Patronage as Politics
in South Asia
Edited by
Anastasia Piliavsky
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Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town,
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Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication data
Patronage as Politics in South Asia / edited by Anastasia Piliavsky.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Summary: “The volume shows that in South Asia patronage is no feudal residue or
retrograde political pressure, but a vital political force behind South Asia’s burgeoning
democratic cultures.”—Provided by publisher.
isbn 978-1-107-05608-4 (Hardback)
1. Patronage, Political—South Asia. 2. Social structure—South Asia.
3. Political sociology. I. Piliavsky, Anastasia, 1981–
jq98.A91P38 2014
306.20954—dc23
2014002313
isbn 978-1-107-05608-4 Hardback
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or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
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For my father
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That which you call corruption I call influence.
John Mortlock (1755–1816)
British banker, woollen draper, Member of Parliament,
and thirteen times Mayor and ‘Master of the Town of Cambridge’
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Contents
List of Illustrations
ix
Foreword by John Dunnxi
Acknowledgmentsxv
Introduction1
Anastasia Piliavsky
The Idea of Patronage in South Asia
1. The political economy of patronage, preeminence
and the state in Chennai
Mattison Mines
2. The temporal and the spiritual, and the so-called
patron–client relation in the governance of Inner
Asia and Tibet
D. Seyfort Ruegg
3. Remnants of patronage and the making of Tamil
Valaiyar pasts
Diane Mines
4. Patronage and state-making in early modern empires
in India and Britain
Sumit Guha
39
67
80
104
Democracy as Patronage
5. The paradox of patronage and the people’s sovereignty
David Gilmartin
6. India’s demotic democracy and its ‘depravities’ in
the ethnographic longue durée
Anastasia Piliavsky
7. ‘Vote banking’ as politics in Mumbai
Lisa Björkman
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125
154
176
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viii Contents
8. Political fixers in India’s patronage democracy
Ward Berenschot
196
9. Patronage and autonomy in India’s deepening democracy 217
Pamela Price, with Dusi Srinivas
10. Police and legal patronage in northern India
Beatrice Jauregui
237
11. Patronage politics in post-independence India
Steven I. Wilkinson
259
Prospects and Disappointments
12. Kingship without kings in northern India
Lucia Michelutti
283
13. The political bully in Bangladesh
Arild Engelsen Ruud
303
14. The dark side of patronage in the Pakistani Punjab
Nicolas Martin
326
15. Patronage and printing innovation
in 15th-century Tibet
Hildegard Diemberger
346
16. The (im)morality of mediation and patronage in
south India and the Gulf
Filippo Osella
365
Contributors395
Bibliography399
Index447
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List of Illustrations
1 Rajasthan’s Chief Minister, Vasundhara Raje, depicted as
goddess Annapurna.
1.1 The author and his assistant V. Gopalakrishnan interviewing
Kaikkoolar naaḍu headmen in Tirumalasai in 1985.
3.1 Kumutam image of the Muttaraiyar statue in Trichy.
3.2 Signboard announcing a village branch of the Perumpituku
Muttaraiyar Youth Association.
4.1 ‘Dun-Shaw’, a cartoon by Gillivray showing a kilted but
crowned Dundas as a ‘Bashaw’, or oriental despot, captioned
as follows: ‘One foot in Leadenhall Street and the other in the
Province of Bengal’.
7.1 Kamble with social workers.
7.2 Water pipes in Aziz Nagar.
9.1 Map of the main regions of Andhra Pradesh prior to its
bifurcation in 2013.
11.1 Percentage of total misallocated or lost food in the 2003–2004
Targeted Public Distribution System.
11.2 The policy mix in India at different levels of competition and
economic development.
15.1 Map of southwestern Tibet.
15.2 The 1407 print of the sBas gdon gsal ba.
15.3 Blockprinting at the Sera monastery in Tibet.
15.4 The Shel dkar (Shekar) fortress, the capital of La stod lho
(Southern Lato).
15.5 A statue of Bo dong Phyogs las rnam rgyal.
15.6 A depiction of Chos kyi sgron ma.
15.7 A monk at the Paltsek Research Institute in Lhasa.
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Foreword
John Dunn
Every human society conceives and seeks to apprehend its political
life and character in two sharply discrepant ways. It does so through
its conceptions of what is valuable and how what it deems valuable
can be realised through action, and it does so through its assessment
of the impact of power on how and how far these values are realised
in the material consequences they have for its human denizens.
Neither of these ways can be a surrogate for the other, and they never
articulate stably or clearly with one another. But every society faces
a standing temptation, intellectual as much as political, to reduce or
subordinate one to the other. The modern social sciences privilege
assessments of material outcomes; and as soon as they attempt to
shape themselves any other way their current renderings rapidly
dissolve into complete incoherence. Indigenist politicians and populist
intellectuals, by contrast, defend the primacy of their society’s own
conceptions of itself and the goods it aspires or hopes to secure.
In the vocabulary and political consciousness of the modern West,
patronage is a residual element in the acceptable structuring of
social, political and economic outcomes, thrust back increasingly into
aesthetic domains or the normatively contingent practical privileges
open to occupants of particular roles. The official normative ordering
of western societies today is systematically egalitarian. Within them,
every departure from it is increasingly stigmatised and must be
rationalised, if it is to be recuperated at all, through contributions
it makes to enhancing equality in some other domain. The result is
a society deeply uneasy at its own reality, in endless denial of itself
as a structure of power, incapable of recognising its own political
substance, or of thinking clearly about the ways in which it is in fact
led, or fails to be led, and about the causal relations between political
and legal subjection within it and the economic destinies across the
ranks of its notionally equal citizens.
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xii Foreword
Patronage as Politics in South Asia presents a very different
conception of society, distributed across the Indian subcontinent over
a time span far lengthier than the epoch in which the normative order
of the modern West took its present shape and established its queasy
hegemony. It is an integrally hierarchical order of value, location and
responsibility that gives much of their sense to the ways in which
its inhabitants live out their lives and structure, experience and judge
interactions with one another. (The uncaptured residue is more a
matter for novels or poems than for would-be systematic social theory,
let alone social science.) Because it covers such vast stretches of time
and space and such heterogeneous practices, it makes no attempt
to present the order it discloses as a systematic ideology or social
totality, as Louis Dumont’s Homo Hierarchicus for example appeared
to, at least to some of its readers. What it does show from a startling
range of angles is how comprehensively the modern social sciences
have disabled themselves to take in the reality of most societies in
the world, and even of those that generated them, incorporating them
ever more deeply into their faltering efforts at self-understanding.
It shows how impotent any economistic rendering is to capture the
political or social reality of most of the humanly inhabited world,
and how impertinent and external a picture it offers even of the
structuring of economic outcomes in much of that world.
Patronage as Politics in South Asia holds deep lessons for too
wide a range of potential readers to list them all. But several points
are worth insisting on from the outset. In the first place, it shows
how indispensable the focus on social order is to capture the lived
political reality of any human society: a task beyond the reach of
any paradigm of rational choice. It shows the profoundly crippling
cognitive impact of the egalitarian protocol for political, economic
and social practices on the comprehension of societies not merely
with quite different normative visions but even of the very societies
from which that protocol first emerged. It shows the extreme
plasticity and the permanent potential efficacy of patronage in
settings from political and religious construction in classical Tibet
to the exigencies of survival in the slums of Mumbai and the
structuring of labour migration from Kerala to the Gulf. It shows
that they still shape and inspire potent communities in the subcontinent’s great cities. It shows that they frame and dynamise the
intense political life of far the largest democracy in human history,
and fit as effortlessly into a political system articulated through
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Foreword xiii
legal equality as they did into classical Tibet, Hindu Kingdoms or
the Mogul empire. It shows that there is nothing superannuated
about the causal presence and weight of such practices across the
world, and that they travel as readily beyond the sub-continent
as they do within it and are adopted indefatigably precisely
because they hold far more utility for those who choose them
over competing bureaucratic structures or transnational meliorist
facilities. It shows how far even the most penetrating and sensitive
of social anthropology has been handicapped by its misgivings and
discomfiture at patronage’s frank embrace of inequality, in a setting
where even the cultivated and self-conscious heirs of ancient Rome
find the idea that friendship can be lop-sided (as most friendship
rather evidently is) and be so without jeopardising its reality as
friendship, too disconcerting to endorse openly and explicitly.
This book shows how easy it remains to take in and comprehend
how a society is led and follows or refuses to follow, or how it
chooses to act politically through its own structuring of power, by
viewing patronage as a huge array of practices incessantly at work,
doing good or ill to all they affect. It shows how India’s huge and
frenziedly animated democracy could learn to understand itself just
the way it is and suggests how far it already does, quietly, on its
own and within the relative privacy of its own languages, even if
it is still as nonplussed as its western counterparts at combining
that quiet self-understanding with the official normative rubric of
India’s own Constitution. Very strikingly, too, it suggests a political
verdict to which the rest of the world needs to attend every bit as
much as India itself. India’s democracy, it intimates, however its
material consequences come out in a metric of relative subjugation
(where every existing human society comes out pretty mercilessly),
is a profoundly democratic outcome, achieved through means
that are in essence clearly democratic. As a structuring of material
inequality, much of it is still remarkably grim; and that grimness is
as unmistakably a product of power as it has ever been. (What, do
you imagine, has generated the present class structure of the United
States of America: Democracy’s finest and oldest fruit?) Insofar as
the material outcome of India’s democracy is recognised, sustained,
modified or enforced through public law and the coercive capacities
of the state, that law and those coercive capacities act in the end,
not just at the alleged behest and on the alleged behalf of all India’s
legally equal citizens, but causally and as appropriately as almost
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xiv Foreword
anywhere else in the world, at the direction of India’s own demos,
acting at regular intervals for and as itself, at its own iteratively
sovereign moments. That just is democracy, and every bit as much
so as any specifiable passage in the history of the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, classical Athens or any other
presumptively democratic exemplar. What democracy means is just
that everywhere that has it judges, chooses and acts as and for itself.
That is how India judges, chooses and acts. More precariously and
hence less resolutely, it is also the way that Pakistan and Bangladesh
judge, choose and act on the more intermittent occasions when their
armed forces let them.
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Acknowledgments
This volume started at a colloquium held in October 2011 at King’s
College, Cambridge, which made it both possible and enjoyable for
us all. Chris Fuller, Caroline Humphrey, James Laidlaw, Sian Lazar,
Norbert Peabody, Kim A. Wagner and David Washbrook joined in the
discussion and made it much more instructive and fun. In different
ways and at different stages John Dunn, John Kelly, Jenny Malpass,
Yelena and Alexander Piliavsky, Piers Vitebsky, Rob Wallach, Indra
and Suresh Chattrapal, Ramesh and Kalla Kanjar, and Arvind and
Shweta Singh helped to bring this volume about. David Watson at
the Cartographic Unit of the Department of Geography in Cambridge
drew the beautiful maps. At Cambridge University Press Suvadip
Bhattacharjee, Ranjini Majumdar and Debjani Mazumder have been
especially accommodating, and Qudsiya Ahmed displayed a rare
combination of patience and enthusiasm in seeing this volume
through to print. Editorial work on the volume was supported by
research grants from the European and British Research Councils,
and by a Research Fellowship at King’s—as fine an intellectual setting
as I could wish for.
A.P.
Jaipur, Rajasthan
October 2013
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Introduction
Anastasia Piliavsky
A scandal in Jodhpur
I
n the summer of 2007 a curious incident occurred in the city of
Jodhpur in the north Indian state of Rajasthan.1 The wife of a
Member of the State Legislative Assembly lodged a complaint with
the police, accusing a local temple priest of ‘hurting the religious
sentiments of the people’. The cause of offence was a poster
designed by the priest which depicted Rajasthan’s then Chief
Minister, Vasundhara Raje, as the bread-giving goddess Annapurna.
On the poster the crowned Miss Raje appeared mounted on a lotus
throne, from which she showered an assembly of parliamentarians,
legislators and ministers gathered below with golden coins and rays
of light (see Figure 1). Either side of her were a pair of guardian
lions and two cabinet ministers, portrayed as the ancient Hindu
gods Kuber and Indra. Floating just above were the leaders of Raje’s
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), depicted as Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva,
the gods of the Hindu trinity. The incident sent ripples of amusement
through the Anglophone press, but in the landscape of South Asian
politics this was neither a singular occurrence nor a laughing matter.
A host of leading politicians—including President of the Congress
Party Sonia Gandhi, head of the People’s Party in Uttar Pradesh (UP)
Mayawati, the Chief Minister of Bengal Mamata Banerjee and the
former Tamil Chief Minister Jayalalitha—have all received colourful
popular veneration.
1
The ideas in this volume and introductory essay have been long in the making.
I owe a great debt to Paul Dresch, David Gellner and Jonathan Norton, who in their
different ways were there for me when I was first working them out as a doctoral
student. I am grateful to Naor Ben-Yehoyada, Lucia Michelutti, Mattison Mines and
Pamela Price for their comments, and especially to Piers Vitebsky and John Dunn
for braving multiple drafts and for all our conversations. As ever, my greatest debt
is to my many hosts and interlocutors in India, and especially to Suresh and Indra
Chhattrapal, Ramesh and Kalla Kanjar, and Arvind and Shweta Singh for their tireless
generosity, patience and help.
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2 Anastasia Piliavsky
Figure 1 Vasundhara Raje depicted as goddess Annapurna. Courtesy of
Pandit Hemant Bohra.
To most readers of this book, a picture of voters prostrated before
a politician (like the one that appears on the cover of this book) will
look not just ridiculous or bizarre, it will appear positively obscene:
a perversion of every political virtue. This image projects inequality in
place of equality, personal bonds where detached judgement should
be and subjugation where the free will of individual citizens ought to
reign. It makes a mockery of the very idea of representative democracy,
a government by people elected to act on behalf of the citizens, not to
rule over them as kings or gods. The shock of this vision reverberates
far beyond politics. It shakes the foundations of what liberal
cosmopolitans believe human beings to be and the society which they
live in to be really made of—innately equal and independently judging
individuals—the beliefs enshrined in the modern political theology of
democracy and the universal ritual of each adult citizen casting a single
vote in the isolation of a polling booth.2
2
On the development of this ritual, see Crook and Crook (2007), Crook (2011) and
Gilmartin (2012).
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Introduction 3
One look at South Asian popular politics topples all this. In cities
and villages across the subcontinent voters adorn political leaders with
crowns, garlands, turbans and swords, recite for them praise verses,
and fall at their feet in adulation. Time and again, newspapers seem to
confirm just how dissolute South Asian politics really is. Votes are cast
not by autonomous citizens concerned with their countries’ long-term
general good, but by interest groups, or ‘vote banks’, which elect one of
their own to provide for them. Parties and politicians do not convince
their electors with ideological platforms. They buy votes with short-term
benefits. Endemic poverty and governmental dysfunction obliterate free,
reasoned and responsible judgement and drive people to exchange their
votes for bureaucratic favours, clutches of cash and bottles of hooch.
Politicians run the show like royal sovereigns, often at the expense of
law. Rates of corruption registered by Transparency International in the
region hover at Sub-Saharan levels (www.transparency.org). Nepotism,
political backwardness and decadence fill news reports, which often
attribute this political bedlam on the subcontinent to the prevalence
of ‘patronage’ or ‘clientelism’, the common glosses for ‘corruption’. It is
seldom clear what exactly these words describe, but what they indicate
is never obscure: a perverse and backward political practice, which
prevails only where modern states fail.
Yet South Asia is not a site of state failure. Far from it. Since the
retreat of colonial powers from the subcontinent, it has been one
of political modernity’s busiest laboratories, and it has turned out
some very striking results. While in many parts of Europe electoral
participation has flagged, in most of South Asia it has been steadily
on the rise.3 The region is now home to the world’s most populous
democracy and one of its most vigorous. The sheer scale of India’s
general elections is mindboggling: a population of more than a billion,
eager to cast their votes, makes this the single-largest social event
in the world. India’s general elections regularly involve over 60% of
voters, often substantially exceeding American presidential elections,
and local elections often rise to 100% turnout. In 2008 the Hindu
Kingdom of Nepal became a Democratic Republic, electing its first
(Communist) government with more than 74% of its electors’ votes.
In Pakistan, in the spring of 2013 voter participation rose from 40%
(in 2008) to a spirited 60%, with people voting in face of great threat.
3
For country-by-country voter turnout data, see the database of the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance at www.idea.int.
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4 Anastasia Piliavsky
Yet these political achievements have not stamped out patronage,
which continues to thrive not despite democratic statehood, but
alongside and indeed often through it. Clearly, we face not a feudal
residue, but with a current political form vital in its own right.
In this volume we do not treat ‘patronage’ as a term of art and
we offer no definitions. Nor do we see it as an unchanging, timeless
‘phenomenon’, a transactional arrangement with a fixed and predetermined content. Rather, we see it as a living moral idiom that
carries much of the life of South Asian politics, and society at large. Here
‘patronage’ is an imperfect gloss for a widespread moral formulation
which helps us escape the gridlock of liberal political heuristics and
see the local actors’ own normative imagination. Collectively, we try to
think our way into the region’s own political sense and into the ways
in which political communities and attachments, modes of leadership
and ways of following shape the hopes and disappointments which
political engagement necessarily brings. At the centre of our analysis
are the relations which constitute South Asian politics. By working out
the ways in which South Asian citizens relate, and think they ought
to relate, to one another, we address some central conundrums of
political modernity in the region: how people live and think about
democracy and the state, what they make of ‘political representation’
and how to understand why the region appears at once so politically
engaged and in many ways successful, and so drastically ‘corrupt’ and
‘criminalised’. We hope that those who do not know much about South
Asia and those who know a great deal will find this book equally
thought-provoking. We also hope that our readers find the accounts
collected here, and their implications, helpful for thinking not only
about South Asia, but also about politics in other places, including
those which they call their home.
What happened to patronage?
In the social sciences patronage has had its day. Whilst debates
on nationhood, sovereignty, governance, democracy and the state
nowadays fill the journals, patronage barely figures. If three decades
back academics as distinguished as Ernest Gellner, Shmuel Eisenstadt
and James Scott published thick volumes on the subject,4 today
few dare to put the words ‘patron’ or ‘patronage’ on the cover of
4
For helpful overviews of this literature, see Scott (1977b), Eisenstadt and Roniger
(1981) and Roniger (1981; 2004).
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Introduction 5
their books. This avoidance is in part a reaction to the concept’s
career in earlier decades (mainly in the 1960s–1970s) when its
analysis, even as the brightest minds applied themselves to it,
generated a literature that was overwhelmingly dull. Endless case
studies and descriptions of patronage observed around the world
yielded little comparative framework or analytical continuity to
sustain debate.5 We agreed in 1960 that ‘patronage’ had something to
do with asymmetry of status and power, that it involved reciprocity,
and that it relied on particular, intimate, face-to-face relations
(Powell 1960). More than five decades on we have not moved far
beyond this basic picture, but we no longer care to explore it further.
The problem runs deeper than the concept’s dispiriting recent career.
It issues from deep-seated prejudices and from two beliefs about
patronage to which we hold fast, if often unwittingly. We believe that
we already know what patronage is, and we believe that it must be
a bad thing. At a bare minimum, we think of patronage as a relation
between two unequal persons, one of whom holds the upper hand.
Patrons are wealthier, politically more potent or otherwise privileged,
and they control what others need or want, making their clients at best
dependent and at worst oppressed. Call up some images which the
phrase ‘political patronage’ brings to mind: a Sicilian peasant kissing the
hand of a Mafioso, Vladimir Putin appointing governors to the Russian
provinces, pharmaceutical lobbyists at work in DC. The slide show can
go on with countless snapshots of political deformity, each capturing a
disfigurement of what modern politics should be: equal, disinterested
and impersonal. Over the decades, deeply ingrained moral aversion to
patronage has frustrated the task of understanding it; description slips
inadvertently into evaluation, which in turn poses as analysis. Time and
again patronage appears as the cause or symptom of political infirmity.
Time and again it is portrayed as a retrograde, oppressive or at best
ancillary, institution destined to vanish the moment modern, democratic
states take proper hold of the world.6 Time and again analysts forecast
its disappearance, time and again lamenting its refusal to go away.7
5
For a sense of the sprawling vastness of this literature, see Eisenstadt and Roniger’s
(1980) summative article, in which footnotes listing case studies occupy several full
pages of text.
6
For example, Geertz (1960), Eisenstadt (1973, 60), Blok (1974), Boissevain
(1974, 147–148) and Eisenstadt and Lemarchand (1981).
7
Gellner’s prediction is typical: ‘where power is effectively centralized … patronage
is correspondingly less common’ (1977, 4).
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6 Anastasia Piliavsky
Patronage first came to the fore of the social sciences in the 1960s and
1970s, mainly in Mediterranean and Latin American peasant studies.
These writings had a broadly Marxist overtone and they dismissed
patronage as a sentimentalisation of class inequality (e.g., Leeds 1964;
Galjart 1965; Alavi 1973). For them, patronage was a ‘myth’ or the
‘ideology’ of the elites, endorsed by those social analysts who dared to
present it as anything but power struggle.8 The language of kinship,
friendship and sympathy, they claimed, concealed behind it the brutal
mechanisms of dependence and exploitation.9 Sociologist Anthony
Hall, for example, wrote that however one may approach patronage,
‘the important fact is the inherently coercive nature of patron-clientage’
(1977, 511, emphasis in original). One could view this struggle from
different angles and ask: How do the powerful access, create and
misuse their subjects? What degree of control do they have? How do
the powerless get access to resources, resist oppression or negotiate
for themselves better deals? Yet whichever way analysts turned
their viewfinders, the scene in focus remained a site of oppression,
submission, resistance and domination.
A second academic camp developed a more forgiving view.
They suggested that patronage was not everywhere plainly bad news.
Patron-client relations, they insisted, did not necessarily propagate
inequality or sent modern politics back into feudal darkness, but often
achieved the obverse: social mobility and political participation.10
Ties of patronage might assist the poor to wrest resources from the
elites or help immigrants access state services. Some reported that
patronage and electoral politics often went hand in hand; patronage
promoted electoral participation, which in its turn generated fresh
patronage bonds. Patron–client relations formed the backbone
of ‘traditional’ politics and were the main political tool of tribals,
peasants and the urban poor. As modern politics spread into far
corners of society and the globe, patronage became a link between
8
For example, Silverman (1977), Lemarchand and Legg (1972), Flinn (1974), Scott
(1975) and several essays in Gellner and Waterbury (1977), especially those by
Silverman, Gilsenan, Weingrod and Scott.
9
Characteristically, Flinn (1974), Scott (1976), Schmidt et al. (1977) and Malloy (1977); and
slightly more recently Bodeman (1990), Knoke (1990), Breman (1993) and Fox (1994).
One representative study in this mode appears in this volume (Martin, Chapter 14).
10
On clientelism as the vehicle for peasant movements, see for instance, Landsberger
(1969) and Scott (1977a; 1985). On the symbiosis of patronage and democracy, see
Gwyn (1962), Chambers et al. (1967), Powell (1971) and Fagen and Tuohy (1972).
Introduction.indd 6
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Introduction 7
governments and ‘social peripheries’ culturally unfit for or otherwise
excluded from direct engagement with the state.11 Because patronage
connected bureaucracies to traditional politics, cities to villages
and governments to citizens through patron-politicians and brokerbureaucrats, it could paradoxically modernise ‘developing’ states (e.g.,
Schmidt 1974). Between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, studies
of political patronage focused almost exclusively on the ‘developing
world’ and its political ‘systems in transition’ (Martz 1997, 14). Insofar
as patronage ‘at all interested political scientists, it did so principally
as intermediary between the centre and the periphery’ (Dogan and
Pleassy 1984, 76; also Eisenstadt 1973, 60; Boissevain 1974, 147–148).
If in anthropology patronage has lost its currency, in political
science it is still ready money. Political scientists have long agreed
the meaning of ‘clientelism’, as they usually term patronage. For
them it is an exchange of goods and services for political support.
This system of political barter, a ‘distributive’ politics of ‘take there,
give here’ (Graham 1990), turns elections into auctions and political
choices into calculations of profit.12 Politicians use goods and favours
to buy their positions and their electors employ such means as they
have at their disposal to wrest resources back from politicians and the
state. ‘Machine politics’ could grease the wheels of electoral systems.
It might boost political party membership and electoral participation,
and even occasionally benefit the poor (e.g., Banfield 1969). But in
doing so it depletes democracy of its point and meaning. This politics
of purposeful mutual exploitation substitutes moral, responsible
judgement and the concern for greater good with the pursuit of selfish,
short-term advantage—what political scientist Edward Banfield once
called The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (1958). Clientelism is
the politics of dire poverty, which turns democracy into a spectacle of
desperation and greed.
In the past two decades political scientists have slowly recognised
that patronage has not slunk away in the face of modernity and
democratisation, as their predecessors had hoped, but instead
carries on stridently in fully developed, rich countries like Austria,
11
For example, Geertz (1960), Leeds (1964), Wolf (1966), Powell (1970), Lemarchand
and Legg (1972) and Boissevain (1974).
12
This approach is ubiquitous. Representative recent examples include Rose-Ackerman
(1999), Chandra (2004), Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) and Stokes et al. (2012). See
also essays by Wilkinson (Chapter 11) and Martin (Chapter 14) in this volume.
Introduction.indd 7
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8 Anastasia Piliavsky
Japan and the United States.13 These striking revelations make
continued analytical resistance to patronage appear increasingly
strange. And yet the resistance persists. Workshops and conference
panels on clientelism organised around the world at the millennium’s
turn, for instance, reached long-familiar conclusions: patronage
was a regressive force inimical to democracy, civil society and the
market’s free flow (Roniger 2004, 372). Most recent studies are still
framed by old questions: Why doesn’t patronage disappear? When
may it do so? What might bring about its demise (see Wilkinson,
Chapter 11 in this volume)? Over the years, whatever role patronage
has played in the literature—as a means of exploitation, a vestige
of feudalism, a governmental pathology, a politics of the poor or an
ancillary institution—it has never been a site of positive value in its
own right. There is no better expression of this attitude than Ernest
Gellner’s definition of patronage as ‘not bureaucracy’, ‘not kinship’,
‘not feudalism’, ‘not the market’, ‘not the state’ (1977). But what is it?
More than two decades earlier anthropologists had shown that
relations between ‘patrons’ and ‘clients’ could be sympathetic and
even intimate, based on mutual esteem and affection, like the bonds
between kith and kin. In southern Spain Julian Pitt-Rivers (1954)
wrote that patronage formed the backbone of politics and social
relations, as they were lived and understood. Relations between
patrons and clients were best seen as a kind of friendship. Other
anthropologists showed that patronage was woven tightly into the
fabric of many societies, where people did not see the institution
itself as problematic, however dissatisfied they might feel with
particular persons involved.14 But this literature left little legacy.15
Campbell’s (1964) superb, intimate study of patron–client relations
in rural Greece, for instance, is hardly ever cited today.
Resistance to patronage proved so strong that even as fine an
anthropologist as Pitt-Rivers found it difficult to take his informants
seriously. In his analysis he demurred: if patronage was a kind
of friendship, he said, the friendship was necessarily ‘lop-sided’.
13
Roniger and Gunes-Ayata (1994), Briquet and Sawicki (1998), Piattoni (2001) and
Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007).
14
For example, Mintz and Wolf (1950), Pitt-Rivers (1954), Campbell (1964), Foster
(1967), Weingrod (1969) and Powell (1970).
15
Exceptions include Martz (1997), Auyero (1999; 2001), Mitchell (2002) and
Lazar (2004).
Introduction.indd 8
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Introduction 9
He wrote that ‘while friendship is in the first place a free association
between equals, it becomes in a relationship of economic inequality
the foundation of the system of patronage … used to cloak a purely
venal arrangement, a rich man using his money to attain his ends’
(1954, 140, emphasis mine). Patronage, in other words, was spoiled
friendship. Where relations were unequal, they could not be right.
Inequality was inherently oppressive. No one could sanely choose
to be someone else’s client, and those who did must have acted
under duress.
Patronage in South Asianist scholarship
South Asianists have been of a different mind, at least until recently.
Once upon a time in South Asianist scholarship patronage was the
hub of key debates on status and power, personhood, sociality,
economic exchange and polity. Studies of kingship, the history of
colonial relations, ethnographies of village exchange and ‘big-men’ in
urban centres, and the more recent work on fixers have all focused
centrally on patronage. For a long time for historians patronage was
the centre of debates about kingship, which cast much light on lasting
local conventions of ruler–subject bonds. Historians showed that for
as far back as history stretched on the subcontinent, kingly rule relied
on the distribution of gifts.16 The king’s defining duty was to provide
for (and protect) his subjects. The act of giving linked rulers to their
subjects (and their subjects in turn to their subjects), creating chains
of gift and receipt that defined kingly realms. Historians showed
that giving and receiving were not just economic transactions, but
socially and politically constitutive acts which authorised kingly
rule and defined political communities. Giving was an expression of
generosity, the cornerstone-value of South Asia’s political life. And as
such it had to be performed. Whether or not the kings had the wealth
to give, they staged their capacity to do so with extreme flamboyance.
Royal courts were dazzling spectacles of munificence where kings
often gave away much more than they could afford at extravagant
feasts and gifting ceremonies. Kingly realms constantly stretched and
shrunk with the subjects’ ever-fickle loyalties. As Sumit Guha shows
(Chapter 4 in this volume), in 18th-century Maratha polities kingly
16
For example, Dirks (1979; 1987), Stein (1980) and Peabody (1991; 2003).
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10 Anastasia Piliavsky
rule was sustained by constant personal engagement, and collapsed
when the regime of favours ossified into a regimented system of
formal entitlements. This structure of loyalty was replicated on every
level—from grand maharajas to ‘little kings’, vassals and vassals of
vassals, all the way down to village landlords, producing the series
of concentric and identically structured sovereignties which Stanley
Tambiah termed ‘galactic polity’ (1977). In this tight structure of
mutuality donor-kings depended on the gifts’ recipients no less than
recipients depended on kings. Recipients of royal gifts provided not
just tax money or manpower in times of war. They—paradigmatically
the Brahmin donees—were the source of kingly authority.17
Another camp of historians, the Cambridge School, produced
meticulous accounts of local political economies and how these
were embedded in networks of patron–client ties, mostly in British
India.18 By the middle of the 19th century, India’s ruling class were
severely disenfranchised, and colonial administrators took over as
the premier patrons. In this political ecology, Indian merchants
and bankers emerged as the new class of indigenous patrons
who, Chris Bayly argued, came to steer a great deal of politics and
much else that happened in India at the time. Many merchants
patronised political, and often progressive, activities: new religious
movements (including the more ‘Protestant’ Hindu sects), Hindu
revivalist campaigns (like the cow-protection movement), new
cultural organisations, literary and political publications and the
founding of the new Congress Party (Bayly 1973; 1983).
Bayly argued that in high colonial India patronage had two
sides—a moral and an instrumental—and that these were perennially
at odds. All patrons engaged in two types of relations: the essentially
commercial vakil patronage meant to maximise profit, and the moral
or dharmic patronage of religious and community institutions which
enhanced patrons’ standing (1973, 367ff). He suggested that amidst
vast shifts in political and economic infrastructures new figures of
17
The paradigmatic donees were the Brahmans, the ultimate providers of kingly
authority. To get a sense of debates which once raged around problems of kingly
sovereignty and Brahmanical legitimation, see Peabody, Fuller and Mayer (1991).
On the classic model of the donor–donee relationship between rulers and their
spiritual preceptors, see Ruegg (Chapter 2).
18
Some representative essays can be found in Gallagher, Johnson and Seal (1973).
See also Low (1968), Broomfield (1968), Seal (1968) and Bayly (1983).
Introduction.indd 10
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Introduction 11
pre-eminence appealed to old ideals to legitimate their role as patrons,
and not mere financial sponsors. To succeed socially, every bit as
much as financially, bankers and dealers had to put on the old kingly
shows of largesse. Conflict was built into the system. Generosity
required wealth and acquiring wealth corrupted the image of an ideal
patron, putting the two modes of patronage inexorably at odds. In
this volume David Gilmartin (Chapter 5) shows that Bayly put his
finger on something far bigger and more important than he himself
may have realised—a clue to a fundamental aspect of patronage—to
which I return below.
In the era of ‘classic’ ethnography (1930s–1980s) South Asia’s
anthropologists took patronage perhaps even more seriously than
the historians. At the time they focused chiefly on something known
as the jajmani, a system of inter-caste village exchange.19 In the ideal
jajmani model each village revolved around a land owning patronfamily (the jajman). Each service-caste (the kamin) performed
a unique economic and ritual role—priests conducted rituals,
sweepers swept floors, barbers shaved beards—and each caste, in
return, received payments and gifts, along with a share of the village
harvest.20 This was what anthropologists termed ‘total exchange’ (after
Mauss 2002 [1925])—at once economic, political, ritual, and moral—
which constituted multi-dimensional social bonds. Over the decades,
ethnographic descriptions of jajmani exchange solidified this general
scheme into a closed, rigid and internally integrated village ‘system’.
At the height of the village ethnography era, the subcontinent often
seemed a universe of village-galaxies, each a microcosm of South
Asia’s social life as a whole. Patronage was the heart of society,
encompassing its hierarchical principles and the ways in which
communities, political or otherwise, were composed and related to
one another.
Like all theoretical perfections, the jajmani system eventually
collapsed under the weight of observation. Anthropologists noticed, for
instance, that in various south Indian types of village exchange (known
by names like baluta, mirasi, paniwallu, padiyal or kaniaci), the
19
Classic accounts include Wiser (1936), Kolenda (1967), Mandelbaum (1970, 159–180)
and Dumont (1980, 98ff).
20
Such arrangements were observed by Hindus (Wiser 1936) as well as Muslims,
including Pathans (Barth 1959; Marriott 1960; Guha 2004).
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12 Anastasia Piliavsky
identities of patrons and clients, the types of payments and quality of
relations between them varied a great deal across time and space. There
was, they maintained, no single ‘jajmani system’ (Orenstein 1962; 1965;
Fukuzawa 1972; Reiniche 1977). By the late 1980s the jajmani system
which seemed to bind villages into time capsule ‘village republics’ fell
to pieces (Fuller 1989). With it the era of village ethnography too came
an end.21 Since then anthropologists turned to other matters: urban
anthropology, development, media studies, bureaucracy, middle classes
and so on; and for today’s anthropologists the word ‘jajmani’ remains a
relic of quaint, positivist ethnography. The time had certainly come to
vacate the creaking jajmani edifice. But the baby was thrown out with the
bathwater: along with the system anthropologists abandoned the many
lessons about relational principles which jajmani studies contained and
which still hold vital clues to some of the knottiest puzzles of political
life on the subcontinent (Karanth 1987).
One thing the jajmani studies have taught us is that in South Asia
patronage was never a purely economic or ‘top-down’ power relation.
Crucially, it was a relation of status difference. Status asymmetry in this
relation, they taught us, was expressed in the language of ‘services’
and ‘gifts’—terms which defined the normative principles organising
the relationship and identities of those involved. The donor-servant
relation was a profoundly mutual and socially constitutive bond in
which all participants were defined relative one another. One was
never simply a drummer, barber or priest, but a drummer, barber
or priest for this or that patron. Servants, in turn, maintained their
patrons’ ritual purity, authorising their pre-eminence and the authority
through which they ruled. Both ritually and economically, servants
turned landholders into patrons. In their turn, patrons passed down
their identities to their servants together with the payments and gifts.
Gifts were not just remuneration, they were receptacles of what South
Asianists refer to as ‘bio-moral substance’, or a kind of total sociophysical identity.22 This substance was carried most effectively in food
and drink, the honoured and paradigmatic gifts in South Asia. As in
21
For more on the rise and fall of jajmani studies, see Piliavsky in this volume
(Chapter 6, 156–161).
22
The theory of substantive contingency was at the forefront of the work of Chicago
transactionalists led by McKim Marriott and Ronald Inden, who argued that in India
exchange was a substantively constitutive process, in which gifts (most importantly
food) carried the givers’ nature (e.g., Marriott and Inden 1973; 1977; also Parry 1986;
Raheja 1988a; 1988b).
Introduction.indd 12
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Introduction 13
the kingly realms, all exchanges were put on display, transforming
transactions into statements of the relation’s moral content and the
qualities of the parties involved. Gifts expressed patronal generosity
and clients’ devotion.
Later studies of south Indian ‘big-men’ (periyars) put this wisdom
in motion, showing how the old values and relational principles
worked in contemporary urban life.23 In his work on wealthy
entrepreneurs in Chennai, Mattison Mines showed that the relational
values present in jajmani exchange were not confined to the rural
backwaters, but also shaped institutional development and political
life in big, modern cities (see Chapter 1). The old values of munificence
and the practices of their display provided a moral frame for urbane
big-men’s pursuits and achievements, shaping their public selves
and their contributions to public life. Big-men built their careers
on grand feasts, ostentatious sponsorship of temples and schools,
and other displays of munificence akin to the erstwhile rajas’ or
the village jajmans’. Mines showed that the durable, widespread
set of ideals and rhetorical tropes was as much the framework for
individual action as for the vagaries of subcontinental politics in
all its guises. Big-men created new institutions and organisations
to benefit their constituents and expand their followings. They
were the agents of history, and the identities of institutions (like
temples, cooperatives or schools) and communities (like castes or
caste associations) were, and were locally seen as, expressions of
big-men’s aspirations and their ability to make things happen. Caste
as such was not a stable ‘social structure’, but a mobile form of
organisation constantly shaped and reshaped by the political and
economic pursuits of big-men operating through old moral idioms
(Mines 1984; 1994).
Yet just like jajmans, big-men dropped off the menu of
ethnographers’ interests. With them patronage generally vanished
too. Post-modern critiques of empirical inquiry and the ‘literary turn’
shook anthropology’s ethnographic nerve. Research shifted away
from villages towards subjects without any determinate location:
globalisation, neoliberalism, citizenship, civil society, development,
post-colonialism, mass mediation, middle class shopping habits and
23
Pioneering studies include Mines and Gourishankar (1990) and M. Mines (1994).
For examples of more recent work, see Hansen (2005) and D. Mines (2005).
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14 Anastasia Piliavsky
so on.24 Today, with South Asianist anthropologists devoting increasing
energy to corruption and the state, continued apathy towards
patronage appears increasingly ill-timed. While in international news
patronage remains a hot item, in the indexes of books published
by South Asianist anthropologists the words ‘patronage’, ‘patron’ and
‘client’ hardly figure.25
The subject retains currency in political science, but most of this
literature is more attuned to the established sense of clientelism in
the discipline than to its South Asian practices and norms. Early
studies of post-independence politics showed how patronage worked
in electoral politics, political parties and factions. But they failed to
explain what patronage meant for its participants and why it remained
such a pervasive and central part of local political life.26 Nowadays,
just as before, when political scientists mention patronage in South
Asia, one can be certain they are writing about political failure: vote
banking, party corruption, inequality, ethnic party politics, the capture
of governance by elites, failures of distribution and accountability or
the overall ‘crisis of governability’.27 Even if by now patronage has
been accepted as a central practical feature of politics in the region,
‘the supposition of a tension between patronage and democratic
values’, as Gilmartin notes,
persists in writings on ‘civil society’ in India, which often
embody a normative emphasis on the tension between
patronage (arising from ‘tradition’) and the more abstract,
individual-oriented values, including openness, equity,
and efficiency, commonly associated with democratic
(and capitalist) forms of rule (Chapter 5, 128–129).
By binding people into particularistic top-down loyalties and ties
of direct exchange, patronage appears to undercut the free choice
which ought to guide electoral process; by making voter-clients
24
A striking recent illustration is A Companion to the Anthropology of India (ClarkDecès 2011), which includes nearly 30 chapters, not a single one of which is about
village affairs or is even based on research conducted substantially in rural areas.
25
Important recent contributions to South Asian political anthropology (including
Fuller and Béneï 2001; Chatterjee 2004; Gupta and Sharma 2006; Sengupta and
Corbridge 2010) hardly comment on patronage. When they do mention it, they
do so with little explanation, as if we already know what it is (e.g., Brass 1994;
Spencer 2007, 85–86; Chakrabarty 2008; Madsen et al. 2011).
26
For example, Bailey (1963), Brass (1965), Rudolph and Rudolph (1967),
Weiner (1967) and Fox (1969).
27
Weiner (1967), Kohli (1990), Chandra (2004) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2012).
Introduction.indd 14
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Introduction 15
dependent on politician-patrons, it seems to invert the very idea of
democracy as the people’s rule.
Political scientists Kitschelt and Wilkinson, for instance, argue
that clientelism replaces political accountability with a transaction:
‘the direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct payments
or continuing access to employment, goods and services’ (2007, 2).
This is a desperate system: voters require continuous proof that
politicians will deliver on their promises, and politicians have to
construct elaborate (and often unsustainably costly) structures of
surveillance and enforcement to ensure that voters whom they
had paid off honour the deal (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Or
consider Kanchan Chandra’s (2004) picture of Indian ‘patronage
democracy’ in what is now the most widely cited study of political
patronage on the subcontinent. India’s citizens do not care for
policies or ideologies, only for the goods and benefits they may
personally receive. They know that politicians only give to their
own—that ‘their’ politicians provide for them and that others
provide for others. And they vote accordingly. Political choice is
thus an ongoing calculation of loss and profit on both sides: ‘Faced
with a choice between parties’, writes Chandra, ‘an individual voter
in a patronage democracy should formulate preferences across
parties by counting heads, preferring the party that represents elites
from her “own” ethnic category to the greatest degree’ (ibid., 13).28
Voters are so caught up in these calculations that they fashion their
social identities with no other aim but to maximise gain: ‘Regardless
of the good they seek’, contends Chandra, Indian voters are
‘instrumental actors who invest in an identity because it offers them
the best available means by which to obtain desired benefits, and
not because such identification is valuable in itself’ (ibid., 11). In
their turn, politicians scramble to buy most votes and to secure for
themselves positions from which they can earn even more (and gain
‘psychic goods’ like prestige) (ibid., 12). The poorer are the voters,
the cheaper their votes. The electoral process is thus a mechanism
of hand-to-mouth barter fuelled by the desperation of poverty and
28
The use of the term ‘ethnic’ to describe South Asian communities may surprise
readers more familiar with descriptions of South Asia as a ‘caste society’. Chandra’s
use of the term follows the widely agreed belief that since India’s independence,
hierarchically arranged, interdependent castes have transformed into independent
groups like ethnic communities vying for economic and political resources, what has
been termed the ‘ethnicisation’ of caste (see p. 30 below; also Michelutti, Chapter 12
in this volume)
Introduction.indd 15
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16 Anastasia Piliavsky
steered by self-serving choice. A billion profiteering voters wielding
the abacus of rational choice is an arresting picture. But is it really
like this? What happens when we move closer in?
Patronage close-up
Pamela Price (Chapter 9) takes us to a village in the former Indian state
of Andhra Pradesh (now in Telangana), where villagers tell her how
they make electoral decisions and why indeed they vote at all. Focusing
on one of south India’s biggest political heroes, the state’s former
(and now late) Chief Minister Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy, better known
as YSR, she reflects on the sources of his popularity. YSR’s widespread
esteem did not come easy. In the hot summer of 2003 he trekked 1500
kilometres on foot across Andhra wearing simple farmer’s dress and
speaking to villagers as he went along. ‘I am not bothered about my
comfort’, he was quoted as saying, ‘I am ready to sacrifice my life for the
wellbeing of the poor’ (Chapter 9, 221). YSR painted himself in moral
hues and he appealed to what people looked for in a politician, and
what they valued more generally when they cast their votes. In 2012,
just months after being re-elected as Chief Minister, YSR’s helicopter
crashed. Posthumous investigations into his and his young son’s vast
fortunes revealed the extent of his nepotism and embezzlement of
public funds. Little came of the irrigation schemes that he promised to
farmers, while his son’s expansive range of businesses flourished. Many
villagers, nevertheless, did not seem to mind: YSR could take whatever
he wished for his family, as long as he was generous to ‘his people’ too.
And that he was. Much of what he had done while in office may look
like corruption, but he also did a great deal for his electors, who still
remember him as a ‘good man’ (manchi manishi), swearing that they
would have voted for him again, had he lived.
Villagers want politicians to provide (reliable supplies of water
and electricity, sugar and kerosene at low prices, high pensions and
interest-free loans) and they vote for those who they believe will ‘do
their work’. Electors’ insistence that politicians ‘get things done’—
what Ward Berenschot (Chapter 8) calls the ‘new pragmatism’ of South
Asia’s post-independence politics—may look like the devolution
of political life into the pursuit of purely instrumental gain. But, as
Price shows, villagers in Andhra value effective politicians both as
essentially useful persons and as good ones. That is, they assess them
Introduction.indd 16
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Introduction 17
in moral rather than practical terms. The terms politicians appeal to
and the terms in which they are judged by electorates are equally
moral. This fact alone makes voting in participants’ eyes a choice, not
a reflex of poverty or a function of greed.
Cross the subcontinent and join Lisa Björkman (Chapter 7) in the
slums of Mumbai, where notoriously ‘corrupt’ politicians are said to
‘bank’ on the votes of the destitute. Here Mr Kamble, an effective
municipal councillor gets water pipes laid and water pressure raised
in the taps; Kamble solves family disputes and helps with college
applications, he saves people’s sons from police and their homes
from demolition. For more than two decades he has been what they
call the area’s ‘social worker’, first as an informal ‘fixer’ and later as
elected councillor. He earns his keep, but after 20 years in politics
he is no magnate. Marching about the slum in plain trousers and
shirt (see image on p. 181, Chapter 7), he needs no flashy jewellery
(or flashy guns and body guards), like the gangster-politicians
described by Lucia Michelutti in UP (Chapter 12), to show that he can
provide. He gets things done and he gets people’s votes.
Leave the metropolis and travel north to rural Rajasthan during
elections (Piliavsky, Chapter 6), where gifts and feasts remain the
essence of electors’ choice. In electoral law such offerings constitute
bribery, but villagers hold a much more nuanced view, distinguishing
carefully between ‘gifts’ and ‘bribes’. In practice, gifts and bribes
may look identical, but the contrast between them is pivotal to how
electors assess candidates and in the end cast their votes. Bribes
are things politicians give when they attempt shamefaced, oneoff transactions. Voters may accept ‘bribes’, but they maintain that
these have no effect on their electoral choices. ‘Gifts’, conversely, are
no cause for shame; in fact, voters expect politicians to give and
complain when they fail to do so, calling this failure ‘corruption’.
The line between gifts and bribes is not economic, but normative.
Whereas ‘bribes’ are self-serving transactions meant solely for profit,
‘gifts’ create (or ought to create) mutually beholden relations which
can become the basis for political ties. Despite a great deal of legal
intimidation, politicians continue to throw lavish feasts, which often
require increasingly ingenuous disguises like fake wedding parties
or funerary feasts. Food remains the ultimate moral gift, which is as
pivotal to elections in rural Rajasthan today as it was in former kingly
courts and jajmani exchanges.
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18 Anastasia Piliavsky
Leave South Asia’s shores and travel together with labour migrants
from Kerala to the Gulf, where you will also find the familiar moral
economy based on patron-client exchange (Osella, Chapter 16).
Despite a great deal of effort by governmental and non-governmental
organisations to liberate migrants from the yoke of ‘informal economy’,
labourers seeking opportunities across the Arabian Sea prefer to
sidestep bureaucracy and follow chains of relations, men whom they
know from home, to the Gulf. The promise of patronage is perilous for
new arrivals, as many old hands make it a lucrative, and often deeply
dishonest, business. As many Malayalis on both sides of the Gulf see
it, brokers ‘operate in the amoral, or altogether immoral, realm of
calculated self-interest’ (Chapter 16, 366). Yet while promises of visas or
good employment often come to nothing, migrants continue to prefer
networks of kith and kin to NGOs. As Osella shows, despite widespread
disappointment in their trade, ‘Gulf-based Malayali entrepreneurs
mobilise their business skills to sustain community “upliftment” back in
Kerala and many help by privileging the recruitment of migrant labour
from among “their own people”’ (Chapter 16, 370; also Osella and Osella
2009). Partha Chatterjee (2004) has similarly shown that for many Indian
slum dwellers it is patronage, and not the institutions of civil society and
state law, that helps when the state fails to protect and provide (see also
de Wit and Burner 2009; Witsoe 2011). Here, as elsewhere, the practical
goods needed and the services which provide them are sought and
offered through a common normative frame in a continuous process of
choice by everyone concerned, however irrational it may seem to those
who cannot recognise, or accept, this frame.
A number of moral conventions persist across space and time
in South Asian politics. The donor-patron ideal has endured for
centuries (perhaps millennia) in a vastly diverse linguistic and cultural
terrain, through maelstroms of political change, and across the many
different, and constantly changing, styles of leadership.29 Whether
in medieval Tibet (Ruegg and Diemberger, Chapters 2 and 15),
18th-century Maratha polities (Guha, Chapter 4) or recent elections
in Andhra Pradesh and Mumbai (Price and Björkman, Chapters 9
and 7), munificence is the mainstay of political rhetoric, action,
judgement and choice. Political giving is never only a matter of
redistributing resources, it is also necessarily a rhetorical act that
29
On the variety of leadership styles in South Asia see studies collected in Price and
Ruud (2010).
Introduction.indd 18
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Introduction 19
conveys largesse as a politician’s virtue. As Price (1989) argued more
than two decades ago, this idea is heir to the persistent, historically
embedded kingship model. To be a raja, one had to display one’s
capacity to provide in grand spectacles of magnificence (see also
M. Mines, Chapter 1, in this volume). Electoral feasts in Rajasthani
villages, pilgrimages undertaken by south Indian politicians and
the extravagant charities of Tamil big-men all dramatise selfdenial and giving away. These dramas have discerning audiences,
whose standards for judgement are often very strict. The range of
presentational styles available to politicians is broad (e.g., Price and
Ruud 2010), yet crucially, giving must appear selfless: boundless,
from the heart, done for the people one ‘loves’.
South Asian history is a parade of many different patrons, some
of whom find a place on the pages of this book: Tibetan sovereigns,
Maratha warlords, Tamil merchant-princes, Chief Ministers, tribal chiefs,
gangsters and mafia bosses, MLAs and policemen, white-clad Gandhians
and royalty, British colonial administrators, ‘every man’s’ politicians and
modern India’s grandest patron of all—Jawaharlal Nehru. What makes
all these characters into ‘patrons’ is the imputed obligation of selfless
munificence and the duty to provide for those whose loyalties they
hope to claim.
What patrons give away varies, depending on their circumstances
and their followers’ demands. It can be land grants made by kings to
vassals, printing presses constructed by Tibetan monarchs for their
lama-clients, temples built by Tamil merchants for communities of
devotees, welfare and subsidy schemes initiated by Chief Ministers,
money, jobs, ‘development’, protection (as in Michelutti’s and Ruud’s
accounts in Chapters 12 and 13) or the ubiquitous administrative
and legal favours arranged by political fixers, policemen and MLAs.
A patron’s generosity, crucially, must not be generalised; it must
come from one person to another. When aimed at ‘one’s own’ people,
generosity forms attachments that are much more substantial than
financial debt. It generates loyalties.
If in the past kings gave land grants and temples, South Asia’s
archetypal political ‘gifts’, the economics of patronage has grown more
precarious now that most patrons are no longer sovereigns with royal
coffers, but elected politicians and government employees, for whom the
state itself has become the chief resource. In her study of negotiations
surrounding the lodging of First Information Reports (FIRs) with the
police, Beatrice Jauregui (Chapter 10) shows how policemen use
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20 Anastasia Piliavsky
legal and administrative restraints as ‘gifts’ or ‘favours’, which they can
choose to grant (or withhold), thereby generating petitioners’ loyalties
and styling themselves beneficent patrons with the power to give and
protect. The legally pivotal and notoriously ‘corrupt’ process of lodging
an FIR reveals that what is at stake in South Asia’s policing practice is
not just bribery or extortion (however important bribes certainly are),
but always also relations with the police who ‘serve the public not as
“impersonal” bureaucrats in Weber’s mould (Weber 1958 [1918]), but as
patrons or providers of access to the state’s legal powers’ (Chapter 10,
257). The same logic structures the ways in which people relate to the
state—via its intermediaries—in the slums of Ahmedabad (Berenschot,
Chapter 8). Here, as elsewhere on the subcontinent, the state controls a
great deal of what is crucial for daily survival—water, subsidies, jobs—
creating legions of elected and informally acting politicians, whose work
consists primarily of helping citizens access the state. In observable
practice the primary job of these politicians is to help their constituents
negotiate bureaucracy’s labyrinths and facilitate access to public services
and goods. But in both popular imagination and politicians’ rhetoric
these efforts appear as personal favours and gifts. Advocates of ‘good
governance’ see this as the end of the state’s impartiality, as corruption’s
reign. Yet in the slums it is precisely partiality—the exchanges, obligations
and bonds among real people by no means indifferent to one another—
which forces the torpid bureaucracy to do its citizens’ work.
New circumstances and exigencies require new types of provision
and displays of largesse. In parts of the subcontinent there has been
an increasing need for protection from both criminals and the state.
Lucia Michelutti and Arild Engelsen Ruud (Chapters 12 and 13) tell
us that in the increasingly ‘criminalised’ political ecologies of UP
and Bangladesh voters increasingly look to politicians to provide
them with security instead of cash, infrastructure and bureaucratic
help. Growing concerns with security in these parts of the region
are part of vicious cycles of political violence among increasingly
‘muscular’ politicians who promise to defend, by whatever means
and at any cost, from the threat which they themselves often pose.
If the economics of politics has changed, the normative structure of
relations has remained in many ways remarkably stable. New leaders
who hail from disadvantaged classes do not have the means of elite
politicians who dominated politics in the decades following 1947.
New leaders parade munificence in other ways: by showing off muscle
and courage, ‘gangster-politicians’ can appear capable of providing
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Introduction 21
almost anything at will. Or, as Björkman shows, even in more dire
circumstances resourcefulness is never only an instrument of security
or a provision operating in an ethical vacuum. Resourcefulness
remains distinctly a virtue. The show of selfless munificence is as
much a part of gangster politician’s work as it is of less violent policy
makers. While current talk of ‘development’ and ‘programmes’ may
seem to mark a shift away from paternalism to programmatic, policydriven governance (Manor 2010a; 2013), observations show that this
appearance is largely misleading: today most ‘development’ does
not target generalised bureaucratic reforms, but offers subsidies and
poverty-relief programmes, jobs, electricity, schools, hand pumps,
paved roads, and latrines (see M. Mines and Price, Chapters 1 and 9 in
this volume).30 In March 2013, for instance, UP’s young Chief Minister,
Akhilesh Yadav, launched 71 development projects, which included
27 roads, a college, a hospital and seven marketing hubs. Not a single
proposal was for programmatic or administrative change (Times of
India, Kanpur edition, 4 March 2013, ‘Chief Minister Akhilesh Yadav
Inaugurates 71 Projects’).
The moral logic and the conflict within
Social scientists have long imagined patronage as a domain of
transactions.31 When they use the word ‘patronage’, what they usually
mean is something politicians dispense (favours, benefits, jobs) to their
followers. A model of patronage as a set of transactions may show
what people exchange. It may even show how resources end up being
distributed. What it does not explain is why exchange takes the forms
that it does, why people care about how well or badly it is enacted
30
The best known and most successful big policy scheme, Sonia Gandhi’s ‘feed the
poor’ NREGA programme, guarantees a set number of days of paid work every year
to every Indian citizen. When welfare schemes are not eponymous, the names and
faces of their political sponsors are always prominently displayed on announcements
of the giveaway sprees, which leave no doubt about their identities. Popularly, these
programmes are known as ‘Sonia’s [Gandhi’s] programme’, ‘Akhilesh’s [Yadav’s]
scheme’ and so on.
31
Eisenstadt and Roniger’s (1980) formidable effort to move patronage to the centre
of social studies, at a time when it had already slipped to the sidelines, and to pull
together the disparate case studies of the 1960s and 1970s into a coherent model is
representative. Their exhaustive list of transactional characteristics of patronage runs
to 19 points, but it fails to provide any more serviceable framework for understanding
what makes patronage such a distinctly important socio-political form.
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22 Anastasia Piliavsky
and why they are so concerned with morally appraising those who
engage in it. None of this can be understood without a sense of the
motivations and values behind the transactions. Because ‘patronage’
describes a particular moral idiom through which transactions are
organised, we cannot understand it as a transactional network.
If patronage is a moral form, the question is: whose morals are
these? The model of individual profit-seeking, which shapes the idea
of ‘clientelism’ in political science, precludes this question, leaving
no room for understanding how South Asian politicians lead, how
their followers follow, how they all decide what to do, what not to do
and how to go about it in the right way. To make sense of all this we
need to grasp what they value in politicians, what they think political
leaders should and should not do and what relations with them
should be like: what we may call a moral logic of relatedness. The
calculus of rational choice offers one very distinctive set of values,
which pivot around the calculating, profit-seeking individual.
The actors themselves, however, insist on the opposite. They say
that instrumental self-advancement is bad and that uncalculating
altruism is good. As they swap gifts for services, they are not just
trading, but also displaying, and hoping to be shown, the good. You
can shove some cash into a voter’s pocket (as I show politicians in
Rajasthan doing in Chapter 6), but this does not itself constitute
an act of ‘patronage’ or guarantee electoral loyalty. Such ‘donations’
can only be thought of as patronal when the giving is perceived as
generosity, and performed to this effect. The local logic of patronage
is not about profiteering. On the contrary, it is a radical denial of
individual self-advancement. Patronal munificence and the client’s
service (seva)—both of which ought to be markedly selfless acts—
affirm social relations, connectedness and society as ultimate values
(see Osella’s Chapter 16 for more on that). Giving and serving as
such are necessarily exertions for another’s sake. Shows of patronal
munificence display the will to give away, something the picture of
self-serving appropriation turns upside down, making it impossible
to grasp the inner rationale of patron-client proceedings.
The idea of selflessness is captured by the language of kin,
which is often used in patron-client relations. The idea of patron
as parent is very old, and traditionally royalty and patron-deities
have been referred to as ‘parents’, or maa-i-baap (literally, mother
and father). Parental honorifics have persisted in popular use
Introduction.indd 22
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Introduction 23
and in villages across northern India people still call policemen,
bureaucrats and parliamentarians just that—maa-i-baap (Roy 1965,
560; Saxena 1998, 494; Chapter 6 in this volume). Gandhi is still
remembered as ‘Bapuji’, or honourable father. In some places the
language of parenthood has given way to talk of dadas (‘elder
brothers’ or ‘grandfathers’) (Hansen 2001, 72), but the moral
significance of the new terms has remained—dadas are elder
kinfolk and they ought to act as such: with selfless devotion and
boundless love. Whether or not they in fact do this is a wholly
different matter. The language of kinship as such, insofar as it
expresses what Marshall Sahlins called the ‘mutuality of being’
(2011, 10), rejects the individual self in favour of relations in which
individuals give themselves away, often quite literally via selfconstituting ‘gifts’. As in Jean-François Bayart’s Africa (2009), on
the subcontinent ‘feeding-and-eating’ is the most pervasive cultural
idiom (and act) of self-diffusion. At times of election, victuals are
politically vital and their distribution forms the lifeline of voters’
identification with politians (Piliavsky, Chapter 6). ‘Feeding and
eating’ is the central idiom in popular assessments of politicians:
‘feeding’ refers to the correct performance of patronly duty and
‘eating’ describes its betrayal, or ‘corruption’ (ibid.; also Chapter 9).
The moral logic of selflessness marks the line between two classes
of South Asian political personages: political patrons proper and the
vast class of political ‘fixers’. In practice, patrons and fixers ply the
same trade: both extract money and political support in exchange
for access to state resources (Berenschot and Osella Chapters 8 and
16). Yet in popular discourse patrons and fixers stand on opposite
ends of the moral spectrum: patrons are held in esteem and fixers are
scorned (often with derogatory terms like dalaal, ‘fixer’, or chamcha,
‘sycophant’). The contrast has nothing to do with differences in what
both do in practice, but in the moral assessment of motives that
people ascribe to their work. A patron does what he does—ought to
do what he does—out of selfless devotion and a fixer does it for gain.
As Berenschot’s account (Chapter 8) makes plain, ‘patrons’ and ‘fixers’
are not different persons, but different evaluative terms that can be
used to describe the same person under different circumstances or be
put to instrumental use. An MP who should protect and provide, but
who instead extorts bribes, may be dismissed as a ‘fixer’. A petitioner
may plead with a professional fixer with honorifics used for patrons
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24 Anastasia Piliavsky
in hope of receiving help at no cost; upwardly mobile fixers may offer
services to clients at no cost to gain patronal status, and perhaps even
get elected.32
The patron–client relation is not a stable arrangement or a
freestanding phenomenon, but a normative formula. While the
roles remain constant, the practical content of such relations alters
ceaselessly and the actors are ever changing, often switching back and
forth between the two roles, as suits their purposes. A head of police
station in UP may play the patron with petitioners, but he is also a
client of his rank superiors and the local MLA. As Jauregui suggests
(Chapter 10), when police officers move in and out of roles of patron
and client, the moral basis for their actions also shifts. Patrons and
clients may swap parts. In Seyfort Ruegg’s medieval Tibet (Chapter 2)
princes and preceptor-monks were ‘patrons’ and ‘clients’ in turn;
asymmetry of status seesawed as each gave to and accepted from the
other the material means for life and the religious validation for rule.
During electoral campaigns candidates play the patron. They host
feasts and give away hundreds of thousands of rupees. If they hope
for a re-election, they will carry on in the same mode: dole out cash,
build roads, ‘rescue from the police’ (thana bacchana) and arrange
jobs for their constituents. But when they appeal to constituents, they
turn the donor–donee relationship upside down, promising ‘selfless
service’ (seva) in return for the ‘gift of a vote’ (mat daan). Or, when
pressed to deliver what they had promised, politicians hide behind
the rhetoric of seva, styling themselves ‘servants of state’—not patrons
but themselves clients with no duty or power to provide (Chapter 6).
Yet however much patrons and clients may improvise, they return to
the keynotes of service and gift.
This composition is not in symphonic harmony, as its lofty morals
suggest, but in conflict that lies, as Gilmartin shows, at the very
heart of patronage: ‘An effective patron is enmeshed in a world
of perpetual calculation of costs and benefits, even as he projects
an image of moral transcendence over the strategic connections
and calculations on which his position relies’ (Chapter 5, 126).
Generosity requires wherewithal, which patrons must accumulate,
by whatever means, and so risk a clash of high morals and
32
For more on the moral complexities of political fixers’ careers, see chapters by
Osella, Björkman and Berenschot in this volume.
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Introduction 25
instrumentalism, which comprises its material base. To satisfy the
patronal ideal, patrons must betray it.33 The rhetoric of selfless
love often hides brutal distortion and cynical profiteering: and the
more brutal the politics, the more politicians speak of ‘love’ (see
Ruud, Chapter 13). As Diane Mines (Chapter 3) shows, the threat
that lurks behind the promise of patronage and the fear of losing
patronal bonds often suffuses low-caste, or tribal, accounts of their
past (see also Price 2006).
Patrons can never deliver as much as their clients expect them to.
This is particularly so if they are not royal sovereigns, but politicians
or government officers with limited legitimate means. They may use
ostentation to compensate for their inability to provide, as Mattison
Mines (Chapter 1) reports from Tamil Nadu. But such performances
convince few, making electoral politics a desperate affair, full of hope
and disenchantment, in which politicians are perennially suspected
of hypocrisy, cynicism and sinister intent (Piliavsky, Chapter 6). In
cities and villages across the subcontinent people say that politics
is in essence degenerate—‘dirty’ (Ruud 2001; also Price, Chapter 9).
This inner conflict is reflected voluminously in reports on electoral
corruption and excessive campaign spending, which regularly agitate
South Asia’s middle-class imagination and its projections in the
international press.
In patron–client relations the balance of forces is always liable
to tilt, till the scales collapse, and relations which should be mutual
become coercive. Then patronage turns into slavery, indenture or
other forms of inequality with no legitimate moral base. When that
happens, it ceases to be ‘patronage’. As John Powell noted some time
ago, ‘patron-client ties clearly are different from other ties which
might bind parties unequal in status … such as relationships based
on coercion, authority, manipulation and so forth. Such elements
may be present in the patron-client pattern, but if they come to be
dominant, the tie is no longer a patron-client relationship’ (1970,
412). When the moral form falls to pieces, what it leaves behind is
a skeleton of transactions—the bare payments (or appropriations)
33
This tension is echoed in earlier writings on patronage, which remarked on the
built-in contradiction between the exercise of power on the one hand and the
assertion of solidarity on the other (e.g., Roniger 1994, 4). It also tracks Bayly’s
(1973; 1983) distinction between dharmic and vakil patronage, which I note above.
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26 Anastasia Piliavsky
and services (at times forced)—which analysts who view patronage
as a set of transactions readily mistake for the real thing. The ugly
practical consequences of patronage, when bonds of hierarchy
become a struggle of unequals, are all too evident. As Nicolas Martin’s
stark account of Pakistan illustrates (Chapter 14), a patronage which
has become indenture can bring social catastrophe (see also Breman
1974). In the Pakistani Punjab patronal masters trap client slaves in
cycles of chronic debted and bondage, where clients languish for
generations without the protection of morals or a state law (itself
a plaything of their masters). These grim pictures have long led
their interpreters to see patronage as a mere gloss for abuse. But
the client slaves no longer perceive their masters as ‘patrons’ who
provide and protect.
Fear that the normative frame is just a mask for the politics of greed
and that patronage can at any moment disintegrate into coercion was
there long before electoral politics reached the subcontinent. It has
always been felt most acutely by the most marginal and vulnerable
service-groups (often ‘tribal’). In her account of one such community,
the Valaiyars of South India, Diane Mines (Chapter 3) relates how
hopes for good patrons and fears of bad ones structure Valaiyars’
historical narratives and define their sense of self, present and past.
Good patrons make life good and bad ones make it intolerable.
Which particular circumstances precipitate momentary or longer-term
collapses in patronage is a question for historians. But history shows
that patronage, in its intrinsic moral ambivalence, is a highly unstable
practical arrangement with material consequences which shade from
the magnificent to the appalling, as people across South Asia readily
recognise. Mattison Mines (Chapter 1) offers colourful snapshots of
patronage’s brighter side: wealthy Tamil big-men using their fortunes
to develop travellers’ lodgings, educational institutions, temples and
medical services for the poor. No one demanded these from them.
They were what a progressive patron did spontaneously for the
common good. Another vivid example of ‘good patronage’ comes from
medieval Tibet. There, Hildegard Diemberger (Chapter 15) shows, the
great 15th-century efflorescence of religious and literary production
emerged from relations between princely patrons who sponsored the
‘printing revolution’ and Buddhist monks who printed the books.
The intense, if always unstable, patronage bonds she describes drove
technological and aesthetic innovation, along with much cultural and
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Introduction 27
economic advancement—as they did in Italy during the Renaissance.
This account evokes the one context in Euro-American discourse in
which patronage remains exempt from derision: artistic production,
which still relies substantially, and without stigma, on the good will
of patrons.
Patronage as politics
In mid-19th-century Britain political debates focused intensely on
elections and the legal and procedural standards, which were still
to be clearly established. By the 1870s, the government had adopted
the secret ballot and a body of electoral law, both of which travelled
to India in the early 20th century, as elections were introduced. The
debate hinged on a crucial distinction—between good and bad ways
for politicians to influence voters. This was no easy task, and the
elusive difference between ‘due’ and ‘undue’ influence was disputed
for four decades. At stake was the delicate balance between voters’
freedom to choose and politicians’ freedom to sway their decisions,
on which democracy rests. The voters’ freedom to choose was
required by the democratic mandate of ‘people’s sovereignty’ and the
politicians’ freedom to sway voters’ choice was necessary for electoral
politics to work at all. As Gilmartin explains (in Chapter 5), political
thinkers of the time espoused the ideal of free choice as the basis
for democratic governance, but also recognised that electoral politics
could not take place without voters’ attachments to politicians, most
of whom were no mere equals of their constituents, but ‘men of
influence’. They recognised that patronage was unavoidable—and
not necessarily undesirable—in democratic practice. It was not a
question of whether politicians could patronise voters, but of how
they should do so. Electoral law was not intended to eradicate
patronage, but to separate good patronage from the bad. George
Grote, historian, radical politician and advocate of the secret ballot,
argued that while ‘pressure’ or the ‘purchase’ of votes threatened the
people’s sovereignty, there was nothing wrong with the ‘influence
of wealth and station’, which naturally—and legitimately—drew
voters to follow it. ‘“Good” patronage thus provided a model for how
democratic politics ought to operate’ (Chapter 5, 130).
The moral vision of liberal democrats today retains no trace of
this picture. Since the 19th century, the freely choosing individual
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28 Anastasia Piliavsky
has been sheltered from ‘external influences’ in the isoloir of the
voting booth, has triumphed over patrons and clients. We may no
longer deny the practical co-presence of patronage and democracy,
old and new, but we still find it difficult to believe that the two can
be morally commensurate.34 To grasp how peculiar this resistance
really is, try running a simple thought experiment. Recall the liberal
master principles of good democratic practice: equality and freedom
of choice. Imagine a voter who decides to exchange her vote for
a bicycle she wants or needs. Imagine both she and the candidate
with whom she made a deal are both perfectly honest and each
gives their due. Does this subvert the principles of choice by equal
and free individuals? It does not. Yet does it strike us as morally
acceptable? Probably not. Yet a purchase is as pure an exercise
of individual free choice as there can be. What is upsetting us in
this picture? Why should we think so poorly of swapping votes for
bicycles? We do so because we believe both voter and politician are
merely advancing their personal interests. Sound political choices
should emerge from concern for the greater social good, and be
driven by policies and ideologies whose benefits stretch beyond any
individual’s interests or lifespan. Or so we think. Paradoxically, it
is the very rational-choice theorists, and other hardened neoliberal
champions of reasoned advancement of individual selves who,
when it comes to democracy, believe ‘good’ political judgement
must be completely selfless. What is it about democracy that makes
egocentric and wholly ‘free’ choice appear so reprehensible, even
to avowed egoists?
Whatever institutional arrangements people live under, or
ideologies they espouse, from feudal to fiercely individualist, their
politics is necessarily shaped by a relational morality: a set of
ideas about how those who govern and those they govern should
relate to each other, and conceptions of political community which
issue from these ideas. When democracy meets individualism, it
generates a contradiction: an explicit denial of sociality alongside
a demand for the highest levels of selfless dedication from citizens.
‘Corruption’, as defined by Transparency International or decried
by Anna Hazare, encapsulates this denial. In its official definition
corruption is the ‘misuse of public office for private gain’, the
34
Gilmartin makes the same point (Chapter 5).
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Introduction 29
capture of government by the ‘interests’ of family, friends, tribe
or any other community, and indeed by relations between one
particular person and any other. Corruption is the eruption of
sociality into governance.
But how can representative democracy work without particular
relations—relations of real human beings to other human beings?
What are elections if not acts of preference in which politicians bid
for voters’ exclusive loyalties and voters select the candidate of their
choice? More broadly, what is democratic representation if not a social
relation? Articulations of this relation vary from culture to culture
(Spencer 1997), but however hard cosmopolitan political theory tries to
purge politics of sociality—its own grounds for representative relations
necessarily invoke society as a whole. The morals of relatedness carry
special weight in representative democracies, which do not only require
intense and regular involvement of the governors with the governed,
but authorise such relations under the banner of ‘representation’. It is
precisely because neoliberal theorists assign to political representation
such great moral significance that they find patronage-based democracy
so deeply offensive.
There is no ready single equivalent to the English word ‘patron’
in the Indian languages. The many appellations (raja, jajman,
periyar) and common terms of address (bhaiya, anndata, maa-ibaap, dada) South Asians use for ‘patrons’ cannot be captured by
a single term as in the languages of Europe. The very fact that
the semantic field is too broad and important to essentialise in
this way suggests that the term’s socio-political implications
are much broader than words like ‘sponsor’, ‘master’ or ‘boss’,
the meanings routinely attached to the Latinate ‘patron’ in the
Romance and Germanic languages.35 The studies collected here
show that ‘patronage’ does not apply to a narrowly defined set of
political relations. It encompasses the fundamental principles of
social life far beyond ‘the political’, in printing in medieval Tibet
(Diemberger, Chapter 15), relations between gods and humans
(Michelutti, Chapter 12) or in the lives of Keralan migrants in the
Gulf (Osella, Chapter 16).
Political patronage is an expression of the broad moral sense
that shapes the ways in which people relate across social levels
35
For more on the sense of ‘patron’ in French, see Ruegg (Chapter 2) in this volume.
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30 Anastasia Piliavsky
and contexts. The essence of this moral formulation is the idea
that in South Asia differences of rank do not prevent relations, but
promote intimacy between parties in distinct and complementary
roles. The roles themselves and the people who play them are
defined vis-à-vis others, and the values their occupants espouse are
oriented towards relations and sociality. Louis Dumont called this
social apperception ‘holism’, contrasting it with the anti-societal
orientation of the modern West (1980; 1986), whose inhabitants
imagine that human dignity and respectful relations can arise only
from a basic condition of sameness: the state of being individual, or
identically unique. From this angle, differences of rank and power
look morally distorting in themselves.
Many have argued that the post-colonial democratisation of
the subcontinent levelled social hierarchies in the region. South
Asia’s masses, the argument goes, no longer heed traditional
elites, but seek instead to topple them. Political mobilisation is
no longer typically ‘vertical’, but increasingly ‘horizontal’ (intracaste) (Breman 1996, 262). The logic of caste has lost its legitimacy
and whilst ‘castes’ have not vanished, the order of ranked and
mutually dependent communities has given way to a collection of
independent ‘societies’ (samaajs) or ‘ethnic groups’ (e.g., Chandra
2004; Michelutti 2008).36 This account captures much of what has
happened in South Asia’s changing recent past. It frames the story
of many new social formations, political players and parties. What it
fails to reveal, and indeed obscures, is a central structuring principle
at work behind the plotline. If the imagined totality of caste is no
longer what it seemed to earlier lyricists of timeless ‘village India’,
the relational principles of mutual dependence and intimacy across
differences of rank have not lost their force. The persistence of
patronage in shaping the politics of the region is the strongest
possible testimony to this.
Analysts of South Asian politics often say that local politicians
are less representatives and more rulers who covert citizens into
subjects and take away their electors’ prerogative to authorise
governance. The royal stage set of popular politics—the crowns,
36
Literature on the decline of hierarchy is vast. Representative accounts include
Béteille (1965), Kothari (2010 [1970]), Barnett (1975), Harriss (1982), Robinson
(1988), Frankel and Rao (1989–1990), Breman (1996), Fuller (1996), Panini
(1996), Seth (1999) and Michelutti (2008). For a helpful overview of this literature,
see Manor (2010b).
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Introduction 31
garlands and genuflections—appears to endorse this view. But are
the citizens of South Asia utterly stripped of their sovereignty and
the leaders they choose just sovereigns in new guise? Democratic
representation is both a mode of political authorisation and a social
relation through which governance is organised. In Europe and the
United States that relation has been conceived, at least since the
17th century, as a contract, or explicit agreement between electors
and those they elect to govern on their behalf. Representation is
always an imperfect substitute for the citizens’ direct involvement
in governance, a way to render most citizens who are in fact
absent from government vicariously present with in it. Political
representatives both stand in for and stand for those whom they
represent. The substitution of one person for another is never a
straightforward cognitive process, and does not explain how exactly
any person can ‘stand for’—or represent—any other.37 The answer
lies in the ways that people conceptualise relations on which they
can rely, and more specifically, in how they imagine identifying
with one another.38 Cosmopolitan political theory has privileged
identification through contract, placing it above all others, which
are now illegible, like the rival political systems which they uphold.
In South Asia, no less than elsewhere, identification—and hence
‘representation’—forms the centre of politics, audible perhaps most
loudly in the ubiquitous promise of politicians to work for their
people and the voters’ stated desire to elect their men.
South Asian patronage-politics is no more grotesque than politics
anywhere else. Its high normative code, however often and brutally
betrayed in practice, prescribes distinctive ways of identifying with
politicians and distinctive ways of asserting demands on them. Local
forms of political identification, which we gloss as ‘patron–clientage’, are
37
Some years ago Jonathan Spencer (1997) bade anthropologists investigate
the content of democratic representation. But aside from Michelutti’s
(2004; 2008; Chapter 12 in this volume) accounts of substantive (and divinely
inspired) identification of citizens with their political leaders, this call remains
unanswered. In the only available collection of anthropological studies of democracy
(Paley 2008) the term ‘representation’ appears only a dozen times, and in none of
them queryingly.
38
Some anthropologists have referred to indigenous forms of political representation
and other democratic forms as ‘vernacular’ and the process of creating
them as ‘vernacularisation’ (e.g., Michelutti 2004; 2008; Tanabe 2007; Neyazi
et al. 2014). This leaves one wondering what kind of democracy is not vernacular
or where we may be able to find it.
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32 Anastasia Piliavsky
often bonds of intense intimacy: relations of common substance, shared
divine origins and blood (e.g., Price 1989; Spencer 1997; Michelutti 2004;
2008; Chapter 12 in this volume). They are as substantial as contractual
links (and arguably often more so) and they generate equally powerful
political loyalties. It is not only that people may appeal to patronage
to resist political pressures or demand resources from governments
(à la Chatterjee 2004).39 Patronage itself involves entitlements and
obligations, which are politically constitutive in their own right, and
which oblige politicians to understand, convey and respond to their
constituents’ needs. Ideally, patrons are a perfect vessel for the people’s
rightful capacity to govern themselves—for their sovereignty. (If rarely
or never so in fact.)
In South Asia, as in Europe or the United States, the gulf between
ideal and actual politicians is vast and expressed most starkly and
ubiquitously in rumours of ‘corruption’—the global gloss for all
that is wrong with the politics of our dreams. These dreams differ
from place to place like the narratives of their betrayal. As several
authors in this volume show, the meanings of ‘corruption’ on the
subcontinent carry differing messages. If cosmopolitan followers of
Anna Hazare in Bombay (Björkman, Chapter 7) equate patronage
with ‘corruption’, for many others it is the distortion of good, proper
patronage which is ‘corrupt’. Across the subcontinent, people hold
few illusions about the goodness of politicians, but when leaders
show loyalty to ‘their men’—by whatever means—they attract intense
admiration. In Kerala, townsmen accuse politicians of corruption not
when they ‘buy’ electoral loyalties, but when they fail to deliver on
their promises (Osella, Chapter 16; also Osella and Osella 2000a).
For villagers in Andhra Pradesh ‘corruption’ is not the embezzlement
of public funds, but the politicians’ failure to share its spoils properly
(Price, Chapter 9). Or, in the words of an Oriya man cited by Wilkinson
(Chapter 11), ‘all politicians eat, but the BJD [regional Party] eats less’.
In all of these formulations ‘corruption’ is not the misuse of public
office for private gain, but the collapse of ‘good patronage’—when
patron-politicians prove instrumental, selfish and tight.
39
Appadurai (1990), Osella and Osella (1996), de Neve (2000), Staples (2003),
Berenschot and Osella (Chapters 8 and 16) in this volume, show that in South Asia
political patronage involves greater reciprocity than earlier studies of clientelism
have assumed. In a recent ethnography, Ajantha Subrahmanian (2009) showed how
Keralan fishermen deploy the language of patronage—not the language of rights—to
claim benefits from the state.
Introduction.indd 32
03/04/14 4:49 PM
Introduction 33
The idea that hierarchy may form the basis for democratic governance
may look less incongruous if we turn back to the Euro-American origins
of modern democratic rule. When representative governments were first
established in Europe and the United States, few thought of democracy
as an essentially egalitarian or individualist political form. Political
thinkers of the time, either side of the Atlantic, understood that the
relationship between governed and governors—whether elected,
divinely ordained or otherwise—is necessarily ranked. Rousseau, for
instance, (1984 [1754]) described representative democracy as ‘elective
aristocracy’, a system that embraced social differences and put them
to political ends. The Founding Fathers who drafted the American
Constitution were not egalitarians, and neither were the citizens of
Ancient Athens, the only state of any scale where democracy ever
existed in its ideal, direct form (e.g., Dunn 2005, 24–44). Both were
slave-owning societies and both comfortably excluded women from
franchise. Democracy departed from other governmental forms not
by levelling differences between electors and politicians, or between
people more generally, but by allowing the ordinary citizen to place the
extraordinary politician above himself (Manin 1997, especially Chapters
3 and 4). The grounds for choice never included only merit (talent,
charisma, experience), but also inherited status and wealth, both of
which had great importance for electors in 18th-century Europe and the
United States.
Idols in Westminster
In August 2013 the Daily Telegraph reported an embarrassment:
British Members of Parliament in Westminster were found
‘worshipping at the feet of idols like Thatcher and Churchill’
(2 August 2013). Apparently, it is the parliamentarians’ custom to
rub the feet of statues of their parties’ tutelary patrons—Thatcher
for Tories, Clement Attlee for Labour and David George Lloyd for Lib
Dems. But in 2013 the practice was formally banned, not just because
it threatened the condition of the four statues outside the Commons
chamber, but because it caused a scandal like the incident in Jodhpur.
Politics was marred by ‘worship’. The ‘idols’ in Westminster were only
statues, not living politicians, and one could see the MPs’ practice as
a charming ‘superstition’, but it pressed an awkward question: if our
own parties and politicians have patrons, may our own politics too be
subject to the unreason of personal bonds? In the 1830s George Grote
Introduction.indd 33
03/04/14 4:49 PM
34 Anastasia Piliavsky
would not have opposed such a claim nor found it upsetting. But
this was a long time ago. By now the idea of abstracted, impersonal,
asocial governance has prevailed as the sole possible model for good
governance. Bizarrely enough, it is an idea which deprives democracy
of its demos and politics of its content: the ‘interests’ and ‘influences’,
which we call ‘corruption’, yet without which electoral politics would
simply cease.
In the Summer of 2013 I met the priest who had designed
Vasundhara Raje’s poster. He turned out no lunatic, but astute, witty
and conspicuously sane. He cast the Chief Minister in the image of
the bread-giving goddess because, he explained, she developed the
midday meal scheme in Rajasthan’s primary schools. ‘In India we
respect seniors and people who have the power to bring good to their
people. This is an old Indian tradition. Devotion is a way to show our
respect’. A year earlier, one of Miss Raje’s cabinet ministers caused
similar commotion by claiming he worshiped her icon every day.
He shrugged off suggestions that there might be anything perverse
about this by insisting the BJP was a family and that he deferred to
Raje as he would to his own mother. Indeed, what the Anglophone
press may deride as ‘idolatry’ is a widespread South Asian form of
deference to authority, whether democratic or divine (e.g., Bate
2009). The people cast their chiefs, patron-deities, ancestors, elders
and MPs in the role of ‘patrons’, not only entitling them to special
honours and privileges but making them responsible—obliging
them to provide, protect and stand accountable for their actions. In
practice, this logic may sometimes fare much better than other logics
(see chapters by Mattison Mines, Osella and Diemberger), and
sometimes much worse (see chapters by Martin and Michelutti).
But however it manifests itself, and however we judge its many
manifestations, we can ignore it only at the expense of comprehension.
To see a similar set of principles at work elsewhere, we need
only look back a century in the history of Britain. 19th-century
commentators on British politics recognised and accepted that
persons who were superior (whether by achievement or birth) were
obliged by their status to bear a greater load of responsibility, making
them the electors’ natural, and indeed most appropriate, choice
(Gilmartin, Chapter 5). As Tocqueville remarked in his own memoirs,
the early days of the French Republic—before the French countryside
was infested with talk of ‘degrading equality’ (already rampant in
Introduction.indd 34
03/04/14 4:49 PM
Introduction 35
the United States)—peasants attached themselves to politicians-elect
(including Tocqueville himself) with exceptional fervour (1896, 127).
For French peasants in the mid-19th century, inequality was not
democracy’s foe. On the contrary, it provided political representation
with a solid structure of responsibility: politicians were grandees who
had to act in ways which were commensurate with their standing.
Liberal theorists and champions of democracy may choose to tell
themselves that democracy proper raises politics above inequality
and particular social bonds. But if to them the politics of South Asia—
and much of the rest of the world—still appears unprincipled, it is
because among them its principles remain so poorly understood.
Introduction.indd 35
03/04/14 4:49 PM
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