Religious Minorities and Resistance to Genocide
The Collective Rescue of Jews in the Low Countries during the
Holocaust
Robert Braun
Department of Government
Cornell University
DISSERTATION OUTLINE
August 9, 2014
1
Abstract
Why do some religious groups protect victims of genocide while others do not? This
dissertation argues that local religious minorities are more likely to save persecuted groups.
Two reinforcing mechanisms link minority status to rescue operations. First, religious minorities are better able to set up clandestine organizations because their members are more
committed. Second, religious minorities are attached to pluralism, imbuing their networks
with preferences that lead them to resist genocide. A geo-referenced dataset of Jewish evasion in the Netherlands and Belgium during the Holocaust is deployed to assess the minority
hypothesis. Spatial statistics and archival work reveal that Protestants were more likely to
rescue Jews in Catholic regions while Catholics facilitated evasion in Protestant areas. Postwar testimonies and secondary literature demonstrate the importance of minority groups for
rescue in other countries and genocides, underlining that it is the local position of church
communities -and not something inherent to any religion itself- that produces networks of
assistance to threatened neighbors.
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1
Introduction
During episodes of mass killing church communities have saved lives of thousands by stepping
up to illegally shelter persecuted groups. However, religious help is far from universal and varies
within countries, genocides and denominations. Existing theories of genocide have difficulty explaining this variation because their focus is either too micro or too macro. On the macro-side of
the spectrum researchers treat denominations as monolithic entities that are driven by inherent
doctrines or national leaders. On the micro-side, scholarship focuses religious inspiration as as
an individual level attribute that operates the same for everyone.
In contrast, this dissertation disaggregates the role of religion by taking a meso-level perspective. Drawing on theories of collective action and political violence, I argue that the capacity
and willingness of religious groups to resist genocide depends on how they are locally embedded.
In particular, I hypothesize that local religious minorities are more likely to protect persecuted
groups because: 1) group commitment enables them to set up clandestine organizations, and
2) attachment to pluralism imbues their networks with empathy for repressed minorities.
I deploy spatial statistics and archival work to test this hypothesis in the context of the Low
Countries during the Holocaust. The “Final Solution” in the Netherlands and Belgium provides
a unique albeit tragic opportunity to investigate whether minority churches were more likely to
produce rescue networks as both countries lay at the frontline of the reformation and counterreformation. Missionary activities (of both Protestants and Catholics) and disputed scripture
(mostly within the Protestants church) created a dynamic religious landscape and resulted in
pockets of religious minorities in both Catholic and Protestant areas. This religious mix allows
me to assess whether denominational deviance affected mobilization for both Protestant and
Catholic communities while keeping religious and national differences constant.
The dissertation is divided in four parts. In chapter 2 I develop a simple formal model to
explain why religious minorities are more committed to rescue. The following two chapters test
the mechanisms underlying my theory and assess whether members of religious minorities in
the Netherlands indeed displayed more empathy towards Jews and group commitment before
the outbreak of the German invasion. Chapters 5 to 7 investigate whether Dutch religious
minorities were more likely to rescue Jews during the war. The last three chapters look at the
importance of religious minorities in Belgium, other countries and different Genocides.
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2
Theory: Religious Minorities and Clandestine Collective Action
Protecting victims of Genocide often takes the form of clandestine collective action as it involves
cooperative efforts of like-minded individuals that cannot be exposed to the outside world.
Rescue operations require the cooperation of reliable host families, couriers, food providers,
organizers and informants in the police system. However, as it takes only one denunciation
-be it motivated by ideological conviction, personal grudges or induced by monetary rewards
or protection- to put an operation at risk, clandestine rescue necessitates careful recruitment
of helpers to avoid defection. Group commitment is key in creating protective shells insulated
from defection.
By extending a formal model developed by Berman, Laitin and Iannaconne, I show that
minority congregations are better able to produce clandestine cooperation because their members are more committed. To build a community in which membership is valued one needs to
attach committed individuals and repel potential free-riders. In countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium where prohibitions to interact with members of other congregations are in
place, a religious minority position acts as a natural screening device because it imposes costs
on members by inhibiting participation in dominant networks. These costs in turn deter the
undedicated -but not the dedicated- turning minority communities into self-reinforcing hubs of
commitment that simultaneously enable secrecy and collective action.
Religious minorities are not only more capable but also more willing to secretly shelter victims of persecution. Since religious minorities rely on pluralism for their own survival they will
empathize with other minorities that are persecuted. As a result their networks are imbued with
preferences that lead them to resist organic purification in general and genocide in particular.
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3
Religious Minorities and Commitment in the Netherlands
In this chapter I assess whether religious minorities in the Netherlands displayed more commitment than majority churches before the outbreak of World War 2. Religious leaders in this time
period wanted their followers to be organized in segregated sub-cultures with separate churches,
labor unions, schools and political parties. Participation in these subcultures would thus be
a good measure of group commitment. Archival work and census data are utilized to compile
a data set of 2088 religious groups living in 1313 counties between 1900 and 1937. For each
of these communities I calculated the strength of religious union membership, religious school
attendance, voting for religious parties and church ownership per capita. Pooled time-series
analysis with fixed effects for counties, years and denominations were deployed to regress these
proxies of commitment against a measure that marked religious minorities. The results are
presented in the Figure 1. As one can see members of religious minorities were more likely to
vote for a religious party, be a member of a religious union and send their children to a religious
school. In addition, minority communities owned more churches per capita. All in all, this
suggests that religious minorities were indeed more committed than majority congregations.
DV: Religious Union
Membership (%)
DV: Religious Union
Membership (%)
DV: Attendance
Religious Schools (%)
DV: Attendance
Religious Schools (%)
DV: Voting for Religious
Party (%)
DV: Voting for Religious
Party (%)
DV: Church Buildings
per 1000 Believers
DV: Church Buildings
per 1000 Believers
0
2
4
6
8
Δ in DV for Religious Minorities versus Majorities
Figure 1: Effect of Religious Minority Position on Group Commitment 1900-1939
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4
Religious Minorities and Empathy in the Netherlands
In this chapter I assess whether religious minorities in the Netherlands displayed more empathy
for persecuted Jews than majority churches before the German invasion. A content analysis of
local newspapers between 1933, the year in which anti-Jewish legislation was introduced in Germany and the start of the German invasion is conducted to determine how socialists, liberals,
Protestants and Catholics living in different parts of the country responded to the persecutions.
So far I have finished the content analysis for Catholics and secular actors (i.e. liberals and socialists). The resulting 3588 statements coded from 8 different outlets are summarized in Figure
2. In both Catholic and Protestant parts of the country close to 60 percent of the statements
made by liberals and socialists displayed empathy for Jews. In line with my theory, the tone of
newspaper comments by Catholics depended on whether they lived in Protestant or Catholic
parts of the country. While Catholics in Protestant areas made pro-semitic claims almost eighty
percent of the time and were more favorable towards Jews than seculars, the reverse was the
case for Catholics in Catholic areas where only 19 percent of all their claims supported Jews.
Overall, statements by Catholics in Protestant areas highlighted equal rights and religious freedom which provides preliminary evidence for the notion that religious minorities were more
likely to empathize with Jews because of their attachment to pluralism.
Protestant Areas:
% Pro Jewish Claims
Secular Claims
Catholic Claims
Catholic Areas:
Secular Claims
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Catholic Claims
Figure 2: Pro-Jewish claims of Catholics and seculars in Catholic and Protestant parts of the
Netherlands 1933-1939.
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5
Religious Minorities and Resistance to Genocide in the Netherlands
Based on German registration lists and commemoration books I build a geo-coded dataset
of Jewish evasion to test whether religious minorities were more likely to rescue Jews in the
Netherlands. Spatial regression models of 93 percent of all Dutch Jews demonstrate a robust
and positive correlation between the proximity to minority churches and evasion. The results
are summarized in the plot below. While proximity to Catholic churches increased evasion in
dominantly Protestant regions with more than 20 percent, proximity to Protestant churches
had the same effect in Catholic parts of the country. County fixed effects and the concentric
dispersion of Catholicism from missionary hotbed Delft are exploited to disentangle the effect
0
-20
-40
Δ in Evasion (%)
20
of religious minority groups from local level tolerance and other omitted variables.
0
20
40
60
80
100
% Roman Catholics
Figure 3: The change in predicted probability of evasion with 95 percent confidence intervals
as Catholic church proximity moves from its minimum to its maximum value conditional on
strength Roman Catholicism in region.
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6
Religious Minorities and Resistance to Genocide in Twente
Chapter five zeros in on rescue networks in the Dutch region of Twente. This area provides a
important test for my theory because it is located across the Catholic-Protestant divide. If the
minority hypothesis holds we would expect the religious color of rescue networks to flip around
as soon as we cross the denominational fault-line. Information on rescue networks in this region
is obtained from a unique and under-utilized collection of post-war testimonies gathered in light
of an honorary pension program. Religious networks are plotted on the map in Figure 4. In
line with my theory, Catholic networks were more active in Protestant regions and vice-versa.
In addition, the analysis reveales that a) rescue networks were rarely religiously mixed b) a lot
of religious rescue attempt got thwarted early on because of denunciations, suggesting that the
capacity to rescue was more important than the willingness do so.
Figure 4: Rescue Networks in Twente.
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7
Interregional Entrepreneurs and Small Towns
The case-study of Twente also uncovered some religious majority networks that contradict my
central hypothesis. I investigate these networks in more detail and identify two additional factors
that enabled these communities to set up clandestine organizations. 1) Students organized
in interregional networks prompted religious leaders in the country side to undertake rescue
activities. Often these students were former residents who were able to take care of initial
collective action problems and funneled Jews from the city. 2) Some communities were very
cohesive because of their small size. The fact that everyone was aquatinted in these towns
facilitated mobilization. Four measures are created to test for the statistical significance of
these factors. To operationalize links with student networks, I used county level migration to
and from university cities in the four years preceding the war (it takes four years to get a college
degree) and a dummy that marked whether Jews from college cities were found in a 2 kilometer
radius after the war. Based on historical land use data I recovered the overall size of residential
areas in which Jews lived and marked those that were smaller than 2 squared kilometers to
capture cohesive villages. Results are mixed. While migration to and from university cities
increases invasion, the presence of Jews from cities with colleges had no effect. Evasion is
higher in small residential areas but the effect is weak.
Residential Area < 2km
Migration to University Cities
Previous 4 Years
Migration from University Cities
Previous 4 Years
Jews from University City Sheltered
Within 2km radius
0
10
20
30
Δ in Evasion (%)
Figure 5: The change in predicted probability of evasion with 95 percent confidence intervals
as variables moves from minimum to maximum value.
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8
Religious Minorities and Resistance to Genocide in Belgium
Whether religious minorities were also more likely to rescue Jews in Belgium is tested using
two different datasets. 1) Similar to Chapter 4, I created a geocoded dataset of evasion for
Belgium by combining Jewish registrations with deportation lists. 2) I digitalized a survey
conducted among clerics in 1960 by the Belgian Institute of War Documentation. This survey
provides information on denomination, location during the war and help provided to Jews for
1423 clerics. Since Belgium is a predominantly Catholic country we would expect Protestants to
be more likely to rescue Jews than Catholics. The results of the post-war survey are displayed
in the Figure below. As we can see Protestant clerics were more than twice as likely to assist
Jews. In addition, we can see that Roman Catholic clerics were most likely to provide help in
secular counties where their congregations were relatively small. The geocoded data confirm
this picture. Proximity to Protestant churches increased invasion throughout the country while
evasion was negatively related to the overall strength of the Catholic church vis-a-vis secular
forces.
Catholic clerics:
% that helped Jews during WW2
All
County >75 % Catholic
County 75-50 % Catholic
County 50-25 % Catholic
County <25 % Catholic
Protestant clerics:
Figure 6: Percentage of Clerics that Helped Jews in Belgium.
10
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
ALL
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Other Countries
I cull testimonies of 6,407 religious rescuers living in 20 countries to investigate whether the importance of minority rescue is unique to the Low countries. To see whether members of minority
congregations were overrepresented among rescuers in other parts of Europe, I divide their share
through the percentage of minority believers in their region. These ratios are presented for each
country separately below. When we look at the parts of Europe where the “Final solution” was
carried out through deportation, a striking pattern emerges. Religious minorities were active
in all countries but Denmark and Bulgaria. These two countries are exceptional however in
that both were relatively autonomous satellites of the German reich reluctant to execute antiJewish legislation. As a result majority church leaders could easily cooperate with national
elites to safeguard the Jewish population, limiting the importance of clandestine collective action. Things become less clear when we look at the “Bloodlands” of Eastern Europe. Baptists
and small sects were overrepresented among rescuers in Latvia, Belarus, the Ukraine and other
parts of the Soviet Union. Surprisingly, this was not the case in Lithuania and Poland, where
Anti-Semitism was prevalent among majority Catholics. Maybe, earlier religious persecutions
by the Germans united majority Catholics and Jews against bloodshed on a local level.
% Minority Rescuers
Region
% Minority Population
the Netherlands
Belgium
Germany+Austria
France
Denmark*
Bulgaria*
Hungary*
Slovakia
Romania
Poland*
Lithuania*
Latvia
Belarus
Ukraine
Russia
Italy
12.0
10.0
7.5
5.0
2.5
1.0
0.0
Albania
Greece
Serbia
Croatia+Bosnia
Figure 7: Over and Underrepresentation of Religious Minorities among Rescuers in Other Countries.
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10
Religious Minorities and Resistance in Other genocides
There is suggestive evidence that the dynamics described in this dissertation so far also operate
in other genocides. The Rwandan case is interesting because religious cleavages did not reinforce
ethnic differences in this predominantly Catholic country. Yet again there is evidence that sects
such as the Pentecostals and Abarokore actively opposed mass killings. For other Protestant
minorities the picture is less clear. Although examples of rescue attempts by Seventh Day
Adventists and more mainstream Presbyterians have been documented, we also know that they
sometimes actively engaged in killings. In line with the minority hypothesis however Muslims
staged a coordinated challenge to killers in the northern Rwandan region Mabare, demonstrating
that religious rescue was not unique to Christians. Islam on the other hand was a driving force
in the Armenian genocide, where the Young Turks used religion to mobilize the majority of the
population against a small group of Christians. Consistent with what we saw in our analysis
of the Low Countries help for persecuted Armenians often came from Kurdish sects, western
missionaries and small patches of Syrian Christians.
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Conclusion
My dissertation makes several contributions. First my research challenges traditional studies
on religion and genocide that focus on inherent characteristics of different congregations. It has
been argued that some religions reduce solidarity with out-groups by focussing on schisms while
others create empathy by highlighting similarities impacting the willingness to protect. Others
suggest that different religious traditions either produce obedience or independence which in
turn affects the capacity to resist. The central finding of my research is that it is local position of
a church community - and not something inherent to any religion itself - that produces collective
networks of assistance to threatened neighbors.
Second, this dissertation urges scholars of religious resistance to genocide to move beyond
the study of bishops and other high-level church officials and dig deeper into localized patterns
of evasion. By forging links with literatures on political violence and collective action, this
dissertation highlights that even when national elites consistently protest genocidal policies the
actual willingness and capacity of constituents to actively resist mass killing depend on local
religious demography.
Third, the micro literature on religious rescue during genocide has helped us to better
understand how religion motivates individuals to help. The equally important collective capacity
to actually rescue someone once they are willing to do so however has received less attention.
This dissertation suggests that whether religious altruists can turn into heroes depends on the
networks in which they are embedded, linking micro-motives to community outcomes. Even if
individuals are willing to save Jews, their environment does not always provide them with the
protective shell needed to reduce risk, impeding the (local) impact they would want to have on
evasion.
This dissertation is not as much a story of hope as of tragedy. My theory reveals how successful, rapid collective mobilization in highly repressive contexts depends upon relatively strong
social ties among well screened community members. But the necessity to restrict channels of
recruitment to trusted ties prohibits the expansion of collective rescue efforts beyond a narrow
set of actors. In other words, being a religious minority not only explains mobilization, it also
explains why such efforts are disjointed in nature and have such a limited carrying capacity.
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