“Axis of Evil” also is an Axis of Oil
While campaigning, President Bush vowed to curtail nation-building. Sept.
11 and oil prices have changed his policy, writes David D. Peck
Idaho Falls Post Register, July 14, 2002 A7
Counting the cost of nation-building
In a world where fanatics fly planes into skyscrapers can the US afford the risk of
making more enemies through nation-building policies? Imperialism and nation-building
activities in the Middle East in the 19th and 20 th centuries contributed to the cultivation of
an enmity whose end is not yet in sight. A series of events during the past year in Central
Asia and the Muslim Middle East may drag the United States into even more nationbuilding and into conflicts in countries most Americans have never heard of before.
Why? To satisfy the American appetite for cheaper oil.
Last April Saparmurat Niyazov, the President-for-life of Turkmenistan (located
north of Afghanistan and Iran, bordering on the Caspian Sea), met in conference with
representatives of Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The conference was the first
ever, designed to settle recent territorial disputes over control of the Caspian Sea’s critical
natural resources (and I don’t mean caviar). Behind the scenes, Niyazov was busy
negotiating deals with some of the world’s most influential corporations involving these
same natural resources. Globally positioned companies in recent times poured billions of
dollars into high-stakes ventures at levels unheard of in the history of Central Asia. The
conference failed to produce conclusive results, disappointing political leaders and
corporations alike.
Global corporate interests involving oil seldom go into negotiations alone. Central
Asia has also recently become the focus of an increased military buildup:
• Last May, less than two weeks after the conference, Vladimir
Putin ordered the Russian Caspian Fleet to begin large-scale
maneuvers in a thinly-veiled show of force. Putin, as a result of the
failed April conference, ordered the Admiral of the fleet to “bolster
[Russian] presence” on the Caspian as a “substantial promotion of
Russia’s economic and political interests.” Since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, Russia has consistently given investment in the
Caspian Fleet high priority, sometimes at the expense of other
military units elsewhere. Publicly, the Caspian Fleet was simply
conducting exercises aimed intimidating caviar smugglers.
• The recent 101st Airborne deployment to Kandahar points toward
a long-term military design on the part of the United States. The
number of soldiers arguably exceeds the short-term requirement of
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ousting the Taliban and providing minimal security for the
fledgling government in Afghanistan. Last January General
Tommy R. Franks reported that these troops will likely be rotated
in and out of the area on a 90 to 180 day cycle, another suggestion
of military permanence.
• America also began construction on an air force base in
Kyrgyzstan, an independent state that was once tied to the USSR.
The base will serve as a logistics center for troops in the area,
designed to accommodate up to 3,000 soldiers. Kyrgyzstan has a
sizeable border with China bringing the US into military contact
with its Western border.
• The US increased its military presence in Uzbekistan as part of
the war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, establishing a military
presence immediately northeast of Iran. Deputy secretary of
defense Paul D. Wolfowitz recently said that this sent “a message
to … important countries like Uzbekistan, that we have the
capacity to come back in and will come back in…were not going
to forget about them.”
What, exactly, makes Uzbekistan an “important” country militarily, and what are
globally-positioned corporations looking for in and around the Caspian Sea?
In a word, oil. Well, access to oil whose full productive capacity is yet undetermined.
How much black gold is in or around the Caspian Sea? Estimates range from a
conservative 35 billion barrels up to 300 billion (with a gross value of up to 5 trillion
dollars). Daily production might reach 6 million barrels by 2020. This would yield about
$150 million every day to these relatively poor countries and, of course, to the oil
companies involved. With such high monetary stakes, and in light of recent energy issues
in California and other parts of the United States (which became acute in proximity to
September 11th), competition is very high. The rush to dominate the region is on, and a
new “Great Game” has begun. The 19th century battle for Middle Eastern hegemony
between Britain and imperial Russia was called the “Great Game.” It led to four wars in
Afghanistan culminating in the Soviet invasion of 1979-1989, and the subsequent
empowerment of the Taliban. One can only imagine the effects of the new “Great Game”
upon an area already politically and culturally stressed to the breaking point.
The estimated oil deposits of the Caspian Sea area, if accurate, would rival those
of Saudi Arabia and Iraq, accounting for up to 6% of the world’s annual consumption,
upsetting the regional balance of petrol power, but giving western nations a non-Arab oil
alternative. At a price, that is. Former Secretary of State James Baker concluded that
“Caspian oil may eventually be as important to the industrialized world as Middle
Eastern oil is today.” Unfortunately, the operative word is “may.” This oil is relatively
inaccessible. The Caspian Sea is landlocked, so the oil must be transported overland to
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ports on the Black Sea, or to the Persian Gulf. Current pipelines, which cannot handle
increased volumes of crude oil, either pass through southern Russia, or thorough smaller
countries like Georgia or Armenia. However, American and western European oil
companies want to keep this oil out of Russian control but still maintain direct access to
the new pipelines.
The only way to do this is to direct these pipelines southward, toward the Arabian
Sea. Additionally, pipelines to the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf either pass through
politically problematic nations like Iran, or through geographic choke points like the
Bosporus and the Straits of Hormuz. These limitations essentially restrict the preferred
route southward to the Arabian Sea. That means passage through nations like Uzbekistan,
Afghanistan and Pakistan, among the least stable countries in the world. Historical
examination of the region indicates that western oil politics and nation-building policies
have not had a stabilizing influence. If anything, the opposite is true.
What course of action should the United States therefore take with reference to
this region? Is there any hope that the exploitation of oil in the Caspian Sea area would
avoid strengthening fundamentalist or reactionary movements in the region? Events in
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Chechnya indicate the instability of the area, as does the existence of militant
fundamentalist groups in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan looking for an opportunity to assert
themselves.
Nation-building as foreign policy
A growing number of foreign policy commentators, such as Richard N. Haase of
the Brookings Institute currently espouse nation-building and an imperial approach to the
issue. The strength of this approach is illustrated by the rather dramatic reversal in the
administration’s recent position on nation-building. In October of 2000, then Presidential
Candidate George W. Bush stated “if we don’t stop sending our troops all around the
world in nation-building missions, then we’re going to have a serious problem coming
down the road. I’m going to prevent that.” The rather impressive list of US troop
deployments into Central Asia since September 11th indicate that nation-building is in
full-swing regionally. What will this do to an already complex situation in the Middle
East?
History of oil and nation-building
• Britain became involved in the Persian Gulf in the early 1900s, in a quest for
large oil reserves located near India. This eventually had a negative effect on Iranian
society and politics as Britain attempted to assert control over the Shah. After World War
Two, the United States followed Britain’s lead, further radicalizing Iran and perhaps
inadvertently empowering religious extremists like Khomeini. The US tried to counterbalance the effect by empowering Iran’s rival, Saddam Hussein, with disastrous results.
• Oil wealth also had a destabilizing effect in Saudi Arabia. Prior to the
exploitation of oil in the 1950s, the annual royal budget of the Saud family was about
$200,000. Within the short period of three years that amount skyrocketed to $2.5 million
per week. The Saudis used religious fanaticism to come to power, and found they
couldn’t control it. So they used oil wealth to export their instability abroad, most notably
into Afghanistan with direct US assistance (in the case of Osama bin Laden particularly).
In both the case of Iran and of Saudi Arabia, entire populations were abruptly
brought into a modern economy within the span of a single generation, accompanied by
the disruption of traditional cultural, economic and religious systems. From the
perspective of many among these peoples, modern western material culture offered no
adequate replacement, and they embrace fundamentalism as a method of reawakening
traditional values and perspectives. There is every indication that the same thing would
happen in the economically primitive countries of Muslim Central Asia, in the event that
the US engages in oil-related nation-building there.
Two lessons are apparent from historical experience involving oil wealth and
nation-building. First, it doesn’t work: nation-building has a destabilizing effect (Iran).
Second, the instability is often broadcast to other regions, extending its reach (Saudi
Arabia and bin Laden).
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Current Middle East geopolitics
Imagine the Middle East as three mini-regions. On the Western extreme, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict currently holds center-stage (and has for the past fifty-plus
years). On the Eastern extreme, the Pakistani-Indian conflict holds center-stage (as it has
for the past fifty-plus years). The center has been an area of instability dominated by oil,
principally located around the Persian Gulf. In a very real way, the “axis of evil” is also
the “axis of oil”, and may now expand to include more northern deposits. The United
States currently entertains the notion of another war involving Iraq, the third major war in
the Persian Gulf since the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s.
How might the development of potential oil reserves in the Caspian Sea affect the
Middle East, and by extension, the world? Consider each of these mini-regions of the
Middle East in turn:
• In the West – The history of US foreign policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict demonstrates that its effects cannot be contained. As much as American leaders
have tried to maintain a unilateral support for Israel without affecting oil politics, this has
proved difficult, and at times impossible. The 1973 oil embargo demonstrates this clearly.
As the conflict continues, extremists within Israel and among Palestinians are gaining the
upper-hand. Unless a US-brokered and US-enforced peace is seriously pursued (a peace
in which neither side gets everything it wants) this conflict will likely continue to produce
unforeseen consequences threatening American aims in the rest of the region, and will
likely continue to threaten security at home.
• In the East – The US faces some genuinely tough issues in the perennial
Pakistani-Indian conflict that extend northward into Afghanistan and Central Asia. A
more permanent American military presence (as appears to be the case) runs the risk of
forcing America into taking sides. If the US decides to follow its oil interests, the
preferred ally is nuclear-armed Pakistan. This would alienate India, now emerging as the
most powerful nation in Asia (aside from the countries of the Pacific Rim).
• In the Center – The development of Caspian Sea oil, and pipelines running
through Uzbekistan and Afghanistan would introduce an expanded oil influence into the
region’s politics, bringing Pakistan into the orbit of oil power. If the world gradually
became dependent upon Caspian oil, the influence of the Pakistani-Indian conflict could
widen into a truly global problem. The United States could become increasingly involved
in the politics of questionable regimes in Central Asia, and increase its exposure to the
wrath of militant factions within these countries.
As America moves militarily into Central Asia an important question takes shape:
is oil-related nation-building worth the price?
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Peck is a history professor at BYU-Idaho specializing in the modern Middle East. You can write
him at Smith 314, Rexburg, ID 83460-0830.
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