the
crisis. To argue against this position and in favour of the League of the Nations, the reference to
1914 was also used, for example by a spokesperson of the Little Entente in Geneva: “This case is
precisely the type of a threat of war that the League was created to meet, for the charge that the
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Marseilles assassinations were plotted in Hungary parallels the charge that the Sarajevo
assassinations were plotted in Serbia. Every reason cited against an appeal to the League applies
equally to Sarajevo, and if the League was not created to deal with that, what was it created for?“
When the crisis was brought to Geneva and finally resolved there, through a resolution which
condemned the murder of Marseille and charged Hungary a bit but not too much, so that both
sides could claim they were the winners, the reference to 1914 was again very much used in the
press, in order to praise the involved actors, and especially the League of the Nations. A French
journalist for example wrote : “Twenty years ago, an affair like the assassination of King
Alexander would have been settled with cannon shots. Today, thanks to the Geneva institution, the
two opponents have been reaching hands.” And an English newspaper stated: “Had there been no
League, it is almost sure that by now the continent would have been facing a situation very similar
to that of the July days 1914.“ In several other newspapers we find similar “what if scenarios”:
Imagine we would not have the League now, or: imagine in 1914 we would have had the League,
which shows again how strong had been the tendency to see the situation after Marseille as
similar to 1914.
Let us summarize and conclude: First, we see that the Sarajevo-analogy has been very present
and has been used in various ways by different actors during the Marseille-crisis. Different
elements from the analogy were emphasized for different purposes, and similarities between
1934 and 1914 were for example underlined in order to refrain and to delegitimize Belgrade,
while others insisted on differences in order to defend the attitude of Yugoslavia. Secondly, the
memories of Sarajevo have certainly influenced the interpretations of the assassination and the
crisis in 1934, but to what extent have they also influenced the actions during the crisis? More
generally asked: Did the memories of Sarajevo 1914 have an impact on the evolution and the
resolution of the crisis? These are very difficult questions to answer. Anthony Eden, who was the
British delegate in Geneva in 1934, wrote later in his autobiography: "We are all marked, to some
extent, by the stamp of our generation ; mine is that of the assassination of Sarajevo ." But it would
certainly be too much to say that the Marseille-crisis was defused because of the Sarajevosouvenir. There have been various reasons which explain why the different actors acted like
they did, for example that the French government pressured Yugoslavia to be moderate was
mainly motivated by its will not to compromise good relations with Italy. Nevertheless, we can
say that the remembrance of Sarajevo played a role during the crisis. The fact that the reference
to Sarajevo was so much used illustrates that many estimated it would be a powerful argument
in the political debate. It seems also that the Sarajevo-references contributed to create a public
atmosphere which put the Yugoslav regime in a more defensive position. We can also see that
for some protagonists the will to act differently than in 1914 was one of the motivations for their
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action. In the same time it is difficult to say to what extent the use of the 1914-references, by
politicians, diplomats and journalists, was a result of convictions and authentic apprehensions,
or a purely tactical argument - often certainly it was a mix of both. I would like to finish with a
quotation from the French writer Julien Green who wrote in October 1934 in his diary: “There
was the fear that a war would break out following the tragedy of Marseille. There was this fear
because most of the persons reason through analogies and that they thought of Sarajevo. » This
quotation raises an interesting question: Did people fear a war and therefore thought of Sarajevo
– or did they think of Sarajevo and therefore feared a war? That is a question that may be
discussed also with regard to other historical analogies in other political contexts. Thank you for
your attention.
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