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DIPLOMACY
India’s Five Foreign
Policy Goals: Great
Strides, Steep
Challenges
BY DHR UVA JAISHANK AR ON 26/0 5 /20 16 • 6 COMMENT S
Several commentators have been left disappointed
by Modi’s – and India’s – handling of international
relations in the past two years. The record shows
otherwise.
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Prime Minister Narendra Modi and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj. Credit:
PTI
Two years ago today, Narendra Modi took the oath of office as India’s
14th prime minister. Among his first decisions as head of government –
in fact, it was set in motion even before the formal start of his tenure –
was an unconventional act of diplomacy: inviting eight foreign leaders
(http://www.firstpost.com/printpage.php?idno=1541653&sr_no=0) of neighbouring
countries to attend his inauguration. While many commentators
claimed before his election that Modi would be a nationalist hardliner
(http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/modi­watching­in­pakistan/), a
foreign affairs novice
(http://www.livemint.com/Politics/bqRNNtjifAmgfLkjgJY1fM/How­the­international­
community­perceives­Narendra­Modi.html), or simply more of the same
(https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2014­04­03/foreign­policy­la­modi) on
external affairs, the prime minister instead proved more active and
(perhaps less surprisingly (http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/19/eeny­meeny­
miney­modi/)) more pragmatic than many had expected. In two years,
Modi has displayed (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/651ce248­6f35­11e4­8d86­
00144feabdc0.html#axzz49BVIv4cK) an instinctive understanding of power in
the conduct of world affairs, and he has also benefited from being less
politically hamstrung than his predecessor Manmohan Singh, with
whose worldview he in fact shares much in common
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(http://www.orfonline.org/research/the­manmohan­doctrine­and­narendra­modis­
foreign­policy/).
A highlight of Modi’s first year was his outreach to the United States. In
September 2014, Washington rolled out the red carpet for a leader it
had once publicly shunned (http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la­fg­us­india­
modi­20140925­story.html), and Modi reciprocated by inviting Barack
Obama to India’s Republic Day celebrations, a first for a U.S. president.
But beyond normalising and enhancing relations with the US, Modi’s
international priorities were quickly made evident. Within his first year,
he embarked upon state visits to India’s immediate neighbourhood,
three crucial Indian Ocean island countries, important Asia­Pacific
powers (China, Japan, and Australia), and eventually Western Europe.
Modi’s second year followed in much the same fashion, with a ground­
breaking (http://southasiamonitor.org/images/India­Bangladeshfriendship.pdf)
visit to Bangladesh, a swing through Central Asia
(http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2015/07/06/narendra­modis­visit­to­central­asia­
what­to­know/), a long overdue visit to Afghanistan, and a renewed focus
(http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/04/01­india­modi­visits­saudi­
arabia­madan) on the Middle East or West Asia. It also included a surprise
stopover in Pakistan, a trip no Indian prime minister had managed
since 2004. In addition, Modi has in his first two years played host in
India to most of the world’s top leaders, including those of the United
States, China, Russia, France, Japan, and Germany. He also hosted a
landmark India­Africa Forum Summit last November that involved 41
heads of state and government.
Despite this flurry of activity, several commentators have been left
disappointed by Modi’s – and India’s – handling of international
relations. My Brookings India colleague W.P.S. Sidhu has pointed
(http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/GbrCaa2izXp3h1uso1Y7VI/Indias­underpowered­
foreign­policy.html) to a lack of strategic vision, and describes Modi’s
various foreign policy initiatives – such as Neighbourhood First and Act
East – as “vacuous.” While commending the prime minister’s sound
instincts, initiative, and energy, former foreign secretary Shyam Saran
has lamented (http://www.business­standard.com/article/opinion/shyam­saran­
mr­modi­s­mixed­record­116051201236_1.html) the lack of an overall national
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security strategy and criticised the priority granted showmanship over
substance. Meanwhile, Rajesh Rajagopalan of Jawaharlal Nehru
University has expressed disappointment
(http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016­05­
15/news/73102191_1_narendra­modi­modi­government­prime­minister­nawaz­sharif)
with the lack of new ideas and synergy and his colleague Happymon
Jacob has faulted (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/modis­
neighbourhoodfirst­policy­losing­the­neighbourhood/article8612193.ece) New Delhi’s
bullying and poor imagination for bad relations with its neighbours.
Much of this criticism is perplexing. Ambiguity and deniability have
value in foreign affairs. As a consequence, neither this Indian
government nor any of its predecessors have ever explicitly spelled out
their strategic intentions in a single document, although there are
plenty of (http://www.narendramodi.in/pm­chairs­combined­commanders­
conference­on­board­ins­vikramaditya­at­sea­386407) public
(http://mea.gov.in/Speeches­Statements.htm?
dtl/25491/Remarks_by_Foreign_Secretary_at_the_release_of_DrC_Raja_Mohans_book
_Modis_WorldExpanding_Indias_Sphere_of_InfuencequotJuly_17_2015)
statements (http://thewire.in/2015/07/20/india­wants­to­be­a­leading­power­
rather­than­just­a­balancing­power­6903/) that
(http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india­news­india/full­text­of­sushma­swarajs­
speech­at­un­there­can­be­no­distinction­between­good­and­bad­terrorists/) offer a
good indication of the government’s outlook. These public articulations,
combined with the nature, outcomes, and timings of Modi’s diplomatic
activities, offer a clear picture of India’s priorities and strategic
objectives. They are essentially five­fold:
Prioritizing an integrated neighbourhood; “Neighbourhood First.”
Leveraging international partnerships to promote India’s domestic
development.
Ensuring a stable and multipolar balance of power in the Indo­
Pacific; “Act East.”
Dissuading Pakistan from supporting terrorism.
Advancing Indian representation and leadership on matters of
global governance.
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These are the yardsticks against which the international activities of this
government – or, for that matter, any Indian government – should be
measured. In each case, it is important to assess the progress made, the
setbacks experienced, and the long­term or structural challenges that
will continue to confront India.
1. Neighbourhood First: Improving connectivity, mitigating
nationalism
The approach called ‘Neighbourhood First’ – a phrase adopted by the
Indian government – is meant to indicate four things. The first is New
Delhi’s willingness to give political and diplomatic priority to its
immediate neighbours and the Indian Ocean island states. The second
is to provide neighbours with support, as needed, in the form of
resources, equipment, and training. The third, and perhaps most
important, is greater connectivity and integration, so as to improve the
free flow of goods, people, energy, capital, and information. The fourth
is to promote a model of India­led regionalism with which its
neighbours are comfortable.
The newfound diplomatic priority on the region is evident in Modi’s
visits to all of India’s neighbours – barring The Maldives – as well as
regular leadership meetings in India and on the sidelines of multilateral
summits. India has also become more forthcoming in providing support
and in capacity building, whether concluding its biggest ever defence
sale (http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/modi­commissions­
indiabuilt­mauritian­naval­patrol­ship/article6986526.ece) to Mauritius, or in
providing humanitarian assistance to Nepal or Sri Lanka. With
Bangladesh, the completion of the Land Boundary Agreement,
improvements in energy connectivity
(http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India­Bangladesh­power­ties­with­21st­
century­nuclear­deal/articleshow/52274994.cms), and steps taken towards
accessing the port (http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/joint­task­force­to­
discuss­indias­access­to­chittagong­port/article8184920.ece) of Chittagong have
all been crucial developments that help to set a positive tone for a
region long defined by cross­border suspicion and animosity. India’s
focus on connectivity is also gradually extending outward, whether to
Chabahar in Iran or Kaladan (http://mdoner.gov.in/content/introduction­1) in
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Myanmar. Although India will continue investing in the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as an institutional
vehicle, it has also expressed a willingness to develop issue­specific
groupings that are not held hostage to consensus: a “SAARC minus X”
approach. Two examples of this are the Bangladesh­Bhutan­India­
Nepal (BBIN) grouping – meant to advance motor vehicle movement
(http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/logistics/bbin­motor­vehicles­
agreement­implemented/article7829675.ece), water power management, and
inter­grid connectivity (http://www.business­standard.com/article/news­
ians/bbin­cooperation­on­water­power­connectivity­carried­forward­
116012201124_1.html) – and the common SAARC Satellite
(http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/pakistan­opts­out­of­saarc­satellite­
project/article8385885.ece), which India has decided to proceed with despite
Pakistan’s objections.
These concerted efforts have so far had mixed results. Bangladesh and
Bhutan have clearly been positive stories for India. Ties with Sri Lanka
have proved (http://in.reuters.com/article/sri­lanka­india­coal­idINKCN0Y90R8) a
mixed bag (http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/diplomacy/article/1747362/can­china­
sri­lanka­mend­ties­maithripala­sirisenas­visit), despite the electoral loss of
former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had testy relations with New
Delhi. However, President Maithripala Sirisena remains well­disposed
and personally invested in better relations with India. The Maldives has
proved more difficult. India has continuing concerns
(http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/world/maldives­defends­arrest­of­
nashee/46276.html) about the fate of former president Mohamed Nasheed,
although several defence agreements
(http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india­news­india/india­maldives­sign­six­
pacts­resolve­to­expand­defence­cooperation/) were concluded during the visit
to India of the incumbent Abdulla Yameen.
The obvious regional outlier has been Nepal, which has been the most
vexing foreign policy problem facing the Indian government over the
past year. Despite considerable Indian assistance
(http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india­others/india­pledges­usd­1­billion­aid­
for­nepals­reconstruction­programme/) in the aftermath of last year’s
devastating earthquake – that reportedly included
(http://www.ndtv.com/india­news/nepal­earthquake­indian­air­force­army­made­
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2223­sorties­rescued­11200­people­769167) over 1,700 tonnes of relief material
and medical assistance to thousands – Nepal’s constitutional crisis
severely set back relations. The crisis was not of India’s making
(http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/understanding­nepals­constitutional­crisis­a­
conversation­with­prashant­jha/) – it was primarily the product of
differences between Nepal’s hill elites and the Madhesis
(http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016­05­13/news/73064288_1_indian­
ambassador­state­visit­kathmandu) – but New Delhi was confronted with a
tough choice. Either it could have welcomed a flawed Nepal
constitution, knowing that months – perhaps years – of Madhesi
agitation would follow, risking escalation that could have damaged
Indian interests. Or it had to take some form of action to urge
Kathmandu to revisit the more contentious aspects of the constitution,
risking the immense goodwill
(http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/world/asia/nepal­enthralled­by­visit­of­indian­
prime­minister­narendra­modi­who­hits­the­right­notes.html?_r=0) that it had
built up over the previous year. After Indian diplomatic entreaties
(http://www.himalayannewsexpress.com/news/article/94/?lang=en) were
dismissed, it opted for the latter. New Delhi was guilty of responding
late to fast­moving developments, and despite successfully pressuring
Kathmandu (http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india­welcomes­
amendments­in­nepal­constitution/article8147871.ece) to amend some aspects of
the contentious constitution, it has not been able to overcome
continuing mistrust (http://indianexpress.com/article/world/world­
news/rumours­of­expelling­indian­ambassador­baseless­says­nepal­deputy­pm­kamal­
thapa­2791432/) or resolve the remaining constitutional differences
(http://scroll.in/article/802560/interview­for­madhesis­the­first­amendments­to­
nepals­new­constitution­are­a­disappointment).
With respect to all of its neighbours, including Nepal
(http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/BBIN­
MVAPushingRegionalIntegration_nnayak_190615), India has taken concrete
steps over the past two years to promote goodwill and deepen economic
and social connectivity. But nationalist sentiments in all these countries
– often directed against India as the region’s predominant power – will
continue to present a challenge. Anti­Indian sentiments will also,
paradoxically, drag India (http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016­05­
13/news/73064288_1_indian­ambassador­state­visit­kathmandu) further into
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these countries’ domestic politics, suggesting that undulating highs and
lows in its neighbourhood relationships will now be the norm.
Furthermore, for all of India’s neighbours, China is now prepared to
step in to provide financial, military, infrastructural, and even political
(http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/the­chinese­advice­behind­prachanda­s­u­
turn­on­support­to­nepal­govt/story­4sdNKxZxTu3QRMDdfcnjlN.html) assistance,
and act as a potential alternative to India. This new development is
something India will have to carefully monitor and appropriately
respond to – as it has (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/rajapaksa­
raw­not­government­conspired­against­me/article6987460.ece) in recent years
(http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/sri­lanka­may­bar­port­visits­by­chinese­
submarines/) – particularly if Indian security interests are seriously
compromised. As the status quo power in its neighbourhood, India will
have to constantly play defence in its own backyard.
2. Bridging diplomacy and development
A second major objective of India’s foreign relations has been to
leverage international partnerships to advance India’s domestic
development. This includes improving technological access, sourcing
capital, adopting best practices, gaining market access, and securing
natural resources. In these respects, a truly accurate assessment will
only be possible in the years to come, given the lag time between initial
agreements and results. That being said, some of the short­term
indicators show promising signs. Greenfield foreign direct investment
(FDI) has already seen a jump (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/94351bda­0620­
11e6­a70d­4e39ac32c284.html) – with India surpassing China – although
how much of that can be attributed to diplomatic efforts is uncertain.
Some new international collaborative efforts, such as Japan’s
ridiculously low­cost loan (http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2015/12/14/modi­
bullet­train_n_8802734.html) for a high­speed rail line, have immense
potential and, like high­profile Indian metro
(http://www.livemint.com/Politics/mcQh3ZfkfIHQ3Q7zkwOQUP/8216Metro­is­a­
financial­success­not­just­a­technologica.html) and airport
(http://www.newindianexpress.com/cities/hyderabad/Hyderabad­Airport­Ranked­
Third­Best­in­the­World/2015/02/17/article2673373.ece) projects in the recent
past, might be replicable (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi­edit­
page/japan­bets­big­on­india­abe­lends­new­delhi­the­same­helping­hand­that­china­
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and­southeast­asia­leveraged­to­take­off/). The recently amended tax treaty
with Mauritius is but one example of how diplomacy can be used to
benefit both investors and the government
(http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/et­commentary/mauritius­treaty­longest­
running­saga­in­indian­tax­history­may­well­be­at­an­end/), and potentially
increase India’s tax base. The extension of lines of credit to Africa
(http://thewire.in/2015/10/30/india­announces­10­billion­concessional­credit­to­
africa­14448/) and Iran (http://www.ndtv.com/india­news/gamechanger­chabahar­
port­on­agenda­as­as­pm­modi­visits­iran­10­facts­1408983) promises to increase
business opportunities for Indian firms. And securing buy­in from
major Silicon Valley corporations (http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/26/an­
app­wont­solve­indias­bloated­bureaucracy­problem/) in increasing Internet
access in India marks another effort at advancing national
development.
In this respect, however, the greatest challenge will be in tying
international agreements to domestic agents of change, whether specific
ministries, the private sector, or local actors. Securing international
agreements is hard enough; using that to spur developments at home is
an altogether more (http://realty.economictimes.indiatimes.com/realty­check/the­
top­10­implementation­challenges­for­smart­cities­in­india/776) challenging
proposition
(http://www.pmi.org.in/manageindia/volume3/issue03/invitation.html). Such
complications are most obviously manifested in trade policy
(http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016­04­11/news/72238261_1_trade­
talks­rcep­talks­trade­negotiators), which has more immediate implications
for domestic constituencies, and in defence, where the government is
struggling to balance the desire for defence indigenization
(https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/publications/2016/make­in­india­achieving­self­
reliance­in­defence­production.pdf), commercial viability
(http://www.nasscom.in/The­art­of­soft­war­55496), and an under­performing
public sector­led defence industrial complex
(http://www.newindianexpress.com/thesundaystandard/Defence­PSUs­Spoil­PMs­
Make­in­India­Dream/2015/04/05/article2747901.ece). The overall trajectory for
India’s development is certainly positive, and the diplomatic
momentum has clearly increased. But India still has a mountain to
climb to fully harness external inputs to advance economically, socially,
and technologically. This will be a decades­long project.
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3. Acting East as China rises
When Modi rhetorically replaced
(http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/look­east­policy­now­turned­into­act­east­
policy­modi/article6595186.ece) two decades of India’s ‘Look East’ policy with
‘Act East,’ the purpose was to show greater intent in realising what had
long been an aspiration for India: to become an integral part of Asia.
The greater urgency implicit in the shift in terminology is largely an
outgrowth of Indian concerns regarding China’s rise and the upsetting
of Asia’s delicate balance of power. In addition to the development of
military (http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/confirmed­construction­begins­on­chinas­
first­overseas­military­base­in­djibouti/) and dual use
(http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/chinese­state­firm­takes­control­of­strategically­
vital­gwadar­port/) Chinese infrastructure in India’s neighbourhood and
the Indian Ocean, India’s concerns are three­fold: the risk of Chinese
assertiveness on the disputed border, the possibility of Chinese primacy
in the Indo­Pacific region, and an uneven economic playing field.
After an ill­timed Chinese incursion
(http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/chumar­xi­jinping­ladakh­narendra­modi­
pla/1/383574.html) during Xi Jinping’s 2014 visit to India, the disputed
Sino­Indian border has proved reasonably stable over the past year.
China has remained preoccupied in more politically sensitive disputes
over the South (http://www.bbc.com/news/world­asia­pacific­13748349) and East
China Seas (http://www.cfr.org/asia­and­pacific/chinas­maritime­
disputes/p31345#!/p31345) with the likes of Vietnam, the Philippines, and
Japan. India­China border negotiations have been continuing apace
(http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india­news­india/india­china­border­dispute­
peace­talks­ajit­doval­nsa­2762698/), but a breakthrough is highly unlikely.
The development of border roads on India’s side remains an uphill task
(http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india­news­india/border­roads­organisation­
tight­funds­uphill­goals­in­a­tough­terrain­2806057/), as is preserving a military
balance (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Indias­new­mountain­corps­
cant­match­Chinas­military­capabilities­across­LAC/articleshow/21148212.cms),
particularly in terms of air superiority
(http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/03/29/troubles­they­come­in­battalions­
manifold­travails­of­indian­air­force/ivwr). The diplomatic conditions are
currently favourable (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/US­pips­Russia­
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as­top­arms­supplier­to­India/articleshow/40142455.cms) for India to retain its
military advantage. But while progress on the border has been steady
(http://www.orfonline.org/wp­content/uploads/2013/05/OccasionalPaper_42b.pdf), it
has also been slow.
In terms of the broader strategic context in Asia, India’s ‘Act East’
policy has three distinct facets: institutional, commercial, and security­
related. The first has largely been successful – mostly as by­product of
two decades of Indian economic growth. Barring
(http://www.cfr.org/india/bringing­india­inside­asian­trade­tent/p33173) the Asia­
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, India has integrated into
Asia’s multilateral networks, most notably the apex East Asia Summit
(http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/IndiaandtheEastAsianSummit_gvcnaidu_1005).
However, the conclusion (https://ustr.gov/about­us/policy­offices/press­
office/press­releases/2015/october/trans­pacific­partnership­ministers) of the Trans­
Pacific Partnership agreement, the largest trade pact in history,
threatens to affect India’s commercial ambitions in the region, possibly
costing India (https://piie.com/publications/wp/wp16­2.pdf) as much as 0.1
percent of GDP. Unfortunately, the Indian response to the development
of new trade blocs has too often (http://mintonsunday.livemint.com/news/the­
trans­pacific­partnership­and­indias­trade­strategy/2.4.1926295954.html) been
defensive (http://www.business­standard.com/article/opinion/shyam­saran­india­
and­a­fragmented­globe­115031001405_1.html). Rather than remain in denial,
India will have to rethink how to adapt to the new trade order.
Better trade with Southeast Asia will also require developing overland
connectivity (http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/154305/adbi­
wp500.pdf) in India’s northeast, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Expanding
India’s port capacities (http://www.joc.com/port­news/asian­ports/india­has­
plans­double­port­capacity_20140730.html) and relaxing constraints on
shipping (http://www.joc.com/port­news/asian­ports/india­relaxes­cabotage­
protections­container­shipping_20160311.html) are necessary first steps that are
now being taken. But beyond institutional and commercial changes, the
greatest departure over the past two years has been on the security side.
Not only have India and the United States been able to articulate
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/the­press­office/2015/01/25/us­india­joint­strategic­
vision­asia­pacific­and­indian­ocean­region) a Joint Strategic Vision for the
Asia­Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, but India has become far less
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reluctant to embrace “minilateral” or “plurilateral” security
arrangements and political consultations. This includes effectively
elevating the Malabar naval exercises (http://www.business­
standard.com/article/economy­policy/amidst­tension­in­south­china­sea­us­japan­
and­india­ready­for­naval­exercise­malabar­115101200065_1.html) into a trilateral
India­U.S.­Japan initiative, and commencing an official India­
Australia­Japan dialogue (https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the­not­quite­
quadrilateral­australia,­japan­and­india/SI92_Australia_Japan_India.pdf).
Deepening security partnerships
(http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/eye­on­china­india­and­vietnam­
advance­their­strategic­partnership/articleshow/49002738.cms) with other Indo­
Pacific states that share India’s concerns remains a priority, but is also
largely subject to their own vacillations
(http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/vietnam­between­china­and­the­united­states­the­
next­balancing­test­beckons/) and political processes
(http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/05/17/1584126/china­congratulates­
duterte­expects­friendly­dialogue).
Finally, bilateral economic relations with China offer a contradictory
picture. On the one hand, India seeks to be a beneficiary of China’s
attempts at rebalancing its economy (http://blog.mpettis.com/2015/11/chinas­
rebalancing­timetable/), and has become a destination for Chinese
investment. The last two years saw a significant jump
(http://www.dipp.nic.in/English/Investor/China_Desk/FDI_Synopsis_China.pdf) in
Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI), from Rs. 767 crores in 2013­
2014 to Rs. 3,066 crores a year later. In fact, those two years alone have
accounted for over 70% of Chinese FDI ever into India. But China’s old
economic habits are proving hard to kick
(http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/3/23b198f4­ded2­11e5­b67f­a61732c1d025.html).
Barriers to entry (http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014­06­
15/news/50598128_1_indian­it­indian­companies­indian­firms) for Indian
software companies remain, even as China’s high tech sector
(https://www.techinasia.com/china­tech­titans­startups­partnerships) comes into
its own. And India shares (http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/india­
studying­impact­of­market­economy­status­for­china/article8264686.ece) continuing
international concerns (https://euobserver.com/eu­china/131801) about
China’s dumping of goods.
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To date, India’s Act East policy has added greater urgency to its earlier
aspirations. Certain aspects, such as institutional participation have
been more successful over the years, and others such as bilateral and
‘minilateral’ security cooperation have seen discrete recent
improvements. India’s primary challenges will lie in preserving the
military balance on the disputed border with China, and integrating
itself into the region’s commercial networks. This will require placing a
greater priority on improving border infrastructure, on overland
connectivity to Southeast Asia via Bangladesh and India’s Northeast, on
port and shipping infrastructure at home, and on developing an
understanding of the implications of TPP for India. Only then can India
really come into its own as an Asian power.
4. Pakistan: Engagement and isolation
Pakistan’s relative importance for India has waned significantly over
the past two years. The development of nuclear weapons by both
countries has ensured an uneasy peace
(http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the­case­indias­nuclear­weapons­9008),
while Pakistan – despite Indian entreaties
(https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Pakistan_April2014.pdf) – has
refused (http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south­asia/pakistan­in­no­
mood­to­grant­mfn­status­to­india­yet/article7903550.ece) to open up
(http://tribune.com.pk/story/1088955/in­disarray­afghanistan­losing­interest­in­
trade­links­with­pakistan/) economically. Terrorism by entities based in
Pakistan, and supported (https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013­10­
22/husain­haqqani­my­country­supports­terrorism) by the country’s military and
intelligence agencies, continues to be directed
(http://www.southasiaathudson.org/blog/2016/1/7/pakistans­terror­game­1) at
India, although certain measures (http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india­
others/threetier­border­fencing­along­loc­turns­a­death­trap­for­infiltrators/) have
helped reduced the number of infiltrations and severity
(http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/Cumulative_Fatalities.htm)
of attacks. Nonetheless, Pakistan remains a political hot button issue,
and India­Pakistan relations still dominate media coverage
(http://thewire.in/2016/03/29/indian­journalists­respond­to­sensationalist­charge­
from­pakistan­media­authority­26465/) and political discourse
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(http://www.ndtv.com/india­news/terror­attacks­from­pakistan­have­gone­up­
government­to­lok­sabha­1285477).
None of the last few Indian governments have been
(http://www.thehindu.com/2003/12/31/stories/2003123103641100.htm) under any
illusions
(http://www.livemint.com/Politics/7yL41ezE4OSUhp4gAMKJZN/Manmohan­Singh­
says­Pakistan­must­not­aid­terrorism­agains.html) about Pakistan. Terrorism
emanating against India by entities based in Pakistan and supported by
elements of the state remains a top priority; one need only look at
(http://www.ndtv.com/india­news/foreign­minister­sushma­swaraj­sartaj­aziz­issue­
joint­statement­full­text­1253040) every recent (http://www.ndtv.com/india­
news/joint­statement­issued­by­national­security­advisors­of­india­pakistan­1251676)
statement (http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/full­text­of­the­joint­
statement­by­the­foreign­secretaries­of­india­and­pakistan­in­
russia/article7407431.ece) made by India with Pakistan to see the
prominence given to that issue. But India’s options are also limited. For
all the talk about retaliating against Pakistan, particularly militarily,
such steps risk an escalation (http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/indo­
pak­tensions­a­fictional­nuclear­war­scenario/story­gundIhC1iC0amJjMFYo3AN.html)
to the nuclear level (http://takshashila.org.in/takshashila­policy­
research/discussion­document­the­india­pakistan­conflict­escalation­framework/).
Containing Pakistan is not a possibility either. India’s economy is not
yet large enough, it is limited by geography, and Pakistan continues to
find support in the Gulf (http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/06/what­pakistan­and­
saudi­arabia­want­from­each­other.html), the United States
(http://www.cgdev.org/page/aid­pakistan­numbers), and China
(http://www.amazon.com/China­Pakistan­Axis­Asias­New­
Geopolitics/dp/1849043418). Any suggestion of India’s responding “in the
same coin (http://www.deccanherald.com/content/479816/attackers­paid­back­
same­coin.html)” is also unnecessary; Pakistan is doing a perfectly good
job (http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/31/balochistan­is­seething­and­that­cant­
make­china­happy­about­investing/) destabilizing itself
(http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/06/pakistan­war­loss­hope­
displaced­150615090443950.html). Nor can Pakistan be ignored. Indian
passiveness is exactly what Pakistan wants
(http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Pak­seeks­to­internationalize­
Kashmir­issue/articleshow/45355183.cms), for it would invite third­party
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intervention (http://www.thehindu.com/news/the­india­cables/how­india­kept­
kashmir­out­of­us­afpak­envoys­brief/article2035576.ece), something a rising
sovereign India would naturally resent
(http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india­rejects­sharifs­plea­for­us­
intervention­on­kashmir/article5254367.ece).
After several attempts at setting the terms
(http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india­calls­off­foreign­secretarylevel­talks­
with­pakistan/article6329082.ece) of engagement
(http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/ufa­statement­has­put­nawaz­sharif­on­
the­mat­in­pakistan/story­2gKqO90ZipHGPF9AtxsaDI.html) over the past two
years, India has had to settle upon a two­track policy. The first is to
continue keeping lines of engagement open, as long as terrorism tops
the agenda (http://m.indiatoday.in/technology/story/india­pakistan­to­hold­talks­
tomorrow­terrorism­top­on­agenda/1/102765.html) and that dialogue is strictly
bilateral (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pakistan­spoiled­the­game­by­
talking­to­Hurriyat­Sushma­Swaraj/articleshow/43481699.cms) in nature. This has
resulted in a peculiar ping­pong. Inviting
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/21/narendra­modi­invites­pakistan­
nawaz­sharif­inauguration) Nawaz Sharif to Delhi in 2014 resulted in
Pakistan trying to involve
(http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article­2728298/Pakistan­double­
talk­angers­India­PM­Modi­cancels­Foreign­Secretary­talks­Islamabads­Hurriyat­
snub.html) the Hurriyat, a coalition of Kashmiri separatists, and
Pakistani shelling (http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india­others/pakistani­
troops­resumes­mortar­shelling­along­loc­india­retaliates/) along the Line of
Control with India. The 2015 Ufa Declaration
(http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/full­text­of­the­joint­statement­by­the­
foreign­secretaries­of­india­and­pakistan­in­russia/article7407431.ece) was heavily
criticized in Pakistan and led to Islamabad calling off the national
security advisor talks (http://www.bbc.com/news/world­asia­34028095) under
rather farcical circumstances. Modi’s Lahore stopover
(http://www.thehindu.com/news/modi­stuns­all­with­surprise­stopover­in­lahore­
following­unannounced­stop­in­kabul/article8029007.ece) in December 2015 was
followed soon after by the Pathankot attack
(http://indianexpress.com/topic/pathankot­air­base­attack/). And the response to
India allowing (http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india­news­
india/pathankot­attack­pakistans­probe­panel­arrives­in­india/) Pakistani
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investigators access to the Pathankot site was Pakistan producing
(http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india­news­india/pakistans­spy­video­raw­
kulbhushan­yadav­confession­india­mea/) an alleged Indian spy, whom India
insists is an innocent former Navy officer kidnapped
(http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/india­takes­iran­relations­forward/) from Iran.
The pattern is clear: India has repeatedly tried to renew talks in good
faith, only for elements in Pakistan to make brazen attempts at
sabotaging the process. While frustrating, the process has created
considerable diplomatic space
(http://www.livemint.com/Politics/dvbmcYc9815kmS9xlIeTEM/Narendra­Modi­is­
rewriting­the­diplomatic­lexicon.html) for India – much as Atal Bihari
Vajpayee’s Lahore trip enabled a bolder response to Pakistan’s 1999
Kargil incursion. More importantly, India’s constant willingness to
engage has kept the United States and others from interjecting
themselves in the region (http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/03/modi­will­
continue­engagement­with­pakistan/ioie).
The government has not been content with simple bilateral
engagement, but has also had to take countermeasures and steps to
delegitimize state support for terrorism. New Delhi’s critical response to
the U.S. decision to supply Pakistan with F­16s and prime ministerial
visits to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Afghanistan have
all been part of an attempt to isolate Pakistan, to slowly compel its deep
state (http://www.wsj.com/articles/pakistan­leaders­predicament­shows­power­of­
deep­state­1410282028) to reconsider its priorities. It is unrealistic
(http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india­oic­and­the­kashmir­
charade­2759499/) to expect that the United States or Saudi Arabia will
change their Pakistan policies overnight, but both now have the ability
to ‘de­hyphenate (http://in.reuters.com/article/india­saudi­modi­visit­
idINKCN0WY49R)’ their subcontinental relationships. Of greater concern
in this respect is China’s decision to go forward with the ambitious,
multi­billion dollar China­Pakistan Economic Corridor
(http://in.reuters.com/article/pakistan­china­ports­idINKCN0X91PT). While India
has expressed its concerns (http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/India­
Lodges­Protest­over­Chinese­Investments­in­PoK/2015/05/13/article2811562.ece),
dissuading Beijing from this path will be a severe challenge; after all,
much of China’s historical support for Pakistan has been driven by its
desire to balance (http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2009/01/02/why­
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china­helped­countries­like­pakistan­north­korea­build­nuclear­bombs) against
India.
Modi’s efforts with Pakistan have not yet borne results. A stalemate
continues. The only difference now is that India’s Pakistan policy has
assumed a certain consistency and that it is playing the chessboard with
white, rather than black, pieces, seizing control of the momentum and
initiative. The process of both engaging and isolating Pakistan despite
repeated provocations will be long, frustrating, and politically
unpopular at home. But as long as domestic pressures can be navigated,
India’s continuing bilateral engagement with Pakistan, its efforts at
internationally isolating it, and its offering a viable alternative model of
South Asian engagement remain the only real prospect for resolving the
Pakistan problem on India’s terms.
5. India as a leading power: Raising ambitions
India is rising in a world system that has been largely favourable to its
rise, but one that India was not involved in creating. According to Modi
(http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=115241), the present
international environment represents a rare opportunity for India,
which it must use to “position itself in a leading role, rather than just a
balancing force, globally.” India is not yet fully in a position to lead, or
set the rules of the international order, but it is taking steps to seek full
membership of the most important global governance platforms. India
is already a member of the G20, the East Asia Summit, and the BRICS
coalition, a testament to its status as a large country with a fast­growing
economy. New Delhi also naturally aspires for permanent membership
on the UN Security Council. It has also been actively lobbying for full
membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as well as the
Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime.
These efforts could bear fruit as early as 2016, although there has been
opposition from China (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India­counters­
China­says­no­need­to­sign­NPT­for­NSG­membership/articleshow/52359604.cms)
and – because of the Italian marines controversy – Italy. All the while,
India has been trying to bolster its leadership credentials, whether
through international relief efforts in Yemen
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/04/08/india­leads­
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rescue­of­foreign­nationals­including­americans­trapped­in­yemen/) and Libya,
reminders of its history of UN peacekeeping (http://www.ndtv.com/india­
news/full­text­of­pm­modis­statement­at­the­un­peacekeeping­summit­1224071), or
the public reclamation of its contributions to
(http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/modi­war­memorial­indians­
france/1/429685.html) the World Wars (http://www.firstpost.com/world/india­
stands­in­support­and­solidarity­with­belgium­pm­modi­pays­tribute­to­brussels­
attacks­victims­2703990.html). The successful outcome
(http://www.c2es.org/international/negotiations/cop21­paris/summary) of the
COP21 climate summit in Paris and India’s constructive role
(http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/cop­21­live­
updates/article7933275.ece) have also gone some way towards shedding its
reputation as a multilateral ‘naysayer’ and ‘obstructionist’
(https://books.google.co.in/books?
id=53QerkgX8DYC&pg=PT441#v=onepage&q&f=false).
India has only just recently embarked upon institution building of its
own. The International Solar Alliance (http://www.thehindu.com/sci­
tech/energy­and­environment/modi­launches­international­solar­
alliance/article7934560.ece) represents one such effort, as do the Indian
Ocean Rim Association (http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india­
others/need­strong­grouping­around­indian­ocean­modi/) (IORA) and BBIN
(http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/PB/2014/BBINNewToolinIndiasSubRegionalDiplomacyPB0
8072015.pdf). While India will continue to lobby consistently for inclusion
in multilateral security institutions, its presence in the evolving
international economic (http://asiasociety.org/policy­institute/india­and­apec­
charting­path­membership) and trade order
(http://www.idsa.in/askanexpert/TransPacificPartnership) will still require a
clearer articulation of its trade policy, one that gives greater priority to
India’s concerns on services, intellectual property, and labour mobility.
India has clearly expressed broad comfort with the international order
and has actively been lobbying for a seat at the global high table.
Learning to lead, however, will be harder. As the prime minister himself
has noted, it will require a change in mindsets
(http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015­02­07/news/58902828_1_indian­
diplomats­indian­missions­prime­minister­narendra­modi).
Polarized perspectives
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A broad overview of the Indian government’s foreign policy, particularly
over the past year, ought to clearly show not just a strategic vision, but
progress along every one of India’s major objectives. It also reveals
some of the frustrations and structural limitations that confront the
Indian government, and are likely to confront it for many years going
forward. They include the twin spectres of nationalism and Chinese
inroads in India’s neighbourhood, insufficient commercial integration
with Southeast and East Asia, gaps between diplomatic efforts and
agents of domestic implementation, political resistance to engagement
with Pakistan, and relative inexperience with leading on matters of
global governance. India clearly has to do a much better job remaining
vigilant in its own neighbourhood, managing or proactively addressing
the domestic political fallout of its Pakistan policy, and better
coordinating external outcomes with internal development, all the while
raising its ambitions and improving its ability to follow through.
What ultimately matters in any assessment, however, is the broad
direction or orientation of India’s international relations, and its
implementation. This is often at odds with public discourse, which often
views developments in isolation and sees facts being used to fit
preconceptions. For the television media in particular, Pakistan bashing
has become a full­time preoccupation. Of equal concern is the
unnecessary polarisation of much of the foreign policy discourse.
Politics ought to end at the water’s edge. Unfortunately, the last decade
has witnessed more fractious and self­serving discourse on many areas
in which there has in fact been remarkable continuity and consensus.
The changing media environment is in part responsible for this, as is
the behaviour of the opposition parties – both past and present.
Evaluating India’s advancement of its international interests will
require a clearer assessment of its objectives, the progress made, and
India’s continuing limitations. That challenge will be all the more
difficult in a fast­evolving and unpredictable world.
Dhruva Jaishankar is Fellow for Foreign Policy at
Brookings India in New Delhi.
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K.Bharat • 8 months ago
USA is veritably the high point,with a record 4th visit next month.Has
this overdrive delivered anything tangible?In fact, evidence seems to
suggest the reverse, with USA having got more out of this relationship,
through the defense foundational agreements. A visit to the US and
addressing the Congress at a time when the levels of electoral turmoil
are at their highest and worst is symptomatic of the ill­advised
adhocism that exists in the Indian FP setup, both at the bureaucratic
and strategic thinking planes.. Who pray will focus on India­US
relations during the visit when party nominations in the US are a few
week away?
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△ ▽ • Reply • Share ›
Nath Timsina • 8 months ago
Worth a read. It's not your fault to miss some key points at certain
factors when you a single person has to write on such a vast areas. I'm
so happy to learn that India has been growing up so fast and so
much. I wish India to accomplish more, the right way. I don't claim
expertise on many things but I got to say I'm at least on one minor
factor. The India Nepal relationship.
Being a so called Hills Elite! I'm kinda proud being called elite but
then I asked myself. Why am I elite to my Madhesi friends? I went to
the same school. Some of them did better than I and some worse.
Which is normal like everywhere else as talent has no barrier to color,
race, gender, or geography. We are still good friend as we were even
before the term 'hill elite' coined together.
But then when I heard about hill elites, I was like you got to be out of
your mind. I understand the majority of government position are
taken by Brahman, Chhetri, and Newar Caste of hill region. Other
Caste are behind, not just the Madhesi, and there are reasons. Most of
the Madhesi came to Nepal, as well all know, recently but they have
been picking it up faster than any other race. Madhesi have been
President and deputy Prime Minister of Nepal already.
I'm not trying to justify anything here. Nepal needs to do more and
it's been doing better than expected despite many difficulties. What I don't understand is India is looking for scapegoat to justify its
failed Nepal relationship by picking up one race over the another. If
we are looking for long term relationship, we need to revolutionize the
thought process at botb the Gov and public level. The fundamental
understanding of Nepal relationship has been at fault. Beside
Madhes, India has always been playing only at the political leadership
level. Not saying it needs to visit villages and stuff but it has not
handled the issues that matters at villages well since a very long time,
decades.
The borders, electricity generation, continuous involvement in Nepali
local politics and more. Nepali ppl are as frustrated not just with
previous Gov of Nepal but with India as well for a long time. India
has most of the electricity producing agreement with Nepal and yet
they just holding it and not producing any to provide services to
Nepal. This has been going for years. This may be a little exampl for
some but when it keeps adding up for years, the rage has no limit.
India can always blame anybody it wants but that will only alienate
the regular ppl like myself. India should not blame others for its
weakness. I realize we have many things in common with India and
none with China. Yet, I am forced to look at the alternative. It's too late now but India can still do so much to prevent further
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It's too late now but India can still do so much to prevent further
damage in relation.
△ ▽ • Reply • Share ›
Gernailsaab > Nath Timsina • 8 months ago
Elite because they form the bulk of bureaucracy, political and
ruling class. And, evidently decided to widen the divide more
by writing a constitution that doesn't assure fair representation
to its own citizens from tarai. Oh btw, i was looking for a 'thank you' note to India for its
17000 tonnes help during earthquake, but then free doles
from India is elites birth right, including electricity that
Nepal's govt is so studiously and for years deciding to pick a
project for India to kick start work. Next time, do some research and learning before commenting.
△ ▽ • Reply • Share ›
I m possible • 8 months ago
Act east policy has been great. But has there been quick
implementation? Has there been any change in life of hungry
educated unemployed youths ? Has there been any ray of hope to
their dreams ? Policies should be made for fast track economic growth
of Northeast cities like Agartala. Currently this beautiful city has been
bogged down by incompetency, ,lackluster attitude, backdated
approach, anti growth mindset, nepotism favoring, corruption ­ by
the ruling leadership and administration.
How India's GDP can grow when Northeast cities like Agartala
continues to remain economically backward ? Left ruled Agartala has
become 3rd Internet gateway and with a lameduck leadership
unwilling and having poor understanding of Industry and
technology, Tripura and its Youth's future have been continuously
ruined leaving a record 25.2% (highest in India) unemployment.
It has been a long wait for Tripura and its youths who have been
suffering everyday from chronic unemployment and concerned folks
are just happy to mint Govt salary month after month with an excuse
of unemployment is throughout country or no infrastructure. At
whose cost please ?
With a record (highest in India) 25.2% of unemployment Left ruled
Tripura continues to bite dust of under­development and non­
performance due to state's outdated policies of being anti
development and industry without realizing world and India's
economy driven by Business and technology.
So far it has been about Govt job, salary, subsidy ­ on tax payers
money and mediocre plastic industry for name sake being the focus ­
https://thewire.in/38708/indias­five­foreign­policy­goals­great­strides­steep­challenges/
22/23
1/30/2017
India’s Five Foreign Policy Goals: Great Strides, Steep Challenges ­ The Wire
money and mediocre plastic industry for name sake being the focus ­
which still fails to show hope to lakhs of educated unemployed
https://thewire.in/38708/indias­five­foreign­policy­goals­great­strides­steep­challenges/
23/23