paper series
Missing the Point(s)
The declining fortunes of Canada’s
economic immigration program
Edwina O’Shea
Bosch Fellow, Transatlantic Academy
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Missing the Point(s)
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
Transatlantic Academy Paper Series
April 2009
Edwina O’Shea*
Bosch Fellow, Transatlantic Academy
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Origins of the Points-based Selection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Immigration in the 1980s and 1990s: Emerging Discontents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Preparing for a New Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Economic Immigration Post IRPA: Continuing Malaise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Ad Hoc Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Back to the Future: Bill C-50 and a Return to Labor Market Driven Criteria . . . . . . . . 22
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
* Edwina O’Shea is a senior policy analyst with the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, most recently
working on asylum and refugee issues. She has conducted comparative analyses of Canadian and U.S. asylum polices and
practices, as well as research into decision-making in the Canadian refugee resettlement program. Ms. O’Shea has also
worked in Canadian diplomatic missions abroad conducting refugee, immigrant, and non-immigrant selection in Thailand,
Nepal, Singapore, and Kenya. She holds a bachelor’s degree in political studies from Queen’s University and a master’s degree
in political science from the University of Toronto, Canada. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author
alone, and do not represent the views of Citizenship and Immmigration Canada.
1
Introduction
Finding the right model to manage an economic
immigration program is certainly a topical
challenge. In Europe, several countries are in
the process of moving from traditional familydominated immigration to systems based on
selection for economic potential. France, for
example, has set the goal of selecting half of its
immigrants on economic criteria.
Canada has a long tradition of managing an
economic immigration program, but despite 40
years of experience the Canadian system is today
in a state of flux. Change is nothing new within
the Canadian system: since its beginning in the
1960s, there has been a consistent tension between
pressures to respond to the demands of the labor
market and a sense of how immigration might meet
the longer-term needs of the country.
There can be no doubt that the current system
is facing severe pressures. More than 800,000
people have applications pending a decision, by
far the largest number. Of that number roughly
600,000 are economic migrants. As a result of this
backlog, processing times have lengthened to the
point that applications wait three to five years
for a decision. At the same time there is evidence
that recent immigrants earn considerably less
than Canadians—and that the gap is larger than
was the case for previous cohorts of immigrants.
The Canadian public is well aware that many
immigrants selected for their skills and education
are underemployed.
In the past two years a series of measures have
been implemented, some administrative and
others legal. Most dramatically, in 2008, legislative
amendments brought the promise of far-reaching
change. But what really can these measures achieve?
Do they really address the causes of the present
dilemmas? What can new immigrants expect as a
result of the recent changes? And does this mean
that the Canadian model for selecting economic
immigrants—the human capital model—has been
proven a failure?
Missing the Point(s):
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
3
Canada has a
long tradition
of managing
an economic
immigration
program, but
despite 40 years
of experience
the Canadian
system is today
in a state of flux.
2
Henceforth,
economic
immigrants would
be assessed
against a set of
selection factors
that measured
the potential of
the individual
to successfully
establish herself
in Canada.
Origins of the Points-based
Selection System
Contrary to popular belief, the Canadian points
system for selecting economic immigrants
predates the 1976 Immigration Act. In fact, it
dates back to the mid 1960s, when the Canadian
immigration system was at a crossroad. Despite
initial reforms in 1962, vestiges of national
preferences that favored migrants from Europe
and the Americas remained embedded in the
system. These preferences had brought the
immigration program into visible conflict with the
Canadian Bill of Rights, which came into force in
1960 prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
criteria such as race, national origin, or religion.
At the same time, the immigration program was
seen as disconnected from the economy, with
sponsored migrants dominating admissions,
regardless of their skills or experience. Sponsored
immigration had been uncontroversial in the
decade of economic growth following the end of
World War II, but became controversial in the
1960s as the demand for skilled labor increased
even as unemployment among lower skilled
workers grew. In 1966, the Liberal government
released a White Paper1 on immigration policy
that laid out proposals for reform.2
The White Paper recognized the role of
immigration in supporting both economic
and population growth. While it affirmed the
importance of family reunification as a component
of the immigration program, the White Paper
announced the government’s intention to better
align the immigration program with the needs
of the labor market and complete the work of
removing the last vestiges of national or racial
preferences from the program. The means of
achieving this goal would be universal selection
1
Department of Manpower and Immigration. White Paper on
Immigration. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966. 2
In Canada a “White Paper” is a statement of settled
government policy that is usually followed by legislative or other
initiatives.
4
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criteria based on objective factors that assessed the
skills and experience of individual migrants.
The proposals set out in the 1966 White Paper were
implemented in 1967 through two main initiatives.
First, with the creation of the Department of
Manpower and Immigration, responsibility for
both labor market and immigration policy was
combined within the same organization. This
administrative structure was seen as essential to
realizing the vision of an immigration program that
was responsive to the needs of the Canadian labor
market. Next, regulations were enacted establishing
what came to be known as the “points system”3 for
the assessment of “independent” immigrants (that
is, immigrants not sponsored by a Canadian family
member).
Henceforth, economic immigrants would be
assessed against a set of selection factors that
measured the potential of the individual to
successfully establish him or herself in Canada.
The factors addressed two broad sets of attributes:
first, what today would be called the applicant’s
“human capital”—for example, his or her education
and language ability. The second element of the
selection factors sought to align the immigration
process with the needs of the labor market.
The primary link between the selection factors and
the labor market was a factor coined “occupational
demand.” Tracking the demand for specific
occupations within the national labor market
was the responsibility of the manpower side of
the new department, which maintained a list of
occupations in demand as a tool for immigration
officers. The factor identified as “specific vocational
preparation” is a measure of the amount of training
and education required to work in a particular
occupation. It overlaps both with education, a
3
CIC. Forging Our Legacy: Canadian Citizenship and
Immigration. http://www.cic.gc.ca/ENGLISH/resources/
publications/legacy/chap-6.asp#chap6-7
Table 1. Selection Factors in the 1967 Immigration Regulations
Factor
Maximum Units
Age
10
Education
20
Language Ability
10
Occupational
Demand
15
Specific Vocational
Preparation (SVP)
10
Personal Suitability
15
Notes
While the 1967
regulations
laid the basis
for a selection
system that
would be familiar
to Canadian
immigration
practitioners in
2009, it remained
embedded in
legislation dating
back to 1952.
Bonus Factors
Arranged
Employment/
Designated
Employment
Assisted Relative
Pass Mark
10
35 to 50
Ten units awarded for an approved job offer; or if
occupation listed on the Designated Occupation List
Depending on the nature of the relationship
50
Source: Green and Green, 19994
human capital factor, and with occupation, a
labor-market factor, but because of its alignment
with the applicant’s ability to work in the Canadian
labor market can be considered as primarily a
labor market factor. Labor market factors made up
a potential maximum of 35 points, with 50 points
required to pass. These factors were, therefore, not
sufficient in themselves to determine the success of
an application.
In addition to education (20 points) and language
ability (10 points), the applicant’s age was also
assessed, with up to 10 points awarded. A total of
40 points were potentially at stake based on the
4
Green, Alan G. and Green, David A., “The Economic Goals of
Canada’s Immigration Policy: Past and Present” Canadian Public
Policy, Vol. XXV, No. 4 1999.
assessment of human capital factors. In addition,
however, an immigration officer’s subjective
assessment of the applicant’s “personal suitability”
(not anywhere defined) was worth up to 15 points.
Finally, reflecting the long-standing connection
between family links and immigration criteria,
the presence of family members in Canada could
win the applicant between 35 and 50 bonus points,
clearly enough to make the difference between
success and failure.
While the 1967 regulations laid the basis for a
selection system that would be familiar to Canadian
immigration practitioners in 2009, it remained
embedded in legislation dating back to 1952. In
the early 1970s, a new Liberal government, headed
by Pierre Trudeau, undertook the task of more
Missing the Point(s):
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
5
comprehensive immigration reform, followed by
a process of public consultation centered around a
Green Paper5 published in 1975. The Green Paper
was the basis for national consultations, led by a
joint committee of the House of Commons and
Senate; hearings were held across Canada in 21
cities, and the committee received more than 1,400
written briefs. On the basis of the committee’s
report,6 legislation was enacted in 1976. Two years
later, new regulations were enacted that brought the
act into force.7 As part of the 1978 regulations, a
revised set of selection factors were established.
As Table 2 shows, only modest changes were
made to the selection factors first established in
1967. Based on recommendations made by the
joint parliamentary committee, an effort was
made to strengthen the labor-market relevance
of the selection criteria. This was reflected in the
introduction of a new factor that awarded points
based on the number of years of experience in
a particular occupation. The number of points
5
In Canada a “Green Paper” is a tool used to support public
debate on a particular issue; it lays out possible options, without
committing the government to action.
6
Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of
Commons on Immigration Policy, Report to Parliament. Ottawa:
Queen’s Printer, 1975.
7
CIC. Forging Our Legacy: Canadian Citizenship and
Immigration. http://www.cic.gc.ca/ENGLISH/resources/
publications/legacy/chap-6.asp#chap6-7
6
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available for education was reduced, from 20 to 12
(with the maximum points awarded to high school
graduates). The weight of the immigration officer’s
subjective assessment of personal suitability was
reduced, but the value of family links to Canada
remained important. Overall, up to 48 points were
potentially at stake based on labor market factors,
while human capital elements amounted to only 32
points; these changes made by the new regulations
represented a clear shift toward greater alignment
with labor market needs.
In addition to the revised selection factors, two
other innovations in the 1976 Immigration Act are
worth noting. Annual planning of immigration
levels was now required, with the government
obliged to report to the House of Commons on its
plans for the following year. The act also recognized
that the Constitution makes immigration a shared
jurisdiction between the federal government
and provinces, and required regular consultation
between the two levels of government in the annual
planning exercise. As part of the evolving dynamic
of relations between Quebec and the Federal
government that marked the 1970s, this shared
jurisdiction was given real force in 1978 through an
agreement that devolved authority for the selection
of economic immigrants to the government of
Quebec.
Table 2. Selection Factors in the 1978 Immigration Regulations
Factor
Maximum Units
Age
10
Education
12
Language Ability
10
Occupational
Demand
15
Specific Vocational
Preparation (SVP)
15
Experience
8
Personal Suitability
10
Notes
Bonus Factors
Arranged
Employment/
Designated
Employment
Assisted Relative
Pass Mark
10
35 to 50
Ten units awarded for an approved job offer; or if
occupation listed on the Designated Occupation List
Depending on the nature of the relationship
50
Source: Green and Green, 1999
Missing the Point(s):
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
7
3
The economic
downturn that hit
Canada in the
early 1980s with
accompanying high
unemployment led
to measures to
reduce immigration.
Immigration in the 1980s and 1990s:
Emerging Discontents
The economic downturn that hit Canada
in the early 1980s with accompanying high
unemployment led to measures to reduce
immigration, and in particular measures were taken
to limit independent immigrants. The result can be
seen in Table 3. Thanks to measures that effectively
restricted access to economic immigrants who had
an approved job offer, the economic component
of total immigration scarcely exceeded 30 percent
until 1986, when the arranged employment penalty
was lifted.
With the lifting of restrictions on independent
immigration that accompanied economic recovery
in the mid 1980s came renewed attention to the
effectiveness of the selection criteria, with concerns
evident that immigrants were being selected who
might not have the personal attributes necessary to
successfully integrate in Canada. As Table 4 shows,
the selection criteria was amended to rebalance the
human capital/labor market factors, with points
being transferred from occupational demand to the
language factor. Several other changes were made
to enhance the government’s ability to manage the
selection system.
Table 3. Economic Immigrants as Component of Total Immigration, 1983 to 1992
Year
Economic
Immigrants
Percentage
1983
24,187
89,192
27.1
1984
26,079
88,276
29.5
1985
26,112
84,345
31.0
1986
35,839
99,353
36.1
1987
74,103
152,069
48.7
1988
80,220
161,574
49.6
1989
90,145
191,550
47.1
1990
97,930
216,445
45.2
1991
86,507
232,803
37.2
1992
95,803
254,818
37.6
Source: Green and Green, 1999
8
Total Immigrants
Transatlantic Academy
Table 4. Selection Factors, as Revised in 1986
Factor
Maximum Units
Notes
Age
10
Education
12
Language Ability
15
Raised from ten
Occupational
Demand
10
Reduced from 15
Specific Vocational
Preparation (SVP)
15
Experience
8
Personal Suitability
10
Demographic Factor
10
With the lifting
of restrictions
on independent
immigration that
accompanied
economic recovery
in the mid 1980s
came renewed
attention to the
effectiveness
of the selection
criteria.
New tool designed to managed levels; set at five points
initially
Bonus Factors
Arranged
Employment/
Designated
Employment
10
Assisted Relative
10
Substantially reduced
Pass Mark
70
Raised from 50
Source: Green and Green, 1999
Missing the Point(s):
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
9
The early 1990s
saw increased
interest in
adjusting the
balance between
economic and
noneconomic
immigrants.
The years following 1986 saw continued debate
over both immigration levels, in particular the
balance between economic and other immigrants,
and the effectiveness of the selection factors.
Again, the balance between human capital and
labor market relevance was at play, with particular
attention given to the need for better educated
workers in the rapidly evolving economy. In 1993,
as part of a package of amendments to the act and
regulations, the selection factors were amended,
again to reinforce the human capital component
in the form of the education factor. Taken together
with the 1986 measures, the effect was by 1993
to move a considerable distance away from the
original vision of the 1978 regulations, with
increasing emphasis placed on core human capital
factors—language and education—and less weight
given to the role of the labor market.
In addition to the amendments to the selection
criteria, the early 1990s saw increased interest
in adjusting the balance between economic and
noneconomic immigrants. Provinces, employers,
and academics were increasingly making the
argument that the modern Canadian economy
needed not only better educated immigrants, it
needed more of them. Despite the increase in total
immigration post-1986, the share of economic
Table 5. Selection Factors, as Amended in 1993
Factor
Maximum Units
Age
10
Education
16
Language Ability
15
Occupational
Demand
10
Specific Vocational
Preparation (SVP)
18
Experience
8
Personal Suitability
10
Demographic Factor
10
Notes
Raised from 12; university or other postsecondary
credential required to exceed ten units
Raised from 15
Bonus Factors
Arranged
Employment/
Designated
Employment
10
Assisted Relative
5
Reduced from ten
Pass Mark
70
Raised from 50
Source: Green and Green, 1999
10
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immigrants had not reached 50 percent by 1992.
The result was a policy decision in 1996 to strive
for what came to be known as the “60/40 split” in
which immigration levels planning would reflect the
goal of 60 percent of immigrant admissions coming
from the economic categories, with the remaining
40 percent drawn from family reunification and
refugee categories. While not a legal requirement,
this policy goal was largely achieved in subsequent
years, as is shown in Table 6.
The result was a
policy decision
in 1996 to strive
for what came to
be known as the
“60/40 split” in
which immigration
levels planning
would reflect the
goal of 60 percent
of immigrant
admissions
coming from
the economic
categories, with
the remaining 40
percent drawn
from family
reunification
and refugee
categories.
Table 6. Economic Immigrants as Component of Total Immigration, 1993 to 2003
Year
Economic
Immigrants
Total Immigrants
Proportion
1993
105,662
256,703
41.2
1994
102,312
224,397
45.6
1995
106,632
212,872
50.1
1996
125,370
226,073
55.5
1997
128,351
216,038
59.4
1998
97,911
174,197
56.2
1999
109,251
189,955
57.5
2000
136,292
227,458
59.9
2001
155,718
250,638
62.1
2002
137,864
229,049
60.2
2003
121,045
221,349
54.7
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Facts and Figures 2007)8
8
CIC 2007. “Facts and Figures 2007 Immigration Overview:
Permanent and Temporary Residents.” Citizenship and
Immigration Canada. Retrieved at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/
resources/statistics /facts2007/index.asp
Missing the Point(s):
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
11
4
During the 1990s
research by
both academics
and officials
began to point
to evidence that
recent economic
immigrants were
experiencing
more difficulty
integrating into
the Canadian
economy than had
been the case
in the 1970s.
Preparing for a New Century
By the mid 1990s, and despite modest legislative
and policy reforms earlier in the decade, there was a
sense within the government that more fundamental
reform was necessary. The Immigration Act
was now 20 years old and had gone through
numerous ad hoc revisions. In November 1996,
an independent Legislative Advisory Group
(LRAG) made up of three independent experts
was appointed to undertake a comprehensive study
of the act and regulations. In December 1997, it
delivered its report, entitled “Not Just Numbers: A
Canadian Framework for Future Immigration.” The
report called for an ambitious program of legislative
reform: in place of amendments to specific sections
of the existing law, an entirely new legal framework
was proposed.
During the 1990s, research by both academics
and officials began to point to evidence that
recent economic immigrants were experiencing
more difficulty integrating into the Canadian
economy than had been the case in the 1970s.
Academic studies in the previous two decades
had recognized that new immigrants experienced
lower earnings than Canadian-born workers, but
that the gap narrowed and eventually disappeared.
Beginning in the 1990s, research started to point
to a widening gap that narrowed more slowly than
in the past.9 Although immigrants in the1980s
and early 1990s were better educated and more
highly qualified than previous cohorts, their
economic situation had actually deteriorated
in comparison to the earlier groups.
Despite these findings, which raised concerns
about the value accorded by Canadian employers
to education and training outside of Canada, the
LRAG report recommended a new system for
selecting economic immigrants that made no
9
Picot, Garnett & Sweetman, Arthur, 2005. “The Deteriorating
Economic Welfare of Immigrants and Possible Causes: Update
2005.” Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series
2005262e, Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch.
12
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reference at all to labor market demand. Instead,
the focus was entirely on what the report referred
to as “core competencies,” defined as education,
language ability, and experience in any skilled
occupation. Other recommendations included a
proposal that provinces take on greater responsibility
for the selection of immigrants whose admission
would meet specific social or economic needs, as
determined by each province. Often overlooked
at the time, this concept would take on increasing
importance in later years. The government
responded to the LRAG report following a process
of public consultations with the publication in 1998
of a White Paper, entitled “Building on a Strong
Foundation for the 21st Century.”10 In the White
Paper, the government laid out its vision for a
reformed economic immigration selection system.
The government noted the evidence that immigrants
were experiencing deteriorating earnings, and
pointed to a selection system, with occupation
demand at its core, that had first been conceived in
the 1960s. In fact, the government argued, the effort
to micro-manage immigration based on demand
for specific occupations in the national labor market
was ineffective and created unrealistic expectations
among new immigrants.
Instead, and building on the LRAG recommendations, the White Paper proposed a selection
system based on the concept of “human capital.”
Immigrants would be assessed against selection
factors that addressed the skills and competencies needed for success in the rapidly changing,
knowledge-based economy. Central to the “human
capital model” were language ability, education, and
experience in any skilled occupation. No assessment of labor market demand would be included,
although immigrants with an approved job offer
would receive bonus points. Instead of a high
10
CIC. “Building a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century:
New Directions for Immigration and Refugee Policy and
Legislation,” 1998.
subjective assessment of an immigrant’s personal
suitability, immigration officers would award points
based on objective indicators of potential to adapt,
such as previous work or study in Canada by either
the applicant or his or her spouse.
This vision was realized in 2002 with the
implementation of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act (IRPA). Table 7 lays out the human
capital selection factors that included a pass mark
set at 67 points.
IRPA assigns relatively little weight to an applicant’s
ability to work in a specific occupation. While
a substantial number of points are awarded for
experience in a skilled occupation (defined as
an occupation at the National Occupational
Classification level 0, A, or B), it matters little which
occupation. There is no longer any concept of jobs
in demand or designated occupations. In place of the
focus on an applicant’s training and experience in a
specific job, under IRPA visa, officers focus more on
the applicant’s education and language ability. The
education factor, which is worth up to 25 points, is
heavily weighted in favor of university qualifications:
only five points are awarded to high school graduates
and no points for less than high school. Language is
also heavily weighted and is worth up to 24 points.
Under IRPA applicants may be required to submit
proof of language ability, normally based on an
assessment of a third-party language test such as
the British Council ILETS. Adaptability, which
replaces the former personal suitability factor, is
based on a limited number of specified attributes,
such as the presence of relatives in Canada or
previous work or study in Canada, is worth up to
ten points. Applicants between the ages of 21 and 49
receive a full ten points against the age factor, which
represents a slightly wider range than was the case
previously when applicants older than 44 began to
lose points.
As can be seen in Table 7, the IRPA selection
factors represent an almost complete realization of
a “human capital model” for managing economic
immigration. The only nod in the direction of
responding to labor market requirements is in the
retention of ten bonus points for applicants with an
approved job offer. The critical factors are clearly
Table 7. Selection Factors in the 2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations
Factor
Maximum Units
Age
10
Education
25
Language Ability
24
Adaptability
10
Notes
Applicants between 21 and 49 receive full points
Based on objective criteria; includes five units for
presence of relative in Canada
Bonus Factors
Arranged
Employment
10
Pass Mark
67
Source: Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, 2002
Missing the Point(s):
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
13
The IRPA
selection factors
represent an
almost complete
realization
of a “human
capital model”
for managing
economic
immigration.
education and language ability, worth a possible 49
points between them. The emphasis on these two
factors, and in particular the weight assigned to
university education, was somewhat controversial
at the time, as trade unions and employers warned
that skilled trades persons would be disadvantaged
in favor of white-collar workers. Although
consistent with the direction of amendments in
1986 and 1993, this emphasis was also at odds with
emerging research on the economic integration of
immigrants in Canada.
In addition to changes to the selection criteria for
skilled workers (formerly known as independent
immigrants), IRPA affirmed the role of provincial
14
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governments. In the years following the imple­
mentation of IRPA, all ten provinces began to
expand the size and scope of what were known
as provincial nominee programs. Established
through individual agreements between the federal
government and each province, the provincial
nominee program provides flexibility to respond to
specific local needs that may not be well addressed
by the IRPA selection criteria. Initially, the number
of applications that each province could nominate
in a given year was limited, but the numerical caps
contained in the federal-provincial agreements
were gradually eliminated, and provincial
nominee numbers grew each year following IRPA
implementation.
5
Economic Immigration Post IRPA:
Continuing Malaise
In the years following the introduction of IRPA,
public and stakeholder discontent with the state of
the immigration program, and in particular with
the economic immigration program, focused on
two main concerns: long and growing processing
times, linked to a massive inventory of unprocessed
applications, and the perception that skilled
immigrants were wasting their potential after
arriving in Canada (the apocryphal immigrant taxi
driver with a Ph.D.). Both of these concerns were
real and pressing. For example, in 2007, over half of
the applications finalized had been in the inventory
for more than three years. A substantial number
(20 percent) had been waiting for a decision for
more than 68 months—almost five years!11 These
processing times certainly make Canada a less
attractive destination for potential immigrants; the
long lag time between application and arrival also
means that immigrants selected under IRPA only
started to arrive in Canada several years after IRPA
came into force.
proportions. By that year12 some 800,000 people
had applications pending a decision; more than
500,000 of the applications were in the traditional
skilled worker category. The cause was quite simply
a situation in which demand out-paced both
the government’s desired level of intake and the
system’s operational capacity. IRPA had maintained
the statutory requirement for annual levels
planning through the requirement that the minster
of immigration present an immigration plan to
parliament each year. The total number of planned
admissions remained remarkably consistent in
the post-IRPA period, in a range between 220 and
260,000 immigrants in all categories.13 As more
applications were received than were finalized, the
backlog grew and processing times lengthened. Or,
more accurately, more skilled worker applications
were received than could be finalized, the backlog
of skilled worker applications grew, and processing
times for skilled workers grew longer, as is shown
in Table 8.
At the same time, academic research continued to
show that immigrants were earning less compared
to native born Canadians, and that their education
and professional credentials did not bring them the
same reward that a Canadian would expect. Less
well known, but of great concern to practitioners
and immigration experts in Canada, were several
trends, outlined below, that contributed to both the
backlog and declining immigrant outcomes.
What is common to the categories that boast
relatively quick processing is that applications are
processed as they are received, and because there
is no limit on output, applications do not have
to wait in a backlog for their turn. The federalskilled worker category does have a limit, albeit
an administrative one that is simply a function
of the relationship between overall immigration
levels and the priority economic categories. As will
be shown, the priority economic categories have
grown, and in turn the number of federal-skilled
worker admissions has shrunk, meaning that
applications wait longer for a decision.
Processing times and the “backlog”
While inventories, or backlogs, were nothing new
in the world of Canadian immigration, by 2006
the scale of the problem was reaching mammoth
11
Source: application processing times as posted on CICs public
web-site. Note that these figures are global; applications in
some offices were finalized more quickly while others took even
longer to finalize.
12
See remarks by the Honorable Monte Solberg, minister of
citizenship and immigration, before the House of Commons
Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, May 10,
2006.
13
See the Annual Report to Parliament, 2003 to 2008. Available
at: http://www.cic.gc.ca/EnGLIsh/resources/publications/index.
asp
Missing the Point(s):
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
15
By 2006 some
800,000 people
had applications
pending a
decision; more
than 500,000 of
the applications
were in the
traditional skilled
worker category.
Table 8. Processing Times in Selected
Immigrant Categories, 2007
Between 1980
and 2000, the
earnings of
immigrant men
fell by 13 percent,
while the earnings
of Canadianborn men rose
by 10 percent.
Immigrant
Category
Processing time (months)
for 50 percent/80 percent
of cases
All Applications
12/37
Federal-Skilled
Workers
36/68
Quebec-Skilled
Workers
8/15
Provincial
Nominees
7/11
Family Class
(spouses and
partners)
5/8
Family Class
(parents and
grandparents)
11/21
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada14
But the limited room to finalize skilled worker
applications is only part of the explanation for the
backlog of federal-skilled worker applications. Prior
to IRPA, applicants who did not have experience in
an occupation listed on the General Occupations
List—an occupation in demand in the Canadian
labor market—were barred from applying. PostIRPA, any applicant with at least one year of
experience in any skilled occupation may submit
an application. Without the control previously
afforded by the occupational demand factor, intake
of skilled worker applications ballooned. The
combination of rising intake and falling output
See http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/information/times/
international/index.asp
14
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(finalizations) created a perfect storm that led to
the situation in which more than half a million
applicants must wait years for a decision, a major
blow to Canada’s ability to compete with other
major immigrant-receiving countries.
Deteriorating immigrant outcomes
By the middle of the present decade, academic
studies were confirming the trend of declining
immigrant earnings, in comparison with both
native-born Canadians and earlier immigrant
cohorts. These findings, which drew on a
longitudinal immigrant database maintained by
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, as well as
census and tax-filing data, showed that earnings
remained well below Canadian norms despite the
increasing weight in the late 1990s of immigrants
selected for their economic characteristics—and
despite reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s
that were intended to make the selection criteria
for economic immigrants more in tune with the
modern economy. This finding is of particular
concern because the late 1990s were also years of
strong economic growth, with strong employment
growth. Between 1980 and 2000, the earnings
of immigrant men fell by 13 percent, while the
earnings of Canadian-born men rose by 10 percent.
Earnings for immigrant women did rise by 6
percent during the same period, but this was still
well behind earnings growth for Canadian-born
women.15 Immigrants in the 1990s were also less
able to close the earnings gap over time than had
been the case for earlier immigrant cohorts. By
the early years of the present decade, immigrants
who arrived in the 1970s were earning more than
Canadian-born workers while immigrants who
arrived in the 1980s were earning 85 percent of
Canadian salaries. Immigrants who arrived in the
15
Picot, Garnett & Sweetman, Arthur, 2005. “The Deteriorating
Economic Welfare of Immigrants and Possible Causes: Update
2005.” Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series
2005262e, Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch.
1990s were earning roughly 70 percent of Canadian
salaries, though this figure in part reflects the
shorter period of time spent in the workforce.16
Along with findings of declining earnings, even
over time, came evidence that immigrants with
university education and professional qualifications
were unable to benefit from those qualifications in
the job market. While immigrant degree holders,
for example, did report higher earnings than
less qualified immigrants, they remained well
behind their Canadian counterparts. Immigrants
from “nontraditional” source countries in Asia,
Africa, and South America, were worse off than
immigrants from Western Europe. A more
Ibid.
16
important tendency can be observed with respect
to foreign work experience, where experience in
“nontraditional” countries provides fewer returns
than does experience in the United States or
Europe. Taken together these findings suggest that
the decline in the economic performance of recent
immigrants can be explained in large part as the
result of the changing composition of immigrant
intake. As immigration from “nontraditional”
source countries increased, fewer immigrants
arrived in Canada speaking English or French at
the same level as native-born Canadians, and their
experience and credentials are less valued by the
labor market.17
17
Aydemir, Abdurrahman & Skuterud, Mikal, 2004. “Explaining
the Deteriorating Entry Earnings of Canada’s Immigrant
Cohorts: 1966-2000.” Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper
Series 2004225e, Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch.
Missing the Point(s):
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
17
These findings
suggest that
the decline in
the economic
performance of
recent immigrants
can be explained
in large part
as the result of
the changing
composition of
immigrant intake.
6
Ad Hoc Responses
Foreign credential recognition
As the declining economic fortunes of recent
immigrants became better known both within
governments and in the broader public, the issue
of foreign credential recognition became a matter
of considerable controversy. Although academic
research, as described above, suggested that the
most important factor affecting immigrant earnings
was the lack of recognition by Canadian employers
of overseas experience in “nontraditional” source
countries, this was not the aspect of the problem
that resonated with the public. Instead, driven
largely by stories of immigrant professionals unable
to work in their field due to obscure or unfair
licensing procedures by Canadian authorities, the
federal government sought to find ways to help
immigrants gain recognition for their education
and qualifications. Very quickly this effort ran into
legal complications: provinces have constitutional
jurisdiction over the many independent licensing
bodies, and given the fractitious state of relations
between the two levels of government, federal
prescriptions were unwelcome. After considerable
intergovernmental discussions, the federal
government established in early 2007 a new Foreign
Credential Referral Office (FCRO) with a mandate
to assist immigrants in navigating the complexities
of the licensing process. No substantive legal or
regulatory changes in the credential assessment
process resulted from this initiative, but at least
immigrants would now have easily accessible
resources available to help them make sense of
the various requirements to be licensed to work in
Canada.
Growing numbers of provincial nominees
As was noted earlier, following the recommendation
of the LRAG report, the federal government
began in the late 1990s to negotiate agreements
with provinces, delegating authority to provincial
authorities to nominate economic immigrants.
The federal government retained responsibility for
admission, including ensuring that applicants met
health, security, and public safety criteria, but the
economic assessment was made by the nominating
province. These applicants were not assessed against
the federal selection factors. While the number of
provincial nominees admitted each year was initially
very small, by 2005, the year in which backlogs and
processing times for skilled workers began to receive
real attention, the number of provincial nominees
was becoming more significant.
As is shown in Table 9, the annual admission of
provincial nominees grew quickly from less than
500 in 1999, the first year of the program, to more
than 17,000 in 2007.
While the program had originally been conceived
as a way to provide flexibility to respond to
specific local needs that were not well addressed
by IRPA’s “human capital model,” it quickly
became attractive to applicants and their legal
representatives as an alternative to the long
processing times affecting the skilled worker
Table 9. Provincial Nominee Admissions, 1999 to 2007
Year
1999
Admissions
(including
477
dependents)
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
1,252
1,274
2,127
4,418
6,288
8,047
13,336
17,095
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Facts and Figures 2007)
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category. This is because, as described above,
provincial nominee applications are processed as
a priority category, with no numerical limit. With
admissions nearing 20,000 in 2007, this priority
processing was beginning to have an impact on
the number of skilled worker applications that
could be finalized.
Expansion of the Temporary Foreign
Worker program
Parallel to the permanent immigration stream,
Canada has for many years allowed foreign
nationals to work on a temporary basis, filling
short-term or specialized needs in the labor
market. With the exception of agricultural
laborers who come to Canada under the auspices
of bilateral agreements with Mexico and several
Commonwealth Caribbean countries, most of
these temporary foreign workers filled jobs that
were highly skilled. Generally employers wishing
to hire a temporary foreign worker are required to
show they have been unable to locate a qualified
Canadian. There are exceptions, for example,
under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), professionals and certain other skilled
workers may work temporarily in Canada (as may
Canadians in the United States).
The number of temporary foreign workers
admitted to Canada, as well as the total population
of foreign nationals working in Canada with
temporary status, began to grow dramatically
in 2005 (see Table 10). The trend continued on
through 2007, and while the economic downturn
in late 2008 may reduce demand for foreign labor,
there will likely be some lag time before numbers
fall significantly.
Two factors drove the recent increase in temporary
foreign worker arrivals. The first, a new openness
to lower-skilled workers to meet demand in certain
regions of the country was largely unconnected to
the permanent immigration program. A second
factor, though, was directly linked to backlogs and
processing times for skilled workers. Frustrated
with delays in the permanent immigration system,
employers began to seek to bring prospective
immigrants into the country using temporary
work permits (usually issued in a matter of weeks
rather than the year needed for a skilled worker
application to be processed) and at the same time
began to lobby for a new approach to selecting
economic immigrants that would emulate the
two step process in the United States and other
developed countries. While workers in Canada
with temporary status had always had the option
of submitting an immigration application at a
Canadian consulate in the United States (a process
known as the “Buffalo Shuffle”), in early 2007,
the government announced a new immigration
category that would provide a streamlined path
to permanent residence for workers who had
spent at least two years in Canada, as well as
foreign students who had completed their studies
in Canada. This trend toward a two-step process
helped drive temporary foreign worker volumes
to record levels, and forced the government to
reallocate resources from permanent immigrant
Table 10. Temporary Foreign Workers in Canada, 1997 to 2007
Year
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Admitted
107,221
116,651
119,775
111,016
103,426
112,720
122,848
139,279
165,198
Total
165,755
178,587
187,561
182,694
180,884
199,867
225,481
257,028
302,307
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Facts and Figures 2007)
Missing the Point(s):
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
19
This trend toward
a two-step
process helped
drive temporary
foreign worker
volumes to record
levels, and forced
the government
to reallocate
resources from
permanent
immigrant
processing.
processing to the handling of temporary visa and
work permit files, reducing the operational capacity
to finalize skilled workers as a consequence.
Canada Experience Class
Each of these
measures sought
to respond to one
aspect or another
of the discontents
plaguing the postIRPA economic
immigration
program… For the
most part, though,
the solutions
addressed only
the symptoms,
not the causes,
of the problems.
In early 2007 the Canadian government announced
plans to amend the IRPA regulations creating a
new economic immigration category—the Canada
Experience Class (CEC). As described above, the
new CEC was a response to growing frustrations
with lengthy processing times for other economic
immigration applications, a problem explicitly
acknowledged in the Regulatory Impact Statement
that accompanied the publication of the proposed
regulations. Interestingly the regulatory package
also pointed to other concerns with the existing
skilled worker category, noting in particular that:
“the Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP)
is facing challenges that are hampering
our labor market responsiveness and our
ability to compete internationally for skilled
workers...the FSWP’s emphasis on formal
education limits its responsiveness to labor
market demand for skilled tradespersons….
as a result, employers are increasingly turning
to the Temporary Foreign Worker Program to
meet their human resource needs…”18
Less than six years after the implementation of a
comprehensive new act and regulations, which had
entirely endorsed the vision of a human capitalbased selection system, the Canadian government
announced that the system was broken. Moreover,
the principal failings identified in the regulatory
package, a lack of responsiveness to the labor
market and an overemphasis on formal education
were, ironically enough, central to the “human
capital model” concept itself.
Canada Gazette, Vol. 142, No. 32 – August 9, 2008.
18
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Transatlantic Academy
The requirements of the new CEC represented
a dramatic departure from the IRPA selection
criteria. Divided into two streams, one for persons
who had been working in Canada as temporary
foreign workers for at least two years, the other
for persons who had been foreign students in
Canada, the CEC moved away from the points
system. In introducing the CEC, the government
made clear that applications processed under
the new category would be given priority in
processing that would mean processing times
equivalent to Provincial Nominee or Quebec
selected cases. This would mean applications
would typically be finalized within 12 months or
less, as compared to the 36 to 68 months required
to finalize a skilled worker. Equally important, the
CEC would be implemented “within levels,” that
is, for every CEC immigrant issued a visa, there
would be one fewer spot for another applicant—in
practice one fewer skilled worker. Both these
decisions only added to the pressure on the skilled
worker category.
Impact of the ad hoc responses
Each of these measures sought to respond to one
aspect or another of the discontents plaguing the
post-IRPA economic immigration program. For
the most part, though, the solutions addressed only
the symptoms, not the causes, of the problems. In
some cases, the new measures actually exacerbated
the difficulties facing the established skilled
worker program. For example, the combination
of increasing Provincial Nominee volumes and
the introduction, within levels, of the CEC as a
new priority category meant that there would be
progressively less space in the levels plan and fewer
resources available to process skilled workers. In
the absence of new funding, increased numbers
of temporary foreign workers, while responding
to employer demands for timely processing, also
diverted resources away from the permanent
immigration program, again reducing the
operational capacity to deal with skilled workers
and other immigrants.
The creation of the FCRO was an attempt to
respond to concerns about barriers that were
causing immigrants to fall behind economically.
A worthy initiative, it is by design limited to a
modest role in helping immigrants understand
the intricacies of the credential recognition
process. The federal government, hampered by the
constitutional division of powers, was unable to
come to grips with the more fundamental problems
of a balkanized and often frankly protectionist
approach to credential recognition by Canadian
authorities. An even greater weakness is the
fact that there is clear evidence to suggest that
credential recognition is not the most important
factor contributing to declining economic
outcomes for recent immigrants. No doubt because
of the political difficulties that would arise from any
discussion of the reasons why Canadian employers
fail to recognize experience in many of the major
source countries for Canadian immigration,
that problem has so far gone unrecognized and
unaddressed.
In this context, it is important to note that
because of the large inventory of applications
received before IRPA came into force and slow
processing times, none of the evidence about
immigrant performance available has any bearing
on the effectiveness of the IRPA model. Even as
stakeholders raised doubts about the value of the
“human capital model,” the data that prompted
their concerns is limited to immigrants who were
selected under the pre-IRPA criteria.
Missing the Point(s):
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
21
7
The most
obvious impact
of the ministerial
instructions
is to return
the Canadian
economic
immigration
program to
its roots.
Back to the Future: Bill C-50 and a
Return to Labor Market Driven Criteria
Although plans for the CEC had been announced
in the 2007 Federal Budget, proposed implementing
regulations had not even been made public when
the government announced a second and much
more ambitious reform effort. In February 2008,
again as part of the federal budget, plans were
announced to amend the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act. The government’s stated goal was
to make the immigration program more responsive
to labor market needs. The legislative amendments
that were subsequently introduced in parliament
as Bill C-50 had two main components: first, IRPA
was amended to eliminate the legal requirement to
make a full and final decision on all applications;
and second, the minister of immigration was given
new authority to make instructions relating to the
processing of applications, including the possibility
that certain applications would simply not be
processed.
Following passage of Bill C-50, and an election that
returned the Conservative government to power,
ministerial instructions were made under the new
authorities. The instructions provided that all
skilled worker applications received after February
27, 2008 (the date of the budget announcement)
would have to meet certain criteria in order to
be eligible for consideration. Those applications
that did not meet the new eligibility criteria
would be returned, along with the processing
fee. Other immigrant categories, including
Provincial Nominees, business immigrants, family
reunification applicants, and refugee applicants,
were unaffected by the instructions.
For skilled workers, the ministerial instructions
restricted eligibility for processing to applicants
who had at least one year of experience in an
occupation that was considered to be in demand
in the Canadian labor market, an initial list
of 38 occupations that had been identified in
consultation with provincial authorities and
employers was included in the instructions. The
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listed occupations range from highly-skilled
professionals (engineers, geologists, doctors, and
nurses) to managers of various sorts (construction
managers and financial managers) and even
apparently lower skilled trades (plumbers,
electricians, and cooks).19 Applicants who had an
approved job offer, or who were actually residing in
Canada and had been either working or studying
for at least one year, regardless of their occupational
experience, were also made eligible to have their
immigration applications assessed.
The most obvious impact of the ministerial
instructions is to return the Canadian economic
immigration program to its roots. The creation
of a list of occupations “in demand” and to make
access to a full assessment contingent on previous
experience in a listed occupation was a central
feature of the 1967 immigration regulations, and
remained an important part of the selection criteria
until 2002. One difference between the present
system, as modified by C-50, and the earlier
selection systems is that occupational demand is
not part of the points system: once applications pass
through the “gate” established by the ministerial
instructions they continue to be assessed against
the IRPA human capital factors. But there can be
no doubt that the program as a whole is now more
connected to labor market demand than was the
case with the original IRPA scheme.
The changes introduced by Bill C-50 are expected
to have a significant impact on the ability of the
system to make timely decisions. New applications
will very quickly be either screened out or, for
those that meet the terms of the instructions, put
into process on a priority basis. The goal is to
achieve processing times comparable to Provincial
Nominee or other priority economic categories,
19
For full text of the instructions and listed occupations please
see http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/apply-whoinstructions.asp
meaning that most applications would be finalized
within six to nine months from submission. Of
course this result is in part dependent on keeping
the number of eligible applications to a manageable
number. An initial assessment of applications
received since February 2008, which will now
be subject to screening against the instructions,
suggests that roughly 20 percent will qualify
for a full assessment. The remaining 80 percent
will be returned unprocessed. It is important to
note, however, that the 600,000 skilled worker
applications submitted prior to February 27, 2008,
and which are waiting for processing at Canadian
visa offices all around the world must still be
screened. Depending on future immigration levels
and the number of new applications that meet
the requirements of the instructions those old
applications could face wait times far longer than
the current 36 to 68 months. It is also likely, given
the litigious nature of the Canadian immigration
system, that the instructions and the legislative
authorities on which they are based will soon be
challenged in the Canadian courts, a process which
can take years to resolve.
Missing the Point(s):
The declining fortunes of Canada’s economic immigration program
23
8
Conclusion
What are all these measures really likely to achieve?
Are any of them likely to make a real difference in
the lives of future immigrants to Canada? And is
there evidence that really demonstrates the failure
of the human capital selection system?
While there is
no doubt that
recent immigrants
face integration
challenges, the
most pressing
issues facing
the system
relate to intake
management
and not the
selection model.
The answer to the latter question is clearly no. The
present debate in Canada should not be taken as
evidence that human capital model is a failure; in
fact, evidence is simply not yet available one way or
another. The most recent available data draws from
the 2001 census and immigrant cohorts from late
1990s, well before IRPA implementation. The jury
is still out on immigrant outcomes with the “human
capital model,” but measures like the FCRO are
unlikely to achieve much on their own.
While there is no doubt that recent immigrants
face integration challenges, the most pressing issues
facing the system relate to intake management
and not the selection model. As we’ve seen, intake
management issues have drastically reduced space
for skilled workers. The return with C-50 to an
Occupational Demand List is really about intake
management. C-50 should mean faster processing
times for new skilled worker applicants, who meet
the criteria in the Ministerial Instructions. But for
applicants who have been waiting in the backlog
the future seems bleak. Processing times for old
cases will almost certainly increase dramatically.
It is ironic that many of the measures that were
designed to provide a faster alternative to the
skilled worker category themselves contributed to
the worsening situation in recent years. C-50 simply
continues that trend. As for CEC, the fact that it is
limited to workers or students with experience in
a skilled occupation (NOC 0, A, or B—the same
threshold as IRPA skilled workers) means it is
unlikely to do more than divert a relatively small
number of cases from one category to another.
Whether the new approach to managing the
economic immigration program will help improve
the fortunes of new immigrants to Canada is less
certain. Prospective immigrants will have a better
idea of the state of the Canadian labor market,
thanks to the existence of the list of occupations
in demand, and the Australian experience
suggests that assessing labor market relevance
as part of the immigration process is one factor
that can help achieve better economic outcomes
for new immigrants.20 But as Hawthorne notes,
the Australian approach is based on a number of
elements, including measures such as mandatory
language testing and pre-immigration credential
recognition that remain outside the scope of the
Canadian system.
In sum, the lack of attention to the main underlying
causes of declining immigrant outcomes means that
any real change seems unlikely. The system itself
may become less clogged, but the fundamentals
including the human capital selection system have
not changed. Overall, despite considerable attention
and debate, fundamental change still seems far off.
See Hawthorne, Lesleyanne. “The Impact of Economic
Selection Policy on Labor Market Outcome for Degree Qualified
Migrants in Canada and Australia.” IRPP Choices, Vol. 14, No.
5 May 2008.
20
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