Mad versus Nuts: Can Doctrine or Weaponry Remedy the Mutual Hostage Relationship of the
Superpowers?
Author(s): Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr. and Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Winter, 1981), pp. 287-304
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20041081 .
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SpurgeonM. Keeny, Jr.
andWolfgang K. H. Panofsky
MAD VERSUS NUTS
Can
or Weaponry
Doctrine
Hostage
the
Remedy
of
Relationship
Mutual
the
Superpowers?
II there has been a continuing
debate on
World War
the actual utility of nuclear weapons
doctrine concerning
of the divergent
This debate,
irrespective of the merits
^^^ince
military
in war.
of
points
tends
view,
to create
the
perception
that
the
outcome
and scale of a nuclear conflict could be controlled by the doctrine
or the types of nuclear weapons
Is this the case?
employed.
risks of nuclear
We believe not. In reality, the unprecedented
The
conflict are largely independent
of doctrine or its application.
are
at
nuclear
of
that
doctrines
directed
limiting
principal danger
is that they might
conflicts
and form the basis for
be believed
action without
of the physical facts and uncertainties
appreciation
to understand
the
of nuclear conflict. The failure of policymakers
truly
nature
revolutionary
of
nuclear
weapons
as
war and the staggering
size of the nuclear stockpiles
States and the Soviet Union
could have catastrophic
for
the
entire
Military
ways
to
of the United
consequences
world.
planners
apply
of
instruments
the
and strategic
tremendous
thinkers
power
for 35 years have
of nuclear
weapons
sought
against
to the winning
contribute
of a future
target systems that might
war. In fact, as long as the United
States held a virtual nuclear
was
the targeting
of atomic weapons
looked upon
monopoly,
as
a
more
the
effective extension of
essentially
strategic bombing
II.With
in the mid-1950s
the advent
of a
concepts of World War
substantial
Soviet nuclear
capability,
including multimegaton
at the National
Scholar-in-Residence
Jr. is currently
Spurgeon M. Keeny,
He served on the staff of the National
inWashington.
of Sciences
Academy
from 1963 to 1969, was Assistant
Director
of the U.S. Arms
Security Council
to
and Disarmament
from
Control
1969
and
Director
1973,
Agency
Deputy
of that Agency
from
1977 to 1981. Wolfgang
K.H.
is
currently
Panofsky
at Stanford
of the Stanford
Professor
of Physics
and Director
University
Linear Accelerator
Center. He served from 1960 to 1965 as a member
of the
President's
Science Advisory
Committee
and from 1977 to 1981 as a member
on Arms Control
of the General
Committee
and Disarmament.
Advisory
288
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
thermonuclear
it was
weapons,
soon
that
apparent
the populations
and societies of both the United
States and the Soviet Union were
A
of
mutual
nuclear stockpile of either side
the
portion
hostages.
as 100 million
could inflict on the other as many
fatalities and
as
a
the rhetoric of
society. Thus, although
destroy it
functioning
declaratory
doctrine
strategic
has
over
changed
the
mutual
years,
has in fact remained
the central fact of the strategic
two
and of the nato and Warsaw
of the
superpowers
relationship
deterrence
Pact
alliances.
Most
observers would agree
two hostile blocs on a worldwide
have
been
prevented
the
by
that a major
scale during
the
conflict between
this period may well
of
nuclear
specter
catastrophic
war.
At the same time, few would
argue that this state of mutual
on which to build world
is a very reassuring foundation
deterrence
In
1960s
the
the
of the basic strategic relation
peace.
perception
came
as "Mutual
to
of
deterrence
mutual
be characterized
ship
Assured Destruction,"
which
critics were quick to note had the
attacked
acronym of mad. The notion of mad has been frequently
as
not only as militarily
but also
immoral since it
unacceptable
holds the entire civilian populations
of both countries as hostages.1
an
As
over
doctrines
on
years
that
or even
the battlefield
the
sparing
consequences
of
general
nuclear
civilian
These
oriented
population
against
concepts
are
strategy
would
war-fighting
use of nuclear
the
in controlled
from
designed
consequences
since
interrelated
a nuclear
have
targeting
weapons
scenarios,
the devastating
an alter
found
have
the
clearly
also make
war
strategic
posture
military
innovators
strategic
various
civilian
population
war.
Other
critics
in a defense-oriented
native
and
critics
develop
somehow
retain
sought
would
while
the
to mad,
to
alternative
the
to defend
war.
of nuclear
a defense
such
war-fighting
doctrine
on the solution of
credible. But both alternatives
depend
posture
military
staggering technical problems. A defense-oriented
over
a large
a
and
air
missile
defense
nearly impenetrable
requires
a
to
And
controlled
have
of
the
any attempt
portion
population.
more
war-fighting
a nuclear
exchange
places
tremen
not only on decisions made under
incredible
but on the
in senior positions
of responsibility
dous
requirements
pressure by men
technical
during
capability
of command,
performance
control,
communications
and
in professional
circles "c3i" and
functions?called
intelligence
as
describe
which
for the sake of simplicity we shall hereafter
1
See,
Foreign
for example,
January
Affairs,
Fred
1973,
Charles
pp.
Ikl?,
267-85.
"Can
Nuclear
Deterrence
Last
Out
the Century?",
MAD VERSUS
289
NUTS
It is not sufficient as the basis for defense
"control mechanisms."
assert
to
to
will "somehow"
that
science
find solutions
policy
on
critical
technical
which
the
is
problems
policy
dependent,
when
technical
are
solutions
in
nowhere
sight.
In considering
these doctrinal
issues, it should be recognized
that there tends to be a very major gap between declaratory
policy
and actual implementation
expressed as targeting doctrine. What
ever the declaratory
for the
be, those responsible
policy might
must
lists
forces
real
and
generate
target
strategic
develop proce
various
dures under which
of targets could be
combinations
attacked. In consequence,
the perceived need to attack every listed
even
after absorbing
the worst imaginable
first strike from
target,
the
creates
adversary,
procurement
or economic
the military
even
"requirements,"
of many
importance
of
though
the targets
is
small.
In fact, it is not at all clear in the real world of war planning
or
whether
doctrine
has generated
declaratory
requirements
whether
the availability
of weapons
for targeting
has created
an estimated
doctrine. With
at the disposal of
30,000 warheads
more
the United
to be
than 10,000 avowed
States,
including
in
it
to
is
all
character,
necessary
strategic
target redundantly
urban
areas
and
economic
one
targets,
a
make
always
case
and for more specialized
doctrinal
considerations,
weapons
These
dance
can
of
nuclear
nuclear war which
Selection.
we
specific
targets
to be
period
that
in a
a wide
of
range
the
complex
to a
led
not
acronym
to utilize
of
for more
requirements
conceptual
as Nuclear
and
seek
for
weapon
designs.
combined with the superabun
can be described
convenience,
have
chosen
doctrines
intended
extended
have
weapons,
For
epithets,
various
to cover
and
targets
to frame uses for the stockpile. And, once
elusive mobile
and secondary military
targets in order
military
one tries to deal with
in
any
of nuts
nuclear
nuclear
to
approach
Utilization
Target
of
spirit
trading
to characterize
the
weapons
war-fighting
against
situations
over an
limited, as well as the management
of a general nuclear war between
the superpow
ers.2
While
2
The
some elements
of nuts may
be involved
in extending
the
NUT
for Nuclear
was
Utilization
used by Howard
and
acronym
Theory
Margolis
on Shadow
"SALT
II: Notes
and Substance,"
1979, pp.
Technology Review, October
Utilization
which
more
relates
the line of thinking
prefer Nuclear
Selection,
Target
the operational
of target
not
Readers
selection.
with
familiar
problem
colloquial
American
to be told that "nuts"
need
or demented."
is an adjective
usage may
meaning
"crazy
For everyday
it is a synonym
for "mad."
purposes
Jack Ruina,
31-41. We
to
closely
290
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
of our nuclear
credibility
the
changes
fact
that
in no way
this consideration
deterrent,
mutual
assured
or
destruction,
is
mad,
inherent in the existence of large numbers of nuclear weapons
in
In promulgating
the real world.
the doctrine
of "countervailing
summer
in
the
of
of
President
Carter's
1980,
strategy"
Secretary
Defense Harold Brown called for a buildup of nuclear war-fighting
in order to provide greater deterrence by demonstrating
capability
the ability of the United
States to respond
in a credible
fashion
war.
to
to
without
escalate
all-out
nuclear
He
having
immediately
was
"very
at
careful,
very
likely"
level
any
to note
however,
that
that the use of nuclear
would
into
escalate
he
by the superpowers
weapons
general
nuclear
and,
as
long
nuclear
substantial
weapon
This
war.3
situa
or technologies;
it will persist as
to present
is not peculiar
force structures
of
future
technical
regardless
developments,
tion
it was
that
thought
remain.
stockpiles
to the deterrence
its possible
contribution
of nuclear
Despite
can
to military
doctrine
and planning
war, the nuts approach
a
in
become
serious
itself.
The
of
very easily
danger
availability
numbers
increasing
delivery
of nuclear
in a
at all levels of the military
packages
the
encourages
itably
weapons
illusion
that
somehow
the
depressing
expanded
accidental
tally,
recent
bomb
case
as
nuclear
nuclear
a cata
unleashing
see in more detail
it tends
on the virtue
of the so-called
to deal with
is a
tank attacks
creates
its own
endless
for
pressure
device
nuts
with
stockpiles
to
diversions
use,
to obscure
can
weapons
debate
uninformed
a selective
in point,
and
inev
establishment
be applied
in selected circumstances
without
we
of
series
As
shall
consequences.
strophic
below,
neutron
of designs
variety
increasing
terrorists,
etc.
danger
of accidents,
more
But
the fact that the nuclear
fundamen
world
is in fact
MAD.
The
the
nuts
essential
approach
mad
to nuclear
character
of
will
war-fighting
nuclear
war
for
two
not
eliminate
basic
reasons,
are
in the nature
rooted
of nuclear weapons
and the
limits
of
the
destructive
First,
power of
practical
technology.
in the large
and most
nuclear weapons,
individually
certainly
numbers discussed for even specialized application,
is so great that
the collateral effects on persons and property would be enormous
and, in scenarios which are seriously discussed, would be hard to
from the onset of general
nuclear war. But more
distinguish
seem
even in the most
not
does
it
spe
fundamentally,
possible,
which
3
at
the Naval
See Harold
Brown,
Speech
on the significance
statement
authoritative
public
before.
Carter
by President
shortly
approved
War
College,
of Presidential
August
Directive
1980,
59, which
20,
the most
had been
MAD VERSUS
where
of nuclear
utilization
cialized
to
escalation
general
to envisage
weapons,
war
nuclear
would
291
NUTS
situation
any
occur
not
probably
of the situation and the limits of the control
given the dynamics
a limited
to manage
available
that could be made
mechanisms
nuclear
war.
In
the
case
a
of
becomes
control
completely
problem
there does not appear to be any prospect
a secure
will provide
that technology
citizens
limited
the
of
nuclear
two
superpowers
on other
war
can
nuclear
general
protracted
the
war,
Finally,
unmanageable.
future
for the foreseeable
the
shield behind which
the
observe
safely
course
of a
territory.
people's
ii
about the terrible conse
So much has been said and written
war
of the
that
of nuclear
any brief characterization
quences
seems strangely banal. Yet it is not clear how deeply the
problem
horror
even
have
of
such
an
event
has
the public
penetrated
or
consciousness
who in theory
the thinking of knowledgeable
policymakers
re
access to the relevant
lack of public
information.
The
to authoritative
sponse
estimates
that
general
nuclear
war
could
in the United
in 100 million
fatalities
States suggests a
is
with
the
when
the
denial
confronted
general
psychosis
public
an
It is interesting,
prospect of such
catastrophe.
unimaginable
a
to the
been
considerable
reaction
that
there
has
however,
in
the
doctors
medical
several
countries
(including
by
campaign
to
the
United
States and the Soviet Union), which calls attention
tens
the
die
who
would
of
of
millions
of
casualties
hopeless plight
over an extended
period due to the total inability of surviving
to cope with
medical
and facilities
the situation. One
personnel
can stoically
of
the
death, but the haunting
ignore
inevitability
image of being among the injured survivors who would eventually
is a prospect
that few can easily accept fatalisti
die unattended
result
cally.
It is worth
fact
that
a
repeating
single
modern
the oft
strategic
stated,
but
nuclear
little comprehended,
weapon
could
have
a
million
times the yield of the high explosive
strategic bombs of
or
one
a
to
World War
hundred
thousand
times the yield of
II,
the atomic bombs that destroyed Hiroshima
and Nagasaki,
killing
250,000 people. The blast from a single one-megaton
weapon
over the White
in Washington,
detonated
House
D.C. would
a
concrete
to
out
distance
of about
destroy multistory
buildings
three miles
(ten pounds per square inch overpressure with winds
of 300 miles per hour)?a
circle of almost complete
destruction
292
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
to the northwest,
the National
Cathedral
reaching
to the east, and across the National
Stadium
Airport
Most people in this area would be killed immediately.
from
radiation
the
same
would
weapon
cause
the Kennedy
to the south.
The thermal
spontaneous
ignition
to a distance of about five
combustibles
of clothing and household
circle of raging fires
centimeter
calories
miles
per
squared)?a
(25
a
to
to
distance of almost nine
line. Out
the District
reaching out
to ordinary
frame buildings
miles
there would be severe damage
these
individuals.
burns to exposed
and second-degree
Beyond
been
had
fires
that
innumerable
the
effects
immediate
separate
an
into
would
either
merge
conflagration
outward-moving
ignited
and
or more likely create a giant fire storm of the type Hamburg
II.
on
a
in
War
World
smaller
much
scale
Tokyo
experienced
to
the
of
limit
the
tend
winds
would
the inrushing
While
spread
fire storm, the area within five to six miles of the explosion would
be totally burned out, killing most of the people who might have
initial injury in shelters.
escaped
of the
The point has been forcefully made recently by members
that the vast numbers of injured who escape
medical
community
could expect little medical
of this holocaust
death at the margin
touched
if
of the explosion
the
fireball
But
this,
beyond
help.
fallout
debris would
the resulting
radioactive
produce
ground,
the site of the explosion. Assuming
with lethal effects far beyond
a typical fallout pattern
the prevailing westerly wind conditions,
indicate that there would be levels of fallout greater than
would
1,000 rems (450 rems produce 50 percent fatalities) over an area
than 100 rems (the level
and more
of some 500 square miles,
health effects) over some
there will be significant
above which
In
the
all
miles
way to the Atlantic Ocean.
4,000 square
reaching
be
would
a
case
fallout
the
of
the
of
the
impact
single explosion
to
secondary
immediate
the
effects,
weapons
but
when
there
are
a major component
of the
the fallout becomes
many
explosions
are
and
additive
effects
from
each
fallout
since
the
weapon
threat,
cover
soon
fallout patterns would
the overlapping
large portions
of the country with lethal levels of radiation.
are difficult
for
Such levels of human and physical destruction
anyone,
but when
layman
extended
or
specialist,
to an attack
to
comprehend
on an entire
for a single
city,
country
they become
even
maze of statistics. Comparison
a dehumanized
with past natural
is of little value. Such events as dam breaks and earth
disasters
surrounded by sources of
quakes result in an island of destruction
help
would
and
reconstruction.
deny
the possibility
Nuclear
war
involving
of relief by others.
many
weapons
MAD VERSUS
293
NUTS
General David Jones, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of
was
a
at
asked
of the Senate Foreign Relations
Staff,
hearing
on November
Committee
3, 1981 what would be the consequences
in the northern hemisphere
of an all-out nuclear exchange, he had
the following
stark response:
When
We have examined
that over many, many
years. There are many
assumptions
are targeted. Clearly,
in
that you have as to where
the weapons
the casualties
the northern
could
the worst
into the
be, under
conditions,
hemisphere
hundreds
of millions
of fatalities.
It is not to the extent that there would
be no
were
a
life in the northern
if
in
such
but
all
weapons
hemisphere,
targeted
as
to
are
to
maximum
urban
and
industrial
areas,
way
you
give
damage
in history by many orders of magnitude.
talking about the greatest catastrophe
A devastating
attack on the urban societies of the United
States
and Soviet Union would
in fact require only a very small fraction
of
the more
than
nuclear
50,000
weapons
in the
currently
arsenals
of the two superpowers. The United
States is commonly
credited
some
with having
of which well over
30,000 nuclear warheads
of hitting
the
10,000 are carried by strategic
systems capable
Soviet Union.
It is estimated
that the Soviet Union will soon have
some 10,000 warheads
in its strategic forces capable of hitting the
United
States. An exchange
of a few thousand of these weapons
could kill most of the urban population
and destroy most of the
of
both
sides.
industry
But such figures are in themselves misleading
because
they are
returns and much
smaller
already high on a curve of diminishing
attacks
could
have
very
severe
A
consequences.
single
Poseidon
submarine captain could fire some 160 independently
targetable
nuclear warheads
(each with a yield several times larger than
those of the weapons
that destroyed Hiroshima
and Nagasaki)
as
Soviet
cities.
If
the
many
against
optimally
targeted against
Soviet population,
this alone could inflict some 30 million
fatali
ties. One clear fact of the present strategic relationship
is that the
urban societies of both the United
States and the Soviet Union
are
side's
completely
accumulated
vulnerable
stockpile
to
even
a
of nuclear
small
fraction
of
the
other
weapons.
iii
The theme
in war-fighting
pears
4
to be
can be successfully
that nuclear weapons
employed
roles somehow
shielded from the mad world ap
recurring
with
increasing
frequency
and
seriousness.4
For a
see Colin
clear statement
of this view,
S. Gray
and Keith
particularly
Payne,
"Victory
Is Possible,"
Summer
see Michael
14-27. For opposing
E.
1980, pp.
Foreign Policy,
arguments,
a
"On
Nuclear
International
and a
Howard,
War,"
Fighting
1981, pp. 3-17,
Security,
Spring
further
between
and Howard
Messrs.
in International
exchange
Gray
1981, pp.
Security, Summer
185-87.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
294
Support
from
for Nuclear
Utilization
sources:
diverse
Selection?nuts?comes
Target
who
those
believe
that
nuclear
weapons
in anticipated
those who
should be used selectively
hostilities;
that such capabilities
deter a wider
of
believe
range
aggressive
an alleged
Soviet acts; those who assert that we must duplicate
and those who are simply trying to
Soviet interest in war-fighting;
or
in a more
"rational"
carry out their military
responsibilities
manner. The net effect of this increasing, publicized
cost-effective
link between
the almost
inevitable
interest in nuts is to obscure
any
use
of
nuclear
and
weapons
the
"mutual
grim
hostage"
this link are
realities of the mad world. The two forces generating
the collateral damage associated with the use of nuclear weapons
against selected targets and the pressures for escalation of the level
effects and
of nuclear force once it is used in conflict. Collateral
for
pressures
scenarios
out
carry
that
a
are
disarming,
partially
effects of nuclear
must
seriously
are
considered
often
or
one
escalation,
that have been
most
linked.
closely
of the collateral
for
pressure
scenarios
war-fighting
themselves
the significance
the
and
weapons
are
escalation
To appreciate
Soviet
actual
The
proposed.
two
to
attempts
attack
disarming,
at
look
U.S.
against
States
strategic forces in order to force the surrender of the United
without
war, and the selective use of nuclear weapons
by the
nato
to
of
the
United
States inWestern
prevent
collapse
Europe
forces
One
in the face
can
expect
weapons
of an overwhelming
to hear more
about
by the United
Soviet
overwhelming
Soviet
the
conventional
use
selective
in the Middle
States
attack
conventional
East
on
that
The much discussed
"window of vulnerability"
launch a "surgical"
fear that the Soviets might
vulnerable
icbm
Minuteman
silos?the
land-based
attack.
of
nuclear
in the face of an
area.
is based on the
attack against
component
of
disarm the U.S.
retaliatory
partially
strategic triad?to
not
The
retaliate.
would
States
United
that
the
confident
forces,
to Soviet
States to capitulate
scenario then calls for the United
the U.S.
dictated
peace
terms.
assessments
of the
based on intelligence
arithmetic
Simple
on
the
and
missiles
Soviet
the
warheads
of
and
accuracy
yields
a
that
show
indeed
silos
does
Minuteman
of
hardness
estimated
small number of surviving
Soviet attack leaving only a relatively
in the near future.
icbms is mathematically
Minuteman
possible
such an attack is
about whether
ismuch valid controversy
There
that a rational
with
the
confidence
in fact operationally
feasible
here is the
is significant
would
decision-maker
require. But what
question
whether
the
vulnerability
of Minuteman,
real
or percep
MAD VERSUS
NUTS
295
tual, could in fact be exploited
by the Soviets without
risking
war.
a
react any differently
Would
U.S.
nuclear
President
general
in response
to an
attack
the Minuteman
against
force
than
to an
attack
of comparable weight against other targets?
icbm
the relatively
isolated location of the Minuteman
Despite
an
there
from
such
would
be
tremendous
collateral
fields,
damage
scenario would
involve at
attack, which under the mathematical
with megaton
It
least 2,000 weapons
has
been
estimated
yields.
Office of Technology
Assessment
that such
by the Congressional
an attack would
to
two
result in from
20 million
American
at
from
the
since
least
half
fatalities, primarily
fallout,
weapons
would
be ground burst to maximize
the effect of the
probably
attack on the silos. The range of estimated
fatalities
reflects the
in fallout
inherent uncertainties
calculations
due to different
on
assumptions
such
as
factors
conditions,
meteorological
weapon
of burst and amount
of protection
yield and design,
height
and used. Estimates
available
of fatalities
below
eight to ten
million
require quite optimistic
assumptions.
It seems incredible
count on any
that any Soviet leader would
President
suing
for peace
in circumstances
where
some
ten million
to a slow and cruel death but the
American
citizens were doomed
United
States still retained 75 percent of the strategic forces and
its entire economic base. Instead, Soviet leadership would perceive
a President,
confronted with an incoming missile attack of at least
and possibly many more to follow inminutes,
and
2,000 warheads
with the action options of retaliating on warning with his vulner
able land-based
at
forces or riding out the attack and retaliating
a
air
level
and
and
manner
sea-based
of his
strategic
own
choosing
forces.
with
substantial
surviving
It is hard to imagine that this scenario would
give the Soviets
much
in their ability
confidence
to control
of the
escalation
If the Soviets did not choose to attack U.S. command,
conflict.
and intelligence
the
control, communications
(c3i) capabilities,
United
States would clearly be in a position
to retaliate massively
or to launch a more selective initial response. If vulnerable
control
assets
were
concurrently
attacked,
selective
responses
might
be
but the possibility
of an automatic massive
jeopardized
response
would
be increased
since the nature
of the attack would
be
unclear. But even if these control assets were initially untouched,
the Soviets could not be so overly confident
of their own control
or so overly impressed with those of the United
mechanisms
States
as to imagine that either system could
such
control
massive
long
levels of violence, with increasing collateral
the
damage, without
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
296
situation
The
very
rapidly
of nuclear
question
esoteric
history.
an additional
by
Tactical
escalation
tegic
forces?the
tactical
nuclear
so-called
forces
has a long and
in Europe
war-fighting
war.
nuclear
general
nuclear
have
been
considered
weapons
to a massive
Soviet
conventional
attack
to
war
stra
nuclear
general
involving
deterrent
threatening
into
degenerating
have
been
At
effect.
coupling
on
looked
as
same
the
time,
a necessary
coun
to Soviet conventional
terbalance
forces in a limited war-fighting
situation. To this end, the United
States is said to have some 6,000
to 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons
in Europe.5 The existence of this
so long that it is largely taken
has
been
stockpile
public knowledge
for granted and the power of the weapons,
which
range in yield
from
a kiloton
around
a megaton,
to around
is not
appreciated.
that we
to note
one
is interesting
in Europe
have
an
weapon
average
(with
yield probably
comparable
that destroyed Hiroshima)
for every 50 American
weapon
stationed
there
support
troops. Tactical
including
It
are,
weapons
are building
of
nuclear
a U.S.
longer
monopoly.
forces and have
up comparable
theater
long-range
no
course,
earlier
missiles,
the
nuclear
to the
soldiers
nuclear
The
Soviets
had
for some
time
SS-4
and
and
SS-5,
now
the SS-20, for which
the United
States does not have a strict
must
In
it
this
be remembered
that it is
counterpart.
regard,
or
to
feasible
for
the
States
the
Union
Soviet
United
always
employ
in
Europe.
some
of
their
missiles
strategic
long-range
targets
against
is now a great debate, particularly
in Europe, about the
on
soil
of
U.S.-controlled
proposed
deployment
European
long
II and ground-based
cruise missiles
of
range Pershing
capable
to
in response
the territory of the Soviet Union,
the
reaching
of
Soviet
mobile
ballis
SS-20
growing deployment
medium-range
tic missiles. This discussion
tends to consider
the SS-20s and the
There
proposed
new
forces
nuclear
medium-range
as
a
issue
separate
weapons
already
from
deployed
the
shortin
and
Europe.
II
is indeed a technical difference:
the proposed Pershing
is of sufficient range to reach Soviet territory in only a few
and the SS-20
is a much more accurate
and flexible
minutes,
There
missile
weapons
system
than
earlier
Soviet
nuclear
intermediate-range
in
issue which
tends to be submerged
systems. Yet, the overriding
in
the current debate
is the fact that any use of nuclear weapons
to
in Europe would almost certainly
massive
theater warfare
lead
5
For a discussion
C. Enthoven,
1975, pp. 523-31.
Alain
of theater
of the usefulness
in Europe:
How
Forces
"U.S.
nuclear
Many?
forces
Doing
in NATO
What?",
as of
Foreign
that
date,
Affairs,
see
April
MAD VERSUS
even
casualties
civilian
to
escalate
Calculations
event
in the unlikely
the
involve
homelands
of collateral
297
did not
the conflict
two
the
of
NUTS
superpowers.
nuclear
accompanying
casualties
war
in the extreme. First, the likely
fare in Europe tend to be simplistic
areas
to the combat zone must be
of
highly populated
proximity
taken
account.
into
One
assume
cannot
simply
that
invading
so that they offer the
themselves
enemy columns will position
areas
most favorable
isolated target to nuclear attack. Populated
could not remain isolated from the battle. Cities would have to be
or they would
a safe stepping-stone
defended
become
for the
to
In
it
advance.
either
is
difficult
case,
enemy's
imagine cities
areas remaining
in the midst
and populated
sanctuaries
of a
tactical
ber
war
nuclear
that during
was
population
raging
past wars
on
the
around
them.
in Europe
in
road
one
Then
as much
the
form
remem
must
as one-half
of masses
of
of the
refugees.
in the confusion
of battle,
there is no control system
assure that weapons
not inadvertently
strike
would
areas.
immediate
effects, nuclear fallout would
populated
Beyond
not recognize restrictions based on population
density.
The common
feature of the above examples
is that specialized
use of nuclear weapons
will as a practical matter
to
be difficult
use in the chaos of tactical warfare.
from unselective
distinguish
neutron bomb, which has
A case in point is the much-publicized
Above
all,
that could
been
as
promoted
a
anti-tank
specialized
since
weapon
neutrons
can penetrate
tank armor and kill the crew. It is frequently
that the neutron bomb
overlooked
is in fact a nuclear weapon
with significant yield. While
it does emit some ten times as many
as
neutrons
a
comparable
also kills by blast,
of
kiloton
damage
distance
An
heat,
neutron
the proposed
small
"ordinary"
and prompt
warheads
for
nuclear
it
weapon,
radiation.
For
instance,
the Lance
missile
has
one
a one
would
the same levels of blast
yield, which
produce
a
at
at
Hiroshima
little
less than one-half
the
experienced
from the point of detonation.
on
attack
tanks
near
a
area
populated
or
a
targeting
error
in the heat of battle would
effect on
clearly have a far-reaching
civilians and structures in the vicinity. Moreover,
the lethal effects
are not sharply defined. There would
of the neutrons
be atten
uation
by
intervening
structures
or
earth
prominences,
and
there
is a wide gap (from 500 to 10,000 rems) between
a dose which
would
be
fatal
and
that
which
would
eventually
immediately
a soldier from continuing
combat. Under
actual war
prevent
no
conditions
maker,
could
local
readily
commander,
tell whether
much
a neutron
a national
or
weapon
less
decision
some
other
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
298
kind of nuclear weapon
had been employed
from local to all-out
the threat of escalation
of nuclear weapons,
of collateral
damage
of errors
consequences
of the nuclear
clear
not
the
by
changed
nature
weapons.
In short, whatever
nuclear
"tactical"
are
in targeting,
by the enemy. Thus,
the problems
conflict,
and the disastrous
attack,
or any other
bomb
in deterring
Soviet
of such weapons
weapon
use
actual
any
of the neutron
the utility
nu
conventional
or
is extremely
unlikely
to remain limited. We come back to the fundamental
point that
inmodern warfare, be it strategic
"firebreak"
the only meaningful
or
is between
tactical,
between
self-proclaimed
and
nuclear
conventional
of nuclear
categories
not
weapons,
weapons.
IV
rests ulti
thesis that we live in an inherently mad world
on
of the
the
technical
conclusion
that
effective
mately
protection
not
is
nuclear
attack
possible. This
against large-scale
population
from
follows
which
technical
assessment,
inexorably
pessimistic
illus
is
nuclear
of
the devastating
weapons,
power
dramatically
difference
between air defense against
trated by the fundamental
The
and
conventional
ventional
the
of
nuclear
bombs,
bombers
incoming
defeat
ten
per
bombers
Against
system destroying
sortie
as
would,
attacks
such
against
a defense,
10 percent
only
a
matter,
practical
II.
War
force
bomber
the
con
carrying
air raids such as the ones during World
sustained
After
attack.
an air defense
would
to less than one-third
be reduced
of its initial size, a very high
weapons
price to pay given the limited damage from conventional
even
over
when
90 percent
of
the
bombers
In contrast,
penetrate.
an air defense
a bomber
nuclear
attack with
bombs,
against
even
the
90
of
percent
incoming bombers
capable of destroying
on each sortie would
since the damage
be totally
inadequate
would be
the
bombers
10
of
the
percent
penetrating
produced by
devastating
When
defenses
numbers
would
a
single
fact,
almost
urban
against
targets.
to ballistic missile
analogy
and industry against large
one extends
this air defense
intended to protect population
of nuclear
have
warhead
but
leakproof
cause
would
such a ballistic
leakproof
it becomes
missiles,
to be almost
missile
also
a defense
such
the penetration
great
destruction
defense
would
nationwide
that
clear
since
to a soft
have
in coverage
of even
to be not
since
In
target.
only
the attacker
or industry he
the centers of population
choose
could always
that he
to target. The attacker has the further advantage
wished
can not only choose his targets but also decide what fraction of
MAD VERSUS
NUTS
299
his total resources to expend against any particular
target. Thus,
an effective defense would have to be extremely heavy across the
entire defended
targets. The
territory, not at just a few priority
technical problem of providing an almost leakproof missile defense
the at
is further compounded
technical measures
by the many
tacking force can employ to interfere with the defense by blinding
or
its
confusing
system's
When
radars
or
traffic-handling
these
general
sensors
other
with
capacity
are
arguments
and
the
overwhelming
decoys.
to
reduced
analysis,
specific
of the
conclusion
is inescapable
that effective
protection
or
missile
of
either
of
the
superpowers against
population
industry
with present abm (anti-ballistic
attack by the other is unattainable
since even the most elaborate
systems
missile) defense technology,
could be penetrated
side at far less cost. This
the
other
by
in the
is not altered by prospective
conclusion
improvements
or
of new
of present
systems
components
by the introduction
the
concepts
as
such
lasers
or particle
beams
into
system
design.
These conclusions, which address the inability of ballistic missile
the mad character of the strategic relationship,
defense to eliminate
not
do
necessarily apply to defense of very hard point targets, such
as missile
silos or shelters for mobile missiles. The defense of these
hardened military
technical
targets does offer a more attractive
since
the
immediate
site
of
the
hardened
opportunity
only
vicinity
a
to
needs
be defended
and the survival of only
fraction of the
defended
silos
is necessary
serve
to
as
a
deterrent.
the
Thus,
technical requirements
for the system are much
less stringent than
or industrial defense and a much higher
for population
leakage
rate
can
be
tolerated.
When
these
general
remarks
are
translated
into specific analysis which
takes into account
the many options
to the offense,
available
hard site defense
still does not look
attractive. Moreover,
such a defense, even if partially
particularly
successful,
would
not
prevent
the
serious
collateral
fallout
effects
from the attack on the population
discussed above. Nevertheless,
the fact that these systems are technically
feasible, and are advo
cated by some as effective,
tends to confuse
the public on the
broader
issue of the feasibility
of urban defense against ballistic
missiles.
The United
States has a substantial
research and development
icbms as a possible
effort on ballistic missile defenses of land-based
to increase survivability
of this leg of the strategic triad.
approach
The only program
under
serious consideration
that could be
load
in
this
is
decade
the
so-called
deployed
(Low Altitude
This
which
utilize
would
system.
Defense)
system,
very small
300
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
radars and small missiles with small nuclear warheads,
hardened
to intercept at very close range those attacking missiles
is designed
icbm to destroy
that might detonate
close enough to the defended
it. This
last ditch defense
is possible with nuclear weapons
since
can
the defended
is
hard
and
tolerate
nuclear
target
extremely
if they are not too close. While
detonations
such a system for the
defense of hard sites is technically
feasible, there has been serious
as
to
whether
it
in defending
would
be
cost-effective
the
question
in fixed Titan or Minuteman
MX
silos since the system could be
In the case of the defense
overwhelmed
of a
easily.
relatively
in a multiple
mobile MX
shelter system, the economics
of the
are
ratios
if
the
of the
location
exchange
substantially
improved
are
mobile MX
and mobile
to
in
defense
fact
unknown
system
the
attacker;
of
presence
there
however,
radar
radiating
are
serious
systems
might
whether
the
questions
not
compro
actually
the location of the MX during an attack.
further into the future, the U.S.
research program
is
Looking
a
more
much
for
hard
considering
sophisticated
"layered" system
site defense. The outer layer would
involve an extremely
complex
system using infrared sensors that would be launched on warning
Based
of a Soviet attack to identify and track incoming warheads.
mise
on
this
information,
infrared-homing
launched
them
well
against
outside
many
interceptors,
rockets
non-nuclear
with
the cloud
the
of
incoming
atmosphere.
The
each
carrying
warheads,
warheads
warheads
through this outer exoatmospheric
layer would
a
close-in
the
lines
of
the load
by
layer along
described
multiple,
would
be
and
attack
that
leaked
then be engaged
last ditch system
above.
It has been suggested that the outer layer exoatmospheric
system
area defense
evolve
into an effective
and
for population
might
industry.
Actually,
there
are many
rather
technical
fundamental
that will take some time to answer about the ability of
questions
in the
such a system to work at all against a determined
adversary
a
to
needed
it.
For
such
time frame
system would
deploy
example,
or
be
defeated
blinded by
by properly designed
decoys
probably
nuclear
explosions
and,
above
all,
may
well
be
far
too
complex
to operate. Whatever
for even prospective
control capabilities
the
to
value of these types of systems for hard site defense
support the
mad role of the deterrent,
it is clear that the system holds no
or industry defense and simply illustrates
promise for population
the technical difficulty
of dealing with that problem.
While
the government
less demanding
struggles with the much
a
to
whether
it
is
cost-effective
design
problem
plausible,
possible
MAD VERSUS
icbm silos,
of hardened
defense
reports
recurring
some
that
with
is bombarded
the public
new
301
NUTS
technological
"breakthrough"
umbrella" which would
will suddenly generate an "impenetrable
Such irresponsible
the mad strategic relationship.
obviate
reports
are
which
claims
"directed
rehash
for
energy" weapons
usually
either
of
of extremely
beams
based on the propagation
energetic
or
at the speed of light
atomic
(lasers)
propagated
light
particles
to the target. Some of the proposals are technically
infeasible, but
cases
in all
one
must
remember
that
system with
country-wide
coverage
performance
would
an
have
for
and
defense
the
mad
a
only
effective
extraordinarily
on
impact
urban
To
condition.
constitute a ballistic missile defense system, directed energy devices
and tracking devices
would have to be integrated with detection
the
for
an
warheads,
the necessary
incoming
system,
handling
effective
extremely
power
supplies
and
for the
fast
data
extraordi
narily high demand of energy to feed the directed energy weapons,
to score a direct hit
and would have to be very precisely oriented
to
the
destroy
target?as
to nuclear
opposed
that would
warheads
to destroy the target.
only have to get in the general vicinity
are fundamental
limit the
considerations
that severely
There
to
directed
ballistic
missile
defense.
of
energy weapons
application
if
Particle beams do not penetrate
the atmosphere.
such a
Thus,
it would have to bore a hole through
system were ground-based,
and then the beam would
the atmosphere
have to be focused
a
in
All
hole
that
through
subsequent
pulse.
analyses have indi
to
cated that it is physically
this feat stably.
accomplish
impossible
other things, laser systems suffer from the fact that they
Among
can
only
in good
operate
since
weather
clouds
the
with
interfere
beam.
These
problems
the
basing
involving
in space.
system
the desirable
feature
vulnerable
the
during
dispersed.
complex
However,
with
system
the atmosphere
a
Moreover,
could
be avoided
system
space-based
of potentially
being
launch phase before
by
has
able to attack missiles
the reentry vehicles are
involve
systems
space-based
a
large power
requirement
putting
into orbit.
a very
Anal
defensive
system of this type
ysis indicates that a comprehensive
in turn would need
would require over a hundred
which
satellites,
to
of
thousands
shuttle
sorties
It has been
assemble.
space
literally
a
cost several hundred billion
estimated
that such
system would
were available
to operate
dollars. Even if the control mechanisms
such
a
system,
of the satellites
would
interfere
there
are
serious
to physical
with
the
attack
system's
as
questions
and
to
the
to various
operation.
In
vulnerability
measures
short,
no
that
respon
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
302
has
sible analysis
"death
such
that for at least the next
indicated
have
ray weapons"
or that there is any prospect
the mad
of our
character
any
on
bearing
that they would
two decades
abm
the
problem
subsequently
change
world.
the inherently mad
Defense
against aircraft further illustrates
enor
nature of today's world. Although
the Soviets have made
mous
in air defense,
investments
the airborne component
of the
U.S. strategic triad has not had its damage potential
substantially
indicate
of the
reduced. Most
that a large fraction
analyses
present Soviet defenses, with
"aging" B-52 fleet would penetrate
countermeasures
the aid of electronic
and defense suppression by
to penetrate
will
It is true that the ability
missiles.
of B-52s
as
be
"look
radar
Soviets
down"
the
impaired
deploy
gradually
awacs
to
much
similar
the
(Airborne Warning
publicized
planes
these systems will not be effective
and Control System). However,
on B
cruise missiles whose deployment
against the air-launched
to
not
will
be
their ability
52s will begin
penetrate
shortly;
a
new
air
until
defenses
Soviet
of
totally
generation
endangered
enters
ments
the
At
picture.
that
in the ability
penetrate
time,
of both
a number
through
one
can
foresee
and
bombers
of
in
techniques,
improve
major
to
missiles
cruise
so
the
particular
called "stealth"
technology which will reduce by a large factor
to radar.
the visibility of both airplanes and cruise missiles
race
that in the defense-offense
In short, there is little question
between
air
and
defenses
the
airborne
leg of
the
triad,
the
offense
For its part, the United
will retain its enormous damage potential.
States does not now have a significant air defense, and the limited
have
in President
program would
Reagan's
buildup
proposed
to
on
Soviets
nuclear
the
deliver
of
effect
the
little
weapons
ability
by
aircraft
tage"
this
against
between
relationship
country.
the
Consequently,
two countries
the
will
hos
even
"mutual
continue,
of the triad is considered.
if only the airborne component
could provide
It is sometimes
that civil defense
asserted
escape
from
the
nuclear
general
assertion
with
a
of
nuclear
the
continuing
of civil defense
effectiveness
civil defense program. Much
failure of some civil defense
consequences
of
consequences
war
between
is coupled
the mad
world
superpowers
controversy
and
make
a
This
winnable.
as
an
even
to the
actual
and the scope of the present Soviet
of this debate reflects the complete
to comprehend
the actual
advocates
war.
There
is no
question
that
civil
lives and that the Soviet effort in this field is
States. Yet all
than that of the United
greater
substantially
a significant
to
have
it
that
made
clear
have
abundantly
analyses
to
a
have
would
in
civil
defense
nuclear
war,
general
impact
defense
could
save
MAD VERSUS
a much
involve
and
or
population
the
now
than
effort
greater
that no amount
of effort would
of
ability
on
practiced
side
either
a large portion
protect
nation
either
303
NUTS
as
to continue
of the
a
func
society.
tioning
is evidence
that the Soviets
fallout
which
could provide
There
program
ten percent
for about
to attempt
of
to protect
evacuation
the
of
the urban
have carried out a shelter
and some blast protection
The
population.
entire
urban
to
population
even
way
only
would
the bulk of the population
be complete
the
countryside.
to our knowledge
there has never been an actual urban
Although
true believers
in the
in the Soviet Union,
exercise
evacuation
of Soviet civil defense point to the alleged existence
effectiveness
ex
of detailed
evacuation
plans for all Soviet cities. Yet, when
in detail,
evacuation
amined
of
such
are
there
major
questions
as
to
the
practicality
plans.
Arms Control
has calcu
and Disarmament
Agency
a
reasonable
model
and
normal
lated, using
targeting
assuming
even
citizens
and
that
with
the
evacuation
of
all
practices,
general
still be at least 25
full use of shelters, in a general war there would
million
Soviet fatalities. Such estimates obviously
depend on the
some
have been lower but others by the Defense
model
chosen:
been
have
considerably
Department
higher. The time for such an
The
U.S.
all-out
evacuation
guarantee
would
be
unambiguous
at
least
strategic
a week.
warning
This
action
and
would
ample
provide
time for the other side to generate
its strategic forces to full alert,
which would
result in a substantially
strike
greater retaliatory
than would
be expected
from normal day-to-day
alert. If the
strike
retaliatory
were
burst
ground
rise to 40 to 50 million;
could
weapons
were
targeted
and
against
the
to maximize
fatalities
fallout,
if part of the reserve of nuclear
evacuated
some
population,
70
to 85 million
little has been said
could be killed. Until
recently
in
about the hopeless fate of the vast number of fallout casualties
care or what
medical
organized
the survivors
with
the almost
destruction
complete
base
and urban
housing.
the
absence
of
would
of
become
the
of
economic
there is no evidence
that the Soviets are carrying out
Finally,
or are decentralizing
industrial hardening
their industry, which
more
remains
centralized
than U.S. industry. This is not surprising
since there is nothing
they can do that would materially
change
the inherent vulnerability
of urban society in a mad world.
v
In sum, we are fated
the
tremendous
power
to live in a mad world.
This
of
the
nuclear
weapons,
is inherent
size
of
nuclear
in
304
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
stockpiles, the collateral damage associated with the use of nuclear
on
the technical
limitations
weapons
targets,
against military
involved in efforts to
strategic area defense, and the uncertainties
control
the
escalation
of nuclear
war.
There
is no
reason
to believe
that this situation will change for the foreseeable
future since the
too
is
far
and
the
of
technical
pace
problem
profound
military
far too slow to overcome
the fundamental
technical
development
that underlie
considerations
the mutual
of
hostage
relationship
the
superpowers.
What
approaches
is clear above
has
not
all
is that the profusion
offered
an
escape
from
of proposed
the
mad
world,
nuts
but
a major danger in encouraging
the illusion that
rather constitutes
limited or controlled nuclear war can be waged free from the grim
realities of a mad world. The principal
hope at this time will not
nuts
in
be found
doctrines
that ignore the mad realities
seeking
it is and
but rather in recognizing
the nuclear world
for what
seeking
to make
it more
stable
and
less dangerous.