454694
2012
WMR30910.1177/0734242X12454694Waste Management & ResearchAdama
Short Report
Urban governance and spatial inequality
in service delivery: a case study of
solid waste management in Abuja, Nigeria
Waste Management & Research
30(9) 991­–998
© The Author(s) 2012
Reprints and permission:
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DOI: 10.1177/0734242X12454694
wmr.sagepub.com
Onyanta Adama
Abstract
Spatial inequality in service delivery is a common feature in African cities. Several factors account for the phenomenon but there
is growing attention towards urban governance and the role of the state. Urban governance policies such as privatization serve as
key strategies through which the state regulates and (re)produces spatial inequality in service delivery. This study examined how
governance practices related to privatization and the regulatory role of the state reinforce spatial inequalities in the delivery of solid
waste services in Abuja, Nigeria. It focused primarily on the issue of cost recovery. Privatization became a major focus in Abuja in
2003 when the government launched a pilot scheme. Although it has brought improvements in service delivery, privatization has also
increased the gap in the quality of services delivered in different parts of the city. Drawing on empirical data, the study revealed that
little sensitivity to income and affordability, and to income differentials between neighbourhoods in the fixing of user charges and in
the choice of the billing method is contributing to spatial inequalities in service delivery. Furthermore, the study suggests that these
practices are linked to a broader issue, a failure of the government to see the people as partners. It therefore calls for more inclusive
governance especially in decision-making processes. The study also emphasizes the need for a policy document on solid waste
management, as this would encourage a critical assessment of vital issues including how privatization is to be funded, especially in
low-income areas.
Keywords
Urban governance, spatial inequality, state, privatization, solid waste management, Abuja, Nigeria
Introduction
The problem of urban inequality featured prominently in recent
United Nations Habitat reports: State of the World’s Cities
2010/2011 (UN Habitat 2008) and The State of African Cities
2010 (UN Habitat, 2010). Inequality manifests in different forms:
from income, to access to employment and services (UN Habitat,
2008). While urban inequality is a global phenomenon, African
cities exhibit the highest levels (UN Habitat, 2010). Spatial inequality, defined as significant differences in the levels of service
delivery between different neighbourhoods is a notable form of
urban inequality (Chakravorty, 1996). Privatization, a form of
public–private partnership (PPP), where the state transfers some
aspects of service delivery, or the whole operation to the private
sector (Batley, 1996) is a driving force behind spatial inequality in
the delivery of solid waste services (Cointreau-Levine, 1994). In
many cases, the benefits of privatization are often limited to highincome and commercial districts (Adama, 2007). In the search for
explanations, the behaviour of private firms, particularly the privileging of high-income areas has received some attention (Post
et al., 2005). However, as this article shows, what the state does or
does not do also plays a crucial role in determining the quality and
level of services provided in different parts of cities. As summed
up by Jessop (1997), the state is the site, generator and product of
strategies with a tendency to privilege particular actors and spaces.
Urban governance policies such as privatiation, serve as key strategies through which the state regulates; produces and reproduces
configurations of urban space (Brenner, 1997).
The decision to relocate Nigeria’s capital city from Lagos to
Abuja was taken in 1976 and Abuja became the new capital
in 1991. A major justification for relocation was that Lagos
had become unsuitable as a national capital (Federal Capital
Development Authority, 1979). Lagos had gained notoriety for a
host of problems including traffic congestions, lack of housing
as well as environmental degradation (Mabogunje, 2001). Thus,
the government decided to plan and develop a new capital city
The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden
Corresponding author:
Onyanta Adama, The Nordic Africa Institute, P O Box 1703, SE-751 47
Uppsala, Sweden
Email: [email protected]
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Waste Management & Research 30(9)
that would avoid all the problems associated with Lagos. Abuja
was conceived as a modern city with emphasis on nature, spaciousness and environmental quality and was also meant to be
functional and efficient but things have turned out differently.
When a review of the Abuja master plan was conducted in 1999,
the city was described as dysfunctional and physically deteriorating (Kalgo and Ayileka, 2001). The reference to ‘physical deterioration’ highlights the state of solid waste services. The solid waste
sector is plagued with numerous problems ranging from inappropriate storage equipment to shortage of collection vehicles (Imam
et al., 2008). Some areas are left for months without receiving any
collection services, making illegal disposal a common practice
(Adama, 2007). There is no formal sorting or treatment of waste
and waste is disposed of in an open dump. The government puts
most of the blame for the problems in the solid waste sector on
the rapid growth in population (Chukwuocha, 2003). Although
Abuja has witnessed a huge increase in population, from 378
671 in 1991 to 1.4 million in 2006, population increase alone
does not provide an adequate explanation for the situation in the
solid waste sector. This article draws attention to urban governance practices.
Privatization became the preferred choice for service delivery in Abuja following the launch of a pilot scheme in 2003. The
government cited the desire to reduce its financial burden,
broaden participation and ensure sustainability as major justifications for privatization (Adama, 2007). A government assessment of the pilot scheme noted improvements in service delivery,
but also highlighted some problems including lack of commitment from the state; limited capacity of the private sector; and
the unwillingness of users to pay for services (Mohammed,
2004). Crucially, the report identified a huge gap in the level and
quality of services provided in different parts of the city. It is
within this context that the study examined how urban governance practices, specifically the regulatory role of the state reinforce spatial inequalities in the delivery of solid waste services
in Abuja, Nigeria.
The article is divided into four sections. The first is a brief
conceptual discussion on urban governance and spatial inequality. The second is a background section highlighting the origins
of spatial inequality in Abuja and the spatialized hierarchy that
exists in the delivery of solid waste services. The third and fourth
sections present the results and discussions under two headings:
the fixing of user charges and the billing method.
Materials and methods
Primary data was first obtained during the author’s doctoral fieldwork in Abuja between 2003 and 2006. The data was updated
between 2008 and 2011. The updated data is based on ten semistructured and in-depth interviews conducted with officials of
the Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB), the agency
responsible for solid waste management, and a selection of contractors. Purposive sampling was adopted in the choice of interviewees. The analysis relies mainly on empirical data to support
the major proposition that the regulatory role of the state play
some role in the spatial inequalities that exists in the delivery of
solid waste services in Abuja. Tables were useful not only in
making data more accessible but also to draw conclusions and
move to the next step of analysis.
Urban governance and
spatial inequality
Urban governance is concerned with the institutions, processes
and policies of city governance, and with the power relations
between the multiplicity of actors (Devas, 2002). In Africa, the
term ‘governance’ is ideologically deployed in the rhetoric and
practices of privatization, decentralization, democratization and
liberalization and the most concrete discussions of governance
have been in regard to the delivery of urban services (Myers,
2011). Urban spatial inequality has received some attention within
the governance discourse (Miraftab, 2004; Smith, 2004). Myers
(2011) reports that the (re)production of spatial inequality is a
consistent feature of urban planning and policies in Africa. Much
of the debate has been conducted within the context of neo-liberal
policies, particularly privatization (Miraftab, 2004). Privatization
remains a priority of African city governments and donors but the
growing arguments against the policy are generating more interest
in the role of the state (Freund, 2010). While the structural adjustment programme (SAP) imposed on African states by the Bretton
Woods Institutions in the 1980s assumed an anti-state stance and
saw the private sector as the main engine of growth, the concept
of governance brought with it an acknowledgement that some
level of state participation was necessary, but in partnership with
the private sector and civil society (Igoe and Kelsall, 2005). The
attempt to bring the state back in is strengthened by the belief that
marketizing essential services without a strong state regulation
undermines the entire process of devolving core responsibilities
of the state to the private sector (Smith, 2004). Although a strong
state regulation is crucial, this article shows that how the state
actually performs its regulatory role also deserve attention.
MacLeod and Goodwin (1999) refer to a mode of regulation
as a range of institutional ensembles, formal procedures, and
informal social norms, which articulate at certain times and in
certain places to secure capitalist development. Crucially, processes of regulation are constituted through unevenly developed
social practices and are spatially embedded (Goodwin and
Painter, 1997). Goodwin and Painter go on to cite patchy administrative coverage and uneven levels of service provision as two
key outcomes of uneven regulation. Following from above, this
article contends that regulation is a major mechanism through
which the discriminatory practices of the state are concretized
and spatial inequality is (re)produced.
How the state handles issues of finance is an important part of
its regulatory role (Freund, 2010). In the case of solid waste management, finance encompasses a wide range of issues such as how
low-income areas are to be funded: how user charges will be fixed
and collected: and the willingness of users to pay for services
(Cointreau-Levine, 1994). Furthermore, full cost recovery is a key
element of the market logic and the basis for the argument that
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993
Adama
Figure 1. Map of Abuja showing the location of Maitama, Wuse and Gwarimp; source: the Federal Capital Development
Authority 1979 (Adapted by Cederström (2007)).
privatization is a more efficient method for delivering public
goods (Smith, 2004). As a result, non-payment often translates
into the non-delivery of services as documented in the case of
Abuja (Awaisu, 2010), in Accra (Oteng-Ababio, 2010) and in
Cape Town where the decision of municipalities to adopt measures aimed at maximizing cost recovery has been accompanied by
extensive cut-offs for disadvantaged households (Miraftab, 2004).
It is important to note that while privatization has received a lot
of attention, it is not the only factor responsible for spatial inequalities in service delivery in African cities. There is the colonial legacy. Colonial administrations were primarily concerned with
protecting European populations from diseases and thus concentrated solid waste services in areas inhabited by Europeans (Myers,
2011). The trend continued in post-colonial Africa, albeit in a different form as documented in Nigeria where the emerging elites
moved into the areas previously occupied by Europeans, and such
areas continued to receive better services (Olukoju, 2003). A more
recent phenomenon is the tendency of urban planners in Africa to
see informality as illegal, a notion which often leads to the marginalization of informal areas in service delivery (Myers, 2011).
Spatial inequality in Abuja: the origins
Following the decision to relocate Nigeria’s capital from Lagos
to Abuja, an American firm, International Planning Associates
was hired to produce a master plan for the construction and
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Waste Management & Research 30(9)
Figure 2. The urban design plan of Abuja showing phases 1 to 3; source: the Federal Capital Development Authority 1979
(Adapted by Cederström (2007)).
development of the city (Federal Capital Development Authority,
1979). The firm recommended a central area urban plan, which
resulted in a crescent-shaped urban design form (Figure 1).
Accordingly, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) was designated into four phases: with phase 1 in the centre (Figure 2).
The development of Abuja began in the early 1980s and Phase
I, which consists of the Central Area, Garki, Wuse, Asokoro
and Maitama has witnessed most of the development (Figure
1). The development has also been accompanied by the emergence of slums (Mabogunje, 2001). A notable feature of the
Abuja landscape is that the rich live in the main city area and
the poor at the periphery (Kalgo and Ayileka, 2001). The Abuja
master plan is noted as having contributed to this spatial segregation through specifications of type of buildings and where
they should be located (Vale, 1992). Vale reports that the specifications meant only a few could afford to build houses in certain parts of the city.
Over the years, the provision of services in Abuja has followed a certain pattern: priority to the central area and highincome districts (Adama, 2007). For example, Asokoro and
Maitama, located close to the centre have the most number of
high-income households and receive the best services (Awaisu
(2010), see also Figure 3). In contrast, the low-income peripheral
settlements such as Nyanya which are largely populated by traders, artisans and low-income civil servants receive the least services and are the filthiest (Adama (2007) and see also Figure 4).
Figure 3. A street in Asokoro district; source: the
author (2010).
The average waste generation rate in Abuja is estimated to
be 0.55–0.58 per person per day (Imam et al., 2008). Whereas the
amount of waste generated has increased along with the increase
in population, the capacity of the government to manage the
waste lags behind (Chukwuocha, 2003). Crucially, some areas
are better served than others. For example, there are variations in
the rate of collection. Over 90% of the waste generated in the
high-income districts of Asokoro and Maitama is collected,
whereas the figure is over 40% for the medium-income district of
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995
Adama
Figure 4. A street in Nyanya; source: the author (2010).
including the Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC), which
houses Abuja, the main city area. In an interview with the head of
solid waste department in December 2011, he maintained that
AEPB has responsibility only for the main city area and not for
the peripheral settlements such as Nyanya which fall within the
same municipal council. This position contrasts with that of his
predecessor, who had opined that AEPB’s jurisdiction covers the
entire FCT. What is not in doubt is that AMAC has no major role
in solid waste management. It is AEPB that has been responsible
for major functions such as the hiring and monitoring of contractors, and the direct provision of services, even in the peripheral
settlements. The study revealed that a major result of the unclear
picture surrounding the institutional arrangement is an ad-hoc
and inconsistent approach to solid waste management in the lowincome areas, an outcome that leaves such areas for long periods
without services.
Table 1. Rate of collection in selected districts.
Districts
Asokoro
Maitama
Wuse
Garki
Gwarimpa
Percentage of
respondents having 1 or
2 collections weekly
Percentage of
respondents having 2
or 3 collections weekly
5
11
54
59
78
95
89
46
41
22
Source: Awaisu (2010).
Gwarimpa (Awaisu, 2010). Table 1 gives an indication of the differences in the rate of collection between different districts.
In the case of waste storage, not all areas of Abuja have the
recommended standardized waste bins. Bins are highly visible in
the main city districts but non-existent in peripheral areas such as
Nyanya where residents resort to using all kinds of substandard
equipment such as baskets and buckets (Adama, 2007). In another
example, during the 2003 pilot scheme, it emerged that one of the
reasons given by residents of Lugbe, another peripheral settlement, for the refusal to pay user charges was that they were not
given proper storage containers. Residents complained that it was
easy for dogs to tear the polythene bags distributed to them for
waste storage, thereby contributing to littering. There has been
little improvement in Lugbe since the pilot scheme. Interviews
conducted in December 2011 revealed that the settlement had
been left without the services of a private contractor for about a
year and AEPB could only provide ad-hoc services.
Evidently, the problem of spatial inequality in Abuja cannot
be attributed to a single factor. The roles of the master plan and
the preferential treatment given to high-income areas have both
been highlighted above. It is also worth making a reference to the
institutional arrangements. Decree No. 10 of 1997 gives responsibility for solid waste management in the FCT to AEPB but
in practice, it is not clear who is responsible for what and
where (Adama, 2007). The FCT is made up of six area councils
The fixing of user charges
In Abuja, the government expected privatization to be funded
largely from user charges. The payment of user charges was first
introduced in 1993 when AEPB, citing inadequate finance made
a decision to commercialize solid waste services. Households
were asked to pay N200 (200 Naira) a month or the equivalent of
US$1.27 (based on an exchange rate of N157 to US$1 obtained
May 5 2012). However, AEPB made a deliberate decision to target only businesses and households willing to pay for services.
The implication of this ‘no money, no service’ approach for poor
users and neighbourhoods is obvious. In large part, the peripheral
and low-income areas of the city were left without services. In
addition to this development, corporate bodies challenged the
authenticity of the rates fixed by AEPB based on the argument
that the rates were arbitrary. AEPB had used criteria such as the
number of wash hand basins and water closets (WCs) found in a
premises to fix the rates.
In 1997, AEPB reviewed the tariffs. Commercial rates were
fixed based on type of activities. For example, pharmacy; embassies; small-, medium- and large-scale enterprises were some of the
categories identified. In the case of residential rates, AEPB took
the decision to fix rates based on number of rooms. This was the
situation until the 2003 pilot scheme. With no policy in place, it
was hoped that experiences from the pilot scheme would provide
answers to various questions including the controversy surrounding user charges. The government employed twelve contractors to
cover different parts of the city.
Under the pilot scheme, the criteria adopted in the fixing of
user charges included: type of house: number of rooms: estimated
number of occupants: and anticipated volume of waste. However,
AEPB conceded that it lacked reliable data on the criteria. The
board made further adjustments to the charges in 2005. It retained
the criteria used in 2003, but classified the city into three groups:
I, II and III (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2005). Group 1 consists
of peripheral areas such as Nyanya, Karu and Kubwa; whereas
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Waste Management & Research 30(9)
Table 2. User charges according to groups.
Type of house
Large detached duplex
Small detached duplex
Semi-detached duplex
Detached bungalow
Detached back house
3–4 bedroom flat
1–2 bedroom flat
Mud house
Amount in Naira
Group 1
Group II
Group III
2500
2000
2000
1500
1000
750
500
100
3125
2500
2500
1850
1250
938
625
125
3750
3000
3000
2250
1500
1125
750
150
Source: Federal Government of Nigeria (2005).
Table 3. Percentage of income groups according to projected
earnings per month (amount in Naira).
Districts
N20–99 000
N100 000–200 000
> N200 000
Asokoro
Maitama
Wuse
Garki
Gwarimpa
2
3
15
25
30
13
17
25
20
35
85
80
60
55
35
Source: Awaisu (2010).
group II covers Garki I and II, Wuse I and Gwarimpa and group
III is made up of Asokoro, Maitama and Wuse II among others.
Residential charges were then released according to the groups
(Table 2). The document did not specify the criteria used to classify the city into groups. Crucially, it failed to highlight the income
disparities between the groups. This omission was reflected in the
lack of sensitivity to the income disparities in the user charges.
Table 2 shows the user charges according to the three groups
identified by AEPB and Table 3 gives a breakdown of income
groups in selected districts. Based on the figures in Table 2, a
resident living in a detached bungalow in group II is expected to
pay N1 875 (US$11.9). For group III, the figure is N2 250
(US$14.3). The figures show a difference of less than US$3
between the two groups. Meanwhile, Asokoro and Maitama
which are in group III, have a high concentration of diplomatic
and top government functionaries. As shown in Table 3, 85% of
households in Asokoro earn above N200 000 a month (US$1
273) whereas the figure is 35% for Gwarimpa, which is in group
II and largely inhabited by medium-income earners (Awaisu,
2010). Although these figures confirm that there are spatial disparities in income in Abuja, the user charges do not reflect these
disparities. The neglect of income disparities and the arbitrary
nature of the methods used by AEPB in the fixing of user fees are
further reflected in the observation by a contractor that the
charges were too high in some places and too low in others. It
should be noted that over the years, AEPB has not deemed it necessary to consult users before fixing charges.
In addition to income differentials, it is important to examine a
related issue: affordability. Income is a major determinant in
households’ willingness to pay for solid waste services since it is
linked to affordability (Rahji and Oloruntoba, 2009). The approach
adopted by AEPB in the fixing of user charges neglects the
importance of affordability. AEPB conceded that it had no data
on household income. It made no attempt to conduct a survey or
obtain the relevant data from other sources. The National Bureau
of Statistics (NBS) is a federal government agency charged with
the responsibility of gathering data on major indicators of national
development. For example, NBS has data on poverty and on
household income. Data on poverty headcount released by NBS
reveal that 82.32% of Abuja residents are poor and 17.68% are
non-poor (National Bureau of Statistics 2009). The definition of
poverty and how it should be measured is highly contested but it
can be argued that if AEPB had used the available data on poverty,
the charges fixed would have been more realistic.
Table 4 shows that only 4.4% of households in Abuja have an
income above N80 000 (US$509.4) whereas 39.1% earn between
N20 000 to N49 999 (US$128 to US$319) and at the bottom,
4.0% earn N1000 (US$6.4). The figures not only highlight income
disparities, they clearly suggest that affordability differs between
income groups. In a confirmation of the spatial variations in
income and affordability, Awaisu (2010) reports that even though
defaults in payments cannot be attributed to income alone as other
factors such as the perception that waste is a social service and
should be provided free play a part, income is a crucial determinant in the higher default rates recorded in Gwarimpa and Garki.
The billing method
The billing method adds another dimension to the problem of
spatial differentiation in service delivery in Abuja. While the
charges shown in Table 2 are monthly rates, officially, AEPB has
adopted a system whereby residents and all users are expected to
pay annually.
Every owner, caretaker or occupier of any tenement or any
person, authority, body corporate who lives, resides or carries on
any activity within the Territory shall pay in advance to the Board
on yearly basis such rates and charges as specified in the schedule
hereto (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2005; p. 179).
The contractors interviewed maintained that the annual billing
method is not practical. It is difficult to grasp the rationale behind
this approach, in a city where the unwillingness to pay for services,
is one of the greatest challenges facing privatization (Adama,
2007). Inevitably, the annual billing method is more problematic
in some areas than in others. In the low- and medium-income
areas where residents are predominantly tenants, most are against
annual rates based on the argument that they might lose their
money, if they have to move out before the one year period expires.
This argument points to the relevance of tenancy. In addition, civil
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Adama
Table 4. Percentage distribution of household monthly income/allowances in 2007.
Amount in
Naira
Percentage
1000
1999–4999
5000–9999
10 000–19 999
20 000–49 999
50 000–80 000
>80 000
4.0
4.8
9.5
26.2
39.1
12.0
4.4
Source: Compiled from National Bureau of Statistics (2009).
Table 5. Preferred method of billing in selected districts.
District
Yearly
Monthly
Asokoro
Maitama
Wuse
Garki
Gwarimpa
92
89
45
21
18
8
11
55
79
82
Source: Awaisu (2010).
servants, who make up a sizeable proportion of the population of
Abuja, are particularly against the method arguing that their salaries are not paid a year in advance. The argument draws attention
to affordability. If income is closely linked to affordability and the
majority of Abuja residents are poor, both of which have been established, the question is: can users afford to pay the annual rates, and
even more crucial, is the capacity to pay the same in all districts?
Awaisu (2010), reports that the annual rate charged by AEPB
represents over 30% of the average income of households in
Garki and Gwarimpa, whereas the figure is 15% for Asokoro and
Maitama. From the figures in Table 5, which shows the percentage of residents who prefer yearly or monthly charges in selected
districts, the majority of residents of Asokoro (92%) prefer the
annual billing method to monthly charges. Asokoro is closely followed by Maitama. It should be recalled that Asokoro and
Maitama also follow each other at the top in terms of household
income (Table 3). The lowest figure for preference for annual
billing 18% is recorded in Gwarimpa, which occupies the lowest
position on the income ladder. There is an obvious correlation
between income and the preferences for and against annual rates.
Awaisu (2010) attributes the high figures for preference for
annual billing in Asokoro and Maitama to two factors: the residents belong to the high-income group bracket; and in many
cases, they own the houses or the houses are owned by federal
and state governments, embassies or multinationals. The two factors confirm the role of income and tenancy, respectively. The
billing method has obvious spatial implications for service delivery. There is a correlation between willingness or ability to pay,
and the quality of services delivered. The assessment of the 2003
pilot project noted that the high-income districts of Asokoro and
Maitama generated the highest revenues and received the best
services (Mohammed, 2004).Of the five neighbourhoods commonly referred to in this article: Asokoro, Maitama, Wuse, Garki
and Gwarimpa, the largest measure of uncollected waste is in
Gwarimpa, and the least is in Asokoro (Awaisu, 2010).
Conclusion
This article has shown how urban governance practices reinforce
spatial inequality in the delivery of solid waste services in Abuja,
Nigeria. It confirms the role of regulation as a major mechanism
through which spatial inequality is (re)produced. The problem of
spatial inequality in service delivery is not unique to Abuja or to
Nigeria but there is a need to investigate individual cases since
policy environments and implementation strategies vary. The
study revealed that little sensitivity to income and affordability in
general, and to income differentials between neighbourhoods in
the fixing of user charges and in the choice of billing method in
particular, is reinforcing spatial inequalities in the delivery of
solid waste services in Abuja. Furthermore, the study suggests
that the problem of spatial inequality in solid waste services in
Abuja is linked to a wider issue: a failure of the government to see
the people as key partners in urban governance. The implication is
that they are not consulted on key issues and thus their interests
are not taken into consideration when decisions are made. While
this is a general problem, the study confirms that the poor are
particularly disadvantaged. A related problem is the tendency of
the government to ignore the relevance of data in decision-making,
a practice which leads to decisions becoming unrealistic and
arbitrary and further marginalizing the already disadvantaged
urban poor. The study calls for a more inclusive governance in general and a policy document on solid waste management in particular
as this would encourage a critical assessment of issues such as
data gathering, and how privatization is to be funded, especially in
low-income areas.
Funding
This study was supported by the Swedish International Development
Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Department for Research Cooperation
(SAREC).
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Downloaded from wmr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 11, 2016
Downloaded from wmr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 11, 2016