WILLIAM WARD'S ESSAY OM GRAMMAR
A Critical Account and an Assessment of its Relevance
to Eighteenth and Twentieth Century Linguistics
James N. Pankhurst
B.A.
(Hons.), London University, 1966
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLHENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in the Department
of
English
a
JAMES N. PANKHURST
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
August, 1969
1969
,
EXAMINING
C OJflMITTEE APPROVAL
Bursill-Hall)
Senior Supervisor
( G .L.
(D.He S u l l i v a n )
Examining Committee
(Philippa Polson)
Examining Committee
-.<-
Name:
Degree:
7 , -
,
( ~ o n a t h a nc en nett)
Philosophy Department
James N. Pankhwst
Master of A r t s
T i t l e of Thesis:
WILLIAM WARDtS ESSAY ON GRAMMAR
A C r i t i c a l Account and an Assessment of i t s
Relevance to Eighteenth and Twentieth Century
Linguistics
O
This thesis offers an account of William Ward's
Essay on Grammar.
The Introduction discusses the relation
of the history of linguistics to general linguistics and
suggests that the study of former theories provides a
useful evaluation measure for current work.
The first
two chapters outline the main formative influences of
linguistics from the Greek period of 1765. The link
between the study of language and other intellectual
--
pursuits is suggested as the force behind innovations in
the European tradition; in England linguistics was
divorced from other interests and the problem of adapting
the grammatical categories of Latin to the English language was the main spur to linguistic investigation.
Chapter I11 describes Ward1s attitudes 'to language
and education, and suggests that he is distinctive among
the English grammarians because his grammatical theory grew
from the wider intellectual tradition of his age.
Chapter
IV is an account of Ward's sources and the use he made of
them.
John Locketstheory of ideas is the basis for a
psychological theory of language.
David Hartley and some
continental grammarians also figure as major influences on
Ward.
Chapter V discusses Ward's metalanguage in preparation
for an account of his grammatical theory.
iii
The juxtaposition
of psychological terminology and grmatical terminology
gives new values to the grammatical terms.
Ward's
word-class theory, the subject of Chapter VI, is unusual
because it concentrates on the similarities of the major
classes rather than their differences. The Lockean idea
is seen as existing prior to grammatical categories;
operations performed by the mind on the idea give it
grammatical features. A feature analysis of the major
parts of speech is developed as a means of explicating
and formalizing Ward's theory.
Ward's approach to syntax is discussed in Chapter
VII,
His account is motivated by the desire for a
psychological explanation of the relation between words
in constructions and the Lockean ideas that are said to
lie behind them, The realism inherent in Ward's adaptation of Locketsideas makes it difficult to acoount
for transitive sentences, and leads him to formulate a
singular analysis of them.
His account of prepositions
is unusual on account of his enlightened discussion of
their meaning and his proposal that they are signals of
underlying transitive verbs.
Ward's efforts to relate
language to ideas in the mind lead him to make significant remarks on the syntax of the relative clause and on
extraposition. For the former he proposes a solution
analogous to a rule cycle: extraposition is recognized
to be the result of an optional rule of the grammar,
I
The f i n a l chapter discusses Wzrdtsgrammatical
theory in terms of its relevance to contemporary theories
of syntax.
A parallel is drawn between Ward's notion of
grammatically undifferentiated ideas and Emmon Bachts
proposal that nouns, verbs, and adjectives are all members of one major category. The later rules of Ward's
grammar give the noun substantive a priority over the
other categories, which are all describable in terms of
their relationship to the noun; this suggests a comparison with categorical analyses of syntax which have two
major categories: sentence and noun.
The fact that Ward's
grammar has so much in common with current interests is
attributed to the use he made of Locke's philosophy.
The philosophical standpoint from which he was working
gave new impetus and depth to his linguistic analysis,
When Ward's conclusions are false, which is not infrequent,
they serve to remind the linguist that his theory will
never be able to transcend the inevitably limited intellectual background of the age in which he was living,
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
William Ward's Essay on Grammar.
Goals of the History of k-guistiCS.
0.3. Two Criteria for Evaluating Lingu.istic
Theories. 0.4. The Contemporary and Historical
Significance of Ward's Essay. 0.5. Division of
of the Thesis.
0.1.
0.2.
p. 12
Chapter I
The European Linguistic Tradition behind Ward's Essay
on Grammar
1.0. ~ntroduxion. 1.1. A Unified Tradition:
The Limits of Linguistics
The Greeks. 1.1.1.
in Greece. 1.1.2. Reasons for Greek Interest
in Language. 1.1.3. Aristotle. 1.1.4. The
Stoics. 1.1.5. Dionysius Thrax and the
Alexandrians. 1.1.6. Appolonius Dyscolus.
1.2. The Romans. 1.2.1. Varro. 1.2.2. Donatus
and Priscian. 1.3. The Middle Ages. 1.3.1.
Helias, Bacon, and Kilwardby. 1.3.2. The Modistae. 1.4. The Renaissance. 1.4.1. Sanctius,
Ramus and Lily. 1.4.2. Continuing Interest
in Speculative Grammar. 1.5. The Seventeenth
and Eighteenth Centuries. 1.5.1. The Cartesian
Movement. 1.5.2. Port Royal,
Chapter I1
P. 44
Philosophy and Linguistics in Post-Renaissance England
.
2.0. Introduction. 2.1 Cartesian Ideas in
England. 2.2. John Locke 1632-1705. 2.2.1.
Locke and Language. 2.2.2. An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding. 2.2.3. The Grammarians'
Neglect of Locke. 2.3. David Hartley 1705-1757.
2.3.1. Hartley and Locke. 2.3.2. Hartley's
Theory. 2.3.3. Hartley's Place in the Intellectual Tradition. 2.4. Summary of the Dominant
Intellectual Trends of the Eighteenth Century.
2.5. Survey of the Grammatical Works in England
prior to 1765. 2.5.0.1. Ways of Dealing with
Case. 2.5.0.2. The Notional Concept of Case
in Latin. 2.5.1. William Bullokar. 2.5.2.
Alexander Hume. 2.5.3. John Wallis. 2.5.4.
Charles Gildon and John Brightland. 2.5.5. James
Harris. 2.5.6. Further Directions.
Chapter I11
William Ward
3.0. Introduction. 3.1. Editions of the Essav
-- - on Grammar. 3.1.1. contents of the Essay.
3.2. Ward's Motives for Writing a Grammar.
3.3. Ward's Attitudes to ducati ion. 3.4.-ward's
Attitudes to Language. 3.5. Ward's claim to
Uniqueness.
Chapter IV
The Sources of Ward's Essay on Grammar
-
p . 87
4.0. Introduction. 4.0.1. Ward's Acknowledgement of his Sources. 4.1. The direct Influence
of John Locke, David Hartley, and Claude Buffier.
4.1.1. John Locke: An Essay concerning Human
Understanding (1690). 4.1.1.1. LocketsDivision
of Ideas. 4.1.1.2. Ward's Use of Locke's Ideas.
4.1.1.3. Mixed Modes as a Source of Ward's
Linguistic Relativity Theory. 4.1.1.4. Ideas
of Relation and Ward's Transitity Theory.
4.1.1.5. Particles. 4.1.1.6. The Relation of
Ideas and Words. 4.1.1.7.
Summary of Lockets
Influence. 4.1.2. David Hartley: Observations
on Man (1749). 4.1.2.1. Hartley and Rational
Grammar. 4.1.2.2. Hartley's View on Language
Structure. 4.1.2.3. HartleytsWord Classes
A
and the Analogy with Algebra. 4.1.2.4.
Seminal Semantic Theory. 4.1.2.5. Swnmary of
Hartley's Influence. 4.1.3. Claude Buffier's
Grammaire Francoise sur un Plan Nouveau (1749).
4.1.3.1. Grammar, Particular and Universal.
4.1.3.2. Ward's Advance on Buffier. 4.1.3.3.
Ellipsis. 4.1.3.4. Summary of Buffier's
Influence. 4.2. The Indirect Influence of
Some Continental Grammarians. 4.2.1. Franciscus
Sanctius: Minerva (1587). 4.2.1.1. Ward's Use
of Sanctius. 4.2.2. Antoine Arnauld and Claude
Lancelot: Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee (1660).
4.2.2.1. Language and Thought. 4.2.2.2. Arnauld's
and Ward's Views of Underlying Structure.
4.2.3. Abbe Fromant: Reflexions sur les Fondemens
de 1'Art de Parler (1756). 4.3. The Indirect
Influence of some Ehglish Grammarians.
4.3.1. Richard Johnson: Grammatical Commentaries
(1706). 4.3.2. James Harris: Hermes (1751).
4.3.2.1. Harris' View of Case. 4.3.2.2. The
Parts of Speech 4.3.2.3. Sentence Types
4.3.2.4. Coalescence 4.3.2.5. Summary of the
Relation of Harris and Ward. 4.3.3. Robert
Lowth (1762). 4.4. Summary of Sources.
P O 149
Chapter V
The Metalanguage of Ward's Essay on Grammar
5.0. Introduction. 5.1. Technical Terminology.
5.1.1. The 'Idea' or 'Conceptiones
5.1.1.1. The Term 'Ideatin Previous Theories.
5.1.1.2. The 'Idea' or 'Conception' in Ward's
Theory. 5.1.2. The Term 'Speculative.
5.1.3. 'Operations of the Mind.' 5.1.4.
'Principles of Exist'Coalescence.' 5.1.5.
ence.' 5.1.6. 'Demonstrative Circumstancesee
5.2. Terminology of Word Classes. 5.2.1e1Parts
of Speech.' 5.2.2. Definitions of Particular
'Parts' Examined. 5.3. The Study of Metalanguage.
Chapter VI
6.0. Introduction 6.1. Common Features of
Substantives, Adjectives and Verbs. 6elele
Noun Substantives and Noun Adjectives.
6.1.3. The Verb. 6.2. Feature Analysis of
Major Word-Classes. 6.2.1. The Feature (con3
Constant Mark. 6.2.2. The Feature (ss) or
Self-supporting. 6.2.3. The Feature (~oted)
6.3. Rules Linking Ideas to Word-Classes.
6.3.1. Coalescence and the Principle of
Existence 6.4. The Minor Word-Classes.
6.4.1. Pronouns. 6.4.2. The Adverb,
Chapter VII
p 207
Relations Between Concepts: An Approach to Syntax
7.0. Grammatical Relations. 7.1. Case.
7.1.1. Three Levels of Analysis. 7.1.2. The
!
Function of Case. 7.1.3. Nominative and
Accusative Cases. 7.1.4. Substantives in
Oblique Cases the Equivalent of Adjectives.
7.1.5. A New Theory of Transitivity. 7.1.6,
Two Basic Sentence Types. 7.1.7. Verbs
viii
Followed by Prepositions or more than One
Noun, 7.1.8, Prepositions. 7.2, Adjectives
and Verbs. 7.2.1. Syntactic Function of the
Definitive Verb. 7.3. Relative Pronouns and
Relative Clauses. 7.3.1. The Notion of Degree.
7.3.2. Content Clauses and Relative Clauses.
7.3.3.
The Relative Clause and its Resolution.
7.3.4. Rule Cycles in Relative Clauses.
7.4. Extraposition. 7.5. A Note on Performatives.
p.264
Chapter VIII
The Essay on Grammar in the Eighteenth and Twentieth
Centuries
8.0. Introduction. 8.1. Eighteenth Century
Views of Ward. 8.1.1. Eighteenth Century
Interest in Universal Grammar. 8.2. Ward
and the Twentieth Century. 8.2.1. Categorial
Grammars.
8.3. Conclusion: WArd and Locke.
Bibliography
I would like to express my appreciation for the
help I have received in the preparation of this thesis
from Geoffrey Bursill-Hall and the other members of my
committee, My thanks also to Ronald Baker, who introduced me to early English grammars, to Barry Bartlett,
Richard de Armond, and Wynn Roberts for many productive
discussions on the history of linguistics and syntactic
theory, and to Philippa Polson for her many helpful
suggestions and enthusiastic encouragement, Finally
my thanks to Maureen Henry for devotedly typing the
manuscript.
James N. Pankhurst
S i l e s p r i n c i p e s d e , l a Langue que l ' o n enseigne
h t o i e n t vraiment r a i s o n n e s , l e s jeunes g e n s , que l a
on e n r i c h e r o i t
Grammai,re r e b u t e , y p r e n d r o i e n t g 8 u t ;
l e u r memoire, e t on o r n e r o i t l e u r e s p r i t ; on n 1 6 t e i n d r o i t
p a s , dans l e s g l a c e s d g u n e t r i s t e e t sombre r o u t i n e , c e s
beaux f e u d l u n e n o b l e i m a g i n a t i o n , q u g o n ne d o i t
q u l e x c i t e r e t e n t r e t e n i r dans l e c o w s d e s huma$nit&.
~ k f l e x i o n ss u r l e s
Pondemens d x l m
de ~ a r l e, r1 7 5 6 , ~
-
Introduction
0.1
.
-
William Kard s Essay on G r a m m a r
0.2
Goals of t h e History of L i n g u i s t i c s
0.3.
Two C r i t e r i a f o r Evaluating L i n g u i s t i c Theories
0.4.
The Contemporary and H i s t o r i c a l S i g n i f i c a n c e
of Ward's Essay
0.5.
Division of Thesis
-.
INTRODUCTION
0.1.
William Ward's Essay on Grammar
The following chapters offer as a contribution to
the history of linguistics an account of an interesting
but little known English grammarian, William Ward.
-
He
-
published An Essay On Grammar in 1765; its complexity,
scope of investigation, and speculative1 approach place
it outside the more familiar English grammatical tradition.
In eighteenth century England the only study at all comparable to Ward's is James Harrist Hermes: -or
9
-A Philosophical
-
Inquiry Concerning Language and Universal Grammar (1751)~
and although Ward's Essay is in many ways a development
from Hermes, it is markedly different in approach. The
-
Essay on Grammar owes a considerable debt to the Grammaire
Generale et ~aisonngeof Port Royal, published in 1660,
/
/
-
yet there is little direct borrowing; Ward follows a
different line of development from it than do the eighteenth
century French speculative grammarians.2
The Essay has
1. The word 'speculative' is defined by the O.E.D. as
"characterized by speculation or theory in contrast to
practical or positive knowledgeetlThis meaning would
seem to be close to Ward's; it is, however, different
from the older sense of the word, as it was used in the
Middle Ages, in the sense of 'mirroringtreality.
1
2. Louis Kukenheim, Esquisse
Fran aise et de
'+li566~
eenth century grammars.
many intellectually stimula4ing suggestions, but it
appears to mark the end of development in the short
speculative tradition in English grammars.
' There are
several other English works which purport to be universal
or speculative, but they are usually so only in name. 2
Ward and Harris are the only two outstanding speculative
grammarians of the English tradition in grammar.3
0.2.
Goals of the History of Linguistics
The present-day linguist may very well question the
value of attempting to characterize the grammatical theories
of earlier periods, particularly the work of a man who
marks the end of a line of development; it is, in any case,
commonly held that the scientific study of language began
with Sir William Jonesf lecture on Sanskrit in 1786, However,
it has recently become evident that the past two thousand
years have been rich and varied as far as linguistic
speculation is concerned. What has not been made so evident
is why the study of the past in linguistics is not merely
1,
No one appears to have developed Ward's ideas, although
there is evidence that Charles Coote owes something to Ward.
Ian Michael in ''English Grammatical Categories," (unpublished
Dissertation, University of Bristol, 1903), p. 428, notes
that Coote uses the same examples as Ward in his discussion
of the transitive verb. Coote's interest in communication
and his interest in Locke are discussed in Chapter V I I I .
2.
There is a discussion of these in paragraph 8.1,1,
3. Harrisf Hermes has frequently been discussed in histories
of linguistics. It will only be discussed here in its relation to Ward's Essay.
5
an antiquarian interest.
'
Obviously, although the past may
well have much to teach us, the linguist does not in practice
go to history in search of new ideas or new approaches. The
importance of the history of linguistics is that it helps
place the present in perspective.
Present-day linguistic
science is inevitably a product of the past in that it was
the past which provided the intellectual and cultural environment out of which the present grew.
This suggest that
an understanding of the history of linguistics provides us
with a means of measuring the extent to which our own theo--
retical assumptions are culture bound and a means of observing the latent dependency ~f these assumptions on the
~
requirements of current applications of linguistic theory. 2
If the history of linguistics is to serve these ends it is
important that the past should be seen as it was rather than
through tinted lenses of the present.
It is tempting to
survey the past and select those aspects of it for study
which seem to support the findings of modern theory, but
In R. H. Robins, A Short Histor
of Lin istics, (London,
4
--f?-7
to which
this introduction owes much) offering a theoretical justifica1.
1968), there is an e x F e r n lntro uccry c apter
tion of the
study of the history of-linguistics.
2.
The argument does exist, and is supported in part by
M. A. K. Halliday, that practical requirements would dictate
the structure of the theory. In many ways it is a persuasive argument, but it renders even more necessary a clear
understanding of the nature of the dependency between theory
and a~nlicationof theory. See M. A. K. Halliday, "Syntax
Series on
i d thi consumer,lt
Language and Literature,
-
-
such a procedure will not be a means of illuminating the
present.
Historical studies will be interested in the
relevance of the past to the present, but the historian
must seek to unfold the past according to what it was, even
though he is a very different participant in the context
of situation.
After he has illuminated the past his task
would seem to consist in relating it to the present, pointing out such advances or parallels as may seem relevant,
always remembering that the present is but the antecedent
of the future and cannot necessarily be used as a yardstick
--
for measuring the worth of the past.
However, the past,
because it is not part of the present to which we are culturally and intellectually bound, may be able to serve as
a yardstick or criterion for evaluating the present,
0.3.
Two Criteria for Evaluating Linguistic Theories
The progress which is being made today in theoretical
linguistics can be measured according to two criteria: one
is the extent to which a theory is able to account in general terms for the phenomenon of language. This supposedly an empirical criterion; however, as yet, no acceptable
evaluation procedure has been agreed upon by linguists for
measuring a theory's value, (simplicity is rejected by some,
I
and agreed by others, but even those who agree to it have
been unable to define it satisfactorily); 1 moreover, there
1.
P.
H e
Mathews, ttSomeRemarks on the Householder-Halle
is no general agreement as $0 whether the starting point
of a theory should be a series of syntactic ruies to which
semantic and phonological representations are eventually
attached or whether it should be a number of unordered
terms, with attached lexicon-independent semantic features,
which are ordered according to the rules of the grammar and
their inherent semantic features. While these questions
remain unanswered, there are definite problems in attempting
to use a theory's accountability value as a critical tool
measuring its worth.
--
The alternative criterion to empirical
evaluation is the historical and comparative evaluation.
This depends on the hypothesis, for which there is an
.
increasing amount of evidence, that most supposedly new
developments in linguistic theory will have various historical antecedents.
By modern standards these antecedents will
generally appear to be crude attempts at formulating coherent theories; that these antecedents appear crude will
partly be due to our inability to understand the writer's
terminology and general frame of reference.
However, past
Controversy," Journal of Linguistics, IV, 2 (1968), 279,
discusses the problem of how we are to measure simplicity:
It is not obvious that there is ANY evaluation
procedure which will meet this particular condition h hat descri tively adequate grammars will
Halle evidently hoped that
always be shorter
such a procedure could be devised; but there is
nothing, at least in the published literature
which suggests that this hope is likely to be
fulfilled.
5.
theories will offer assistance in several ways: they will
illumine for us the philosophical motivations for the kind
'
of approach that we ourselves are embarking on; critical
evaluation of an earlier theory will sharpen the critical
faculty for approaching the contemporary theory, making
us aware of the more obvious pitfalls; finally, the later
development of the old theory, or its falling into oblivion,
will suggest possible trends for the future of the contemporary theory.
Modern linguistics, then, has two methods
available for evaluating its progress; one is the account--
ability approach, which it shares with modern science; the
other is the critical evaluation approach based on the
~
history of linguistics, which is akin to the evaluation
procedures of literary criticism and philosophy: contemporary work is evaluated implicitly or explicitly in terms of
what has gone before it.
The fact that linguistics uses
and needs both the accountability and the comparative
criterion in evaluating its progress suggests that the
elucidation and evaluation of previous theories of language
1 , Noam Chomsky, Language and -*Mind
says:
With the benefit
see clearly that
a rich tradition
quite harmful to
(New York, 1968), p.19,
of hindsight I think we can now
the disparagement and neglect of
proved in the long run to be
the study of language.
Chomskylswork in the history of linguistics, even if somewhat sketchy, is a good example of how history can clarify
the presuppositions, goals, and philosophical asswnptions
of a contemporary theory.
is a contribution to present-day linguistics and that the
I
study of the history of linguistics is part of the study
of general linguistics.
The Contemporary and Historical Significance of
0.4.
Ward's Essay
The speculative theories of the Middle Ages and the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which are so often
dismissed as obscure, are particularly deserving of attention.
Their obscurity arises out of our own failure to
understand the language and the goals of the writers of
past ages.
Many theories were successful or unsuccessful
attempts to make insightful statements about language;
however, we find that even if the expositions were unsuccessful the explanatory goals were often remarkably similar to
our own goals.
William Ward's Essay on Grammar puts forward
an explanatory hypothesis which describes not merely what
the relationships are between words, but explains how the
relationships achieve the speaker's communicative intention.
He sees what is essentially a two-term system operating in
our process of thinking, and relates the traditional and
somewhat arbitrary categories of grammar to this system.
Ward's language is often obscure, his categories often
I
doubtful, and his anlysis frequently in psychological terms
rather than grammatical terms, but there is ample evidence
that recent developments in linguistic theory appear to
have features in common with Ward's system. I
The historical
I
significance of Willim Ward is not to be seen in ternis of
the influence he had on his contemporaries as an authority
on usage or as an innovator in the tradition; indeed, in
this sense he is not a major historical figure.
His impor+
tance lies in the fact that he took over some ideas that had
developed from the Port Royal theory of language in eighteenth century France, and adapted them to the theory of
knowledge of John Locke, and attempted to show how one
human mind uses words to communicate with another hwnan
mind.
It was not enough for William Ward that there should
be a certain number of grammatical categories (parts of
speech) in language to which ideas or meanings happen to
be attached; for him the starting point had to be the idea
itself as it existed in the mind.
He sought to explain
grammar not just as a system of classification (as the
tradition was content to do), but as an account of the
total process of communication.
0.5.
Division of the Thesis
Chapter I outlines the European grammatical tradition
which was the matrix out of which English linguistics grew.
Chapter I1 discusses the philosophical and grammatical
tradition in England of which Ward was part, and suggests
the special problems of the English grammarians. Chapter I11
1.
This is discussed in paragraphs 8.2. and 8.2.1.
introduces Ward the grammarian and educator.
Chapter IV
discusses in detail the most obvious and important sources
-
of the Essay on Grammar.
Ward's metalanguage.
Chapter V is an explication of
Chapter VI gives an account of Ward's
view of the formation of grammatical categories.
Chapter
VII outlines Ward's approach to syntax and seeks to show
how the Essay offers new psychological dimensions for the
study of language; it examines Ward's discussion of the
operations performed by the mind in encoding and decoding
speech.
The final chapter evaluates Ward's significance
in terms of the eighteenth century and present-day linguistics.
Chapter I
The Euro~eanLinmistic Tradition Behind Ward's
Essay on Grammar
1- 0
Introduction
1.1.
1.1,1.
1 - 1 -2.
1.1 - 3 .
1.1.4.
1.1.5.
1.1.6.
A Unified Tradition: The Greeks
The Limits of Linguistics in Greece
Reasons for Greek Interest in Language
Aristotle
The Stoics
Dionysius Thrax and the Alexandrians
Appolonius Dyscolus
1.2.
1.2.1.
1.2.2.
The Romans
Varro
Donatus and Priscian
1 ,3.
1.3.1.
1.3.2.
The Middle Ages
Helias, Bacon, and Kilwardby
The Modistae
1.4.
1.4.1.
1.4.2.
The Renaissance
Sanctius, Ramus and Lily
Continuing Interest in Speculative Grammar
1.5.
1.5.1.
1.5.2.
The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
The Cartesian Movement
Port Royal
CHAPTER
I
I
THE EUROPEAN LINGUISTIC TRADITION BEHIND WARD'S
-
ESSAY ON GRAMMAR
Introduction
The history of linguistics is much more than an account of the Western grammatical tradition which grew out
of Plato's first speculations about the function of language.
China had a tradition of linguistic studies even
before the European world had made contact with the country;' both the Jews and the Arabs are known to have had a
linguistic tradition; then there were apparently isolated
-
developments of great originality, such as the First Grammatical Treatise by an unknown Icelandic grammarian.2
However, there are two dominant streams of thought which
are the antecedents of current work in linguistics: one
is the European tradition which grew from Greece, and the
other is the Indian tradition.
Indian linguistics was pro-
bably inspired by the desire to preserve religious texts of
the Vedic period (c. 1200-1000 B.C,) 3 and flourished several centuries before the main Greek studies of grammar.
The
Indians were especially sophisticated in the area of phono-
R, H, Robins, A Short History of Linguistics, (London,
1967), p. 104.
1.
2.
Ibid., p. 72.
3.
Ibid., p. 136.
14
logical theory; the discovery of their work at the end of
the eighteenth century provided a great impetus for linguists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to
concentrate their studies on phonology rather than syntax.
The latter was largely abandoned, and those studies of
syntax that were produced in the first half of the twentieth century tended to be arid and unproductive in
theoretical terms.'
However, prior to the discovery of
Indian linguistics, syntax had been of much greater theoretical significance and William Ward was writing his
-
Essay on Grammar at a time when the rich Greek-inspired
tradition was still flourishing.
The following account'
of the European tradition2 attempts to show that it was
a productive tradition, and suggests that the science of
linguistics has made its greatest strides forward when
the field of enquiry has been in touch with other disciplines and has thus been wider than what is often
conceived to be the field of linguistic enquiry.
1.
The work of Noam Chomsky is important historically
because it has served to unite the phonological tradition
in linguistics with the European grammatical tradition.
Chomsky readily admits the correlations between his work
and the concerns of the earlier grammarians,
2. This account has largely relied for factual information and, often, quotation of primary sources on the
following books and article: R. H. Robins,
. op.
- cit.,
Francis 5. Dinneen, An Introduction to General Lin istics
(New York, 1967). a n d ~ .L. ~ u r s i l l - E l m i a e v a
ramm ma tical ~h&ies," Canadian Journal of Linguistics,
IX (1963)p 40-45.
-
--++-
1.1.
A Unified Tradition: The Greeks
The 'Parts of Speech' approach to language study,
which Ward and the other grammarians of the eighteenth
century inevitably followed, owed its origins to classical
Greece. We see Plato and Aristotle attempting to talk
about language and making basic divisions of the sentence
(or rather the proposition, which was taken to be the basic
sentence form), calling the first part the onoma and the
second part the rhema.
It is not easy to decide from the
texts whether these were names of linguistic divisions of
the
comparable to subject and predicate, or
topic and comment, or whether they were names of word categories as such. The terms were interpreted or re-classified
by later speculators as what we understand to be noun and
verb; various other parts of speech were then distinguished.
Dionysius Thrax recognized eight, and his system was followed closedly for the succeeding two thousand years.
There is
probably no other science which has clung so closely, or so
doggedly, to the framework set up by the Greeks,
The Limits of Linguistics in Greece
Discussion of the science of linguistics in the past
is inclined to beg an important question, which is that of
!
the delineation of the area of its enquiry.
It would be a
possible but fruitless procedure to limit the area to what
is today considered as part of linguistic science ( and there
is no general agreement on this question even today),
,
A
more satisfactory working procedure would bc to recognize
all discussion of problems connected with language as relevant to the history of linguistics in those times when
there was no division between philosophical and grammatical
studies on the other: thus although Aristotle's preoccupation with language may have been a logician's preoccupation,
his logical categories were the foundation of the Stoics'
and Alexandrians' grammatical classification, The latter
procedure has been followed here, but this is not to suggest
that a comprehensive history of linguistics is being presented.
Rather the aim is to present a highly selective account
of the study of language in as broad a historical perspective
as possible,I
1,l.Z.
Reasons for Greek Interest in Language
Interest in language in the past was fostered by the
practical needs of the community or by its intellectual
interests in areas other than language.
In Greece linguis-
tic speculation was motivated by a wide-ranging number of
contemporary problems.
One of these was the physis-nomos
controversy--the controversy which when discussed in relation to language centered on the question of whether it was
1 , One of the areas that has not been touched upon at all
is phonetics.
17
purely conventional, Aristotle held that language was conventional, while the stoics believed that it had once been
natural even if it had now become largely conventional, There
were good arguments for both sides, and in itself, it was not
perhaps a very important issue.
Its importance, suggests
Robins, is that it stimulated people to examine language as
an entity in itself:
Historically the importance of the controversy
is due to its place in the early development of
linguistic theory and to the stimulus it provided
to more detailed examination of the Greek language.
Ir,maintaining and criticizing each side of the
argument people were led to examine more closely
the structures and the meaning of the words and
the formal patterns that words exhibited. In
such examications lies the beginnings of precise
linguistic analysis,1
It is important to recognize that this physis-nomos
debate did not arise from an interest in language, but
developed from the much more general philosophical concerns
of the day, and was instrumental in creating an interest
in language:
A principal topic of discussion among the preSocratic Philosophers and among the later Sophists,
and one that appears in several dialogues of
Plato, was to what extent accepted standards,
institutions, and judgments of what is right
and wrong, just and unjust, and so on, were
grounded in the nature of things and to what
extent they were essentially the products of
a tacit convention or even of explicit legislation.2
1.
R. H. Robins, op. cit., p . 19,
2.
Ibid., p. 19.
1.1.3.
Aristotle
,
The e x t e n t of A r i s t o t l e ' s i n f l u e n c e i n l i n g t i i s t i c s i s
debatable.
The S t o i c s , although d i s a g r e e i n g with him i n
t h e above controversy, d i d u s e h i s d i v i s i o n of t h e sentence
o r p r o p o s i t i o n ; but they used h i s terms only as a s t a r t i n g
p o i n t , and made t h e i r d i v i s i o n of language i n t o p a r t s of
speech.
However, h i s comments on language have served a s
more t h a n j u s t a s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r S t o i c grammarians.
Others throughout t h e next two thousand y e a r s repeated i n
v a r i o u s ways what A r i s t o t l e had s a i d ; t h i s suggests t h a t he
w a s touching on m a t t e r s of enduring concern t o l i n g u i s t s ,
H i s remarks occur i n De I n t e r p r e t a t i o n e , a d i s c u s s i o n on
logic.
He i n t r o d u c e s h i s d i s c u s s i o n of o'noma and rh8ma i n
connection with t h e proposition:
Let u s f i r s t d e f i n e 6noma and rhcma, and then
e x p l a i n what i s m e a n w d e n i a m f i r m a t i o n ,
p r o p o s i t i o n , and sentence
A n dnoma i s a sound having meaning, e s t a b l i s h e d
through convention a l o n e but with no r e f e r e n c e
whatever t o time
A rhzma has a time
I m i c a t e s always
r e f e r e n c e as well
i
s
s
a
i
d
o
r
a
s s e r t e d of somethingt h a t something
e- -l s e- Rhemata bs themselves. then. a r e
6nomata, and t h e y n d V f o r o r s i g n i f y something
for sueaker s t o p s i n h i s process of t h i n k i n g
and t h e mind of t h e - h e a r e r acquiesces. ~ o w e v e r i
they do nor as y e t express p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e
judgments
..........
.-
....
.
........
.
.
A r i s t o t l e was i n t e r e s t e d i n speech a s a way of
!
1.
The t r a n s l a t i o n i s by Dinneen; see ope c i t . , p . 80.
expressing judgment.
It is interesting to note the essential
I
similarity that he sees between &oma
and rhema.
The only
difference is that one has time reference and the other does
not.
There is no other such explicit emphasis on the simi-
larity of noun and verb until William Ward makes his out.-standing and revolutionery statement that they are more alike
than different, 1
In his discussion of language Aristotle introduced
a word that has had a long and controversial history in
the metalanguage of linguistics: ptosis, 'case.'
Aristotle
used it to mean falling away. For him all tenses of the
verb except the present tense were cases of the verb, or
fallings away, and all of our cases except the nominative
were cases or falling away from the true :noma
or noun.
He is not using the term in a linguistic sense, but as a
descriptive term with, it seems, slightly pejorative overtones; he uses it as a means of circumscribing and excluding
as irrelevant all linguistic forms which do not make up
part of his logical proposition. Propositions about which
truth value had to be determined were necessarily in the
present tense (there could be no doubt about the past and
no certainty about the future), and they were of the form:
"every man is healthyw or "no man is healthy."
In Greek,
all nouns, substantive and adjective, in these phrases would
be in what we call the nominative case, consequently, only
1.
~f.
Para. 6.1.
the nominative was relevant to Aristotelian logic.
The words
I
used for connecting propositions, or distributing them (in
a logical sense) were known as syndesmoi, which is often
translated as tparticles.t The point which is being emphasized here is that Aristotlets terminology was ~ o t
really
grammatical terminology as such, but was developed in order
to talk about the linguistic units which made up one type
of logical proposition, The significance of Aristotle Is
comments on language arises directly from the fact that at
a certain stage in its history linguistics was not distinguished from the science of logic.
The lack of differ-
entiation between what we now recognize as separate sciences
was, however, productive; Aristotletsmethodology for
establishing categories was different from the methodology
of traditional grammar.
His alternative criteria provide
us with fresh insights on the process of classification,
In as much as he was not using grammatical criteria it
could be said that he is not actually part of the western
grammatical tradition, but was instrumental in creating it,
1.14.
Thestoics
The Stoic philosophers divided Aristotlets units
according to formal linguistic criteria, The syndesmoi
were divided into those which had invariant forms (prepositions and conjunctions) amd those which were subject to
/
inflection (having certain formal similarities to onoma),
21
namely, the article and the pronoun; as such articles and
I
pronouns were not distinguished at this stage, They were
jointly called the arthra.
Aristotlelsptosis was restrio. .
ted to nominal categories, and extended to include the
nominative case.
A separate terminology for verbal cate-
gories was evolved; temporal divisions of the verb were
analysed and the Stoics recognized aspectual as well as
temporal classification of tenses, The principal interest
of the Stoics was philosophical, but theirwell known zeal
for categorization of reality led them to create categories
in language on a formal linguistic basis,
1 . I .5.
Dionysius Thrax and the Alexandrians
Ultimately it was not the Stoics, but the Alexandrian
scholars who were responsible for the final division and
naming of the parts of speech as we know them.
Grammatika of Dionysius Thrax (c.100 B,C.)
J
The Techne
is the most def-
initive of the Alexandrian gramrcatical works, Thrax8s
classification of the parts of speech is a masterpiece of
formal precision and is quoted here on account of its
historical importance. 1
I
1. Robins attests its importance: "...the description given
by Thrax was regarded as definitive. It was translated into
Armenian and Syrian early in the Christian era, and was the
subject of a considerable amount of comment and exegesis
from Byzantine critics, or scholiasts. It remained a standard work for thirteen centuries and a modern writer has
declared that almost every textbook of English grammar bears
evidence of a debt to Thraxa4*(p. 3 1 ) .
onoma (noun): a part of speech inflected for case,
signifying a person or'a thing,
4
rhema (verb): a part of speech without case inflee-t
u
t
inflected for tense, person, and number,
signifying an activity or process performed or
undergone,
/
metoche (participle): a part of speech sharing the
features of the verb and noun,
A
arthron (article): a part of speech inflected for
case and preposed or postposed to nouns,
antonymia (pronoun): a part of speech substitutable
for a noun and marked for person,
rothesis (preposition): a part of speech placed
P/her
words in composition and syntax,
/
>
-
epirhema (adverb): a part of speech without inflection, in modification of or in addition to a verb,
1
Syndesmos (conjunction): a part of speech binding
together the digcourse and filling gaps in its
interpretation.'
The Alexandrians were literary scholars, and interest
in language was inspired by a desire to perform textual
analysis and to preserve the literary language; thus classification of linguistic material was regarded as a worthwhile activity in itself.
1 .I -6.
Appolonius Dyscolus
The grammatical work of Appolonius Dyscolus, a grammarian
who introduced developments and innovations to Thraxts scheme,
has survived.
He was described by Priscian as the greatest
authority on grammar.
1.
His historical importance lies
The translation is by Robins; see op. cit., p. 34.
f i r s t l y i n h i s attempt t o r e u n i t e philosophy and l i n g u i s t i c s :
He made use of t h e same s e t of e i g h t word c l a s s e s
a s those given i n t h e ~ d c h n e ,but he redefined
some of them more p a r t m l y t o make g r e a t e r
use of p h i l o s o p h i c a l terminology and t o e s t a b l i s h
a common c l a s s meaning f o r each word c l a s s . He
defined t h e pronoun not merely as a noun s u b s t i t u t e as Thrax had done, but a d d i t i o n a l l y as
s t a n d i n g f o r substance ( d u s i a ) without q u a l i t i e s ,
a statement repeated by P r i s c i a n and of considera b l e importance l a t e r i n mediaeval l i n g u i s t i c
thought ,l
and secondly i n h i s i n t e r e s t i n syntax, an a r e a which Thrax
had n o t d e a l t with.
H i s i n t e r e s t i n syntax centered on t h e
r e l a t i o n of t h e noun and t h e verb; he recognized d i f f e r e n t
c l a s s e s of v e r b s ( a c t i v e , p a s s i v e , and n e u t e r ) , and described
t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e nominal cases.
He d e s c r i b e s t h e
a c t i o n as "passing over t o something e l s e H i n a c t i v e o r
t r a n s i t i v e verbs.
The r e s u l t of many of h i s innovations
i s s t i l l with u s today.
1 .2.
The Romans
1.2.1.
Varro
The l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r i e s propounded during t h e period
of t h e Roman Empire a l l owe a g r e a t d e a l t o t h e i r Greek
a n t e c e d e n t s ; t h i s i s even t r u e of Varro, who w a s t h e most
o r i g i n a l of a l l L a t i n grammarians.
Only fragments of h i s
work remain; i t i s evident from t h e s e t h a t he was dependent
1.
Robins, op, c i t . , p. 37.
on Greek thought: he analyses in detail the analogy-anomaly
debate on the nature of language,
Here h e offers a compro-
mise solution with his notion of 'spontaneous derivationt
and hatural derivation.
I
.
tSpontaneousderivation8
(derivatio voluntarius) refers to the spontaneous creation
of a lexical item with or without regard to the rules of
the language, and would appear to correspond to the anomalist position; 'natural derivationt (derivatio naturalis)
,
is the derivation of forms according to the rules of the
language. Varro asserted that any expression referring to
an object or--anidea must be subject to this process.
It
is the process of analogy that the Greeks had discussed,
but Varro's observations are interesting because h.e suggests
that not only is it a property of Latin, but a property of
language in general, and one that makes language learning
possible.2
Varrotsaccount of word formation was also inter-
esting on account of his separation of derivational and
1. This is discussed in D. Terence Langendoentsarticle,
"The Lin istic Theory of Varro," ~oundationsof Language,
11 ( 1 9 6 8 3 3 - 3 6 , .
-
tt~erivation
has been introduced not only into Latin
speech, but into the speech of all men, because it is
useful and necessary; for if this system had not developed, we could not learn such a great number of words
as we should have--for the possible forms into which
they are inflected is numerically uclimited--nor from
those which we should have learned would it be clear
that the relationship existed between them so far as
their meanings were ~oncerned.~'
(De Lingua Latina, viii,
15, 62. tr. Roland G. Kent, Loeb masslcal m y ,
Cambridge, Mass., 1938, quoted in Langendoen, op. cit.)
2.
!
inflexional endings.
His division of the parts of speech,
I
which appears to owe l i t t l e to the Greeks, and which seappears in later grammars, was based on four inflexionally
contrasting classes: nouns, having case inflexion, verbs,
having tense inflexion, participles, having both, and adverbs having neither.
Varro wrote his grammar in the first
century B.C.
1.2.2.
Donatus and Priscian
Donatus (fourth century) and Priscian (c. A.D, 500)
are the two best
-known Latin grammarians.
They both owe
much to the Greek tradition, especially the formulations
of Thrax and Appolonius Dyscolus.
Although the evidence
of borrowing from Thrax is strong in both grammarians,
Priscian claims that Appolonius is the source of much of
his work.
Priscian's grammar, the most complete of the
Byzantine period, and still the most complete Latin grammar
,
shows evidence of Appolonius' influence, Appolonius is
quoted when Priscian describes pronouns as having substance
without quality; the sentence is defined semantically:
"Oratio est ordinatio dictionwn congrua, sententiam perfectam demonstrans."'
Priscian's definitions of the noun
and verb indicate most clearly the change in emphasis from
1.
Priscian, 2.4.15.
formal to semantic criteria: I
nomen (noun, including words now classed as
G t i v e s ) : the property of the noun is t"nindicate a substance and-a quality, it assigns
a common or a particular quality to everybody
or thing.
verbwn (verb): the property of a verb is to
indicate an action or being acted upon; it
has tense 9nd mood forms, but is not case
inflected.
Priscian was codifying the grammar of classical Latin, a
dialect which had little in common with the vulgar Latin
tongue spoken in the sixth century.
His purpose in ana-
lysing grammar was the elucidation of the classical authors
and the preservation of classical Latin as a literary language among his own contemporaries.'
The literary approach
of the Alexandrians had favoured formal analysis as the
process most suitable for it's purposes, and Prisciants
adoption of semantic definitions is not obviously explained
by his immediate objectives.
It was probably due to the
influence of Appolonius, who Priscian esteemed so greatly.
In any event, Prisciantssemantic definitions, which were
accompanied in most instances by formal criteria, were to
1. But formal or logical definitions are not abandoned.
It would seem likely that the non-semantic definitions
are still prior to the semantic.
2.
i
I
I
I
The translations by Robins, op. cit,, p , 57.
3. The debt that classical scholarship owes to Priscian
as the preserver of literary Latin through the Dark Ages
can only be guessed.
change the entire direction of the study of language in the
following centuries.
1.3.
The Niddle Ages
From the point of view of the present study this period
is the most interesting and important prior to the eighteenth
century itself, We are still not able to estimate the value
and extent of the grammatical work which was accomplished
during the Middle Ages, This rather broad term should be
delimited more accurately: the most interesting period for
this study coincides
with the golden age of scholastic philo-sophy and extends from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries. The development of interest in grammar is due to the
integration and organization of scholarly activities of the
university curriculum into the trivium and the quadrivium.
Before a student could go on to acquire knowledge of
mathematics, astronomy, music, and geometry--the quadrivium-he had to become familiar with the basic tools of the scholar: grammar, logic, and rhetoric, which were known as the
trivium.
Thus grammar was to be studied by every student,
The general direction of grammatical studies in the Byzantine
period had been towards the elucidation of literary classics,
but the linking of grammar with logic and rhetoric gave
I
these studies a new impetus.
I
i
I
Although a considerable number
of literary grammars are known to have been produced in the
Middle Ages, they were becoming less literary in that they
paid less attention to the literary works they were intended
for. Bursill-Hall notes the shift in emphasis: "In the
twelfth century, grammar was taught primarily as the guide
to the art of good speaking and writing, but with the shift
away from the study of literature to the study of logic,
grammar in the thirteenth century became the handmaid no
longer of literature but of logic, a speculative science;
grammar and logic go arm-in-arm, logic distinguishing from
true and false in speculation and grammar ensuring their
correct expression.ltl Peter Abelard, who has some claim
to being called a grammarian, was a significant figure in
this change of emphasis 'in that the rise of dialectic in
the twelfth century, in which he played an important part,
coincides with the change in grammatical interest.
1.3.1.
Helias, Bacon, and Kilwardby
Most grammatical treatises since the sixth century
had been commentaries on Priscian, and it is one such
commentary, by Peter Helias2 which signals the change of
interest in grammatical studies. Peter Helias sought
philosophical explanations for Priscian's rules of grammar.
Both Robins and Bursill-Hall suggest that Peter Helias is
a systematizer of past achievements. He gains his place
in history as the man who reintroduced Aristotle to
1.
Op. cit., p. 42.
2.
Peter Helias, Summa Super Priscian, c. 1150,
grammarians and r e u n i t e d language s t u d i e s with l o g i c a l
studies.
There i s no doubt t h a t he would have given t h e
same response a s t h e s p e c u l a t i v e grammarians who followed
him t o t h e f r e q u e n t l y asked question of t h e next century:
I1Quisgrammat&
sophus
i n v e n i t , an s c i l i c e t grammaticus an philo-
Roger Bacon ( ? 1214-1294) and Robert Kilwardby
( d . 1279) follow H e l i a s , and i t i s with t h e s e men t h a t we
f i r s t observe t h e question of g e n e r a l o r u n i v e r s a l grammar
discussed.
Bacon t h i n k s t h a t t h e a c c i d e n t a l d i f f e r e n c e s
i n languages a r e n o t worth s e r i o u s study, and c o n s i d e r s
t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r of grammar t o be g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s :
"Grammatica una e t eadem e s t secundum substantiam i n omnibus
l i n g u i s , l i c e t a c c i d e n t a l i t e r v a r i e t u r O t t 2 Robert Kilwardby
i s s i m i l a r l y e x p l i c i t i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e property of grammar
which g i v e s i t t h e r i g h t t o be c a l l e d a science: l1Since
s c i e n c e remains t h e same, i n any p a r t of t h e world, and i t s
s u b j e c t remains t h e same, t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r of grammar
ought t o be t h e same i n a l l p a r t s o f t h e world.113 The
p o s s i b i l i t y of a g e n e r a l grammar stemmed from t h e f a c t
t h a t a l l languages were believed t o m i r r o r t h e world,
1 . Boethius of Dacia, quoted by M. Grabman, i n Thomas
von E r f u r t , (1943), p. 81, and quoted by Michael, op. c i t e
2.
Roger Bacon, Greek Grammar
S. A. Hirsch, (camiiig-j,
ed. Edmon Nolan and
p . 27.
3. Robert Kilwardby, quoted by G. Wallerand, Les 0gvres
de C o u r t r a i (Les Philosophes Belges,
de S i g e r ~ o u v a i n , 1963, t r . Michael, op. c i t e , p. 9.
m.'8),
30
(hence the term 'speculativet)and so would possess certain
I
correspondences. These considerations would lead to a new
grammatical movement in the thirteenth century.
1.3.2.
The Modistae
The second half of the thirteenth century was to see
the rise of a new grammatical theory, proposed by a group
of grammarians who came to be known as Nodistae.
The name
comes from the subject of their investigation: the word
classes' mode of signifying (modi
- significmdi) of the
world's mode of being (modus essendi).
Their theory un-
doubtedly grew out of the work of Peter Helias; while
Peter was concerned with the connection of logic and language they were concerned with studying language according
to the way in which it was capable of signifying reality.
Their treatises were known as Summae Modorum Significandi.
The basis of grammatical division was moved from the realm
of language to the real world, Words had different powers
of signifying reality, and the various word classes signified different aspects of it; the division of the parts of
speech was according to the way words signified reality.
It is generally considered to be a semantic classification
but Bursill-Hall takes issue with the concept of signifying as only a semantic notion and suggests that "the new
method
... sought to state the functional nature of the
categories which Priscian had described, but by means of
31
criteria stated in the form of correlates of reality to
which they correspond.l8'
The problem for the Modistae
lies with the indeclinable parts of speech, which can only
be described in functional, or formal terms.
Any account
of the modes of signifying which discussed the indeclinables as well as the principal parts of speech tends to be
unsatisfactory if it is seen as a semantic classification.
Bursill-Hall summarizes the usual explanations of the
modi
- significandi of the various word classes:
Of the declinable partes operationis, the Nomen and
Pronomen signify substance, that is, the stability
and permanence of thi~gs;the Verbwn aridParticipium
express becoming, and this mode of signifying which
embraces movement and becoming is the general feature that they share. The Nomen and Pronomen thus
represent an essentially static element and the
Verbwn and Participium an essentially dynamic
element. The indeclinable partes orationis are
grouped together by virtue of a general mode
signifying the disposition of the "ens" or the
act and then are differentiated by their special
modes. The division of the declinable partes
orationis into two sections, together with the
indeclinable partes, suggests a classification,
even though based on different criteria, which
is not unlike the classification of word classes found among modern linguists, viz. Hockett
and Jespersen.2
~
This account derives its coherence and usefulness from
the fact that it is in reality a psychological account of
the distinguishing features of the functions of the various
partes.
The indeclinables are grouped together signifying
1.
Op. cit., p. 47.
2.
Op. cit., pp. 52-53.
32
t h e l l d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e ' e n s t o r t h e a c t . "
This s i g n i f i c a t i o n of d i s p o s i t i o n , s i g n i f y i n g Ifper modim d i s p o n e n t i s " 1
a s S i g e r de C o u r t r a i c a l l s i t , does not seem t o have any
o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s , but r a t h e r a psychological s t a t u s i n
t h a t i t i s , as i t were, an i n s t r u c t i o n t o t h e mind t o cons i d e r one of t h e p r i n c i p a l p a r t s of speech i n a c e r t a i n way. 2
Whether they r e a l i s e d i t o r n o t , t h e Modistae were having
r e c o u r s e t o formal d e f i n i t i o n i n t h e s e cases.
The mode
of s i g n i f y i n g of t h e nomen, perhaps t h e m o s t c l e a r l y semant i c of t h e modes i n t h a t i t s i g n i f i e s through t h e modes of
s t a b i l i t y akd permanence,
h a s a c e r t a i n dependence on
psychological c r i t e r i a , because t h e permanence and s t a b i l i t y
of many nouns, p a r t i c u l a r l y a b s t r a c t nouns, i s t h e r e s u l t
of a c o n s t r u c t of t h e mind r a t h e r than of any c r i t e r i o n i n
t h e r e a l world.
The modistic a n a l y s i s of s y n t a c t i c descrip-
t i o n , which i s based on t h e f o u r t y p e s of c a u s a t i o n of
A r i s t o t l e : m a t e r i a l , formal , e f f i c i e n t , and f i n a l , i s f u r t h e r
1.
S i g e r de C o u r t r a i , Summa Modorum S i g n i f i c a n d i , p. 146.
2. Ian Michael d e n i e s t h a t t h e r e i s any psychological
motivation i n t h e Modistae ' s a n a l y s i s of language: llGrammar
i s fundamentally concerned with t h e expression and communication of i d e a s , but t h i s c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n given t o
communication d e r i v e s not f r o m psychological t h i n k i n g
about language, but from l o g i c a l . " (Op. c i t . , p. 25).
Michael i s t a l k i n g about t h e Modistae h e r e , but t h e f a c t s
d o n o t seem t o bear out h i s statement.
3. Thomas of E r f u r t d e s c r i b e s t h e nomen as lla p a r t of
speech s i g n i f y i n g by means o f t h e mode of an e x i s t e n t
o r of something with d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
The mode o f an e x i s t e n t i s t h e mode of s t a b i l i t y and
permanence.ll The t r a n s l a t i o n i s by Robins, op. c i t . , p. 79.
....
testimony of their essential, concern with the psychological
aspects c2f language:
Each construction is subject to analysis in terms
of the four principles of construing, so that the
material represents the members of the potential
construction, the formal represents the construction itself, the efficient represents congruence,
the mutual appropriateness (congruitas) of the
construction, and the final represents the completed construction which has satisfied all the
requirements for the,expression of a compound
concept of the mind.
The four principles of causation are used as a means of
syntactic analysis, but the discussion of the final cause
can only be interpreted as an ultimate interest in how
concepts of the human mind are communicated, rather than
a purely grammatical interest.
This is not a criticism;
the point at issue is whether going beyond narrowly grammatical concerns yields a grammatical theory which is
richer than it would otherwise have beenThe richness of
the syntactic theory of the Modistae is only now being
discovered.
Their discussions of transitivity, of depend-
ents and terminants, of congruity (collocational suitabiI
lity?) and other matters offer evidence of concerns of
1
fundamental importance to linguistics. It seems evident
I
j
!
that these concerns were brought to the notice of the
!
mediaeval grammarians as a direct result of their training
1.
Bursill-Hall, p. 53,
34
in and interest ifi scholastic philosophy and the renewed
I
mediaeval interest in ArisSotelian philosophy.
Scholastic
philosophy is often accused of dealing in fine logical or
psychological distinctions which have no validity in the
real world; these accusations are often unfair, and arise
out of a lack of understanding of the goals of the scholastics; in their approach to language the awareness of
fine distinctions led the writers of this period to attempt
not merely a classification of linguistic data, but to
attempt to understand how linguistic forms convey an
awareness ofd-realityfrom one human mind to another.
They
stand out in sharp contrast to the Nominalist grammarians
of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
1.4.
The Renaissance
This survey of grarcmatical interest in Europe is
following the usual divisions of history because these
divisions seem to be well founded, even if not as clear
cut as was once believed; more importantly, they do correspond to changes in linguistic interest, changes brought
about by changing philosophical interests and new political movements.
On the political scene the most obvious
Renaissance factor is the rise of nationalism and the recognition of the status of the vernacular tongues as
-
languages. Dante is justly famous for his De Vulgari
Eloquentia, written in the early fourteenth century, which
recognizes the need for an accepted Italian dialect other
than Latin as a means of political unity.
As the vcrnacu-
lars came to be recognized as languages, the study of Latin
as an ideal of perfect language gave way to studies which
once again had the task of imparting rules to people who
wished to learn Latin or Greek.
The Renaissance stressed
the values of classical Rome and Greece, and hence the
value of the literature of these periods.
Thus grammarians
once again adapted themselves to the needs of literary
study; they did not ignore the syntactical work of the
Mediaeval speculators; they only ignored its implications:
The teaching of Latin and Greek grammar gradually
took on the form in which it is known today in the
standard school textbooks. Essentially this process
involved the incorporation of mediaeval syntactic
notions i ~ t othe morphologi~alsystematization of
the late Latin grammarians.
1.4.1.
Sanctius, Ramus, and Lily
One of the most famous of the Renaissance grammars
is Sanctiust Hinerva -Seu de Causis Linguae ~atinae' which
was widely read and respected throughout Europe for the
two centuries following its publication.
critical edition of Minerva
its
1.
i
1
E /
There is no
and it is difficult to assess
content from a cursory reading.
There would appear to
Robins, p. 110.
2. Pranciscus Sanctius, often known as Francisco Sanchez,
first published his grammar in 1604.
be reason to believe that Sanctiushork was not as barren
1
as Robins suggests most of the Renaissance grammars were.
He may have been instrumental in developing the Port Royal
view of language. This will be considered briefly in a
later chapter.
It was not Sanctius, but two other Renais-
sance grammarians who overshadowed the English grammarians
/
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Pierre Ramee
was one; he was a Frenchman, born about 1515, and is famous
for the educational reforms he introduced into Europe.
He
wrote grammars of French, Latin, and Greek, and set down
his theory of grammar in his Scholae Grammaticae.
He
attempted to analyse each language according to its own
a priori
formal system and showed scant respect for the -
approach of the Middle Ages.
One result of his system was
an intense formalism. lhma Vorlat describes the Scholae
Grammaticae asuan attack on the philosophical foundations
of the Aristotelian grammatical theory. lt2
She claims that
Alexander Hume, Paul Greaves, Alexander Gill, Charles Butler
/
and Ben Jonson follow Rameetsformal system in England. 3
His influence is fairly limited; the main reason for this
is that sixteenth century England already had its accepted
I
Latin Grammar, published by William Lily and John Colet in
1
i
.
Robins, p. 102.
2.
Op. cit., p. 17.
3.
Ibid., p . 18.
1510.
It has easy, straightforward definitions, and
restricts itself to the essential mles of grammar.
Its
success was so great that in 1540 Henry VIII decreed that
it was the only 'authorized grammar.
It was written for
the purpose of instructing English children in the Latin
language, and was completely devoid of any philosophical
/
intentions (unlike Sanctiust and R m e ' s grammars).
It
had a major influence on the grammars published in England
in the following hundred years, and is the chief single
reason why English grammarians showed absolutely no interest in offe&ng
reasons for the classifications they had
Lily's authoritative, lapidary definitions had
made.
every appearance of being God-given, and there was very
little reason for challenging them,
1.4.2,
Continuing Interest in Speculative Grammar
Speculation about the nature of lariguage was not extinguished so easily in France during the Renaissance
period, Grammars by Sanctius, Julius Caesar Scaliger
and Thomas Campanella (the latter two being Italian grammarians of the sixteenth century) kept alive at least some
interest in the reasons behind language; this is attested
-
by the recurring titles, like De Causis Linguae Latinae,
I
This interest was to have a remarkable resurgence with
the publication of the Crammaire
1.
'Ibid., p. 14.
f
et Raisonnee
-
at
Port Royal in 1660. But by this time there would no longer
I
be a unified European tradition in grammatical studies,
1.5.
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
The Renaissance marked the breaking up of the unified
Europe of the Middle Ages, and the rise of nationalism,
The intellectual development of the following centuries
cannot be treated as a unified movement.
There were sepa-
rate movements in Germany, Prance, and England, movements
which undoubtedly were still closely related and influenced
each other, but which have their own separate identity.
The remainder of this chapter will consider France and the
significance of Descartes and Port Royal, The development
of grammar and philosophy in England will be the subject
of the next chapter.
1,,1,
The Cartesian Movement
The Renaissance saw the diversification of intellec-
tual endeavour according to the emerging national boundaries;
but the impact of Rene Descartes' writings and thoughts on
the Western world was such that we must consider him and
the Cartesian school as a significant factor in the intellectual history of seventeenth century Europe.
His philosophy
laid emphasis on the dichotomy between matter and the spirit,
since all certain knowledge came from ideas, which derived
from the spirit. Cartesian dualism fostered an interest in
language because language was the vehicle through which the
spirit of man expressed itself.
' Ernst Cassirer suggests
the implications of Cartesianism for the philosophy of
language and quotes Descartest remark to Mersenne:
Descartes gave us no independent philosophical
study of la~guage--butin a letter to Mersenne
he shows a very characteri&ic approach
--which was to be highly significant in the
ensuing period
Since the one identical
fundamental form of knowledge, the form of
human reason, recurs in all branches of knowledge, really deserving the name, all speech
must be based upon the one, universal, rational form of language, which, though cloaked by
the abundance and diversity of verbal forms,
cannot be hidden entirely.
...
....
...
As the system of numbers is exact with relatively few signs
Ititmust be possible
to designate the sum and structure of all
intellectual contents by a limited number of
linguistic signs, provided only that they are
combined in a cordance with definite, universal rules." ?!
Robins .notesthat Mersenne "probably influenced by Descartes,
suggested the creation of the best of all possible languages
by which all ments thoughts could be put into the same words
with brevity and clarity. 11 3
1, Cartesian philosophy laid much greater emphasis on the
separation of the spirit from matter, on the idea and its
importance than did the scholastics, whose philosophical
starting point was one of Mrealism,M
2. Ernst Cassirer, The Philoso h of
Ralph Manheim, ( Y a l e ; 7 9 3 d 8 ~
Mersenne is dated Nov. 20th 1629, and
Correspondence, ed., Adam-Tannery, 1 ,
3. Op. cit,, p. 114.
S bolic Forms, trans,
h
s
~
t
e to
r
appears in Descartes'
80ff.
Port Royal
The Cartesian influence on linguistic studies is most
R
/
evident some thirty years later when the Grammaire Generale
et ~aisonnkeby
-
published.
Antoine Arnauld and Claude Lancelot was
Port Royal Grammar in England and
Known as the -
referred to as such hereafter, it was an attempt to look
behind the apparent anomalies of usage and to find a rational explanation for the grammar of the French language.
The possibility of rational explanation of syntax was suggested by Descartes; Arnauld attempted to find the reasons
behind the facts of French and several other languages, but
he did not, as has often been suggested, attempt to set up
universal and immutable principles about language .ingeneral.
His synthesis was rational rathep than general,
Although one of the tenets of Cartesianism is that one should
begin scientific enquiry with an analysis of the innate conceptions which are known to be true, this method is not
Port Royal Grammar; Arnauldtsapproach is
followed in the synthetic rather than analytic.
He makes no attempt to set
up a discovery procedure, for example, and the resulting
grammar has much in common with the Modistic grammars
produced by the scholastic philosophy which Cartesianism
had rejected.
I
The influence of Cartesian thought on lang-
uage had another important parallel with the Middle Ages, and
this was the relationship, suggested in Descartest letter
to Mersenne, between language and a system of logic. The
Port Royal Grammar takes as its starting point that the
I
mind of man has the powers of perception, judgment, and
reasoning, that the first two are to be explained by grammar, but it is the study of logic which throws light on the
process of reasoning. Two years after the publication of
-
the Grammar, Arnauld published La Logique, ou 1'Art de Penser.
-
In this work he sees the connection between grammar and
logic to be close; it is reminiscent of the work of Peter
Helias in the twelfth century.
Arnauld thinks that the
mistake of recent logicians is that they have concentrated
-
exclusively on the process of reasoning, for which the syllogism was the necessary tool, and neglected the way in
which the premises are formed, the joining of words in a
nexus of affirmation:
Most philosophers seem to busy themselves with
giving rules for good and bad reasoning. These
rules often help us to discover the defects of
certain intricate arguments and to arrange our
thoughts in a more convincing manner; so we
cannot say the rules are useless. Still this
utility must not be thought to extend very far.
Most of man's errors derive not from his being
misled by wrong inferences but rather from his
making infprences from premises based on false
judgments
.
Arnauld is stating here that logicians should concern
themselves with the processes involved in sentence formation, and he appears to be suggesting that a study of
1. Antoine Arnauld, The Art of Thinkin
trans. J. Dickoff
~ ~ f : edition
and P. James ( I n d i a n a ~ i ~ l ~ i 6 4 Original
was published in 1662,
grammar, o r s e n t e n c e c o n s t r y c t i o n , should precede a s t u d y
of l o g i c , which f o r him means t h e p r o c e s s of deducing
t r u t h o r f a l s e h o o d from complete s y l l o g i s m s .
On account
of t h i s many of t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s made i n t h e Grammar a r e
r e p e a t e d i n t h e Logic because of t h e i r r e l e v a n c e t o t h e
f o r m a t i o n of premises.
The achievement of Arnauld, which
w a s t o be a major i n f l u e n c e on French thought f o r t h e n e x t
two hundred y e a r s , and t h e o u t s t a n d i n g r e p u t a t i o n of t h e
-
P o r t Royal G r a m m a r can be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
s t u d y of language w a s d e r i v i n g i n s p i r a t i o n from an a l l i e d
-
.
d i s c i p l i n e , i n t h i s case, logic,
Chapter I1
Philosophy and Linguistics in Post-Renaissance England
Introduction
Cartesian Ideas in England
John Locke, 1632-1705
Locke and Language
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
The Grammarian's Neglect of Locke
David Hartley, 1705-1757
Hartley and Locke
Hartley s Theory
Hartley's Place in the Intellectual Tradition
Summary of the Dominant Intellectual
the Eighteenth Century
rends
of
Survey of the Grammatical Work in England Prior
to 1765
. Ways of Dealing with Case
The Notional Concept of Case in Latin
William Bullokar
Alexander Hume
John Wallis
Charles Gildon and John Brightland
James Harris
Further Directions
CHAPTER 11
PHILOSOPHY AND LINGUISTICS IN POST RENAISSANCE ENGLAND
2.0.
Introduction
Lily's Latin grammar was significant for the future
of mglish linguistics in that it divorced grammatical
studies from the wider field of intellectual pursuits.
A reunion occurs in the latter part of the eighteenth
century, but until then the separation was total.
Con-
sequently this chapter will consider first the philoso.-
phical and intellectual perspectives of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, and then the development of .
the grammatical tradition.
Cartesian Ideas in England
It is neither possible nor necessary to estimate the
total impact of Cartesianism on the intellectual life of
England.
In the field of philosophy it was obviously con-
siderable; its influence on grammatical works will be
dealt with in the latter part of the chapter.'
The aspect
to be considered here falls midway between philosophy and
linguistics: it is concerned with projects for a universal language.
It seems likely that Descartes and Mersenne
were instrumental in the development of these projects
in seventeenth century England.
1.
Para. 2.5.4.
These two Frenchmen had
discussed the possibility and
desirability of a language
,
which would be universal and unmbiguous, but it was
Englishmen who undertook the extensive task of creating such
a language. At the time Arnauld was undertaking a rational
explication of the grammar of French, George Dalgarno,
Bishop John Wilkins, and other Englishmen were attempting
to create a general or universal language.
Although
Mersenne's work was known to Wilkins,1 suggestions of a
similar nature had already been made in England.
Francis
Bacon had deplored the inefficient nature of language, and
had mentioned it was one of the idols of the market place
which hinder the advancement of learning.*
However, Wilkins
was chiefly influenced by Cartesian ideas in writing his
Essay Toward a -Real Character and
- a Philosophical Language.
The Essay is part of the intellectual tradition rather than
the grammatical tradition of England in that it does not
treat of natural language; it is an attempt at a classification of reality.
Scientists in kgland were interested in
classifying data and thus the working out of such a language
would have many practical applications. The Essay had this
much in common with the grammatical work of the period: its
creation was dictated by practical needs.
The projects for
universal language never really reached fruition: they
1.
Robins, p. 114.
...
2. Francis Bacon, -The Two Bookes
of the Proficiency
and of Learning, Divlne and Humane, (160v._CI-
-
remain as monuments to the great ingenuity of their authors,
It is interesting to note the different directions that
Cartesian ideas took in England and France: in France they
served as an impetus, but not a model, for the creation of
rational firammars, while in England they moved people to
create rational languages,
2.2.
John Locke, 1632-1704
The history of thought or intellectual trends is diff-
erent from the history of philosophy because philosophical
writings are read and discussed by specialists, and only
slowly do the ideas contained in them influence the thought
and attitudes of the greater part of the literate and educated population.
Thus although David Hwne had published
all his philosophical works over a decade before William
Ward wrote his Essay, Hwne is not here considered part of
the intellectual movement of the period because he is read
for the most part only by philosophers, Samuel Jonson
dismissed Hume as a man who had a morbid love of change
1
which involved a preference of new error to old truth,
The dominant philosophical influence on the thought of the
age was undoubtedly John Locke,
I
Leslie Stephen, Histor of English Thou ht in the
Eighteenth Century, d , 7 N e w York,'+
1.
2.2.1.
Locke and Language3
Locke has been sadly neglected by h i s t o r i a n s of t h e
study of language.
England, 176C-1869,
-
I n h i s book, The Study of Language i n
Hans A a r s l e f f has w r i t t e n more exten-
s i v e l y on Locke than anyone e l s e i n t h i s f i e l d , and he i s
very c o n s c i o ~ sof h i s i n a b i l i t y t o t r e a t Lockets work with
t h e a t t e n t i o n i t deserves:
ItA
f u l l account [of t h e philo-
sophy of language i n t h e mid-eighteenth centurylwould need
t o pay much more a t t e n t i o n t o ~ o c k e . ~ ~A'a r s l e f f confines
himself t o d- -i s c u s s i n g Lockets i n f l u e n c e on Condillac and
D e s t u t t de Tracey and does not d i s c u s s t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of
h i s philosophy on English l i n g u i s t i c s ; i n f a c t , t h e only'
r e f e r e n c e t o Locke t h a t w i l l be found i n d i s c u s s i o n s of
E n g l i s h l i n g u i s t i c s w i l l be e i t h e r about James Harris8
\
antagonism towards Locke o r Lockets i n f l u e n c e on educationa l t h i n k i n g , and hence on t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of grammar books.
The next c h a p t e r w i l l d i s c u s s Lockets i n f l u e n c e on English
l i n g u i s t i c s , which appears t o amount t o h i s i n f l u e n c e on
Ward.
H i s i n f l u e n c e on t h e teaching of grammar has been
assumed r a t h e r than proved, but t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t he
was one of t h e f i r s t people i n England t o s t a t e c l e a r l y
t h a t " t h e c h i l d should f i r s t be i n s t r u c t e d i n i t s own
tongue so t h a t i t speaks, r e a d s , and w r i t e s t h a t tongue
Hans A a r s l e f f , The Study o f Language i n England, 1760-1869,
( P r i n c e t o n , 1967), p. 1 1 .
1.
"'the proposal that English should be studied
correctly;
as thoroughly as Latin and Greek would have seemed revolutionary at the time he was writing, (1693), and for long
after; perhaps even until the middle of the present century
the study of the English language has not been accepted in
its own right. 2
2.2.2,
A n Essay Concerning Human Understanding
-
Locketsmost famous philosophical work is An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding; it was first published in
1690, His purpose in it was "to inquire into the original,
certainky, and extent of human Kxlowledge, together with the
grounds and degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent," 3 unlike the mediaeval philosophers who allowed a theory of
knowledge to grow out of their system of philosophy, Locke
developed the suggestion implicit in Descartest work, that
philosophy should begin with epistemology.4
He rejected
Descartest assumption that ideas were innate and the mind
worked on them.
9
Instead he called the mind a tabula -raza
and investigated how it acquired ideas, and how far these
1. Richard I. Aaron, John Locke, 2nd ed,, (Oxford, 1963),
p. 290.
2. Charles Gildon and John Brightland, A Grammar of the
Ton e, (171I ) , is an interesting except'ion, In triisyrk
&is
no hint of its being a preparation for learning
Latin,
3, John Locke, A n Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (1690),
I, 1 , 2.
4.
-
D, J. OtConnor,John Locke, (London, 1952), p , 27.
i d e a s a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ~f t h i n g s i n t h e world.
A t the
o u t s e t he had n o t considered t h e n e c e s s i t y of t r e a t i n g
words, but inasmuch as t h e s e a r e t h e means by which
knowledge i s communicated from one person t o another,
t h e i r importance soon became obvious, and he devoted a
whole book of t h e Essay t o t h e i r c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
This book
i s of fundamental importance f o r an understanding of Ward's
Grammar, and w i l l be discussed i n t h e next chapter.
2.2.3.
The Grammarian's Neglect of Locke
Locke w a s a man of s i n c e r e and o r i g i n a l opinions; t h e r e
i s no doubt t h a t many of h i s non-philosophical i d e a s , such
as those on education, were ahead of h i s time.
-a f o r t i o r i
This i s
t r u e of t h e Essay Concerning Human Understandine.
Reaction t o i t came l a r g e l y because of t h e f e a r t h a t i t was
a t t a c k i n g t h e foundations of r e v e a l e d r e l i g i o n .
Locke com-
ments on some i n i t i a l r e a c t i o n t o a preliminary d r a f t : nI
have been t o l d t h a t a s h o r t epitome of t h i s t r e a t i s e , which
w a s p r i n t e d i n 1688, w a s by some condemned without reading,
because i n n a t e i d e a s were denied i n i t ; they too h a s t i l y
concluding, t h a t i f i n n a t e i d e a s were n o t supposed, t h e r e
would be l i t t l e l e f t e i t h e r of t h e n o t i o n o r proof of s p i r i t s . "
Yolton d i s c u s s e s t h e n a t u r e of t h e r e a c t i o n t o t h e Essay
I
and shows t h e e x t e n t of t h e c r i t i c i s m , but n o t e s t h a t only
1.
Op. c i t . , The Preface t o t h e reader.
1
a small p r o p o r t b n of i t came from p h i l o s o p h e r s . 1
In spite
of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e Essay w a s a t f i r s t hastily r e c e i v e d
( p a r t l y on r e l i g i o u s g r o u n d s ) , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o understand
why grammarians s o completely i g n o r e d one of t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t books of t h e c e n t u r y , and one t h a t w a s concerned i n
no small way w i t h language.
U n t i l 1765 only one grammarian
used L o c k e t s work, and t h e n tlonly i n two o r t h r e e p l a c e s . "
T h i s i s James Greenwood; f o r t h e most p a r t he c r e a t e s a
Latin-based grammar, but he does l o o k t o Locke on b r i e f
occasions.
The f a i l u r e of grammarians t o t a k e n o t e of Locke
c a n be a t t r i b u t e d t o two causes: one ( a s mentioned), t h a t
t h e y viewed t h e i r t a s k as grammarians as narrowly pedagog i c a l and were c o n t e n t t o merely make s l i g h t emendations
t o t h e b a s i c p l a n of L i l y ' s grammar; t h e o t h e r ( r e l a t e d t o
t h e i r pedagogical i n t e n t i o n s ) , t h a t t h e y were bound t o t h e
C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n , t o which L o c k e t s i d e a s were n o t acceptable.
2.3.
David H a r t l e y , 1705-1757
H a r t l e y w a s n o t a p h i l o s o p h e r of t h e same c a l i b r e
as
Locke, but he w a s a man who was i n much c l o s e r c o n t a c t w i t h
t h e people of h i s age.
H i s Dutg,
-
-
H i s Observations on -'
Man
and H i s ~ x ~ e c t a t i o nappeared
s~
some f i f t y y e a r s
- 7
-
--
John W . Yolton, John Locke and t h e
19571, p. 25.
1.
H i s Frame,
-
of I d e a s , (Oxford,
7
2. David H a r t l e y , Observations on Van H i s Frame, H i s Duty,
and H i s Ex e c t a t i o n s , 2 vols.(London,
-;7~~7-.
~ as ci n e
__.
Hepr~:*
1967.
-
after LocketsEssay and was)much more immediate in its effect on the reading public,
2.3.1.
Hartley and Locke
It is argued here that Hartley was largely responsible
for making Locke8s ideas acceptable to the ordinary man in
the eighteenth century, thus allowing even conservative
grammarians to use Locke, Hartley makes few specific references to LocketsEssay, but appears to be interested in
those areas which Locke felt were beyond the province of
--
the philosopher, and that Locke had stated that he was not
going to treat: "1 shall not at present meddle with the
physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to
examine wherein its essence consists, or by what motions
of our spirits or alterations of our bodies, we come to
have any sensations by our organs, or any ideas in our
understandings; and those ideas do, in their formation, any
1
or all of them, depend on matter or noOtt
2.3.2,
HartleytsTheory
Hartley was advocating a physiological psychology in
place of one based on the c~nceptof soul, a psychology
that would complement Locketsphilosophy in explaining how
ideas are formed in the mind.
However, the work as a whole
deals with many more issues than the physiological explica1,
Locke, o p e cit., The Preface to the reader.
tion of the formation of ideas. The Encyclopaedia
Britannica summarizes Hartleytswork, saying he
...
aimed to overcome "the greatest difficulty
of supposing that the Soul, an immaterial Substance, exerts and receives a physical influence
upon and from the Body." The preface states
that he had been llinformedthat the Rev. Mr. Gay
had asserted the possibility of deriving our
intellectual ~leasuresand pains from Association." From Isaac ~ e w t o n ~ s ~ ~ ~ t(1704)
i c k s he
derived the idea that sensory stlmuli might
operate by producing "vibrationsw propagated
through the nerves, like "the trembling of
particles in sounding bodies;" in the brain the
occurrence of vibrations in a certain order sets
up a readiness for similar vibrations to recur
in the same order. Part I1 explains how more
complex processes--imagining, remembering,
reasoning--may thus be analysed into clusters
or sequences of elementary sense impressions
formed by individual experience, so that all
psychological acts ?an be explained by a single
law of association.
2.3.3.
Hartley's Place in the Intellectual Tradition
-
In Chapter I of the first volume of Observations of
Man,
- Hartley explains how he deals with questions raised
by Newton and Locke; he stands in a direct line of intellectual development from them, His contribution to the
intellectual climate of his time has not been thoroughly
investigated by scholars and his influence on the thinking of the ordinary educated man may well have been much
greater than is suggested by the short references to him
1.
Encyclopaedia Britannica (1965),
53
in histories of philosophy', and histories of ideas.
Ac-
counts of Hartleyssthought have given no attention to
his original and extremely interesting remarks on language.2
2.4.
Summary of the Dominant Intellectual Trends of the
Eighteenth Centurx
This has been a selective rather than a comprehensive
account of those major trends of the age which are known
to have had an effect on Ward's intellectual development.
The Cartesian revolution was of such importance that it
could not be omitted; people who were antagonistic to some
of its basic assumptions, such as Locke, could not but be
influenced and stimulated by its interest in rational explanation.
Locketsimportance derives from the amount of
debate that centered around his proposal that there was no
such thing as an innate idea and his alternative suggestions.
His incomplete but substantial theoretical assumptions
about the nature of language were to filter down to and
affect the grammatical tradition, but not for some time,
on Education had a wider influence on the
and the Thoughts reasons and motivation for teaching grammar.
Hartley did
much to soften the earlier conflict between science and
1. An account of Hartley's position is given in Frederick
A History of Philosophy, vol. 5, 1961, pp. 191 ff.
Copleston, -
2. The direct influence of Hartley's ideas on William Ward
will be discussed in the next chapter. His psychology also
seems to have been a major influence on Joseph Priestley,
as has, to some extent, already been recognized.
religion, and to make way for a rational explanation of the
world and events in it which the theologians had believed
to be beyond the scope of such an explanation.
Survey of Grammatical Work in England Prior to 1765
2.5.
This survey1 views the tradition of grammatical work
in England largely in terms of the category of case.
The
reasons for this are several: firstly, the development
of the English grammatical tradition is very much a continuing attempt by grammarians to accomodate this category
(inherited from Latin grammar), to the English language;
secondly, the attempts to accomodate the category of case
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had the positive
result of introducing new approaches to linguistic analysis;
and finally, Ward's own attempt to deal with case is the
main spur to his innovatory ideas, and forces him to extend
the subject area of grammar to horizons beyond the ken of
his contemporaries in England.
2.5.0.1.
Ways of Dealing with Case
Most early English grammarians recognized that case
is an unimportant category in the description of English.
1. This is a brief survey. Fuller accounts may be found
in the following sources, which have been used in the
preparation of this summary: Ian Michael, "English Grammatical Categories to 1800 and the Tradition Behind Them,"
(Unpublished Dissertation, University of Bristol, 1963);
of Some Problems on English
Ivan Poldauf, On the History 194bTEmma vorlar Pro ,ress
Grammar ~ eoreT8r(Prague,
f
in English Grammar 1585-1735, 4 vols., (Louvain,
-
-
?8$ir
Understandably they were d i , f f i d e n t about abandoning a
category so c e n t r a l t o t h e grammatical systems o f L a t i n
and Greek, and t h e i r continuing a t t e m p t s t o make i t a
v a l i d concept were i n s t r u m e n t a l i n forming opinions about
t h e n a t u r e and s t r u c t u r e of language.
One p a r t i c u l a r l y
i n t e r e s t i n g f a c t t h a t emerges i s t h a t grammarians r e s i s t e d
any approach t h a t would c a r r y t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e category i n English t o i t s l o g i c a l conclusion,
The s i g c i f i c a n c e
of t h e i r r e f u s a l w i l l be seen as t h e d i s c u s s i o n develops;
i t s most l a s t i n g e f f e c t seems t o be t h a t they never succeeded
--
i n making a complete break with t h e L a t i n system.
Let i t
s u f f i c e h e r e t o say t h a t t h e r e a r e presumably two l o g i c a l
conclusions about c a s e i n English: one t h a t t h e r e a r e no
c a s e s i n English--this
w a s i n f a c t put forward by John
Wallis i n 1653, but w a s completely ignored by everyone
except Cooper i n s p i t e of t h e high esteem i n which Wallist
grammar w a s held.
The o t h e r conclusion, which would follow
f o r those who pursued t h e ' s i g n t h e o r y t t o i t s l o g i c a l
conclusion would be t h a t t h e r e a r e as many c a s e s i n English
as t h e r e a r e ' s i g n s t o r p r e p o s i t i o n s .
No one proposed such
a n i d e a ; i t s p o s s i b i l i t y w a s considered, but r e j e c t e d as
t o o unusual t o deserve s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
James
B e a t t i e ' s a t t i t u d e i s t y p i c a l : "1 should not wonder, i f a
I
grammarian, much given t o novelty and paradox, were t o
1 . Christopher Cooper, Gramrnatica Linguae Anglicanae,
(London, 1685).
a f f i r m t h a t t h e r e a r e i n E n g l i s h as many c a s e s almost as
there a r e prepositions."'
2.5.0.2.
The N o t i o n a l Concept of Case i n L a t i n
There had been problems i n t h e a n a l y s i s of c a s e i n
t h e c l a s s i c a l languages.
D i f f e r e n t d e c l e n s i o n s had d i f f -
e r e n t numbers of c a s e endings: t h e mensa d e c l e n s i o n had
f o u r , dominus had f i v e , and verbum o n l y t h r e e .
However,
because of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c r i t e r i a , i t w a s p o s s i b l e t o
a s s i g n d i f f e r e n t c a s e s t o t h e same forms of some words, as
t h e diagram .shows:
rnenSaL
MOM*
d
~
domine
mensam
mensae
ncc
.
m
i
doc.
"
"
~
,
verbum
dominwn
CefQ* domini
Ged
verbi
Although no L a t i n word h a s s i x d i f f e r e n t forms i n one
number t h e r e were seen t o be s i x c a s e s i n t h e language:
domino sometimes had t h e same d i s t r i b u t i o n as mensa, but
sometimes i t shared t h e p r i v i l e g e s w i t h mensae.
"'
\
1.
Hence i t
James B e a t t i e , The Theory of Language, (London, 1788),
p. 338.
-
-
represented two cases. Names
,
based on notional values
were applied to the cases in order to distinguish dominol
and dominop.
Thus case in nouns came to be not just a
formal variation, but necessarily a notional concept.
Word terminations represent the formal aspect of case.
The interrelation of nouns with themselves and with other
parts of speech was seen as representing the interrelation
of objects, and the denotation of this was seen as the
semantic aspect of case.
Notional names were given to
cases on the basis of their most frequent semantic fucction
--
in Latin grammars, and it was the notional aspect of case
which was taken up by the EEglish gr-arians.
The obvious
manner of approaching case in English was to take a Latin
grammar (usually Lily's) and tracslate it into English,
making such alterations as would seem necessary.
Thus
from 1586 to 1654 Bullokar, Greave, Hume, Gill, Butler,
and Wharton all claim that English has five or six cases.
2.5.1
.
William Bullokar
The first English grammar was written by William
Bullokar, and was published in 1586.
Although Bullokar
largely translates from Lily's Latin grammar, he shows
sophistication in the adaptations he makes, and the way
he handles case. He says: "A noun substantive may be
declined or at least used in five cases: to wit the Nominative, the Accusative, the Gainative, the Vocative, and
t h e G e n i t i v e ~ r o ~ i e t a r ~ ". A~t ' l,e a s t usedt1 i s a n addit i o n Lo L i l y ' s d e f i n i t i o n , and s u g g e s t s t h a t E n g l i s h does
n o t have as many d i s t i n c t forms as t h e r e a r e c a s e s .
G e n i t i v e i s d e f i n e d formally: "it g e t t e t h -e9 s
s
-9
The
or z
added t o t h e nominativev1and s y n t a c t i c a l l y : "having
after
i t a n o t h e r word p r o p e r o r p e r t a i n i n g t o i t c a l l e d t h e propriety.
lt2
B u l l o k a r n o t e s t h a t t h e g e n i t i v e may be r e s o l v e d
by s e t t i n g t h e p r o p r i e t y b e f o r e t h e p r o p i e t a r y and i n s e r t ing 'of.'
If t h i s i s done, t h e n he s a y s t h a t t h e noun
i s no l o n g e r i n t h e g e n i t i v e , b u t i n t h e a c c u s a t i v e because
t h e a c c u s a t i v e f o l l o w s "verb, p a r t i c i p l e s , p r e p o s i t i o n s ,
o r g e r u n d i a l , and answereth t o t h e q u e s t i o n 9whomf?813 .
Although t h e a b l a t i v e g e n e r a l l y followed p r e p o s i t i o n s i n
L a t i n , B u l l o k a r c l a i m s t h a t i t i s t h e a c c u s a t i v e i n English.
He does n o t g i v e any r e a s o n f o r t h i s , but from h i s t r e a t ment of t h e o t h e r c a s e s , r e a s o n s may be e s t a b l i s h e d ,
His
d e f i n i t i o n of t h e nominative i s s y n t a c t i c and f u n c t i o n a l :
i t p r e c e d e s t h e v e r b and answers t h e q u e s t i o n "who, what?'@
The G a i n a t i v e c a s e i s d e f i n e d i n s t r i c t l y s y n t a c t i c terms:
i t i s t h e f i r s t noun when two nouns f o l l o w a verb.
Me i s
-
i n t h i s c a s e i n t h e two s e n t e n c e s he g i v e s as examples:
-
1. William B u l l o k a r , B r i e f Grammar f o r E n g l i s h , (London,
15861, p. 3.
I
2.
Op. c i t . ,
3.
Ibid.,
p. 5.
p , 47.
"He told me the matter," "fie showed me his mind."
Like
the genitive it can be resolved, by a preposition, to the
accusative case; 'He told the matter to me.'
Bullokar
sees case in a consistect fashion--insofar as the category
can be treated consistently in English: case belongs to
one word, the noun, as in Latin; a noun must be in some
case, although it shows no formal variation.
determined by the syntactic position.
The case is
The position is the
case, because that position has meaning.
A noun acquires
a distinctive case if its position performs a function
which would otherwise require a special preposition.
While
it is to Bullokartscredit to have proposed the phenomenon
of resolution (it is an explicit recognition of the functional 'slotst that nouns can occupy in English, and a recognitioc of word order as a signalling device) it was tantamount
to a complete rejection of the concept of case, because all
its characteristic features had been rejected.
It is
usually a formal distinction in the termination of the
word, or, much more loosely, an attribution of the semantic
meaning signalled by a particular formal termination to a
word which does not actually have the variation.
2.5.2.
Alexander Hwne
In Hume's Latin grammar case is the vlspecialistermi-
natio nominis."
1.
Ibid., p. 5.
Hume defined case as the change in form
in a word, the bending to $he oblique position from the
rect or straight form, It is also the "affectio nominis
ad societatem personarum variati"--the changing of the
nominal form to indicate the relation between persons,
or beings, or subjects of the discourse: ItRectusunde
transitio procedit, obliquus est in quem fit transitio." 1
His English grammar has the same approach: nCase is an
affection of the noun for distinction of person;" however,
Hume notes, arid deserves much credit for doing so, that
English differs from Latin in having 'notest or 'particles1
-.
rather than termination cases: "This difference we declyne
not as doth the Latines and Greeks be terminations, but^
with noates after the manner of the Hebrew, whilk they
call particles.112 It is perfectly true that English often
expresses the same meaning as Latin cases by means of a
sign before the noun, and in stating this Hume is stating
a fact that was already implicit in Bullokartstheory:
meaning is expressed by a particular case (formal ending
or position) or the combination of preposition and noun.
However, as it stands, the sign theory does not seem to
be an advance in the treatment of case.
Hurne sees English
cases as parallel to the Latin cases, and very often one
case will have two or more signs (e.g. #to8and 'for1 for
1.
Alexander Hume, Grammatica -9Nova
(London, 1612), p, 22.
-
2. Alexander Hume, Of the Ortho,ra hie and Congruitie of
the Bri tnin Tongue, ~
o
~
n
'
e
2
-
~
the dative) while two different cases may have the same
note: @'the accusative h a t h noe other n o a t than the nomThe note of both these cases is -'
the and Hume
inative."
does not even suggest distinguishing them by position.
Frequently, as in Humels own example, the note is entirely missing: "Men in authority should be lanterns of lighten!
2.5.3.
John Wallis
John Wallis1 Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae (1653) is
considered significant in the history of English grammar
because in it Wallis recognizes openly and clearly that
English has a different structure from Latin, and so will
require a different mode of analysis: "Et propterea nova
prorsus methoda indedendum esse mihi visum est, quam non
tam usitata Latinae Licguae quam peculiaris linguae nostrae
suade.ll'
But in spite of this he appears to accept many
of the categories of Latin without question:
"
. . . nollem
expectatis ut singula artis vocabula quae Grammaticae
Anglicanae cum alianun linguanun Grammaticis sunt communi&
singillatim explicarem."*
This was perhaps an intelligent
way of avoiding a very difficult task.
If he accepts the
names of the Latin parts of speech, the correspondence
ends there.
!
He recognizes only six of them in English:
noun, verb, preposition, adverb, conjunction, and inter-
1.
p. vii.
2.
p. 68.
jection.
Pronouns are not,a distinct part of speech, but
part of the noun: "sunt quidem nomina, sed aliquantwn
irregularia.
"'
The noun, of course, comprised substantive
and adjective, and words like
x,and this which
stand in a substantival position are adjectives.
an adjective, and so is man's.
could not
The is
Wallis conceives of an
adjective as something that wants and cleaves to a subshis are manifestly lacking in signiMan's and -
tantive.
fication without the addi-tbnof a following substantive,
and
BO,
in Wallis' grammar they became adjectives, and
are not substantives in the genitive case.
The noun there-
fore has no case, because there is no variation of form if
the genitive is discounted.
The cases discovered by other
grammarians (apart from Bullokar) were only translations
of the meaning of Latin cases, and it is difficult to contest the reasonableness of Wallis' statement: "Diversitatern
casbum
. . . AnglicanacLinguae . . . neutiquam agnoscit:
sed praepositionum auxilio rem omnem illam praestant quam
Graeci et Latini partim praepositionibus partim casuwn
."* He recognizes that the function
diversitatem perficiunt
of the nominative and accusative is performed by word order
case with the function
in English, but he does not equate of case.
This treatment of case might well have been the
of the genitive form been
final word, had Wallist handling
,
more acceptable.
But the grammarians who followed him and
many commentators have been unable to accept that two words
belonging to the same inflectional paradigm should belong
to different word classes.
Of course, in saying that they
belong to the same inflectional paradigm one is actually
stating that they do belong to the same word class, but perhaps the so-called genitive suffix should be considered
as a derivational ending.
Wallis recognized two cases in
pronouns, the rect and the oblique; but he calls them
'states,' not from antipathy to the word 'case,' but because the change in form is more than inflectional change,
(cf.
2.5.4.
am me,
we/us).
Charles Gildon and John Brightland
Gildon and Brightland are influenced by Wallis in their
--
treatment of case in A G~ammarof the English Tongue (1711).
They call the cases 'statestand do not mention case names
-
in English; the influence of the Port Royal Grammar is
evident in the form of copious footnotes, which are little
more than a direct translation of that work.
Brightland
and Gildon reformulate exactly Arnauldts logical descrip-tion of the nominative and his notional description of the
accusative.
Arnauld had described the nominative as the
subject of which an affirmation is made in the proposition:
"Its principal use is to be set in discourse before the
\
v e r b i n o r d e r t o be t h e s u b j e c t of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n , a s
I
ttDominus r e g i t rne.ltl
But, when t h e p r o p o s i t i o n i s broken
down i n a l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s i t has a s u b j e c t , a copula, and
a t t r i b u t e : "Dominus e s t regens;" grammatical o b j e c t s do
not f i t easily i n t o the logical pattern.
Thus t h e accusa-
t i v e h a s t o be defined n o t i o n a l l y :
The v e r b s t h a t express a c t i o n s , which pass from
t h e a g e n t , as t o b e a t , t o break, t o h e a l , t o l o v e ,
t o h a t e , have s u b j e c t s t o r e c e i v e t h o s e t h i n g s , o r
o b j e c t s , which they regard. For i f a person b e a t s
so t h a t t h o s e - v e r b s rehe b e a t s something
which i s c a l l e d t h e
q u i r e a f t e r them a noun
a c c u s a -t.i v e , 2
. . .. . .
Arnauld and Lancelot adapted L a t i n c a s e names t o French
u s i n g l o g i c a l and n o t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n s .
Failure t o dis-
t i n g u i s h between t h e two c r i t e r i a being used prevented
them from making t h e t r a n s i t i o n from t h e l o g i c a l system
of subject--copula--attribute
of subject--verb--object.
t o t h e grammatical system
Gildon and Brightland a r e i n -
adequate i n t h e same way,
2.5.5.
JamesHarris
James Harris' Hermes (1751) w a s n o t intended t o be
a grammar of English, and H a r r i s makes no claim t o t r e a t
c a s e i n English.
1
H i s book i s given t h e secondary t i t l e
1 . The English t r a n s l a t i o n of 1753 i s used throughout,
t h i s being t h e only one e a s i l y a v a i l a b l e ,
2.
I b i d . , p. 116.
Enquiry Concerning Language and
of A -Philosophical
While he accepts uncritically the
Universal Grammar.
case systemof Latin, his two chapters on prepositions
and cases contain ideas that mark a development in the
approach to case in English, and the relation of cases
and prepositions.
He first attempts to define the nature
of the preposition for language in general: "A preposition is a part of speech devoid itself of signification,
but so formed as to unite two words that are significant,
and that refuse to coalesce or unite themselves.88' He
explains how far language can coalesce words into phrases,
and phrases into sentences without prepositions, and shows
how prepositions eventually become necessary if the process is to continue.'
The discussion of coalescence
appears to reflect the trend towards a psychological explanation of language, which becomes much more evident
in William Ward.
Harris claims that the genitive, dative, and ablative
cases in Latin.and Greek perform the function of prepositions:
These relations the Greeks and Latins thought of
so great importance as to distinguish them when
they occurred, by peculiar terminations of their
own, which exprest their force, without the help
of a preposition. Now 'tis here we beho d the
rise of the ancient genitive and dative.
3
1.
James Harris, Hermes
(London, 1751), p. 261.
2.
Ibid., Book 11, Chapter 3.
3.
Op. cit., p. 27.
H i s s t a n d on c a s e s i n t h e modern languages i s c l e a r :
I
W h a t e v e r we may be t o l d of c a s e s i n modern l a n g u a g e s ,
t h e r e a r e i n f a c t no such t h i n g s ; but t h e i r f o r c e and
power i s expressed by two methods, e i t h e r by s i t u a t i o n
o r by preposition^.^^
He l a t e r q u a l i f i e s t h i s s t a t e m e n t
i n r e l a t i o n t o E n g l i s h , and p o i n t s out how t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of E n g l i s h throw l i g h t on t h e n a t u r e of case:
There a r e no c a s e s i n t h e modern languages,
except a few among t h e p r i m i t i v e pronouns
and t h e E n g l i s h g e n i t i v e , formed by
t h e a d d i t i o n of s
From t h i s d e f e c t
however., we may be enabled t o d i s c o v e r i n
some i n s t a n c e s what a c a s e i s , t h e P e r i p h r a s i s , which s u p p l i e s i t s p l a c e being
t h e c a s e ( a s i t were) unfolded.1
...
....
I t seems as i f Harris h a s a double view of c a s e .
On t h e
one hand i t i s only a formal v a r i a t i o n , but on t h e o t h e r
hand i t i s some kind of u n i v e r s a l c a t e g o r y which e x i s t s
i n language independent of formal c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
In
l a t e r d i s c u s s i o n Harris r e f e r s t o t h e nominative, accusat i v e , and g e n i t i v e (of
g o r i e s of E n g l i s h .
+
noun t y p e ) as i f t h e y were c a t e -
H i s p o s i t i o n a p p e a r s t o be t h a t c a s e
a s a formal v a r i a t i o n i s n o t one of t h e e s s e n t i a l s of
. l a n g u a g e , b u t t h e r e l a t i o n s which i n f l e c t e d c a s e s i n d i c a t e
a r e u n i v e r s a l s , and we may u s e t h e term c a s e w i t h t h i s
new d e f i n i t i o n a s a convenient form of r e f e r r i n g t o t h e s e
1.
I b i d . , p. 275.
relations.
(Cf. a s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n taken by F i l l m o r e ) .
I
Harris' p r o p o s a l s concernirig t h e n a t u r e of c a s e have l i t t l e
importance i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e g e n i t i v e and d a t i v e , being
but a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d v e r s i o n of Hume's s i g n theory.
However, h i s proposals concerning t h e nominative and accus a t i v e a r e of some i n t e r e s t :
When a sentence i s r e g u l e r and o r d e r l y , N a t u r e ' s
substance, t h e L o g i c i a n ' s s u b j e c t , and t h e Gramm a r i a n ' s s u b s t a n t i v e a r e a l l p d e n o t e d by t h a t
c a s e we c a l l t h e nominative.
He then g o e s on t o say "The nominative i s t h e c a s e , witho u t which t h e r e can be no r e g u l a r and p e r f e c t sentence."
That i s t o say t h a t every v e r b must have a s s o c i a t e d with
i t a t l e a s t one noun, and t h e noun which occupies t h i s
o b l i g a t o r y p o s i t i o n i s s a i d t o be i n t h e nominative case. 3
Harris t h e n d e f i n e s t h e a c c u s a t i v e as t h e case which g i v e s
a n a c t i v e v e r b a s u b j e c t t o work on ( a n o b j e c t i n gramm a t i c a l terminology), t h u s rendering t h e sentence complete.
" A c h i l l e s v u l n e r e v i t Hectorem
i s more complete t h a n
1 . Charles J . Fillmore, "A Proposal Concerning English
P r e p o s i t i o n s , lonograph s e r i e s on Languages &d ~ i n g u i s t i c s ,
19, 19-34.
-
2.
!
Ibid.,
p . 280.
3. Note similar r e c e n t proposals t h a t when a v e r b h a s two
nouns, one i n s u b j e c t , one i n o b j e c t p o s i t i o n , one i s cons i d e r e d o b l i g a t o r y , t h e o t h e r o p t i o n a l , e.g.:
The man kicked t h e b a l l : The man kicked.
The man closed t h e s t o r e : The s t o r e closed.
But i n t h e s e r e c e n t proposals t h e o b l i g a t o r y noun i s somet i m e s a s u b j e c t , and sometimes an o b j e c t .
ttAchilles vulneravit
,
l1
but , t h i s l a t t e r , Harris c l a i m s ,
can be u n d e r s t o o d , and i s t h e b a s i c s e n t e n c e f o m .
Thus
A c h i l l e s i s t h e o b l i g a t o r y noun, and t h e r e f o r e i n t h e nomi n a t i v e (though t h i s h a r d l y f i t s t h e f a c t s of L a t i n ) .
Harris was t h i n k i n g of c a s e as something which spe-
c i f i e s t h e o b l i g a t o r y and o p t i o n a l terms which may e n t e r
i n t o r e l a t i o n s h i p with verbs.
A t t h e time i t must have
seemed a c u r i o u s approach, but i t l o o k s ahead t o t h e
approaches t o language s t r u c t u r e which s e e semantics
having a r o l e i n t h e base component of grammar.
I n Harris'
view t h e o b l i g a t o r y term w i l l always be i n t h e nominative,
and t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s o b l i g a t o r y w i l l be marked by t h i s ;
t h e v e r b w i l l s p e c i f y whether t h e noun i n t h e nominative
i s an " a c t i v e e f f i c i e n t c a u s e w o r a 1 8 p a s s i v es u b j e c t . "
The secondary o r o p t i o n a l term w i l l be i n t h e a c c u s a t i v e
c a s e , which, i n e f f e c t , marks t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s secondary.
Thus f a r , c a s e i s a u n i v e r s a l phenomenon f o r Harris.
I n L a t i n t h i s u n i v e r s a l c a t e g o r y w i l l be r e a l i z e d by c a s e
i n f l e c t i o n s , and i n E n g l i s h by word o r d e r .
The t h e o r y
d o e s n o t improve w i t h a n a l y s i s , but i t does seem important
because i t proposes o p t i o n a l and o b l i g a t o r y c a t e g o r i e s ,
determined by c a s e , and l i n k s c a s e w i t h semantic and s t r u c t u r a l f e a t u r e s i n a meaningful way, and n o t simply because
i t i s t r a n s l a t i n g Latin cases i n t o English.
2.5.6.
Further Directiqns
In the period discussed (1586-1751) there were many
minor alterations, especially to the more traditional
definitions, and many rather grotesque imitations of Latin,
with long declensions of nouns in English.
This summary
has touched on the more colourful variations; it does not
seem unreasonable to suggest that the case problem was
forcing English grammarians to be creative in spite of
themselves.
The proposed solution of equating case with
prepositions was little help in dealing with the nominative
--
and accusative cases; the muddling of criteria in the Port
Royal explanation of these made the most reasonable method
(syntactic position) of dealing with these two cases less
acceptable.
Attention was directed to the peculiar prob-
lems of the transitive construction, which Harris dealt
with
in an unsatisfactory but interesting way.
Descrip-
tion of cases was fast becoming explanation of cases.
Further progress in purely descriptive grammar was unlikely and difficult with the state of linguistic science at
that time.
Ward would be dealing with the problem of case
some fourteen years after Harris; the general direction
of his predecessorsf work suggests that any further development would have to be in terms of some kind of explanatory hypothesis.
Chapter L L I
-
'f/illiam Ward
3 .O.
Introduc tion
3.1.
on Grammar
Edit ions of the Essay -
3.1.1.
Contents of the Essay
3.2.
Ward's Motives for Writing a Grammar
3 3
Ward's Attitudes to Education
3.4.
Ward's Attitudes to Language
3-50
Ward's Claim to Uniqueness
CHAPTEI~111
WILLIAN WARD
3.0.
Introduction
W i l l i a m Ward (1708-1772) was a man of v a r i e d i n t e r -
e s t s , of which t h e study of grammar w a s but one; he w a s
a n e d u c a t o r , a n ordained m i n i s t e r , a t r a n s l a t o r of
Terence, and a promoter of t h e f i r s t w r i t t e n school p l a y s
s i m e medieval t i m e s ; he i s a l s o b e l i e v e d t o have w r i t t e n
a n opera, The B i l l e t - M a s t e r ,
humously
at
which w a s performed post-
Edinburgh i n 1787.
1
Other E n g l i s h grammar-
i a n s had had e q u a l l y v a r i e d i n t e r e s t s : W i l l i a m B u l l o k a r
w a s a s o l d i e r and a f a r m e r , John Wallis a mathematician,
James Harris a n a n t i q u a r i a n , and Joseph P r i e s t l e y a
scientist.
But t h e d i f f e r e n c e between Ward and a l l t h e
r e s t , except Harris, i s t h a t while t h e o t h e r s l a i d a s i d e
t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n t h e world around them when they took
up t h e grammarian's pen, Ward d i d n o t ; h i s grammar a t t e s t s
t h e b r e a d t h of h i s i n t e r e s t i n o t h e r i n t e l l e c t u a l p u r s u i t s .
I t i s u s u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t o r e l a t e E n g l i s h grammars t o
t h e t i m e s t h e y were w r i t t e n i n , except perhaps through
t h e i r c i t a t i o n of a u t h o r s ; I a n Michael s u g g e s t s t h a t t h i s
i s because " i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , e s p e c i a l l y , t h e r e
1 . The B r i t i s h Museum c a t a l o g u e e n t e r s t h i s p l a y under
h i s name.
71
-
i s a gap (because t h e r e was t h e n a gap) between t h e gram-
mars and t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l movements of t h e time.'
'
Ward,
however, s t a n d s o u t as being deeply involved i n t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l i s s u e s of h i s a g e , and, as a n
e d u c a t o r , w a s obviously s e e k i n g t o make t h e s t u d y of
language r e l e v a n t t o h i s p u p i l s , and t o p r e s e n t i t i n a
much broader c o n t e x t t h a n w a s g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d necessary.
L i t t l e i s known about Ward's l i f e except what i s
r e l a t e d i n "The H i s t o r y of Beverley G r a m m a r ~ c h o o l . " '
Born i n 1708, he w a s educated i n Cambridge, and became
--
headmaster of Thornton Grammar School a t t h e age of
twenty e i g h t .
I n 1751 he w a s a p p o i n t e d headmaster of
'
t h e Grammar School a t Beverley, Y o r k s h i r e , and i t w a s
w h i l e he w a s t h e r e t h a t he wrote t h e Essay on Grammar.
3.1.
E d i t i o n s of t h e Essay on Grammar
The Essay w a s p u b l i s h e d i n 1765; two y e a r s l a t e r a
-
--
s h o r t e r v e r s i o n of i t w a s p u b l i s h e d as A G r a m m a r of t h e
--
E n g l i s h Language i n Two T r e a t i s e s .
The o r i g i n a l Essay
w a s r e p r i n t e d t h r e e t i m e s i n 1778, 1779, and 1788.j
1.
The
I a n Michael, E n g l i s h Grammatical C a t e g o r i e s , p, 575.
2.
"The H i s t o r y of Beverley Grammar School XXXVI-XXXVII,
The Guardian, (Beverley, May 1930).
1
3. The t h r e e r e p r i n t s of t h e
a r e postwas p u b l i s h e d
humous. I n 1766 t h e second
A
a l o n e as A P r a c t i c a l G r a m m a r
l i s t of
e d i t i o n s appears i n t h e bibliography a t the
end of t h e t h e s i s . For a l i s t of a l l known p r i n t i n g s of
arl
7-
-
f i r s t e d i t i o n of 1764 h a s as i t s f u l l t i t l e : An Essay
on G r a m m a r As I t Mag Be Applied -t o t h e E n g l i s h Language
a n Attempt
The One S p e c u l a t i v e , Being in Two T r e a t i s e s . -t o I n v e s t i g a t e Proper Principles. The Other P r a c t i c a l ,
-
-
--
Containing D e f i n i t i o n s and Rules Deduced from t h e
-
P r i n c i p l e s , and I l l u s t r a t e d
&a
t h e Most
--
Approved W r i t e r s .
3.1.1.
Contents of t h e Essay
-
-
V a r i e t y of Exvnples from
The t i t l e i s m i s l e a d i n g i n t h a t t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s of t h e f i r s t p a r t t u r n out t o be n o t so much g e n e r a l
p r i n c i p l e s as p r i n c i p l e s d e r i v e d v e r y much from t h e s t r u c t u r e of E n g l i s h ; t h e r e s u l t i s t h a t many d e f i n i t i o n s a r e
o f f e r e d i n t h e f i r s t p a r t , and a r e n o t confined t o t h e
second p a r t as t h e t i t l e s u g g e s t s ; much of t h e second p a r t
i n e v i t a b l y a p p e a r s as almost verbatim r e p e t i t i o n of t h e
S p e c u l a t i v e Grammar.
The P r a c t i c a l G r a m m a r c o n t a i n s
l i t t l e new m a t e r i a l , even i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of g e n e r a l
p r i n c i p l e s ; f o r t h i s r e a s o n l i t t l e w i l l be s a i d about i t
i n t h e account of Ward's grammatical t h e o r y .
Yet I v a n
t h e s e e d i t i o n s , and i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e whereabouts of
of the
c o p i e s , c o n s u l t : R. C . A l s t o n , A Bibliography En , l i s h Lan ua e , (Leeds, 1965); I , pp. 50-51.
The
*was
used throughout t h i s t h e s i s ; i t h a s
been r e p u b l i s h e d i n f a c s i m i l e r e p r i n t by The S c h o l a r
P r e s s , Menston, Yorkshire. Research by Alston, Michael,
and Poldauf i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h i s e d i t i o n i s d e f i n i t i v e and
t h a t l a t e r e d i t i o n s do n o t d i f f e r from i t i n any m a t e r i a l
way, a p a r t from being l e s s comprehensive.
&
Poldauf has claimed that the most remarkable aspect of
Bard's Essay is the successful integration of speculative
and practical grammars; such an opinion overlooks other
more significant features of Ward's work, but it probably
suggested itself to Poldauf because of the heavy dependence of the practical grammar on the speculative. This
is in contrast to the usual procedure of those who professed to treat of universal or speculative grammar,
which was to append a short essay on universal features
of language to a completely traditional grammar.
The
554 pages of the Essay are divided almost equally between
the speculative and practical grammars.
The former com-
prises sections dealing first with the noun and verb together (on account of their similarities), then with the
noun substantive in particular and the meaning and function of its cases; this account of the substantive completes Book I of the speculative grammar.
Book I1 is
short, and treats the noun adjective; Book I11 is entitled
"Of the Pronoun" and as well as discussing the personal
pronouns it has a long section on the syntactical implications of the reletive pronoun.'
Book IV discusses
the verb; Ward's account of the verb as a major part of
speech is important, but his account of tense is lengthy
1. It was not unusual for the relative
to be
discussed in early grammars, but there are few discussions of its syntactic significance or of dependent
clauses in general.
and u n i n t e r e s t i n g .
Book V d e v o t e s a s e c t i o n each t o
t h e adverb, t h e c o n j u n c t i o n , t h e p r e p o s i t i o n , and t h e
interjection.
The account of t h e p r e p o s i t i o n i s one of
t h e most i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t s of Wardls t h e o r y of grammar.
Book V I d i s c u s s e s " t h e power of u s e o r custom i n langu a g e , " i t o f f e r s a d e f i n i t i o n of t a s t e , and s u g g e s t s
why g e n e r a l r u l e s a r e n o t followed i n every iristance i n
t h e p r a c t i c a l arts.
The second s e c t i o n of Book V I would
seem t o belong t o t h e p r a c t i c a l grammar: i t i s e n t i t l e d
"Of words i n connected
construction^ acd d i s c u s s e s prac-
t i c a l r u l e s of s y n t a x and prosody.
The P r a c t i c a l G r a m m a r
f o l l o w s almost e x a c t l y t h e same p l a n as t h e S p e c u l a t i v e
Grammar, and o f f e r s r~umerous examples i n E n g l i s h ' a t a l l
stages.
I t r e p e a t s a l l d e f i n i t i o n s i n p o e t i c form s o
t h a t t h e y may be more e a s i l y memorized.
3.2.
Ward's Motives f o r W r i t i n g a Grammar
For v a r i o u s r e a s o n s t h e w r i t i n g of grammar books
was a common occupation i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y .
R . C . A l s t o n l i s t s over f o u r hundred d i f f e r e n t p r i n t i n g s
of grammar books devoted t o t h e a n a l y s i s of E n g l i s h i n
t h e p e r i o d 1750 t o 1800.
A t t i t u d e s t o e d u c a t i o n both
i n B r i t a i n and i n North America c r e a t e d a demand f o r such
1.
In A Bibliography of t h e E n g l i s h Language, I.
books, as P r i s c i l l a T y l e r l a n d S. A. Leonard have shown. 1
From t h e a v a i l a b l e evidence i t seems t h a t s c h o o l s were
n o t l o o k i n g f o r complex and l o n g t r e a t i s e s :
even Robert
-
Lowthls S h o r t I n t r o d u c t i o n t o E n g l i s h G r a m m a r w a s cons i d e r e d t o o d i f f i c u l t f o r b e g i n n e r s , and John Ash's
Grammatical I n s t i t u t e s w a s commonly used as an i n t r o d u c t i o n t o i t . 2 I t w a s n o t , t h e n , t h e p o p u l a r demand
f o r pedagogical grammars t h a t l e d W i l l i a m Ward t o t u r n
grammar w r i t e r .
I t seems t o have been c u r i o s i t y t h a t
f i r s t l e d him t o s p e c u l a t e about language and t h i s l e d
--
I
him t o t h e w r i t i n g of a grammar which he w a s a b l e t o
make u s e of i n h i s own t e a c h i n g .
I
Curiosity existed i n
o t h e r s as w e l l as Ward because t h e r e w a s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n
among s c h o l a r s and e d u c a t o r s w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a l enum e r a t i o n of t h e p a r t s of speech a c c o r d i n g t o L i l y ' s
a d a p t a t i o n of t h e P r i s c i a n schema.
This d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n
r e s u l t e d i n t h e numerous grammar books of t h e p e r i o d .
In
t h e P r e f a c e t o t h e Essay W i l l i a m Ward a t t e m p t s t o answer
t h o s e who, coming upon y e t a n o t h e r grammar, w i l l complain
P r i s c i l l a T y l e r , Grammars of t h e E n g l i s h Language t o
1850: w i t h S p e c i a l Em h a s i s on School Grammars used inAmerica. Four S t u d l e s
~ h . 3 .D i s s e r t a t i o n , Western
Heserve University, 1953); S t e r l i n g Andrus Leonard, The
D o c t r i n e of C o r r e c t n e s s i n E n g l i s h Usage 1700-1800,
-York71962)
1.
--
-
-5-
.
-
--
2.
Changes i n t h e name of Grammatical I n s t i t u t e s a r e
evidence of i t s u s e i n t h i s w a y . An e d i t i o n w a s ~ r o d u c e d
The E a s i e s t ~ n t > o d u c t i o nt o D r . I,okth1s
i n 1766 c a l l e d E n g l i s h Grammar.
"that grammar has been treated of already by so many
writers in so many languages, that whatsoever can now
be said upon the subject must be little more than a
repetition of what has been said by former grammarians." 1
Ward answers these people by saying that he is going to
show "the true nature of the conceptions annexed to
single nouns and verbsttand the "several modes of proceeding by which these conceptions are again united into
conceptions more and more complex at pleasure.2
Ward
feels that he has important contributions to make to
--
our knowledge of language, or rather, to our knowledge
of how language works.
He is obviously fascinated by^
how grammatical constructions bring about the coalescence
of the separate conceptions in the mind to form Itone
single conception. l t 3
1
.
2.
He also feels that although others
-
William Ward, An Essay on Grammar, ondo don, 1765).
Ibid., p. iv.
3. Ward says that he is attending to the problem which
Locke called attention to long ago. In fact Locke was
little concerned about how words join together; he was
concerned only with individual words, and the nature of
the idea that lay behind the single word. What Ward
mistook for an interest in connected discourse was an
interest in the nature of the ideas which lay behind
particles, those words which, according to Locke, connected other words. Locke the philosopher showed no
interest in grammar, but felt that the grammarian
should be interested in the words which puzzled the
philosopher; he remarked: "These words that are not
truly by themselves the names of any ideas are of such
constant and indispensable use in language. This part
of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected as some
had accomodated the Latin,case system to English, they
had neglected to explain the "effect" or the function
of the cases or the signs of cases. I
Thus Wardss prin-
cipal reason for writing his grammar was to give some
explanatory account of the linguistic system.
He is
not content with observing correspondences between the
classical languages and English (e.g. the correspondence
of cases to certain prepositions and word order), but
wants to explain why these different grammatical forms
are able to perform the same function. His professional
'I
I!
&
concerns as a teacher were never far removed from his
I,
work.
He states at the conclusion of his Preface:
My design was to make a grammatical knowledge of
the English language a step towards gaining the
like knowledge in other languages, especially in
the Greek and Latin: therefore I have followed
the usual heads which are found in the grammars
of these languages. To depart from these heads
may perhaps seem more concise; but in reality
little advantage is gained by it; at least no
1
others over-diligently cultivated.Iv (~ssayConcernin
Human Understanding, 111.7.1.)
Whether or not Locke'was
interested in connected discourse, there is no doubt that
he should have been for words do not exist just as separate entities but are always parts of sentences. Ward's
apparent misunderstanding of Lockets intentions led him
into an interesting study of how words join together.
Ward's concern with "the grammatic forms
introduced
into language for the sake of direction and precision1'
(i.e. prepositions and cases) was closer to Lockets
real concern.
...
1. William Bullokar had called repositions "signs of
casesI1 in his Brcf Grammar of 15i;6.
-
advantage which i s e'quivalent t o t h e inconvenience of a new p l a n and new t e r n s , t o
t h o s e who have been accustomed t o t h e o l d . 1
Yet i f t h e .Essay was t o be used as a pedagogical
a i e d , one wonders why i t should be so l e n g t h y (554 q u a r t o
~ a g e s )and so obviously beyond t h e needs of schoolboys.
Perhaps i t i s because Ward b e l i e v e d as a n e d u c a t o r t h a t
t h e m a s t e r should be more t h a n a few pages ahead of h i s
p u p i l and have a genuine and deep u n d e r s t a n d i ~ gof h i s
s u b j e c t m a t t e r so t h a t he can h e l p h i s s t u d e n t s n o t
j u s t t o l e a r n but t o understand.
He a d v i s e s language
t e a c h e r s i n terms t h a t a r e r e m i n i s c e n t of t h e ~ b b b
Fromant :2
But t h o s e who p r o f e s s t o t e a c h any language,
would do w e l l t o c a r r y t h e i r r e s e a r c h e s s t i l l
f u r t h e r concerning t h e n a t u r e of human speech;
because such r e s e a r c h e s , i f p r u d e n t l y made,
w i l l enable them i n many i n s t a n c e s t o g i v e
t h o s e whom t h e y t e a c h , g e n e r a l views of t h e
r e a s o n s of c o n s t r u c t i o n , which i s t h e o n l y
s u r e way of f i x i n g i n t h e i r minds.3
1.
Op, c i t . ,
p. x i v .
2. Fromant's views on t h e t e a c h i n g of grammar s u g g e s t s
a worthy i d e a l f o r a l l language t e a c h e r s , They a r e
quoted on page 4. I t seems t h a t Ward w a s t r y i n g t o
a c h i e v e t h e i d e a l proposed by l'romant f o r s p e a k e r s
of E n g l i s h .
3.
I b i d . , p.
12.
3.3.
Ward's Attitudes to Education
Ward wrote his Essay on Grammar because he was
interested in educating people.
His views on education
would seem to be sound and enlightened. For example,
he is quite clear that one goes from the known to the
unknowri in learning; this means that one should first
understand the grammar of one's own language before
seeking to understand that of a foreign tongue.
This
is an idea that was accepted only slowly in the seventeenth and..eighteenthcenturies.
Only sixty years beUh
fore Ward, Richard Johnson (who may well have influenced
Ward in this respect) was complaining bitterly about
the practice of teaching Latin grammar in Latin:
Against these rules [Lily's] I have several
exceptions. At first, that they are given
in Latin; which, considering the time that
children are to learn them in, that is, before
they understand anything of the Latin tongue,
is not only improper but ridiculous.
'Tis ignotum perthan which nothing
can be more
be said, that this
Latin is explained to them in ~nglish;then
I say again, 'tis the English they learn them
by, and they would sooner do it by the English
without Latin. And this exception is good
against the whole Latin grammar: and I here
make it once for all.
...
Not only does Ward wholeheartedly espouse this fundamental
educational principle of working from known to unknown,.
1.
Richard Johnson, Grammatical Commentaries, (London,
1'7061, p .
15.
,,
but he applies it when he insists on using the terminology
of Latin grammar in his grammar of English so that his
\
students will be more prepared to come to terms with
Latin, Even more important is the fact that he realizes
that the transfer from the grammar of English to the grammar of Latin will not be automatic, as the two languages
differ in many ways, He attempts to compensate for this
by providing the student with general principles.
These
general principles help the student to understand how
there can -.be a similarity of function in spite of the
diversity of form in the structure of the two languages,
The understanding of these principles is not considered
as too strong milk for his young students; it is looked
upon as an intellectually stimulating activity which,
though abstruse, will lead to enlightenment, Ward's
greatest quality as an educator would seem to be his
desire to create understanding in his students, This is
the force behind his grammar; it is the reason why he
is not content with the usual enumeration of rules; it
is the spirit which Ward inherited from ~ b b 6Fromant
and suggests that Ward is a figure to be esteemed in the
history of education as well as the history of linguistics,
I
3.4.
Ward's Attitudes to Language
Since the publication of Sterling A. Leonard's
1
Doctrine of Correctness ih English Usage 1700-1800,
the eighteenth century has been labelled as the century
of authoritarian attitudes in language.
Leonard is by
no means wholly responsible for this gross generalization, but it is true that attitudes to correctness
developed then were of such force that they still have
tremendous influence at some levels of our society today.
It is important to emphasize that not only did the grammarians of the eighteenth century not have any divinely
bestowed legislative authority, but many of them, most
notably Joseph Priestley, developed enlightened and
intelligent attitudes to usage.
William Ward preserves
an attitude of almost scientific neutrality in that he
offers no cri'icisms of any particular usages; he certainly never has any prescriptive advice for his readers.
The following quotation from the Essay argues that the
analysis of usage is not enough; the task of the g r m a r ian is to investigate the principles behind the usage;
Ward is not condemning usage as a guide, he is saying
only that to understand the principles behind language
we need to think, and not to take for granted the folk
myths about the nature of language:
For if that is true which is laid down, as a
certain principle, by some writers on grammar,
1. Sterling Andreas Leonard, Doctrine of Correctness
in English Usage 1700-1800, University 3 Wisconsin
Studies 25, 1929.
-
v i z . t h a t w h a t s o e v e r ' i s a u t h o r i z e d by u s e and
custom, i s t h e r e f o r e r i g h t i n language; i t i s
then e v i d e n t , t h a t t h e only province of a grammarian i s , t o examine what i s of t h e most e s t a b l i s h e d use i n t h e language of which he t r e a t s ;
and t o g i v e himself no t r o u b l e as t o s p e c u l a t i v e
r e f l e x i o n s on t h e g e n e r a l n a t u r e of language.1
A t no p o i n t i n t h e Essay does h i s s p e c u l a t i v e reasoning
l e a d him t o make proposals about a theory of usage.
He
does make c l e a r t h a t we have "an accustomed p l a n of cons t r u c t i o n " which'enables u s t o u s e language, and t h a t ,
u s i n g t h i s p l a n , we a r e a b l e t o say t h i n g s which have
n o t been s a i d b e f o r e , bending o r moulding t h e language
t o our needs:
But when an a u t h o r s i t s down t o w r i t e , he must
adapt h i s s t y l e t o h i s s u b j e c t , and t h i s s u b j e c t
may be of a kind t h a t has never been t r e a t e d of
i n t h e language i n which he w r i t e s . Here t h e n
he i s a t l i b e r t y t o e x e r t h i s genius upon t h e
language i t s e l f i n which he composes. And,
provided he does not q u i t e l o s e s i g h t of t h e
accustomed p l a n of c o n s t r u c t i o n , he may model
h i s expressions i n t o v a r i o u s forms t h a t never
have been used before; and every o r i g i n a l g e n i u s
h a s c o n s t a n t l y done t h i s i n p o e t r y , o r a t o r y ,
h i s t o r y , and i n every work o f imagination
So t h a t t h e received forms of c o n s t r u c t i o n i n
t h e language i n which they w r i t e , supply them
not with f i x e d p a t t e r n s , from which they must
never d e p a r t ; but with rough m a t e r i a l s , which
they mould and f a s h i o n so as t o f i t them t o
t h e i r conceptions of excellence i n t h e language
i n which they w r i t e . 2
....
1.
Op. c i t . , p. 254.
2.
Op. c i t . , p. 258.
Not only is this passage 'exceptional in the eighteenth
century in its attitude to variation from the accepted
norm, but it also seems as if Ward is here making the same
kind of suggestion which is often made today when discussing poetry and generative grammar: poets have to follow
the general plan of the language in order to be understood,
but can obtain special effects, insights, and creativity
by breaking low level rules of syntax.'
Ward does not
offer any examples of how creativs writers mould language,
-to decide exactly what he means; but
so it is difficult
the important point is that Ward not only refuses to see
himself as a legislator, but makes a posikive attempt to
include deviations from the norm in his general theory.
This position is a long way from that of his contemporary
James Buchanan who took it upon himself to render the
-
first six books of Paradise Lost into grammatical English!
2
Although Ward does not set himself up as an arbitep
right and wrong in language, he does profess to see language as an organic and growing system which is capable
1
1. Cf. Noam Chomsky, I1SomeMethodological Remarks on
Generative Grammar," Word, XVII (1961), 219-39, especially
235 ff. See also ~ a m u e l R . Levin, "Poetry and Grammaticalness," in Essa s on the Lan ua e of ~itergture,ed. Seymour
Chatman & amue KT ~ i - 0 ~
19671, 224-230.
2. Ward's comment on Milton's language is amusing:
IfMr.Addison says that the English language sunk under
Milton. So would the Greek language have sunk under Homer,
if he had made an epic poem on Miltonts subject." (p. 291).
of amelioration or deterioration:
Many attempts in every language are usually made,
before the plan of construction is brought to
such a degree of perfection as the language is
capable of reaching. And posterity easily perceives, that the language used in one age by
the writers of a nation, is better than that
which is used by those of another aEe. As for
instance, all agree that the language of Virgil
is better than that of Ennius. 1
In spite of the ease with which we are able to decide
on the superiority of Virgil over Ennius, the way we
do it, our judgment by taste, is so intimately human
that Ward is able to offer no analysis of how it is
done.
Ward does not go so far as to offer any judgments
about style in English; we can only infer from the fact
that he uses Dryden, Pope, and Addison as sources of
many of his examples of English that he considers the
language of the hundred years immediately preceding
publication of his grammar to have reached an acceptable
standard of development. On the other hand, it may be
that the practical purposes of his grammar suggest to
him that the obvious period to go to is the most recent
regardless of the value of the style of the period.
3.5.
Ward's Claim to Uniqueness
Ward's claim to uniqueness derives from his interest
1.
Op. cit., p. 259.
in the intellectual movements that were influencing man
-
of letters and scientists, but not grammarians in the
eighteenth century. He had obviously read and thought
about John Locketsphilosophical work; there is considerable evidence, which will be discussed in the following
chapter, that David Hartleytspsychological theories
had a great impact on Ward's thinking.
Even his attitudes
to language mark him as a man of his age, aware of the
I/
intellectual currents around him.
His reading of the
French grammarians
point to a breadth of scholarship
-.
which appears to be unequalled by his fellow-grammarians.
Harris' Hermes and Ward's Essay mark a turning point in
language studies in England.
After them we see two
distinct developments: on the one hand the continuation
of prescriptive school grammars; on the other the scholarly study of language. The uniqueness of William Ward's
work and the viewpoint from which it will be studied here,
is that it is the only comprehensive synchronic study of
the English language in the eighteenth century that relates
the study of language to the wider intellectual movements
of the age.
b
Chapter IV
,
The Sources of Ward's Essay on Grammar
4.1.
4.0.1.
Introduction
Ward's Acknowledgement of his Sources
4.1.
The Direct Influence of John Locke, David Hartley,
and Claude Buffier
John Locke A n Essay Concerning Human Understanding
4.1.1.
(1690)
4.1.1.4.
4.1.1.5.
4.1 .1.6.
4.1.1.7.
LocketsDivision of Ideas
Ward's Use of Locke's Ideas
Mixed Modes as a Source of Ward's Linguistic
Relativity Theory
Ideas of Relation and Ward's Transitivity Theory
Particles
The Relation of Ideas and Words
Siunmary of Locke's Influence
4.1.2.
4.1.2.1.
4.1.2.2.
4.1.2.3.
4,1.2.4.
4.1,2.5.
David Hartley: Observations on Man (1749)
Hartley and Rational Grammar
Hartley's View on Language Structure
Hartley's Word Classes and the Analogy with Algebra
A Seminal Semantic Theory
A Summary of Hartley's Influence
4.1.3.
Claude Buffier: Grammaire Fran~oise--sur un Plan
Nouveau
Grammar, Particular and Universal
Ward's Advance on Buffier
Ellipsis
Summary of Buffier8s Influence
4.1.1.1.
4.1.1.2.
4.1.1.3.
4.1.3.1.
4.1.3.2.
4.1.3.3.
4.1.3.4.
4.2.
4.2.1.
4.2.1.1,
4.2.2.
4.2.2.1.
4.2.2.2.
4.2.3.
4.3.
4.3.1.
4.3.2.
The Indirect Influence of Some Continental
Grammarians
Franciscus Sanctius: Minerva (1587)
Ward's Use of Sanctius
Antoine Arnayld and Claude Lancelot: Grammaire
~Qneraleet Raisonee ( 1 6 6 0 )
Language and ~ h o u g m
Arnauldls and Ward's Views of Underlying Structure
Abbe' Fromant: Reflexions sur les Fondemens de ltArt
a a X & The Indirect ~nfluen= 'of Some English Grammarians
Richard Johnson: Grammatical Commentaries (1706)
James Harris: Hermes ( 1 7 5 1 )
4.3.2.1.
4.3.2.2.
4.3.2.3.
4.3.2.4.
4.3.2.5.
4.3.3.
H i s View of c a s e '
The P a r t s of Speech
Sentence Types
Coalescence
Summary of t h e R e l a t i o n of Harris and Ward
Robert Lowth
4.4.
Summary o f Sources
CHAPTER IV
THE SOURCES OF WARD'S ESSAY ON GRAMMAR
4.0.
Introduction
Chapter I1 outlined the grammatical tradition and
allied philosophical developments of the years prior to
lard's Essay.
This chapter is also concerned with the
years prior to 1765, but only insofar as certain works
of grammar or philosophy appear to have directly influenced William Ward.
It is intended as an investigation
of his sources, and will prepare the way for an account
of his own theory; in the course of the chapter a number
of interesting points in the Essay will be mentioned, as
they grew out of Ward's study of his sources.
They are
mentioned here as they do not form part of the main
argument of later chapters.
4.0.1.
Ward's Acknowledgements of his Sources
Anxious to show his suitability for the task before
him, Ward indicates the extent of his reading in his
preface:
I have received some assistance in this work from
a very learned and ingenious treatise, called
Hermes; as likewise from the Grammaire ~aisonnde
of Messieurs de Port-Royal, with the ~ b b dPromant's
very useful and ingenious reflexions upon it; also
from Father Buffier's Grammar: I have had some
advantage from Sanctius' Minerva; some from the
excellent Introduction mentioned above [Robert
~owthls]; I have a l s o received some h e l p from
D r Ward's f o u r Essays on t h e English Language,
e s p e c i a l l y f r o m t h e l i s t of verbs published a t
t h e end of t h e s e Essays; I l i k e w i s e made u s e
of M r White's t r e a t i s e of t h e English verb:
but above a l l M r Johnson's d i c t i o n a r y has been
o f u s e t o me. I could not have w r i t t e n s e v e r a l
parts of t h e P r a c t i c a l Grammar, had n o t t h i s
most e x c e l l e n t p e r f ~ r m a n c e ~ s u p p l i emde with
examples, and o t h e r help.
Ward a l s o mentions William Holder ( "
. . . whoever con-
s i d e r s a t t e n t i v e l y what D r Wallace and D r Holder have
s a i d or. t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n s by which t h e sounds of language
a r e formed
. . . .'I)
and Thomas ~uddiman.
Although Ward
never mentions David Hartley t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence
i n t h e t e x t t o suggest t h a t he n o t only knew of H a r t l e y ' s
work, but w a s s t r o n g l y influenced by i t .
Ward r e f e r s t o
John Locke i n h i s p r e f a c e , and h i s e n t i r e p l a n of grammar
e v i d e n t l y owes much t o h i s reading of Locke.
I n the
following pages t h e d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e of Locke, Hartley,
and Claude B u f f i e r w i l l be discussed, and then t h e i n d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e of t h r e e c o n t i n e n t a l grammarians (Franc i s c u s S a n c t i u s , Antoine Arnauld, and ~ b b kPromznt) and
t h r e e English grammarians (Richard Johnson, James Harris,
and Robert Lowth) w i l l be considered. 3
1.
Ward, p. x i i i .
2.
Op. c i t . ,
p. 24.
3. John W a l l i s , W i l l i a m Holder, Thomas Ruddimon, Samuel
Johnson, John Ward, and James White a r e not s i g n i f i c a n t
i n terms of i n f l u e n c e . However, a s h o r t account o f t h e i r
r e l a t i o n t o Ward i s g i v e n h e r e :
John Wallis: Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae (1658). Ward
mentions t h e a i d he r e c e i v e d from a D r . W a l l i s ; t h e h i s t o r y of E n g l i s h grammar s u g g e s t s t h a t Wallis w a s r e a d and
i g n o r e d by a l l h i s s u c c e s s o r s ; t h i s c e r t a i n l y seems t r u e
as f a r as Ward i s concerned. There i s no t r a c e of any of
Wallis' o r i g i n a l grammatical i d e a s i n Ward's Essay; he
h a s r e a d him because a t one p o i n t Ward s a y s h i s d i s a g r e e w i t h Wallis on c a s e i s only r e a l l y a n argument about
terminology. The main r e f e r e n c e t o Wallis i n t h e t e x t i s
a d i s c u s s i o n on a r t i c u l a t i o n . Ward w a s u s i n g Wallis1 account of a r t i c u l a t i o n i n h i s i n t r o d u c t o r y c h a p t e r on
orthography and phonology; Ward does n o t c o n s i d e r t h a t
orthography and p r o n u n c i a t i o n form p a r t of u n i v e r s a l grammar, apart from t h e s e l f - e v i d e n t f a c t t h a t a l l words a r e
composed of sounds, and t h e s e sounds u n i t e t o g e t h e r t o
form s y l l a b l e s ; a l l e l s e i s beyond h i s province as a spec u l a t i v e grammarian: "But t h i s proceeding must be conducted by d i f f e r e n t r u l e s i n every d i f f e r e n t language,
and t h e r e f o r e h a s l i t t l e r e l a t i o n t o u n i v e r s a l grammar.*I
(Ward: p. 6 ) . Ward's remarks i n t h e s e a r e a s a r e n o t
worthy of s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and so Wallis1 i n f l u e n c e
w i l l n o t be d i s c u s s e d . William Holder w i l l n o t be d i s cussed f o r t h e same reason.
ment
Thomas Ruddiman: Grarnmaticae L a t i n a e I n s t i t u t i o n e s (1725).
Ward makes an i s o l a t e d r e f e r e n c e t o Ruddiman's L a t i n grammar on page 24. The grammar i s completely u n i n t e r e s t i n g
a p a r t from t h e f a c t t h a t Ruddiman makes h i s primary d i v i s i o n of t h e p a r t s of speech a c c o r d i n g t o whether t h e y a r e
d e c l i n a b l e s o r non-declinables.
He a l s o acknowledges
t h a t t h e r e i s a ' n a t u r a l t s y n t a x and a n a r b i t r a r y s y n t a x ,
t h e former being language u n i v e r s a l . He had no obvious
i n f l u e n c e on Ward's t h i n k i n g , but e x p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n
o f p o s s i b l e u n i v e r s a l s i s unusual enough i n England t h a t
he d e s e r v e s mention f o r t h i s a l o n e .
Samuel Johnson: D i c t i o n a r y of t h e E n g l i s h Language (1755).
I t i s r a t h e r s u r p r i s i n g t o f i n d t h a t Ward d e s c r i b e s
J o h n s o n t s d i c t i o n a r y as "my g r e a t e s t h e l p ; ' ' Ward e x p l a i n s
t h a t he used i t t o h e l p him w i t h h i s examples i n t h e Pract i c a l Grammar; t h u s i t i s n o t d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e
development of h i s t h e o r y . We do n o t e a s i l y understand
t h e v a l u e a t t a c h e d t o i t because we a r e n o t aware of t h e
tremendous g r a t i t u d e t h a t people i n t e r e s t e d i n language
4.1.
The D i r e c t Influenpe of John Locke, David H a r t l e x ,
and Claude B u f f i e r
Locke, H a r t l e y , and B u f f i e r a l l a p p e a r t o have had
a d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e on t h e f o r m a t i o n of Ward's t h e o r y , i n
t h a t he n o t only r e a d t h e i r works, but took o v e r i n almost
t h e i r o r i g i n a l form some of t h e i r t h o u g h t s concerning
language.
4.1.1.
John Locke: An Essay Concerning Humanunderstanding
( 1690)
Locke!s Essay i s l a r g e l y concerned w i t h what he c a l l s
' i d e a s , ' and how t h e y a r e formed i n t h e mind as a r e s u l t
of s e n s e i m p r e s s i o n s ; he t o t a l l y r e j e c t s t h e C a r t e s i a n
i d e a l i s m which r e g a r d s i d e a s as i n n a t e .
He i s concerned
as a r e most p h i l o s o p h e r s who t a k e r e a l i s m as a s t a r t i n g
p o i n t of t h e i r philosophy, w i t h t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a c q u i r -
i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y must have f e l t towards
D r . Johnson f o r t h e east and u n p a r a l l e l e d work of r e f e r ence t h a t he gave them.
John Ward: Four Essays Upon t h e E n g l i s h Language (1758)
and James White: The E n g l i s h Verb (1758). John Ward's
f o u r e s s a y s and James W h i t e ' s t r e a t i s e on t h e v e r b helped
Ward w i t h t h e p r a c t i c a l grammar r a t h e r t h a n t h e s p c c u l ~ t i v e
grammar. I n t h e p r a c t i c a l grammar Ward's a n a l y s i s of
t e n s e s and mood i s t r a d i t i o n a l and bad. I t seems l i k e l y
t h a t such s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n as he h a s he took d i r e c t l y from
Ward and White. We f i n d t h e u s u a l c o n j u g a t i o n of t h e v e r b
w i t h s i x p e r s o n s , but j u s t one change i n form on page 292.
Ward's t r e a t m e n t of t e n s e i s t h e worst a s p e c t of t h e Essay
on G r a m m a r .
-
i n g g e n e r a l o r u n i v e r s a l i d e a s from t h e t r a n s i t o r y and
p a r t i c u l a r sense impressions which a r e f o r him t h e source
of a l l i d e a s .
He proposes t h a t g e n e r a l i d e a s a r e formed
by t a k i n g n o t e of only c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s i n t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y of sense impressions which an o b j e c t p r e s e n t s u s with;
t h e s e f e a t u r e s have no r e f e r e n c e t o t h e e x i s t e n t i a l
uniqueness of t h e o b j e c t : "Ideas become g e n e r a l by separ a t i n g from them t h e circumstances f o time and p l a c e and
any o t h e r i d e a s t h a t may determine them t o t h i s o r t h a t
p a r t i c u l a r existence.ltl
--
Book I11 of Lockets Essax i s
entitled O f Words, and i s e x p l i c i t l y concerned with t h e
expression and communication of i d e a s ; i t i s from t h i s
book t h a t Ward o b t a i n s some of h i s most s t i m u l a t i n g i d e a s
on language.
4.1.1.1.
Lockets Division of I d e a s
Locke d i v i d e s t h e i d e a s t h a t we have i n our minds
i n t o f o u r major c a t e g o r i e s : simple i d e a s , complex i d e a s
of substance, complex i d e a s of r e l a t i o n , and complex i d e a s
of mixed modes.
Adjectives denoting s i n g l e p h y s i c a l
p r o p e r t i e s would s i g n i f y simple i d e a s ; g o l d , when i t s i m p l y means a c o l o u r , i s t h e example t h a t Locke uses.
But
g o l d would s i g n i f y a complex i d e a of substance when i t
!
r e f e r s t o t h e m e t a l , and i n t h i s case would be composed
1.
Locke, op. c i t . , I I I . i i i . 6 .
of a c o l l e c t i o n of simple) i d e a s r e p r e s e n t i n g i t s c o l o u r ,
m a l l e a b i l i t y , weight, v a l u e , e t c . ; we have complex i d e a s
-
of s u b s t a n c e of a l l n a t u r a l o b j e c t s qua o b j e c t s .
Man
s i g n i f i e s a complex i d e a of s u b s t a n c e , but i f a man
-is
c o n s i d e r e d as a f a t h e r , t h e n t h i s i s a complex i d e a of
r e l a t i o n ; i d e a s of r e l a t i o n a r e i d e a s of c a u s e , e f f e c t ,
i d e n t i t y , and c o n v e n t i o n a l o r n a t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s ;
Aaron says: "For i n s t a n c e if of Caius I s a y he i s a man,
t h i s i s d e s c r i b i n g him p o s i t i v e l y , but i f I s a y he i s a
husband, t h i s l a t t e r i s a p u r e l y r e l a t i v e term, and I
-.
s i g n i f y more t h a n Caius h e r e , I s i g n i f y a n o t h e r person." 1
Locke d e s c r i b e s complex i d e a s of mixed modes thus:
I
Modes I c a l l such complex i d e a s which, however
compounded, c o n t a i n n o t i n them t h e s u p p o s i t i o n
of subsisting by themselves, but a r e considered
as dependences on, o r a f f e c t i o n s of s u b s t a n c e s ;
such as a r e t h e i d e a s s i g n i f i e d by t h e words
t r i a n g l e , g r a t i t u d e , murder, e t c . 2
Ward's c h o i c e of examples a p p e a r s t o r e f l e c t a n
a t t e m p t t o d e a l w i t h t h e u n i v e r s a l i s t language which
caused d i f f i c u l t y i n t h e e m p i r i c i s t ' s p o s i t i o n .
Locke
had t o account f o r t h e a b s t r a c t terms i n language and
d i d so by choosing t o d i s c u s s f a i r l y c o n c r e t e a b s t r a c t
1.
Aaron, op. c i t . , p. 181.
2.
II.xii.4.
such as triangle and murder.
I
He subsumed all
qualities that were universal rether than particular
under the catch-all category of mixed modes.
Ideas of
substance are ideas of things that subsist by themselves,2
while mixed modes are taffections'of something else.
In Lockets discussion of ideas he seems to have been concerned with describing the ideas of things and qualities.
He does not consider explicitly the ideas attached to verbs.
However, we are not concerned so much with Locketsintentions as with Ward's understanding of those intentions.
There is sufficient ambiguity in Lockets discussions for
Ward to perceive grammatical correlates in Locketsdistinctions.
,f
Simple ideas correspond to adjectives, ideas
substance to s ~ b s t ~ t i v e sbut
, mixed modes could be
interpreted either as abstract nouns or second order
nominals (nouns derived from verbs or adjectives), or as
verbs.
In this passage Locke appears to be referring to
I am grateful to Jonathan Bennett for suggestions
1.
about Locketsmixed modes,
2.
Locke describes them thus:
The ideas of substances are such combinations of
simple ideas as are taken to represent distinct
particular things subsisting by themselves; in
which the supposed or confused idea of substance,
such as it is, is always the first and chief,
(I1.xii.6.)
abstract nouns :
The names and essences of mixed modes have nothing
but what is common to them with other ideas; but
they have something peculiar.
...
...
The first particularity is that abstrzct ideas or
of mixed modes are made by the
the essences
understandin~wherein they differ from those of
simple ideas. In the next place, these essences
of the species of mixed modes are not only made
by the mind, but made very arbitrzrily.1
Locke also refers to mixed modes as actions, and here
they would seem to refer to verbs:
Besides, the greatest part of mixed modes, being
actions which perish in their birth, are not
capable of lasting duration, as substances which
are the actors, and wherein the simple ideas that
make up the complex ideas designed by the name
have a lasting union.2
4.1.1.2.
Ward's Use of Lockets Ideas
Lockets discussion of mixed modes is unclear, probably because Locke himself was unclear, but in any case
Ward makes little attempt to follow this discussion of
ideas as it stands.
There are, however, a number of
important correspondences and borrowings.
He accepts
completely Locketsdistinction between words, ideas, and
things. Ward discusses the correspondence of grammatical
categories, not to things in the world, as did the
!
Modistae, but to distinctive types of ideas or conceptions in the mind: "The whole plan of the application of
language takes its immediate original from the nature of
the conceptions which the mind of man forms and affixes
to substantives and verbs; and not from the nature of the
objects whence the conceptions are formed."'
A detailed
analysis of Ward's use of the term 'idea' is given in
the following chapter.
Ward makes a distinction (corre6
sponding to Locke's distinction between ideas of substance,
and ideas of mixed modes) between words whose annexed
--
conception denotes a principle of existence with a foundation in the world and those whose conceptions denote
'
a principle of existence which is given by the understanding; this distinguishes abstract and concrete nouns.
He talks of verbs as having an ninconstant principle of
existencet1because they denote transitory states.
This
inconstant principle is again based on Ward's understanding of Lockets analysis of mixed modes ''which perish in
their birth."
4.1.1.3.
Mixed Modes as a Source of Ward's Linguistic
Relativity Theory
Lockelsdiscussion of mixed modes appears to have
stimulated Ward to some comments on language differences
and t h e problem of t r a n s l a t i o n .
Locke s a y s t h a t mixed
modes a r e a r b i t r a r y c r e a t i o n s of man:
But i n i t s complex i d e a s of mixed modes, t h e
mind t a k e s a l i b e r t y n o t t o follow t h e e x i s t ence of t h i n g s e x a c t l y
I n t h e making
t h e r e f o r e of t h e s p e c i e s of mixed modes men
have had regard only t o such combinations as
they had occasion t o mention one t o another.
These t h e y have combined i n t o d i s t i n c t complex
i d e a s and given names t o , w h i l s t o t h e r s t h a t
i n n a t u r e have a n e a r union a r e l e f t l o o s e and
unregarded. 1
.
Following from t h i s Ward s e e s a uniformity i n a l l languages i n t h e naming of n a t u r a l o b j e c t s and animals
( L o c k e t s complex i d e a s of s u b s t a n c e ) , but n o t i n t h e
naming of a r t i f a c t s and i n s t i t u t i o n s of s o c i e t y (which
a r e r e p r e s e n t e d by i d e a s of mixed modes); h e r e t h e sel e c t i o n of i d e a s i s made according t o what s o c i e t y s e e s
as important: "such combinations as they had occasion t o
mention one t o another.ll2
This w i l l p r e s e n t problems i n
t r a n s l a t i o n from t h e language of one c u l t u r e t o t h a t o f
another: "It comes t o pass t h a t t h e r e i s l i t t l e agreement
amongst t h e conceptions annexed t o names o f s p e c i e s , which
t a k e t h e i r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s from i n s t i t u t i o n s p e c u l i a r t o
each n a t i o n .
And t h i s i s one p r i n c i p a l reason
why
t h e s e languages cannot be. t r a n s l a t e d one i n t o another.
4.1.1.4.
I d e a s of R e l a t i o n and Ward's T r a n s i t i v i t y Theory
Probably t h e most far-reaching,
though not t h e most
obvious u s e t h a t Ward made of Lockets d i v i s i o n of i d e a s ,
i s h i s u s e of t h e i d e a s o f r e l a t i o n ,
Ward f e l t i t w a s a
grammarian's t a s k t o d i v i d e nouns i n t o s p e c i e s according
t o t h e kinds of s p e c i e s d i s c o v e r a b l e i n n a t u r e ; t h i s w a s
an amusing pastime f o r e a r l i e r grammarians, but w a s of
l i t t l e r e a l u s e i n t h e grammatical c a t e g o r i z a t i o n of
language,-- One s p e c i e s t h a t Ward f i n d s among nouns i s
t h e " c o r r e l a t i v e s p e c i e s t t which comprises a l l nouns t h a t
Locke would have s a i d s i g n i f y i d e a s of r e l a t i o n ,
A
p a r e n t i s "an o b j e c t g e n e r a t i n g , " and an o f f s p r i n g Itan
o b j e c t g e n e r a t e d g t ; mention of one i n t r o d u c e s i n t h e mind
a n o t i o n of t h e o t h e r , o r a s Aaron s a y s of Caius: " I f
I say he i s a husband, t h e l a t t e r i s a purely r e l a t i v e
term, and I s i g n i f y more t h a n Caius h e r e , I s i g n i f y anot h e r person.812 The i d e a of r e l a t i o n i s not important i n
Ward's d i s c u s s i o n of nouns, but he extends t h e d i s c u s s i o n
of r e l a t i o n t o suggest t h a t one grammatical s t r u c t u r e w i l l
c a l l f o r t h i n t h e mind i t s r e l a t e d transform:
I
1,
p * 37.
2,
Aaron, p. 181.
Hence i t i s c l e a r , t h a t t h e c o n c e p t i o n of e i t h e r
s p e c i e s of any c o r r e l a t i v e p a i r , supposes t h e
c o n c e p t i o n of t h e o t h e r s p e c i e s of t h e same
p a i r . And i t w i l l a p p e a r , when we speak of t h e
corresponding a c t i v e and p a s s i v e s t a t e s of any
one and t h e same t r a n s i t i v e v e r b , t h a t e i t h e r
of them supposes t h e o t h e r ; so t h a t i f t h e v e r b
which e x p r e s s e s e i t h e r of t h e s t a t e s be ment i o n e d , t h e r e i s no need t o mention t h a t which
e x p r e s s e s t h e o t h e r ; but any c e r t a i n mark, o r
s i g n , a p p r o p r i a t e d f o r t h e purpose, i s s u f f i c i e n t t o d i r e c t t h e h e a r e r t o supply i n h i s own
mind t h e v e r b a l s t a t e , e i t h e r p a s s i v e o r a c t i v e ,
which i s t h e c o r r e l a t i v e t o t h a t which i s a c t i v e l y mentioned.
T h i s s p e c u l a t i o n on t h e e x t e n s i o n of L o c k e t s i d e a of
r e l a t i o n i s seminal i n forming Ward's a n a l y s i s of t h e
t r a n s i t i v e s e n t e n c e type.
On account of some i n c o n s i s -
t e n c i e s i n t h e Essay on Grammar t h e r e seems l i t t l e doubt
t h a t Ward developed h i s t h e o r y while he w a s a c t u a l l y
w r i t i n g t h e grammar; t h e r e i s l i k e w i s e l i t t l e doubt t h a t
L o c k e t s d i s c u s s i o n of r e l a t i o n w a s t h e i n s p i r a t i o n of
h i s t h e o r y of t h e t r a n s i t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n .
The t h e o r y
w i l l be f u l l y d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter V I I .
4 . 1 5
.
Particles
I d e a s a r e s i g n i f i e d by words, and c o n v e r s e l y moat,
b u t n o t a l l words s i g n i f y i d e a s .
Those t h a t do n o t s i g -
n i f y i d e a s a r e d i s c u s s e d by Locke i n h i s c h a p t e r O f
Particles:
1.
Ward, p.40.
I
Besides words which are the names of ideas
in the mind, there are a great many others
that are made use of to signify the connexion that the mind gives to ideas or propositions, one with another
The mir~d
needs other signs to show or intimate some
particular action of its own at that time
relating to those ideas. This it does
several ways, as is and is not are the general marks of themind, E i n g or denying. But besides affirmation or negation,
without which there is in words no truth or
falsehood, the mind does, in declaring its
sentiments to others connect not only the
parts of propositbns but whole sentences
one to another, with their several relations
and dependencies, to make a coherent discourse.
Man must observe the dependence of his
thoughts and reasonings one upon another:
and to express well such methodical and
rational thoughts, he must have words to
show what connexion, restriction, distinction, opposition, emphasis etc. he gives to
each part of his discourse
These
words not truly by themselves the names of
any ideas are of such constant and indispensable use in language. 1
....
....
Particles are concerned with the connexion of ideas, and
it is the problem of connecting ideas which motivates
Ward to write his grammar; he says his primary intention
is to account "for the several modes of proceeding by
which those conceptions are again united into conceptions
more and more complex at pleasure.
This is by much the
most difficult part of grmmar, and, as Mr. Locke complained long ago, has not been sufficiently attended
to."'
Locke says that particles are used to connect
subject and attribute; these particles are the copula
-
in its positive and negative form: is and is not. Lockets
discussion of the copula appears to be not so different
from the Port Royal proposal that the verb is essentially
an affirmation.
Such a view is totally rejected by Ward,2
and he never discusses the copula as an affirmation word.
His proposal for the joining of noun and verb is nevertheless remarkably similar to Lockets;Locke says that
the function
of the copula is to assert that the idea
.represented by the subject and the idea represented by
the attribute are present together in the same larger
unit; Ward says that when a noun and verb are in construction the conceptions denoted by each unite to form
one larger conception and become "an object of the species
1. Ward, p. fv.
is referring is:
The passage from Locke to which Ward
But though prepositions and conjunctions etc.
are names well known in grammar, and the particles
contained under them carefully ranked into their
distinct subdivisions, yet he who would show the
right use of particles, and what significance
and force they have, must take a little more pains,
enter into his own thoughts, and observe nicely
the several postures of his mind in discoursing.
I
They are all marks of some action or intimation
of the mind; and therfore to understand them
rightly, the several views, postures, stands,
turns, limitations and several other thoughts
are to be diligently studied.
of the mind
(111.vii.3.)
...
whereof t h e s t a t e i s t h e c r a r a c t e r i s t i c .l"
Affirmation
f o r Locke o r t h e construcLion o f t h e noun w i t h t h e V e r b
d e f i n i t i v e M f o r Ward i s a r e c o g n i t i o n of i d e n t i t y r a t h e r
t h a n a s t a t e m e n t of a f f i r m a t i o n ,
" A i s bl1 becomes Itab,"
whereas t h e t r a d i t i o n a l l o g i c i a n and even t h e P o r t Royal
logician sees
'la
i s b w as a s t a t e m e n t t h a t Itone of t h e
p r o p e r t i e s of a i s b-ness.I1
While t h e d i v i d i n g l i n e
between t h e s e two p o s i t i o n s may seem f i n e , i t r e f l e c t s
i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f language.
The
P o r t Royal view of t h e a f f i r m a t i o n as t h e s i g n a l of judg--
ment i n a p r o p o s i t i o n s e e s language as a t o o l f o r anal y s i n g and d i s s e c t i n g t h e u n i v e r s e , whereas Locke and
Ward s e e language as a p r o c e s s of a d d i t i o n i n t h e mind.
Our mind i s f u l l of i s o l a t e d i d e a s , and t h e f u n c t i o n of
language i s t o s i g n i f y t h e j o i n i n g of t h e s e d i s p a r a t e
i d e a s t o g e t h e r , so as t o b u i l d from them a p i c t u r e of
t h e u n i v e r s e which w i l l e n a b l e u s t o communicate t o anot h e r p e r s o n t h e c o n c e p t i o n s we have.
I t i s t h e s t r e s s on
t h e communicative s i d e of language which i s t h e s i g n i f i c a n t a s p e c t of Ward's t h e o r y , and Locke i s d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s emphasis,
4.1 . I - 6 .
The R e l a t i o n of I d e a s and Words
I n s p i t e of t h e c r e d i t g i v e n t o Locke f o r h i s foundi n g of t h e e m p i r i c a l school of philosophy, many of h i s
ideas have been severely criticized by philosophers,
I
particularly his views on lamguage.
His proposal that
ideas exist independently of words has been rejected inasmuch as no one has been able to give an empirical account of the thought process before it is expressed in
any symbolic medium.
Wittgenstein points out the vacuity
-
-
of Locketsargument in The Blue Book: "It is misleading
then to talk of thinking as a 'mental activity.'
We may
say that thinking is essentially the activity of operating
with signsattlLockets separation of the idea or content
from the sign or the vehicle of expression is not acceptable to his critics.
However, this separation of word
and thought is of considerable importance when adapted
to Ward's theory of language. Ward suggests that the
idea can have several characteristics, and the particular
characteristics it has will determine the form of the
word which is later attached to it.
Thus the idea WHITE
may have Itamark of constant existence which is not attended to;" this will mean that it has the form of an ad-
jective: white; on the other hand, the principle of
existence may be attended to, in which case the idea or
conception will have the noun whiteness attached to it.
Something similar occurs when certain ideas or characteristics arc withdrawn from the complex conception; here
the complex idea is represented not by different gramma1.
---
Ludwig Wittgcnstein, The Blue and Brown -Books
9
1964), p . 6 .
(Oxford,
tical categories, but by different words altogether:
Locke suggests that Itmanand horse can be subsumed under
animal, by taking away particular parts of these separate
complex ideasu1 and Ward makes use of the distinction
between idea and word to elaborate a theory of pronominalization, which clearly owes much to Lockets suggestion
that distinguishing characteristics can be withdrawn.
Lockets account of the idea/word distinction, as taken
over by Ward, is not an unrealistic or useless linguistic
assumption when considered as a level of abstraction rather
than of physical separation; the idea corresponds closely
to what linguists today call a bundle of semantic features.
The occurrence of a lexeme signifies that certain semantic
man would appear to
features are present; thus the word consist of several semantic features including the following:
i ) human, ii) adult, and
its meaning with that of -9bull
iii) male; these contrast
child, and woman respectively.
Linguists who accept that the meaning of words can be
atomized in this way into semantic features will have no
trouble in accepting Ward's interpretation of Lockets
idea/word distinction in spite of the absurdity of some
aspects of Locketsoriginal formulation.2
2. A full discussion of the philosophical debate over
Locketsdichotomy between idea and word is out of place
here. D. J. OtConnoroutlines the arguments against
Locketsposition in Chapter 6 of his book John Locke.
I
4.1.1.7.
Summa.ry of LocketsInfluence
Locketsphilosophy enabled Ward to bread away from
the traditional concept of the idea as an objective copy
of reality.'
He was then able to discuss translation
difficulties, and to offer at least a weak version of
the linguistic relativity hypothesis.
The novelty of
this approach to the idea is discussed in the following
chapter, Locke provided a means for Ward to differentiate the parts of speech not on a semantic or logical
basis, but- - on a psychological basis, according to the
kind of idea or conception to which they were attached.
Perhaps the greatest contribution of Locketsphilosophy
is the fact that it enabled Ward to recognize that the
word was not the ultimate unit in linguistic analysis,
and could be broken down into its semantic components,
4.1.2.
David Hartley: Observations on Man (1749)
Hartleytsmain contribution to psychological theory
is his extension of Locketsaccount of the doctrine of
association to account for the interaction of the spiritual and material in man; he puts forward a theory of physical vibrations which are in perfect correspondence with
a parallel set of intellectual vibrations.
Among other
1. An account of the development of the idea in linguistic
theory is given in the following chapter.
t h i n g s t h i s o f f e r s an a c c ~ u n tof language and i t s conn e c t i o n with thought: atwords and phrases must e ~ c i t e
I d e a s i n u s by Association, and they e x c i t e i d e a s i n u s
by no o t h e r means."'
The i d e a s t h a t most words e x c i t e
a r e simple i d e a s , but they c o a l e s c e t o form complex i d e a s ,
and t h e s e complex ones coalesce t o form more complex ones:
"And
. . . i t may appear . . . t h a t
simple I d e a s of sen-
s a t i o n must run i n t o c l u s t e r s and combinations, by Assoc i a t i o n ; and t h a t each of t h e s e w i l l , a t l a s t , c o a l e s c e
i n t o one complex i d e a O u 2 Locke had spoken of t h e simple
--
i d e a s c o a l e s c i n g t o form complex ones, but H a r t l e y ' s
statement of coalescence of complex i d e a s i n t o more cornp l e x ones i s much c l o s e r t o Ward's own view.
For Ward,
every noun, a d j e c t i v e , o r v e r b i n d i c a t e d some kind of
conception, which he u s u a l l y c a l l e d a complex conception;
when two words were u n i t e d i n c o n s t r u c t i o n Ward described
t h e conceptions as c o a l e s c i n g t o form one s i n g l e more
complex conception.
Only o c c a s i o n a l l y d i d Locke d i s c u s s
coalescence above t h e l e v e l of t h e word; with Hartley t h i s
i s a c o n s t a n t theme.
4.1.2.1.
Hartley and R a t i o n a l Grammar
Hartley c o n s i d e r s t h a t h i s theory of a s s o c i a t i o n of
1 . David H a r t l e y , Observations on Man, H i s Frame, H i s Duty,
and H i s Expectations, (London, lng),p.268,
--
ideas will have important,ramifications in the field of
rational grammar: '!It follows from the Proposition [that
words and phrases excite ideas in us by association] that
the Arts of Logic a ~ drational Grammar depend entirely on
the Doctrine of Association.
For Logic, considered as
the Art of Thinking or Reasoning, treats only of such
Ideas as are annexed to Words;"
he is suggesting that
his analysis of words joining together to form more complex
I
I
conceptions be used as the starting point of a grammatical
analysis, and Ward willingly takes up his challenge:
--
have accounted for the several modes of proceeding by
which these conceptions are again united into conceptions
more and more complex at pleasure. ,I 2
4.1.2.2.
Hartley's Views on Language Structure
Hartley himself makes a number of interesting general remarks about language structure in the context of
a discussion about how a child learns his language; he
sees the child as conditioned to learn the meaning of
words by constant repetition, and coupling of the sound
with what it represents: "The Association of the Picture
of the Nurse will by degrees overpower all the accidental
Associations of this Picture with other Words, and be so
1.
Ibid., p. 270.
2.
Ward, op. cit., p. iv.
firmly cemented at last, that the Picture will excite
4
the idea of the word.lt' Hartley emphasizes one important
point about language learning which appears to contradict
his analysis of speech as a process of coalescence: it is
that we learn a language by learning the sentences of the
language rather than the individual words: "Both Children
and Adults learn the Ideas belonging to whole Sentences
many times in a summary Way, and not by adding together
the Ideas of the several Words in the sentenceOu2 Locke
has been much
criticized by philosophers of language for
-proposing that word meaning is prior to sentence meaning,
and sentence meaning is always to be derived from an addition of word meanings.
We get the i~pressionfrom Locke
that by adding words together we create conceptions more
and more complex until we get final complex conception,
which is the sentence.
Locketsposition is clearly un-
tenable as a model of language learning because word
meanings are normally only learnt in sentential contexts.
Hartley is not contradicting himself and Ward is not compromised by tacitly accepting Locketsapproach; it is
perfectly true that sentence meaning is a composite of
the meaning of the words and the structural meaning. 3
1.
Hartley, op. cit., p. 271.
Op. cit., p. 274.
3. See for example, J. J. Katz and J. Fodor, "The Structure
of a Semantic Theory," Q., 39. 170-210.
2.
The p o i n t i s t h a t Locke's,account i s not a v a l i d a n a l y s i s
of t h e way languages a r e l e a r n t , but i t i s perhaps a
v a l i d account of how a language, once l e a r n t , i s used.
H a r t l e y i s p e r c e p t i v e i n n o t i c i n g and c o r r e c t i n g Locke's
shortcoming; Ward never a c t u a l l y c o n s i d e r s t h e n a t u r e of
language l e a r n i n g ,
H a r t l e y shows even more p e r c e p t i o n
when he d i s c u s s e s how, having l e a r n t a language, c h i l d r e n
p o s s e s s a s e t of r u l e s , with which they can form new
sentences: "The r u l e s of Etymology and Syntax determine
t h e a p p l i c a t i o n and purport of words i n many c a s e s ; agree--
a b l y t o which we s e e , t h a t Children, while y e t unacquainted with t h e P r o p r i e t y of Words and Phrases, which Custom
e s t a b l i s h e s , o f t e n make new Words and Constructi'on, which
. . . are yet
analogous t o t h e Tenor of t h e language, i n
which they speak.'''
I t i s remarkable t h a t a view so s i m i -
l a r t o t h e modern views of language l e a r n i n g should be
proposed: Hartley i s suggesting t h a t i n l e a r n i n g a language we i n t e r n a l i z e a system of r u l e s .
This view i s
r e f l e c t e d i n Ward's own approach t o language and grammar
t e a c h i n g , which i s t o r e v e a l what i s i n a sense a l r e a d y
known, r a t h e r than t o impart r u l e s , 2
4.1.2.3.
H a r t l e y ' s Word C l a s s e s and t h e Analogy with Algebra
The d i s c u s s i o n of language l e a r n i n g l e a d s Hartley t o
1.
H a r t l e y , op. c i t . , p. 282.
2.
T h i s i s discussed i n Chapter I.
see four different classes of words.
1:
2:
3:
4:
Such
Such
Such
Such
as
as
as
as
have
have
have
have
He distinguishes:
Ideas only.
both Ideas and ~efinitibns.
Definitions only.
neither Ideas nor Definitions.
These may be equated with different classes of ideas in
Locketsanalysis of ideas: the first class are Lockets
simple ideas, which, being simple, cannot be defined.
The second class are his complex ideas of substance,
which may be defined by enumerating simple ideas of which
they are composed; the third class are abstract ideas, or
mixed modes, which do not have exact counterparts in reality, and therefore, according to Hartley, but not Locke,
are made up of ideas.
The fourth class is equivalent to
Locke's particles, and Hartleyts comments on this class
are interesting:
Lastly, Words of the Fourth Class.answer to the
algebraic Signs for addition, Subtraction, &c.
to Indexes, Coefficients, &c. These are not
algebraic quantities themselves; but they alter
the Import of the Letters that are; just as
Particles vary the Sense of the principal Words
of a Sentence, and yet signify nothing of themselves. 1
Hartley refers to the principal word classes as algebraic
quantities, and to particles as the signs of algebraic
operations.
When Ward discusses the fact that different
prepositions can be arranged with substantives to produce
1.
Hartley, op. cit., p . 280.
Y,,
t h e same meaning, he f o l l ~ w sH a r t l e y i n t h e analogy w i t h
algebra:
T h i s i s no more t h a n comes t o p a s s i n estimat i n g a l l k i n d s of q u a n t i t y , so as t o e x p r e s s
t o e x p r e s s t h e r e s u l t of t h e p r o c e s s i n algebraic species:
And t o c a r r y on t h e
resemblance f a r t h e r , a f i c t i t i o u s q u a n t i t y
i s always i n t r o d u c e d merely t o assist t h e
mind i n r e g i s t e r i n g t h e s t e p s of t h e p r o c e s s ;
and t h i s q u a n t i t y i s f r e q u e n t l y p l a c e i n t o
a f i c t i t i o u s s t a t e , t i l l t h e r e s u l t of t h e
o p e r a t i o n a r i s e s , i n which whatsoever w a s
f i c t i t i o u s i s a s c e r t a i n e d . T h i s proceeding
i n a l g e b r a i s made u s e of merely t o a i d t h e
l i m i t e d powers of t h e mind of ma, and t h e
l i k e kind of proceeding i n language i s made
u s e of on t h e v e r y same account .I
....
Here t h e p r e p o s i t i o n i s compared t o a n a l g e b r a i c symbol of
unknown v a l u e , and i t s v a l u e i s determined from t h e cont e x t ; t h e u s e of c o n t e x t i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e s i g n i f i c a t i o n
-
o f words such as b~ o r t o i s s e l f - e v i d e n t .
I n h i s pre-
f a c e Ward t a l k s about ' c a s e t and s t r u c t u r a l markers a c t i n g as s i g n s which r e q u i r e t h e mind t o perform c e r t a i n
operations:
I t h a s l o n g been observed, t h a t a l g e b r a i c s p e c i e s ,
when used i n connected s e r i e s , form a kind of language a p p l i c a b l e t o q u a n t i t y o n l y ; and t h e r e a s o n
why t h e s e a r t i f i c i a l marks do s o , i s e v i d e n t l y because t h e l e t t e r s e x p r e s s c o n c e p t i o n s similar t o
t h o s e which a r e denoted by noun s u b s t a n t i v e s , and
t h e s i g n s by which t h e l e t t e r s a r e connected, den o t e d i s c u r s i v e a c t s similar t o t h o s e which a r e
denoted by t h e s i g n s of c a s e s , w h i l s t t h e mark of
1.
Ward, op. c i t . ,
p. 244.
....
e q u a l i t y d e n o t e s affirmation
It i s
c l e a r t h a t t h e [ a l g e b r a i c ] s i g r ~ sdo n o t
perform t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s , but a r e only marks
i n v e n t e d t o r e g i s t e r t h e s e v e r a l k i n d s of
d i s c u r s i v e o p e r a t i o n s by which t h e mind proc e e d s i n i t s i n v e s t i g a t i o n ; and t h e s i g n s of
c a s e s a r e e x a c t l y of t h e same n a t u r e w i t h
t h e s e s i g n s , only l e s s d e f i n i t e and p r e c i s e .
Now s u r e l y no man w i l l s a y t h a t t h e r e a r e
no g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s on which t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a l g e b r a i c s p e c i e s proceeds, and
i f t h i s cannot be s a i d , n e i t h e r can i t be
t r u l y s a i d , t h a t t h e r e a r e no g e n e r a l
p r i n c i p l e s on which t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of language proceeds. And i f t h e former a r e l e a r l y d i s c o v e r e d , why may n o t t h e l a t t e r . $
H a r t l e y and Ward a r e t h e f i r s t people t o make a comparison of t h i s kind between a l g e b r a and language.
I
I a n Michael
n o t e s Ward's r e f e r e n c e t o a l g e b r a 2 and two o t h e r i s o l a t e d
-
comparisons of t h e same kind: John Sedger, i c The S t r u c t u r e
of the
-
E r g l i s h Language (1798)
compares a u x i l i a r i e s w i t h
t h e s i g n s of a l g e b r a , and t h e 1797 e d i t i o n of t h e Encychpaedia B r i t a n r i i c a (Be p. 5 6 ) t e l l s u s "The o f f i c e of
the verb
. . . seems t o be merely t h i s :
'To j o i n t o g e t h e r
t h e s u b j e c t and p r e d i c a t e of a p r o p o s i t i o n ' ; i t s powers
a r e analogous t o t h o s e of t h e s i g n
+
i n Algebra."
Michael d e s c r i b e s such r e f e r e n c e s as "extremely r a r e u
and s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e y a r e a n t e c e d e n t s of George B o o l e t s
l i n k i n g of language and a l g e b r a ; he does n o t observe
1,
Op. c i t , , p. v i .
2. Michael, op. c i t . , p. 514. Michael d i s c u s s e s o t h e r
r e f e r e n c e s t o a l g e b r a on p. 418.
,
that it was David Martley who made the first extended
comparison of language and algebra about a hundred years
before Boole.
4.1.2.4.
A Seminal Semantic Theory
Hartleygs speculations on the relation of language
and thought have some interesting implications for semantic theory that Ward appears to have taken over.
Hartley
discusses how we acquire the meaning of words and suggests
that words have a central core of meaning and additional
meanings which they take on when in association with other
words.
The words they collocate with determine to some
extent their semantic features: "Thus the word white-being associated with the visible appearances of Milk,
Liner*,Paper, gets a stable power of exciting the Idea
of what is common to all, and a variable one in respect of
the particularities, circumstances and adjuncts. l t l
Ward
goes even further than Hartley in stating that these words
will have certain selection restrictions; he properly does
not attempt to state the rules for these.
He then clear-
ly reiterates Hartleygspoint that the substantive determines the precise semantic content of the adjective:
It is manifest that the judgement must be exerted
before any adjective can be joined consistently
with the word on which it depends; for every
1.
Hartley, op. cit., p. 273.
adjective cannot coalesce with every substantive; nor can any rules be given to shew what
substantives or verbs a particular adjective
The conception denoted
may depend upon
by one and the same adjective is modified in
the mind, so as to suit the nature of every
different object, or state, upon the name of
which such adjective is made to depend
The quality denoted by Mgoodll
is as different
as the nature of the objects to which the same
adjective is applied.1
....
....
A comparison of the two passages does not offer conclusive
I
evidence that Ward has taken this idea from Hartley; howt
ever, the obviously close reading which Ward gave to
Hartley means that Hartleyts discussion of the meaning
of the word white cannot have escaped him, and probably
did inspire his om
4.1.2.5.
reflections on semantics.
Summary of Hartley's Influence
Ward is indebted to Hartley for stating many of the
suggestions offered by Loeke in a form much more suitable
for the grammarian to accomodate.
Hartley's account of
the coalescence of conceptions at sentence level expanded
considerably Lockets seminal ideas ori this subject;
Hartley's account of how a child learns language produced
completely new insights; his views on an internalized
grammar were useful to Ward in establishing what the function of grammatical teaching should be.
1.
Ward, op. cit., p. 116.
His considerations
I
of semantics were also extremely novel (although the
Bodistae had recognized the need for collocational suitability or 'congruitasg) .
Hartley's most significant
influence is his attempt to compare algebra and language.
This had far-reaching possibilities which Ward made use
of throughout his account of grammatical construction,
and particularly in his accou~tof the meaning of prepositions.
Hartleytsinterest in larguage forms but a small
-
part of his Observations of Man.
His whole plan is
offered as a possible explanation of the tension between
--
the spiritual and the material in man.
I
&ard accepts his
views on language, and with more dogmatism thar. Hartley
shows; Ward never considers the possibility that his explanations may have very little empirical validity.
Hartley was very conscious of his limitations; however,
he felt that even if his theory was incorrect, it was
a mode of understanding some of the phenomena that were
little understood in his day; an incorrect understanding
was much more than no understanding at all.
Hartley gave
Ward the impetus to explore language in its psychological
dimensions, dimensions that had been virtually ignored
for the last four centuries,
4.1
-3.
Claude Buffier: Grammaire Franpoise sur un
Plan Nouveau ( 1 7 4 1 )
Ward says that he found great help in Buffierts
,
grammar; i t seems t h a t he w a s t h e o n l y E n g l i s h grammarian
t o make u s e of E'rench grammars o t h e r t h a n t h e P o r t Royal
grammar.
French was t a u g h t i n s c h o o l s , and i t would seem
t h a t grammars such as B u f f i e r ' s , though l i t t l e s u i t e d f o r
t e a c h i n g Englishmen French, found t h e i r way i n t o England
f o r t h e purposes of i n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e language r a t h e r
t h a n on accourLt of i n t e r e s t i n t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l viewpoint.
I n a n age t h a t w a s t r y i n g t o break f r e e from t h e
v i c e - l i k e g r i p of t h e L a t i n grammatical t r a d i t i o n i t i s
u n d e r s t a n d a b l e t h a t grammars o t h e r t h a n E n g l i s h grammars
should be i g n o r e d by grammarians.
However, French had
f a r more i n common w i t h Efiglish t h a n L a t i n had, and Ward
was a b l e t o d i s c o v e r many s t i m u l a t i n g i d e a s i n B u f f i e r l s
Like Arfiauld, t o whom he w a s o b v i o u s l y g r e a t l y ind e b t e d , B u f f i e r recognized a n i n t i m a t e connection between
language and t h o u g h t , t h a t would i n f l u e n c e a l l t h e s c i e n c e s
i n c l u d i n g theology:
...
puisque 1 ' a r t d l a r r a n g e r l e s mots, a conngxion
e s s e n t i e l l e avec l a manibre d l a r r a n g e r l e s pensees.
C 1 e s t par-l$ q u l i l fe r t de base aux p l u s h a u t e s
s c i e n c e s , e t s u r t o u t , & l a Logique: e t q u l i l f o u r n i t
d e s re'gles, oh l a Theolo i e m&e e s t q u e l q u e f o i s
obligke d ' a v o i r r e c o u r s .
f
1.
Claude B u f f i e r , Grammaire Fran o i s e s u r un Plan Nouveau,
Nouvelle E d i t i o n , ( p a r i s , I t / 5 4 ] ) 7
-
The reference to theologg reflects the theological debates
that Arnauld entered into, and reminds us of his attempt
to defend the doctrine of tran"substafitiation with his
grammatical definition of the pronoun.
4.1.3.1.
Grammar, Particular and Universal
Buffier follows Sanctius in his discontent with the
usual methods of defining the parts of speech, claiming
that they are long, ambiguous, and often circular! He
says that it is necessary to pay more attention to their
natural relations with each other and their mutual dependence:
~ n e
d6faut qui semble les regarder toutes:
savoir qulonne fait point assez sentir
leur rapport mutuel, leur arrangement, leur
d6pendance; ce qulelles ont dlessentiel selon
llordrenaturel, et ce que llusageou la
pr6vention y ont ajout6 dlarbitraire.1
It is not possible to make a language fit a preconceived
and fossilized grammar:
Tout au contraire clest essentielement ramma ma
de slajusteraux langues pour lesquelles elle
est faite, & dont elle nlest pour ainsi dire
que $e tgmoin ou ltanalyse. Les langues nlont
pas etk faites pour la Grammaire, mais la
Grammaire pour les langues: elle doit servir
k les enseigner ?ceux
i
ui ne les savent pas:
mais en les supposant d ja &tablies telles
qulellessont; puisqulil seroit ridicule de
prdtendre rnontrer ce qui nlexisteroitpas dkj$.
9
1.
Op. cit., p. 5.
ire
-.
De-la v i e n t que chaqve l a n g u e , pour G t r e
b i e n a p r i s e , d o i t a v o i r sa Grammaire p a r t i c u l i k e ; & ce q u i a f a i t t a n t d ~ mauvaises
Grammaires,, c t e s t d t a v o i r voulu a p l i q u e r
c e l l e q u i e t o i t 2 ~ p r o p r $$
e 'une,langue, 5 une
a u t r e langue t o u t e d i f e r e n t e .
B u f f i e r h a s been quoted a t l e n g t h h e r e on account of h i s
sound views on grammar as a d e s c r i p t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r
language, r a t h e r t h a n as a u n i v e r s a l system which i s
superimposed on language.
He d o e s , however, r e c o g n i z e
t h a t t h e r e w i l l be c e r t a i n t h i n g s i n common t o a l l language s :
--
I1 s e t r o u v e e s s e n t i e l l e m e n t dans t o u t e s , c e
que l a P h i l o s o p h i e y consid&e, en l e s regard,ant
comrne l e s e x p r e s s i o n s n a t u r e l l e s de nos pensees;
c a r cornme l a n a t u r e a m i s un o r d r e n d c e s s a i r e
e n t r e n o s penskes, e l l e a m i s p a r une conskquence
i n f a i l l i b l e , un o r d r e n e ' c e s s a i r e dans l e s langues.
The n e c e s s a r y o r d e r r e s i d e s i n t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of t h r e e
u n i t s i n language: t h e r e a r e t h o s e which s i g n i f y
f ) "le
s u j e t dont on p a r l e , " i i ) I t c e q u t o n a f f i r m e , " and
iii)
I t l e s c i r c o n s t a n c e s de P u n & de l ' a ~ t r e , ~ 'T. h i s i s v e r y
d i f f e r e n t from t h e P o r t Royal d i v i s i o n of t h e p a r t s o f
speech: t h e l i n k between t h e noun and t h e v e r b i s one of
-
a f f i r m a t i o n , but t h e v e r b i s n o t t h e a f f i r m a t i o n i t s e l f ,
as i n t h e P o r t Royal grammar, b u t i s what i s a f f i r m e d
2.
Op. c i t . ,
p. 9.
of t h e s u b j e c t .
The noun'and t h e v e r b a r e t h e two
p r i n c i p a l p a r t s of speech, and t h e y may b o t h be modified
by a d j u n c t s . '
Thus t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e o f t h e sentence
c o u l d be r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e f o l l o w i n g :
( Noun
( Adjunct )
)
( Verb
( Adjunct )
)
B u f f i e r does n o t d i s c u s s t h e f a c t t h a t a d v e r b s w i l l modify
/I//
t h e v e r b while a d j e c t i v e s w i l l modify t h e moun; i n h i s
d i s c u s s i o n of n a t u r a l syntax he s e e s them belonging t o a
8
common c l a s s of adjuncts.'
Y
Ward b r e a k s w i t h t h e powerful
P o r t Royal t r a d i t i o n and f o l l o w s B u f f i e r f s p l a n almost
identically.
Ward s t a t e s t h a t Itthe noun and v e r b a r e t h e
p r i n c i p a l p a r t s of speech"3 and he c o n s i d e r s t h a t t h e adv e r b d e r i v e s i t s importance from t h e f a c t t h a t i t m o d i f i e s
nouns, a d j e c t i v e o r v e r b s , and completes o r c l o s e s t h e
construction: "notice i s given t h a t the conception i s
i n t e n d e d t o modify some q u a l i t y denoted by an a d j e c t i v e ,
o r some s t a t e denoted by a v e r b which i s p l a c d i n cons t r u c t i o n w i t h t h e adverb; w h i l s t t h e c o n c e p t i o n i t s e l f
1 . Le nom & l e verbe s o n t l e s p l u s e s s e n t i e l l e s p a r t i e s
Lfuce & L f a u t r e
sont susceptibles
du language
d e d i v e r s e s c i r c o n s t a n c e s ou m o d i f i c a t i o n s : 'Le z k l e s a n s
i
prudence a g i t temerairement.
--Ibid., p. 44.
...
...
f
f
IfCette dernie're s o r t de mots, q u i ne s e r v e n t q u 1 s mo2.
d i f i e r l e nom e t l e verbe n f a p o i n t de nom g&&al dans
l e s grammaires o r d i n a i r e s . On nous p e r m e t t r a de l e s
a p p e l e r i c i m o d i f i c a t i f ~ . ~ @ - - I b i d .p.
, 45.
3.
Ward, op. c i t . p. 1 1 .
U
denoted by the adverb, is ,not usually intended to be
modifiedeil' Buffier suggests that nouns occur in one of
two positions in sentences: they are either 18nominatifs
du verbe,llwhen appearing in subject position, or "si le
nom est seulement employ&, pour exprimer 1 lobjet qui particularise la signification du .verbe,alors le nom est
apelk r&me
du verbe;" Buffier gives the following sent-
ence as an example: llLepasteur cono?t ses brebislt and
states that I1les
- brebis est le rc&ime du verbe, parce que
ctest llobjet qui particularise la signification du verbe
-
conoh, marquant en particulier ce que le Pasteur cono?t.ll
He continues, stressing the modifying function of the .
object of the transitive verb:
Quand les norns sont employe's c o m e r&gimzs &
non pas c o m e nominatifs, ils sont dits etre
en des cas obliques. Ces cas obliques des
noms se distinguent 2ar les divers articles
dont nous avons parle. 11s pouroient encore
trss-bien stapelercas modificatifs: car ce
qui particularise la signification dlunmot
la modifie aussi.2
Ward's view of syntax is that the noun in the nominative
is the principal unit of the sentence, and that the verb
attached to it modifies its conception in a certain way,
and the noun following the verb modifies or limits the
1.
Ibid., p. 213.
2.
o p e cit., pp. 57-58.
I
Y
verb's conception very much a s any o t h e r modifier would.
Common t o t h e two d e s c r i p t i o n s i s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e nouns
o t h e r than t h o s e i n t h e nominative a r e demoted f r o m t h e i r
s t a t u s as nouns t o t h a t of mere m o d i f i e r s ,
I t should be
noted t h a t t h i s i s only one of two d i s t i n c t explanations
of t r a n s i t i v i t y t h a t Ward p u t s forward.
-
Ward d i s c u s s e s t h e v e r b be e x a c t l y a s i f i t were any
o t h e r verb, whereas i t had been given s p e c i a l s t a t u s by
S a n c t i u s and P o r t Royal, and had been known as t h e v e r b
substantive,
--
B u f f i e r made t h e break with t h i s t r a d i t i o n
before Ward and may have suggested t h e i d e a t o him; he
d i s c u s s e s t h e sentence V o u s $ t e s s a v a n t n a s i f i t had
e x a c t l y t h e same s t r u c t u r e a s a t r a n s i t i v e sentence typeH
-
llvous s e r a l e nominatif, & savant s e r a l e rggime: parceque
savant p a r t i c u l a r i s e c e que vous @ t e s O w
Ward's Advance on B u f f i e r
Ward only mentions B u f f i e r once, and t h i s i s i n a
d i s c u s s i o n of t h e r e l a t i v e pronoun, where Ward ' s conclus i o n s about i t a r e t h e same as B u f f i e r l s , but he f e e l s
t h a t h i s explanations a r e b e t t e r :
We have shown, t h a t t h e r e l a t i v e pronoun extends
i t s s i g n i f i c a t i o n , so a s t o p a r t a k e o f t h e s e
connexions of i t s antecedent; and t h e r f o r e i t
i s seldom considered s i n g l y and i n i t s e l f , as
t h e name of any o b j e c t . Hence Father B u f f i e r
had c a l l e d t h e r e l a t i v e an incornpleat pronoun,
and t h e personal and demonstrative pronouns
compleat ones; because, he s a y s he, t h e s e
f r e q u e n t l y s t a n d a l o n e f o r t h e names of o b j e c t s ,
which t h e r e l a t i v e pronouns do n o t , B u f f i e r
g i v e s no r e a s o n why t h i s happens i n l a n g u a g e , ,
which r e a s o n i s m a n i f e s t l y t h a t g i v e n above.
I t seems t h a t Ward had g r e a t r e s p e c t f o r B u f f i e r t s grammar,
b u t f e l t t h a t he himself w a s a b l e t o go somewhat f u r t h e r
i n e x p l a i n i n g t h e u n i v e r s a l phenomena of language,
We s.ee
him c l a i m i n g h i s s u p e r i o r i t y of e x p l a n a t i o n h e r e , and t h e r e
i s no doubt t h a t he f e l t t h a t h i s second and l a t e r expla-
n a t i o n of t h e t r a n s i t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n w a s s u p e r i o r t o t h e
one suggested t o him by B u f f i e r .
4.1.3.3,
Ellipsis
S a n c t i u s and P o r t Royal had d i s c u s s e d t h e f u n c t i o n
of e l l i p s i s i n language, but i t i s B u f f i e r who most c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s how c e r t a i n formal d e v i c e s i n language s e r v e
t o s i g n i f y t h e same t h i n g as a much l o n g e r l o c u t i o n .
Thus he s e e s t h e i m p e r a t i v e and t h e i n t e r r o g a t i v e moods
a s s h o r t ways of s a y i n g what i s i n t h e mind: "Les i n t e r r o -
g a t i f s s o n t encore d e s termes du sup16ment: a i n s i d?tesvous c e l a ou quand v i e n d r e z vous s i g n i f i e n t j e vous demande s i vous d l t e s c e l a , ou j e vous demande quardvous
v i e n d r e z n and ItLes imp&atifs d e s v e r b e s q u i s o n t pour
marquer l a v o l o n t k que nous avons q u t u n a u t r e f a s s e c e r a i n e c h o s e ; a i n s i venez me t r o u v e r s i g n i f i e j e vous
ordonne, ou j e vous c o n s e i l l e , ou j e vous p r i e , ou j e
1.
Ward, op. c i t . , pp. 146-7.
I
vous exhorte do me venir trouver.l1l He is spelling out
in a paraphrase the meaning of the structural devices
which mark the imperative and interrogative, Ward follows him in resolving imperatives and interrogatives to
affirmative sentences; his description of interrogatives
is part of a general discussion of interrogative pronouns:
To dispatch the subject of question in language
all in one place, it is only necessary to observe,
that when a question is not asked by the means of
an interrogative pronoun, or an interrogative
a supposition is made by the speaker
adverb
concerning that which the question is about, and
the speaker signifies his desire to be informed,
whether that supposition is right or not; which
signification is made by placing the nominative
case after the verb. Thus, "1s Mr M-here?" is
equivalent to the expression "1 would know
whether the supposition express d in the words,
Mr N- is here, be true or not?"1
...
The
paraphrase of the imperative mood is more straight-
forward :
We have already shewn, that a question always
depends upon the words, "1 would know, or I
would be told," or upon some sentence of the
same import, And it is equally manifest,
that a command always depends upon the words,
!'I direct--1 ordain--I command" or on some
sentence of the like import; for if the
expression, Itdothis" be completed it will
amount to the foll wing sentence, ltI direct
that you do this."
3
1.
Buffier, op. cit., pp. 81-2.
2.
Ward, op. cit., pp. 151-2,
3.
Ibid., p . 189.
Faraphrase as a mode of qesolving structural features
in language was not unknown in the preceding centuries,
but the closeness of Ward's analysis and BuffieA, the
almost parallel performative verbs used in the imperative
paraphrase (ordonner, corseiller, prier, and direct,
ordain, and command) suggest that Buffier's grammar is
the immediate source of Ward's resolution of imperatives
and interrogatives.
4.1.3.4.
Summary of Buffier's Influence
Buffier is one of Ward's most important sources;his
analysis of transitivity, and oblique cases, his division
of the parts of speech, and his analysis of imperatives
and interrogatives are all taken over by Ward.
It would
seem that Sanctius was one of the major sources of
Buffier's own work; but much research remains to be done
on the sources of many of the seventeenth and eighteenth
century grammarians. Vivian Salmon has pointed out that
most of the supposedly new or 'Cartesian' ideas in fact
have antecedents in Priscian, the Modistae, and some
little known Renaissance grammarians. 1
4.2.
The Indirect Influence of Some Continental
Grammarians
One of the aspects of Ward which distinguish him
1. Vivian Salmon, Review of 'Cartesian Linguistics,'
Journal of Linguistics, V, 3 , 1969, 165-187.
from o t h e r E n g l i s h grammarians i s t h e e x t e n s i v e u s e he
made of t h e c o n t i n e n t a l grammatical t r a d i t i o n .
rowings from B u f f i e r h a s been examined.
H i s bor-
If t h e r e i s n o t
any evidence of d i r e c t borrowing o r a b s o l u t e dependence
on S a n c t i u s , Arnauld, and Fromant, t h e r e i s undoubtedly
ample evidence of i n d i r e c t i x f l u e n c e .
F r a n c i s c u s S a n c t i u s : Minerva (1587)
4.2.1.
Ward's r e f e r e n c e t o S a n c t i u s was perhaps more d u t i f u l
t h a n genuine.
S a n c t i u s was t h e one Renaissance grammarian
b e s i d e s t h e n a t i v e L i l y t h a t every E n g l i s h grammarian
knew o f .
There i s evidence i n t h e form of numerous edi-
t i o n s of Minerva t o show t h a t he w a s much r e a d and widely
esteemed.
Both Chornsky and Michael a t t e s t t h a t he i s t h e
most i n t e r e s t i n g of t h e Renaissance grammarians.
He i s
d i s c o n t e d w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a l grammatical c a t e g o r i e s ,
mocks t h e i r weakness, and s u g g e s t s t h a t more l o g i c a l
c r i t e r i a be used i n d e l i n e a t i n g them.'
He b e l i e v e d t h a t
r e a s o n s should be g i v e n f o r language; by t h i s i t seems
t h a t he meant a s e t of r u l e s ; language would be e x p l a i n e d
by i t s conformity t o t h e s e r u l e s .
One of t h e n o t i o n s
t h a t he i n t r o d u c e d t o a c h i e v e t h i s g o a l of e x p l a n a t i o n
w a s t h a t of e l l i p s i s , whereby c e r t a i n c o n s t r u c t i o n s could
I
be r e n d e r e d more r e a s o n a b l e by t h e a d d i t i o n of c e r t a i n
words, which though n o t u t t e r e d , were supposed t o be i n
1.
See Michael, op. c i t . , p. 550.
t h e mind of t h e s p e a k e r .
Agairi p u r s u i n g h i s g o a l of
l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n he makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between v e r b s
-
s u b s t a n t i v e and v e r b s a d j e c t i v e , e s s e b e i n g t h e o n l y v e r b
substantive.
The P o r t Royal grammar f o l l o w e d t h i s d i s -
tinction.
4.2.1.1.
W a r d l s U s e of S a n c t i u s
Ward's u s e of S a n c t i u s i s no more obvious t h a n h i s
disregard.
He e x p l i c i t l y r e j e c t s S a n c t i u s ' s t a t e m e n t
t h a t t h e v o c a t i v e c a s e i s n o t i n t h e second person.1
On
t h e o t h e r hand, h e m a i n t a i n s e m p h a t i c d l y w i t h S a n c t i u s ,
and a g a i n s t almost everyone e l s e , t h a t t h e i n f i n i t i v e i s
a t r u e verb.'
I t w a s g e n e r a l l y r e g a r d e d as a k i n d of
noun s u b s t a n t i v e .
S a n c t i u s makes t h e o b s e r v a t i o n , which
i s p a r t l y t r u e , t h a t the a b l a t i v e i s t h e case associated
with prepositions i n Latin.
B u l l o k a r , who a l s o r e a d
S a n c t i u s , had decided i n 1586 w i t h some s e n s e t h a t r a t h e r
t h a n t h e a b l a t i v e t h e a c c u s a t i v e would be t h e c a s e which
performed t h i s f u n c t i o n i n E n g l i s h .
V!ard n a i v e l y f o l l o w s
1. S a n c t i u s had claimed: V o c a t i v u s non e s t secundae
p e r s o n a e , u t a j u n t G r a - m a t i c i , sed r e s a l i q u a , cum qua
sermonem communicamus.~--Kinerva, (apud Jansonio-Waesberg i o s , 1 7 3 3 ) , p. 155. Ward s a y s "This c a s e i s i n e f f e c t
( p . 90)
o n l y a nominative c a s e of t h e second person.''
2.
S a n c t i u s ' d e f i n i t i o n of t h e i n f i n i t i v e w a s : " I n f i n i tivum verburn e s t , quod p e r s o n a s , modos, e t tempora non
f i n i t , ( s i v e quod p e r s o n i s numeris e t temporibus non def i n i t u r ) ol--Op. c i t , p. 104. He s a y s t h a t time and
p e r s o n a r e p r e s e n t but n o t d e f i n e d s o t h a t i t does n o t
c o n t r a d i c t h i s g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n of t h e v e r b : loverbum
e s t vox p a r t i c e p s numeri p e r s o n a l i s cum tempore." ( p . 78)
.
.
S a n c t i u s ' p o s i t i o n i n E n g l i s h and g i v e s a l o n g , v e r y
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y e l a b o r a t i o n of p r e p o s i t i o n s which go w i t h
t h e a b l a t i v e case.
Ward a l s o u s e s e l l i p s i s as a means
of e x p l a i n i n g a g r e a t d e a l i n h i s system, but i t i s n o t
obvious t h a t he borrowed t h e concept
d i r e c t from S a n c t i u s ,
a s most of t h e French grammarians t h a t Ward knew had a l s o
followed S a n c t i u s i n proposing e l l i p s i s as a means t o
grammatical a n a l y s i s.
I t would be a m i s t a k e t o a t t r i b u t e t o o much importance t o Ward's having r e a d S a n c t i u s , as S a n c t i u s had been
a source of maEy i d e a s t o many people; i t i s i m p o s s i b l e
t o i s o l a t e i n f l u e n c e u n l e s s t h e r e i s evidence of d i r e c t
quotation.
But K a r d l s t e n a c i o u s claim t h a t t h e i n f i n i t i v e
w a s a v e r b and n o t a s u b s t a n t i v e , a l t h o u g h t o some e x t e n t
a m e a t i n g l e s s q u i b b l e 1 r e f l e c t e d a burning i s s u e of t h e
day.
The f a c t t h a t he had t h i s esteemed a u t h o r i t y t o
s u p p o r t him would have been i n v a l u a b l e and h i s r e l i a n c e
on S a n c t i u s a t t h i s p o i n t i s without q u e s t i o n ,
4.2.2.
Antoine Arnauld and Claude Lancelot: Grammaire
Generale e t Haisonn6e (1660)
Ward knew t h i s grammar w e l l , but i t s i n f l u e n c e seems
1 . I t i s a meaningless q u i b b l e f o r t h o s e who can s e e t h e
s t u d y of language as something more t h a n a s t u d y of only
one l e v e l of language, and f o r whom t h e t a s k of d e f i n i t i o n
i s n o t of paramount importance. Obviously i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h e problem of adequate d e f i n i t i o n could
n o t be e a s i l y dismissed.
to have been limited to proposing topics for Ward to consider and provide better explanations for.
It had been
read widely in England ever since its publication in the
original French.
in 1753.
An English translation was published
Gildon and Brightland are the only English
grammarians to have made extensive use of it, and it seems
that they did not understand it very well.
Misunderstand-
ing of its method was probably as widespread as knowledge
of its aims in England; it was remarkably different from
the English grammars of the seventeenth and eighteenth
A.
centuries.
4.2.2.1.
Language and Thought
~rnauld,'like Ward, stresses the relation of
language to thinking, and the fact that words are signs
by which we express our thoughts.
His definition of gram-
mar states this point: "Grammar is the art of speaking,
Speaking is to explain our thoughts by signs which men
have invented for that purpose.tt2 Any investigation of
language, he says, will have to pay attention to what
happens in our minds: "We cannot therefore perfectly
understand the different sorts of significations, annexed
I
1. Arnauld and Lancelot were co-authors; for the sake
of convenience only Arnauld will be mentioned, as he is
the senior member of the partnership.
2.
Port Royal Grammar, p . 1
P
.
to words, without first cbnsidering what passes in our
minds, since words were invented only to communicate our
thoughts.u1 The powers of the mind are said to be powers
of perception, judgment, and reasoning.
Judgment is
considered to be the essence of language; consequently
Arnauld's theory of language stresses the process of
affirmation; it divides parts of speech into those which
signify objects of thought, and those which signify the
manner of thought, that is, those that are signals of the
process of affirmation or judgment, and the other operations of the mind.
-
The verb esse was the one word that
truly expressed affirmation and hence expressed a manner
of thought, but all verbs, on account of their similarity
to this verb were considered as expressing manners of
thought, The theory was not always coherent; the division
of words into those representing objects, and those representing manners of thought was an interesting one, but its
application was slipshod.
However, the grammar was break-
ing new ground, and it is not surprising that there should
have been inconsistencies; the inconsistency of the definitions of case was mentioned in Chapter 11.
Both Arnauld
and lK!ard are inconsistent in their efforts to accomodate
the category to their native languages. The difference
1.
Op. cit., p , 22.
between the two is that the Port Royal grammar makes no
attempt to show how case functions, while Ward does.
Both claims to be rational grammarians, yet Ward has much
more far-reaching explanatory goals; perhaps this is because Port Royal shared Sanctius' views of explanation in
language..' We find the same absence of interest in explanations in the Port Royal discussion of the relative pronoun; the analysis has been widely acclaimed in that it
recognizes both the conjunctive and the subordinating aspects of this pronoun, but the explanation of how or why
--
the pronoun subordinates the following clause is not considered as it is in Ward's discussion.
4.2.2.2.
Arnauld's and Ward's Views of Underlying Structure
The linking of the adjective and noun in the sentence:
"The invisible God created the visible world1'is seen as
the signal that there are underlying propositions present,
namely 'God is invisible1 and 'the world is visible1; this
recognition of underlying structure has recently been considered as the greatest insight of the Port Royal grammar.
However, its failure to see more than one proposition in
''The valour of Achilles has been the cause of the taking
of Troy1'is difficult to understand; Arnauld saw the
genitive relationship as a simple one involving no underlying proposition.
1.
Cf. Para. 4.2.1.
Ward on the other hand felt that
between t h e two nouns i n > t h i s r e l a t i o n t h e r e w a s a n
understood t r a n s i t i v e v e r b ; he w a s slow t o r e c o g n i z e
a n y t h i n g corresponding t o t h e P o r t Royal r e s o l u t i o n of
t h e Adjective-Noun c o n s t r u c t i o n .
I t w a s mentioned i n
t h e d i s c u s s i o n on H a r t l e y t h a t Ward recognized t h a t prepos i t i o n s had a range of meanings from which we had t o s e l e c t
t h e a p p r o p r i a t e one f o r t h e d i s c o u r s e ; t h i s w a s n o t an i m p e r f e c t i o n w i t h language i n Ward's e y e s , but t h e gentlemen
of P o r t Royal s e e i t as n o t i n accord w i t h a r a t i o n a l
ac-
count of l m
g u a g e : llMo one language h a s followed on t h e
.s u b j e c t of p r e p o s i t i o n s what r e a s o n seems t o r e q u i r e ,
which i s t h a t one r e l a t i o n should be marked only by one
p r e p o s i t i o n , and t h a t t h e same p r e p o s i t i o n should n o t
mark more t h a n one r e l a t i o n . # @ ' The P o r t Royal account
o f t h e a d v e r b as a n a b b r e v i a t i o n of p r e p o s i t i o n and noun
(cum s a p i e n t a = s a p i e n t e r ) w a s a l s o questioned.
Ward's
-
r e j e c t i o n of t h e v e r b e s s e as a n a f f i r m a t i o n word d i s t i n c t
from o t h e r v e r b s i s a l s o s u r p r i s i n g .
H i s alternative
views t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l a s p e c t of a f f i r m a t i o n .
It is
d i f f i c u l t t o t a l k of i n f l u e n c e when Ward c o n t i n u a l l y seems
t o be paying no heed t o P o r t Royal, and o f t e n s a y i n g t h e
exact opposite.
The p o i n t i s t h a t t h e P o r t Royal grammar
w a s r e a d by Ward, as he admits, thought a b o u t , and t h e n
much of i t w a s r e j e c t e d .
1.
Op. c i t . p. 86.
I t s i n f l u e n c e may have been
negative, but such a work could not be considered unimportant.
Ward's rejection is evidence of a positive
step to build a new and independent theory,1
4.2.3.
~ b b kFromant: Reflexions sur les Fondemens de
1'Art de Parler (1756)
~bbe'Fromant wrote his reflections on the art of
speaking only some nine years before Ward's own grammar
was published.2
Fromant is a compiler and seeks to bring
together what has been said on universal grammar since
the publication of the Port Royal grammar.
He is emphatic
about the universality of grammatical phenomena: "Cornme
il n o y a qutune Grammaire dans le monde pour toutes les
1. No mention is made in Ward's Grammar of LtArt de Penser,
or the Art of Thinking as it was known in ~nglish(see
chapterT,=d
there is no reason to assume that Ward
was familiar with it; however on p , 117 Arnauld says:
"Mote that any sentence containing an active verb along
with its object expresses a complex proposition and in
one sense two propositbns." This sounds remarkably like
Ward's statement that every transitive verb implies that
there are two sentences, however, Arnauld clarifies his
stztement by saying that the sentence "Brutus killed a
tyrantu can be analysed as "Brutus killed someone who was
a tyrant." Ward's own analysis of the transitive construction is concerned with the relationship of active and
passive sentences rather than Arnauld's (extremely interesting) analysis of noun phrases.
2. It has not been possible to consult the original edition which Ward probably knew; the one consulted was
published in 1769, some four years after Ward had written
his grammar,, and, more important, after the publication
of M. Beauzee's grammar. Frornant's reflections are concerned with what was being written about language in the
eighteenth century; thus the 1769 edition has numerous
comments on and criticisms of ~eauzge'sgrammar. He claims
that there is little difference between this later edition
and the previous one; such as there are would presumably
be the additbns about ~eauzde.
l a n g u e s , parce q u ' i l n l y a , qulune Logique pour t o u s l e s
hommes, il ne f a u t p a s e t r r s u r p r i s de t r o u v e r d a m une
langue,
. . . l e s memes p r i n c i p e s e t l e s memes r e g l e s que
dans l e s a u t r e s langues.
He h a s few o r i g i n a l opinions
of h i s own, though he h a s considerable a b i l i t y i n c r i t i c i z i n g t h e opinions of o t h e r s .
H i s claim t o g r e a t n e s s
undoubtedly r e s t s on t h e importance he gave t o reasonable
e x p l a n a t i o n , as opposed t o emmeration
of f a c t s .
The
q u o t a t i o n a t t h e beginning of t h e t h e s i s i s ar, eloquent
testimony t- -o an educational i d e a l t h a t Fromant passed on
t o Ward.
Fromant f e l t t h a t those s t u d e n t s who have t o
put up with d u l l r u l e s i n c o l l e g e s would l o v e I1les r i g l e s
lwnineuses e t fgcondes de l a Grammaire raisonnge.
He
adopts B u f f i e r l s system of nouns, v e r b s , and m o d i f i e r s ,
and emphasizes t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h i s and t h e P o r t
Royal approach.
Aoun s u b s t a n t i v e s and a d j e c t i v e were t h e
same p a r t of speech f o r him because they s h a r e i n an ident i t y ; a t t r i b u t e s i n t h e p r e d i c a t e p o s i t i o n do n o t share
i n i d e n t i t y with t h e s u b s t a n t i v e because they a r e i n a
r e l a t i o n o f a f f i r m a t i o n on account of t h e nexus formed
by t h e s u b s t a n t i v e verb.
Although an admirer of B u f f i e r ,
Fromant l a y s much g r e a t e r emphasis than d i d B u f f i e r on
t h e v e r b as an a f f i r m a t i o n word.
.
1
~ b F rb rnant,
~
d e P a r l e r , ~Paris,*,
7
Ward's treatment of
i o n s s u r 1"s Fondemens
p. x l l .
91 ' A r t
.' Frornant is im-
the verb follows Buffier, .not ~romant
portant to Ward because of his plea for grammatical studies
which would not only be useful for the acquisition of languages, but would also be intellectually stimulating. Ward's
Essay on Grammar can be seen as an attempt to answer
Fromant's plea for the students of grammar in England.
4.3.
The Indirect Influence of Some English Grammarians
W.
No mention has been made as yet of any English grammarian that had any influence on Ward.
Obviously, influence
cannot be traced when it is extremely general.
Ward in-
herited the tradition, such as it was, of English grammar,
There were, however, three grammarians that may be singled
out as having influenced him in a more specific way than
the others.
Their influence is not direct.
Ward thought
about what they said, and then went his own way in the tradition.
These three grammarians are Richard Johnson,
James Harris, and Robert Lowth.
4.3.1.
Richard Johnson: Grammatical Commentaries (1706)
Richard Johnson's commentaries are on Lily's Latin
grammar, and he is completely concerned with a discussion
l
I
1. Fromant's position had difficulties as he himself
realized. It correctly suggested that the adjective and
noun in 'beau livre8 were in a relationship of identity,
and the words in 'liber Petri' were not, because "ces deux
mots prdsentent $ loespritdeux objetidiff&ens, dont llunC
n'est pas l1autre8@--(p.157). However, forms in Latin of
the type 'Evandreus ensis' could not be claimed to be in
an identity relation.
,
of Latin; Michael suggests,that he was widely read in the
eighteenth century. Johnson's emphasis on sound educational methodology has been noted in Chapter I11 as a
possible stimulus to Ward's own common-sense approach;
perhaps with educational objectives in sight, Johnson
rejected the regular concept of substantive and adjective
as members of the same major parts of speech; he has been
credited with introducing them as separate parts of speech,
but Mark Lewis had already recognized their distinctness
in 1670. Ward did not follow Johnson in his innovation,
-
but his grammar does reflect Johnson's definition of the
adjective, Johnson's definition is:
It is a word added to a substantive, to declare
some additional accident of the Substantive considered by itself as of Quality, Property, Relation
I have added considered by itself
because the Relations of substantives, as considered in sentences are declared by Prepositions
and not by ~djectives.1
....
Johnson distiriguishes the adjective by its having a relation solely with the noun; it is never involved in the
sentence structure as such other than as an adjunct of
the noun.
This is quite different from the Port Royal
account where every adjective is part of a proposition.
It is a reasonable account, particularly when one considers the structure of Latin, and would seem to be the
1. Richard Johnson, Grammatical Commentaries, (London,
1706), p. 8.
motivation for Ward's str?ng assertion in his preliminary
d i s c u s s i o n s o f the adjective that it unites with and ope-
rates with the substantive; for all other constructions
Ward requires some verb to be recognized in the deep
structure as a linking force, Johnsontsviews on the distinction between substantive and adjective do not prevent
him from recognizing class change between nouns and adjectives, depending on position and use of the words: "And
though Substantives be put in apposition with other Substantives and agree with them, yet this is no real object--
ion; such Substantives become Adjectives, by that very
use, as an adjective, or any other part of speech becomes
a Substantive when it is used like a Substantive, that is,
'
considered as a thing.lt
Johnsonts definition of parts
is based on their form, and he allows class change through
functio~alchange, This is a much more structural account
of language2 than we find in Ward, however, the fact that
Johnson sees this change of class as a possibility in
language allows Ward to give his psychological account of
class change with good authority.
Ward's use of Johnson
is reflected in his adherence to the general plan of Latin
grammar and the viewing of noun and adjective as closely
1,
Op. cit., p. 9.
2. The distinction so clearly drawn between form class
and functional class membership is similar to that proposed by James Sledd in A Short Introduction to ~nglish
Grammar, (Chicago, 1959);
related.
Johnson's grammar does not make any startling
innovations, and one doubts whether it greatly affected
Ward's general plan.
Johnson formed part of the gramma-
tical establishment, and Ward would have failed in his
preparation for his task if he had not made himself
familiar with Johnson's work.
Ultimately Johnson's great-
est significance stems from his enlightened and sensible
comments on methods of teaching grammar.
4.3.2.
James Harris: Hermes (1751)
--
Harris was the most interesting and certainly the
most readable grammarian of eighteenth century England,
He wished to excite his readers to a contemplation of
language and universal grammar, and has a number of stimulating ideas which later grammarians unfortunately
failed to develop.
As a classical scholar he goes to
Aristotle and Plato rather than to John Locke for the
philosophical background to his theory. The result is
that he is able to talk with confidence about universals
in language; he offers lexical universals and grammatical
universals.
His lexical universals are interesting but
were unacceptable to Ward as they assume a Platonic ideal
relation between words and things; his grammatical universals were far more reasonable and Ward's attempt to recognize universals developed from Harrist position,
il
I
,
4.3.2.1.
His View of Case
We saw in Chapter I1 that Harris viewed case not just
as an inflectional ending or the translation of such into
Engli sh , but as a category
functional relation, and as
such language universal; this view of case as a relation
can be compared with Ward's; Ward sees case as an operation of the mind; it has the function of subordinating the
idea signified by the noun so that it can coalesce with
the idea signified by the verb or noun it is in construction with.
--
Harris sees case as a statement of relation
rather than a signal of an operation; these positions are
not so far apart and Hockett suggests that statements of
relation or operation are alternate ways of looking at the
same thing: "Whekher we speak of an 'operationtor of a
'relation8 depends on notation and attitude, rather than
on the abstract mathematical nature of what we are dealing
with."' Both grammarians have in common the view of case
as a language universal phecomenon expressing functional
relationships; while this does not seem an extraordinary
or unusual view today, it is in marked contrast to the
usual eighteenth century view of it as a transfer to English
of the meaning of a Latin inflection which had been determined by rules without reason.
1.
h he
Charles C. Hockett, Language, Mathematics and Linguistics,
Hague, l 9 6 7 ) , p. 32.
4.3,2,2.
The Parts of Speech
Harris1 views of the parts of speech is his most
original contribution to grammatical theory.
He divides
all words into 'principals1 and 'accessories1according
to whether they signify ideas or relations within the
linguistic system. The 'principals1are divided into
'substantives1and 'attributes1;both verb and adjective
belong to the common class called sattribute.l The substantive is separated from other principals because it
existing object: "Whatever a thing may be wheposits an *.
ther black, white,
. . . it must first of necessity exist,
before it can possibly be anything else."'
Harrist view
is in accord with modern linguists who believe that the
one universal surface category in language may be the
noun.
Attributes take several forms: "The Sun is bright,
the Sun rises, and the Sun is risingt1have three different forms, but are said to form a common class inasmuch
as they all modify the substantive. Harris distinguishes
a third class of principals which he calls 'attributes of
the second order1 and which are commonly called adverbs.
Jespersen develops much the same analysis of the parts of
The Philosophy of Grammar and it is the basis
speech in of most theories of categorial grammar.
It would appear
to be fundamentally the same as Ward's system, but Ward
1.
Harris, Op, cit., p. 88.
did not explicate it with the clarity of Harris; it
put forward in a slightly different form as Ward sees
the basic sentence as a noun modified by (or coalescing
with) a verb, and finally closed by an adverb, Ward's
explanation has some advantage over Harris8 in that he
is able to accommodate the transitive verb sentence pattern to his explanation, whereas Harris appears to be
content to consider only those kinds of sentences which
Aristotle had considered (see Chapter I),
Harris is
more realistic than Ward when he includes adjectives with
verbs as a common part of speech; Ward, under Richard
Johnson's influence, discusses the adjective as ,part of
the noun phrase rather than as a sentence element, It
is not suggested here that Harris was the definitive
influence on Ward in his account of the principal parts
of speech; Buffier's analysis of the sentence was closer
to Ward's than Harrist;had Ward been following Harris
directly he could have scarcely avoided considering the
adjective from a wider perspective than he in fact did.
4.3.2.3.
Sentence Types
A central concept in Harriso discussion about
language is that of energy.
I
He sees words and parts of
speech generally endowed kith the energy of things;1
sentences publish an energy of the soul.2
Although he
sees four sentence types: statements, interrogatives,
commands, and volitions, he claims that they represent
only two energies of the soul: those of perception and
volition.
Thus although he does not spell out the expla-
nation of how four tmoodstor sentence types can be subsumed to two major categories in the same detail as Ward
,
I
and Buffier, he is wrestling with the same problem: the
semantic resolution of structurally distinct types.
4.3.2.4.
Coalescence
The term lcoalescence' is familiar to us from Hartley's
Observations; Harris sees coalescence as an important concept in language, although it is not aiways clear whether
his discussion is about language or about things:
Some things coalesce and unite of themselves;
others refuse to do so without help and as it
were compulsion. Thus in words of War the
mortar and the stone coalesce of themselves;
1. nAll things that exist, exist as energies or affections
of some other thing, or without being the energies or affections of some other thing. If of something else they
are attributes. Thus 'to thinkt is an attribute of 'man,'
'to be white' of a swan. If not of this manner they are
substances."--Ibid., p. 9.
2. "Speech or Discourse is a publishing of some Energie
or Motion of his soul, So it indeed is in everyone that
speaks, excepting along the Dissembler or Hypocrite."
--Ibid., p, 15.
but the wainscot and' the wall not without
nails and pins. For example all quantities
and qualities coalesce immediately with
their substances. Thus 'tis we say 'a fierce
lion,' 'a vast mountaint;and from this natural concord of subject and accident arises
the grammatical concord of Substantive and
Adjective.1
Harris concludes from this .that things which are united
in nature unite easily in language, but those which do
not, need the addition of prepositions: .Those parts of
speech unite of themselves in Grammar, whose original
archetypes-uniteof themselves in Nature. lt2
Coalescence
occurs between noun and adjective, noun and verb, and
even verb and verb
, though here
the help of the accessory
to is required; Harris gives as examples of the coalescence
of verb and verb: "1 desire to livev and "1 eat to live,"
remarking that the coalescence is more intimate in the
first case than in the second, Wardts discussion of coalescence in the Essay on Grammar is derived from Hartley
rather than Harris; Harris views coalescence not as the
coalescing of ideas but rather the coalescence of things
in nature as reflected in language. While two very different ideas when joined in construction are said to be
completely in coalescence in Hartleyts theory, Harris
will only admit a degree of coalescence, because the
1.
Op, cit., p. 262.
2.
Op. cit., p. 363.
I
things represented by the words cannot easily coalesce
in the world.
Ward and Hartley use the term 'coalescencet
to denote the complete union of ideas in the mind which
a grammatical construction represents, while Harris uses
the term only as a means of distinguishing those constructions of principals which do not require accessories
from those that do.
4.3.2.5.
Summary of the Relation of Harris and Ward
There are many points of common reference between
A
-
Viard and Harris: there is the reduction of the sentence
types, the analysis of the principal parts of speech,
~
there is the idea of coalescence, and the proposal that
words represent ideas. However, there were fundamental
differences on all these points.
Harris' statement that
there are two kinds of sentences, those indicating perceptions and those indicating volitions seems to be a
foretaste of the modern distinction between performative
verbs and others; Ward was intent on reducing sentence
types too, but he did not make the division with the
clarity that Harris does.
Harrist analysis of the prin-
cipal parts of speech has much in common with Ward's,
but they both use a very different terminology. Harris8
1
idea of coalescence is not nearly so well worked out as
Ward's, and suffers from confusing the realm of language
w i t h t h e realm of t h i n g s . '
Rather t h a n s u g g e s t t h a t Ward
borrowed t h e i d e a from Harris, we should q u e s t i o n whether
Harris went t o t h e same s o u r c e f o r i t as Ward, i . e .
H a r t l e y ; if he d i d , he d i s t o r t e d r a t h e r t h a n developed
H a r t l e y l s views.
Both Ward and Harris d i s c u s s t h e i d e a s
t h a t a r e s i g n i f i e d by words, and seem t o p o s i t t h e e x i s t ence of an i d e a i n t h e mind f o r every word.
Here t h e y
a r e m a n i f e s t l y d i f f e r e n t : Harris c l a i m s t h a t h i s i d e a s
must have been implanted i n t h e mind by God, w h i l e Ward
g o e s t o L o c k e l s philosophy f o r an e x p l a n a t i o n of h i s
ideas.
Thus t h e i r i d e a s have no common ground.
Harris
u s e s h i s as evidence of l e x i c a l u n i v e r s a l s , and Ward u s e s
h i s as evidence of l i n g u i s t i c r e l a t i v i t y and as a b a s i s
f o r a t h e o r y of pronominalization.
Ward's i n t e n t i o n s t o
a v o i d " a l l d i s p u t e s w i t h former w r i t e r s of grammar'l must
have been s t r a i n e d t o t h e utmost when he considered t h o s e
of Harrist i d e a s which were s o c l o s e t o h i s own and y e t
so different.
4.3.3.
Robert Lowth: A n I n t r o d u c t i o n t o E n g l i s h Grammar
(1762)
W i l l i a m Ward had a h i g h o p i n i o n of Lowthls grammar,
p a r t i c u l a r l y of t h e way i t d i s c u s s e d t h e so-called e r r o r s
of many eminent w r i t e r s .
He a r g u e s f o r t h e importance of
p r a c t i c a l grammar of E n g l i s h on account of t h e m i s t a k e s
made by the great, which Lowth had pointed out.
Yet such
an attitude is totally foreign to Ward (see Chapter 111);
it is certainly disappointing that such a perceptive
writer should be so impressed with Lowth's syllabus of
errors.
Lowth's grammar had been published three years
before Ward's Essay, and had obviously gained immediate
popularity.
Lowth acknowledged the importance of univer-
sal grammar, but said that it should be approached through
Q
the grammar of particular languages; his own grammar deals
1
with English,
and makes no further mention of universal
-.
,
1
grammar.
It is a significant advance on earlier works
published in England as it has a long section on syntax,
enumerating twelve distinct construction types, Ward's
attitude to Lowth is difficult to determine.
He appears
to admire him, but rejects almost everything that Lowth
says: Lowth observes only two cases in English; Ward
recognizes six.
There are two points of interest which
do not appear to have influenced Ward, but which do suggest
that Lowth and Ward were not quite so apart as a casual
glance at their grammars might suggest: firstly, Lowth
recognizes three modes in English: the explicative, the
interrogative mode, and the imperative.
He goes on to
say that the interrogative mode does not exist as such
(presumably because there is no formal distinction of
the verb for it, but only a change in word order), but
8
8
I
I
I
L
the interrogative construction should be recognized as
a mode.
His belief in this suggests that he is in accord
with Harris and Ward in seeing modes from a semantic point
of view as well as a structural point of view; secondly,
he recognizes that many verb
+ particle constructions
could be seen as paraphrases of another verb.
-
While to
cast means the same as to throw, to cast up is totally
distinct, and means to compute. He is attempting to resolve the same kind of problem as Ward, who claimed that
to arrive at should be paraphrased as to reach as a means
of avoiding the explanation of this difficult post-verb
preposition.
Such views reflect a common attempt in both
men to recognize lexicon-independent semantic units or
ttideas,w
to which lexical formatives are afterwards
attached. 1
4.4.
Summary of Sources
William Ward claims that he received help from many
sources, and we have examined most of them, not in enough
detail to do justice to the intrinsic merits of the sources,
but sufficiently to suggest which of his sources were
most obviously responsible for his very singular views on
1. Cf. John Anderson, "On the Status of Lexical Formatives,"
Foundations of Lan a e, IV, 3. (1968) 308-318. Several
-I?=c apter points have been mentioned because
times.in this
they are recurring in modem discussions; their reappearance does not imply that they are valid or correct; it
merely suggests that these ideas are of enduring interest
linguistic theory.
Many bf the ideas that Locke had
brought forward were used by Ward, but Locketsideas
came to Ward just as much through the writings of Hartley
as through those of Locke himself.
Hartley was the most
powerful ar:d important influence of all on Ward, inasmuch
as he was chiefly responsible for suggesting to Ward that
some words are signals of operations that are performed
by the mind on ideas, and that the construction of words
together was a symbol or sign of the coalescence of ideas.
P2re Buffier suggested to Ward many of his most interesting grammatical ideas; he suggested an explanation of
transitivity, the resolution into ordinary discourse of
the various moods of the verb; he suggested a system of
the parts of speech to him and preceded him in the complete break from the Port Royal tradition, Richard
Johnson and ~ b b kFromant are important because of their
sound views on pedagogy and the function of language
studies.
James Harris, though not an obvious influence,
cannot be ignored because even though he and Ward agreed
on so few points, Ward's course ran so close to his own
and they were both attempting to improve the study of
language in eighteenth century England.
to the students of language, and hence are of some interest
to the historian of linguistics,
Chapter V
I
The Metalanguage of Ward's Essay on Grammar
Introduction
Technical Terminology
The 'Idea1 or 'Conception1
The Term 'Idea1 in Previous Theories
The 'Ideat or 'Conceptionvin Ward's Theory
The Term 'Speculative1
'Operations of the Mind1
'Coalescence1
'Principles of Existence
'Demonstrative Circumstancesa
Terminology of the Word Classes
'Parts of Speech1
Definitions of Particular 'Parts1 Examined
The Study of Metalmguage
I
CHAPTER V
THE METALANGUAGE OF WARD'S ESSAY ON GRAMMAR
5.0.
Introduction
A grammarian's metalanguage is the language he uses
to talk about language; he has to discuss a linguistic
system by means of itself or a related system, and in
order to do this he introduces new terms or re-defines
old terms to accomodate the language to its introspective
examination of itself.
Ward's metalanguage needs exa-
mining with some care, for, as he says, "the old terms
of grammar are indeed retained; but the investigation .
of every part of the subject is altogether new."'
Ling-
uists are sometimes criticized for talking about everyday subjects in technical jargon; Ward goes to the other
extreme and hides novel ideas behind familiar terms.
This Chapter will consider Ward's metalanguage in two
parts: firstly, the general technical vocabulary he uses
will be discussed, and then the terminology of the wordclasses.
Both these areas cover to some extent the
terminology of syntax.
Syntax is very much Ward's concern,
but his psychological interest in the formation of language leads him to talk about it in psychological terms
rather than specifically grammatical terms.
1. These two terms are used interchangeably by Ward,
although he usually opts for 'conception.'
5.1.
Technical Terminology
5.1.1.
Thc 'Idea' or 'Conception'
The 'idea' or 'conception that Ward is always dis-
cussing is a case in point, His use of the term is the
most significant aspect of his metalanguage; in order
to make clear the novelty of his approach, the relationship of 'idea,' 'word,' and 'thing' will be traced through
history as a prelude to analysing Ward's own view of the
J
i
relationship of the three, and his meaning of the term
'idea.'
Inasmuch as 'ideas8are the building blocks of
Ward's lii&istic
*theory,an understanding of them is of
paramount importance.
Their elucidation renders under-
standable the differentiation in the levels of his analysis; it ascertains his views on the relation of
substantives, adjectives, and verbs; it accounts for his
theory of linguistic relativity, his comments on collocation, and his view of pronominalization. Above all
it will enable us to determine whether the idea is a
linguistic unit of some kind, or just, a mentalistic
copy of the word, whether or not it has a formal relation
to linguistic units on other levels which is statable in
non-redundant terms,
5,l,l.l.
The Term 'Idea8 in Previous Theories
The relationship between the word, the idea, and
the object that the word represents has been of constant
iY
j
i
I
i n t e r e s t t o s t u d e n t s of language.
For P l a t o t h e meaning
I
of a word i s i t s i d e a .
I n t h e Thea&etus he has S o c r a t e s
f o r m u l a t e h i s d e f i n i t i o n of language: "The e x p r e s s i o n of
o n e ' s t h o u g h t s by means of gnomata and rhsmata which, as
i t were, m i r r o r r e f l e c t o n e ' s i d e a s i n t h e stream which
p a s s e s through t h e mouth.I1
The main p o i n t h e r e i s t h a t
words a r e capable of r e f l e c t i n g o r m i r r o r i n g i d e a s , and
ideas f o r Plato are the distinctive reality, existing
i n d e p e n d e n t l y of words and t h i n g s .
F. R. Dinneen s a y s
t h a t P l a t o d i s c u s s e d language because of Onthe p o s s i b i l i t y
I
I
I
of l e a r n i n g something about t h i n g s through a s t u d y of
t h e i r names and t h e c o r r e c t combinations of e x p r e s s i o n s
,
I
d e a l i n g w i t h them.
I
It'
A r i s t o t l e brought P l a t o ' s i d e a s down t o e a r t h conc e i v i n g of them n o t as e x i s t i n g independently of t h e
r e a l i t y t h a t we s e e , but as a b s t r a c t e d from t h e world
around by t h e a c t i v e power of t h e mind.
He b e l i e v e d
t h a t a l l people s e e t h e world i n t h e same way and words
r e p r e s e n t e d t h e ' e s s e n c e s ' of t h i n g s ; h i s system of l o g i c
provided him w i t h t h e means o f e n s u r i n g t h a t language
would a d e q u a t e l y r e f l e c t r e a l i t y ; t h u s h i s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l
f o u n d a t i o n s were s e c u r e .
E r n s t C a s s i r e r d e s c r i b e s how
n o t only words, but even gramma%ical s t r u c t u r e s were seen
as corresponding t o r e a l i t y i n A r i s t o t e l i a n apd Medieval
1 . F r a n c i s P. Dinneen.* An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o General
L i n g u i s t i c s , (New York, 1 9 6 ' 0 , p. 79.
philosophy:
The structure of the sentence and its division
into words and classes of words seem, in large
part, to have served Aristotle as a model for
his system of categories
the last four
categories
seem to become fully transparent only when we consider them in reference
to certain fundamental distinctions which the
Greek language makes in its designation of
verbs and verbal actions. Here logical and
grammatical speculation seemed to be in thoroughgoing correspondence, to condition one another
--and medieval philosophy, basing itself on
Aristotle, clung to this correspondence between
the two.1
...
...
But t.herewere important differences between the
Greek and mediaeval grammars.
The Greeks analysed only
Greek; the mediaeval grammarians were aware of other
~
languages and sought to discover universal grammatical
features, and later, the actual rules followed by the
.'
mind in expressing itself
Their search for universal
categories implied a belief in universal properties of
the mind; one of these powers for the Modistae was the
power of understanding things.
Bursill-Hall sees the
direct relation of word and thing in Modistic grammar
as prior to any grammatical function: "The word, which
must express a reality, is a sign (signum); these words
1.
Ernst
Vol. I , tr. Ralph
2. G. L. Bursill-Hall, "Mediaeval Grammatical Theories,
op. cit., p. 43.
must be t a k e n as c o r r e l a t i v e s of t h i n g s i n t h e world of
r e a l i t y b e f o r e t h e y can be c o n s i d e r e d grammatical expressions."'
The b e l i e f t h a t t h e word can c o r r c c t l y e x p r e s s
r e a l i t y i s t h e same as A r i s t o t l e l s , but h e r e t h e i d e a
h a s a b s o l u t e l y no p l a c e i n t h e system: t h e mind can unders t a n d an o b j e c t , b u t i t does t h i s by p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e
o b j e c t i t s e l f ( t h e o b j e c t h a s t h e 'modus i n t e l l i g e n d i
p a s s i v i l ) r a t h e r t h a n c r e a t i n g a copy o r i d e a of t h e
object,
The age of D e s c a r t e s h a s been c a l l e d t h e Age o f
Reason because many b e l i e f s which p r e v i o u s l y had been
u n c r i t i c a l l y a c c e p t e d were s u b j e c t e d t o r i g o r o u s i n t e l lectual analysis.
T h i s r i g o r o u s a n a l y s i s stemmed from
a f a i t h i n t h e power of t h e mind, and because o f t h i s
v e r y f a i t h , no one q u e s t i o n e d t h e power of t h e mind t o
f o r m u l a t e o b j e c t i v e i d e a s of t h i n g s .
Ideas o r thoughts
were recognized as i n t e r m e d i a r i e s between words and t h i n g s ;
t h e purpose of language i s t o communicate o u r t h o u g h t s
about t h i n g s :
I1Words t h e r e f o r e may be d e f i n e d , d i s t i n c t ,
and a r t i c u l a t e sounds, made u s e of by men as s i g n s , t o
express t h e i r thoughts,
lt2
--
The P o r t Royal A r t of Thinking
emphasizes t h e p r e c i s e s t a t u s and psychological r e a l i t y
1
1.
I b i d . , p . 49,
2.
P o r t Royal
Grammar, op. c i t e , p. 25,
of the idea as intermediary: W e are capable of expressing something with a word when we have an idea of the
thing signified by the word." 1
Thus in the past an idea was sometimes recognized
as intermediary between words and things, and sometimes
it was not; when it was, it had no function in linguistic
theory.
The word expressed our idea of a thing, but since
our idea of a thing was always a direct reflection of the
thing (Platolsposition), or objectively shared in the
qualities of
the thing (Arnauldlsposition), it was not
-.
a useful concept for grammatical analysis,
English linguistics was dominated by practical motives in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
The
English grammarians did not question or even consider
the relationship between words and things.
Gildon and
Brightland offer a description of 'names (nouns) which
is the most extended comment we find on the relation of
words and things in the first half of the eighteenth
century:
Names, (as the Word imports), express the things
themselves, and convey some certain Idea, or
Image of the Mind that wants not any other Word
1.
Ibid., p. 22.
2. Analysis of the relationship between words and things
is here considered in terms of the noun substantive. If
a grammarian has no comment on this part of speech it is
unlikely that he will have any on the others.
to make it the Object of the Understanding.
1
I
Wilkins with his Philosophical Language had realized
that natural languages do not offer a one to one description of the world.
He had demanded that
"
. . . the
theory uporiwhich such a design [as a universal language]
were to be founded should be exactly suited to the nature
of things.u2 De Mott, noting the development within
Wilkins' thoughts remarks:
One notes a progress from the conviction that
a satisfactory pattern for a new language can
be taken from an old language to the belief
that such a patterc must derive from a correct
description of the order of reality,3
While Wilkins is not in the main line of devdopment of
English linguistics, his interest in universal language
had drawn attention to the fact that the words we use
do not necessarily represent things as they are, It is
not wltil Harrist Hermes in 1751 that the problem of the
relation of words and things really entered the field of
discussion. Harris argues that words are not images or
1.
Gildon and Brightland, op. cit., p. 72.
-
2. John Wilkins, Essay Towards a Real Character and
Philosophical Language, (London,-lm, p. 21.
3. Benjamin De Mott, I1TheSources and Development of
John Wilkinsl Philosophical Language," Journal of English
and Germanic Philology, LVI ( 1 9 5 8 ) , po 2.
-
i m i t a t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l p b j e c t s , as t h i s would make
c o m u n i c a t i o n impossible:
They can be Symbols of n o t h i n g e l s e , except
g e n e r a l I d e a s , because n o t h i n g e l s e except
t h o s e remains. --And what do we mean by
g e n e r a l I d e a s ? --we mean such as a r e common
t o many i n d i v i d u a l s ; n o t only t o I n d i v i d u a l s
which e x i s t now, but which e x i s t e d i n l p a s t
a g e s , and w i l l e x i s t i n a g e s f u t u r e ,
U l t i m a t e l y t h e permanence and a u t h e n t i c i t y of t h e s e i d e a s
i s d e r i v e d from God, because i t does n o t make s e n s e t h a t
i n t e l l e c t u a l i d e a s should o r i g i n a t e from s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s ,
P r e s u m a b l y - t h e s e n s e i m p r e s s i o n s made on t h e mind i l l u m i n e
t h e d i v i n e i d e a s which a r e i n n a t e i n t h e mind.
Because
t h e s e i d e a s i n t h e mind came from God t h e y a r e s e e n as
t h e b a s i s of t h e l e x i c a l u n i v e r s a l s discussed i n t h e last
chapter.
5.1.1.2.
The ' I d e a 1 o r 'Conception1 i n Ward's Theory
-
-
W i l l i a m Ward broke new ground i n An Essay on Grammar
by borrowing o r r a t h e r a c c e p t i n g L o c k e t s p s y c h o l o g i c a l
t h e o r y of t h e f o r m a t i o n of i d e a s and h i s d i s t i n c t i o n
between nominal and r e a l e s s e n c e s ,
Locke had argued t h a t
words must r e f e r t o g e n e r a l i d e a s of some kind; however
h i s g e n e r a l i d e a s were v e r y d i f f e r e n t from t h o s e of James
I
Harris.
1,
He recognized t h a t t h i n g s could have two essences:
James Harris, op. c i t . ,
p.
341.
I
I
a nominal essence imposed,as it were by the name, and
a r e a l essence, which is generally unknowable.
In other
words a sign, because it represents a thing does not
represent the heart of it, or a kind of Platonic or even
Aristotelian essence, but it is just a name which is
associated with those ideas that the speaker associates
with the things; there is no reason why the speaker's
idea of a horse should correspond to the real essence,
or even be the same as the listener's idea of a horse.I
The consequences of this position are more significant
--
than they may appear: we do not attach (arbitrary) names
to fixed, pre-established ideas in the mind, but we
construct or unite the complex ideas themselves on an
arbitrary basis.
We have ideas of some things but not
of others because we have never yoked together the right
collection of simple ideas.
Moreover although two people
may use the same word to designate the same object, there
is no guarantee that the word will refer to the same
complex idea in their minds.
These are the foundations on which a theory of
1. To understand the origin we must consider wherein this
making of these complex ideas consists: and that is not
in the making of any new idea, but putting together those
which the mind had before. Wherein the mind does these
three things: first it chooses a certain number. Secondly,
it gives them connexion and makes them into one idea.
Thirdly it ties them together by a name. (John Locke,
op. cit., 111 .iii .9).
linguistic relativity could easily be built.
'
When Ward
explains how the conceptions of noun substantives are
created in the mind he is almost paraphrasing Locke:
the mind is not passive in acquiring its conceptions but
exerts a selective attention.
The fixing of attention
upon an object accompanied by hearing its name mentioned
in childhood creates a bond of association whereby the
occurrence of one will call forth the other. 2
The fact that most ideas are constructs of the mind
of man, that
once constructed they can be stored and
-recalled at will enables Ward to treat them as malleable
entities capable of modification, and as dassifiable into
a variety of states, which would have the function of
selecting the appropriate lexical or grammatical word
form.
1.
In adopting a Lockean approach to the idea Ward
Cf. Para. 4.1.1.3.
2. 'The power of the mind is not merely passive in acquiring the conceptions above mentioned, as it is in receiving
the perceptions which are conveyed to it by the senses.
But the attention is confined to some particulars of what
may be before the mind at once, so that the rest are disregarded, till the particulars which are intended to be
taken into signification of one substantive, or verbal
name, are fixed in the intellect. We acquire in our
earliest infancy the custom of exerting the power of confining or checking the attention. For this is constantly
are pointed out, or
done, when particular things
presented to us, in such a manner that we fix our attention on them, whilst their names are mentioned to us.
When any set of particulars has been so attended by the
mind, as that it forms a conception from them, separately
considrred and denoted by a substantive or a verbal name;
the event is, that whensoever the conception recurs to
the mind, the name recurs with it by mere recollecti~n.~~
(Ward: p. 23)
...
.
160
was attempting to create some linguistic unit below the
surface on which (psychologicel) operations could be performed to produce the peculiar picture of reality that
language provides.
often unclear.
The components of Ward's ideas are
The idea which represents a noun is said
to have ltconstant
marks or characters, which are conceived
to be evidences of a constant principle of existence
peculiar to each object, whether such principle is to be
taken notice of or not
."' In other words, the features
which mark the noun as a noun are in some way related to
--
the fact that there is an object which caused the idea.
But this is not always the case: ideas annexed to abstract
nouns are considered as if they themselves were the external objects. 2
Ward had difficulty severing completely the idea as
an entity from the objects to which he owes its origins.
The confusion in many instances appears to be due to lack
of revision; the following quotation appears to be a
statement of intention and should serve as a guide in a
search for a coherent theory in Ward's presentation:
1.
Ward, p. 12.
2. Very many objects denoted by substantives have really
no separate principle of existence in themselves; as for
instance, all the lvirtues--vices--arts--sciences, and all
relations--qualities--attributes,' and in general all objects, the conceptions whereof are usually called abstract
ideas. But the mind considers these objects as if each
of them had a constant principle of existence in itselfet1
(Ward: p. 1 4 ) .
The whole plan of the application of language
takes its immediate 'original from the nature
of the conceptiolr;which the mind of man forms
and affixes to substantives and verbs; and
not from the nature of the objects whence the
conceptions are formed.1
Grammarians had recognized from the very beginning
that the word,
or material part
was of an arbitrary nature.
language
De Saussure's %ignet or the
traditional 'idea1had been considered to be fixed, to
be some sort of a copy of the entities of the external
world.
The result was an increasing faith in the power
--
of semantics to define word categories, and several naive
approaches to the problem of universal grammar. The significance of Ward's application of Locke's philosophy to
grammatical studies is that at last the 'signet as well
as the 'signifiank' is seen as an arbitrary construct of
the mind of man.
Its powers to function in discourse
depend not on some grammatical category that it is given
from above, but on what operations the mind chooses to
perform on this grammatically undifferentiated bundle of
features, or as Ward calls them, conceptions. The consequences are that Ward will have to seek for universals
or general principles not as pre-existing entities, but
either as entities created by the mind using ideas as
basic data, or in terms of the kind of processes which the
1.
Ward, p. 31.
mind performs; t h e i n t e r e s, t i n u n i v e r s a l s i s t r a n s f e r r e d
f r o m p a r t i c u l a r categories ( e . g . cane) t o t h e u n i v e r s a l
p r o c e s s e s of t h e mind t h a t a r e s i g n i f i e d by such a category; t h e e n t i r e l y new l i n g u i s t i c u n i t v;hich h a s brought
about t h i s r e v o l u t i o n i s Bard's ' i d e a ' o r 'conception.'
5.1 .2.
The Term
Speculative
Ward made use of i d e a s o r conceptions i n o r d e r t o
o f f e r h i s r e a d e r s a ' s p e c u l a t i v e ' grammar.
The meaning
of t h e term h a s changed l i t t l e s i n c e t h e e i g h t e e n t h cen-
I
I
I
t u r y , but Ward's meaning of t h e term d i f f e r s considerably
from t h e mediaeval meaning.
The Modistae were s p e c u l a t i v e
grammarians because they believed t h a t language w a s a
speculum o r m i r r o r of r e a l i t y , and because t h e y believed
t h e i r t a s k w a s t o e x p l i c a t e e x a c t l y how language was a b l e
t o mirror r e a l i t y .
Ward however f e l t t h a t language was
anything but a p i c t u r e of r e a l i t y ; i t w a s perhaps a pict u r e of how we see r e a l i t y , but t h a t i s a very d i f f e r e n t
thing.
While h i s P r a c t i c a l Grammar would g i v e i n s t r u c t -
i o n s on how words a r e t o be placed i n c o n s t r u c t i o n , t h e
Speculative Grammar would account f o r t h e "general principles
. . . by which t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of
conducted."'
language i s
I t c o n s i d e r s t h e "general n a t u r e of t h e
very p a r t s of speech" and i s i n t e r e s t e d i n language i n
1.
Ward, p. 1.
1
general.
But Ward does not make the claim that the
categories he is investigating are in any sense universal.
They are categories of English, and a speculative
grammar for Ward does not attempt to show why particular
categories are universal, but instead shows the general
principles that are involved in setting up these categories
in this language and in setting up these or other categories in other languages.
Speculative grammar will
investigate the principles involved in language generation, and these appear to consist in the kind of operatbns performed on the fundamental and non-grammatical
ideas or conceptions which are at the base of Ward's
theory.
5.1.3.
'Operations of the Mind8
Language is a signalling system for Ward, but it
does.not directly
signal meaning, but rather signals
'operations of the minde8 Ward sees words as signs of
Lockean ideas: almost every word has an idea associated
with it.
When words are placed in construction, the
grammatical construction itself is a signal that the
ideas behind the words are to be linked in certain ways.
One of the most usual ways that they are linked is by
1
means of fusing the 'principles of existencet of separate
ideas so that instead of there being two unlinked ideas,
they are indistinguishable from each other and exist in
coalescence.
This transfer of the 'principle of exist-
ence' is a typical 'operation of the mind' signalled by
certain constructions.
5.1.4.
'Coalescence8
'Coalescence' is a term that Ward has borrowed from
~artle~,'
and which he uses with the same signification.
Hartley discusses the union of ideas to form more complex
ideas, and even the union of letters to form words.
The
union is h e of 'coalescence:' what were previously separately existing entities are no longer distinguishable
from the other parts to which they have united, In Ward's
theory the union of the noun and the verb is one of coalescence: "Thus, 'a man speaking--thinking--approving,'
denotes the man to be considered as of the species 'speak-
5.1.5.
'Principles of Existence'
While one of the fundamentals of Locke's theory of
ideas was that every idea in the mind must have been
caused by some sense impression, Locke himself had difficulty in the application of this, which led to a class
1.
Cf. Para. 4.1.2.
2.
Ward, p. 161.
of i d e a s known as mixed modes.'
The problem w a s even more
a c u t e f o r Ward who wished t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e n a t u r e of
v e r b a l c o n c e p t i o n s as w e l l as o t h e r a b s t r a c t conceptions.
For Ward t h e ' p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e ' of a n i d e a w a s t h a t
which gave i t i t s r a i s o n d B % t r e ,which s u s t a i n e d i t i n
existence.
Where he c o u l d , he claimed t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e
was i n o b j e c t s i n t h e e x t e r n a l world, and t h a t i d e a s had
'marks' which i n d i c a t e d t h e n a t u r e of t h e p r i n c i p l e of
existence.
However, w i t h a b s t r a c t nouns which d i d n o t
have c o r r e l. a t e s i n t h e world of o b j e c t s , t h i s became
.
meaningless, so Ward claimed t h a t such words, o r t h e i r
i d e a s , were d e r i v e d from t h e world of o b j e c t s , but t h e
p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e had been t r a n s f e r r e d from t h e r e a l
world and were a c t u a l l y a t t a c h e d t o t h e i d e a s themselves.
I n a s e n s e , t h e i d e a s became t h i n g s .
I n verbs, the prin-
c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e w a s s t i l l c o n s i d e r e d t o be i n t h e act i o n i n t h e world, and because a c t i o n s a r e t r a n s i t o r y ,
t h e p r i n c i p l e w a s s a i d t o be ' i n c o n s t a n t ' ( p r i n c i p l e s of
e x i s t e n c e i n nouns were always ' c o n s t a n t t ) .
Moreover,
t h e p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e of v e r b s w a s s a i d t o be 'comm u n i c a b l e , ' t h a t i s , i t could be t r a n s f e r r e d t o p a r t i c u l a r nouns, which s i g n i f i e d o b j e c t s o r people capable of
performing t h e a c t i o n denoted by t h e i d e a . Thus when a
3.
C f . P a r a . 4.1.1.1.
noun and verb were in congtruction the inconstant principle of existence of the verb, which had t o receive its
existence from some actual performing of the action denoted by the verb, received it from the object or person
denoted by the noun, who was the performer.
5.1 - 6 .
tDernonstrative Circumstances8
'Demonstrative Circumstancest are Ward's way of deI
scribing the non-linguistic context in which an utterance
occurs. They would seem to be the equivalent of the
Firthian term 'context of a situation. I 1
Like Firth,
Ward maintains that the total meaning of an utterance is
1
I
only knowable if the demonstrative circumstances are taken
into account. Ward's conception of the relevance of the
non-linguistic setting is narrower than Firth's in that
he only sees it as important in connexion with a limited
number of grammatical features; pronouns and one word
sentences are the areas where demonstrative circumstances
become important, He remarks that the first and second
person pronouns are not marked for sex, and do not need
any form of antecedent because the 'antecedentois the
speech act itself in which the first and second person
J. R. Firth used and developed the term 'context of
situation' to refer to the extra-linguistic components
of the speech event itself and its situation.
1,
I
I
actually participate.
'
Ward remarks that the nature of
verbs is such that they require a noun to precede them
in order for there to be a sentence realising the speaker's communicative intention. When there are single
word sentences, the fact that they are sentences derives
not from the nature of the verbs "but from the demonstrative circumstances which may attend the act of pronouncing any one of them ~ingly.'~'Demonstrative circumstances' include not only the actual situation ic which
a sentence- .is uttered
, but
the act of pointing, and
paralinguistic features, such as the tone of voice: "The
act of pointing
. . . and the tone of voice . . . amount
to declarations, by the established customs observed in
the use of language. '12
5.2.
Terminology of the Word-Classes
Nowhere is Ward's claim that he is using the old
terminology with new meanings more completely demonstrated
than in his discussion of the parts of speech.
Although
his delineation of the class of verbs for example is
probably little different from most
other^,^
his diver-
gence lies in the reasons for calling them verbs.
1.
Cf. Para. 6.4.1.
2.
Ward, p. 263.
His
3. The o ~ l yarea of difference being the infinitives,
which were often considered to be nouns.
definitions of the parts will be examined briefly in this
chapter (fuller discussion of the more interesting classes
follows in the next chapter), but first his rather confused overall view of the parts will be examined,
5.2.1.
'Parts of Speech8
Although Ward refers to the word-classes as 'parts
of speech,' and enumerates seven of them in the aeculative Grammar, his conformity to
-
the tradition is apparent
rather than real, and his discussion of the various classes indicates that the term 'part of speech' had little
meaning in his grammatical analysis, The plan of the
Speculative Grammar treats the parts in the following
order: Noun (including Substantive and Adjective; the
article is treated with the noun, and deemed to be just
an appendage of the noun rather than a part in its own
right), Pronoun, Verb, Adverb, Conjunction, Preposition,
and Interjection. However, in the Practical Grzmmar,
Ward says that the participle is a part of speech, and,
in English, the article as well,
1
Ward's manner of definition or description suggests
a very different plan: he has five major categories, distinguished by the nature of the ideas annexed to exponents
1.
Ward, p. 320.
of the categories.'
These categories are: Concrete Noun
Substantive, Abstract Noun Substantive, Noun Adjective,
Verb Infinitive, and Verb Coalescent (including Verb
~efinitive). Pronouns are not a separate category, but
are a subclass of Nouns, and are also divided into Substantives and Adjectives.
Some Pronouns have a special
syntactic function (e.g. relatives and interrogatives),
but this special syntactic function is not a reason for
making them members of a separate class, any more than
syntactic function of the definitive verb
the special
.
is a reason for setting this up as a class separate from
the verb coalescent. Adverbs, however, although in many
ways equivalent to nouns in the ablative case, form a
separate class precisely because they have a distinctive
syntactic function which differentiates them from nouns. 2
Prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections are all
traditionally defined. The disparity between Ward's
superficial description of the 'parts of speech' and his
working model suggests that the term 'parts of speech1
had no theoretical significance or real meaning for him.
5.2.2.
Definitions of Particular 'PartstExamined
The term 'noun' refers primarily not to a particular
1.
These categories are discussed in detail in Chapter VI.
2.
Cf. Para. 6.4.2.
syntactic class of word, but to those words which are
attached to a particular class of idea, or conception.
The distinguishing feature of the conceptions annexed
to nouns is that they have llconstantmarks or characters."'
Pronouns are able to belong to the same general
class because they have annexed conceptions, which though
less distinctly laid out than those of nouns, have the
same constant marks attached to theme2 Adjectives and
substantives are closely related, but the relation is
conceived as existing only between abstract substantives
--
and adjectives. There appears to be no real difference
between the conceptions of substantives and adjectives,.
Both, as nouns, have a constant principle of existence,
but the mind is only aware of it in substantives.
In
adjectives the principle of existence.isnot noted; instead the principle of existence of the adjoining substantive is noted.
Verbs have inconstant marks of existence, denoting
the
statese3 The verb is divided into the infiniti~e,~
coalescent, and the definitive.
The infinitive is like
the other verbs because it has an inconstant principle,
1.
Ward, p. 12.
2.
Ward, p. 125.
3. Ward, p. 12.
4. Ward often calls the infinitive the 'verb objective.'
but it is like a noun substantive in that it can have
other verbs depending on it when it is in subject position, The verb coalescent is so called because it most
naturally coalesces with a noun; the verb definitive has
the same properties as the verb coalescent, but it also
marks a completed construction, Coalescence is a quality
of ideas, definiteness is a grammatical quality.
5 -3.
The Study of Metalanguage
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: in the first
place, it attempts to relate some of the more important
terms that Ward uses to the intellectual context of their
time; secondly, it provides in short space an introduction
to the more unusual terminology that will be met
in the
detailed explication of Ward's grammatical theory.
Ward's technical language highlights a juxtaposition
of terms taken from psychology and the conventional grammatical terminology. Grammatical terms in collocation
with the psychological terms (coalescence, principle of
existence, conception) have taken on a signification so
entirely new
that an understanding of their new meanings
requires a full analysis of Ward's theory of word-classes.
Bursill-Hall has suggested that collocational analysis be
used as one way of stating the meaning of the technical
terminology or metalanguage of grammar.
But it would
seem that the theory of collocational meaning is suggestive rather than definitive in its analysis of terms, It
shows that familiar words in new collocations take on
new meanings, but it does little to show why Ward assigns
new values to old terms, nor does it reveal the significance of the new values.
The full explanation of the
new values and Ward's aims in assigning these new values
will be the subject of the next two chapters.
1. G. L. Bursill-Hall. "Notes on the Semantics of
Linguistic Description," In Memory of J, R. Firth,
ed. C. E. Bazell et al., (London, 1-67,
70-51.
Chapter VI
Word-Class Theory
6.0.
Introduction
6.1.
6.1.1.
6.1.2.
6.1.3.
Common Features of Substantives, Adjectives,
and Verbs
Noun Substantives and Noun Adjectives
Class Change in Substantives and Adjectives
The Verb
6.2.
6.2.1.
6.2.2.
6.2.3.
Feature Analysis of Major Word-Classes
The Feature [con] or Constant Mark
The Feature [ss] or Self-Supporting
The Feature [noted]
-.
6.3.
6.3.1.
Rules Linking Ideas to Word-Classes
Coalescence and the Principle of Existence
6.4.
6.4.1.
6.4.2.
The Minor Word-Classes
Pronouns
The Adverb
WORD-CLASS THEORY
6.0,
Introduction
William Ward8s theory of the parts of speech is
idea or conception.
based on the -
He sees different
word-classes based on distinctions in the ideas that are
annexed to words.
This chapter seeks to explicate Ward's
analysis of the parts of speech in terms of the idea,
6.1.
Cominon Features of Substantives, Adjectives,
and Verbs
Grammatical theories can usually be divided into .
those that stress the similarity of verb and adjective
and those that stress the similarity of substantive and
adjective.
In the past the latter approach was almost
universal as a result of the impetus given it by the
close ontological relation of substance and accidents in
the philosophy of the time; Plato and Aristotle, however,
had favoured the identification of adjective and verb as
a result of the close dependence of their linguistic
analysis on the logical proposition, William Ward's
position differs from all others in that he recognized
"If grammatic definitions are made as accurate as
1,
the subject admits of, they must be founded on properties
of the conceptions of the mind which are somewhat remote
(Ward, p o x . )
from common observation^.^'
an underlying similarity ip all three parts.'
It may
well be, he thinks, that the gramrnarianssmost difficult
task is to indicate how parts differ from one another:
for this I8muchabstract consideration becomes necessary." 2
One obvious difference appears to emerge which will distinguish nouns and verbs: it is that nouns are said to
denote objects and verbs to denote states.
But we must
weigh against this Ward's warning that his plan of language takes its form from the conceptions that the mind
-
of man forms and affixes to nouns and verbs, and not
--
from the nature of the objects.
The fact that Ward says
some ideas refer to states and some to objects is therefore irrelevant and extra-linguistic: parts of speech
differ only as the ideas annexed to them differ.
6.1.1.
Noun Substantives and Noun Adjectives
Wardss explanations are often cumbersome, and his
style repetitious.
In the following pages a feature
analysis of his major parts of speech is proposed which
1. It will be necessary to consider the general nature
of several [sc. subst., adj., and verb] of the parts of
speech together on many occasions, for the sake of discovering the properties that they have in common with
each other--as likewise the properties in which they
disagree." (Ward, p. 3.)
I
2. Wuch abstract consideration becomes necessary to
distinguish the several particulars of the signification
of the same part of speech one from another; and especially
in the noun and verb. Every part of speech in some particulars of its signification approaches to the nature of
some other part of speech." (ward, p. x.)
Il
attempts to abbreviate and state succinctly what Ward
takes mamy pages to lay before his reader.
The con-
ceptions or ideas annexed to nouns "are distinguished
in the mind by constant marks or characters, which are
conceived to be evidences of a constant principle of
existence peculiar to each object, whether such a principle is to be taken notice of or not."'
Although the
constant marks or characters are evidence of a constant
principle of existence in the extra-linguistic world
-
of objects the constant marks are characteristics of the
ideas.
When an idea or bundle of semantic features is
associated with the grammatical category 'noun8it has
the characteristic or distinguishing feature of a 'constant mark'; we will call this an "Idea with a Mark of
Existence which is constantt'and give it the abbreviated
notation: IME [+con].
Noun substantives and noun adjectives are distinguished according to whether or not the mind takes
notice of this constant mark attached to the idea.
1.
2
Ward, p. 12.
2. nIn the conceptions annexed to substantives, notice
is taken of the peculiar separate principle of existence
of the object which each substantive denotes
In
the conceptions annexed to adjectives, no separate principle of existence is to be taken notice of." (Ward, p.12)
The second sentence here could be interpreted as a suggestion that not only should a separate principle not be
taken notice of in adjectives, but that it may not exist
at all. But this would contradict Ward's claim that all
nouns have a constant mark indicating principles of existence.
....
Ideas associated with adjectives do have a constant mark
as evidence of a constant principle, but the mind does
not attend to the mark.
In noun substantives the con-
stant mark is taken notice of.
The mind's attention to
this feature of the idea will be marked with [+noted]
in our abbreviated notation, and its lack of attention
will be marked with [-noted].
will become:
IME rEz:ed]
IME
.
e
Thus the noun substantive
and the noun adjective:
Ward envisages the ideas not simply as
the perception in the mind of the essences of objects
denoted by sense impressions (the position of the Port
Royal grammar), or as constructs made from these sense.
impressions through association by the active process of
the mind (Locketsposition), but as objects existing in
the mind which the mind can know completely or only
partially.
If an idea has a constant mark attached to
it, as do all nouns, there seems no reason in principle
why the mind should not pay attention to this mark.
But
according to Ward the mind frequently does not take
notice of this mark, for this is the reason why the word
annexed to such an idea takes on the grammatical form
and function of an adjective.
6.1.2.
Class Change in Substantives and Adjectives
It would seem to follow from this that all adjectives
are capable of becoming substantives, and all substantives
are capable of becoming adjectives, as it is merely a
matter of the kind of attention given the idea by the
mind.
Thus Ward says that woody is an adjective, because
its conception is not llseparatelyascertained in the
intelle~t,'~
that is, its constant mark is not attended
to.
If it were attended to and ascertained, it would
receive a separate principle of existence and would become the abstract conception denoted by woodiness.'
In
fact it seems that all substantives are not freely interchangeable-with adjectives because here Ward has selected
-
woodiness rather than wood, and later he becomes even
more explicit : "The conceptions denoted by 'manly-brutishearthy1 are not the same with those denoted by the
substantives 'man-brute-earth,' but with those denoted by
lmanliness-brutishness-earthiness.''11
This is because
all adjectives "express abstract conceptions":even such
1.
Ward puts it thus:
If it were considered under such ascertainment,
it would become the conception of an abstract
object, to which the mind gives a separate principle of existence; and such conception might
be denoted by a substantive which corresponds
with the adjective. As for instance the conceptions denoted by the adjectives 'woodyfertile--extensive--desolate,' if considered
as separately ascertained in the intellect,
become the abstract conceptions which are denoted by the substantives 'woodiness--fertility
--extent--desolation.
(Ward, p a 15)
2.
Ward, p . 15.
adjectives as are derivedlfrom substantives which are
the names of real beings.ll' Adjectives, then, as signals
of abstract conceptions are related only to abstract
substantives.
Some adjectives do not have a related
abstract substantive, but this is only llbecausesuch
have not been found necessary in language."
Ward's dis-
tinction between substantives which represent abstract
conceptions and those which do not depends on whether
the conception has a constant mark indicating a constant
principle of
- existence in some object or whether "the
mind considers these [conceptions] as if each of them
."* Ward
has a peculiar principle of existence in itself
is saying that the constant mark is not always evidence
of a constant principle in things, but is sometimes evidence of a principle of existence in the ideas themselves.
He seems to be saying that the constant mark of an abstract
noun has the additional characteristic of being self-
-
supporting, of being a mark of the idea's own constant
principle.
As only the conceptions attached to abstract
nouns enjoy the privilege of changing class from substantive to adjective and vice versa it seems that the fea-
-
ture [+noted] is relevant to these only.
I
1.
Ibid., p. 15.
2.
Ward, p. 14.
The conceptions
which are self-supporting,willbe marked [+ss] and those
whose marks are evidence of a principle of existence outside the idea will be marked [-s~], The following analysis of Ward's plan of the ideas annexed to nouns is
proposed:
Concrete substantives: IME
F~F]
(e.g. wood)
(.here
is a constant mark of a
principle of
existence outside
the idea),
1
Abstract substantives: IME +ss
he principle of
+noted existence is now
(e.g. woodiness)
nO'[
within the idea,
and thus it is
self-supporting,
The mind is taking notice of
the principle).
(A constant prin-
Adjectives:
-noted
(e.g. woody)
ciple belongs to
the idea, but is
not noticed, All
adjectives are
considered abstract).
In spite of the fact that Ward sees the 'abstract' adjectives related to abstract nouns (inasmuch as they have
the same bundle of semantic features behind them), he
calls such adjectives 'derived'adjectives' and claims
that they are derived from concrete nouns.
He does not
state what this process of derivation consists of, and
1.
Ward, p. 15.
he probably had no clear idea; for the purposes of our
analysis we can say that it consists in the marking of
[-ss] with a positive value; this makes a concrete noun,
or idea of substance, into an abstract idea without any
grammatical or phonological realization; a linguistic
distinction will arise according to whether or not the
mind is attending to the mark of existence which is now
a property of the idea itself.
Thus derivation of abs-
tract nouns and adjectives consists in the change of the
'self-supporting' feature from negative to positive value,
and the addition of the feature 'noted.' For Ward, ideas
annexed to concrete noun substantives, being the equivalent of Locke's complex ideas of substance, are inevitably linked to the grammatical category of substantive,
but when the mind makes these ideas independent of the
world of objects, so that they become self-supporting,
they are not intrinsically substantival or adjectival,
but belong to a more general category, 'noun.'
They
only become further differentiated when the mind actually focusses on the idea.
If the mind focusses on it
cornrJetely then the noun takes on the rank of substantive;
if it only focusses in a more general way and does not
take into account the specific nature of the mark of
existence, then the noun only has the status of adjective.
The category to which the word belongs depends
on the degree of attention given to the idea by the
mind; but t h i s only seems to be the case with abstract
nouns and adjectives; all other categories would seem
to enjoy the full attention of the mind.
6.1.3.
TheVerb
Ward's definition of the verb stresses that it has
a mark which indicates that the principle of existence
of the verbal state is not constant.'
The main problem
with this definition is to establish what Ward means by
the inconstant nature-ofthe principle of existence, and
to determine how and when it is present, and when it is
absent.
Unfortunately Ward gives few examples to demons-
trate his definitions; it seems that he recognizes an
inconstant principle to be present when a verb is in
construction with a noun; the principle of existence is
inconstant because it is the mark of existence of one of
Lockets ideas of mixed modes, which perish in their birth;
thus verbs in construction have a mark of the inconstant
1.
Ward's definition of the verb is:
Verbs are expressions of states of being, as distinguished in the mind by marks or characters,
which may be conceived as evidences of a principle of existence in the states. But not of
a principle of such a nature as to be constantly
in each state, or peculiar to each period into
which the state may be distinguished. (Ward, p, 12).
principle of existence of ,the fleeting actions denoted
by imixed modes.l
Because this principle of existence
i s communicable to the noun and will be the means of
uniting the idea of the verb with the tincommunicable
principle of existencet of the noun, Ward says that the
inconstant principle is not inherent in the idea, but is
only marked by it.
Thus finite verbs do not have a
self-supporting principle of existence.
However, the
infinitive, when used as subject 0f.a sentence, having
another verb dependent on it, is not required to commu-.
nicate any principle of existence to a noun; here, Ward
says, Itthe state under such consideration will be represented to the mind by a conception that is separately
ascertained in the intellect [i.e.
of existence],
has its own principle
a s the conception denoted by a substantive
1
is; and such conception must become the object of nwnberOgt
Ward appears to be giving an explanation of the independence of the 'conceptiont attached to an infinitive verb
which is similar to that proposed for an abstract noun:
the conception is marked for a principle of existence
not in some extra-linguistic entity but in the idea itself.
Ward is adamant that infinitive differ from nouns,
even though there are so many similarities; the greatest
1.
Ward, p. 16.
similarity for him is that infinitives, like substantives
are subject to number; his examples include "to think and
to speakttand "to speak once
-
twice
-
thrice many times.It1
Apart from the formal distinction of the linguistic forms
themselves (which Ward recognizes as a reason for looking
for distinguishing features, but not the basis of the
difference), the only distinction between nouns and infinitives is that the .ideaattached to an infinitive verb has
an inconstant principle of existence, inconstant because
the state it denotes is inconstant.
He also notes that
while even abstract nouns can receive Itthemark of the
*
vocativeu in poetry, infinitives never can; this, however, is a structural feature, and does not explain why
they are different.
The ideas attached to infinitive verbs will be
represented in our notation as ItIdeaswith Marks on
Existence that are not constant, but that are self-
CcOl.
supporting,Itwhich becomes IME +ss
All other verbs
differ from infinitives in having conceptions which are
not separately laid up in the mind, and therefore are not
self-supporting; they have a derived principle of existence; it is derived from the world of objects as was the
1.
Ibid., p. 17.
2.
Ward, p. 26.
case with the concrete noun substantives. Verbs other
than infinitives are annexed to "Ideas with Marks of
existence which are not constant and self-supporting,Is
-con
There are also difor in our notation: IPE [-ss
].
ferences between participles and finite verbs; Ward
calls the two categories 'verbs coalescent1 and 'verbs
definitive'; but these differences are not differences
in the ideas annexed to them, but differences in them
as signals of operations, and as such will be discussed
later,
6.2.
Feature Analysis of Major Word-Classes
Thus far we have discussed five different kinds of
principal parts of speech; these are: concrete substantives,
abstract substantives, adjectives, infinitives, and other
verbs.
The ideas attached to these differ according to
the nature of the mark of existence.
It may be constant
or inconstant, it may be self-supporting or derived from
things; whether the mind focusses on it or not may also
be significant. The feature representation for the marks
of existence of the various parts is:
Concrete substantives
Abstract substantives
recon 1
IME +ss
,
I
Adjectives
:
1
1
-note$
IME +ss
Infinitives
Other Verbs
The purpose of this feature representation is to
suggest the similarity in Ward's view of all three parts
of speech.
The three become five distinguishable parts
in Ward's analysis, and the change in class is achieved
in all instances by the change of one feature from a
positive to a negative value or vice versa, or by the
addition of one new feature.
All five distinctive class-
es or parts have in common the fact that they are made up
from an idea with a mark of existence.
Differences are
only in the nature of the mark of existence, and it is
these differences that are distinguished by features in
this analysis.
6.2.1.
The Feature [con] or Constant Mark
The validity of the analysis rests upon the recogni-
tion of these features, and so these will be examined in
some detail; let it first be clear that the purpose of
this analysis is not to test the validity of Ward's
theory, but is simply a means of explicating his writing.
I n Ward's d i s c u s s i o n of t h e c o n s t a n t o r i n c o n s t a n t
p r i n c i p l e s of e x i s t e n c e ( [ +- con]) he a p p e a r s t o be
a l l o w i n g t h e r e a l world t o impinge on h i s l i n g u i s t i c
system: t h e f i n i t e v e r b h a s an i n c o n s t a n t p r i n c i p l e of
e x i s t e n c e which i s n o t i t s own, but t h a t of o b j e c t s i n
a c t i o n ; t h e r e a s o n t h e p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e i s c o n s t a n t
i n t h e noun, and i n c o n s t a n t i n t h e v e r b , i s t h a t i t i s
o n l y i n e x i s t e n c e f o r t h e v e r b d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of time
i n d i c a t e d by t h e t e n s e of t h e v e r b , o r perhaps, f o r t h e
d u r a t i o n of t h e a c t i v i t y s i g n i f i e d by t h e v e r b ; i t can
be completely w i t h h e l d by t h e n e g a t i v e p a r t i c l e . '
It is
p o s s i b l e t o f o l l o w Ward's r e a s o n i n g , i f n o t t o a g r e e w i t h
i t , when he d i s c u s s e s t h e i n c o n s t a n t p r i n c i p l e i n r e l a t i o n
t o t h e t e n s e s and t o t h e n o t i o n s a t t a c h e d t o v e r b s i n
g e n e r a l : we a r e reminded of L o c k e t s mixed modes.
However,
h i s d i s c u s s i o n of t h e n e g a t i v e , and h i s p r o p o s a l t h a t a
v e r b w i t h a n e g a t i v e p a r t i c l e g i v e s evidence of a n i d e a
1 . Ward d i s c u s s e s t h e v e r b ' s p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e and
t h e e f f e c t of t h e n e g a t i v e p a r t i c l e as follows:
I t i s c l e a r t h a t a v e r b a l s t a t e , as expressed by
any of t h e t e n s e s o r any of t h e moods, i s apprehended t o have a p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e which may
be conceived as with-held from i t a t t h e p l e a s u r e
of t h e mind. If t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s conceived t o
be always with-held from any p a r t o r p e r i o d of
a v e r b a l s t a t e , such p a r t o r p e r i o d can have no
e x i s t e n c e . Hence t h e n e g a t i v e p a r t i c l e @kotN
when u n i t e d w i t h a v e r b , e x p r e s s e s a s t a t e which
i s without a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e
because t h e
p r i n c i p l e by which i t should e x i s t i s n e v e r communicated t o i t .
(Ward, p. 19).
...
with absolutely no mark of existence is perplexing.
If
the idea has no mark of existence, one wonders how it
exists at all; Locke and Hartley believed that the mind
had a store of ideas that had accumulated from birfh and
were summoned forth either by the recurrence of the appropriate physical stimulus or by a word linked to them
by association; consequently for them, ideas do all exist
in the mind, but are only activated or charged with what
Ward calls existence when stimulated by the associated
words or things.
We must assume that where Bard considers
verbs that have been negated he is suggesting the ideas
excited by those words remain in the unactivated state
which the countless other unmentioned ideas in the mind
are in.
The only difference between uniting the particle
not
--. with a verb, thus negating it, and not mentioning the
verb at all is that in the former case one is explicitly
publishing the fact that the state denoted by the verb
is not existing, and therefore cannot be in coalescence
with the substantive. Ward's explanation is consistent
with the rest of his theory of ideas, although it produces
certain difficulties in the formulation of the parts of
speech which he sets out, and which has been explicated
here.
However, even today linguists are not at all certain
about how the negative enters into the verb phrase.
The
rather curious implications on the proposed feature analysis of the parts of speech suggests an inconsistency
i n W a r d ' s own t h e o r y , b u t t s h o u l d n o t be c o n s i d e r e d of
s u f f i c i e n t importance t o d e s t r o y t h e otherwise c o h e r e n t
scheme t h a t Ward h a s e s t a b l i s h e d .
The f e a t u r e [con] i s f a i r l y c l e a r i n i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s :
i d e a s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h words have t o be a c t i v a t e d , t h a t i s ,
t h e y have t o become a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t ence; some words (nouns) have t h i s p r i n c i p l e a l l t h e time,
w h i l e o t h e r s ( a l l v e r b s ) only have i t f o r t h e p e r i o d
covered by t h e i r time r e f e r e n c e .
This appears t o suggest
t h a t t h e main d i f f e r e n c e between nouns and v e r b s i s t h a t
of time r e f e r e n c e ; however, Ward does n o t s a y t h a t t h i s
i s t h e c a s e , and h i s d i s t i n c t i o n may well be more s u b t l e .
(Cf.
6.2.2.
end of P a r a . 6.3.).
The F e a t u r e [ s s ] o r S e l f - s u p p o r t i n g
The f e a t u r e [ss], when marked f o r i t s p o s i t i v e v a l u e ,
i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e mark of e x i s t e n c e , whether c o n s t a n t
o r i n c o n s t a n t , d e n o t e s a p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e w i t h i n
t h e v e r y i d e a s (as i n woodiness o r woody), while i t s neg a t i v e v a l u e d e n o t e s t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e i s
d e r i v e d from t h i n g s i n t h e c a s e of noun ( a s i n wood) o r
a c t i o n s of t h i n g s i n v e r b s (as i n -s9 e e s
holds).
This
r a t h e r tenuous d i s t i n c t i o n between marks of e x i s t e n c e
and p r i n c i p l e s of e x i s t e n c e , t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e concept
of t h e p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e , a n d t h e supposed t r a n s f e r -
a b i l i t y of i t c o n s t i t u t e t h e most u n s a t i s f a c t o r y p a r t
of Ward's a n a l y s i s ; i t i s c l e a r l y based on L o c k e l s n o t i o n
t h a t a l l i d e a s e x i s t i n t h e mind only because t h e y have
some kind of c o r r e l a t e s i n t h e o u t s i d e world.
Ward un-
doubtedly c o n s i d e r s t h i n g s i n t h e world as t h e ' p r i n c i p l e
of e x i s t e n c e ' of i d e a s ; when i d e a s a r e removed from t h e
immediate realm of t h e p h y s i c a l world ( t h a t of t h e conc r e t e noun s u b s t a n t i v e ) t o t h e realm of t h e a b s t r a c t
i d e a s they a r e given a self-supporting p r i n c i p l e of
e x i s t e n c e ; - - Ward r e a l i z e d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s of t h e r e a l i s m
i n h i s t h e o r y , and excuses himself f o r t h i s hypothesizat i o n of p r i n c i p l e s of e x i s t e n c e ; nThe mind c o n s i d e r s
t h e s e o b j e c t s [ a b s t r a c t i d e a s ] as i f each of them had
a p e c u l i a r c o n s t a n t p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e i n i t s e l f
[ + s s ] ] ; and t h i s t h e mind does merely f o r i t s own
[i.e.
convenience. '(1
6.2.3.
The F e a t u r e [ ~ o t e d l
The f e a t u r e [+noted] i n d i c a t e s whether o r n o t t h e
mind i s paying a t t e n t i o n t o t h e mark of e x i s t e n c e .
Ward's
p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e mind e i t h e r n o t i c e s o r does n o t
n o t i c e t h e p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e i s , as i t s t a n d s , d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d ; however, i t h a s much i n common w i t h
t h e P o r t Royal s u g g e s t i o n t h a t s u b s t a n t i v e s s i g n i f y t h i n g s
1.
Ward, p. 14.
'
clearly and adjectives sipify them confusedly; it also
-
reminds us of Jespersentssuggestion in The Philosophy of
Grammar
that adjectives can become substantives through
a process of specialization, focussing, or definition.2
Although Ward does not use the terms 'clear' or 'confusedt
of Port Royal, and although he does not appear to see the
wider implications of his statement that Jespersen does,
it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that he had in
mind a similar explanation.
--
6.3.
Rules Linking Ideas to Word-Classes
It is now possible to see why Ward's ideas are said
to be grammatically undifferentiated, and to demonstrate
how related the various parts are one to another.
Ward,
as a follower of Locke, believed all our ideas to be
founded in sense knowledge; as a consequence of this the
basis of all linguistic ideas would have to be objects
in the world; concrete substantives, then, are in a sense
the primary linguistic category. Ideas all start as
+con
members of this category: IBE pss]
The first process
.
which the mind can perform on these ideas is to make
them abstract, or self-sufficient, by removing their
1.
Port Royal
-
2.
Otto Jespersen, The Philosophy of Grammar (1924), p. 78.
Grammar, op. cit., Part 11, Chapter on Noun.
-
dependence on the world oftobjects; this is done by
making the feature [ss] positive.
As a result of this
the idea does not belong to any surface grammatical cate-
Kconl
gory (there is no category with only the features
kssli
if, however, the mind is considering the idea as representing an object in the world (and linguistically
manifested as a primary or concrete noun) this feature
change will not take place.
The mind has the option of
leaving the original idea in the concrete noun substantive form or preparing it to belong to other categories;
-
this option can be expressed by the following feature
change rule:
Assuming that the optional change is made, the idea now
has no grammatical significance and is just a collection
of simple ideas or semantic features which, as they are,
can have no grammatical function.
However, any change or
addition to them will make them members of a grammatical
category.
The following rule allows them to remain as
they are, in which case an additional feature will be
added ( [ +noted] ) which will distinguish abstract nouns
and adjectives; alternatively the value of one or both
features may change, giving an infinitive or some other
verbal form:
The change in feature from [+con] to [-con] implies that
the mind is focussing on a typical activity of the object
rather than on its existence, It would be useful to demonstrate these rules with an 'idea' or semantic concept in
--
English; Ward himself only outlines his theory; he never
worries about showing us how it will work.
There are .
few semantic concepts that occur in all five grammatic
forms that have been discussed, The concept of a circle,
although not considered by Ward, is one that is susceptible
to the various changes which he envisaged: circle could
be a noun or a verb, there is an adjective circular,
and an abstract noun circularity.
But these forms do
represent a considerable semantic spread: to circle is
to 'put a circle around,' and circularitx is considered
a property of arguments rather than circles; however,
if we can lay aside the semantic spread of these words,
and consider the verb circle as referring to what aircraft
do when waiting to land, and circularity a property of
circles, and circles to be physical objects (which is
highly unlikely!) we can see Ward's point: the mind
p e r c e i v e s a c i r c l e througQ t h e sense impressions, and
t h e i d e a t h a t t h i s enkindles i s an IME
pzp]
, that
is,
one t h a t has t h e grammatical p r o p e r t i e s of a concrete
noun s u b s t a n t i v e ; however, t h e r e a r e occasions when one
does n o t wish t o r e f e r t o a c i r c l e , but may wish t o r e f e r
t o t h e a c t i v i t y of c i r c l i n g , t h e a b s t r a c t property of
being c i r c u l a r , o r j u s t t h e q u a l i t y .
If t h i s i s t h e c a s e ,
t h e mind t a k e s t h e i d e a e i t h e r f r o m t h e s t o r e of i d e a s ,
o r f r o m t h e immediate sense impressions and f i r s t performs t h e process of t u r n i n g i t i n t o an a b s t r a c t i d e a by
> .
applying r u l e one.
f e a t u r e [-noted]
This a b s t r a c t i d e a can r e c e i v e t h e
by r u l e two and may t h u s be l e x i c a l i z e d
without t h e mind n o t i n g i t s p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e ; i t
w i l l t h u s become t h e a d j e c t i v e c i r c u l a r .
If r u l e two
changes t h e e x i s t i n g f e a t u r e s t o t h e i r n e g a t i v e value
we w i l l have t h e f i n i t e v e r b c i r c l e s ( b u t n o t n e c e s s a r i l y
marked f o r t h i r d person o r i n t h i s t e n s e ) ;
Ward i s clairn-
i n g t h a t t h e mind can a l t e r t h e grammatical c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a bundle of semantic f e a t u r e s t o make them belong
t o d i f f e r e n t c a t e g o r i e s of c l a s s e s .
t h e t h r e e terms man
-9
Khen he d i s c u s s e s
manly, and manliness, he says t h a t
this
both manly and manliness a r e derived from man*
-9
would be achieved by applying r u l e s and t w o ; he a l s o
s a i d t h a t they both s h a r e t h e same idea: t h a t i s , i n our
+con
a n a l y s i s , both have t h e f e a t u r e s [+ss]
There a r e no
.
v e r b s with t h e base form 'mant except as i n " t o man t h e
guns," which is semantically distinct, but Ward does
suggest that to be a man and to be a judge are verbs;
so if the negative value of [con] were chosen the verbal
form of the idea would be the result.
The rules of syn-
tax ensure that the correct feature matrix combinations
result in a sentence which follows the normal conventions
of the language.
Ward says that the process of abstraction from a
concrete substantive may result in the formation of a
verbal conkeption;I the process involves forming abstract
conceptions from the objects, and allowing these to exist
by a principle that may be communicated or withheld, i.e.
an inconstant principle.
Interchangeability between
verb and adjective is also easily accomplished by ignoring the inconstant principle in verbs, with the result
that no principle is noted; the idea would appear to have
1.
He says:
No such object as is expressed by the 'mind,
body, a man, a tree, a beast, a mineralt can
be denoted by any verb. But states, the conceptions whereof are formed by abstraction
from the objects above mentioned, may be denoted by verbs, if these states are conceived
to exist by a principle which may be cornmunicated to them, or withheld from them, at the
pleasure of such objects as have a real principle of existence in themselves, or of any
object to which the mind assigns such principle
for its own convenience.
(ward, p. 20).
the features of an adjective. 1
The easy change between
verb and adjective helps Ward to see why the verb coalescent (the participle, that is) can easily occupy the
same position as the adjective (cf. a running horse and
a black horse).
He says that verbal conceptions may unite
with substantival conceptions in the same way as adjectival conceptions doe2 But Ward still emphasizes the inconstant principle of existence of the verbal conception,
even though the so-called present participle hardly has
any limiting time reference.
It seems that while Ward
appears to be referring to actual time reference when
discussing the inconstant principle, he is actually
trying to make the active/stative or action/non-action
distinction which is discussed in many modern treatments
of verbs and adjectivesb3 The point that Ward was emphasizing was that verbs are not indicative of a permanent
1.
"The same conceptions which are denoted by verbs, may
be denoted by adjectives, if the occasional principle by
which the verbal states are conceived to exist is not attended to.I1 (Ward, p. 20).
I
2. llConceptionsdenoted by verbs may unite with those
denoted by substantives, much in the same manner that
adjective conceptions unite with substantive conceptions;
except that the verbal conception will carry along with
it the notion of the inconstancy of the principle by which
it exists. But the adjective conception will carry no
such notion along with it.11 (Ward, p. 20).
3. Cf. H. A. Jacobs and P. S. Rosenbaum, English
Transformational Grammar (1968), p. 63.
state as are adjectives; he was gropingly reaching for
this distinction through the limiting factor of tense.
It is not of course true that all verbs indicate action
and all adjectives non-action or permanence, but undoubtedly the great majority do, and Ward felt that this was
the main distinguishing feature of verbs and adjectives;1
it is this feature that lends support to his proposal
that infinitives are true verbs.
While his insight into
the relationof substantive and adjective resembles the
analysis offered by Jespersen early in this century,2
his analysis of the verb and adjective appears to be
founded on the same insights as those developed in
current transformational theory.3
6.3.1.
Coalescence and the Principle of Existence
Construction in language is said to occur through
a process of tcoalescencet;4 this is one of the cornerstones of Ward's theory.
Coalescence has to be under-
1 . He is aware that there are exceptions to the general
rule of action/non-action division between verbs and adjectives, such as t'equalleth,Hand treats them as exceptions.
2.
Cf. note 2, page 191.
3.
Cf. note 3, page
4. Cf. Para. 5.1.4.
196.
stood in terms of Ward's ~otionof number.
He says that
if we had one word to express every different conception
in the mind there would be no need for connected discourse
as such; for him, a sentence is a unit because it builds
up one complex conception, just as a picture subsumes
many details into a unity.
The difficult thing for him
to explain is how it is that words that are each attached
to a separate idea with its own principle of existence
can all refer to only one single complex conception when
they are in construction. He uses the principle of coa--
lescence to resolve the difficulty: an idea becomes a
'coalescent circumstance' by virtue of being in a particular syntactic position, and as such, it "unites with
an object without increasing the number of the Object."
Thus v;hen a verb unites with a noun substantive it is able
to do so because its inconstant principle of existence
coalesces with the principle of existence of the noun, and
instead of there being two distinct principles there is
only the one larger one.
Adjectives in English can
achieve coalescence more immediately than verbs' because
the characteristic of the verb is attended to by the
1.
Ward maintains this position in the first part of
his Speculative Grammar, but appears to revise it later.
See Para. 7.2.
mind.'
Thus the adjective is immediately taken to be
in coalescence with the nearest principle of existence,
that of the noun substantive. Ward does not discuss how
the adjective gives this express notice; he entirely
ignores structural considerations throughout the Essay;
we can only assume that he considered they gave express
-
notice because they are adjectives; we know that they
are adjectives because of their syntactic position, and
the form of the word which, we, as native speakers, know
is that of an adjective.
6.4.
Minor Word-Classes
The discussion of word-classes has so far been limit-
ed to those areas which concern the way the mind forms
concepts; the reason for this is that the uniqueness of
the terms discussed lies in their psychological implications, in the process of the formation of concepts.
Ward's
grammatical analysis consists of two chief topics: one is
a discussion of the formation of concepts, and the other
is the expression of the relation between these concepts.
His discussion of the formation of concepts relies heavixy
1.
Ward says:
Noun adjectives are the names of abstract conceptions, similar to those which are denoted by
substantives; only these adjective names give
express notice, that no principle of separate
existence is to be attended to, in whatsoever is
denoted by any of them. (Ward, p. 13).
2Q0
on Locke and Hartley.
His,unique and original contri-
bution here is that he is able to ~$ve an account in
psychological terms of the characteristics of ideas
which lie behind the different grammatical categories.
The analysis of his account given here has attempted to
stress the essential simplicity of his formulation, a
simplicity which is difficult to see when reading his
grammar on account of the endless repetition which he
indulges in, as well as his failure to give examples
and define his terms unambiguously.
--
So far we have
discussed only ideas which lie behind nouns and verbs,
the parts which Ward calls the most important parts of
speech.
Discussion of the term 'coalescence' suggested
that these concepts, once formed, undergo processes which
relate to each other.
The processes of relation which
Ward discusses are essentially his account of syntax; here,
as in his account of the parts of speech, he pays little
attention to the structural markers of syntax; whether
they are cases, articles, pronouns, or prepositions, they
are all seen as ttsignalsof the operation of the mind":
as such these minor parts of speech will be discussed
mainly in the following chapter; however, pronouns and
adverbs are discussed here because of their relation to
the noun.
6.4.1..
Pronouns
,
Pronouns are Itthenames of objects of certain species,
distinguished by characteristics of so extensive a nature,
as to comprehend all objects whatsoever as individuals
"'sometimes they refer back to objects previous-
thereof;
ly mentioned; often they are general names made to refer
to particular objects by means of additional 'demonstrative circumstances1 such as pointing: Vronouns are names
of objects belonging to species so very extensive that
when some,demonstrative circumstance does not attend the
use of them it must be supplied, in order to ascertain
more particularly the nature and properties of the object
denoted by any one of them.
pronoun is distinctive
,
"*
Ward's description of the
especially when compared to the
more usual definition of them as noun substitutes, such
as Lowthls;Lowth says: llapronoun is a word standing
instead of a Noun, as its Substitute or representative. t t 3
The superiority of Ward's definition of the pronoun is
probably more due to his indebtedness to Harris than to
original thinking, except for one important part of his
description: the quality of the pronoun that he focusses
1.
Ward, p. 125.
2.
Ward, p. 127.
3.
Lowth, op. cit., p. 31.
on is its ability to refer to individuality without
referring to specific characteristics; pronouns have
llcharacteristics
of so extensive a nature, as to comprehend all objects
. . . as individuals."
This approach is
somewhat similar to the much older one which claims that
pronouns indicate 'substance without quality,' but Ward
developed his approach through contact with Lockets
philosophy.
The mind has the ability to focus on parti-
cular ideas, perhaps on those of a horse; but it can just
focus on some so that this horse is seen not as a horse
but as an animal; it may then choose to ignore the features which indicate that it is living; then it will be
referred to as a thing, or just as -it*
the idea is suf9
ficiently removed from particulars to be able to refer
to a wide variety of objects at the choice of the mind,
but its property of number is such that the mind can only
choose to focus on one such object at a time.
Substance
without qualities was unknowable and anathema to the
Lockean spirit, but the association of the pronouns with
ideas so general that the possible area of reference is
unlimited achieves the same perspicuity as the mediaeval
interpretation of the attitude.
It is interesting to
observe how two very distinct philosophical systems are
able to offer equally useful explanations of linguistic
systems.
Ward makes the usual'division of pronouns: personal
pronouns, possessives, and relative pronouns; his analysis
of the relative will be discussed in the chapter on syntax, as he discusses it with reference to the relations
between conceptions.
His treatment of the personal and
possessive pronouns is largely conventional apart from
an interesting distinction between the first and second
person pronouns and the third person pronouns.
The first
person has the characteristic oftlaspeaker mentioning
himself in what he says, as distinguished by the act of
speaking,'! and the second person pronoun has the characteristic of being "an object
. . . mentioned as dis-
tinguished by words addressed to the object."
pronouns are of
It
All other
third personal species. !I' The point is
I and you, although words with extremely general
that signification are immediately given singular significations without any kind of antecedent, the ltdemonstrative
circumstances~being attached to the act of speaking
itself
.*
Although Harris notes and Lowth repeats3 that
2, "For when the words are actuzlly spoken, the person
or persons to whom they are addressed usually see the
speaker; and by that means know more of that speaker,
than the pronoun 11111
expresses. And the speaker, by
seeing those whom he speaks to , and frequently by being
acquainted personally with them, knows more of them than
the pronoun Ityet'
or "you1!expresses. (ward, p. 126).
3. Harris, op. cit., p. 70; and Lowth, op. cit,, p, 32.
the first and second person do not have a sex distinction
because the people are present together, making such a
distinction superfluous, they do not go any further in
studying the implications of this presence.
Ward goes
further in attempting to state the implications of the
peculiarities of these two persons.
He notes that the
writers of Latin grammar had considered these two pronouns
not to require antecedents; he attempts to show how the
place of antecedents is taken by the peculiar circwnstances of the addresser-addressee relationship. He also
criticizes former grammarians for suggesting that pronouns
form a common class on account of the antecedent requirements.
He says: "This is a very considerable over-
sight; for the connexion of a personal pronoun.with its
antecedent is very different from that of a relative
pronoun, as will fully appear in the account of each in
this book.
Ward s inherent conservatism in relation
to class names does not allow him to set them up as
completely distinct classes, but his statement of their
distinctive natures will serve as a justification for
the separate discussion of personal and relative pronouns
in this thesis.
1.
Relatives are discussed in Paras. 7.3.ff.
Ward, p. 128.
6.4.2.
I
The Adverb
The adverb is discussed with a certain ambiguity
by Ward; he does not completely endorse the Port Royal
analysis which sees the adverb as an abbreviation of
the preposition + noun construction because for Ward
the adverb has a particular function to perform which
cannot be performed by any substantive; however, he does
say that "the sense of the adverb may be expressed by
some of the forms of a substantive in the ablative case,
in almost-any sentence.
'good in verity.
'
Thus 'very goodt is in effect
But there is a fundamental distinc-
tion between the adverb and the noun in the ablative
case or with a preposition.
The adverb is more than
just an abbreviated form of 'preposition + nount because
it has the syntactic function of closing the construction
or sentence modification.*
of a mental operation.
1.
This it does by giving notice
However, the conceptions denoted
Ward, p. 213.
2. If the conception, usually expressed by an adverb, is
at any time expressed by the case of a substantive of an
equivalent signification; that conception may, if the
speaker pleases, be farther modified by some connective
word made to depend on the substantive; as appears in the
expressions, 'good in perfect reality--to act with infinite
These modifications by other dependent
wisdom'
words, can very seldom be applied when an adverb is made
use of; and therefore this circumstance
with the
grammatical form of the adverb are the only particulars
which distinguish most of the adverbs from the oblique
case of the noun substantive. (ward, p. 213).
....
...
by the adverb are sirnilar'to those of a noun with a
preposition.
Ward agrees with the Port Royal analysis
in seeing the adverb as signifying a particular species
of conception, also signified by 'preposition
but he disagrees as to its syntactic function.
+
noun,'
Chapter VII
Relations Between Concepts: An Approach to Syntax
7.O.
Grammatical Relations
Case
Three Levels of Analysis
The Function of Case
Nominative and Accusative Cases
Substantives in Oblique Cases the Equivalent
of Adjectives
A New Theory of Transitivity
Two Basic Sentence Types
Verbs Followed by Prepositions or More Than
One Noun
Prepositions
7.2.
7.2.1.
Adjectives and Verbs
Syntactic Function of the Definitive Verb
7 3.
7.3.1.
7.3.2.
7.3.3.
Relative Pronouns and Relative Clauses
The Notion of Degree
Content Clauses and Relative Clauses
The Relative Clause and its Resolution
7.4.
Extraposition
7.5.
A Note on Performatives
I
CHAPTER VII
RELATIONS BETWEEN CONCEPTS: AN APPROACH TO SYNTAX
7.0.
Grammatical Relations
Part of the function of the adverb, the relative
pronoun, the verb definitive, and the entire function
of the cases, prepositions, and conjunctions, is to give
notice of operations of the mind.
Ward's continual
reference to goperationsof the mindt suggests that this
term transcends and embraces the particular functional
units in some way.
and Hartley.
It invokes considerations of Locke
Ward's view of language structure is es-
sentially a dynamic one; he does not view a sentence as
a set or relations without movement, but a set of relations
which has developed because a series of operations have
modified and arranged the primitive conceptions or ideas
of the mind.
These operations of the mind are triggered
off by various structural markers, prepositions, cases,
etc., and serve to arrange the ideas in an order of dependence.
Before these operations start functioning
the grammatical categories attached to the ideas have
already been selected, presumably by the communicative
needs of the speaker.
The operations of the mind are a
means of arranging these grammatically undifferentiated
ideas.
Thus there are two stages in sentence
208
con-
struction; they are:
1)
attachment of semantic concepts to grammatical
categories,
2)
arran~ementof grammatical categories in meaningful dependency relation.
The first stage was discussed in the last chapter, There
were no observable signals for this part of the process;
Ward recognized that there are related forms in language
(cf.: -man
9
manly, and manliness) and used Lockelstheory
of ideas to construct a theoretical interpretation of
these forms.
There are however, observable signals of
the ordering operations that are performed by the mind.
Operations of the mind are signalled by structural markers
II
which place one idea in a dependency relation to another
(as was briefly discussed in relation to adjectives and
verbs).
Operations can be said to order grammatical
units; however, this ordering does not appear to be
a sequential ordering; the way that particular surface
forms in language follow each other is considered only
a matter of custom, and not a part of universal grammar.
Ward gives the Hebrew genitive as an example of language
particular surface distinctions; he says that the same
relation is indicated as in Latin, but the attachment
of case markers to the nouns is the opposite from what
it is in Latin.
Undoubtedly the fact that noun adjective
comes n e x t t o t h e noun sulbstnntive and t h e v e r b f o l l o w s
t h e s u b j e c t i n E n g l i s h , i s considered extremely a p p r o p r i a t e by Ward, but i d e a s themselves cannot be s e q u e n t i a l l y
o r d e r e d ; t h e y can only be placed i n dependency r e l a t i o n s .
T h i s , and n o t t h e o r d e r i n g of t h e phonological manifestat i o n of language i s t h e f u n c t i o n of t h e ' o p e r a t i o n s of
t h e mind.'
If Ward had followed h i s p l a n through coherent-
l y , he would have had t o d i s c u s s t h e s e t of language
p a r t i c u l a r r u l e s which t a k e i n t o account t h e o r d e r of
dependency i n i d e a s and r e l a t e i t t o t h e s e q u e n t i a l
o r d e r i n g of words.
I t does n o t seem t h a t W a r d ' s o v e r a l l
view of language w a s s u f f i c i e n t l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d t o a c h i e v e
t h i s , o r perha.ps i t was t h a t he f e l t t h a t such w a s t o o
t r i v i a l a n a c t i v i t y f o r h i s concern, i t being s o obvious
t h a t a d j e c t i v e s come b e f o r e s s u b s t a n t i v e s , and preposit i o n s between nouns.
There i s perhaps t h e more fundamental r e a s o n why
Ward w a s n o t concerned w i t h s t a t i n g t h e r u l e s which j o i n
t h e dependency r e l a t i o n s of i d e a s t o t h e s e q u e n t i a l
o r d e r i n g of t h e phonological m a n i f e s t a t i o n of them: i n
s p i t e o f t h e f a c t t h a t W a r d ' s s t a r t i n g p o i n t was a philos o p h i c a l o r p s y c h o l o g i c a l account of t h e formation of
i d e a s i n t h e mind, once he had accounted f o r t h e s e b a s i c
i d e a s , t h e c r i t e r i a he used f o r m a n i p u l a t i n g them, t h e
only criteria he had avai:able
in fact, were the cri-
ieria derived f r o m the structure of Latin and English.
Only occasionally does he allow considerations of the
structure of Latin to impinge on his Essay, so his
analysis of English is the continual justification for
his discussion of what happens to the ideas in the mind
which have been derived from the world through sense
impression. This reliance on English is almost inevitable: Ward's limited knowledge of other languages could
not provide him with a wider knowledge or analysis of
.-
language; his predecessors had all been guilty of exactly
the same mistake, believing analysis of language to be
an analysis of their own language. While the peyspective
that this provided him with is inevitably limited, it is
important to point out that his reliance on his own
language does not make his investigations any the less
interesting, but it does render any attempt to relate
the underlying ideas to surface structure completely
redundant. Ward's attempt to understand the process of
speaking, and to suggest some universal properties
associated with it, is not expected to withstand
ob-
jective criticism as a current theory would be; conscious
of the limitations imposed on Ward by the state of
knowledge of his age, the present-day reader of Ward's
grammar is searching for innovations in terms of the
eighteenth century attitudes to language.
Insofar as
Ward's analysis is limited by his lack of knowledge of
other languages and by a lack of methodological presuppositions, we excuse him; insofar as he was able
to transcend these limitations and suggest avenues of
investigation which have proved valuable in throwing
light on the nature of language, we admire him.
These
observations on Ward's aims are made here in order to
account for the continual use of psychological accounts
to explain.supposedly grammatical terminology, and to
account for Ward's lack of interest in what are normally
considered to be grammatical definitions.
It might once
have been objected that accounts of this nature were not
the concern of linguistics; times have changed from this
point of view; interest in categories and phenomena that
are not directly observable has returned, and is justified just so long as there are definite empirical reasons
for positing the existence of such categories and phenomena.
The empirical reasons we find in Ward lie in the
structure of the English Language; insofar as the structure of Ehglish is not characteristic of language in
general it is easy to pinpoint numerous false observations that Ward makes; but a surprisingly large number
of observations do in fact transcend the limitations
of the English language, and it is this ability of
W a r d ' s t o t r a n s c e n d - p a r t i c u l a r s t h a t g i v e s him h i s
claim t o recognition.
7.1.
Case
I t was suggested i n Chapter 11' t h a t t h e c a t e g o r y
of c a s e was a s t i m u l u s t o l i n g u i s t i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and
t h a t Ward's own method of d e a l i n g w i t h c a s e would p l a y
a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n t h e development of h i s s y n t a c t i c
theory.
The e x p l a n a t i o n s of c a s e t h a t had been proposed
i n p r e v i o u s y e a r s were encouraging f u t u r e grammarians t o
-.
be l e s s concerned w i t h d a t a and more concerned w i t h
theory.
Psychological o r explanatory i n t e r e s t i n case
l e d t o a r e t u r n t o t h e kind of s p e c u l a t i o n on s y n t a x
t h a t t h e mediaeval grammarians had indulged i n . -Acc o u n t s of t h e h i s t o r y of l i n g u i s t i c s do n o t u s u a l l y
1.
P a r a . 2.5.6.
James Harris i s d e f i n i t e l y t h e o r y - o r i e n t a t e d .
2.
C f . P a r a . 2.5.5.
3. I a n Michael d e s c r i b e s t h e mediaeval approach t o
s y n t a x as a n i n t e r e s t i n e x p l a i n i n g phenomena:
The s p e c u l a t i v e grammarians ' most s i g n i f i c a n t
e x t e n s i o n of t h e grammatical t r a d i t i o n w a s t h e i r
enlargement of t h e concept of syntax: t h e y were
l e s s i n t e r e s t e d i n whether a v e r b o r a preposit i o n governed a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e t h a n i n what was
meant by s a y i n g t h a t i t 'governed' a c a s e a t a l l .
By v i r t u e of what power d i d i t govern? T h i s new
approach t o s y n t a x , f o r a l l i t s p a t t e r n e d a r t i f i c i a l i t y , w a s , a t i t s b e s t , a l i n p p i s t i c enquiry.
But i t i s perhaps only by h i n d s i g h t t h a t i t can
be s e e n as such. ( ~ i c h a e l ,p. 523).
c r e d i t Renaissance Crammarkans o r E n g l i s h grammarians
of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h and e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s with such
enquiries.
'
However, a c u r s o r y g l a n c e a t Ward's
on G r a m m a r ( o r Hermes) would s u g g e s t t h a t i t i s
Essay d i f f e r e n t from t h e u s u a l run of E n g l i s h grammars, even
though only a few pages a r e devoted t o t h e t o p i c " O f
Words i n Connected C o n s t r u c t i o n u o r what today would
be c a l l e d syntax.
What would be equated w i t h t h e me-
d i a e v a l n o t i o n of s y n t a x i s d i s c u s s e d throughout t h e
S p e c u l a t i v e Grammar.
7.1.1.
Three Levels of A n a l y s i s
I n t h e Essay t h e r e i s no c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of con-
s t r u c t i o n t y p e s of t h e kind we f i n d i n Lowth's G r a m m a r ,
and t h e r e i s l i t t l e e x p l i c i t concern w i t h r&ime and
concord, which formed such a major p a r t of c o n t i n e n t a l
d i s c u s s i o n s on s y n t a x a t t h i s p e r i o d .
Ward's d i s c u s -
s i o n c e n t r e s on t h e r e l a t i o n s of i d e a s r a t h e r t h a n t h e
r e l a t i o n s of words, and i t i s c a s e , o r i t s m a n i f e s t a t i o n
i n E n g l i s h , which he s e e s as t h e p r i n c i p a l s i g n a l of
t h e s e r e l a t i o n s ; c a s e , p r e p o s i t i o n s , and word o r d e r a r e
a l l s i g n a l s of dependencies among i d e a s .
Ward i s
u n i q u e among t h e E n g l i s h grammarians i n recognizing
t h r e e s e p a r a t e l e v e l s of grammatical a n a l y s i s ; he
1.
Ian M i c h a e l ' s account i s t y p i c a l .
See p. 523.
r e c o g n i z e s t h e phenomenon of language as manifested
i n words as t h e s u r f a c e l e v e l of language, below t h i s
t h e r e i s t h e l e v e l of grammatically d i f f e r e n t i a t e d
i d e a s , and below t h i s a g a i n , t h e l e v e l of semantic u n i t s
which belong t o no grammatical category:
Phonological m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f r e l a t e d i d e a s
C
h.
L
ramm ma tic all^
Grammatically
.related
idea
related
idea
I
d
Level
One
related
idea
Two
I
A
A
Rules one and two
of l a s t c h a p t e r
produce l e v e l two
from l e v e l t h r e e
4
semantic
conception
semantic
conception
r
t
semantic
conception
1
Level
Three
4
The s u r f a c e l e v e l , l e v e l one, i s t h e only concern o f
most grammarians, but Ward n e i t h e r d e a l t with t h i s l e v e l
p r e s c r i p t i v e l y , as d i d many w r i t e r s of t h e e i g h t e e n t h
c e n t u r y , n o r d i d he seek t o d e s c r i b e i t s y s t e m a t i c a l l y
as W a l l i s and a few o t h e r s had attempted t o do.
He
r e c o p i z e d t h e s u r f a c e l e v e l only as a means of s i g n a l l i n g important p r o c e s s e s i n t h e u n d e r l y i n g l e v e l s .
Ward's
i n t e r e s t i n t h e deep s t r u c t u r e r a t h e r t h a n t h e s u r f a c e
s t r u c t u r e s u g g e s t s t h a t he w a s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e explan a t o r y r a t h e r t h a n t h e d e s c r i p t i v e a s p e c t s of language;
i n many ways he w a s , and he p a i d l i t t l e heed t o t h e qual i t y of t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of s u r f a c e c a t e g o r i e s , as i s
evidenced by h i s acceptance of a conventional schema
of t h e p a r t s of speech,
However, h i s n e g l e c t of t h i s
a r e a w a s occasioned by a t t e n t i o n t o what he b e l i e v e d
t o be t h e more fundamental concern: t h e meaning of t h e
s y n t a c t i c c a t e g o r i e s of l e v e l two.
He used l e v e l one
as a means of r e a c h i n g l e v e l two; a f t e r a n a l y s i n g l e v e l
two he could have r e t u r n e d t o t h e s u r f a c e l e v e l and
o f f e r e d a new a n a l y s i s of t h i s on t h e b a s i s of h i s f i n d i n g s ; however, he d i d n o t t a k e t h i s f i n a l s t e p , and
c o n s e q u e n t l y h i s work h a s remained r e l a t i v e l y u n n o t i c e d
by t h o s e who t r a c e t h e h i s t o r y of E n g l i s h grammar.
The Function of Case
7.1.2.
Case w a s one of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l c a t e g o r i e s t h a t
Ward used i n o r d e r t o r e a c h l e v e l two.
For him t h e
l a c k of formal m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f c a s e s i n E n g l i s h was
n o r e a s o n f o r i g n o r i n g c a s e o r a b o l i s h i n g i t , as Wallis
had done,
The c a s e s , he a r g u e s , have a f u n c t i o n , and
so they must exist in Engiish in some way.'
The main
function of cases and "the connective parts of speechu
is to place substantives in such a position that they
are able to modify either other substantives or verbal
states
.'
Nodification of substantives by other substan-
tives is fairly common in language, whether it is by
means of the genitive relation or the modifier-head
construction as in pin cushion; Ward says that case
is necessary in order that the conceptions signified
by both words unite to form one complex conception
instead of remaining two separate ones.
The result
of mentioning two different substantives is usually to
increase the number of objects being considered by the
llAlthoughthe English nouns have little of that
1.
variation which in Latin and Greek grammars is called
case, it is by no means unnecessary for the understanding
of the principles on which language is founded to explain
what the cases of nouns are in those languages, and to
shew by what means the En lish
supplies the want
of cases in its nouns.I1 ?Ward, p . 48).
...
2. "The intent of language requires, that the conception annexed to any noun substantive, or to any verb,
should be modified in innumerable ways; and this can
only be done by applying one conception, as to modify,
or give additional ascertainment to another. All the
connective parts of speech are used for this purpose;
and the Greeks and Romans have varied their nouns by
alterations of the last syllables, in order to make
these forms of the substantives themselves connective
parts of speech." (Ward, p. 48).
mind. I
This can be avoided by giving signals that
certain substantives are not to be considered as signs
of independent ideas, but as ftcircumstantiating"or
depending on other nouns.
The signals used are those
of en oblique case or a preposition.2
The result is
that there is only one complex conception in the mind
because when substantives "are applied merely to express
circumstances attending states or objects, or other
circumstances,
. . . no increase of number ensues upon
the application of the dependent circumstance.11 3
7.1 .3.
Nominative and Accusative Cases4
Kard offers a discussion of the transitive verb
which he hopes will help elucidate "this most abstruse
part of grammar."
In the transitive sentence type the
substantive in subject position raises the conception
when the conceptions of objects and states are
.stances
. tlFor
. united,
none of them will represent mere circumcoalescing with some other object, but each of
1.
them will represent an object, or state, as the conception thereof is separately laid up in the memory."
('A1ard,p. 53).
2. "If a substantive be used in dependence upon another
substantive or upon an adjective; the sign of an oblique
case or some preposition, must be made use of to shew
the nature of the dependence." (Nard, p. 54).
3. Ward, p. 54.
4. Ward follows the usual custom of English grammarians
of identifying these cases on the basis of position. His
interpretation is latinate. Cf. 7.1.6.
of a "capital object" in the mind of the hearer; when
this is followed by a verb definitive (any finite verb)
the conception raised by the finite verb does not exist
independently of the conception of the substantive, but
coalesces with it to give a complex conception of the
object represented by the substantive engaging in the
activity or state expressed by the verb.
The reason that
the ideas coalesce is that the verb's principle of existence lies outside of itself, in some object which suggests
to the mind the "idea of mixed modes8I denoted by the
verb and one such object in which the verb's principle
of existence could inhere is that signified by the
substantive.
-
Thus walk denotes a typical activity of
a human being or an animal, and when the construction
"The horse walks" is uttered, the principle of existence
of the idea of walk is said to be in the idea signified
by horse rather than in some unmentioned ideas. Thus
coalescence of two separate conceptions has been achieved
and these have become just one single conception.
Coa-
lescence of adjectives to nouns is even easier because
the principle of existence in adjectives is unnoticed
so there is no necessity of transferring it to the
substantive.
It seems then that the substantive-verb
construction and the adjective-substantive construction
are in no way dependent on the function of cases or any
o t h e r s t r u c t u r a l m a r k e r s , , However, when an o b j e c t f o l l o w s t h e v e r b , a s i t always does i n t h e s e n t e n c e t y p e
we a r e d i s c u s s i n g llNotice i s g i v e n t h a t t h e conception,
denoted by t h e [second] s u b s t a n t i v e i s t o be made u s e
of merely t o c i r c u m s t a n t i a t e t h e s t a t e denoted by t h e
v e r b , i n which t h e s u b s t a n t i v e depends.
ltl
For t h i s
c i r c w n s t a n t i a t i o n t o t a k e p l a c e " t h e s i g n of a n o b l i q u e
c a s e , o r some p r e p o s i t i o n must be made u s e of t o shew
t h e n a t u r e of t h e dependence,t12 because " t h e p r o p e r t y
o f an o b l i q u e c a s e i s , ' a d i r e c t i o n t o supply i n t h e
--
mind somewhat n o t d i r e c t l y mentioned, i n o r d e r t o t u r n
t h e conception of a n o b j e c t i n t o t h a t of a dependent
circumstance.
I u 3
The a c c u s a t i v e c a s e g i v e s e x p l i c i t
n o t i c e , we a r e t o l d , t h a t t h e conception denoted by t h e
noun i n t h a t c a s e i s t o be c o n s i d e r e d as a dependent
circumstance of t h e conception denoted by a v e r b , which
i n i t s t u r n i s a l r e a d y u n i t e d t o t h e noun s u b s t a n t i v e
i n t h e nominative c a s e ,
Thus t h e a c c u s a t i v e i s g i v i n g
n o t i c e t h a t t h e i d e a denoted by t h e word James i n t h e
p h r a s e "John h o l d i n g Jamestt i s n o t t o be considered as
s e p a r a t e l y a s c e r t a i n e d , but i s t o be seen as a dependent
circumstance of t h e conception denoted by John h o l d i n g .
1.
Ward, p. 59.
2.
Ward, p. 61.
3.
I b i d . , p . 58.
The p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e , which i s t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e
conception normally being s e p a r a t e l y a s c e r t a i n e d i s presumably c a n c e l l e d out o r ignored as a r e s u l t of t h e
c h o i c e of t h e a c c u s a t i v e c a s e f o r t h i s noun.
T h i s can-
c e l l a t i o n would appear t o have t h e e f f e c t of making t h e
grammatical composition of t h i s word e x a c t l y t h e same
as t h a t of an a d j e c t i v e .
7.1.4.
S u b s t a n t i v e s i n t h e Oblique Cases t h e Equivalent
of A d j e c t i v e s
A s t h e f u n c t i o n of a l l t h e o b l i q u e c a s e s i s similar
t o t h e a c c u s a t i v e i n t u r n i n g t h e conception of t h e o b j e c t
i n t o a dependent c i r c u m s t a n c e , ' no noun i n any c a s e
except t h e nominative should be c o n s i d e r e d a s u b s t a n t i v e
as i t s p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e w i l l n o t be taken n o t i c e
of by t h e mind.'
Such nouns w i l l of c o u r s e have t h e same
form as a s u b s t a n t i v e and f o r t h i s r e a s o n Ward i s prepared t o c o n t i n u e c a l l i n g them s u b s t a n t i v e s r a t h e r t h a n
upset the t r a d i t i o n .
However, even i f we can equate a
s u b s t a n t i v e i n t h e a c c u s a t i v e w i t h an a d j e c t i v e as f a r
as t h e i d e a i s concerned, we cannot s a y t h a t they a r e
e q u i v d e n t i n a l l ways: t h e dependence on t h e s u b s t a n t i v e
1.
Cf.
Note 3, p.
218.
2 . 'Uard does n o t h e r e c o n s i d e r s e n t e n c e s w i t h Be + Pr'ed.
Nominal, but elsewhere ( p . 4 4 ) s a y s t h a t t o be a man and
t o be a judqe a r e r e a l v e r b s . The p r e d i c a t e nominal
would presumably become p a r t of t h e v e r b i n s e n t e n c e s of
C f . related discussion i n
t h e t y p e 'Jcanes i s a baby.'
Para. 6.3.
is not the same as that of the adjective, at least, not
if we are to continue using Ward's original account of
the adjective, as we have up till now.
It is at this
point that lard's explanation becomes somewhat confused:
he is certain that a case does not denote a fixed relation
but rather 'la mode of attention of the mind itself,''
yet this distinction between the different modes of
attention is never made explicit.
The basic grammatical
distinction in language that he sees is binary rather
than multiple.
It distinguishes between words that exist
independently and the others that exist dependently.
There
do not appear to be distinct modes of dependent existedce
in spite of the four oblique cases, the noun adjective,
and the finite verb.
7.1.5.
A New Theory of Transitivity
So far Ward's system appears to be very similar to
Buffier's:' the verb is dependent on the substantive in
the nominative case, and the substantive in the accusative case is dependent on them both; yet the dependency
of the accusative is obviously not the same as the adjectival dependency of the 'adjective + substantivet construction, and would appear to be of a different order
from the dependency of the verb on the subject noun
1.
Cf. Para. 4.1.3.1.
substantive; the mode of c,ircumstantiation is by no
means obvious or satisfactory to Ward at t h i s point,
The weak point of James Harris1 theory of transitivity1
was that he too saw the initial subject noun and its
verb as the basic unit to which the object was somehow
added on as an optional element.
Such an explanation
does not correspond to our intuitions about language,
although it is a manner of explaining the three terms
of the transitive construction.
Essentially it sees
the object noun phrase as an optional addition just as
-.
an adverbial phrase.
Ward realized clearly the wn-
satisfactory nature of this approach, and investigated.
the implications of the relation between active and
passive sentences as a possible avenue of explanation.
He says that the traditional notion of the two voices
of the verb expressing action and suffering is uproper
enough for conveying to learners a general conception
of the nature of each1'but that the semantic implications
of the two voices is frequently not one of action and
2
passion; they are actually signals of mutual equivalence.
1,
Cf. Para. 2.5.5.
...
2. "The true nature of these states is, that those of
each pair
are conceived to derive their existence
from one and the same principle; so that if this principle of existence is communicated to, or with-held from,
either state of a pair, it is communicated to, or
with-held from, the other state of the same principle."
(Ward, p. 5 9 ) .
He suggests that the followine two sentences are paraphrases of each other:
John holding J m e s
James is held by John.1
This pair, and all similarly related pairs, express the
same account of reality, he says, and if a picture were
painted of both it would be the same in both cases; the
picture, however, would not be able to take notice of
Ifthemodes of operation by which the parts
. . . are
put together in the mind itself.I1 This is a way of saying that speech allows us to focus on particular aspects
of an event.
Both sentences, he says, are made up of
two components: John holds and James is held; the choice
of the active or passive sentence indicates the point
of view or focus of the speaker rather than any real
difference in the situation. The 'subject-verb-objectt
construction is a shorthand way of making two distinct
1. The verbal forms that Ward uses in his examples when
he discusses these paraphrase relations raise certain
points: firstly, he continually uses the present participle rather than an active finite verb in his examples;
this appears strange, and incomplete, but later discussion of the verb reveals that he regards the participial
form of the verb as more basic (Cf. 7.2.); secondly, when
he was discussing the passive, he might well have suggested that is held consists of more than one grammatical
unit, particularly in view of the fact that he views is
as a full verb when it occurs alone in a sentence.
he
fact that he sees the passive construction of 'be + participle' as no more complex than the active form is
statements.1
This new way of analysing transitive sen-
tences is not to be found in any of Ward's sources; it
was suggested in Chapter IV that it grew from a,consideration of Locke8sideas of relation, which Ward used
when discussing the 9qcorrelativespeciest1of the noun
substantive.2
The function of the accusative in this new analysis
is to give notice that the passive form of the verb is
to be associated with the substantive in the accusative
case .3
~ h & the expression ItJohnholding James" tells
us first of all that John is holding, and then, the last
word, James, gives notice that the passive form of the
hold is to be considered in construction with James,
verb -
doubtless a result of his adherence to a Latin-based
interpretation of verb forms. To be consistent with
himself, he should have selected the form being held.
1.
"Now if an object is represented in one of these
verbal states, and another object in the same relation
to the first object, as it would be if the corresponding
state were mentioned and this other object represented
in that state; there is no occasion actually to mention
such corresponding state, but to give notice by some
sicn that it is to be supplied in the mind, and it will
be supplied of course; because the one of these corresponding states always supposes the other." (Ward, p, 6 0 ) ,
2.
Cf. Para. 4.1.1.4.
3. "The sign of the accusative case is not the mark of
any one certain relation, but of a certain kind of operation of the mind itself, which can be performed upon
the sort of conception that is denoted by the active
form of a transitive verb.It (ward, p. 60).
g i v i n g : 81Jamesi s h e l d . " The i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t whene v e r we have any t r a n s i t i v e s e n t e n c e , a l t h o u g h only one
s e n t e n c e a p p e a r s i n t h e s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e , t h e substant i v e which i s c o n s i d e r e d t o be i n t h e a c c u s a t i v e c a s e
g i v e s n o t i c e t o a n o t h e r s e n t e n c e , and i s n o t r e a l l y p a r t
of t h e o r i g i n a l sentence at a l l .
The conception a t t a c h e d
t o t h e p a s s i v e form of t h e v e r b i s t h e same as t h a t att a c h e d t o t h e a c t i v e form, s o a l t h o u g h t h e r e a r e two
s e n t e n c e s i n t h e mind, i n t h e s e n s e t h a t t h e r e a r e two
s u b s t a n t i v e s , both w i t h v e r b s depending on them, t h e y
a r e both l i n k e d by t h e common v e r b a l conception; t h e y
both s h a r e i t s mark of e x i s t e n c e .
The s u b s t a n t i v e s t h e n
have no r e l a t i o n t o each o t h e r except t h a t i n d i c a t e d by
t h e v e r b i n i t s two forms,
7.1.6.
Two Basic Sentence Types
Ward's grammatical terminology r e l i e s h e a v i l y on
L a t i n terminology; "James i s h e l d by John" i s g i v e n a
l a t i n a t e a n a l y s i s : by John i s i n t h e a b l a t i v e c a s e because
t h i s would be t h e c a s e of John i n t h e L a t i n t r a n s l a t i o n .
I n both s e n t e n c e s t h e f i r s t word i s considered t o be i n
t h e nominative, as i n L a t i n , because t h i s h a s t h e f u n c t i o n
of r a i s i n g a conception i n t h e mind: "For t h e noun i n
t h i s c a s e i s considered as b a r e l y r a i s i n g a conception
o f some o b j e c t , and t h a t by mere r e c o l l e c t i o n . 1 1 ' Ward
s e e s t h e a c t i v e and p a s s i v e s e n t e n c e forms and t h e accus a t i v e and a b l a t i v e c a s e s as t h e fundamental grammatical
c o n s t i t u e n t s of t h e language. 2
He s a y s t h a t i f v e r b a l s t a t e s could i n t e r v e n e between every p a i r of o b j e c t s " t h e r e would m a n i f e s t l y be
no o c c a s i o n i n language, f o r t h e s i g n of any c a s e except
t h a t of t h e a c c u s a t i v e , and t h a t of t h e corresponding
The p o i n t i s t h a t v e r b a l s t a t e s do n o t always
ablative."
.-
i n t e r v e n e between two nouns, and t h e r e f o r e t h e s e c a s e s
a r e n o t enough.
Where t h e r e i s no v e r b a l s t a t e between
two nouns, one of them u s u a l l y o c c u r s i n a d i s t i n c t i v e
c a s e , which h a s t h e f u n c t i o n of i n d i c a t i n g t h e n a t u r e of
I.
Ward, p. 73.
2. "Now i t i s m a n i f e s t t h a t t h e o b j e c t s , between which
every p a r t i c u l a r kind of r e l a t i o n can e x i s t , a r e each of
them i n a c e r t a i n s t a t e of being i n consequence of such
r e l a t i o n ; so t h a t t o c o n s i d e r two o b j e c t s as t h e terms
between which a c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n e x i s t s , i s , i n e f f e c t ,
t o c o n s i d e r one of t h e o b j e c t s as i n a s t a t e of being,
w i t h which t h e s t a t e of being, i n which t h e o t h e r o b j e c t
i s , h a s t h e s&me kind of correspondence as t h a t which
o c c a s i o n s t h e r e l a t i o n . And t h i s i s m a n i f e s t l y t h e
r e a s o n why so many k i n d s of r e l a t i o n s may be expressed
i n language, by r e p r e s e n t i n g one o b j e c t a s i n t h e a c t i v e
o r p a s s i v e s t a t e , which i s denoted by some t r a n s i t i v e
v e r b , and a n o t h e r o b j e c t as i n t h e correspondent p a s s i v e
s t a t e . I 1 (Ward, p. 6 3 ) .
the relation. 1
The siign -of
9
I
which f o r Ward i s t h e s i g n of t h e
g e n i t i v e , h a s t h e f u n c t i o n of showing t h a t t h e word
f o l l o w i n g i t depends on t h e word preceding i t .
The kind
-
of r e l a t i o n between t h e words man and l e a r n i n g i n "a man
of l e a r n i n g t t i s so obvious, a c c o r d i n g t o Ward, t h a t t h e r e
i s no need f o r a t r a n s i t i v e v e r b t o e x p r e s s i t ; t h e ' o f t
c o n s t r u c t i o n and t h e saxon g e n i t i v e may be c o n s i d e r e d
e l l i p t i c a l forms of a ' s u b j e c t i v e
pression:
--
+
verb
+ o b j e c t ' ex-
man of l e a r n i n g t t i s e q u i v a l e n t t o "a man
h a v i n g l e a r n i n g . tt2
-
W a r d ' s r e c o g n i t i o n of have as a
deep s t r u c t u r e
v e r b i n d i c a t i n g t h e s t a t e of some o b j e c t i s d i f f i c u l t
t o r e l a t e t o h i s t h e o r y of v e r b s being t h e e x p r e s s i o n
of mixed modes, and would g e n e r a l l y be c o n s i d e r e d
''But on some o c c a s i o n s , i t i s u t t e r l y unnecessary
1.
t o mention t h e p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e s of being, i n which
because t h e n a t u r e of t h e o b j e c t s
objects are
themselves s u f f i c i e n t l y shews how t h e y a r e r e l a t e d ;
and t h e r e f o r e any mark, o r n o t i c e , t o d i r e c t t o t h e name,
which i s t o be considered a mere circumstance and n o t a
c a p i t a l o b j e c t , i s d i r e c t i o n enough t o e n a b l e t h e mind
t o u n i t e t h e conceptions denoted by two s u b s t a n t i v e s i n t o
t h e conception of a c a p i t a l o b j e c t f u r t h e r a s c e r t a i n e d
by t h e circumstance which i s denoted by t h e dependent
s ~ b s t a n t i v e . ~( E
~ a r d , p. 6 3 ) .
...
''The kind of r e l a t i o n t h a t i s g i v e n n o t i c e of by
2.
t h e s i g n "oft placed i n English between two s u b s t a n t i v e s ,
may be more e x a c t l y expressed, by s u b s t i t u t i n g some
t r a n s i t i v e v e r b i n s t e a d of t h e s i p ; as 'a man of l e a r n i n g - a h o r s e of s t r e n g t h t a r e e x p r e s s i o n s e q u i v a l e n t
t o ' a man having l e a r n i n g - a h o r s e having s t r e n g t h ; '
and t h e s e e x p r e s s i o n s may be r e v e r s e d , i f t h e c o r r e sponding p a s s i v e s t a t e , ' h a d t be s u b s t i t u t e d i n s t e a d
unsatisfactory by modern standards;
' certainly the
passivization of such a verb is unacceptable. Ward was
probably aware of the awkwardness of the passive form
here, but, being unable to deal with verbs such as have
and be in any more sophisticated way, he was forced to
bend the language slightly in order for it to fit his
facts, It is not difficult to see the ingenuity behind
his proposal, and on the basis of this, ignore the occasional strange construction he presents.
Ward also
notes the -relation
of 'a horse which has strengtht to
the other forms, but delays discussion of this till he
discusses relative pronouns.
7.1.7.
-
Verbs Followed by Prepositions or More Than
One Noun
Although Ward states that all nouns have a transitive verb linking them, if not on the surface, then at
least signalled by the case of one of the substantives,
he still has a problem in accounting for cases or signs
of cases other than the accusative or ablative which
nouns depending not on other nouns but on transitive
verbs exhibit; there also seems to be no reason for pre-
of Ihavingt
p.
64).
...
I
the learning had by a mant.It
(Ward,
1. Cf. Bunon Bach, "Have and Be in English Syntax,It
L,mgua€:e,XLIII ( 1 9 6 7 ' m G 2 - 4 8 5 .
positions between verbs and nouns.'
These difficulties
lead Ward to state the nature of the relation prepositions
and cases siwify.
-
He discusses for at lencth, suggesting
that the "mode of contemplation is made the characteristic
of the species 'final cause1;"in doing this he is milty
of the worst kind of notional simplification of distinct
semantic relations.
He recognizes that there are diffi-
culties in analysing the meanings of prepositions: "This
way of reducing connections to sorts, by the several
modes of attention which the mind exerts in apprehending
a
-
and applying each sort is mznifestly the utmost effort
of the abstractive powers of the mind."'
He suggests
that although the meaning that we associate with the
different occurrences of the same preposition may not be
the same, the recognition of a common class is justified
because the common basis resides not in the meaning but
in the common processes of the mind: ttPorevery connexion,
or relation, is denoted by the same sign, when the same
kind of proceeding of the mind itself is used in applying
<
"If more than one object are required to circwnstan1.
tiate a transitive state different signs must be used,
to show the different manners in which the conceptions
of these objects are applied to signify mere circumstances
of such state.I1 (Ward, p. 67).
2.
Ward, p. 68.
such connexion, or relation.
In spite of the con-
vincing appeal to the proceeding of the mind, the
recognition of unity here is pure casuistry; Ward is
clearly unhappy that the facts of English do not correspond with the analysis he would like to put forward.
He can account for prepositions or case relations between
nouns, but he has no satisfactory solution for the
lverb-preposition-substantive' construction. Prepositions
are not susceptible to simple semantic analysis, but
their indistinct
meaning can be resolved in the case of
A
the 'noun-preposition-noun' construction by replacing
the preposition or case with a transitive verb.
Not
only does this remove the indistinctness but it also
resolves the construction to the more basic noun-verb
construction which Ward sees as the fundamental one in
language.
But no such solution is possible with prepo-
sitions following verbs.
He sees the necessity of pre-
positions when more than two nouns enter into constructions with the verb, but cannot explain them satisfactorily.
Where there are only two nouns in construction with a
verb, end the one following the verb is preceded by a
preposition as in W e came to such a place,I1 or "John
being with James," Ward attempts to overcome his immediate
1.
Ibid., p. 69.
d i f f i c u l t y by s u g g e s t i n g ' t h a t p a r a p h r a s e s without prep o s i t i o n s a r e i n some s e n s e more b a s i c , and t h e f u n c t i o n
of t h e c a s e s o r p r e p o s i t i o n s i s t o s u g g e s t t h e paraphrase
1
alternatives.
7.1.8.
Prepositions
The p o i n t t h a t Ward's own t h e o r y i s f o r c i n g him t o
r e c o g n i z e i s t h a t t h e p r e p o s i t i o n o r t h e mark of c a s e
i s a v e r y f l e x i b l e u n i t .2
The meaning of a p r e p o s i t i o n
i s d e r i v e d .- from a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e meaning of t h e
words i t j o i n s :
"The p r e c i s e n a t u r e of t h e connexion
. . . i s l e f t t o be determined by t h e judgement,
from
t h e n a t u r e of t h e c o n c e p t i o n s which a r e u n i t e d kb
i t . * 1 3
...
1.
"'Vie reached such a p l a c e ' i s of t h e same import i n
E n g l i s h w i t h 'we came t o such a p l a c e t
, 'John
accompanying James' i s e q u i v a l e n t t o 'John being w i t h
James' and s o of innumerable o t h e r i n s t a n c e s , i n which
a t r a n s i t i v e v e r b may be s u b s t i t u t e d i n s t e a d of a prep o s i t i o n o r s i g n of a c a s e . T h i s shews c l e a r l y , t h a t
t h e same r e l a t i o n between o b j e c t s may be expressed i n
language by d i f f e r e n t modes of e s t i m a t i o n , i f t h e prem i s e s a r e changed, by t h e h e l p whereof t h e r e l a t i o n s
a r e t o be estimated.I1 (ward, p. 7 0 ) . C f . Lowth8s
p o s i t i o n d i s c u s s e d i n Para. 4.3.3.
2. "It i s obvious t o p e r c e i v e , t h a t t h e y a r e a l l exp r e s s i o n s of r e l a t i o n , but t h e d i f f i c u l t y i s t o determine
how such v a r i o u s k i n d s of r e l a t i o n s among o b j e c t s thems e l v e s , can be expressed by one and t h e same p r e p o s i t i o n
w i t h o u t c o n f u s i o n ; and why one and t h e same r e l a t i o n
by t h e h e l p of d i f f e r e n t
,
may be expressed
preposition^.^'
(ward, p. 243).
...
3.
Ward, p. 244.
. .
He recognizes that
,
The distance of London from York
The distance from London to York
The distance between London and York
all indicate the same meaning, and the difference between them comes from the "different modes of estimation,
which modes the prepositions give notice of."
The same
kind of process is seen in numerical calculation where
the same answer is achieved through different modes of
'
calculation-, Ward equated prepositions with variables:
they are like "a fictitious quantity
. . . introduced
merely to assist the mind in registering the steps of
the process."
He is not saying that the preposition or
case is without meaning, but that its meaning is not
clearly determined; it is acquired in a particular construction: "It comes to pass that signs of cases and
prepositions bear in themselves a less determinate signification than nouns and verbs do."
Premises or ac-
companying information are necessary to make their
1.
I1Thisis no more than comes to pass in estimating
all kinds of quantity, so as to express the result of
the process in algebraic species: for we are usually at
liberty to proceed several different ways; and yet, if
the reasoning is just, we shall always come at last to
an expression, which, though different in form, is in
effect the same with that which is the result of any
other way of proceeding, in which the reasoning is also
just. "
(Ward, p. 244).
s i g n i f i c a t i o n c l e a r : "Sornd premises must be g i v e n
...
b e f o r e t h e conception of a r e l a t i o n denoted by a p a r t i c u l a r s i ~ mw i l l a r i s e .
Harris had a t t e m p t e d t o
e x p l a i n E n g l i s h p r e p o s i t i o n s by s a y i n g t h a t i n t h e i r
l i t e r a l meaning t h e y e x p r e s s a s p a t i a l r e l a t i o n , and
t h a t t h i s meaning i s extended m e t a p h o r i c a l l y t o apply
t o abstract objects.
Ward's account i s d i s t i n c t and
o r i g i n a l because he does n o t r e c o g n i z e m e t a p h o r i c a l
e x t e n s i o n t o t h e b a s i c meaning, b u t ' s e e s t h e p r e p o s i t i o n s
as having an almost i n f i n i t e v a r i e t y of p o s s i b l e s i g n i -
f i c a t i o n s and only vague c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h d i r e c t i o n a l
meaning.
The r e f e r e n c e of a p r e p o s i t i o n i s i n d e t e r m i n a t e ,
l i k e tha.t of a n a l g e b r a i c symbol; i t s mezning can only
be d i s c o v e r e d from t h e meaning of t h e words i t i s r e l a ting. 2
Ward i s a t t e m p t i n g t o e x p r e s s what w a s n e v e r considered i n the eighteenth century, t h a t prepositions
do n o t have d e t e r m i n a t e meaning; h i s o r i g i n a l i t y l i e s not
1.
Ward, p. 244.
2.
"The mind p e r c e i v e s t h a t a b s t r a c t o b j e c t s have conn e x i o n s w i t h each o t h e r , which r e q u i r e n e a r l y t h e same
modes of e s t i m a t i o n which t h e r e l a t i o n s of l o c a l s i t u a t i o n do; and t h e r e f o r e , i n Language whatsoever connexion
i s conceived t o r e q u i r e t h e same mode of a t t e n t i o n i n
o r d e r t o e s t i m a t e i t , i s denoted by one and t h e same
s i g n , and t h e p r e c i s e n a t u r e of t h e connexion, as i t i s
i n itself, i s l e f t t o be determined by t h e judgement,
from t h e n a t u r e of t h e c o n c e p t i o n s which a r e u n i t e d
(Ward, p . 2 4 4 ) .
by t h e sign."
in drawing attention to the variety of' meaning, but in
attempting to explain how the person hearing such a
preposition is in fact able to associate with it a
definite meaning.
He suggests that the preposition is
a signal of an operation of the mind which places a
definite transitive verb, suggested by the nouns and
the preposition, in relation with those nouns.
Circuni-
stances do not always make such an explanation possible,
and then his account is less satisfactory; thus he cannot
deal with prepositions in sentences where more than two
..
nouns are attached to the verb phrase.
7.2.
Adjectives and Verbs
Vt'ard's analysis of the transitive sentence type
allowed him to develop his considerations in several
interesting ways.
One particularly valuable approach,
which broke new ground as far as the English grammatical
tradition was concerned, was the analysis of relative
pronouns and relative clauses.
This analysis of the
relative, which will be discussed shortly, led him to
see deficiencies in the theory he had already developed:
he had reduced the principal constructions in the Ehglish
language to two: the adjective-substantive construction
and the substantive-verb construction; but he had to
distinguish, if he wished to preserve this analysis,
between adjective-substantive constructions and particle-
substantive constructions.~IIe also had to offer some
kind of explanation for the difference between verbs
coalescent and verbs definitive.
In his analysis of the
relative he maintains the distinction between participle
and adjective, although, as he commented, most grammarians
see them as the same.'
It is difficult to see 'ilardls
distinctions, and realizing this, he offers other distinctions.
He says that when participles are united
with substantives they have a union which is so intimate
that it is expressible
in the form of derived nouns:
A
'a seeing mant is the equivalent of la seer1, 'a moving
man' the equivalent of 'a mover.'
This, says Ward,
only happens with participles: "But nothing of thls
kind ensues when an adjective, or the oblique case of
a substantive is made dependent on another substantive. 1' 2
Actually a similar process happens with adjectives: the
substantive form a black is derived from a black man,
-er suffix is only added to
but it is true that the verb stems.
Such an explanation as Ward offers here to
distinguish participles from adjectives is still convincing, although at base it is a repetition of Ward's
1. 'The participle is as properly a verb, as any other
verbal form is; for it expresses a state which depends
on an inconstant principle of existence. Wherees an
adjective gives express notice, that no principle of
existence is to be attended to, in that which is denoted
by it."
(V!ard, p. 115).
2.
Ward, p. 164.
belief that the verb represents activity of limited
duration rather than the permanent condition expressed
by adjectives, for he says that the objects denoted by
seer and mover are not
-
to be considered to be in these
states continuously but only occasionally.
His struggle
to mark off the participle from the adjective results
eventually in redefinition of the adjective.
Ward had
originally seen the mode of union of the adjective with
the substantive as a simple one achieved without any
intervention because no principle of existence was to
be noted in the adjective, and it could therefore unite
with the substantive.
'
In his discussion of the verb
coalescent, he has to amend his original account of the
adjective in order to suggest another difference between
adjectives and participles.
He now sees the coalescence
of participles as more natural than that of adjectives.2
1.
The original description of the adjective was:
An adjective unites with a substantive, so as to
form a kind of name of the object represented by
the expression. Por the principle by which the
object exists is taken notice of in the conception which the substantive denotes, and the conception denoted by the adjective takes no notice
of the principle of existence, but unites with the
conception which does take notice of such principle.
(Ward, pp. 15-16).
"The mode of coalescence by which a participle unites
2.
with the object
is more simple than that by which
In the union
=an adjective uni-teswith the object
of' a participle coalescent, there is no interveninp: state
to be understood: but in the union of an adjective, some
...
...
The two salient points of Qis new definition are: firstly,
that an intervening;siate is now required to uni-Leadjective and substantive, and secondly, a substantive is said
to be contained in an adjective; previously they were
alternate grammatical lexicalizations of the same underlying idea.
Yard gives the example 'a deceitful man1 and
says this is equivalent to 'a man of deceit,' Prepositions
often indicate underlying verbs, and this construction in
turn implies 'a man practising deceit.'
This development
of the definition of the adjective is tantamount to a
rejection of the schema proposed in Ward's original discussion of nouns; Ward is here saying that there are no
independently existing adjectives, but all are derivations
from abstract substantives, and that these adjectival
substantives are linked to the head noun by a transitive
verb, here practising, but more usually having.
This
is a move to remove the 'adjective-substantivetconstruction, and reduce all language to the form of either
'substantive + verb active' or substantive
+ verb passive,'
state must be understood to form the coalescence. For
the substantive
ad.iective. can s
ch&acteristic of a species, as a participial state
may be; and therefore the mind is under a necessity
of having recourse to some mode of estimation similar'
to some of those which are denoted by prepositions,
to form the connexions between an ad'ective and the
!Ward, p. 1 6 2 ) .
substantive on which it dcpcnds."
Such a change is brought about by Ward's reco~mition
that his distinction between part.iciples and adjectives
is unconvincing.
Obviously some proposal similar to
current approaches suggesting a common category of
verbals to which both adjectives and verbs belong would
have been a solution to Y!ard, but no such solution was
available; he wanted to keep the treditional categories
separate, but in maintaining the verb/adjective separation he was forcing himself to move the adjective closer
to the substantive.
Such vacillations in fundamentals of the theory in
the course of the Essay make it impossible and meaningless
to attempt to extract a coherent analysis from Ward's
grammar; but it would be a mistake to gloss over his
inconsistencies and to impose on his writings a system
that appears satisfactory to the modern lin,ggist, but is
totally foreign to Ward's own speculations. The interesting aspect of Ward's grammatical speculations, which
in this respect form a microcosm of the whole of English
linguistics in the eighteenth century, is that there is
a continuing search going on as he writes the grammar
for a set of categories, and for definitions of categories, which will fit the facts of the English lcane;uage.
Ward hoped that his own search might be more successful
than most others because he was taking a different
starting point, one that should not lead him astray:
the Lockean idea, which Hartley had shown was a useful
tool in linguistic analysis.
Ward attempted to link
Lockets ideas to grammatical categories, and the link-up
he achieved was convincing; the grammatical categories
themselves, however, had not been examined in the first
place for their validity.
Participles and infinitives
were reckoned to be verbs because Sanctius had seen
them as -such,'
.
and because of their formal similarity
in English; Ward felt that all the verbal forms had the
common characteristic that they were comparable to
certain aspects of Locketsmixed modes: they perished
in their birth.2 But he did not have the means to make
clear in what ways verbs differed from adjectives; he
appeared to be conscious of the active/stative distinction between verbs and adjectives, but was only
able to express it in terms of the time reference of
the verb.
Unfortunately the present participle has
no explicit time reference, und his initial reason for
distinguishing verbs and adjectives was no longer very
good.
1.
He gave up his subtle distinction of constant/
Cf. Para. 4.2.1.1.
2. Abstract nouns were comparable to other aspects
of the mixed modes. Cf. Para. 4.1.1.1.
inconstant (action/stat?) because he could find no
structural marker of the semarli i c disiinciion in participles; and these for him were the basic form of the
verb.'
However, with the new distinction of participles
as immediately coalescing words, and adjectives as
words requiring the intervention of a preposition or
transitive verb, he was able to use the two categories
to define two distinct types of relative clause: all
relative clauses are reducible either to adjectives
or participles,2
--
Where the antecedent indicated by the relative is
linked with the action denoted by the verb in the
relative clause (e,g. 'the man who I sawt) the clause
is equivalent to a participle; where the antecedent is
not immediately linked to the relative clause verb
(e,g. 'the man whose brother I saw8) the relative
clause is the equivalent of an adjective, How much
better Ward's analysis might have been if he had said
1,
Cf. Note 1 la.
2, When the object represented by a relative pronoun,
is neither that on which the verb of its clause immediately depends
such relative clause is equivalent to an adjective. But if the object represented
by the relative is either that on which the verb of its
clause immediately depends, or that depending upon the
verb by the means of a sign of case or other preposition;
such relative clause is equivalent to a participle,"
(Ward, p, 146).
...
that a participle was the equivalent of a relative
clause rather than the reverse.
However, he did not;
in a sense he obviously felt that the participle was
a very basic unit.
The reasons for this probably were
that its union with a substantive so easily summoned
up a picture in the mind: la running man1 seems to be
a single idea in a way that 'the man runs' or 'the man
who runs1 could never be.
This would also account for
Ward's preference for *John holding James' rather than
the sentence 'John holds James.'
The former is not a
sentence from a grammatical point of view, but although
it is not complete, it definitely summons up as clear
a conception in the mind as the more normal sentence
form.
Ward is not decided about the status of the
verb definitive.
He says that it summons up the same
kind of conception as the verb coalescent; this is
the reason they were discussed together in the last
chapter.
7.2.1.
Syntactic Function of the Definitive Verb
Ward defines the verb definitive by its characteristic function which is to show "that the expression
of the objective conception on which it depends is
1
stopped, as to any further composition; and that the
object denoted by the whole expression, becomes an
object of the species whereof the participial state
contained in the verb is the characteristic."'
This
description is interesting for two reasons: firstly,
it shows that the participial form is definitely considered in some sense more basic: it is "contained
in the significance of the verb definitive;" secondly,
it pays no heed to the common notion that affirmation
is the distinguishing characteristic of this form of
the verb.
The participle is the basic verb, and when
it is in construction with the substantive, the ideas
signified by both words are already in coalescence-there is thus an identity between the ideas rather
than an affirmation2--so that the function of the
more complex definitive form cannot be to affirm the
proper ties of the verb to the substantive.
It must
have some function distinct from that of the participle,
and Ward claims that it is to "stopu or limit the conception indicated by the substantive. Ward is saying
that the verb definitive signifies that we have a
complete noun phrase, which will not be susceptible to
further modification.
His example of this is inter-
esting: all the while only participle forms are used
1.
Ward, p. 164.
2.
Cf. Lockelsposition discussed in Para. 4.1.1.5.
i n post-head m o d i f i c a t i o n , t h e complex conception denoted
by t h e noun phrase can expand:
'la
lady s i t t i n g i n the
garden, viewing t h e f l o w e r s , p r e s e n t i n g v a r i o u s c o l o u r s . " 1
The u s e of t h e d e f i n i t i v e form of t h e v e r b i m p l i e s t h a t
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s now c l o s e d .
T h i s i s a d e f i n i t i o n of
t h e f i n i t e v e r b as a s i g n a l l i n g device: i t s i g n a l s t h a t
t h e s e n t e n c e f o r m a t i o n i s now r e a c h i n g a s t a g e of complet i o n , j u s t as a n i n t o n a t i o n contour might do; he s e e s
t h e v e r b d e f i n i t i v e as having c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s similar
t o a n i n t o n a t i o n contour: i t d i r e c t s a t t e n t i o n towards
t h e subject.
The d i f f e r e n c e between v e r b s c o a l e s c e n t
and v e r b s d e f i n i t i v e i s r e l a t i v e l y unimportant.
Ward
'
. m e n t i o n s but does n o t dwell on t h e f a c t t h a t d e f i n i t i v e
v e r b s have t e n s e forms; t h e p o i n t i s t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e
between v e r b s c o a l e s c e n t and d e f i n i t i v e does n o t l i e
i n t h e realm of i d e a s and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p .
7.3.
R e l a t i v e Pronouns and R e l a t i v e Clauses
Only when Ward c o n s i d e r s r e l a t i v e c l a u s e s do t h e
i m p l i c a t i o n s of s y n t a x r e a l l y come t o t h e f o r e .
He
e n t i t l e s S e c t i o n I11 of h i s c h a p t e r on pronouns " O f t h e
R e l a t i v e Pronoun1' but shows i n s i g h t and o r i g i n a l i t y by
e n l a r g i n g h i s d i s c u s s i o n t o c e n t r e on t h e whole r e l a t i v e
c l a u s e r a t h e r t h a n j u s t t h e form of t h e pronouns.
1.
Ward, p.
138.
He
says t h a t t h e simple pronbuns of t h e c l a s s a r e -9who
which, and -pt h a t * he f a i l s t o make any d i s t i n c t i o n between
the relative t h a t and t h e t h a t which i n t r o d u c e s whole
s e n t e n c e s i n noun phrases.
He a l s o i n c l u d e s a l l wh-
adverbs as having t h e wpoweru of a r e l a t i v e pronoun i n
t h e i r signification.
H i s d e f i n i t i o n of t h e r e l a t i v e
pronoun s t r e s s e s t h a t t h e r e l a t i v e c l a u s e must be p a r t
of some l a r g e r u n i t , and t h a t t h e pronoun i t s e l f must
have an m t e c e d e n t
.'
H i s own d i s c u s s i o n s of t h e r e l a t i v e
do n o t i n f a c t always r e q u i r e t h e second c o n d i t i o n , as i s
evident when he d i s c u s s e s t h e v a r i o u s degrees a t which
a sentence can operate.
7.3.1.
T h e N o t i o n of Degree
Ward's concept of a sentence o p e r a t i n g a t v a r i o u s
degrees i s very s i m i l a r t o t h e modern concept of rankshift:*
u n i t s of language u s u a l l y o p e r a t e a t t h e i r own
l e v e l , t h u s words f u n c t i o n i n phrases, phrases within
c l a u s e s , and c l a u s e s within sentences.
I
However, they
"The r e l a t i v e pronoun i s t h e name of an o b j e c t as
1.
a personal pronoun i s : but when an o b j e c t i s named by
a r e l a t i v e pronoun, n o t i c e i s given, ' t h a t t h e pronoun
both expresses t h e o b j e c t , and l i k e w i s e shews t h a t t h e
c l a u s e i n which such o b j e c t i s concerned, i s n o t t o be
considered e i t h e r a s expressing complete t r u t h o r f a l s e hood, o r a complete conception of t h e i n t e l l e c t ; but a s
an expression of t h e same o b j e c t which t h e r e l a t i v e
r e p r e s e n t s . l l (Ward, p. 134).
2.
Cf. M. A. K. Halliday, "Categories of t h e Theory of
Grammar, Word,
- X V I I (1961), 241-92.
a r e f r e q u e n t l y s h i f t e d t o l a d i f f e r e n t l e v e l : when a
c l a u s e m o d i f i e s a noun, i t i s o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n t h e phrase
r a t h e r t h a n w i t h i n t h e s e n t e n c e , and i t i s s a i d t o be
r a n k s h i f t e d t o t h e l e v e l of a word.
Ward d i s c u s s e s t h e
u n i t ' d a u s e , I which, though he does n o t d e f i n e i t , would
seem t o c o n s i s t of some kind of noun followed by e i t h e r
a verb coalescent o r a verb d e f i n i t i v e .
The r e l a t i v e
c l a u s e 'which r u n s 1 c o n t a i n s as i t s noun t h e r e l a t i v e
pronoun, and i n Ward's example h a s as a n a n t e c e d e n t
-
h o r s e , water o r time.
However, i f t h e a n t e c e d e n t "be
i n t h e c l a u s e 'which runst i n s t e a d of t h e r e l a t i v e
placed *whicht t h e t h r e e sentences 'a horse runs
t i m e r u n s 1 w i l l be formed."'
-
water r u n s ' -
Ward concludes from t h i s
t h a t Itany r e l a t i v e c l a u s e w i l l become a complete sentence.'"
He a l s o s e e s t h e r e v e r s e t o be t r u e : t h a t any f u l l sent e n c e may be t u r n e d i n t o a r e l a t i v e c l a u s e .
7.3.2.
Content Clauses and R e l a t i v e C l a u s e s
The n o t i o n of degree i s most completely d i s c u s s e d
when Ward i n t r o d u c e s t h e s e n t e n c e
Ita
A s i t i s , i t i s a complete s e n t e n c e .
peace i s concluded."
By p r e f i x i n g ' t h a t 1
t o t h i s s e n t e n c e and i n s e r t i n g i t i n a n o t h e r s e n t e n c e ,
i t becomes t h e e q u i v a l e n t of a noun s u b s t a n t i v e : "That
1.
Ward, p. 137.
a peace is concluded is no,w past doubt.I1
Ward comments:
"Thus a sentence of complete truth or falsehood is reduced one degree lower, viz. to a level with the expression of a mere object of the intellect, a s denoted by
a noun substantive.11' The clause is now one degree lower
than a sentence, because it occupies the position of
the major or principal sentence constituent, the noun
substantive.
The process can continue: "But it i s of
the utmost convenience in language to reduce a complete
sentence lower still, viz. to a level with the expression
-
of a conception denoted by a noun adjective, or dependent
participle.112 Ward does not give an example of this
~
lower degree with his basic sentence "a peace is concluded" but it would have to be of the following type:
"The belief that a peace is concluded is now past doubt."
This analysis of the three levels at which a sentence
can operate i s very perspicacious, but it i s at odds
with Ward's account of the relative in various ways:
firstly, sentences in the second degree have no antecedent whatsoever, and insteadof proposing some 'understood1 antecedent, Ward affirms that the clause i s in
the noun substantive position of the sentence.
1.
Ward, p. 135.
2.
Ibid,, p. 136.
He does
not appear to notice the inconsistency of this with his
earlier definition of the relative, nor does he notice
that the that is not the 'name of an object. I '
Secondly,
Ward's failure to notice the distinction between the two
-
grammatically distinct forms of that and thus his failure
to recognize that he is not talking about the relative
clause at all, makes us feel that his discussion of the
three degrees is much more idiosyncratic than it in fact
is.
However, the phenomenon with which he was dealing
was an interesting one, and later grammarians' discussions
--
of it indicate the real difficulty which Ward was attempting to account for.
Jespersen recognizes two kinds of'
clauses introduced by -9that
a content clause and a rela-
tive clause;2 content clauses are of the type 'that a
peace is concludedw and they have the characteristic that
-
the that cannot be replaced by a wh-word; relative clauses
-
however have that as an optional reduced form of who or
which.
Ward's proposal that the clause can be reduced
to the degree of adjective or participle, by the placing
of a substantive before it as antecedent has been dernonstrated by the sentence: 'Ithe belief that a peace is
1. Many true relatives do not have antecedents, notably
the indefinite relatives; but they do all name objects
in some sense. Cf. "You can have what you like."
2. Otto Jespersen, Modern English Grammar, 111, Chapter
2, Sections 1-3.
concluded is now past doubt."
Jespersen rejects the
notion that the "that a peace has been concludedH of
this sentence is a relative clause, because the obviously
related sentence "that a peace has been concluded is now
past doubt9'has no relative clause in it.
The content
clause in post-substantive position differs from the
relative clause in that only a limited number of nouns
can come before this clause as antecedents, and these
appear to be pro-forms of -the following content clause.
rather than
Jespersen notes this and calls them 98props98
--
antecedents: "Sometimes the words the fact or the circumstance are used to prop up the clause.ll'
Jacobs and Rosenbawn distinguish between these content clauses and relative clauses in a rather different
manner by positing different deep structure analyses of
the noun phrases:z
whom I saw
the
the
fact
that Ricky came late
1.
Op. cit., Chapter 2, Section 1.1.
2.
~ p .cit., p. 48 ff.
But such a n a n a l y s i s i s ra$her u n s a t i s f a c t o r y because
t h e r u l e s f o r t h e noun phrase expansion
would have t o be complemented by a highly s p e c i f i c s e t
of r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e l e x i c a l s e l e c t i o n of t h e N i f ,
and only i f , t h e o p t i o n a l S were s e l e c t e d ,
r e q u i r e d would be i d e a , f a c t , b e l i e f , e t c . ) .
h he
nouns
I t seems
a p r i o r i requirement of any grammar that t h e
t o be a n o b l i g a t o r y elements should determine t h e n a t u r e of t h e .
o p t i o n a l elements and n o t t h e r e v e r s e ,
J a c o b s and
Rosenbaum f a i l t o s p e c i f y t h e dependence of t h e N on t h e
S i n t h e i r r u l e formulation.
Their analysis a l s o fails
t o r e l a t e ' t h a t Ricky came l a t e 1 with ' R i c k y l s coming
late,'
' f o r Ricky t o come l a t e , ' e t c .
T h e i r oversimpli-
' f i c a t i o n i s almost as g r o s s as Ward's,
Jacobs and Rosenbaum s e e Ward's second degree
s e n t e n c e s a s r e a l l y c o n s t i t u t i n g t h i r d degree s e n t e n c e s ;
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c l a u s e can a p p e a r i n s u b s t a n t i v a l
p o s i t i o n i s a t t r i b u t e d t o o p t i o n a l d e l e t i o n of t h e subs t a n t i v e ; J e s p e r s e n on t h e o t h e r hand s e e s t h e n o u n .
s u b s t a n t i v e only as an a d d i t i o n a l prop, and s u p p o r t s
h i s s t a t e m e n t by h i s t o r i c a l evidence: "1 t h i n k t h a t he
is deadttevolved from "1 Phink that" he is dead";' the
that was
-
originally a demonstrative pronoun.
The facts surrounding this problem are complex
and Ward was attempting to impose a pattern on them.
Jespersenlsand Jacobs and Rosenbaumlsanalyses are not
discussed or offered as a measure to evaluate Ward's
attempt (although he would not come off badly in such
an evaluation),but to demonstrate the contemporary debate
which still surrounds an issue which Ward had provided
a meaningful analysis for in the terms of his o m theory.
-
In the Practical Grammar he again discusses the 'that
+
S t clause or 'content clause' in relation to extra-
position; his remarks on extraposition will be c'onsidered
shortly.
7.3.3.
The Relative Clause and its Resolution
Ward's analysis of "that a peace is concluded is
now past doubtv ignored the requirement of his Own
definition of the relative, that it have an antecedent.
His inclusion of some pronouns in the class, notably
whatsoever, whichsoever, and whosoever completely precludes
the possibility of any antecedent in many cases; he does
not appear to notice this, but he is aware of some forms
i
(apart from the content clauses discussed earlier) which
1.
Op. cit., Chapter 2, Section 3.1.
have no antecedent, such a s l w Iknow who h a s been h e r e u
and "who reasons wisely i s n o t t h e r e f o r e w i s e M ; here he
s a y s t h a t t h e r e i s a personal pronoun understood within
the relative.'
Ward's s o l u t i o n i s open t o d i s p u t e a s
--
being remarkably ad hoc ( i t s a y s i n e f f e c t t h a t a char a c t e r i s t i c of t h e r e l a t i v e i s t h a t i t r e f e r s t o an
antecedent except where i t d o e s n s t ) ; however, i f h i s
a n a l y s i s was incomplete, o r i n a c c u r a t e , i t w a s no d i f f e r e n t from many l a t e r a n a l y s e s i n t h i s r e s p e c t , and i t
was very d i f f e r e n t from t h e m a j o r i t y of contemporary
works.
Ward recognized t h e unusual q u a l i t y of h i s des-
c r i p t i o n , and a t t r i b u t e s h i s n o t i o n t h a t t h e r e l a t i v e
pronoun i s an incomplete pronoun t o B u f f i e r ; but he
s t r e s s e s t h e s u p e r i o r i t y of h i s own explanation of incompleteness.*
The f a c t which he has t o e x p l a i n i s how
t h e r e should only be one i d e a i n t h e mind when i t has
been summoned up twice, once by t h e antecedent and once
by t h e r e l a t i v e ; t h e problem i s one t h a t i s c r e a t e d by
t h e theory of t h e correspondence of words and i d e a s , but
i t i s r e s o l v a b l e by t h e g e n e r a l theory of t h e p l a s t i c i t y
of t h e p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e ; t h e n a t u r e of t h e o p e r a t i o n
1 . "Therefore t h e r e l a t i v e , i n such a p p l i c a t i o n of i t ,
may be considered as equivalent t o a r e l a t i v e and personal
pronoun both i n one, and t h e r e l a t i v e c l a u s e may be cons i d e r e d as c o n t a i n i n g complete sense i n i t s e l f . "
(Ward,
p . 147).
2.
C f . Para. 4.1.3.2.
performed on t h e p r . i n c i p l & of e x i s t e n c e of t h e r e l a t i v e
c l a u s e a f t e r t h e " c l a u s e i s formedw makes i t "vanish
o u t of e x i s t e n c e u r e n d e r i n g t h e c l a u s e e q u i v a l e n t e i t h e r
t o a d j e c t i v e s o r v e r b s c o a l e s c e n t , n e i t h e r of which
i n c r e a s e s t h e number of o b j e c t s e x i s t i n g i n t h e mind." 1
The s t r u c t u r e of t h e a d j e c t i v a l r e l a t i v e c l a u s e
(e.g.
' a man who i s g o o d ' ) g i v e s Ward some evidence and
b a s i s f o r h i s suggestion t h a t a d j e c t i v e s a r e signs giving
n o t i c e t h a t a noun s u b s t a n t i v e e q u i v a l e n t i n meaning t o
--
t h e a d j e c t i v e i s l i n k e d t o t h e p r i n c i p a l s u b s t a n t i v e by
means of a p r e p o s i t i o n o r a t r a n s i t i v e v e r b .
I n t h e reLa-
t i v e c l a u s e t h e a d j e c t i v e i s n o t l i n k e d immediately t o
-
t h e s u b s t a n t i v e , but i s joined by means of t h e v e r b be.
"A r e l a t i v e pronoun r e p r e s e n t s t h e o b j e c t denoted by
1.
i t , only t i l l i t s c l a u s e i s formed, and t h e o b j e c t i s
a s c e r t a i n e d w i t h which t h e conception expressed by t h e
c l a u s e i s t o c o a l e s c e : but when t h e mind forms t h e coal e s c e n c e , t h e o b j e c t w i t h which t h a t c o a l e s c e n c e i s made
i s n o t conceived t o be denoted twice o v e r , i. e. once by
t h e a n t e c e d e n t and once by t h e r e l a t i v e : but by t h e a n t e c e d e n t only. So t h a t such o b j e c t as i s denoted by t h e
r e l a t i v e v a n i s h e s out of t h e conception which i s expressed
by a r e l a t i v e c l a u s e i n a c t u a l union w i t h i t s a n t e c e d e n t ,
Hence i t e v i d e n t l y f o l l o w s , t h a t t h e r e l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t s a n o b j e c t as supported by a p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t ence, which t h e mind can d e s t r o y , o r t r a n s f e r a t i t s
pleasure
but t h e conception may be contemplated
in itself
If t h e p r i n c i p l e by which t h e r e l a t i v e
o b j e c t e x i s t s i s conceived t o be d e s t r o y e d , t h e r e l a t i v e
c l a u s e becomes of t h e n a t u r e of a noun a d j e c t i v e , i f t h i s
p r i n c i p l e be conceived as only t r a n s f e r r e d , t h e c l a u s e
becomes of t h e n a t u r e of a dependent p a r t i c i p l e .
......
I t would seem t h a t t h e r e a r e two s t a g e s i n t h e p r o c e s s
of a r r i v i n g from t h e s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e t o t h e s t r u c t u r e
o f t h e i d e a s i n t h e mind: f i r s t of a l l t h e r e l a t i v e
c l a u s e i s reduced t o an a d j e c t i v e , and t h i s a d j e c t i v e
i s t h e n converted i n t h e mind t o a noun s u b s t a n t i v e ,
and l i n k e d t o t h e p r i n c i p a l s u b s t a n t i v e by means of
a t r a n s i t i v e v e r b , probably have: "A man who i s good"
becomes "a good man," which becomes "a man having goodness.''
Ward does n o t o f t e n connect s t a t e m e n t s made i n
one p a r t of h i s Essay w i t h t h o s e made elsewhere, and it
i s a m a t t e r of c o n j e c t u r e whetherhe e v e r c a r r i e d o u t a l l
t h e s e s t e p s even i n h i s own mind.
They a r e suggested
by t h e t e x t , but examples a r e r a r e l y g i v e n .
The p r e c i s e
e x i s t e n t i a l s t a t u s of t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e s t a g e s a r e no
c l e a r e r t h a n i s t h e e x i s t e n t i a l s t a t u s of v a r i o u s s t a g e s
i n t h e d e r i v a t i o n s proposed i n g e n e r a t i v e grammars, but
w i t h l e s s reason: modern a c c o u n t s of s e n t e n c e d e r i v a t i o n
a r e q u i t e simply r u l e s l i n k i n g one l e v e l w i t h a n o t h e r
l e v e l , and t h e y have no claim t o r e a l e x i s t e n c e ; but
Ward's account i s everywhere c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o what i s
happening t o i d e a s i n t h e mind.
Thus t h e r e l a t i v e c l a u s e
-
I
a h o r s e which i s s w i f t , '
Thus, ' a man who i s good
a r e e x p r e s s i o n s n e a r l y e q u i v a l e n t t o 'a good man
a
s w i f t h o r s e ' and ' a m a n who speaks
a h o r s e which r u n s t
a r e n e a r l y e q u i v a l e n t t o ' a man speaking - a h o r s e running.'
(Ward, pp. 142-3).
-
-
cannot be r e l a t e d t o t h e
substantive
t i v e ' form by means of t h e ' a d j e c t i v e
+ have + substan+ substantive1
s t a g e u n l e s s a l l t h r e e l e v e l s e x i s t i n some r e a l way.
I t might be e a s i e s t t o account f o r h i s p r o p o s a l s by ad-
mitting that the 'substantive
+ have + s u b s t a n t i v e 1 form
corresponds c l o s e l y t o t h e i d e a s i n t h e mind ( t h e a c t u a l
i d e a s b e i n g two:
stantive
lsubstantive
+ verb passive')
+
v e r b a c t i v e 1 and 'sub-
and t h a t t h e only f u n c t i o n of
a l l t h e o t h e r forms i s t o r e c a l l i n t h e mind t h i s b a s i c
form,
They a r e j u s t a l t e r n a t e r e a l i z a t i o n s of i t ; Ward
n e v e r c o n s i d e r s how t h e s e a l t e r n a t e r e a l i z a t i o n s f i r s t
found t h e i r way i n t o t h e language.
7.3.4.
Rule Cycles i n R e l a t i v e Clauses
Ward's e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e way t h e r e l a t i v e c l a u s e
f i t s i n t o t h e s e n t e n c e s u g g e s t s t h a t he s e e s t h e p r o c e s s
of communication t o be i n some s e n s e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of
r u l e s on a c y c l i c b a s i s : he s a y s t h a t t h e pronoun r e p r e s e n t s t h e o b j e c t denoted by i t s e l f Itonly t i l l t h e
c l a u s e i s formed and t h e o b j e c t i s a s c e r t a i n e d w i t h which
t h e conception expressed by t h e c l a u s e i s t o c ~ a l e s c eI , ~ ~
Then, when c o a l e s c e n c e i s achieved between t h e c l a u s e
and i t s a n t e c e d e n t , t h e r e l a t i v e no l o n g e r r e p r e s e n t s
t h e o b j e c t s as e x i s t i n g s e p a r a t e l y from t h e a n t e c e d e n t .
1.
N a r d , p.
142.
256
We a r e reminded of how Katz and P o s t a l suggest i n
An
I n t e l ~ r a t e dTheory of L i n e i s t i c ~ e s c r i ~ t i o nt h' a t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l r u l e s apply f i r s t of a l l t o the innermost
s e n t e n c e ( s i g n i f i e d by t h e b r a c k e t i n g ) , and when a l l
t h e r u l e s have a p p l i e d t o t h i s s e n t e n c e , t h e b r a c k e t s
a r e removed, and t h e sentence becomes a u n i t of t h e n e x t
s e n t e n c e up, and t h e p r o c e s s of r u l e a p p l i c a t i o n b e g i n s
anew.
Ward s e e s t h e r e l a t i v e c l a u s e a t a c e r t a i n s t a g e
(which he presumes t o be t h e a c t u a l moment i t i s u t t e r e d )
a s a n e n t i r- e s e n t e n c e with i t s own ~ r i n c i p a lo r c a p i t a l
o b j e c t ( t h e r e l a t i v e ) , i t s own c o a l e s c i n g v e r b , and t h e
r e l z t e d p a s s i v e form u n i t e d t o t h e o b j e c t of t h e v e r b
within the r e l a t i v e clause.
Noun s u b s t a n t i v e s , o r t h e i r
s u b s t i t u t e s ( t h e r e l a t i v e ~ r o n o u n s ) ,have independent
marks of e x i s t e n c e ; but when t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s complet e d a l l t h e independent conceptions a r e fused i n t o one
complex conception, and t h e n , t h e p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e
of t h i s complex conception i s lfdestroyed o r t r a n s f e r r e d f f
w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e whole sentence u n i t becomes an
a d j e c t i v a l o r v e r b a l p a r t of a l a r g e r u n i t , and t h e
p r o c e s s of s e n t e n c e formation begins a g a i n o Ward's anal y s i s of t h e r e l a t i v e l a c k s some of t h e p e r s p i c u i t y of
the discussions i n the A r tof Thinking of P o r t Royal,
*
1.
J e r r o l d J . Katz and Paul M. F o s t a l , An I n t e g r a t e d
Theor of L i n g u i s t i c D e s c r i p t i o n ( ~ a m b r i z e ,kiss. 1964),
PP. 4 FF.
but the lack of perspicuity'is more on account of style
than poverty of ideas.
Bard does not, however, make
the distinction between limiting and non-limiting relatives that Arnauld does.'
Ward's analysis takes into
account a large number of facts about the relative pronoun, and seeks to relate them to the philosophical
standpoint from which he is giving an account of language.
7.4.
Extraposition
Little attention has been given to the second
-.
half of Ward's Essay, the Practical Grammar; this is
because it very often merely restates the points made
in the Speculative Grammar or discusses usages in English,
ad hoc accounts of them.
and offers -
However, Ward does
turn his attention again in the Practical Grammar to the
sentential complements or content clauses that he had
discussed in the Speculative Grammar as if they were
relative clauses.
This time he does not confuse them with
relatives; in a Section entitled "Of whole sentences used
as substantives"* Ward recognizes that as a demonstrative,
which is historically correct, rather than as a
--
1. The Art of Thinkin-,op. cit., p. 124 and p. 118.
The terms U S Ior
~ TI
ese
? clauses are lrestrictiveland
lexplicative.l
2.
Ward, p. 488.
relative.
clause i n
'
Ward n o t only c o r r e c t l y d e s c r i b e s t h e that
I t i t
came t o pass a t t h e end of f o r t y days,
t h a t Noah opened t h e Window of t h e Ark," but a p p e a r s t o
r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e h a s been extraposed from i t s
subject position.
He d i s c u s s e s t h e phenomenon of e x t r a -
p o s i t i o n under t h e heading " O f t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of v e r b s
impersonal . l 1 2
He s a y s t h a t a l l v e r b s have s u b j e c t s , but
sometimes i t i s n o t convenient t o mention t h e s u b j e c t
b e f o r e t h e d e f i n i t i v e verb.
The f a c t t h a t Ward n o t e s
the,phenomenon a t a l l i s i n t e r e s t i n g ; d i s c u s s i o n of synt a x had been minimal i n p r e v i o u s grammars of E n g l i s h ,
1.
'!The s e n t e n t i a l o r c a u s a l demonstrative t h a t , when
p r e f i x e d t o a s e n t e n c e i s t o be considered a l l of i t tog e t h e r as one s u b s t a n t i v e i n some c a s e s . Thus i n ,
I t came t o p a s s a t t h e end of f o r t y days, t h a t
Noah opened t h e Window of t h e Ark.
(Old Testament)
'That Noah opened t h e Window of t h e Arkt d e n o t e s t h a t
which came t o p a s s , and t h e r e f o r e i s a kind of nominative
case.l1 (Ward, p. 488).
...
2. "1 have a l r e a d y shewed t h a t every v e r b d e f i n i t i v e
Nevertheless, i t i s
h a s r e l a t i o n t o some s u b j e c t
n o t convenient, i n a l l instances t o express t h i s subject
a t l a r g e b e f o r e t h e d e f i n i t i v e v e r b i s mentioned
...
I t i s h i g h l y l a u d a b l e t o pay r e s p e c t t o men
descended from worthy a n c e s t o r s . ( S p e c t a t o r ,
No. 6 1 2 )
i . e . ' t o pay r e s p e c t t o , &c. i s h i g h l y l a u d i b l e . '
It
i s l i k e w i s e used t o r e p r e s e n t what i s denoted by a f u l l
s e n t e n c e depending on t h a t i n t h e f o l l o w i n g p a r t of t h e
sentence.I1 (Ward, p. 492).
which had concentrated on'defining categories and discussing category membership.
Ward not only attempted
to deal with the significance of the basic constructions
in language, but was sufficiently observant to notice
the curious phenomenon of extraposition.
The reason
that Ward gives for the existence of such a feature,
that "it is not convenient
. . . to express this subject
. , . before the definitive verb," has nothing whatsoever
to do with the arrangemqnt of ideas in the mind, or thelr
relation; -it is only for the convenience of the speaker,
and is for the convenience of arranging the surface
structure.
This is presumably the reason why it only
merits a place for discussion in the Practical Grammar,
The 'there is' construction is similarly relegated to
the Practical Grammar, as it is a surface structure variation which does not affect deeper levels.'
All words of
a structural character "give noticell or information about
the linguistic system, Those discussed immediately above
-
(viz, the it replacing extraposed subjects and the unstressed there) give notice of changes in the superficial
word order, and could be called signals of optional
transformations that have taken place, Others, giving
1.
"There is only used to give notice that the nominative
case stand behind the verb, and therefore, is no more than
a notice concerning the structure of the words themselves."
(Ward, p. 492,)
n o t i c e of t h e arrangement b f i d e a s and t h e kind of
dependency r e l a t i o n s h i p , could be c a l l e d simals of
obligatory transformations.
I t i s of course a mistake
t o a t t e m p t t o s e e Wardls grammar through t h e f i l t e r i n g
l e n s e s of c u r r e n t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l t h e o r y ; t h e purpose
o f t h e s t u d y of t e x t s of t h e p a s t i s t o e l u c i d a t e what
t h e y a r e s a y i n g i n t h e i r own time r a t h e r t h a n measure
it against current theories.
A s s t a t e d i n t h e Introduc-
t i o n , t h e purpose of e l u c i d a t i o n i s p a r t l y t h a t c u r r e n t
t h e o r i e s may be measured a g a i n s t t h e o r i e s of t h e p a s t ,
-
r a t h e r than v i c e versa.
However, inasmuch as many of
t h e achievements of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l t h e o r y a r e t h e
f o r m a l i z a t i o n of p r e v i o u s i n s i g h t s about language, t h e
terminology o f t e n proves u s e f u l i n r e f e r r i n g , i n s h o r t hand form, t o phenomena t h a t have l o n g been recognized
by grammarians.
7.5.
A Note on P e r f o r m a t i v e s
I t would be a mistake t o b e l i e v e t h a t Wardls
a n a l y s i s of grammatical d e v i c e s i s thorough and c o h e r e n t ;
a n a t t e m p t h a s been made i n t h i s c h a p t e r t o p r e s e n t some
p o i n t s which Ward develops i n a r e a s o n a b l y coherent
fashion.
But t h e r e a r e many o t h e r phenomena t h a t Viard
a c c o u n t s f o r by s t a t i n g t h a t t h e y g i v e n o t i c e t h a t some
supposedly r e l a t e d form i s t o be understood.
Thus he
gives the unwary reader the feeling that all things are
being reduced to the utmost simplicity whereas in actual
fact Ward makes no real effort to come to terms with
many of the facts.
One particular instance of this
occurs in his discussion of imperatives and interrogatives.
His resolution of these forms, and his dependence on
Buffier for the suggestion have already been discussed
in Chapter I11
.'
It may be remarkably easy to say that
the structural markers of the interrogative signal a
particular locution, and the structural markers of the
-
imperative signal another; however, what Ward is really
doing is attempting to give a semantic analysis of a
syntactic feature; similar proposals are being made
today.*
Of particular interest is the fact that present-
day proposals and Ward's proposal both suggest that these
sentences consist of two sentences in the deep structure:
a performative and a proposition.
Ward is actually
discussing questions with interrogative pronouns, such
as "Who is that man?"; he says: #'Every question that is
asked by the help of one of these pronouns consists in
effect of two complete sentences, in each of which one
and the same object is concerned.
1.
The one of these
Cf. Para. 4.1.3.3.
2. J. Boyd and J. P. Thorne, "The Deep Grammar of Modal
Verbs," Journal of Lintyuisti.cs,V ( 1 9 6 9 ) ~57-74.
sentences shows what the question is about; and the other
signifies the desire or intention of the speaker to receive information concerning that which the question is
about."'
The first of Ward's sentences is the 'proposi-
tion,' and the second is the 'performativet in Boyd and
Thorne's terminology.
In their article '#TheDeep Grammar
of Modal Verbs," they only discuss imperatives, They
suggest that the imperative sentence "You will go," and
its paraphrases (tlGo,u
''1 order you to gow) have identical deep structures made up of two, not one, sentential
elements, the first carrying the illocutionary potential
of the sentence, the second what might be termed its
lpropositionalcontent.
That is, something roughly
like:
Ward's discussion is of interest because similar discussions are currently being hailed as new analyses
( ~ o y dand Thorne claim that they are proposing a new
analysis of modals;) but Ward does not attempt to integrate the fact that there are two sentences here with
1.
Ward, p. 148.
2, Boyd and Thorne, op. cit., p. 59.
w i t h h i s t h e o r i e s about i d e a s i n t h e mind.
There would
perhaps be some d i f f i c u l t y i n having i d e a s s i g n i f i e d by
a performative sentence.
I n any e v e n t , t h i s d i s c u s s i o n
of modals i s n o t p a r t of l a r d ' s a n a l y s i s of language i n
Lockean terms; i t i s an i d e a t h a t he had o b t a i n e d from
B u f f i e r and which i s mentioned here f o r i t s own v a l u e
r a t h e r t h a n as p a r t of h i s o v e r a l l scheme t o r e l a t e t h e
grammatical c a t e g o r i e s of language t o L o c k e t s t h e o r y of
ideas.
Chapter Vlii
The Essay on Grammar in the Eighteenth and the
Twentieth Centuries
8.0.
Introduction
8,i.
8.1.1.
Eighteenth Century Views on Ward
Eighteenth Century Interest in Universal Grammar
8.2.
8.2,1.
Ward and the Twentieth Centu
Categorical Grammars
8.3.
Conclusion: Ward and Locke
*
-
I
CHAPTER VIII
THE ESSAY ON GHNi'DiIAR I N THE EIGHTEENTH AND
TWENTIETH CENTURIES
8.0.
Introduction
William Kard s theory of language had little in-
fluence among his contemporaries; this does not mean
that it is historically unimportant.
In terms of trends
and influences it may not be significant, but in terms of
its relation to present-day linguistics it has much to
offer for consideration. Linguistic theories of the
past are interesting to the antiquarian because they
belong to the past; but to linguistic scientists they
are interesting either because they are the sources of
the present or because they have interesting parallels
with current concerns.
Ward's theory is interesting to
the historian (and not just to the antiquarian) because
of the extensive use he made of Locke8sphilosophy in
his grammatical theory.
It cannot be claimed that his
theory is the source of any present-day approaches to
linguistics, because his influence on the history of
linguistics is negligible.
I
However, his interests do
have important parallels with linguistic trends of the
current decade, and these will be the concern of this
265
,
chapter,
A s l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n h a s s o f a r been given t o
contemporary r e a c t i o n t o Ward's work, t h i s w i l l f i r s t
be c o n s i d e r e d .
8.1.
F i g h t e e n t h Century Views on Ward
I t i s only i n r e t r o s p e c t t h a t Ward can be considered
t o have e n l a r g e d t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y concept of gram-
mar.
H i s contemporaries a p p e a r t o have been b l i n d t o
t h e t a s k t h a t Ward had s e t h i m s e l f , and h i s reviewers
i n both t h e Konthly ~ e v i e w ' and t h e C r i t i c a l Review 2
had few words of p r a i s e f o r h i s endeavour.
The l a t t e r
j o u r n a l i s almost wholely condemnatory of Ward's a t t e m p t ,
b u t t h i s i s because t h e only r e a s o n t h a t t h e reviewer
s e e s f o r t h e s t u d y of grammar i s t h a t i t might e n a b l e
one t o l e a r n b e t t e r t h e p r a c t i c a l a r t of w r i t i n g ; i n
f a c t he n e g a t e s h i s own p o i n t by a l s o observing t h a t
t h e connection between l e a r n i n g grammar and w r i t i n g w e l l
i s illusory.3
He q u o t e s e x t e n s i v e l y from what a r e
...
2.
'!An Essay on Grammar . . . by W i l l i a m Ward,"
r e v . ) C r i t i c a l Review, X I X (1765), 199-203.
1.
"An Essay on Grammar
by William Ward," (anon.
r e v . ) llonthly Heview, XXXII ( 1 7 6 5 ) , 289-293.
3. "Upon enquiry i t w i l l perhaps be
p u r e s t and b e s t s p e a k e r s , a s w e l l as
t i m e s when no grammar of t h e E n g l i s h
o r i f t h e r e w a s one, t h a t they never
( P . 199).
(anon.
found, t h a t o u r
writers, lived i n
tongue e x i s t e d ;
consulted it."
c o n s i d e r e d t o be important' passages of t h e S p e c u l a t i v e
Grammar i n o r d e r t o show t h e i r l a c k of r e l e v a n c e t o
practical rules.
The Monthly Review i s much more sympathetic t o
Ward's endeavours, but p o i n t s t h a t Harris' Hermes and
Lowth's S h o r t I n t r o d u c t i o n a r e s u p e r i o r t o t h e S p e c u l a t i v e
G r a m m a r and F r a c t i c a l Grammar r e s p e c t i v e l y .
There i s no
doubt t h a t Harris' work i s much more r e a d a b l e t h a n Ward's,
b u t t h e revievier does n o t seem t o be aware t h a t Ward i s
4
-
t r y i n g t o do v e r y d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s from Harris.
The
l a t t e r ' s u n i v e r s a l s i n language were s u r f a c e gramrnatica\l
c a t e g o r i e s and l e x i c a l u n i v e r s a l s ; Ward's were concerned
w i t h t h e n a t u r e of i d e a s and t h e r u l e s t h a t u n i t e i d e a s
t o each o t h e r .
The Monthly Review t a k e s i s s u e w i t h Ward's
d e f i n i t i o n s and s a y s t h a t t h e y a r e e n i g m a t i c a l because
they a r e "just."
T h i s comment r e v e a l s an i n t e r e s t i n g
f a c e t of t h e a t t i t u d e s i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y towards
grammatical d e f i n i t i o n .
Ward's d e f i n i t i o n a r e s a i d t o
be bad because t h e y a r e i n c l u s i v e . '
S i m p l i c i t y and
c l e a r n e s s rank above c o r r e c t n e s s f o r t h e reviewer, and
i t would n o t seem u n l i k e l y t h a t t h i s w a s a g e n e r a l a t t i -
tude.
Twentieth c e n t u r y grammarians b e r a t e and c r i t i c i z e
1.
"This w i l l e v e r be t h e c a s e , a l s o , when a w r i t e r ,
i n d e f i n i n g a term, i s s o l i c i t o u s t o i n c l u d e every c i r cumstance t h a t r e l a t e s t o t h e o b j e c t o r a t t r i b u t e
specified."
( p . 290).
eighteenth century grammapians for the inaccuracy and
incompleteness of their definitions without realizing
that they did not perhaps intend to create complete
definitions, but were rather giving useful or mnemonic
descriptions.
On these grounds Ward's attempt at fuller
definition results in criticism; however, the reviewer
is disturbed not only by the difficulty of the definitions themselves but by the extremely incomprehensible
general style of Ward's writing.
Vjhile admitting the
"true philosophic principlesw that Ward has worked from,
the reviewer suggests that 'Imost people will rather
choose to remain ignorant all their lives, than engage
in so laborious a task as that of pursuing the same
pathM as Ward.
It is significant of the reviewer's field of interest that after making his justified comments on Ward's
tortuous style, and his interesting comments on the
function of definition, the reviewer goes on to discuss
Ward's very short section on phonology and his section
on metre1 rather than comment on the much more significant
I
1. The reviewer objects to Ward's use of the classical
metre, indicating that there did not exist a general
acceptance of classical metrics in the eighteenth century:
Mr Ward is also one of those classical theorists,
who would reduce the numbers and measures of English
a s p e c t s of t h e ~ p e c u l a t i v kGrammar t h a t t h i s t h e s i s has
attempted t o d i s c u s s .
I t seems t h a t what modern l i n g u i s t s
s e e as important were n o t n e c e s s a r i l y important i n t h e
e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y ; indeed even H a r r i s 1 Hermes o f t e n
seems t o have been p r a i s e d r a t h e r than used.
i
The mood
o f e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y England w a s n o t ready f o r speculat i o n s on u n i v e r s a l grammar of s o s o p h i s t i c a t e d a form.
The f a c t t h a t Home Tooke w a s t o c a p t u r e t h e minds of
t h e r e a d i n g p u b l i c so s h o r t l y a f t e r w a r d s i s i t s e l f evidence of a n absence of any deep e n q u i r i n g i n t e r e s t i n
language a t t h i s p e r i o d i n England.
8 . 1 .
E i g h t e e n t h Century I n t e r e s t i n U n i v e r s a l Grammar
There w a s a l a c k of i n t e r e s t i n Ward'sy -E
on
-
Grammar because he w a s a t t e m p t i n g t o g i v e a n account o f
language t h a t was more f a r - r e a c h i n g t h a n t h e average
e d u c a t o r f e l t was n e c e s s a r y .
I n t e r e s t i n language t h a t
went beyond t h e s u p e r f i c i a l forms of language was genera l l y known a s l l u n i v e r s a l grammar1t; Harris w a s considered
v e r s e , t o t h e s t a n d a r d s of t h e a n c i e n t s ;
but t h e l e a r n e d have s o l o n g i n v a i n attempted t o s h a c k l e modern p o e t r y w i t h t h e
f e t t e r s of Iambics, Trochees, D a c t y l s and
Anapests, t h a t t h e p o i n t i s now g i v e n
by almost every r e a d e r of t a s t e .
...
1 . Robert Lowth, f o r example, p r a i s e s Hermes
and d i s m i s s e s U n i v e r s a l Grammar i n t h e same s e n t e n c e . ( L O W ~
op. c i t . , p. x i ) .
~ ,
by t h e Monthly Heview wri'ter t o be t h e b e s t r e c e n t exponent of u n i v e r s a l grammar; however, t h e r e were s e v e r a l
o t h e r people who claimed t o t r e a t of u n i v e r s a l grammar
o r who have some claim t o be compared w i t h Ward i n t h e
i n v e s t i g a t i o n of a b s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e s .
A s e a r l y as 1695
A . Lane had attempted t o d e a l w i t h ttsuch p r e c e p t s as
-
a r e common t o a l l languagestf1 i n h i s R a t i o c a l and Speedy
--
-
Method of A t t a i n i n g t o t h e L a t i n Tongue.
L a n e t s grammar
i s c h i e f l y i n t e r e s t i n g because i t i s an e a r l y a t t e m p t t o
a p p l y t h e - V a r r o n i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of t h e p a r t s of speech
t o t h e E n g l i s h language;2 a l t h o u g h Lane's a t t e m p t a t
f o r m u l a t i n g u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e s was muddled and i n d i rect,'
h i s conception of t h e i r e x i s t e n c e w a s unambiguous;
he speaks of " t h e u n a l t e r a b l e r u l e s of r i g h t r e a s o n ,
which a r e t h e same i n a l l languages how d i f f e r e n t s o e v e r
they beett4
I n 1726 J. T. P h i l i p p s p r e f i x e d a u n i v e r s a l
-
grammar t o an e d i t i o n of James S h i r l e y ' s L a t i n G r a m m a r ,
-
-
and c a l l e d t h e whole book a U n i v e r s a l and R a t i o n a l G r a m -
-
-
m
a r : t o g e t h e r w i t h Rules f o r Learning -9L a t i n
.__
i n English
-
-
1 . A . Lane, A R a t i o n a l and S eed Nethod of A t t a i n i n g
t o t h e L a t i n Tongue, 1 6 9 r t l t e page.
--
9iL
2 . Varro had maintained t h a t t h e r e were f o u r , n o t e i g h t ,
p a r t s of speech. C f . Para. 1,2.1,
3.
See Michael, op. c i t . , p.
4.
Lane, op. c i t .
186.
Verse; however, this, in common with several other attempts at investigating general principles was indistinguishable from a basic grammar.1
The most interesting
universal grammar to appear before Hermes was Benjamin
Martin's essay which formed a preface to his dictionary.
The dictionary was known as the Institutes of Language:
containing a Physical-Grammatical Essay -on the Propriety
and Rational -of the English Tongue; Michael describes
it as "the most thoughtful consideration of Universal
grammar since
Wilkins, though on quite different lines
>
and poorly organizedetl2 It was an investigation of
linguistic change rather than a logical analysis of
language.
James Harrisq Hermes was the first extended
treatment of universal grammar or general principles of
language in English; as has already been mentioned, it
is a far more readable work than Ward's.
Ward's Essay
is not able to match the breadth of learning that Harris8
work possesses; the Essay is interesting and a valuable
record of eighteenth century linguistics because it
extended the field of analysis of general principles
or universal grammar beyond the area treated by Harris;
1.
1
See Michael, op. cit., p. 187.
2. Ibid., p. 187. Wilkins and other creators of universal languages have not been considered here because they
were not strictly writing grammars and they were far
removed in time from Ward's Essay.
Ward was concerned with the deep structure of language
as well as the surface categories that Harris treats.
Ward's interest in levels of language below the surface
parallels the continental interest in these areas, but
little of it was borrowed from the French grammarians.
It was Ward's interest in Locketsphilosophy that had
enabled him to extend his analysis in new ways and propose an altogether new basis for the parts of speech.
After-1751 there are numerous works which deal
with the theory of lariguage, and which tend to supersede
the interest in universal grammar, as this is generally
understood. Most of them have a scope of investigation
beyond the narrowly grammatical, and pertain to the
philosophy of language rather than the study of linguistics; three works in the latter half of the century
should be mentioned; these are Joseph Priestley's lectures
On the
-
Theory of Language or Universal Grammar, delivered
and published at Warrington in 1762, James Beattie1s
of Language (1783), and Charles CootelsElements
of the Grammar of the English Language (1788). Priestleyls
Theory
lectures are of interest because they deal with the parts
of speech in psychological terms.'
Ivan Poldauf2 sug-
gests that Priestley's theory is influenced by Hartleyts
psychology, and that his grammatical categories are
founded on Lockets distinction between names and particles.
It appears that although Priestley was using
the same sources as Ward, his theory and his conclusions
are very different.
There is no evidence to suggest that
Kard was aware of Priestley's lectures.
of Language discusses in its
James Beattie's Theory first part "the origin and general nature of speech,"
and in the second, universal grammar, which is defined
1.
He says that their aim is:
...
to point out the several powers and modes
of expression that sounds and characters are capable of, to trace their connexion with, or relation to the ideas they represent; and to show the
actual variety of the external expressions of the
same mental conce~tionswhich different lanmages
exhibit. ( ~ o s e ~Priestley,
-On the Theory of
hL a . a e or Universal Grammar, Warrington, 1 7 6 2 ,
- -
-* ,
2. Ivan Poldauf and Ian Michael are the sources of information of all comments on Priestley; it was hoped that
he could have been considered in much greater detail;
however, it was not possible to locate a copy of the Lectures. Poldauf says of Priestley:
In his general attitude towards language, Priestley
follows the lines of his materialist philosophy and
David Hartley's psychology of associations. His
chief concern is the origin and development of
lankpage in their relation to the social and cultural atmosphere of the single stages of the growth
language, which itself is determined so that it
is useless to try to change it by supposed authority. (~oldauf,op. cit., p. 138).
I
as Ifthosethings, that all languages have in c ~ m m o n . ~
Beattie's treatment of universal grammar is like that
of most of his predecessors: it is a grammar of English
with reference to Latin, Greek, and Hebrew.
His book
is interesting, but not from the point of view of general principles.
Charles Coote quotes Locke to support his opinion
that knowledge of universal grammar is important for
investigating the philosophy of thehunan mind; his
--
treatment of universal grammar, however, is but the
introduction to his grammar of English; it follows
Harrist schema of the parts of speech, while showing
the same interest as Ward in speech as a process of
communication.
This short survey suggests that although in some
sense Ward's Essay is a natural development from the
English grammatical tradition,' it was undoubtedly
unique in the eighteenth century in the scope of its
investigation of general principles.
8.2.
Ward and the Twentieth Century
In the course of the preceding chapters reference
1.
Cf. Para. 2.5.6.
has been made on several occasions to present-day views
on l a n ~ ~ a gand
e lineistics that have parallels in Ward Is
Essay.
These parallels are interesting because they
suggest a continuing effort to come to terms with certain problems and serve as a reminder that much of the
work of present-day linguistic science consists in the
reformulation of linguistic facts in contemporary terms
rather than in their actual discovery.
Examples of this
include the notion of extraposition, the psychological
relation of substantive and adjective, I and the equation
*
-
of adjective and verb in the deep structure.2
It was suggested in the Introduction that Ward's
theory of grammar has much in common with modern theories
which see the base component of language structure as
semantically differentiated units.
The most common
present-day view of grammatical theory is still that of
of the Theory of Syntax ( 1 9 6 5 ) , which
Chomsky in Aspects sees the set of phrase structure rules as the starting
point in sentence generation; they produce a syntactic
A n adjective becomes a substantive throuch the pro1.
cess of focussing. Cf. Para. 6.2.3. where Ward's analysis is compared to Jespersenls.
2. This was not part of Ward's final theory, but was
part of his initial suppositions, and was recognized in
Buffierlsgrammar, from which he borrowed a good deal.
3. Especially those of George Lakoff, John Ross, and
Emmon Bach.
string which is then
with a semantic interpre-
tation, as illustrated below.
Semantics in Chomsky's Model
r
*
Phrase Structure +Deep S t r u c t u r c + T r a n s f o r m a t i o n 9 PhonoHule s
Representation
Ilule s
logical
-
.
2
i
Semantics
J
Phonetic
L
Even from a superficial point of view such a model seems
undesirable because the role of semantics appears marginal rather than central. l
It is intuitively obvious
that semantics should have a central role in sentence
generation.
James McCawley shows that the.syntactic
selection rules, part of the phrase structure rules, are
completely unnecessary and argues that semantic selection
restriction must operate in the base component in order
to produce a deep structure which is adequate for the
functioning of the transformational rules. 2
1. This is perhaps the result of the development of
Chomsky's theory from a series of structural theories
of language, which were not intended to deal with
meaning.
2. James McCawley, "The Eole of Semantics in Grarnmar,l1
in Universal in Lin yuistic Theor , e&. Ehmon Bach and
Ilobert T . H~~G,'-&GTS?,TRJ~, 124-169, but especially 233 ff.
Such a view is held
by Ward who declares that the
starting point of linguistic theory is not grammatical
categories (e.g. nouns and verbs), but ideas or conceptions (i.e. bundles of semantic features) which become
grammatically differentiated for the purpose of entering
into syntactic construction.'
Such a view makes seman-
tics a central part of the theory of language in a way
that it can never be in Chomskyts theory (cf, diagram
above).
Ward goes further than McCawley, however, and
sees seman%ics as relevant not only to the very first
stage of sentence generation, in terms of rules, but as
functioning before the semantic features are attached
to specific grammatical categories.
This can be compared to Emmon Bachls proposal2 that
nouns, verbs, and adjectives are variations of one more
general category
1.
.'
Bachtsview is suggested by a
Cf. Chapter VI.
2. Emmon Bach, "Nouns and Noun Phrases, in Universals
in Linguistic Theor , ed. Emmon Bach and Robert T. Harms
m e w York, 1 9 6 ~ - 1 2 4 .
I
3. "If this third hypothesis [that the actual rules of
the base are the same for every language] is correct,
then it cannot be the case that Nootka, Japanese, and
English,for example, differ in having one, two, and
three major lexical categories, respectively. George
Lakoff and Paul Postal have argued that the classes
of adjectives and verbs in English are in actuality
merely two sub-classes of one lexical category, thus
making English look more like Japanese. Traditional
comparison of Nootka and ' E n g l i s h and i s s u p p o r t e d by
t h e f a c t s t h a t 1) i n g e n e r a l , t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l r u l e s
work on t h e element NP r a t h e r t h a n on t h e c a t e g o r y Noun,
2 ) Chomsky's c l a i m t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e between nouns on
t h e one hand and v e r b s and a d j e c t i v e s i s r e f l e c t e d i n
t h e i r behaviour w i t h r e s p e c t t o s e l e c t i o n r u l e s i s f a l s e ,
3 ) phonological r u l e s of E n g l i s h r e q u i r e t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a c l a s s , c o n s i s t i n g p r e c i s e l y of nouns, a d j e c t i v e s ,
and v e r b s , and
4) a c t i v e and s t a t i v e a r e c a t e g o r i e s of
t h e noun as w e l l as of v e r b s and a d j e c t i v e s ( c f . ItDon't
be a f o o l f t and IfDon1t.bea m a m m a l t 1 ) ' Bach's proposal i s
p a r t of h i s argument t h a t i n d i v i d u a l v e r b s , nouns, and
a d j e c t i v e s a r e a l l d e r i v e d from r e l a t i v e c l a u s e s ; i t
h a s n o t been j u s t i f i e d i n d e t a i l , o r even demonstrated
i n d e t a i l , b u t o f f e r s extremely i n t e r e s t i n g a r e a s of investigation.
The c a t e g o r i e s of t h e base component i n c l u d e
t e r m ' (which Bach s a y s i s more o r l e s s a n N P and 'contentive.
The c o n t e n t i v e s c o n s i s t of grammatically
l 2
Indo-European grammar, on t h e o t h e r hand, h a s g e n e r a l l y
lumped t o g e t h e r nouns and a d j e c t i v e s ( l a r g e l y , t o be
s u r e , because of morphological c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ) . I
shall
p r e s e n t some arguments which seem t o me t o
i n d i c a t e t h a t a l l t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s a r e r e p r e s e n t e d by
one i n t h e base c ~ m p o n e n t . ~ ' (Bah, op. c i t , , pp. 114115).
...
1.
See Bach, op. c i t . , pp. 116-117.
2.
Ibid.,
p. 91.
undifferentiated bundles of semantic features which are
attached to the terms or indices in a relative clause
matrix.
1tules of ordering and transformation determine
the surface categories of noun, verb and adjective,
Bachls conclusions, although tentative, are based
on the facts of English and Nootka.
If his position
turns out to be tenable, it will have far-reaching implications; Bach suggests that these will include the
realization that "the actual rules of the base are the
same for every language,I1 which will constitute Itadirect
denial of the Humboldt-Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in its
strongest form.l1l The implications for the history of'
linguistics are even greater: the apparently fundamental
categories of linguistic description from the beginnings
of the Western grammatical tradition until later than
1965 have in fact only been surface categories, suggested
by the forms of Greek and other Indo-European tongues,
Although this has in part been recognized by the identification in some cases of substantives and adjectives,
and in others of adjectives and verbs, the aspects common
to all three categories has completely escaped the notice
of all grammarians except William Ward, who proclaimed
1.
Op. cit., p. 122.
.
t h a t a l l t h r e e c a t e g o r i e & a r e more a l i k e t h a n d i f f e r e n t . 1
The h i s t o r y of l i n g u i s t i c s , t h e n , i s almost t o t a l l y
t h e h i s t o r y of a s c i e n c e which h a s been u n a b l e t o s e e
beyond c e r t a i n supposedly fundamental u n i t s , because t h e s e
u n i t s had been r e i f i e d and hallowed by t h e t r a d i t i o n .
Viilliam Ward's r e c o g n i t i o n of u n d e r l y i n g u n i t i e s i n t h e
f i r s t book of h i s Essay i s a s i g n i f i c a n t bredsthrough i n
t h e t r a d i t i o n a l t h i n k i n g about language.
The i d e a o r
c o n c e p t i o n i s t h e s o u r c e of u n i t y of t h e t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s
a t a s p e c i f- i c s t a g e of t h e communicative a c t of speech;
>
however, when s u b s t a n t i v e s , a d j e c t i v e s and v e r b s a r e
1.
A r i s t o t l e , though h a r d l y a grammarian, had n o t e d t h a t
t h e only d i f f e r e n c e between onoma and rhema w a s t h a t t h e
l a t t e r had time r e f e r e n c e as w e l l ( s e e Para. 1.1.3.).
George Dalgarno, i n h i s A r s Signorum (1661) had recognized
o n l y one p a r t of speech: "Ego v e r o
unicam tantum
O r a t i o n i s partem, P r i m a r i m , e t p r o p r i e s i c dictam agnosc o ; Nomen s c i l . C a e t e r a s v e r o vulgo s i c h a b i t a s e s s e
i n t e r F l e x i o n e s , e t Casus hu j u s numerandas, (p. 63).
The v e r b was c o n s i d e r e d t o be a name, j u s t as t h e noun.
Apart from t h e i m p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of such a scheme, i t i s
n o t t h e same kind of p r o p o s a l as Ward's and B a c h l s ,
Thomas Gunter Browne i n ~ e r m e sUnmasked; o r t h e a r t o f
S eech Founded on t h e A s s o c i a t i o n of Words and I d e a s
a t t e m p t e T t 1 r s h e wt h a t t h e r e
S l i t v but
one s o r t of word, and t h a t t h e r e i s no d i s t i n c t i o k o r i ( p , 3 ) . T h i s seems
g i n a l l y between t h e noun and verb.'!
a more i n t e r e s t i n g p r o p o s a l , p a r t i c u l a r l y as t l i c h a e l sugg e s t s t h a t " h i s argument i s d e r i v e d from an incomplete
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of
H a r t l e y e 1 I ( ~ i c h a e l ,p. 286).
However, i t h a s n o t been p o s s i b l e t o c o n s u l t Browne's
work a t f i r s t hand. I t i s n o t l i k e l y t h a t h i s proposal
i s as c a r e f u l l y worked out as i s Ward's,
Ward s a y s , a t t h e beginning of h i s d i s c u s s i o n of
grammar: "1 s h a l l t h e r e f o r e proceed t o g i v e a g e n e r a l
view of both of t h e s e p a r t s of speech t o g e t h e r , i n o r d e r
t o account f o r some &enera1 p r o p e r t i e s i n which t h e v e r b
(P. 11).
a p p e a r s t o a g r e e w i t h t h e noun."
-
...
----
h
...
I
2.
Represented by l e v e l 3 i n t h e diagram i n P a r a , 7.1.1.
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by t h e foc;ssine
p r o c e s s of t h e mind,
1
t h e i r d i s t i n ~ p i s h i n gf e a t u r e s and t h e p r i o r i t y g i v e n
t o t h e s u b s t a n t i v e s u g g e s t comparisons w i t h o t h e r prop o s a l s concerning t h e p a r t s of speech.
2
Categorial G r a m m a r s
8.2.1.
W a r d ' s grammar emphasizes t h e fundamental importance
o f t h e noun s u b s t a n t i v e as a s e n t e n c e c o n s t i t u e n t on which
a l l o t h e r s depend.
view of t h e noun.
C a t e g o r i a l grammars have a similar
These grammars, l a r g e l y developed by
l o g i c i a n s , 3 have two fundamental c a t e g o r i e s :
'sentence
and ' n o u n ' ; a l l o t h e r c a t e g o r i e s a r e d e r i v e d from t h e s e ,
and t h e i r n o t a t i o n i n d i c a t e s t h e i r c o m b i n a t o r i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i t h o t h e r elements.
Thus t h e s e n t e n c e "John
-
r u n s u i s denoted by In. S t . The meaning of ' St is that
n
n
In' i n
when t h i s i s combined w i t h a noun (hence t h e
t h e denominator p o s i t i o n ) t h e y w i l l t o g e t h e r form a
1.
Expressed i n r u l e s 1 and 2 i n P a r a . 6.3.
2. E s p e c i a l l y t h o s e of John Lyons and Bar-Hillel.
C f . John Lyons, "Towards a ' n o t i o n a l ' t h e o r y of t h e
' p a r t s of speech,'I1 J o u r n a l of Lin u i s t i c s , I1 (1966),
209-236, and Yehoshua Bar-Hine*-Mathematical
N o t a t i o n f o r S y n t a c t i c ~ e s c r i ~ t i o'In ~, a n & u a . ~XeI,X ( 1953),
47-58.
3. K a s i n i e r z Ajukiewicz, a P o l i s h l o g i c i a n produced a
s e m i n a l a r t i c l e on t h e s u b j e c t of c a t e c o r i a l grammars
i n 1935 : "Die S y n t a k t i s c h e Konnexitat ," S t u d i a P h i l o s o h i c a
(Ylarszawa), Vol. I ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 1-20.
J . Lamm.&
and J , Tlyons have a l s o pursued t h e s u b j e c t , The n o t a t i o n
u s e d i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n i s t h a t of Lyons, but t h e r e i s
l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e between t h i s and o t h e r s .
s e n t e n c e ( i n d i c a t e d by t h e ' S t i n t h e numerator p o s i t i o n ) .
The s e n t e n c e could be expanded w i t h a n a d j e c t i v e and adverb:
Poor
n- .
n
John
n.
ran
-s
n
away
-
S
n
By c a n c e l l a t i o n t h e s e elements can u l t i m a t e l y be reduced
t o - t h e s i n g l e S.
However, t h e o r d e r of c a n c e l l a t i o n
must be r e s t r i c t e d i n o r d e r t o complete t h e p r o c e s s
without r e s i d u e .
The c o r r e c t o r d e r of c a n c e l l a t i o n w i l l
r e f l e c t t h e o r d e r of dependency of t h e elements.
The
proposed advantages of t h e c a t e g o r i a l a n a l y s i s of s e n t e n c e
types r a t h e r than the rewrite r u l e analysis i s t h a t t h e
c a t e g o r i a l a n a l y s i s h a s t o make c l e a r t h e dependency of
one c a t e g o r y on a n o t h e r .
The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e compa-
r i s o n of Ward's system t o c a t e g o r i a l grammars i s t h a t
t h e n o t i o n of dependency i s i n h e r e n t i n Ward's system:
a l l o t h e r words o r c a t e g o r i e s a r e u l t i m a t e l y dependent
on t h e noun s u b s t a n t i v e i n t h e l a t e r s t a g e s of h i s gramm a r , a l t h o u g h he had e a r l i e r a s s e r t e d t h e e s s e n t i a l
s i m i l a r i t y of s u b s t a n t i v e s , a d j e c t i v e s , and v e r b s .
John Lyons d r a w s a t t e n t i o n t o a supposed inadequacy
of c a t e g o r i a l grammars: "A c a t e g o r i a l grammar w i l l i d e n t i f y
'adjectives' and 'intransitive verbs' as members of
the same major category (e.g. beautiful and dances in
such sentences as 'Nary is beautiful' and 'Mary dances'),
but will fail to relate 'transitive verbs' and 'intran-
'
sitive verbs, ' "
Thus dances and is beautiful may be
kick will have
signified by ' S- t , while a verb such as n
the representation IS'
Ward's analysis circumvents
n n
.
this difficulty because he sees the presence of a transitive verb as a signal of two distinct sentences, Thus
-
"John kicks the ball"'is composed of '!John kicks" and
n.
-S
n
"The ball is kicked."
n.
-S
n
The representation given .to "John
walks1'would be exactly the same.
Categorial analysis
fits Ward's scheme suitably because it formalizes his
views of dependency and adequately reflects his view
of the relation between transitive and intransitive
sentences.
Let us consider an analysis in Ward's terms of the
sentence "Poor John, who is holding James, kicked the
horse. 'I
[
1.
A categorial analysis of t'who is holding JamesM
-
John Lyons, A n Introduction to Theoretical Lingyistics,
\P* 330.
2.
This sentence, although not Ward's has been chosen
because it exhibits those features which have had a
central part in the discussion of Ward's syntax,
g i v e s i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e 'two simple s e n t e n c e s : "who h o l d s ~ ~
n. S
n
and "James i s h e l d n ; however, a f t e r t h e s e n t e n c e h a s
n.
-S
n
been u t t e r e d , t h e r e l a t i v e pronoun, a c c o r d i n g t o Ward,
g i v e s n o t i c e t h a t no independently e x i s t i n g conception
i s denoted by i t , t h a t i t e x p r e s s e s an o b j e c t only through
i t s l i n k w i t h i t s a n t e c e d e n t , and t h a t t h e c l a u s e a t t a c h e d
t o t h e pronoun i s n o t a sentence'
t h e capital-object.
but a m o d i f i c a t i o n of
Rhen t h i s n o t i c e i s g i v e n t h e s t a t u s
of t h e r e l a t i v e changes from t h a t of an In' t o a u n i t which
combines w i t h a s u b s t a n t i v e t o i n d i c a t e t h e conception
o f t h a t s u b s t z n t i v e , t h a t i s n.
n
The v e r b h o l d s j o i n s
w i t h t h i s r e l a t i v e t o form a m o d i f i c a t i o n of i t , and so
w i l l be denoted by
n
-.
n
n.
g.
n
n-.
n
n.
n
V o o r John who holdslV becomes:
There does n o t , however, seem any r e a s o n
f o r demoting t h e second p a r t of t h e r e l a t i v e c l a u s e from
i t s s e n t e n c e s t a t u s , because t h i s i s , i n f a c t , a s e n t e n c e ,
...
...
1.
NO^
e x p r e s s i n g complete t r u t h o r falsehood
b u t as a n e x p r e s s i o n of t h e same o b j e c t which t h e r e l a t i v e
( w a r d , p. 1 3 4 ) .
represents."
c o m p l e t e l y independent o f +t h e r e l a t i v e pronoun:
held."
"James i s
Kicked, t h e d e f i n i t i v e v e r b , combines w i t h t h e
-
c o n c e p t i o n denoted by John t o form a s e n t e n c e , and i s
given the notation
-
S.
n
Finally, there i s a t h i r d in-
dependent s e n t e n c e : "The h o r s e i s kicked.
The a n a l y s i s
of t h e t h r e e s e n t e n c e s i s as f o l l o w s :
Poor John who i s h o l d i n g
--
kicked.
I
James i s h e l d .
I
The h o r s e w a s kicked.!
A f t e r t h e f i r s t s e r i e s o f c a n c e l l a t i o n s , t h e s e become:
then:
and f i n a l l y :
The a n a l y s i s l i n k s every element of t h e sentence d i r e c t l y
t o t h e c o n s t i t u e n t noun o r s u b s t a n t i v e , and ensures t h a t
t h e f i n a l c a n c e l l a t i o n i s between t h e noun s u b s t a n t i v e ,
o r t h e phrase r e p r e s e n t i n g i t , and t h e v e r b d e f i n i t i v e .
I t g i v e s a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t o verbs i n subordinate c l a u s e s
which i s d i s t i n c t from t h a t of those i n t h e p r i n c i p a l
c l a u s e , but t h i s i s because they a r e d i f f e r e n t : t h e
r e l a t i v e pronoun has given n o t i c e of t h i s f a c t .
.
The d i s p u t a b l e p a r t of Ward's a n a l y s i s s t i l l remains,
t h a t i t makes of t h e o r i g i n a l sentence t h r e e d i s t i n c t
sentences,
This has no equivalent i n modern theory; i t
was suggested t o Ward by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e a r e t h r e e
d i s t i n c t i d e a s i n t h e mind ; t h e i d e a of John, t h e i d e a
James, and t h e i d e a of t h e horse.
,
However, t h e strange-
n e s s o f t h i s a n a l y s i s may be moreapparent than r e a l :
t h e r e i s l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e statement t h a t
t h e r e a r e two terms i n t h e mind r e l a t e d t o a v e r b by
I
d i s t i q c t c a s e r e l a t i o n s and t h e statement t h a t t h e r e a r e
two nouns which each have s e p a r a t e but i d e n t i c a l v e r b
forms a t t a c h e d t o them.
Much of the unreality of Ward's theory for the
modern reader comes from the fact that he was forever
reifying his categories whereas modern grammarians have
a highly abstract interpretation of the units of linguistics: units in the deep structure obviously exist
in some sense, but the problem of how they exist has not
been the subject of discussion.
It was stated above that
the difference between Ward's unusual approach to the
transitive sentence type and contemporary approaches may
be more apparent than real.
This implies that the cate-
gorial analysis of his grammatical theory is of some
importance: it suggests that the selection of the main
categories of a categorial grammar is a direct reflection
of the notional importance attached to the categories of
the theorists.
This importance is madeclear by Ward,
but does not seem to be noticed by some proponents of
the theory.
Bar-Hillel claims that the notation repre-
sents only a way of presenting an analysis already made;1
however, it would appear that a choice of major categories must be linked with certain theoretical presuppositions.
Ward's Essay makes clear the implications of the
choice of these categories, as does to a certain extent,
John Lyons' discussion "Towards a 'notional' definition
of the parts of speech.''*
The work on categorial grammars
1.
Bar-Hillel, op. cit., p. 47.
2.
See Note 31.
is not sufficiently developed to have produced much
discussion on the implications of the choice of the noun
as the major category, but several linguists feel that
this may be a universal category of language.
Ward's
arrival at this same conclusion by means of a consideration of Locke's philosophy indicates that the findings
of linguists working from different philosophical standpoints will not necessarily be different, but only that
the mode of explanation will be different.
-.
8.3,
Conclusion: Ward and Locke
Vardts central achievement can be considered to b8
his adaptation of Locketstheory of ideas to a grammatical theory of language.
Ward was not a professional
on Grammar
philosopher, and there no evidence in the Essay of any critical evaluation of Locketsideas, and few specific references to the work; Hartley's dilution of ~ocke's
,philosophywas obviously acceptable to Ward, and Ward
himself had no qualms about diluting the theory further
for his own purposes, However, in spite of the dilution
andbsregard for the philosophical issues raised in the
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Ward's reading of
Locke had two consequences of fundamental importance.
/
The first and greatest was undoubtedly that he was to
seek for explanations of the surface structure of language
at a distinct and deeper level; the second was that the
nature of this level was predetermined by -thephilosophical system that he was using.
The first consequence gives
v!ardts Essay a claim to originality in the English grammatical tradition: he was proposing underlying sentences
which existed in the mind, and which were signalled by
the surface structure.
existed in the mind.
The real sentences were those that
Thus the language of thought was
not just a mirror of the real language in Ward's terms,
but was distinct in several ways: there were two sentences
in the mind for every transitive sentence in the surface
structure; imperatives, and interrogatives were signals
of two sentences in the mind; prepositions were signals
of underlying sentences. No such complexities had been
envisaged by Locke, but they arose from Ward's attempt
to adapt Locketsaccount of ideas to units of language
at the sentence level, rather than just at the word level.
The Port Royal grammar had proposed underlying sentences
for adjective-substantive structures, but had not generally dealt with the problems of any construction other
than the Substantive + Be + Adjective construction;
(Participle
thus Lockets schema of underlying levels was much more
I
complex than that envisaged by Arnauld.
In English
linguistics the relations between language and thought
had been discussed to some extent, and the realization
I
that lantuage and thought did not correspond perfectly
had been the impetus for speculation on universal language.
I
The lack of correspondence, however, had never
motivated anyone to attempt to state the rules that link
the level of thought to a natural language.
Ward was the first to see the function of grammar
as that of accounting for the link between the process
of thinking and the surface phonological form of lanpage.
That he attempted
to describe this link may be largely
-explained by the fact that Locke had provided him with
an analysis of the thought process, or the formation
.
bf ideas, which he could use as the starting point of
his analysis.
This leads us to the second point about Ward's
grammar, and that is that the nature of his notions of
the deep level was predetermined by the philosophical
system he was using.
Wzrd set out tb explain the relation
of language to thought, to explain the general principles
on which language was constructed so that there wbuld be
reasoned foundation to grammar.
His model of the thought
processgs was essentially that of Locke; he had the
1.
Cf. Para. 2.1.
E n g l i s h language, and L o c k e t s account
bf
t h e mind; h i s
t a s k w a s t o account f o r one i n terms of t h e o t h e r .
He
w a s r e s t r i c t e d by h i s d e c i s i o n t o keep t h e t r a d i t i o n a l
t e r m s of grammar, but h i s g r e a t e s t r e s t r i c t i o n l a y i n
a d o p t i n g Locke's scheme as h i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t .
However
s u r e Locke and Ward may have been t h a t L o c k e t s system
was a c o r r e c t account of r e a l i t y , we can s e e ( a d m i t t e d l y
w i t h h i n d s i g h t ) , t h a t t h e r e a r e good r e a s o n s f o r r e j e c t i n g L o c k e t s account.
We a r e a l s o aware t h a t any p r e s e n t -
day t h e o r x of t h e mind t h a t we a r e f a m i l i a r w i t h , and
f i n d a t t r a c t i v e , as Ward d i d L o c k e t s , i s only a t h e o r y ,
and cannbt be t a k e n as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t t o develop a
We t h e r e f o r e s t a r t w i t h
system of grammatical r u l e s .
t h e d a t a of language, and seek t o f i n d r u l e s t h a t w i l l
r e l a t e a p p a r e n t l y d i v e r s e d a t a ; t h e more g e n e r a l a r u l e
i s , t h e more l i k e l y t h a t i t i s a genuine i n s i g h t i n t o
t h e workings of language.
Rules today a r e s a i d t o r e q u i r e
' e m p i r i c a l v a l i d i t y ' ; t h i s i s a way of s a y i n g t h a t t h e i r
j u s t i f i c a t i o n must stem from t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y account
f o r d i v e r s e forms i n lnnguage.
When we have formulated
such a r u l e , i t i s o f t e n t h e c a s e t h a t we have done s o
by p y s i t i n g a deeper l e v e l of language from which t h e
s u r f a c e l e v e l i s derived.
The deeper l e v e l i s a n
a b s t r a . c t i o n which i s t e n t a t i v e l y accepted because i t
a c c o u n t s f o r language d a t a .
But Ward d i d n o t work from
t h e data of language t o fbrmulate a b s t r a c t deep l e v e l s .
H i s deep l e v e l w a s a l r e a d y i n e x i s t e n c e , provided by
Locke, and he only had t o produce r u l e s which would l i n k
p a r t i c u l a r s u r f a c e forms t o t h e deep l e v e l .
Hence he w a s
a b l e t o p o s i t many a r b i t r a r y s o l u t i o n s t o problems by
s a y i n g t h a t t h e r e would have t o be r u l e s which connect
a c e r t a i n base form t o a c e r t a i n s u r f a c e form.
He d i d
n o t have t o f o r m u l a t e t h e r u l e s i n every c a s e because h i s
knowledge of t h e base form was n o t d e r i v e d from t h e surf a c e f o r m , _ n o r c o n t i n g e n t on a lmowledge of t h e r u l e s
r e l a t i n g t h e two l e v e l s .
Thus Wardls deep s t r u c t u r e
d i f f e r s from c u r r e n t models of deep s t r u c t u r e i n t h a t i t
i s one of p r e - e x i s t i n g axioms of t h e t h e o r y r a t h e r t h a n
a c o n s t r u c t of t h e t h e o r y .
It a l s o d i f f e r s i n t h a t i n
c u r r e n t t h e o r y a l l l e v e l s of language a r e a b s t r a c t l e v e l s .
Ward made h i s deep l e v e l a l e v e l r e a l l y e x i s t i n g i n t h e
mind of t h e speaker.
Locke's i d e a s were v e r y r e a l t h i n g s ,
and H a r t l e y l s t h e o r y of a s s o c i a t i o n made i t p o s s i b l e t o
r e l a t e them t o t h e l i n g u i s t i c forms.
Ward was proposing
n o t only grammatical r u l e s but a n incompletely formulated
I
b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s r e a l n e u r o l o g i c a l model of speech.
Modern t h e o r i s t s seek t o e x p l a i n language, o r g i v e an
a c c o u n t which s a t i s f i e s t h e p a r t i c u l a r e n q u i r i e s o f
t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y man.
They a r e conscious of t h e l i m i -
t a t i o n s of t h e i r t h e o r i e s - - o r
should be--and
realize
that proposals are tentat'ive and likely to be superseded
by more adequate models.
mind.
No such doubts entered L'ardls
Me was confident of the validity and reality of
his units.
In his certainty and in his concretization
of what we see as abstractions, he was no different from
his contemporaries: although the categories of grammar
were under constant examination and reappraisal in the
1
eighteenth century, the categorymes remained as evidence of some supposedly real entities: the parts of
speech.
They were seen as existing independently of
language, hence the ready transfer of them from one language to another; case and tense distinctions were equally
reified.
Ward is as guilty of the reification of cate-
gories as any other grammarian, and extends it to levels
other than the surface level.
It is Ward's extension of the area of language study,
and hence also of reification, that makes him such an
important figure in the eighteenth century; it is the
reification itself of the deep structure which makes his
analy,sis so unacceptable to modern linguists.
His Essay
serves as a warning to modern linguists of the dangers
of concentrating on rules which connect a pre-established
1. Michael's dissertation attempts to show the amount
of reappraisal and examination beneath the apparent uniformity of the Lhglish tradition.
base component with the surface structure, rather than
reco~mizingthat ultimately the only acceptable input
for the generation of rules is the language itself.
When
rules are derived which account for language data and fit
the constructs produced by other similarly formed rules,
then progress is being made towards producing a general
theory.
Once the underlying abstractions (or real enti-
ties in Ward's case) have become axiomatic, linguistics
ceases to be a scientific investigation of language, and
becomes, as
it has in the Essay on Grammar a sophisticated
-but unproductive form of game playing.
Ward stands near the close of the Priscian tradition
in grammar (no new theories of grammar in the tradition
were to emerge in the following,years, although countless
compilations were published), and almost on the threshhold of modern linguistics (he was writing justtwenty
years before Sir Villiam Jones was to give his lecture
on Sanskrit).
He is significant in terms of the older
tradition in that he considerably enlarges the area of
interest: the relation of language and thought was not
/
one to one, and he idicated that it was the grammarians'
task to state the nature of the relationship between the
two levels.
He is mainly significant for modern theo-
reticians in that he draws attention to the dangers of
reifying hypotheses , treafing them as axiomatic, and
consequently limiting the scope of investigation, His
use of Locke was undoubtedly tremendously productive in
terms of the contemporary approaches to grammar, but it
again serves as a warning that although modern philosophical insights can have a liberating influence on
linguistics, they serve as no panacea and inevitably
turn out to have severe limitations of their own insofar
as the development of linguistic science is concerned,
I
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