Northeastern Political Science Association
Presidential Politicization and Centralization across the Modern-Traditional Divide
Author(s): Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Polity, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Apr., 2004), pp. 477-504
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Polity * Volume XXXVI,Number3 * April 2004
Presidential Politicization and
Centralization Across the
Modern-Traditional Divide*
Daniel Galvin
Yale University
Colleen Shogan
George Mason University
Conventional wisdom describes the "modernpresidency"as an institutionwith
more political authority and autonomy than its "traditional"nineteenth-century
predecessor. A central claim is that since the rise of the modern executive establishment, presidents have had an incentive to "politicize"and "centralize"their
authority within the executive branch. Examining three lesser-known pre-modern
presidents, we argue that the tendency for presidents to politicize and centralize is
neither distinctly modern nor particularlyextraordinary.Rather, it is a fundamental presidential impulse that finds its roots in the ambiguous form of executive
power in America.
Daniel Galvin is a Ph.D. candidate at Yale University.His dissertation examines American presidents as party builders. His research interests include the
American presidency, American political development, and political parties. His
email address is: [email protected].
Colleen J. Shogan is an assistant professor of Government and Politics at
George Mason University.She has forthcoming articles in Studies in American Political Development and White House Studies, and is currentlyfinishing a book manuscript examining the moral and religious dimensions of presidential rhetoric. Her
email address is: [email protected].
Introduction
The concept of the "modernpresidency"is the anchoringparadigmof presidential studies today. In Presidential Power, Richard Neustadt first described
the attributesof the modern presidency,and FredGreensteinlatercodified the
* The authorswish to thankStephenSkowronekfor his commentsand
suggestions,and also David
andMatthew
Glassmanfortheircommentson earlierdraftsof thisarticle.ThismateMayhew,
SidneyMilkis,
rialis baseduponworksupportedundera NationalScienceFoundation
Graduate
ResearchFellowship.
POLITICIZATION
ANDCENTRALIZATION
478 PRESIDENTIAL
term.1The modernpresidencyconstructhas been usefulin clarifyingour understandingof importantdevelopmentalchanges to the presidency,includingthe
proliferationof bureaucraticand administrativestructureswithin the executive
branchover the last seventyyears,2the rise in public expectationsfor presidential agenda-settingand legislativeactivism,3the heightened awareness of the
relationshipbetween the presidencyand public opinion,4and the new powers
derivedfromthe president'sincreasedinvolvementin internationalaffairs.5But
the notion thatthe presidencyhas undergonea fundamental"metamorphosis,"
or "quantumchange"duringthe modern periodhas encour"transformation,"
a
bifurcated
frame of analysis,in which modern and pre-modernpresiaged
dents stand on opposite sides of a historicaldivide.6
the under-studied
presidenciesof JohnTyler,James
Analyzing
nineteenth-century
of the presiwe
and
B.
that
Rutherford
Polk,
Hayes, argue manyof the characteristics
in
transhistorical.
are
claimed
to
be
modern
that
are, fact,
Specifidistinctively
dency
cally,the propensityforpresidentsto politicizeandcentralize7-toincreasetheirpolitical authoritythrough administrativecontrol-is not only a twentieth-century
but is an
phenomenontiedto the existenceof the modernexecutiveestablishment,
the
structure.
incentive
institutional
of
the
Indeed, originsof
president's
enduringpart
can be foundin the ambivalenceof executivepowerin the Constituthispropensity
to claim
andleftpresidents
definedexecutivepowerambiguously,
tion.8TheFounders
in
to
the
Constituthem
not
that
were
andderivepowers
specifically
granted
authority
Power(NewYork:Wiley,1960);FredGreenstein,
1. RichardNeustadt,Presidential
"ChangeandConin TheNew AmericanPoliticalSystem,ed. AnthonyKing(Washington,
tinuityin the ModernPresidency,"
Evolution
DC:AmericanEnterprise
Institute,1978);FredGreenstein,LarryBerman,andAlvinFelzenberg,
DC:AmericanEnterprise
ABibliographic
of the ModernPresidency:
Institute,1977).
Survey(Washington,
TheJohnsHopkinsUniversity
2. JohnP.Burke,TheInstitutional
Press,1992);
Presidency(Baltimore:
ChathamHouse,1995);HughHeclo,"TheExecutiveOffice
Branch(Chatham:
JohnHart,ThePresidential
inModernPresidentsand the Presidency,ed. MarkLandy(Lexington:
of the President,"
LexingtonBooks,
TheModernPresidency(NewYork:St.Martin's
Press,1993).
1985);JamesPfiffner,
Presidential
3. GeorgeC.EdwardsIII,Atthe Margins:
Leadershipof Congress(NewHaven:YaleUniJohnsHopkinsUniversity
Press,1982);
Agenda(Baltimore:
versityPress,1989);PaulLight,ThePresident's
MA:Harvard
MarkA. Peterson,LegislatingTogether
Press,1990);StephenJ.Wayne,
University
(Cambridge,
TheLegislativePresidency(NewYork:Harperand Row,1978).
4. GeorgeC. EdwardsIII,The PublicPresidency:The Pursuitof PopularSupport(New York:St.
Martin'sPress, 1983);SamuelKernell,GoingPublic(Washington,DC:Congressional
1997);
Quarterly,
TheodoreLowi,ThePersonalPresident(Ithaca:CornellUniversity
Press,1985);JeffreyTulis,TheRhetoriPrincetonUniversity
cal Presidency(Princeton:
Press,1987).
Pressof Kansas,1995);Lowi,ThePer5. LouisFisher,PresidentialWarPower(Lawrence:University
ChathamHouse,1988);ArthurM.
sonal President;RichardRose,ThePostmodernPresident(Chatham:
Jr.,TheImperialPresidency(Boston:HoughtonMifflin
Company,1973).
Schlesinger,
of theModern
Evolution
in theModernPresidency";
andContinuity
6. Greenstein,
Greenstein,
"Change
Wilson'sCritiqueof
ABibliographic
Survey.TerriBimesandStephenSkowronek,"Woodrow
Presidency:
Dividein Presidential
History,"
Polity29 (1996).
Reassessingthe Modern-Traditional
PopularLeadership:
in TheNew Directionin AmericanPolitics,ed. John E.
7. TerryMoe,"ThePoliticizedPresidency,"
DC:BrookingsInstitution,
1985).
ChubbandPaulE.Peterson(Washington,
TheJohnsHopkinsUniversity
Press,1993).
8. HarveyC. Mansfield,
Jr.,Tamingthe Prince(Baltimore:
Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 479
tion. The presidentialquestfor autonomyand institutional
authorityis a perennial
divide.
strugglethatcrossesthe boundariesof the temporalmodern-traditional
Althoughmostscholarsacknowledgethata few pre-modernpresidents,such as
George Washington,Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln,
TheodoreRoosevelt,and WoodrowWilsonclaimedunprecedentedauthorityfor
of executivepowerin America,they
theiractionsand expandedthe understanding
are treatedas exceptionsto the rule.Instead,the predominantparadigmsare that
modernpower"cannotbe acquiredor employedon the same termsas thosebeneand thatthe adventof the modernpresidencyin the
fiting"pre-modernpresidents9
1930swas accompaniedbya qualitative
changein the interests,motives,andbehavIncontrast,we arguethattherearefundamental
iorsof incumbentpresidents.'0
similaritiesin theway presidentshaveacquiredpowerand authoritythroughoutAmerican history.Inour case studies,we demonstratethatthe tendencyforpresidentsto
claimauthorityand seek out reliableresourcesfor the exerciseof poweris neither
Rather,itis a commontendencythat
distinctlymodernnorparticularly
extraordinary.
findsits rootsin the peculiar,ambiguousformof executivepowerin America.
ExecutivePower in the U.S. Constitution
Theideaof the executiveas a non-monarchical
agentof changeoriginatesin the
of
In
The
Machiavelli.
Machiavelli
Prince,
politicalthought
arguedthatthe powerof
the prince is not bound by law and the institutionsof governance,and is not
restrictedby the liberalChristian
virtuesadmonishingcruelty.Theprinceacts as he
chooses andexertshis powerat will. However,he mustjustifyhis actionsby claiming to representsomethinggreaterthan himself-the people,the laws, or the stawhile not democratic,still
bilityof the state. His authorityto act with prerogative,
reliesuponhis need forlegitimacy,
or at leastthe appearanceof legitimacy.
Assuch,
the princemusttakeactivestepsto earnhis authority.
Hisexecutivepowermustbe
soughtout andcultivatedbeforeitcan be exercisedeffectively.
Accordingto Harvey
Mansfield,the Founders'greataccomplishmentwas to "tame"Machiavelli's
prince
and "republicanize"
Locke'sexecutiveby institutionalizing
the executivepowerin a
democraticsystemof government."Yetnot all the characteristics
of Machiavelli's
of executive
princewere lost in the tamingprocess;the essential"ambivalence"
powerprovidesthe motiveforcebehindthe Americanpresidency.Americanpresidents, like all executivesdescendantfrom Machiavelli's
prince,have had to earn
theirpoliticalauthorityand institutional
autonomy.
9. Neustadt,PresidentialPower.
10. Greenstein,
in the ModernPresidency";
Moe,"ThePoliticized
"ChangeandContinuity
Presidency";
Neustadt,PresidentialPower.
11. Mansfield,
Tamingthe Prince.
480 PRESIDENTIAL
POLITICIZATION
ANDCENTRALIZATION
The Constitution
statesin ArticleIIthat"theexecutivepowershallbe vestedin a
but
nowhere
is the executivepowerexplicitlydefined.Theambiguityof
President,"
in
executivepowerstands sharpcontrastto the specificityof the legislativepowers
enumeratedin ArticleI-"All legislativepowershereingrantedshallbe vestedin a
Congress"(emphasisadded).These constitutional"silences"regardingexecutive
powergrantpresidentsthe right-indeed,theycompelpresidents-to defineexecutivepoweraccordingto circumstance,to seek authorityaccordingto necessity,and
to claim legitimacyfor politicalactions where there is no doctrinalwarrant.'2
the ambiguityof execAlthoughthe debateoverwhy the Foundersinstitutionalized
utivepower is an interestingone, the importantpointhere is thatthe presidency,
unlikethe Congress,mustworkto achievethe authorityit is not explicitlygranted.
Thepresidentcannotmerelydeclarehis authorityandmakeit so: as Machiavelli
observed,executivepowermustbe negotiated,justified,and achieved.As political
actorsoperatingwithina politicalsysteminhabitedby otherinstitutionsvyingfor
presidentsmustensuretheirinstitutional
rights,perse, in relapowerandauthority,
tionto otherinstitutions
of governance.Theymustcarveout specificrealmsof govLike
ernancein whichtheiractionswill be consideredlegitimateand authoritative.
Machiavelli's
prince,theyyearnforautonomy;but unlikethe prince,theirauthority
must be derivedfromthe democraticpoliticalsystem in which they operate.By
arrangements,redefiningpoliticalunderactivelyconfrontingexistinginstitutional
number
of
availableresources,presidentsthroughand
standings, seizinguponany
out historyhaveactivelycraftedtheirpersonal,political,and institutional
authority.
InstitutionalIncentivesof the AmericanPresidency
in the formwe recognizeas the
andrepublicanized
Evenwhenconstitutionalized
theambiguityof executivepowercreatesan incentiveforpresAmericanpresidency,
identsto be dynamicandforcefulagentsof changeas theyinteractwithotherpolitconcernedwiththe
Aspoliticalactors,presidentsarefundamentally
icalinstitutions.
their
and
seek
to
achieve
of
politicalpurposesthroughpolitpolitics governing, they
icalmeans.Amongothergoals,presidentsseek reelection,the perceptionof leaderpartyby assertingtheirauthorshipsuccess,historicalgreatness,anda strengthened
on
to
control
and
politicaldevelopments theirown terms.
ity
by trying
incentivesthatis
of the president'sinstitutional
Moeadvancesan understanding
to
their
achieve
similar
to
ours:
goals by appearingstrong
presidentsattempt
quite
He notes:"autonomyis an
andby workingto expandtheirinstitutional
autonomy.'3
incentivestructure,partof what it means to be a
integralpartof theirinstitutional
12. See also RichardM.Pious,TheAmericanPresidency(NewYork:BasicBooks,Inc.,1979).
in ResearchandTheory,"
13. Moe,"ThePoliticized
Institutions,
Presidency";
TerryMoe,"Presidents,
University
ingthe Presidency,ed. GeorgeC. EdwardsIII,JohnH. Kessel,andBertA. Rockman(Pittsburgh:
of Pittsburgh
Press,1993).
Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 481
To achieve this autonomy,presidentstake "aggressiveaction
good president."14
withintheirown sphereof authority
to shiftthestructure
of politicsforthemselvesand
andforcefully,
everyoneelse."l5Theyengagewiththe institutional
systemstrategically
hopingto achievetheirpoliticalobjectivesandenhancetheirindependentauthority.
Moerecognizesthatpresidentsaremotivatedby a "questforcontrol"andautonomy.Butlikemanypresidencyscholars,he mistakenlyclaimsthatthisquestbegan
with the growthof the bureaucracy
and the dramaticrisein expectationsforpresidential leadershipthat followed from FranklinRoosevelt'sactivistpresidency.
Modernpresidents,Moesays,respondto these unreasonableexpectationsby trying
to shape the structureof the politicalbureaucracyto be more responsiveto their
and regulatoryinstitutions
personalcontrol.Theyaggressivelybuildadministrative
that are more tractable,pose challengesto the structureof the congressional
and act unilaterally
wheneverpossible.By "centralizing"
the policybureaucracy,
in
the
White
House
and
the
institutional
makingprocess
"politicizing"
system,presidentsgainmore personalautonomyand institutional
authority.16
It is our contentionthatthe institutional
incentivesthatlead presidentsto centralizeand politicizeresultnot merelyfromtheir pivotalrole in determiningthe
structureof the modernbureaucracy,
but more fundamentally
fromthe ambiguity
of executivepower and the elusivenessof authoritythat is inherentin the office
itself. Moe makes a strongcase that aggressiveadministrative
and bureaucratic
managementis the most prominentmanifestationof this incentivein the modern
period.Butbecausethe structuralpoliticsof the modernperioddrivehis definition
of institutional
incentives,Moe'sanalysismisses the creativeways in which presidentshavepursuedauthorityovertime.Wecontendthatthe president'smotivation
to politicizeand centralizeis not a modernphenomenon,but a reactionto a pervasiveinstitutional
incentive.
In the followingcase studies,we examine how Tyler,Polk,and Hayeseach
soughtto seize upon the ambiguityof presidentialpowerto politicizehis administrationandcentralizehis authority.
JohnTylerbattledagainstoverzealousWhigsin
Congressto securehis institutional
independenceandadvancehis signaturepolicy,
the annexationof Texas.Throughhis unprecedentedassertionof controloverthe
budgetaryprocess,James Polkcreatednew avenuesof bureaucratic
authorityfor
the presidencyand providedhis administrationwith the necessary means to
accomplishhis ambitiousJacksonianagenda.By displacingentrenchedinterests
and eliminatingpoliticalpatronage,Rutherford
B. Hayesplacedthe presidencyat
14. Moe,"Presidents,
andTheory,"
364-65.
Institutions,
15. Moe,"Presidents,
andTheory,"
367.
Institutions,
16. Moe,"ThePoliticized
in Canthe
Structure,"
Presidency";
TerryMoe,"ThePoliticsof Bureaucratic
Government
ed. JohnE.ChubbandPaulE.Peterson(Washington,
DC:TheBrookingsInstitution,
Govern?,
andTheory";
1989);Moe,"Presidents,
Power
Institutions,
TerryMoe,andWilliamHowell,"ThePresidential
of Unilateral
Action,"Journalof Law, Economicsand Organization15, (1999);TerryMoe,andWilliam
ActionandPresidential
Power:A Theory,"
Presidential
StudiesQuarterly
29 (1999).
Howell,"Unilateral
482 PRESIDENTIAL
ANDCENTRALIZATION
POLITICIZATION
the centerof his party'sorganization.
Thefollowingthreecase studiesdemonstrate
thateven lesser-notednineteenth-century
presidentshadthe incentiveto seek political authoritynot explicitlygrantedto them by the Constitution
and turnit toward
theirown politicalpurposes.'7
I. Politicizing and Centralizing Administrative Capacity:
The Presidency of John Tyler
Thepresidencyof JohnTylerdoes notstandout in historyas particularly
remarkable. Norshouldit: by most measures,Tylerhad modestpolicyambitions,he did
not leadthe nationthroughanywarsor majoreconomiccrises,and his personality
was not especiallynoteworthy.He establishedthe importantprecedentof vice presidentialsuccession,but didnot leavea significantpoliticallegacyafterhe leftoffice
in 1845.Yetbecausehis presidencydidnot makemuchof a markon Americanpolof the presidentialincentiveto establishindependitics,it is allthe moreillustrative
ence and politicalauthorityby playingupon the ambiguitiesof executivepowerin
the Constitution.
Likemodernpresidents,Tylersoughtto pursuehis policyobjectives-the annexationof Texasand moderateeconomic policies that respected
states'rights-by politicizingandcentralizinghis administration.
Tylerdidnotcome to powerwithan abundanceof independentpersonalor political authority,
and as the firstVicePresidentto succeeda deceasedpresident,Tyler
couldclaimno electoralmandate.Tyler'saccessionto the presidencywas hotlyconhisterm,Tyler's
tested,andhislegitimacywas challengedfromallsides.Throughout
policyobjectivesfailedto generatea popularconsensus,and both the Democratic
partyandtheWhigpartyfoundthatorganizingin oppositionto Tylerwas morefruitful than lookingto him for leadership.Fromthe start,Tylerhad to seize upon the
ambiguitiesof executivepowerto createhis own sphereof authority.
SecuringFormalAuthority
Withthe electionof WilliamHenryHarrison
to the presidencyin 1840,the Whig
set byAndrewJackpartyhopedto reversethecourseof presidential
aggrandizement
17. A briefnoteon ourmethodology:
thisresearchis partof a largerongoingprojectcritiquing
thepervasive"modern/traditional"
dividein presidential
the executiveleadershipof
scholarshipby investigating
thesethreecase studiesarenotexhaustive;
presidents.Clearly,
nineteenth-century
yet theyarestillinformative.Togainthemostexplanatory
powerfromourlimitednumberof cases,we followKing,Keohane,and
Verbaby emphasizingthe largernumberof observationsof presidential
actionscontainedwithineach of
the threecases. Forexample,withinthe examinationof Tyler,our thesisis substantiated
by numerous
observations,includingTyler'sstrategicuse of the presidential
oath,hiswrestingof controloverHarrison's
cabinet,his creationof a politicized"kitchencabinet,"his use of theveto,his strategicuse of the appointmentpower,andhis effortsto builda new partyforpoliticalleverage.See GaryKing,Robert0. Keohane,
and SidneyVerba,DesigningSocialInquiry:ScientificInferencein QualitativeResearch(Princeton,NJ:
PrincetonUniversity
Press,1994).
Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 483
son and returncongressional
supremacyto the federalgoverment. Inhis inaugural
of
address,Harrison
understanding
promisedto putintopracticetheWhig'srestrictive
executivepower.Overjoyed
congressionalWhigsexpectedtheirprogramto be fully
fromthe executivebranch.But Harriimplementedwithoutsignificantinterference
of livingup
son's untimelydeatha monthlaterleftto his successorthe responsibility
to theWhigcreed.JohnTyler,however,hadbeen nominatedas theWhigparty'svice
candidateforpoliticalreasons,notforhisdedicationto theWhigpartypropresidential
gram.He hadprovidedvaluablesupportto keyWhigpartyleadersin the recentpast,
andwas a states'rightssouthernerwho broughtsectionalbalanceto the partycoalition.Tylerwas a Democratuntilthe mid-1830s,andonlyleftthe partyto demonstrate
his oppositionto Jackson's"war"on the nationalbank.Inplacinghimon the ticket,
the Whigpartyhad "askedhim no questionsabouthis views and requiredhim to
who stood,unlikemostof his
makeno pledges."'8
politician
Tylerwas an independent
his
didnotalter
above
election
as
a
WhigVicePresident
contemporaries,
partypolitics;
idealsof independent
hiscommitmentto patrician
statesmanship.
Harrison'sdeathpromptedan urgentconstitutionaldebateover how to fillthe
vacuumof powerhe leftbehind.ShouldTylerbecome the president?Orshouldhe
remainVice President,actingas president?Likemanyotherpassagesin the Constitution,the instructionsregardingsuccessionleave considerableroom for interpretation.Itreads:"inthe case of the removalof the Presidentfromoffice,or of his
death,resignation,or inabilityto dischargethe powersanddutiesof the saidoffice,
the same shalldevolveon the Vice President."
Preciselywhat "thesame"meansis
is
it
"said
or
"the
and
duties?"Tyler'sdetractors,includunclear: the
office,"
powers
"Mr.
ing Harrison'scabinet,declaredthat
Tylermust, while performingthe functions of President,bear the title of Vice-President,
actingPresident"and several
majornewspapersconcurredthatTylershouldassumethe powersanddutiesof the
presidencybut not the officeitself.19
IntrueMachiavellian
fashion,once TylerreachedWashington,D.C.,he immediexecutethe Office
atelytook the presidentialoath of office.He swore to "faithfully
of the Presidentof the UnitedStates"and "preserve,protect,and defendthe Constitution."Thisactionprofoundlyaffectedhis status,providinghimwith the formal
authorityof the office,not justof the president'sduties.Althoughformerpresident
JohnQuincyAdamsregardedTyler'sassumptionof the presidencyas a "directviolationof both the grammarand contextof the Constitution,"
most of Tyler'scritics
reluctantlyacknowledgedthathis swearingto executethe officeof Presidentwas
tantamountto beinghimselfthe President.20
18. RobertSeager,AndTylerToo:A Biography
of John&JuliaGardinerTyler(NewYork:McGraw-Hill,
1963),135.
19. RobertJ. Morgan,WhigEmbattled:The PresidencyunderJohn Tyler(Lincoln:Universityof
NebraskaPress,1954),7-11.
20. CharlesFrancisAdams,ed.,Memoirsof JohnQuincyAdams(Philadelphia:
J.B.Lippincott,
1874),
463-64.
484 PRESIDENTIAL
POLITICIZATION
ANDCENTRALIZATION
Tyleralso decidedto deliveran inauguraladdress,which he considered"abrief
expositionof the principleswhichwillgovernme in the generalcourseof myadministration."21
was a directclaimof his autonomyas
Usingthe firstpersonrhetorically
president,anditdidnotgo unnoticedinthe pressor in the Houseof Representatives,
wherea motionwas madeto forcethe titleuponTylerof "Vice-President,
now exercisingthe dutiesof President"(the motionfailed).HadTylerhesitatedfor another
day,week, or monthto asserthis authorityas President,it is reasonableto assume
thathis congressionaldetractorswould haveseizedthe opportunity
to subordinate
the presidencyandits powersto the willof theWhigmajorityin Congress.Withthe
questionof his legitimacyas presidentaddressedforthe moment,if only by his de
factoassumptionof the titleandoffice,Tylerbeganhis questto exertcontroloverhis
and to directpoliticaldevelopmentson his own terms.
administration
Tyler'sPoliticizationand Centralization
One of the most obviousplacesfora presidentto exerthis authorityas political
leaderis in his own administration:
presidentsoften seek to shape administrative
in
the
executive
branch
and influencethe politicalorientationof govarrangements
within
reach.
institutions
their
erning
TerryMoearguesthatpresidentsare drivento
interactwiththe surrounding
institutional
environment
by the "underlying
degreeof
their
incentives
and
and
the
resources
congruence"between
"existingstructures
withthe instimakingup the institutional
presidency.... Ifpresidentsaredissatisfied
tutionalarrangements
theyinherit,then theywill initiatechangesto the extentthat
andcentralization,
theyhavethe resourcesto do so."22Moe'stheoryof politicization
of course,refersto the "patterned
thatexistwithinthe modernexecutive
behaviors"
establishment,includingthe federalbureaucracy,the numerousWhite House
and Budget,andthe ExecutiveOfficeof the Presioffices,the Officeof Management
dent.23The executivebranchin 1841, however,lackedsignificantadministrative
consistedof littlemore
machinery:Tyler'sadministration
capacityor bureaucratic
than a personalsecretaryand a cabinet.YetTylersoughtto controlthe executive
branchin muchthe sameway as modernpresidentsdo. Whatthe presidentalways
wants,Moetellsus, "isan institutional
systemresponsiveto his needsas a political
leader."24
Muchof Tyler'sactivityin the presidencycan be seen, in thislight,as part
of an ongoingeffortto shapethe institutional
environment
to his politicaladvantage.
In Tyler'stime, the most prominentand politicallysignificantestablishmentin
the executivebranchwas the cabinet.The cabinetwas traditionally
composed of
ACompilation
of the MessagesandPapersof thePresidents,1789-1902,
vol.
21. JamesD.Richardson,
5 (Washington,
DC:Bureauof NationalLiterature
andArt,1903),36-39.
22. Moe,"ThePoliticized
237-38.
Presidency,"
23. Moe,"ThePoliticized
237.
Presidency,"
24. Moe,"ThePoliticized
239.
Presidency,"
Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 485
membersof the president'sparty,distinguished
prominent,independent-minded
statesmenin theirown right,who would not only overseedepartmentswithinthe
executivebranch,butas in DanielWebster'scase (Tyler'sSecretaryof State),would
havenear-completeauthorityovertheirpolicyareas.Presidentsreliedon theirsecretariesfor information,advice,and politicalcapital.Who was placedon the cabinet indicatedwhichstates,regions,politicalideologies,and partyandcongressional
cabinetsecretarieswere politileadersheldsway in the president'sadministration;
cal tools justas theywere politicalresources.Proceedingsfromcabinetmeetings
had symbolicvalue and sometimesbecame veritablepoliticalevents-what was
saidbetweenpresidentsandsecretariescouldbecome the subjectof politicalnews.
Howthe presidentmanagedhis cabinet,therefore,was an essentialcomponentof
executiveleadershipin the nineteenthcentury:it impactedhis abilityto implement
his policyobjectives,build politicalcoalitions,advancehis reelectionhopes, and
directthe politicalagenda.
Uponenteringthe WhiteHousein April1841,Tylerwas sensitiveto the national
death.Inan effortto save the nationfromfurther
upheavalsurroundingHarrison's
to
dismiss
Harrison's
cabinetandappointnew secretaries.His
chose
not
strife,Tyler
to
his
transition
was
smooth
over
plan
by showingrespectforthe Whigleadrocky
This
was
not
to
decision
intended
ership.
only ingratiateTylerwith his party,but it
was also a strategicmove designedto preservethe Whigs'delicatefactionalbalance of anti-Democratic
northernersand southernerswith nationalisticeconomic
forTyler,Harrison's
secretarieswere knownlieupolicypreferences.Unfortunately
made
tenantsof SenatorHenryClay,and so his failureto change administrations
the new presidentappearsubordinateto the strongcongressionalWhigleadership.
At the firstcabinetmeetingon April6, DanielWebsterexplainedto Tylerthat
PresidentHarrisonhad made all policydecisionsby a majorityvote in the cabinet,
and the presidentreceivedonly one vote. Thecabinet,as well as the partyleadership, expectedand encouragedTylerto follow Harrisonand cede authorityto his
secretaries.Althoughthis traditionof cabinet decision-makingdated back to
of
ThomasJefferson,it becamea highlycontentiousissueduringthe administration
AndrewJackson.Jacksonnot only refusedto vote with his cabinet,he refusedto
meet with it for the firsttwo years of his presidencyand insteadreferredto a
"kitchencabinet"of informalfriendsand advisors.AlthoughTylerhad made his
careeropposingthe executiveaggrandizement
of AndrewJackson,he now found
himselffacedwith a crucialdecision:shouldhe, likeJackson,asserthis autonomy
and authorityoverhis cabinet,or handcontroloverhis administration
to the Whig
The latterpropositionwas
leadershipin a demonstrationof his partyfaithfulness?
untenable.Not only would a rule-by-committee
systemcompromisehis personal
andinstitutional
to the
autonomy,buthispoliticalobjectiveswouldbe subordinated
to
policyagendaand politicalambitionsof HenryClay.Tylerseizedthisopportunity
defendhis autonomy,declaringto his cabinet:"Iam the President,and I shallbe
I shall be pleasedto availmyselfof your
held responsiblefor my administration.
ANDCENTRALIZATION
486 PRESIDENTIAL
POLITICIZATION
counseland advice.ButI can neverconsentto beingdictatedto as to what I shall
or shallnotdo.... Whenyou thinkotherwise,yourresignations
willbe accepted."25
Tyler'sassertionthat he and he alone possessedthe executivepower demonstratesthe vitalityand enduranceof the Founders'idealsand hopes forthe institutions they created.By allowingthe executivepower to remainambiguousin the
the Founderseffectivelyempoweredpresidentsto interprettheirrole
Constitution,
as theychoose. Inthisway, the executivecould be both strongand weak, accordBut this flexibilityand adaptabilityrequiresindependenceand
ing to necessity.26
theirambivalenceoverexecutivepower
unityin the executive.Byinstitutionalizing
in ambiguouslanguage,the Foundersprovidedthe presidencywith an incentiveto
resistencroachmentupon its unitaryform.InFederalist
70, Publiuscontendedthat
unityis an essentialcomponentof energyin the office,but it can be destroyedby
"vestingit ostensiblyin one man, subject,in whole or in part,to the controland
cooperationof others,in the capacityof counsellorsto him."TheFoundersrejected
as a viableformof executivepower,andTyler'sdecisiondemonrule-by-committee
stratedthatthe president'sincentiveto be autonomouswas indeeda significant
motivatingforce,a testamentto the Founders'foresight.
Yetincreasingthe authorityof the cabinetat the expenseof the presidentwas a
pivotalpartof the Whigplanto restorelegislativedominanceoverthe federalgovernment,and an essentialcomponent of HenryClay'spoliticalstrategy.At the
outsetof Harrison'sterm,HenryClayhad engineeredthe selectionof his supporters to a majorityof cabinetposts,and hadrejectedan offerto serveas Secretaryof
Statein orderto remainin the Senate.As the leaderof the Senateand the controllinginfluenceoverthe cabinet,Clayplannedto bringaboutlegislativesupremacy.
Tyler'sdecisionto thwartClay'splanand asserthis independencefromhis cabinet
was, accordingto Tyler'sbiographers,a painfuland difficultdecision.In addition
to pittingTyleragainsthis own party,his decision defied contemporarynorms.
FromWashingtonto Van Buren,cabinet members had providedconsiderable
input on policy mattersand constitutionalquestions,and often outlastedpresidents in office;even the issue of whetherthe presidenthad the power removehis
secretarieswithoutthe consent of the Senatewas not resolveduntilthe repealof
the Tenureof OfficeActin 1886.Whatwas worse, Tyler'sclaimof autonomywas
reminiscentof AndrewJackson,the only presidentto have assertedcomplete
authorityover his cabinet.Surelythe NationalIntelligencer'sstingingrepudiation
a statement
of Tyler'sactionas a "Jacksonian
pretensionto executiveinfallibility,"
echoed throughoutthe politicalpresses,must have been a bitterpill for the antiJacksonianTylerto swallow.27
25. J. G. Wilson,ThePresidentsof the UnitedStates,Vol.II (NewYork:D. Appletonand Company,
1894),p. 73n,JohnTylerJr.quotedbyJohnFisk.
26. Mansfield,
Tamingthe Prince.
27. TheNationalIntelligencer,
August14, 1841.
Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 487
Despitethesedisadvantages,
anychanceTylerhadto defendhis policyand political commitmentsturnedon the degreeof authorityhe assertedoverthe cabinet.
Tylerwas a "spokesmanof the tidewatertobaccoplanters"who had strongpolitithe resentmentof the greatagrarcal commitments;he "represented
pre-eminently
ians of the SouthagainstJackson'svigorousexecutivepoliciesand especiallyhis
denunciationof the SouthCarolinanullificationists."28
Althoughhe sharedsome of
the Whigs'nationalistviews,Tylerdidnot alignpolitically
with Clay.Inthe summer
of 1841,Clayintroduceda seriesof billsin Congressthatconstitutedthe bulkof the
Whig policy agenda.At the center of the agendawas a plan to re-charterthe
nationalbank.DespitewarningsfromTylerconfidantsthatthe presidentopposed
the ideaof a nationalbankthatinfringedon states'rights,theWhig-dominated
Congressproceededto pass the billand send it to the presidentforhis signature.
Tylerneededcounselon whetherto veto the bill,and how to explainit,if he did.
He perceivedhis existingcabinetmembersas disloyalandwas unwillingto solicit
theiradvice;yet he feareda ruptureof the Whigpartyif he dismissedthe Harrison
holdovers.Drivenby an incongruity
betweenhis motivesandthe politicalstructure
his
andcreatedhisown versionof
him,
surrounding Tylerpoliticized administration
Jackson's"kitchencabinet."His informalcabinetincludedold friends:five members of the Virginiacongressionaldelegation,newspapermanDuff Green,and
Massachusetts
congressmanCalebCushing.Tylereagerlysolicitedtheiradviceand
sharedwith them his most personaland politicalconcerns.Tyler'sreal cabinet,
however,was left guessinghow the presidentplannedto govern.When the first
bankbillwas sent to Tylerforhis signature,WebsterremarkedthatTyler"keepshis
own counselas to approvingor disapproving.
Opinionsdifferverymuchas to what
he will do."29
AfterTylervetoedthe bankbill,Claypubliclyaccusedhimof violatingcontemporarypoliticalnormsand assaultingthe doctrineof cabinetcontrol.Tylershouldhave
followed"thejudgmentof the partywhichbroughthimintopower... and,if public
famespeakstrue,of thecabinetwhichthe lamentedHarrison
calledaroundhim,and
which he voluntarily
Yetcedingthe authorityof the presidencyto his
continued."30
cabinetwouldnot,Tylerbelieved,be inthe nation'sbestinterests.Tocompromiseon
the bankbillwould have been to surrenderthe institutional
authorityof the presidencyto a legislaturedominatedby his ideologicalopponents.Instead,Tylervetoed
the billand directedhis effortstowardthe politicization
of his institutional
environment.Sincehe wouldnot receivefaithful,constructive
politicaladvicefromhis existand insteadreliedon
ing cabinetmembers,Tylercut them out of his deliberations
adviserswho were responsiveto his politicaland policyobjectives.Encountering
an
environment
thatwas at oddswith (andactuallyhostileto) his political
institutional
28. WilfredE.Binkley,
Presidentand Congress(NewYork:VintageBooks,1962),112
29. Morgan,WhigEmbattled:ThePresidencyunderJohnTyler,62.
488 PRESIDENTIAL
ANDCENTRALIZATION
POLTICIZATION
purposes,Tylerdrew upon his informalresourcesto carveout his own sphereof
influencein the executivebranchon his own terms.
authority,
restructuring
Inadditionto politicizing
andcentralizing
the presidential
channelsof adviceand
counsel,Tylersoughtto remakethe executivebranchin his image.Usingthe power
of appointmentto packthe executivebranchwithfriendsandfamilywho were loyal
and responsiveto him and his politicalobjectives,Tylerseized upon this simple,
to his liking.As Moeexplains,
readilyavailableresourceand builtan administration
the powerof appointmentis "anchoredin a formalpresidentialpowerthat,in its
control,is perhapsmore importantthan
implicationsfor politicaland bureaucratic
Thismost basictool of politicization
provedto be highly
anyotherhe possesses."31
effectiveforTyler'spurposes.As Tyler'ssole assistantin the WhiteHouse,the presidentappointedhisson JohnTylerJr.;RobertTyler,the president'soldestson, served
as a politicalliaisonwith conservativenorthernDemocratsandworkedat the Land
Officein Washington;Tyler'ssecond wife, JuliaGardiner,
became one of Tyler's
mosttrustedadvisorsandconsultantson the use of politicalpatronage;one nephew
workedin the Treasury
andanothernephewwas appointedas a diploDepartment,
maticcourier;a brother-in-law
became second assistantpostmastergeneral,and
anotherbrother-in-law
became a U.S. CircuitCourtclerk;Tyler'sdaughter-in-law
became the head socialcoordinatorat the WhiteHouse,and helpedTyleruse his
informalpowersto influenceothers;AbelUpshur,an old friendand southernstalwartfromVirginia,becameheadof the U.S.Navy,andTyler'sson-in-lawbecamea
purserin the Navy;close friendHughLegarebecameAttorneyGeneraland presidentialadvocatebefore the SupremeCourt;familyfriendCharlesWickliffewas
appointedpostmastergeneral.32
nepotismwas,
Althoughthe traditionof presidential
of course,well established,Tylerreceivedbitingcriticismfromhis detractorsforhis
blatantuse of the appointmentpowerfor politicalpurposes.He was laterbrought
up on impeachmentchargesfor,among other reasons,his "wickedand corrupt
abuse of the powerof appointmentto and removalfromoffice:first,in displacing
those who were competentand faithfulin the dischargeof theirpublicduties,only
becausetheywere supposedto entertaina politicalpreferenceforanotherand,secondly,in bestowingthemon creaturesof his own will."33
By politicizinghis institutionalenvironment,Tylerextractedmore political
authorityfor his disadvantagedpresidency.Usingwhateverresourcesat his disand purposefullypursuedhis politicalobjectives.A telling
posal,Tylerstrategically
of
example Tyler'spoliticizationoccurredwhen a second bill to reestablisha
30. Congressional
Globe,27thCongress,1stsession,Appendix,364,quotedin Morgan,WhigEmbattled:ThePresidencyunderJohnTyler,64-65.
31. Moe,"ThePoliticized
245.
Presidency,"
32. NormaLoisPeterson,Presidenciesof WilliamHenryHarrison&JohnTyler(Lawrence:
University
Pressof Kansas,1989),147-64.
33. SeeJournalof theHouseof Representatives
of the UnitedStates,1842-1843,
January10, 1843,proBotts.
by Representative
ceedingsintroduced
Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 489
nationalbankwas passedby Congressandsent forTyler'ssignature.Tylerlearned
earlyon thatthe billwas intendedas partof a politicalployto forcea secondveto,
which would isolatethe presidentfurtherfromthe Whigs,compel his cabinetto
resignin a mass showingof no-confidence,and ultimatelyforcehim to step down
from the presidency.The SenatePresidentSamuelSouthard,a Clayman, would
then be elevatedto the presidency.Tylervetoed the bill, but did not resign.He
stated:"Myresignationwouldamountto a declarationto the worldthatoursystem
of governmenthad failed... thatthe provisionmadeforthe deathof the President
was... so defectiveas to mergeallexecutivepowersin the legislativebranchof the
government."34
Tylerwas burnedin effigy,threatenedwith assassination,and forfrom
the Whig party.Andon September11, 1841,Tyler'scabinet
mallyexpelled
in
a
Ina swiftand decisivemove, Tylernominateda new
mass
exodus.35
resigned
cabinetand establishednew procedures.Indeed,thereis evidencethatTylermay
haveencouragedthe exodusof the Harrisoncabinetin orderto rebuildhis administrationin his image-well in advance of the cabinet resignations,Tylerhad
selectedtheirreplacements.36
Overthe nextthreeyears,Tylercarefullymanipulatedthe circulationof fourteen
men throughhis cabinet,craftingthatbodyto reflecthis own policyambitions.His
appointmentswere gearedtowardforginga new partisanlinkbetweenconservativeDemocratsfromNew Yorkand Pennsylvania
and southernstates'rightsWhigs
who had left the DemocraticpartyduringJackson'spresidency.Throughouthis
term,Tylerinsistedthathis cabinetmembersrecognizetheirsubordinationto the
president,act harmoniouslywith one another,and adhereto his opinionson all
matters.His cabinet meetings were gatheringsof like-mindedpoliticianswho
thoughtcollectivelyabouthow to best implementTyler'spoliticalagenda.
Once he had disposedof the Harrisonholdovercabinet,Tylerwas trulya presidentwithouta party-he now hadthe freedomto concentrateon achievinghis personal politicalgoals.He beganto builda thirdparty,carefullytargetinghis political
appointmentsto bringtogethernationalistsand states'rightsadvocatesunderhis
leadership.Hopingto attractmoderatesfromthe Whigpartyand northernconser-
34. See JohnTyler,Statementin Answerto the Reportof the HouseCommittee,in August,1842,Lettersand Timesof the Tylers,LyonG.Tyler,vol.II,100,quotedin Seager,AndTylerToo:ABiography
of John
&JuliaGardinerTyler,161.
35. Secretary
of StateDanielWebsterwas theonlysecretaryto remainin thecabinet.WebsterandTyler
hadforgeda mutualrespectforone another,andthedistinguished
secretarywas in the midstof important
withGreatBritainoverthe Maineboundary(whichhe ultimately
resolved,signing
diplomaticnegotiations
the important
Webster-Ashburton
he was reviewingthe questionof Mexico'sclaimsin California;
Treaty);
andhe was examiningthe boundaryproblemsin Oregonas well.Websterdidnot feel thathe couldleave
the StateDepartment
at sucha crucialtime.
36. See DuffGreento Tyler,September10, 1841in DuffGreen,TheDuffGreenPapersin theSouthern
HistoricalCollectionof the University
of NorthCarolinaLibrary(ChapelHill,NC:1967);and letterfrom
GilmoreinJohnTylerPapers, ol. V,175;see OliverPerryChitwood,
JohnTyler:
Championof theOldSouth
(NewYork:Appleton-Century
Company,1939).
ANDCENTRALIZATION
490 PRESIDENTIAL
POLITICIZATION
vativesfrom the Democraticparty,Tylerintroducedthird-waypolicy alternatives
such as the ExchequerPlanand the 1842TariffAct.Butthe centerpieceof Tyler's
movementwas the annexationof Texasandthe expansionof America's
third-party
boundariesto the PacificOcean:goalsthatwould not only bringtogetherthe various factionsof moderatesunderhis leadership,but helphim leavehis markon history."Couldanythingthrowso brighta lustrearoundus?"TyleraskedWebster,
whom he solicitedto join in a third-party
InJanuary1843,Tyleroffimovement.37
ciallyfoundedthe Democratic-Republican
Party(referredto as the TylerParty),and
was nominatedforpresidentby a smallgroupof friends.
Histhirdpartynevergot off the groundas an electoralforce,but it did provide
politicalleverageon theTexasquestion.Tylerknewhis partywouldnevergeneratea
largeenoughnationalmovementto defeatone of the majorparties,buthe hopedto
buildan organization
withenoughsupportto swingthe balanceof poweron importantpolicyissues.Thus,with secretnegotiationsstalledin April1844,Tylerrallieda
groupof supporters(comprisedmainlyof politicalappointeesto theofficeof thepostto declareboldlytheirintentionto reelectthe president
masterandmailcontractors)
andmakethe annexationof Texasintoa majorcampaignissue-a movecalculated
to pressurethe Democraticpartyto announcein favorof annexation.The tools of
presidential
patronageand politicalpartybuildingwere centralto the realizationof
to
RobertSeagerwrites,
Tyler'splan leavea historicallegacy.AsTylerbiographer
Ifhe was a Presidentwithouta party,he was stillthe nation'sleadingpatronage
dispenser.Withthe patronage,he believed,wouldcome the party,andwith the
partywould come the vehiclefor annexingTexasand salvagingthe historical
... so the bloodlettingwent forward,Tylerfrereputationof his administration
quentlyand personallyconcerninghimselfwith new personnelfor the most
obscureoffices.Scarcelya sparrowfell fromthe federalfirmamentwithoutthe
President'sknowledgeand encouragement.38
Tylerwas notreelected,buta resolutioncallingfortheannexationof Texaspassed
CongressandTylersigneditthreedaysbeforehe vacatedtheWhiteHouse.Throughin purandcentralization
out his presidency,
Tylerusedthe strategiesof politicization
suitof his politicalgoals,includingreelectionand a historicallegacy,as well as his
seizedupon
president"
policygoals,includingtheannexationof Texas.The"accidental
any and all availableresourcesin the pursuitof his objectives.He playedupon the
as president;he
ambiguityof executivepowerto securehis legitimacyand authority
a breakwith the Whig partyto ensurehis politicalindemanufactured
strategically
pendenceand builda more responsivecabinet;and he used the powerof appoint-
of
Oct.11, 1841,in Seager,AndTylerToo:ABiography
37. JohnTylerto DanielWebster,Williamsburg,
John&JuliaGardinerTyler,171.
38. Seager,AndTylerToo:ABiographyof John&JuliaGardinerTyler,224-25.
Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 491
mentto generatepersonalandpoliticalsupportandto expandhissphereof influence
of JohnTylerstandsas a testamentto the
overthe federalgovernment.
Thepresidency
incentivethatallpresidents
face:to takeallpracticable
measures
powerfulinstitutional
to expandthe president's
in pursuitof his politicalobjectives.
sphereof authority
II. Controlling Federal Expenditures to Create Authority:
The Presidency of James K. Polk
Presidential
scholarswidelyrecognizeJamesPolk'sexpansiveuse of executive
poweras commander-in-chief
duringthe MexicanWar.Thecredithe has received
forhis aggressiveforeignpolicymaking
has overshadowedhis distinctionas the first
presidentto exercise bureaucraticcontrolover federalexpenditures.However,
these two impressiveexpansionsof executivepowershouldbe consideredjointly.
In an effortto achievehis policypreferences,Polkpoliticizedand centralizedthe
nascentbudgetprocess.
Muchlike our currentpresidentGeorgeW. Bush,Polkfaceddifficultdecisions
regardingexpendituresand wartimespending.As a Jacksonian,Polkneeded to
followthroughon his promiseto cut the tariff.Buta reductionin revenuegenerated
by the tariffposeda policyconundrumforPolk.TofinancethewarwithMexicoand
retainhis tariffreduction,Polkneeded to gain tightcontrolover federalexpenditures.Polk'spoliticization
of the earlybudgetprocessresulteddirectlyfromhis pursuitof an ideologicalpolicyprogram.
Polk'sinnovationsin executivebranchprocedurescreatednew authorityforthe
presidencywhere none had previouslyexisted,and allowedhim to exerciseinfluence withoutrevealinghimselfin a dramaticdisplayof "sensationalexecution."39
UnlikeTyler,Polk'slegitimacyas presidentwas neverquestioned.Instead,Polkwas
an innovatorwho soughtnew ways of exercisingindependenceand controlin the
executivebranchin orderto pursuehis policyagenda.Anexaminationof his efforts
to controlexpendituresdemonstrateshow a "pre-modern"
presidentpoliticized
and centralizedeffectively.
Seizing Controlof Expenditures
Everyyear,the variousbureausand officeswithineach departmentof the executive branchgeneratedtheirannualestimates.Beforesending theirbudget esti39. Accordingto Mansfield,
Machiavelli's
executivegovernment"is not ordinarily
visible"(140).The
sometimes"invisible"
natureof executivepowercontributesto its ambiguity.While impressiveactions
which"joltmen intorecalling"
areimportant,
theeverydayactionsof theprince
whytheyneedgovernment
arejustas importantforthe accumulation
of power.InPresidential
Power,RichardNeustadtsubstantiates
thisobservation
when he arguesthatpresidentsmusttryto exercisecontinuousleadershipratherthanleadershipat timesof extremecrisis(6-9).
492 PRESIDENTIAL
ANDCENTRALIZATION
POLITICIZATION
mates to the Secretaryof the Treasury,departmentheads reviewedindividual
bureaurequests.In a finalstep, the Secretaryof the Treasurygatheredall departmentalrequestsandtransmitted
a compiledfiscalproposalto Congress.Therefore,
priorto Polk'spresidency,Congressdid not receivean "executivebudget"per say,
but "collecteddepartmentalestimates"thatmay or may not have been subjectto
As it stood, the Presidentdid not exerciseany power or controlin the
scrutiny.40
process.Ingeneral,Congressandthe Secretaryof the Treasuryshapedfiscalpolicy
in the earlynineteenthcentury.Polk,however,realizedthatnothingpreventedthe
and thatby reviewingdepartmental
president'sinterjection
reports,he could influence policy.41Immediatelyaftertakingofficein 1845,he began exercisingcontrol
overbureaurequestsand expenditures.
In pursuitof his goal to controlthe departmentsin the executivebranch,Polk
held two lengthycabinet meetingseach week and insistedupon regularattendance.42At these meetings,all policies,includingexpenditures,were discussed.
Polkusedthe cabinetas a coordinating
He insisteduponbudgetcutsacross
body.43
the boardand avoidedplayingfavoriteswithinhis cabinet.Inpart,Polk'sequanimitystemmedfromhis desireto insure"equaland exactjustice"to everyinterestin
the DemocraticParty.44
But more importantly,
Polk'sapproachto administrative
facilitated
bureaucratic
complianceand fiscal restraint.If the Postmanagement
masterGeneralknewthatthe Secretaryof the Navyalso neededto cut his expenInshort,Polk
ditures,it was likelyhe would complywith Polk'srecommendations.
treatedhis cabinetnot only as a policymaking
and advisoryinstitution,but also as
an instrumentof administrative
control.45
Polk achieved control over the various executive departmentsthrough his
painstakingattentionto detail.46Whereasearlierpresidentshad allowed department headsto runtheirdivisionswith littlesupervision,Polkused the ambiguityof
his executiveauthorityto his advantage,pushingthe scope of his powerto the fore
Polkwantedcontrol
as a way of protectinghis own politicalprogram.Specifically,
of agencyrequeststo ensurethatfundingforthe MexicanWarwould be available
withoutdrivingthe countryintodebt.47Polkprovedthata Presidentcouldruna war
Polkseized uponthe hazy
by controllingthe navaland militarybudgetestimates.48
the
President's
bureaucratic
powersand grabbedhold of
uncertainty
surrounding
40. LeonardD. White,TheJacksonians:A Studyin Administrative
History1829-1861(New York:
MacMillan
Company,1954),78.
41. White,TheJacksonians:
AStudyin Administrative
History1829-186175.
Pressof Kansas,1987),36.
42. PaulH.Bergeron,
ofJamesK Polk(Lawrence:
ThePresidency
University
AStudyin Administrative
43. White,TheJacksonians:
History1829-1861,62.
44. StephenSkowronek,The PoliticsPresidentsMake (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,
1997),160.
AStudyin Administrative
45. White,TheJacksonians:
History1829-1861,92-93.
A Studyin Administrative
46. White,TheJacksonians:
History1829-1861,69.
AStudyin Administrative
47. White,TheJacksonians:
History1829-1861,79.
AStudyin Administrative
48. White,TheJacksonians:
History1829-1861,51.
Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 493
detail
the pursestringswith innovativemethodsanda vigilantattentionto structural
and policyoutcomes.
TighteningControl
Throughouthis four years in office, Polk'scontrolof agency requestsgrew
strongerand morecomprehensive.Forexample,at a cabinetmeetingin 1845,Polk
informedhis secretariesthathe wantedthe annualestimates"tobe made on the
most economicalscale."49He also asked the membersof the cabinetto develop
their departmentalrequestsimmediatelyso that he would have ample time to
reviewthem. By 1846,the Secretaryof the WarDepartmentsubmittedrevisions
Inan effortto keep
directlyto Polk,not to the TreasuryDepartmentor Congress.50
overall federalexpendituresat a minimum,Polk also supervisedthe financial
requestsof non-military
departments,such as the PostOffice.As the MexicanWar
continued,Polk'spoweroverthe agenciesbecameironcladas he initiatedthe practice of interrogating
bureauchiefsdirectlyaboutproposedexpenditures.
One particular
incidentencouragedPolkto asserttightexecutivefiscalcontrol.
InAugustof 1847,PolklearnedthatCongressplannedto denyhisrequestto callout
of funds.
6,000 new volunteersfor the MexicanWarbecause of the unavailability
Astonishedby the failedrequest,Polk investigatedthe budget insufficiencyand
learned that a foolish transactionbetween the TreasuryDepartmentand War
Departmenthadoccurreda few monthsearlierwithouthis knowledge.Inhis diary,
Polkadmittedthat he was "greatlyvexed"by the "looseness"of the WarDepartment budget, and confessed that the whole incidentmade him "sick."Consequently,Polkresolved,"thereshouldbe a reformin thisrespect."5'
Afterthis incident,Polkmonitoredeach departmentand theirfinancialtransactions.52Polkrefusedto reimbursefinancialexpendituresthathe had not personally
approved,and used the ambiguousnatureof his budgetarypowersto supporthis
executivedecisions.Afterthe MexicanWarended,an Americangeneralsubmitted
a listof expendituresamountingto over$200,000thathe had incurredin Mexico,
allegedlyin pursuitof a "secret"militarymission. An enraged Polk called the
account"remarkable"
and informedthe Secretaryof Warthatas president,he had
"noauthorityto paysuch an account."53
ThetightfiscalcontrolPolkhad exercised
in the previousthreeyearsclearlydemonstratedthathe did havethe powerto pay
the general'saccount.ButPolkdid not wish to reimbursea wastrel,and he denied
the requestwithoutcontroversy.
49 JamesK.Polk,TheDiaryof JamesK Polk,vol. I-IV(Chicago:A.C.McClurg
&Co., 1910),vol. 1,48.
50. White,TheJacksonians:
AStudyinAdministrative
History1829-1861,80.
51. Polk,TheDiaryof JamesK Polkvol. 111,135-36.
52. White,TheJacksonians:
AStudyinAdministrative
History1829-1861,61.
53. Polk,TheDiaryof JamesK Polk,vol. IV,196.
494
PRESIDENTIALPOLITICIZATION
AND CENTRALIZATION
Duringhis presidency,Polk essentially became the "Directorof the Budget."54To
achieve this control, Polk monitored the bureau chiefs, whom he believed inflated
appropriationsand practiced fiscal irresponsibility.Polk usually accomplished this
task by requiringcabinet secretaries to read their reportsaloud to him. Through this
practice, Polk established a direct line of accountabilityfrom the departments to the
president.55His scrutinyof the annual reportsalso enabled Polk to review the policy
goals of each department. Furthermore,Polk recorded the positions and actions of
all his cabinet members in his diary, believing that this notation created an additional source of accountability.When all else failed, Polk interrogatedthe bureau
chiefs directly.In September of 1847, the Presidentasked Secretaryof WarWilliam
Marcyto reduce his estimates. Marcyexplained to Polkthat he could not control the
requests of the bureau chiefs. Polk requested audiences with several of Marcy's
subordinates and achieved the reduced budget he desired.56
In his last year as president,Polkcontinued to manage the bureau officers.A proponent of Jacksonianidealsand policies, Polkwas determinedto returnfederalexpendituresto the low levels in existence before the MexicanWar.In a November 6, 1848
diaryentry,Polkrecountedhis effortto scale down the budget of the WarDepartment:
The Secretary of War submitted to me the estimates of appropriations for his
Department for the next fiscal year, as prepared by the Heads of the several
Bureau[s] in the War Department.On comparing them with the appropriations
for similar objects for previous years, and before the Mexican war, they were
found in some branches to exceed these appropriations.The Secretaryinformed
that... he had much difficultywith his Bureau officers in having them reduced
to what they now were. I directed furtherreductions of some of the items to be
made, and directed some of the items to be struckout altogether.... The Bureau
officers, whose duty it is to prepare the estimates, are always in favour of large
appropriations.They are not responsible to the public but to the Executive, &
must be watched and controlled in this respect.57
Notice that Polk classified the bureau officers not as public servants, but as presidential subordinates. According to the structure Polk imposed, the bureau officers
of TexasPress,1960),74.
54. CharlesMcCoy,
Polkand the Presidency(Austin,TX:University
55. Sometimesthe reportswere readin the presenceof the entirecabinet,andsometimesPolkasked
the secretariesto readthemaloudin frontof him alone.Forexample,on November26, 1847,Polkwrote
in his diary,"ThePostmaster
Generalcalledthismorningandreadto me the draftwhichhe hadprepared
Inan earlierinstance,Polkrecounted,"TheSecretary
of the Navyreadto me theconof hisannualreport."
cludingpartof hisAnnualReportin the presenceof Mr.Ritchie,havingreadthe precedingpartto me two
or threenightsago."Polk,TheDiaryof JamesK.Polk,vol.III,231-2;vol. 1,103.
56. Ina November11, 1847entryin his diary,Polkrecounteda conversation
he hadwithQuartermasterGeneralJesup:"Hesubmittedto me his estimates,and I foundthathe had reducedthemnearseven
millionsbelowthesum he hadfirstproposed."Polk,TheDiaryof JamesK.Polkvol. III,219-20.
57. Polk,TheDiaryof JamesK Polk,vol. IV,180-81.
Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 495
fell under the President'sdirectsupervision.AlthoughMoe contends that only
presidents"anticipate,program,and engineer"the behaviorof
twentieth-century
theirbureaucratic
subordinatesin orderto exerttheirown influence,Polk'sfiscal
controlsuggestsotherwise.58
Polk'sinnovationsdemonstratethatthe tendencyfor
presidentsto politicizeand centralizecannotbe attributedonlyto the existenceof
butalso to a persistentincentivethatencouragespresidents
a modernbureaucracy,
to carveout theirown spheresof activity.
Insum, Polkwas largelysuccessfulin controllingexpenditures.Nearthe end of
his term,he repurchaseda half-million
dollarsin governmentbonds,thusreducing
the nationaldebt significantly
beforeleavingoffice.59Itwould be impossibletoday
for presidentsto exercisethe same degreeof personalcontrolover the executive
branchthatPolkenjoyedduringhis term.However,it is clearthatpresidentsin the
to enacttheirpolicypreferences.The
pre-moderneramanipulatedthe bureaucracy
in
the
of
role
formation
fiscal
and
president's
policyis undefinedin the Constitution,
Polkcapitalizeduponthisimprecision.He interjectedthe presidencyintoan areaof
domesticdecision-makingthat the Treasurysecretaryand the House Waysand
Means committee had dominatedduringearlieradministrations.
Because Polk
assumedcontrolof the budgetthroughthe channelsof administrative
supervision,
He used the
his monopolizationof the processwas accepted"withoutfanfare."60
structureto his advantageand thenexertedhis independlooselyknitbureaucratic
ent influence,which ultimatelyresultedin the executionof the policieshe favored.
Muchlike a "modern"president,Polkconceivedof the presidencyas the driving
forceinAmericanpolitics,andforgedaheadwithan executivedetermination
to disand
the
him.
turb,control, manipulate politicalsystemsurrounding
III. Politicizing Civil Service Reform:
The Presidency of Rutherford B. Hayes
One characteristicof "modern"presidentialleadershipis its increasingindependencefrompartycontrol.As Tulis,Kernell,and Milkishaveshown, contemporarypresidentsspeak in theirown voices and relyless on partisanapparatusesto
establishcredibleleadership.61
Theconventionalwisdomis thatnineteenth-century
"modern"presidentscreate theirown indecreated
whereas
parties
presidents,
that
the
pendentorganizations perform functionsof both campaigningand goverB. Hayessuggeststhat the historicalrelanance. Thisexaminationof Rutherford
between
and
presidents
parties is more complicated. Even when
tionship
58. Moe,"ThePoliticsof Bureaucratic
284.
Structure,"
59 Polk,TheDiaryof JamesK Polk,vol. IV,195-96.
60. McCoy,
Polkand the Presidency,223.
61. Kernell,GoingPublic;SidneyM.Milkis,ThePresidentand the Parties(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1993);Tulis,TheRhetorical
Presidency.
496 PRESIDENTIAL
POLITICIZATION
ANDCENTRALIZATION
presidential
powerreacheda low pointin the latenineteenthcentury,Hayesfound
uniqueways to retainindependencefromthe imposinggripof his party'sleadership.Bypoliticizingcivilservicereform,Hayeschangedthe directionof the Republican Partyand broke the power of the conservativeStalwartfaction.Thus, an
controland
importantconnectionexistedbetween Hayes'squest forbureaucratic
his effortsto promotethe policygoalsof his party'smoderatereformwing.
The Electionof 1876
Situatedwithin an era of presidentialinfirmity,RutherfordB. Hayeswas an
unlikelycandidateto alterthe futuredirectionof the GOP.Hayesis most widely
knownforhis brokeredvictoryoverDemocratSamuelTildenin the 1876election.
With the presidentialvote of four states in doubt, Republicansand Democrats
forgeda dealthatassuredHayes'svictoryandalso endedmilitaryoccupationin the
South.BothDemocratsand Republicans
walkedawaywith unscrupulousvictories
resultingfromthe Compromiseof 1877.
Hayesfound himselfin an unenviableleadershipposition.Besidesassuming
office afterthe damagingpresidencyof AndrewJohnsonand the scandal-ridden
Grantadministration,
Hayes'sprecariouselectionpreventedhim fromclaimingan
electoralmandate.Furthermore,
Hayeswas forcedto deal with the conservative
Stalwartwing of RepublicanParty,which opposed his nominationand programmaticreformefforts.
Mostimportantly,
Hayessoughtto lead with authority,but foundthe structural
capacitiesof the officelacking.Moeexplainsthatpresidentsdissatisfiedwith institutionalstructureswill pursuechanges and reformto the extent their available
resourcesallow them to do so.62To implementhis own policygoals and agenda,
Hayesattemptedto solvethe problemof structural
incongruence.Inpursuitof this
goal,Hayesmanagedto imposehis reformistbeliefsuponthe nascentbureaucratic
structure,establishimportantprecedentsforthe PendletonActof 1883,reassertthe
executive'sappointmentpower by defeatinghis politicalopponentsin the Senate,
the presidencyfromits nadirof influence.Tobolsterhis leadership
and reinvigorate
to the pervasivepresidential
incentiveto initiatereforms
responded
authority,
Hayes
and controlthe administrative
apparatusthatsurroundedhim.63
The Politicizationof CivilServiceReform
In his boldestactionsas president,Hayesassertedexecutivepower to implementcivilservicereform.Hayesdidnot hidethe factthathe aimedto overhaulthe
bureaucracyand seize control from the Stalwartsin Congress;in his Inaugural
62. Moe,"ThePoliticized
238.
Presidency,"
269.
63. Moe,"ThePoliticized
Presidency,"
Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 497
Address,he calledforreform"thatshallbe thorough,radical,andcomplete."Such
stronglanguagewas no surprise;Hayeshad used those exactwords in his July8,
1876 partynominationacceptanceletterto describethe civil service reformhe
pledgedto implementif elected.
ButevenbeforeHayesconfrontedexistingcorruption,he neededto builda governingstructurethatwould supporthis reformefforts.He selecteda strong,independent-mindedcabinet and purposefullyexcluded individualsfrom the Grant
administration.64
goalswould not garnerwide
Fullyawarethathis reform-minded
from
whose
senators
powerreliedon the retentionof the
support
manyRepublican
the
structure
of his administration
by assumpatronagesystem,Hayesmanipulated
The
formation
of
cabinet
cabinet
selection.
full
control
over
Hayes's
strategic
ing
his
was a necessaryprecursorto his controlof the bureaucracy.
Selecting cabinet
sent a strongmessageof presidentialindependenceto the anti-reform
wing of the
in
with
allies
the
also
staunch
executive
and
Hayes
provided
RepublicanParty,
branchwho would supporthis policygoals. Earlyin his term, Hayesrealizedhe
neededto politicizeand centralizeto enacthis policyagenda.
Forthe most part,Hayespickedhis nomineeswithoutconsultingthe leadersof
nomineewas Hayes'schoice forSecretaryof State,
his party.Themostcontroversial
WilliamEvarts.GOPleadershotlycontestedthe nominationof Evarts,who led the
New Yorkreformfactionof the partythat openly criticizedGrant'scorruptions.
Hayes also nominated Carl Schurz as Secretaryof the Interior.Schurz was
"despised"by the Stalwartsbecausehe hadsupportedHoraceGreeley'scandidacy
for Presidentin 1872.65
The Senate,which the Republicansstillcontrolled,threatened to rejectHayes'sselections for his cabinet. Hayesstood firmlybehind his
choices, confidentthatpublicopinionwas on his side.66The newspapersreacted
negativelytowardsthe Senate'srefusalto confirmthe nominees.Telegramsand lettersfloodedCongressional
officesin supportof Hayes'sappointments.67
TheSenate
backeddown withina dayof theirthreats.Onlya shortmonthintohis presidency,
Hayesrejectedexecutivesubservienceto the Stalwartsand challengedthe consertendenciesof his party.
vative,anti-reformist
Inhis firstmoveto overhaulthe civilservice,HayesappointedJohnJay,a known
reformer,to lead a nonpartisancommissionto investigatethe New YorkCustomhouse. AlthoughHayesbelievedin the moralityof civilservicereformand wanted
to eliminatecorruption,his motivationsforscrutinizing
the NewYorkCustomhouse
64. KennethDavison,The Presidencyof RutherfordB. Hayes (Westport,CT:GreenwoodPress,
1972),95.
65. Ari Hoogenboom,The Presidencyof Rutherford
B. Hayes (Lawrence,KS:UniversityPressof
Kansas,1988),52.
66. On March14, 1877,Hayeswrotein his diary,"After
a few daysthe publicopinionof the Country
was shown by the pressto be stronglywith me.... Theexpressionsof satisfactionfromall partsof the
(81).
countryaremostgratifying"
67. Davison,ThePresidencyof Rutherford
B. Hayes,164.
498 PRESIDENTIAL
ANDCENTRALIZATION
POLITICIZATION
were politicaland strategic.New YorkRepublicanSenatorRoscoe Conklinghad
opposed Hayes'snominationto the presidencyin an effortto eliminatethe entire
reformwing of the party.Drawingmuchof his supportfromsouthernRepublicans,
Conklingalso failedto supportthe compromiseof 1876becauseit restoredhome
ruleto the Southand jeopardizedthe powerof the carpetbaggers
withinthe party.
Ifa new RepublicanPartydevelopedin the South,consistingmostlyof OldWhigs,
then the authorityof Conklingand his conservativewing would be severelydiminished.Afterthe 1876election,Conklingcontinuedto antagonizeHayes,openlycalling him "Rutherfraud."68
Using his executivecontrolof the bureaucracy,Hayes
sought to punishConklingand the Stalwarts,who controlledthe New YorkCustomhousesince Grant'sadministration.
Hayes's depoliticizationof the bureaucracywas a politicalmove in itself.
Throughhis efforts,Hayesaimedto eliminatea "hostilefaction"of his partythat
"failedto deliverthe vote in 1876."69
Hayesused the executivearmof the bureaucracyas a mechanismto exertinfluenceoverthosewho threatenedhis presidential
leadership.He sought to neutralizeConklingnot because he was corrupt,but
because he derivedhis power in the Senate from the New YorkCustomhouse
patronageand the southernwing of the RepublicanParty.
Hayesaimedto refashionhis partyto fithis own politicalagenda,andsoughtto
punishthosewho threatenedhis leadershipprojectand preventedhimfromclaiming additionalauthority.Indeed,Hayesviewed the controversyover civil service
Muchlikea
reformas a "war"betweenhis supportersand the Conklingfaction.70
how
as
"modern"
was
concerned
with
the
president,Hayes
"bureaucracy a whole"
was organized.71
Thebattleovercivilservicewas a contestrootedin the president's
capacityto conreformforitsown sake,butmore
trolthefutureof hisparty'sagenda.Hayesinstituted
of the executiveto direct
his effortsreassertedthe independentauthority
importantly,
for
involved
the
of
The
battle
reclamation
power;he
policy. larger
presidential
Hayes
of the bureaucracy
as the vehicleforhisassertionof authority.
usedthe reformation
In PartyGovernment,E. E. Schattschneider
analyzedthe structuralincentives
observed
thatencouragethe presidentto seek civilservicereform.Schattschneider
that in the second halfof the nineteenthcentury,congressmenconsistentlyused
patronageto benefitlocal partybosses, often damagingthe "publicreputationof
the president"in the process.72The abolitionof the spoils in Americanpolitics
of power"thatshiftedauthorityfrom"local
redistribution
requireda "fundamental
of IllinoisPress,1961),156.
68. AriHoogenboom,OutlawingtheSpoils(Urbana,IL:University
69. Hoogenboom,ThePresidencyof Rutherford
B. Hayes,132.
70. Hoogenboom,Outlawingthe Spoils,136.
71. Moe,"ThePoliticsof Bureaucratic
280.
Structure,"
72. E.E.Schattschneider,
TheSemi-Sovereign
People:ARealist'sViewof DemocracyinAmerica(Holt:
Rinehart
andWinston,1960),139.
Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 499
machines"to a morecentralizedleadershipstructure.73
Hayes'sexecutiveactionsto
reducethe influenceof localpatronagecan be explainedby the president'sinstitutionalincentiveto seek centralization
and independentcontroloverthe futuredirection of his party.
Hayes's Reformof the CivilService
AfterreceivingJay's highlycriticalreportconcerningthe New YorkCustomhouse, the Presidentorderedthatfederalcivilservantsshouldnot assume leadership or managementpositions in politicalorganizationsor campaigns.Hayes
wanted to removeChesterArthur,the collectorof the customhouse,but did not
wantto damagethe Republicanorganization
by actinghastily.HeallowedArthurto
his
as
as
he
with
keep
job long
cooperated
ongoingreformefforts.Forthe time
it
in
his
best
believed
was
interest
to pursuea moderatecourse of
being, Hayes
action.74Butwhen customhouseNavalofficerAlonzoCornelldisobeyedthe President's executiveorderand refusedto resignfrom his positionin the Republican
Party,Hayesresolvedto removeArthurand Cornelland eliminateSenatorConkling'sinfluence.The selectionof the New Yorkcollectorwas more than just a
bureaucratic
appointment;it was commonlyunderstoodthatthe individualin this
positionservedas the politicalleaderandmanagerof thestate'sRepublicanParty.75
as a
Thus, Hayes'spracticeof using bureaucraticappointments"systematically"
"mechanismof presidential
control"demonstratesthatthe presidential
tendencyto
politicizeandcentralizeis not a distinctlymodernphenomenon.76
Inan October24, 1877,diaryentry,Hayesponderedhis strategyto wrestcontrol
of the New Yorkcustomhousefromthe Stalwartsin the Senate:
How to meet and overcomethisoppositionis the question.I am clearthatI am
right.I believethata largemajorityof the best peoplearein fullaccordwith me.
Now my purposeis to keep cool-to treatall adversariesconsiderablyand
respectfullyand kindlybut at the same time in a way to satisfythem of my sincerityand firmness.(100)77
Hayes'spersonallettersto friendsand politicalconfidantesthroughout1877and
1878revealedthathe intendedto utilizethe appointmentpowerto gathersupport
forhis administration
and its policies.78
73. Schattschneider,
TheSemi-Sovereign
People:A Realist'sViewof Democracyin America,140.
74. Hoogenboom,ThePresidencyof Rutherford
B. Hayes,131.
75. Hoogenboom,ThePresidencyof Rutherford
B. Hayes,140.
76. Moe,"ThePoliticized
254.
Presidency,"
77. Rutherford
B. HayesandT.HarryWilliams,ed. Hayes:TheDiaryof a President(NewYork:David
McKayCompany,Inc.,1964),100.
78. Hoogenboom,ThePresidencyof Rutherford
B. Hayes,142.
ANDCENTRALIZATION
500 PRESIDENTIAL
POLITICIZATION
By convincingothermembersof the Senatethat the President'sindependent
coursethreatenedlegislativecontrolof the bureaucracy,
Conklingmanagedto kill
Hayes'sappointmentsin late 1877.But Hayesdid not accept defeat easily.In a
December6, 1877 diaryentry,Hayeschargedthat legislationshould be passed
which would relieveCongressfromall "responsibility
for appointments."If Congress failedto pass such legislation,Hayesresolvedto "adoptand publishrules"
thatwould achievethe same effect.79Usingthe politicaltools availableto him,the
in 1878.He issueda specialcivilservicereform
Presidentplanneda counterattack
messageto Congressandcollectedevidenceto supporthisclaimthatthe NewYork
Customhousecheated the federalgovernmentout of revenueby undervaluing
When Congressadjournedin the summer
goods and favoringlocal merchants.80
months,Hayesputhis planintoaction.HesuspendedArthurandCornell,replacing
themwith his own recessappointments.Withpublicopinionfavoringhis actions,
Hayespreparedfor an aggressivebattlewith his opponentsin the Senateoverthe
appointmentpower.8'
Accordingto custom,senatorswould notvote forconfirmationof a nomination
thatwas opposed by the senatorrepresentingthe state in which the office was
located.Togainconfirmationof his appointments,Hayesneededto discreditConkling.Ina letterto the President,WilliamHenrySmithadvisedHayesto attackthe
problemdirectly,arguingthat the only "wayout now lies throughassaultingthe
In Januaryof 1879, Hayes
abuses in the New YorkCustomhousein earnest."82
issueda reportto the Senate,urgingthem to accept his appointments.Usingevidence his executivecommissiongathered,Hayesemphasizedthatthe conductof
the New YorkCustomhousehad improvednoticeablysince his replacement
summerappointmentshadassumedoffice.Conklingrespondedby publiclyinsultwith many
ing Hayes,a strategythatultimatelycausedConklingto lose credibility
of his fellow senators.Withthe help of John Sherman,Secretaryof the Treasury,
Hayesassembleda coalitionof Republicansand Democratswho supportedhis
replacementnominees.ThesouthernDemocratsin the president'scoalitiondidnot
supportreformforaltruisticreasons.Rather,theysidedwithHayesto keepthe intraIn Februaryof
partyfeudbetween the reformersand the Stalwartsgoing strong.83
and
1879,the Senatedecidedthatthe Presidentcouldchoose hisown subordinates,
79. Hayes,ed.,Hayes:TheDiaryof a President,106.
B. Hayes,136.
80. Hoogenboom,ThePresidencyof Rutherford
of the Interior
81. Hayesmighthaverecalleda January25, 1877letterwrittento himby Secretary
Carl
who has publicopinionat hisbackneedfear
Schurz.WritingabouttheSenate,Schurzstated,"APresident
no oppositionin thatbody"CarlSchurzandFrederic
and Polited.,Speeches,Correspondences,
Bancroft,
icalPapersof CarlSchurz,vol. 3 (NewYork:G.P.Putnam'sSons,1913),371.
82. Rutherford
B.HayesandCharlesWilliams,ed.,DiaryandLettersof Rutherford
Birchard
Hayes,vol.
3 (OhioStateArchaeological
Society,1924),455.
B. Hayes,143.
83. Hoogenboom,ThePresidencyof Rutherford
Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 501
throughan execuapprovedHayes'scustomhouseappointments.84
Subsequently,
tiveorder,Hayesextendedthe reformsachievedin the New YorkCustomhouseto
otherportsacrossthe nation.85
When Hayesenteredoffice, he aimedto diminishthe ironcladunionof office
holders and party politics and end the kickbacks required of patronage
appointees.86In pursuit of these policy objectives, Hayes sought to impose
bureaucraticstructuresthatwould advancehis own politicalinterests.He used
bureaucraticcontrolto make the politicalsystem responsiveto his politicalprogramand partisanvision.When possible,Hayesissuedunilateralexecutiveorders
to reformcivil service and relied upon his cabinet members to implementhis
directivesin theirrespectivedepartments.Tocurbthe powerof his adversaryConcabinetsecretariesbuilta coalitionof
kling,Hayesand his independent-minded
Democratsand Republicansto supporthis nominees for the New YorkCustomhouse.As an outsiderwho stood apartfromthe powerfulfactionswithinhis party,
Hayeswas in a favorableposition to bringabout reformand renew the independentauthorityof the presidency.At the end of his term, Hayeshad achieved
all of his goals.
KennethDavisoncontendsthat Hayes'spresidencymarksa "lineof demarcation"thatcan be "drawnin the historyof the Americanpresidency."87
Accordingto
Davison,Hayeswas the firstpresidentof the "modern"era. Butinsteadof placing
at the Hayespresidency,or any other date in
the breakingpoint of "modernity"
time, it is perhapsmore instructiveto appreciatethe persistentinstitutionalincento enacttheirpoliticalagendasand
tiveof presidentsto politicizethe bureaucracy
promotetheirpolicypreferences.
IV. Concluding Thoughts: Politicization, Centralization,
and the Modern Presidency Construct
The politicizedpresidenciesof JohnTyler,JamesPolk,and Rutherford
B. Hayes
demonstratethatthe constitutional
ambiguityof executivepowerprovideda similar
incentivestructureto threenineteenth-century
presidents.
Althoughthe presidentsin
our case studiespursuedtheirpoliticalobjectivesin differentways, the threadthat
bindsthem togetheris theircommon impulseto push the envelopeof executive
of structural
to pursuetheirpolicypropowerand theirmanipulation
arrangements
thetendencyforpresidents
to seekcontrol,authorgram.Asthesecasesdemonstrate,
ity,andautonomyis notonlya modemphenomenon,as typicallycharacterized.88
84. VenilaLovinaShores,"TheHayes-Conkling
SmithCollegeStudiesin History4, no. 4
Controversy,"
(1919),264-65.
85. Hoogenboom,Outlawingthe Spoils,173.
86. Shores,"TheHayes-Conkling
276.
Controversy,"
B. Hayes,66.
87. Davison,ThePresidencyof Rutherford
88. Moe,"ThePoliticized
andTheory."
Moe,"Presidents,
Institutions,
Presidency,";
502 PRESIDENTIAL
POLITICIZATION
ANDCENTRALIZATION
Evenin the absence of the modernexecutiveestablishment,we observethat
presidentsacrosstime aremotivatedby the ambiguityof executivepowerto carve
out a sphereof independentauthorityand exercisecontrolover theiradministrations.Tyler,Polk,and Hayesare a mere samplingof pre-modernpresidentswhose
termswerecharacterized
andcentralization;
we anticipatethataddiby politicization
tionalexaminationsof presidential
leadershipin differenthistoricalerasandpolitical
contextswill yield even greaterexplanatorypower.Studiesof other lesser-noted
presidents,such as VanBuren,Buchanan,Grant,BenjaminHarrison,and Taft,for
Not all presidents,of course,have been
example,shouldbe highlyinformative.89
equallyaggressivein theirquestsforauthorityandautonomy.Some havestoodout
in Americanhistoryas bold,assertivepresidents,andothershavefadedintoobscuincentivesprovidedby the Constitution,
rity.Yetall havefacedthe same institutional
which set out the "geneticcode"of the presidency.90
The pointwe wish to underscore is thatpresidential
scholarshipnarrowlyfocusedon the moderneratendsto
ignorefundamental,
enduringaspectsof the president'sincentivestructure.
what
we
want to know about the presidencyshould guide how we
Clearly,
it.
of
Much
the
study
scholarshipon the modernpresidencydoes well to concentrateon the similarities
when the objectis to
amongmodernpresidents,particularly
betterunderstandthe president'sroleas leaderof a globalpowersince WorldWar
II, or as policymakerand agenda-setterin the same period.91However,theorydrivenanalysesof the presidencywould benefit,we suggest,fromsidesteppingthe
modernpresidencyconstruct.Forexample,Moe'stheoryof the presidencyskillfully
identifiesthe logicof institutional
developmentas consistingof the interplayamong
and
incentives,resources,
structures,but it ignoresthe most significantsource of
incentives-the
Constitution-and 130 years of emergentresources
presidential
era of presidential
and evolvingstructures.Becauseit neglectsthe "pre-modern"
Moe's
is
not
able
to
the
full
politics,
analysis
appreciate
significanceof the institutionalincentivesembeddedin the constitutional
presidency.As our briefstudiesof
the
for
and
Hayesconfirm, tendency presidentsto politicizeand cenTyler,Polk,
in the "pre-modern"
as
observable
era as it is in the "modern"era. The
tralizeis
modernexecutiveestablishmentdoes not createthe incentiveto politicizeandcentralize:thatincentiveis foundin the Constitution.
Why,then,shouldtheoriesof the
presidencybe circumscribedby a historicalbreakpoint which is consideredby
in the presidency?
some-but not others92-to be the beginningof "modernity"
a Progressive
89. See PeriE.Arnold,"Effecting
Roosevelt,Taft,andthe Pursuitof Strategic
Presidency:
StudiesinAmericanPoliticalDevelopment17 (Spring2003):61-81.
Resources,"
90. Tulis,TheRhetorical
Presidency,8.
91. Rose,ThePostmodernPresident;Light,ThePresident's
Agenda;Peterson,LegislatingTogether.
92. Tulis,in TheRhetoricalPresidency,claimsthatthe modernpresidencybeganwith the rhetorical
in "Changeand Continuity
in the ModernPresidency,"
shiftusheredin by WoodrowWilson;Greenstein,
Rooseveltwas the firstmodernpresident;Milkis,in ThePresidentand
advancestheargumentthatFranklin
Roosevelt'spresidency;
and Moe,in
the Parties,arguesthatthe modernpresidencybeganafterFranklin
Daniel Galvin and Colleen Shogan 503
Itis time to revisitthe utilityof the modernpresidencyconstruct.Whilewe can
stillbenefitfroma deeperappreciationof thechangesin the presidencywhich have
in the presidency
takenplace since FranklinRoosevelt,the notionof "modernity"
needs to be more clearlyarticulated:
what do we mean when we talkabout the
Arewe referringto the administrative
and bureaucratic
modernpresidency?
growth
in the executivebranchsince the 1930s?Ornew foreignpolicyresponsibilities?
Or
are we concernedwith fundamentalchangesin the way the presidencyrelatesto
other institutions,derivesand exercisesits power,and impactspoliticaldevelopments in the modern era? The significanceof "modernity"in the presidency
dependson whetherwe view the presidencyas an institutionwith certainproperand propensitiesthat impactpresidents'motives,behaviors,
ties, characteristics,
and purposes;or whetherwe see the presidencyas a historically
contingentpolitical institutionthat has transformeditselfperiodicallyinto differentanimals,with
each break-pointmarkingthe end of one era and the beginningof another,each
incarnationlookingless and less likeits previousself.Yetit is not methodologically
sound to accept either characterization
of the presidencywithout testing our
our
and
the temporalboundarieswe have
assumptions,defining terms, scrutinizing
chosen to erect.
We contendthatunderstanding
the motivesandpurposesof the presidencyand
the people who hold the office-indeed, understanding
leadershipin Americaattention
to
those
institutional
incentives,resources,and structureswhich
requires
across
time
as
which
well
as
those
are emergentor period-based.Examinpersist
institutional
factors
without
ing persistent
consideringemergentones is as muchof
a mistakeas it is to drawtemporalboundariesaroundthe analysiswithoutconsideringcontinuitiesacrossperiods.Tyler,Polk,and Hayesall facedthe same institutionalincentive,yet each operatedwithinverydifferentpoliticalcircumstances:the
partysystemfacedby Tylerwas clearlydifferentfromthatwithwhich Hayeshadto
contend;thewarwith Mexicocreateda differentcontextforpresidentialleadership
in Polk'sadministration
thandid the end of Reconstruction
for Hayes;none of the
three presidentsfollowedthe same path to the White House;each left different
legacies.Yetthe Constitutionprovidedeach presidentwith the same motive to
expandhis politicalauthorityand institutional
autonomy.Inotherwords,we need
to appreciatebothwhathaschangedandwhathasstayedthe same. Inbetweenthe
two picturesof change and continuity,we mightdiscoverwhat drivesthe presiWe havenot connectedall of the dots-our purpose
dencyandwithwhat effect.93
"ThePoliticizedPresidency,"
claimsthatthe moderninstitutionalized
presidencytrulybeganwith the formationof the Bureauof the Budgetin 1921.
93. Fora similaraccountof thisresearchagenda,see JosephM.BessetteandJeffreyTulis,ThePresiOrder(BatonRouge:LouisianaStateUniversityPress, 1981).Considerthe
dency in the Constitutional
fullersignificanceof the presidencythat can come into view when multiplesources of incentives,
andstrategiesareexaminedalongsideone another:see Tulis,TheRhetoricalPresiresources,structures,
dency;Skowronek,ThePoliticsPresidentsMake;JamesW. Ceaser,PresidentialSelection(Princeton:
504 PRESIDENTIAL
ANDCENTRALIZATION
POLITICIZATION
here is to take accountof a singlepervasiveinstitutional
incentiveand takea first
informedand theory-driven
research
step towardthe developmentof a historically
frameof analysis.
agendathattranscendsthe modern-traditional
PrincetonUniversity
informedaccountsof presidential
Press,1979).Usinghistorically
politics,the presidencycan be understoodas an agentof changein politicaldevelopmentsoverthe fullscope of American
history(see Pious,TheAmericanPresidency;Skowronek,ThePoliticsPresidentsMake);theofficecan be
withcertainpropertiesthatareidentifiable
viewedas a politicalinstitution
andcomparableacrosspolitical institutions
andregimetypes;andthebehaviorof the personin officecan be informedbyfactorssuch
of institutional
andpoliticalinterestsat a givenmomentin
as the particular
configurations
arrangements
time (see ScottC.James,Presidents,Parties,and theState(NewYork:Cambridge
Press,2000),
University
acrossthe politicallandscape(see RichardFranklin
the distribution
of politicalauthority
Bensel,ThePolitical Economyof AmericanIndustrialization,
1877-1900(New York:CambridgeUniversity
Press,2000)),
Constitutional
Conand stagesof developmentin constitutional
(see KeithE.Whittington,
interpretation
MA:Harvard
struction:DividedPowersand Constitutional
Press,1999);
Meaning(Cambridge,
University
MA:BelknapPressof HarvardUniversity
BruceAckerman,Wethe People(Cambridge,
Press,1991);and
Princeton
KennethMayer,WiththeStrokeof a Pen:ExecutiveOrdersandPresidentialPower(Princeton:
Press,2001)).
University