The success of a political system depends not only on its constitution but
also on its political culture.
Colin Bradley
BA Politics & History
A constitution is often defined as a “set of rules, written and unwritten, that seek to establish
the duties, powers and functions of the various institutions of government, regulate the
relationships between them and define the relationship between the state and the individual”
(Heywood, 2007:316; see Stone Sweet 2000). While the written rules are enshrined in a text
called the constitution, the unwritten rules find their source in the country’s political culture,
namely its values and beliefs which inherently change over time. The dynamics between the
written constitution, whether it is codified in a text or not, and the country’s political culture
is crucial to the understanding of the development of a political system.
This article will analyse the relationship between a country’s constitution and its political
culture. It will further examine the influence a political culture has on the enforcement of a
constitution and the consequences this has for the political system. If will also examine if
these components create the political stability necessary for a democratic system to survive.
Taking examples from written and codified constitutions in addition to partially written and
uncodified constitutions, this article will base its argument in the frequently cited work of
Almond and Verba (1963) on political culture as well as Chubb’s analysis of the interaction
between constitutions and political culture in an Irish context. Identifying the significance of
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the relationship between a constitution and the political culture that surrounds it, Chubb
(1970:61) stated:
A constitution will reflect the basic values of the community at the time of its
formation, but values will inevitably change, and standards and practices in the
community become different from those prevailing when the constitution was
written.
This article begins by examining the constitution as an entity, the types of constitutions that
exist, and the role a constitution plays in a political system. The paper will then move on to
reviewing the role of political culture, or ‘standards and practices in the community’ as
referred to by Chubb, before we explore the role of judicial/constitutional review in
interpretation of a constitution to reflect the country’s changing political culture, social values
and beliefs.
What is a constitution? A constitution is a set of rules that seeks to establish the duties,
powers and functions of the various institutions of state, regulate the relationship between
them, and define the relationship between the state and the individual (Heywood, 2000: 196).
It often identifies the separation of powers between the institutions of state, the executive, the
legislature and the judiciary. A constitution often begins with a preamble, which sets out the
aspirations of the nation, and how the country aims to uphold its principles and values.
Following this are the various articles that citizens are obliged to abide by, which may
include a Bill of Rights. Blondel (1995: 227) cites the drafting of a constitution as a feat of
political engineering, while Sartori (1997: 200) contends that constitutions are procedures
that are designed to ensure a controlled exercise of power. This point is supported by Chubb
(1970:61) when he says ‘the constitution is an instrument through which the government can
be controlled’. A constitution can also be a guiding system for political actors according to
Almond and Verba (1963) who state:
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In liberal democratic political systems, the configuration of institutions and
groups is based in large part on constitutional arrangements deliberately
designed to implement the norms of the political system.
The constitution may also set out the rights of citizens and the values the society aspires to,
while also promoting and fostering stability. However, the constitution in itself cannot
guarantee that these rights, values or aspirations are practiced, or indeed that stability is
maintained. This can be conditional on the political system the constitution is set against and
the political culture of the country in question. In fact, constitutions are often written after a
time of crisis or conflict, offer a new direction to the country and seek to move beyond the
situation that necessitated their creation or amendment.
One must examine the events,
circumstances and context at the time of drafting to gain a true understanding of the founding
principles of a constitution. These events and circumstances that are present at the time of
drafting could also be classified as the political culture of the time, so we can see here the
linkage between drafting a constitution itself and the political culture of the time.
Generally there are two types of constitution, a written and codified constitution and a
partially written and uncodified constitution. According to Heywood (2000: 197) written and
codified constitutions draw together key constitutional provisions within one single, legal
document. These documents are authoritative, and constitute the highest law in the land or
primary law as it is also known. Many of these written and codified constitutions are long
standing, Sartori (1997: 197) points out that of the 170 written constitutions in today’s world,
more than half were written before 1974. These long established documents often have
provisions engrained in them can only be amended or abolished through special procedures
that are more stringent than that required of ordinary legislation, e.g. referendum. This
process is more complicated than that employed for statue law (Heywood, 2000: 197) as we
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will see further on. This feature of written and codified constitutions brings us back to
Chubbs’ contention in the introduction, that as society changes constitutions may become
dated and the constitution may not reflect the modern society it now seeks to preside over.
For partially written and uncodified constitutions, the role of tradition, precedent and custom
is deserving of consideration. Some may argue that citizens’ rights can be at risk without a
written and codified constitution, because the law is based on the interpretation of the
presiding judges, (judicial interpretation). However, in order to promote stability, checks and
balances are put in place to prevent these partially written and uncodified constitutions being
changed without due diligence. The nation most often cited for not having a partially written
and uncodified constitution is the United Kingdom. Though it is not entirely accurate to say
the constitution is unwritten. The British ‘constitution’ is in fact represented in written
documents; within statutes, court judgements and treaties and has its foundations in the
Magna Carta, Act of Union and the Bill of Rights. The statutes that are passed in the British
Parliament give parliamentary sovereignty and act as the United Kingdom’s supreme and
final source of law. Therefore, in order to amend the partially written uncodified constitution
of the United Kingdom, the parliament simply has to pass a new Act of Parliament. As such,
all parliamentary legislation is of equal validity and effectiveness. Sovereignty and legal
authority is as a result, vested in the British parliament (Heywood, 2000: 197). As stated in
our introduction a constitution sets out citizens’ rights, this can be done via written and
codified or partially written and uncodified constitutions as we have illustrated.
The practice of a constitution can be examined if we look at the Hungarian constitution. In
January 2012 amendments came into effect in the Hungarian Constitution. Replacing the
Communist-era Constitution of 1949, this positioned Hungary as the only ex-Soviet country
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that did not enact a new Constitution with the fall of Communism in 1989. The new
constitution has been widely criticised, with many believing that it undercuts the fundamental
democratic principles. Pablo Gorondi (cited in The Washington Times, 18 April, 2011)
described it as being socially and fiscally conservative (quoted in The Washington Times, 18
April 2011). It aims to reduce the public deficit below 50% of GDP, and in order to do this,
the powers of the Constitutional Court on budgetary and tax matters are restricted until this
reduction occurs. One must consider the social impact that the measures have on the citizens
of Hungary. In opposition to the new Constitution, tens of thousands of citizens took to the
streets, accusing their government of violating their rights. In this instance we can ask if these
new measures violate constitutional norms, even though the amendments were
democratically implemented. One could argue yes, given the amount of international
condemnation that has been voiced, especially within the European Union on the matter.
Remaining with the Hungarian situation, new media laws have also been put into effect with
the government now effectively controlling the media. This could be because the role of the
media in modern society cannot be understated. The media is the main artery for information
dissemination to the public, therefore holding great influence. Almond and Verba (1963: 79)
state that the ‘media of public communication, especially television and radio, have
contributed markedly to the development of the “rising expectations” of citizens’. In fact this
is why others refer to the media’s position in a political system as the fourth branch of
government, or fourth pillar of democracy (Donohue et al, 1995:115). While citizens are free
to make their own decisions in relation to political affairs, the media plays a significant role.
This is why it is worrying that the Hungarian constitution now wishes to limit the role of the
media in the constitution; this affects the political culture and if we believe that political
culture plays a role in the political system then this is affected by extension. A clear example
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of the link between the three and how they interact with one another which leads us to the
direct link between constitutions and the political system.
Blondel (1995: 16) asks the question ‘why is there a political or governmental “system” at
all? Why do we need a mechanism to allocate values in society?’ To answer Blondel’s
question we turn to Thomas Hobbes and his 1651 work, The Leviathan. Hobbes spoke of a
‘war of all against all’ should the world turn into a state of anarchy, using the analogy of a
‘Leviathan’ to promote his ideas. Hobbes underlines the need for ‘sufficient authority’ to
promote order. For that reason, can a political system, relying on a constitution, either written
and codified or partially written and uncodified, provide the kind of structure and order that
citizens rely on for stability and hence prevent a state of anarchy in the system? Constitutions
are valued because they are a means of constraining government and protecting freedom
(Heywood, 2000: 198), both important factors in a functioning democracy, but reliant on the
constitution being practiced in accordance with its aspirations, where applicable. Heywood is
basically pointing out that the constitution can protect the freedom of the citizen by
constraining radical actions on behalf of the government. That is why stability in the
constitution is essential, why written and codified constitutions, as stated earlier, are more
difficult to amend and why partially written and uncodified constitutions still often require
Acts of parliament to be amended.
Although we accept with both types of constitution, that they have a role to play in
maintaining stability in a political system, constitutional amendments can often be required to
update them. Once more, referring back to Chubb from our introduction, the constitution is
drafted for the needs of the time, the changing political landscape can often leave the
document dated and behind the times. This is not to say that having the constitution as a
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constant and not easily changed is negative. Constitutional amendments can take place when
the need arises; for example, a source of debate in Irish politics at present is whether or not
Ireland needs a referendum on the new fiscal treaty from the European Union. This treaty,
which creates tougher budgetary rules, binding Eurozone members to new measures in an
effort to underpin the single currency, will have a substantial impact on Irish fiscal policy for
years to come. The Government has requested that the Attorney General review the text of
the treaty, to determine whether or not the treaty is in compliance with our constitution. If
not, there would be a necessity to hold a referendum. The general reaction of the people at a
superficial level is that a referendum would be the preferred option, but this is not binding.
Whether or not the treaty is in contravention to the constitution will decide if a referendum is
required or not. Is this the democratic resolution? This paper will not attempt to answer that
question, what can be said for certain though, is that this is the constitutional resolution.
This level of stability in preventing needless changes to a constitution can be positive
however, frequent revisions are unsettling and can cause the public to become apprehensive
of the system, as with Belgium. The Belgian constitution has been amended twenty-three
times since the 1994 text was ratified. It is worrying that a constitution should need to be
amended so often, and it is clear that there are serious flaws in the system, which needs to be
addressed. Excessive amending is not conducive to stability, or for the needs of citizens who
abide by it. For that reason, constitutional architects must make provisions for future change
because amendments are necessary, because the very nature of a state is ever changing with
significant shifts in societal values or political culture. Which brings us on to the next area
this article will consider, namely political culture.
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Chubb (1970: 43) refers to political culture as the general pattern of people’s attitudes and
beliefs about, and their knowledge of, politics and political phenomena. The political system
of a country is reflected in that country’s political culture. Conversely, the culture, social
structure and political alignment of each country can be reflected in its political system.
Elkins and Simeon (1979: 127) describe political culture as one of the most popular and
seductive concepts in political science, while also being one of the most controversial and
confused.
Almond and Verba (1963) identify three types of political culture. First, the ‘parochial’
model, where the citizen feels alienated from the political process and feels that they are not
involved in the decision making process. Second, the ‘subject’ model, where the citizen
cannot influence decision making, but is subjects to the state. Third, the ‘participant’ model,
where the citizen can and does participate in the decision making process. These three
combine to create a stable democratic state, but limits need to be put in place for authority to
be respected. We could therefore contend that this is the role of the constitution in the
democratic state, offering the authority that equates to stability and is the common
denominator to Almond and Verba’s three models of political culture
Political culture is also shaped by a country’s historical experiences. These must be
considered also in order to get a clear picture of a country’s politics and political culture.
Countries are influenced by their past experiences, society evolves in response to different
stimuli, as does political culture, because it is not a static concept, it too evolves with society.
Citizens’ priorities and values need to be taken into consideration when examining political
culture as too must the constitution argues Chubb (1970: 69):
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[A Constitution…] can be seen as a product of the political culture of [a]
country. It mirrors some aspects of that culture quite faithfully. However
[…] the Constitution is not merely a product of the culture, but is itself an
important guide to political action.
Here we can see that a constitution can be a result of political culture, as identified earlier a
constitution can often be drafted after significant national events. However, the constitution
then takes on a role that may dictate future political culture due to the provisions it contains.
To examine political culture in an Irish context, we can take as an example the role of the TD.
Though the Constitution of Ireland sets out the role of the parliament as sole legislator for the
state, it does not specify what the role of a TD is. The Burkean theory sees a national
parliamentarian as a national legislator in the interests of the state, and not simply concerned
with the interests of the constituency that elected him. This theory however is not common
practice in Ireland, where TDs spend a higher percentage of their time on constituency
matters and the remaining percentage on national issues, as cited in the work of O’Leary
(2011: 340). As a result of the political system and in particular the voting system in Ireland
localism has become a feature of Irish political culture. This is the reason that intra party
rivalry is intense at election time and personality politics becomes prevalent at the local level.
While this distinction of where the TD should spend his time is not set out in the Constitution
of Ireland, it is an expectation of the constituent that their elected representative act on their
behalf locally to the detriment of the TDs role as national legislator. The constituent expects
this work to be carried out on his behalf in exchange for his vote, perpetuating the cycle of
localist politics, because the culture demands it. Political culture therefore affects the way we
interact with our public representatives; it affects the way parliament works if we demand our
TDs concentrate on alternative issues so the political culture affects the political system as a
result.
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The judiciary is an independent body, often identified as such in constitutions under the
separation of powers. However it can be said that the judiciary in certain cases is not fully
independent of the political system. Stone Sweet (2000) asserts the view that a judge is not
democratically elected, but can, if they so wish, overturn the decisions made by the
representatives elected democratically by the citizens. This however should only happen
where a judge is using a constitution as the guiding principle in making his/her decision.
Judicial interpretation of a constitution is extremely important and sets the precedent for
future rulings. In countries where no codified constitution exists, judicial interpretation is
paramount.
Judicial review has the ability to overturn an incompatible legislation, the
judiciary review bills and government actions to test their constitutionality. In some
countries, e.g. Germany, judicial review is not the manner in which this is done, an
independent Constitutional Court is in place. Germany has both concrete and abstract review
procedures with a third being a scenario where the citizen can bring a bill independently
before the Constitutional Court for review. While partially written and uncodified
constitutions enjoy no review procedure, judicial comment is still possible. In recent years
the judiciary has increasingly been seen as a political actor, using ‘artful ambiguity’
(McGarry, 2012) to allow a constitution to evolve in line with a changing political culture and
not having to commit to taking a resolute position on an issue.
If we take judicial interpretation in Ireland two significant and successful cases were taken
against the Irish state, in relation to the violation of the personal rights provision of Article
40.3.1 of the constitution. But what constitutes as an infringement of personal rights? A list
of rights could potentially be endless, based on individual perceptions of what it means
according to Lee, (1989). In 1987 Raymond Crotty took legal action against the government
for failing to bring the Single European Act to the people in a referendum on the matter. The
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court ruled in favour of Crotty and the government was forced to bring a referendum to the
people. In 1973, Mary McGee brought a landmark case against the state concerning Irelands
ban on the importation and sale of contraceptives. For medical reasons she wished to avoid
pregnancy, claiming that the prohibition on her importing contraceptives for this purpose was
a violation on her marital privacy (Keane, 2003: 9). She was successful in her action. Both of
these cases show, in different ways the significance of judicial interpretation. The second
case in particular demonstrates how interpretation can allow a constitution to evolve while
the political culture also is in transition, as it was with the contraception issue which was a
feature on the political landscape for a number of years after this judgement.
In conclusion, does the success of a political system depend on its constitution and political
culture working in harmony? To measure ‘success’ in a political system is difficult, so if we
take ‘success’ as meaning a free and functioning democratic political system, then the
interaction between a constitution and political culture in a political system is crucial. Easton
(1957:386) believes, ‘the behaviour of every political system is, to some degree, imposed
upon it by the kind of system it is, that is, by its own structure and internal needs’. Therefore,
not only does a constitution reflect the values, standards and practices of society (Chubb,
1970), but its interpretation through judicial or constitutional review is also influenced by
those values which are largely grounded in the country’s political culture. As a result, the
citizens’ rights and political system’s ‘internal needs’ (Easton, 1957: 386) will be developed
over time to take into consideration societal changing social, political, cultural and economic
values and beliefs. A constitution is nothing more than a text, which cannot guarantee the
existence of a democratic system unless it is underpinned by a democratic political culture.
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