The Ethical Implications of Human Nature and Posthumanity 1
Sangkyu Shin
Ewha Womans University
[email protected]
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the plausibility of the claim that the
alteration of human nature through cutting-edge technology will result in the
desecrating moral values including human dignity. For this, I first clarify the
meanings of human nature and then inquire how human nature is related to the
realm of ethical values including human dignity. I distinguishes 3 different ways
in which human nature can be involved in the ethical discourses. Human nature
can be thought of as conditions of practical rationality and moral agency (HN1),
as a feasibility constraint on morality (HN2), and as a constraint on the good for
humans (HN3). I argue that there are partially good reasons to object to human
enhancement that are deducible from each of (HN1)-(HN3). However, none of
them can offer a sufficiently good reason to object to human enhancement in
general.
1
Introduction
Attempts at human enhancement through cutting-edge scientific technology such
as biotechnology are unprecedented phenomena that are fundamentally different
from the consequences of technological developments that we had been familiar with
before the 21st century. Hence, human enhancement in the current age presents a new
challenge that distinguishes it from the old ethical problems in its characteristic or in
the degree or range of its influence.
By “enhancement,” what I intend to mean is the improvement of the basic human
capacities of cognition and emotion, along with other, bodily capacities, as well as
the lengthening of a healthy lifespan, by making use of new scientific-technological
means. 2 The expression “enhancement” is in a sense very misleading because the term
is usually used with normative connotations implying the changes into better human
beings. But many people oppose human enhancement for various reasons, and the
improvement of human capacities doesn’t necessarily lead to the better lives or the
betterment of human beings. 3 In this paper, the term is used to mean the same as the
alteration of basic human capacities in a value-neutral way without any indication of
the better lives or the betterment of human beings.
1 This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean
Government (NRF-2007-361-AL0015).
2 For the more details about the ways of human enhancement, please refer to Bostrom 2003. See also
various articles in Savulescu, Meulen, et al. 2011.
3 For example, Hauskeller 2013 is very skeptical about the possibility of improving our lives by altering
our mental and physical capacities using biomedical technology.
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Sangkyu Shin
It should also be noted that human enhancement technology concerned in this paper
is not confined to the currently available technologies. As of now, there exist various
enhancement technologies, including plastic surgery, mood-enhancing drugs, and
germline genetic intervention. However, the potential of possible future technologies
for human enhancement is much greater than that of current technologies, and it is
in the context of technological visions that the current ethical and political debate on
human enhancement is placed. Hence, our basic problem becomes whether there is
any problem in pursuing the development of human enhancement technologies?
Several criticisms have been put forward against human enhancement, which can
be summarized as the following: 4
• It may bring about unanticipated disaster similar to ecological destruction in the
long-term or even the end of humankind.
• It goes against equality or principles of social justice and leads to widening the
gap between classes or to the emergence of a new class.
• The human is playing the role of God and destroying the sacred value immanent
in life or nature.
• It undermines the autonomy and free will of descendents.
• It damages the attitude of accepting life as a gift and the significance or authenticity of life.
• It threatens the condition of human morality and human rights and destroys
human dignity.
Among these criticisms, I will focus on the last one on the condition of morality
and human dignity. A representative scholar who has offered such an argument is
Francis Fukuyama. In Our Posthuman Future, Fukuyama claims that biotechnological
human enhancement will alter human nature so that the conditions for our human
morality and dignity will be compromised.
According to Fukuyama, «Human nature is what gives us a moral sense, provides
us with the social skills to live in society, and serves as a ground for more sophisticated
philosophical discussions of right, justice, and morality.» 5 In other words, human
nature is the foundation for the moral status and dignity of humans, the foundation for
the natural rights of humans, and the basis that makes human morality itself possible.
However, artificial attempts for human enhancement may alter or violate human
nature and threaten the condition of human dignity itself. Thus, it is Fukuyama’s
contention that any human enhancement by biotechnology and similar such things
should be banned.
Fukuyama’s criticism is interesting in several aspects. While most criticisms against
human enhancements usually point to the potential for the misuse of technologies
to infringe procreative freedoms, violate children’s autonomy, cause social strife, or
to aggravate injustice, his criticism touches the deep metaphysical questions of what
it is to be human and why humanity does matter. In particular, he tries to propose
a naturalistic conception of human nature that does provide the foundation for a
4 For the examples of these criticisms, please refer to Habermas 2003, Fukuyama 2002, President’s
Council on Bioethics 2002, Sandel 2007, Hauskeller 2013 and various articles in Savulescu and Bostrom
2009.
5 Fukuyama 2002, 101.
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substantive conception of human morality and dignity. In doing so, he criticizes
the naturalistic fallacy to the effect that nature cannot provide any philosophically
justifiable basis for rights, morality, or ethics. According to him, the naturalistic
fallacy itself is a fallacy. Our nature may ground human rights and moral norms. The
“ought” and the “is” can be bridged by the goals and ends that we set for ourselves in
accordance with our human nature.
Fukuyama seems to be the first to come up with such criticism based on the claim
that human nature is an important moral guide, even though he does not nail it all
down. He at least offers momentum to think about the connection between human
nature and human dignity, and human enhancement and human dignity. It seems
worthwhile to participate in this conversation—hence my discussion in this paper
shall be focused on Fukuyama’s such contention.
The concept that plays the fundamental role in Fukuyama’s argument is the concept
of human nature. It is the target for the change/transformation that distinguishes
human-enhancement technology from traditional technology. Technology of the
past that is familiar to us, such as civil engineering or architecture or machinery,
has been to improve the external environment surrounding the human. However,
human enhancement technology such as biotechnology, nano-technology, neuroscience,
cognitive science, and robotics aims to change the human itself and is directed towards
our ‘inner’ nature. If the technology of the past can be regarded as a tool that
externally complements human mentality or physical capacities, the technology
of today attempts to fundamentally improve the physical and mental capacities
themselves, i.e., human nature. In other words, these technologies have the potential
to engender the posthuman as a new species whose nature will be different from that
of the biological human species today.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the plausibility of the claim that the alteration of human nature through cutting-edge technology will result in the desecrating
moral values including human dignity. Indeed, will the alteration of human nature
threaten the conditions of human morality and human rights and violate the various
moral values that we esteem? Before answering this question, there are two things we
first need to make clear. First, we must clarify what is meant by the concept of human
nature. Human nature is an ambiguous concept that can be understood in different
ways according to the culture or the context of issues. Rather than appealing to religious perspectives, this paper will focus on the concept of human nature compatible
with our current scientific knowledge. Second, it is necessary to inquire how human
nature is related to human dignity. In the Far-East Asian tradition, familiar with the
idea that human nature is good/evil in itself, human nature is understood as having a
certain moral connotation inherently. It is the same in the Christian tradition, which
understands human nature through the concept of Original Sin. However, when we
are to understand it in a scientific way, it is difficult to find such moral connotation
in the concept of the human nature. Therefore, to justly evaluate the claim that the
alteration of human nature threatens human dignity, it is necessary to elucidate what
the link is that connects human nature with human dignity.
2
Human nature as a part of the nature
In English, “nature” is used largely with two meanings that in Korean are expressed
by two different words “nature1 ” (ja-yeon) and “nature2 ” (bon-seong). “Nature1 ” can
be understood as meaning all sorts of beings that exist for themselves and not made
by humans, including animals and plants. That is, “nature” stands for a world that is
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self-sufficient in contrast to artificial things. “Nature2 ” is an expression that means
fundamental characteristics, traits, or essence of something. When we refer to human
nature, “nature” is used in the second sense and human nature means the fundamental
characteristics, traits, or essence that the human has. The fact that “nature” has these
two meanings suggests that these two meanings are very closely related. Although
there are two separate expressions for two meanings in Korean, as the human is a part
of nature, human nature can also only be natural. Thus, there also is a close relationship
between human nature and nature even in terms of Far-East Asia tradition.
Certain claims that take issue with human nature focus on such natural aspects
that human nature has. Regardless of Eastern or Western cultures, when we refer to
nature1 , there is a tendency to think that there is a certain sacred value fundamentally
inherent in nature itself or in the manner of natural existence. As a result, when we
exploit nature or bring about artificial transformation to it, we believe that such values
are either destroyed or damaged. Various forms of environmentalist or ecologist
positions reflect such thoughts. Altering human ability at the level of biotechnology
through genetic modification amounts to a transformation of the naturally endowed
human nature. To that extent, we may conclude that altering human nature will lead to
the destruction of a fundamental value inherent in nature. For example, when making
the claim that we must recognize our life as a gift and accept (maintain) natural life as
it is, one reason for such a claim may probably be that a certain inherent value ascribed
to nature in the first sense is believed to be damaged.
However, altering nature is not a new phenomenon brought on by biotechnology or
the development of cutting-edge scientific technology. Altering and ‘improving’ nature
to change it to an artificial environment is what humankind has been performing
throughout history for ages, and in some sense, such activities themselves have
become the basis of the formation and development of human culture. Attitudes of
regarding nature as sacred are largely the legacy of mythical perspectives, which are
ways in which humankind understood its surrounding environment before scientific
thinking was born. If we do not regard such a mythical perspective as a serious way
to understand the world any longer, the evidential role that a putative sacred value
inherent in nature can play in the context of human enhancement is very limited. If
we claim that we must not alter human nature on the grounds that it is the endowed
nature, this would be a typical fallacy of begging the question at issue.
Also, in the context of ethical discourse, even if the inherent value in nature is
referred to, what the actual problem is may not be the natural inherent value in
its literal sense. For example, let’s suppose that someone, criticizing the reckless
man-made development, suggests the conservation of natural values and a return
to a nature-friendly life. This assertion is directly referring to the value of nature on
the surface. However, it may be a statement disguising a utilitarian conclusion made
on the basis of calculating profit and loss resulting from developing nature. When
someone asserts that destruction of nature should be banned in apprehension of global
warming, what is actually at stake is not the value or sacredness that nature itself has
but the enormous scale of actual disaster and harm that untrammeled development
will bring about. In such sense, claims for a nature-friendly life is not the prolongation
of inherent value of nature, but a part of utilitarian concern for the actual results that
the development of nature will have on our lives.
On the other hand, such claims may question our attitude towards nature. On
the surface, such claims criticized our attitude of taking nature as the object of mere
development without giving proper consideration to the values nature has. In such
cases as well, the actual discussion is usually not about the inherent values of nature
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but about the fundamental values we esteem in our modern ways of life. That is,
when our attitude of dominating nature becomes a problem, it is not due to the fact
that nature has inherent values, but rather that this attitude is a naked expression of
the predominant way of life today, which regards such material greed and desire for
over-consumption very highly and tries to calculate everything in terms of market
value. Then, the real concern of such claims is about our ways and forms of life, and
they are meant to be a stern warning on the depreciation of moral values or virtues
that should be regarded as important in our lives.
In summary, if we approach the problem of altering human nature in the sense
of change or alteration of nature1 , the claims for forbidding it may result in either an
assertion about tremendous disaster resulting from reckless development of nature
that we have not anticipated, or a criticism of our life pattern that regards nature as
the mere object for exploitation. For the first assertion, it is a problem of utilitarian
judgment that needs to be confirmed on the empirical ground through scientific
prediction of the future and does not pose any philosophically important problem.
A more philosophically fundamental problem seems to be the one posed from the
second aspect. However, such problem is just another form of an old problem that has
been produced by the development of capitalist patterns of life, and hence cannot be
regarded as a new problem brought on by the alteration of human nature through
human enhancement.
3
Human nature as a causal essence
If any new ethical problem is brought on by the alteration of human nature through
human enhancement, it is not due to the destruction of natural characteristics that
human nature has but because of the danger inherent in the alteration of human
nature as the basic traits, characteristics, or essence of the human. The alteration of
human nature that Fukuyama calls into question also takes place in such a context.
For example, Fukuyama describes the threat that the alteration of human nature faces
as the following:
While it is legitimate to worry about unintended consequences and unforeseen
costs, the deepest fear that people express about (bio)technology is not a utilitarian
one at all. It is rather a fear that, in the end, biotechnology will cause us in some way
to lose our humanity—that is, some essential quality that has always underpinned
our sense of who we are and where we are going, despite all of the evident changes
that have taken place in the human condition through the course of history. 6
Here, what Fukuyama takes issue with is not simply the alteration and destruction
of a certain natural state but the alteration or the end of humanity itself, which endows
meaning to human life, including moral characteristics. Humanity in this paragraph
corresponds to the second sense of nature, which can be identified with the basic
characteristic or traits as the condition of being human, that is human nature.
However, even though it is the second sense of nature that poses the problem,
we still need to clarify what exactly is meant by the nature that will be altered by
biotechnology. The most traditional approach to human nature referring to the basic
characteristics of human is essentialism. Aristotle’s definition of the human “as a
rational animal” consisting of a genus and a specific difference illustrates such an
approach. 7 Such a definition tries to capture what the human is through certain
6 Fukuyama
7 See
2002, 101.
Cohen 2012.
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inherent qualities unique to, but shared by all humans. In other words, human nature,
according to essentialism, refers to the traits that are not only shared but must be
possessed if one is to be a human, and at the same time the traits that distinguish
humans from other species.
However, as the simple fact that not all humans are rational shows, such a
definition is difficult to maintain as a matter of empirical fact. Especially, viewed
in our knowledge after Darwin’s theory of evolution, it is very difficult to discover
the unique and universal traits of humanity. For example, having a physical body,
a trait shared by all humans, is also a trait shared by other organisms, while unique
properties to humans such as the ability to make moral judgments do not have the
universality that is shared by all humans.
A promising way that supersedes the traditional conception of human nature
as a unique and universal essence can be found in Richard Samuels’ proposal. 8
Samuels proposes a causal essentialism as a theory of human nature compatible with
evolutionary facts of biology. According to Samuels’ causal essentialism, human nature
is identified with a set of empirically discoverable mechanisms (processes, structures,
and constraints) that causally explain the characteristic properties and regularities
associated with human beings. An important disparity that distinguishes Samuels’
proposal from the traditional one is that such causal essence need not be a necessary
condition shared by all humans nor a discriminating quality that distinguishes humans
from other species. What Samuels wants to capture through this conception of human
nature is the causal mechanism that, as a matter of empirical facts, actually brings
about the typical forms, behavior, and psychological properties of humans. The causal
essence that Samuels refers to not only describes the properties shared by most typical
if not all humans but also offers a causal explanation of why such properties become
manifested and why such properties cannot be easily transformed.
Human nature as causal essence may be approached on three different timescales. 9 The first time-scale to be considered is that of the evolutionary mechanism as
a phylogenetic process that has causally produced the typical properties of human
species through a very long time of historical evolution. Here, mechanisms of natural
selection or genetic drift are included. The second time-scale is that of the ontogenetic
developmental mechanism. This will include the developmental biological process
from a fertilized egg to a grown adult as well as the process of acquiring human
psychological capacities and characteristics through the mechanism of conditioning
and other sorts of learning. The last time-scale is that of the synchronic mechanism
that causally controls the manifestations of our physical or psychological capacities.
For example, looking with your eyes is related with the visual processing mechanism,
speaking with the language production system, recollecting with the memory system,
and so on.
Human nature that becomes the target for manipulation in the context of human
enhancement can be identified with the more proximal causal mechanisms, i.e.,
developmental mechanism and synchronic mechanism. New scientific technology such
as biotechnology intervenes in these mechanisms’ operational process and attempts a
transformation of phenotypic qualities expressed externally. For example, the birth of
8 Samuels 2012. In this paper, Samuels reviews various competing conceptions of human nature in
terms of whether they are compatible with evolutionary biology, whether they play an appropriately large
number of the theoretical roles traditionally played by the notion of human nature, and what notion of
human nature is implicit in the practices of contemporary cognitive and behavioral science. I think that
Samuels made out a fairly good case for his causal essentialism.
9 Samuels 2012, 23.
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a design baby through gene manipulation or selection is through intervention in the
ontogenetic mechanism to ultimately transform the phenotypic traits or appearance
of the baby. In addition, biotechnology and prosthesis technology, which are related
to overcoming degenerative diseases or physical disabilities and artificially enhancing
mental and physical abilities, along with other such interventions, aim at improving
synchronic mechanism.
Fukuyama’s conception of human nature does not appear to be greatly different
from the conception of human nature as causal essence. He also tries to develop
his discussion on the basis of the natural and scientific understanding of human
nature without resorting to any religious understanding of human beings. According
to Fukuyama, «human nature is the sum of the behavior and characteristics that
are typical of the human species, arising from genetic rather than environmental
factors.» 10 Although Fukuyama emphasizes genetic factors, it is not that he accepts
a rigid genetic determinism. Human behavior can be modified through learning
reflecting the environment. The behavioral differences between individual persons
reflect the individual environment much more and are much greater than in other
animals, which are largely incapable of cultural learning. However, Fukuyama thinks
that the range of variation is not unlimited and the possible aspects and degrees of
variability are strictly limited by genetic nature.
There exists a subtle difference between Samuels’ theory and Fukuyama’s proposal
regarding the range of human nature. The causal essence that Samuels refers to is a
causal mechanism that causally explains the characteristic properties and regularity
related to humans. If human nature may be identified with the causal essence which
categorizes humans as a natural species, human nature is not the sum of all typical
human traits but is confined to the causal mechanisms that bring about those traits.
Such mechanisms seem to be the human nature of purely biological dimensions, which
can be discovered by biological sciences or neuroscience, or the like. Of course, the
process of learning as an ontogenetic mechanism is also included as a part of human
nature, but what qualifies as nature here is the biological/neuro-scientific mechanisms
that mediate and make possible such learning processes.
In the case of Fukuyama, as can be inferred from the clause “the sum of the behavior
and characteristics that are typical of the human species,” phenotypic traits that are
externally expressed through biological mechanism are also included as a part of
human nature, in so far as they satisfy the typicality condition. In this understanding
of the human nature, typical properties of not only biological aspects but also cultural
aspects are included as a part of human nature. Creating and utilizing tools, the
use of language, the organization of complex social structures, the control of one’s
behavior through ethical normative system, and so on are characteristics of such
cultural aspects.
However, the difference between two positions is only superficial and does not
produce a significant consequence in the context of our discussion. Behind the cultural
properties of humans, there exists a biological mechanism that makes possible the
expression of such things. It is when such biological mechanisms interact with the
natural and cultural environment that cultural properties are finally manifested. In
most cases where we attempt to alter human nature by applying human enhancement
technology, we cannot directly transform the phenotypic traits that are expressed
externally, so that we must manipulate the casual mechanisms that bring about the
expression of such traits. Despite this, the intention of such intervention is not the
10 Fukuyama
2002, 130.
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transformation of the causal mechanism but the alteration of phenotypic traits that are
expressed from it.
If we accept the above explanation about human nature, we need to ponder much
more seriously about the possibility of the emergence of a posthuman distinguished
from the present biological human species. If the degree of alteration by technological
intervention is very large, these transformed beings will definitely possess causal
mechanisms that bring about typical traits much different from those of the present
human. If we are to define the “human” in terms of the typical traits or biological
nature of Homo sapiens, we may no longer be able to call these transformed beings
“human.” From the perspective of evolutionary theory, the only condition that will
enable us to regard them as a member of the human species, if we want it, will be a
certain genealogical continuity. However, it is not clear if the criterion of genealogical
continuity is a sufficiently good enough reason to regard them as members of the same
human species. They will not be natural beings any longer. They will be probably a sort
of hybrid being embodying various artificial mechanical components, which cannot
be explained exclusively from just a biological perspective. In other words, they will
be beings to which the categorical division that support our everyday understanding
of the human, such as natural/artificial, organic/inorganic, and original/copy, will
no longer be applicable. Then, to call them as the future descendents of the human
species, i.e., as the post-human, may be a more appropriate choice.
4
The Link between Human Nature and Human Dignity/Rights
Let’s go back to the original question. The problem we are trying to answer is why
altering human nature is wrong. It is not appropriate to oppose the alteration of human
nature on the grounds that it will bring the end to the present human species and bring
about the appearance of the posthuman. The human species as a biological species
is a coincidental result of natural evolution. Its existence is neither a metaphysical
inevitability nor a transcendental necessity. Neither is its dignity. However, if there is
a reason for us to preserve the human species in its present state, what would it be?
The answer to this question will ultimately lead to clarifying why “humanity”
matters, that is, what it is that makes our existence significant. If the alteration of
human nature through human enhancement includes an irrevocable negation of or
the danger of destroying the significance or value of humanity, we would have a good
reason to oppose the alteration of human nature. A promising approach would be
then to demonstrate that human dignity is endangered by human enhancement.
The concept of human dignity is also very ambiguous and people have used
the expression to mean different things depending on the contexts of discussion. 11
However, it seems fair to say that, in its most foundational sense, the concept of human
dignity is closely related to the idea of human worth or values that human beings
have by virtue of the fact that they are human beings. To attend to human dignity is to
attend to the value or significance that belongs to human beings. Kant provided a
paradigmatic formulation of this intrinsic notion of human dignity as follows:
In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price
can be replaced by something else as its equivalent, what on the other hand is
raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity. What is
11 Sulmasy 2007 distinguishes three different conceptions of human dignity: attributed, intrinsic, and
inflorescent. The dignity with which this paper is concerned is intrinsic dignity. Intrinsic dignity means
worth or value that people have simply because they are human, not by virtue of any social standing, ability
to evoke admiration, or any particular set of talents, skills, or powers.
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related to general human inclinations and needs has a market price, that which,
even without presupposing a need, conforms with a certain taste, that is, with a
delight in the mere purposeless play of our mental powers, has a fancy price but
that which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end
in itself has not merely a relative worth, that is, a price, but an inner worth, that is,
dignity. 12
In this sense, human dignity can be understood as the supreme value possessed by
all human beings, but also as the ultimate basis for human rights and obligations in
and upon them. uman
Ronald Dworkin once noted that the very idea of human rights depends upon «the
vague but powerful idea of human dignity.» 13 Human beings have rights that must be
respected because of the value they have by virtue of being the kinds of things that
they are, i.e., human beings. We respect people’s rights because we recognize their
dignity.
Then, how is human nature connected with human dignity? Fukuyama thinks
that, when we strip all of a person’s contingent and accidental characteristics away,
there remains some essential human quality underneath that grounds human dignity,
and he calls it Factor X. Factor X distinguishes humans from all other things in the
universe and serves as the basis for moral respect:
Factor X is the human essence, the most basic meaning of what it is to be human. If
all human beings are in fact equal in dignity, then X must be some characteristics
universally possessed by them. 14
According to him, the fact that Factor X is shared by all human beings requires
that they need to be respected equally, or at least that they deserve a minimum level
of respect. Then, what is Factor X? His answer is not so illuminating. In a nutshell, he
regards human nature as a complex whole, which is the result of a long evolutionary
process, the products whose whole is much more than the sum of its parts. And Factor
X is identified with some emergent properties that arise from the complex interactions
of capacities like moral choice, reason, and emotions, which partly constitute human
nature. He claims that there occurred a very important qualitative leap at some point
in the course of our evolutionary history, and it is this leap from parts to whole that
ultimately constitutes the basis for human dignity. But, what this whole is and how it
came to be still remain mysterious.
Anyhow, even if there is such an X, why is it wrong to alter or to improve it? As
we already observed, modifying human nature in itself is not wrong. If we just say
that we should not change our particular characteristics because they are parts of our
human nature, this is just begging the question at issue. The important question to ask
is whether we have good reasons not to change those characteristics. What we need is
a closer connection between the alteration of human nature and the endangerment of
human dignity.
The deep concern I have here is whether any fact of the matter about how we are
consisted of is a good enough reason to warrant human dignity? Is any fact of the
matter about human nature per se a sufficient condition to make us beings of dignity?
I think that Kant suggests a very promising clue to answer these questions. Kant
connects human dignity to human autonomy as the capacity for moral agency, i.e.,
our unique capacity to reason and to make moral choices:
12 Kant
[1785] 1997, 42.
1977, 198-9.
14 Fukuyama 2002, 150.
13 Dworkin
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Now, morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end
in itself, since only through this is it possible to be a lawgiving member in the
kingdom of ends. Hence morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality,
is that which alone has dignity. 15
But, human dignity doesn’t seem to follow straightforwardly from the fact that we
have a certain capacity to make a moral judgment and to act in accordance with that
judgment. The fact that we have a certain capacity doesn’t make us beings of dignity.
It only amounts to a certain potential (or talent, aptitude, disposition) to become a
good person, which is at best a necessary condition to become a moral agent. To
become a full-blown moral agent, it needs to be cultivated and displayed. Here, I
propose, what makes humans into respectable beings with dignity is our commitment
to become moral beings, to live our own life in accordance with a certain moral rules,
and to treat other persons as ends. Without such commitment and cultivation, we are
not so different from mere animals and are no more entitled to be respected as human
beings.
This idea is very similar to the one that we find in Kant’s moral philosophy. In Kant,
the highest good is the will to act on the basis of what a priori rules of practical reason
dictate us to do. If we just succumb to our instinct or immoral desire, our dignity is
compromised. Then, our will or commitment to live in accordance with moral rules is
the ultimate source of human dignity. But, the commitment itself or moral order to
treat others as ends does not have any corresponding counterpart in the natural world
because the order of the natural world is not a moral order. Thus, I believe that the
whole notion of human dignity is our human construction, and that this is our way of
transcending our limit as a natural being. By making our moral commitment, we stop
being a mere natural being and become a moral being with dignity.
Whether you agree or not with my construal of human dignity as our construction,
the least we may agree with is that the concept of human dignity has a very close
connection with our status as moral beings. However, there is no simple translation of
human nature into human dignity. Human nature in itself cannot be identified with human dignity because human nature constitutes mere potential or capacity/disposition
to become a moral being. Then, in order to claim that human enhancement would
destroy human dignity, what first needs to be shown is that human enhancement will
destroy any of our moral potential to the extent that it threatens our status as moral
beings or compromises our commitment to become a moral being.
5
The Connection between Human Nature and Human Morality
If we consider the concept of human dignity as having a close connection with our
morality, we must first confirm what the link is that connects the concept of human
nature with the moral conditions of humans. In other words, how can human nature
become the foundation for our morality?
Human nature as scientifically understood can be involved in our morality largely
in three different ways. 16
15 Kant
[1785] 1997, 42.
idea of discerning these three ways has been borrowed from Buchanan 2011, 121. Buchanan
distinguishes 5 different ways in which the concept of human nature is involved in ethical discourse.
Other than the 3 meanings detailed here, he refers to “(HN4) human nature as the source of substantive
moral rules” and “(HN5) human nature as the whole that exhibits extreme connectedness that is likely to
be seriously damaged by efforts to improve it.” Simply put, (HN4) is the concept of human nature that
presupposes the normative assertion that “what is natural is good.” We have already opposed this claim
16 The
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(HN1) condition of practical rationality and moral agency
(HN2) feasibility constraint on morality
(HN3) constraint on the good for humans
Let us deal with each of these three separately.
First, as (HN1)—the condition of practical rationality and moral agency—human
nature plays a role in making us moral agents acting on practical rationality. That is,
human nature provides the necessary condition to become a moral agent. According
to Kant, only a rational being who will act out of the respect for moral norms can
become a moral agent. 17 In other words, only beings who have the capacity to become
motivated to act by the obligatory belief that “I ought to do something” can become a
moral agent. Of course, we need not agree with Kant’s strict conception of morality
which asserts that only a good will to act in accordance with moral norms has moral
value. However, we may accept the fact that to become a moral agent, we need at least,
in the aspect of disposition or aptitude, the capacity of practical rationality to judge
what is right and act accordingly. More realistically, emotional capacity to empathize
with the suffering or misfortune of others should be included as the condition for
moral agency.
As (HN2)—the feasibility constraint on morality—human nature works as a constraint limiting the range of feasible moral behavior. Moral duty always presupposes
the capacity to practice it. That is to say, the things we ought to morally do should
also be something that we can. However, the things we are capable of are limited by
our biological nature that has been determined through the history of evolution. We
know that there are many people suffering from famine in North Korea and many
areas of Africa through news. However, for many people such facts are just a fleeting
scene reported in a newspaper or in a broadcast and do not come over to them as the
death of a real person. On the other hand, when the well-being of our own children
is of concern, we are so dominated by excessive desire to the extent that we have a
tendency to not even show the slightest interest in improving the community of the
future that our children will live in. Such limited morality of humans for the most part
is caused by the limits of cognitive, emotional, and motivational capacities of humans.
As (HN3)—the constraint on the good for humans—human nature works as a
condition deciding what we humans will consider as good. That is, what we believe
is of value and what we consider as a good life will depend on human nature. We
consider love for our family and friendship as valuable. However, if our nature were
different from now, our evaluation of their value would also be different. For example,
we may live in a society that does not place any significance or value on personal
relationships and thinks only public order and efficiency important. The values that
we pursue are conditioned by (HN3) of the human nature.
Let’s now ask the following questions. If we alter human nature through human
enhancement, through which dimension of human nature would our morality be
damaged? That is, out of (HN1)-(HN3), which does play the role of linking human
nature to the destruction of our morality?
previously. On the other hand, as this amounts to the assertion that human nature as natural becomes the
standard for what is good, (HN4) can eventually be subsumed under (HN3). (HN5) is a concept that plays
an important role in Fukuyama’s argument. However, its role in the ethical discourse is very different from
those of (HN1)-(HN3). It does not have any direct implication on human morality and makes a claim instead
on how human nature is actually structured. If (HN5) poses a problem, this is not because (HN5) itself is a
foundation for human morality but because it has an important consequence on the roles of (HN1)-(HN3)
of human nature. Thus, out of the 5 ways discerned by Buchanan, the first three, (HN1)-(HN3), are those
that have some direct implications for human morality.
17 Kant [1785] 1997, 7.
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Human nature of (HN1) is a possibility condition which makes us moral agents
acting on practical rationality. This is the capacity that encompasses rationality,
emotion, or will and that makes moral decisions, judgments, and behaviors possible.
If we do not possess such a capacity, it would be difficult to imagine how morality
or other values based on it would be possible. Human enhancement aims for the
improvement or reinforcement of our cognitive or emotional capacities. Therefore, as
long as there is no one with ill intentions to injure the moral autonomy of humans, there
is no reason to assume that the alteration of human nature due to human enhancement
will bring the destruction of practical capacities required for a moral agent.
However, one possibility that we must consider seriously is the risk of unintended
bad consequences. 18 Kant attempted to understand human morality completely from
the perspective of rationalism. However, if only the rational capacity is reinforced and
the emotional capacity weakened on the grounds that it hinders rational judgment, it
may bring about a bad consequence that was not at all anticipated. How the biological
elements that enable humans’ moral agency to interact is not an issue that can be
judged a priori. This is an issue that must be discovered empirically through the
scientific investigation of evolutionary biology or neuroscience. For example, in the
case of psychopaths, who lack empathy, we know from experience that some of them
cannot carry out appropriate ethical judgments or actions.
The risk of unintended bad consequences does not offer a sufficient reason to object
to human enhancement in general. The best that can be deduced from this is the
conclusion that alteration of human nature that might injure human moral capacity by
unintended mistake must be avoided. Therefore, we must make strict evaluations
about the methods and influences of enhancement and take all kinds of precautionary
measures so as not to harm human moral capacity. If a certain human enhancement
method is definitely foreseen to imperil the capacity for moral actions, we will have a
good reason to ban such kind of human enhancement.
The human nature of (HN2) is a constraining condition that limits the boundary
of morality that we may practice. However, human enhancement aims to remove
or alleviate such limits. The human is a being that has very limited altruism, such
as being family-centered, or that knows that practicing altruism is good, but lacks a
will strong enough to put altruism into practice. However, if we are able to remove
or alleviate such limits through human enhancement, we may have the capacity to
be more faithful to our moral values than the present. Fukuyama thought the reason
why «socialist dictatorship» has collapsed but «capitalist liberal democracy» still
abounds lies in which one has coincided with human nature. 19 According to him, the
political order that can be stably sustained is a system that coincides with our universal
nature (appetites or desires). Then, if the neoliberal capitalism with its problems that
dominate the global order today is the inevitable result of our nature and a more
sound alternative political order that pursues the happiness of all becomes possible,
shouldn’t we pursue human enhancement more actively? Considering the possibility
that human enhancement will enlarge the range of possible moral practices, it is very
probable that human nature of (HN2) may be used to support human enhancement.
Of course, (HN2), as in the case of (HN1), offers a limited reason to object to human
18 The unintended bad consequences that concern me in this paper are confined to a degradation of
moral capacity per se that is directly caused by the alteration of human nature. On the other hand, human
enhancement may result in the deterioration of our moral practices due to the sociopolitical changes
indirectly caused by human enhancement. The sociopolitical problems caused by human enhancement are
beyond the scope of this paper, so I won’t discuss them.
19 Fukuyama 2002, 128.
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enhancement on the basis of “producing unintended bad consequences.” For example,
a certain method of human enhancement may lead to the reduction of our capacity for
moral judgment and practice, regardless of our intention. On the basis of this reason,
we may object to such method of human enhancement. However, the demonstrative
power to object to human enhancement through (HN2) is ultimately subordinate to
that of (HN1). The reason why the reduction of capacity for moral practice becomes a
problem is that it threatens our moral status as a practicing moral agent. In such light,
the role that (HN2) can play as the link to oppose human enhancement is very limited.
The human nature of (HN3) determines what is valuable and good for us. The
basic factor that determines what is of value and good is the tendency of typical human
appetite or desires. Of course, what is ethically valuable or good is not determined
wholly by such natural tendency. Based on our rational thinking, we sometimes
perform a certain act for the reason that although it goes against our appetite or desires,
it is right. Considering such acts, capacity for practical rationality of purposiveness
may be an important part of (HN3).
As the character of (HN3) is a constraint condition as is also true in the case of (HN2),
Buchanan believes that it cannot play much role as an element of criticism against
human enhancement. 20 To support such a conclusion, he points out that our typical
desire or tendency is only an incidental result of the human species’ evolutionary
process. Human desires or tendencies, and the many traits based on them, have only
been selected adaptively at certain stages of species development. Natural selection is
not a process to seek goodness but rather an adaptive process increasing reproductive
fitness. The evolutionary process is morally blind and does not consider the welfare of
humans. The biological nature produced as a result is ultimately based on reproductive
fitness and not by moral values. This can be confirmed in the fact that much of the
behavior demanded by our nature or natural tendency is unethical.
If such is the case and there exists the possibility of altering our inherent nature in
a way to promote moral values, is it not desirable to try to improve or enhance our
human nature? For example, if the conditions of human nature that determine what is
good for us have been changed, we might not only be able to better recognize what is
truly valuable and good for us but also in some cases, we might be able to discern or
even desire the values and goodness of a completely new dimension that we have
never recognized before. A whole new potential of morality would open through this
process.
However, I believe that although both (HN2) and (HN3) are constraint conditions,
we must note that there are subtle differences in the ways they are constraining
our morality. As (HN2) is a condition that limits our behavioral capacities, altering
such constraint will generally bring about the effect of decreasing the constraint and
with it, the enhancement of our practical ability as its result. As the constraint is
diminished, the range of behavior that can be put into practice will increase. However,
the constraints of (HN3) have a qualitative aspect that is not captured by such a
quantitative measure. When the constraint of (HN3), which determines what is of
value to humans, is altered, the result will not present itself in the increase of moral
values worthy of pursuit but in the swapping of characteristics endowed with moral
value.
Let’s examine such a point through Fukuyama’s contention that «a person who
has not confronted suffering or death has no depth. Our ability to experience is what
connects us potentially to all other human beings, both living and dead.» 21 According
20 Buchanan
21 Fukuyama
2011, 122-5.
2002, 263. This is an example related to (HN5), which assumes an extreme connectedness
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to Fukuyama the most noble and sublime quality that a human has is often related
to how we respond to pain, suffering, and death. If such human evils did not exist,
there would not be pity, sympathy, courage, heroic action, solidarity, or strength of
character.
We may think of this example in relation to (HN3) as in the following. Let’s assume
that “a brave new world” has arrived by altering human nature through human
enhancement. There would be no one in pain or misfortune and everyone will be
living “happily.” People would no longer compete to obtain a career, fame, or power
but live day by day enjoying computer games or light TV programs and satisfying
their sensual desires. Expressions such as “pity,” “sympathy,” “courage,” “solidarity,”
and “sublimity” will no longer have any meaning in this world. That is to say, the
list of the values that were held good has changed through the alteration of human
nature, and a world has arrived in which values that were precious to us are no longer
of value. The only value that matters to them is sensual pleasure.
If the result brought on by the alteration of human nature is such a society, should
we not oppose to the attempts for human enhancement as in Fukuyama’s claim? If
the moral values such as human dignity are made possible on the foundation of the
aforementioned qualities, it seems as if this society is the one in which the conditions
of human dignity has already been compromised. However, for this conclusion, it
seems possible that one may come up with the following counterargument.
The role of human nature that (HN3) connotes is the result of historical contingency.
Human nature as (HN3) is no more than an incidental trait brought by the history
of evolution, blind to moral values and does not have any inherent value in itself.
Thus, the goodness or moral value that is constrained by it cannot but possess an
incidental character, dependent on evolutionary history in the end. This has been
verified many times through the historical experience of mankind. The values we
have held important have changed according to the change in history or culture. Why
we are repelled by a society that “the brave new world” depicts is perhaps because we
make judgments based on today’s standards. If we viewed our world in the light of
ancient people’s perspective, wouldn’t we, like them, also evaluate today’s society as
one in which the order of values has been subverted and collapsed? If human nature is
altered through human enhancement, new values corresponding to our transformed
nature will appear. We cannot prejudge them as undesirable just because the form
and content of such values are different from those that we have presently accepted.
However, I think that there is a logical leap in such counterargument. Even if the
formation of human nature is the product of coincidental process and as a result, the
qualities of the values determined by human nature also have an incidental character,
we may continue to desire the preservation of such moral values and qualities. The
values that we pursue need not be absolute ones that transcend space and time. The
context of the moral judgments that we make is the condition that we face today.
Thus, the important question that we should ask is not whether the genesis of the
values is incidental or not but whether these values are, according to the context of
our judgment today, worthy to be preserved as being important.
On the other hand, we did not reach the conclusion that we must object to human
enhancement in general from consideration of the “brave new world” example.
Human enhancement may be realized through various methods and it seems that
of human nature that Fukuyama uses to object to human enhancement. However, the assumption on the
extreme connectedness of human nature is difficult to maintain in light of evolutionary biology. For criticism
of this, refer to Buchanan 2011, 28-9 and 159-60. Buchanan refutes Fukuyama’s claim, referring to the three
features working in the process of evolutionary selection, i.e., modularity, redundancy, and canalization.
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not all methods will bring damage to important values. Let’s suppose that properties
such as pity, sympathy, courage, solidarity, and sublimity are of value, so we want to
preserve them in spite of any sacrifice. Then, the best conclusion that we might make
is just the assertion to make strict judgments on the methods and the influences of
enhancements so that such values will not be damaged by mistake and take all kinds
of precautionary measures, as in the case of (HN1) or (HN2).
Through the above discussion, we have seen that there are partially good reasons to
object to human enhancement that are deducible from each of (HN1)-(HN3). However,
none of them can offer a sufficiently good reason to object to human enhancement in
general. Also, the characteristics of the reasons drawn from each case vary somewhat.
In case of (HN1) and (HN2), what matters is the “production of unintended bad
consequences.” However, in this case, the demonstrative power of (HN2) is subordinate
to that of (HN1). On the other hand, there is more possibility that (HN2) will be
used as a part of positive arguments in support of human enhancement. Hence, the
role of (HN2) in anti-enhancement arguments is the most limited. The case of (HN3)
presents a different problem from (HN1) or (HN2) in relation to the question of which
virtues or values we want to preserve. An interesting fact that we can point out here is
that trans-humanists usually support human enhancement from the aspect of (HN2).
However, what has more probability to damage human dignity would be aspects of
(HN1) and (HN3).
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