Nuclear Weapons
Name: __________________________ Read and Annotate each piece, organize the key points of each article on a separate sheet of paper Hiroshima: A Controversy That Refuses to Die By JOHN KIFNER Published: January 31, 1995 Fifty years after the B-­‐29 Superfortress Enola Gay was used to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, the decision that ushered in the nuclear age is still the subject of fierce historical debate. The issue stirs enormous passions: at one pole speculative estimates of how many Americans would have died invading Japan, and were presumably spared because of the bombing, and at the other pole whether the attack in August 1945 was necessary to end the war. Indeed, some historians now contend that the bombing was aimed not so much at the wartime enemy Japan as at the wartime ally Soviet Union, delivered as a warning against postwar rivalry. The questions, sometimes raised by a new generation horrified at the death and destruction that rained on Hiroshima and, three days later, on Nagasaki, resonate harshly among World War II veterans, particularly those who survived the bloody fighting in the Pacific that took more than 41,000 American lives. In the latest clash, the Smithsonian Institution, attacked by veterans groups and members of Congress for a World War II exhibit that they said was overly solicitous of Japan, has decided to drastically scale back the display: The narrative, already revised five times, will be dropped, and visitors will see only part of the Enola Gay's fuselage, along with a small commemorative plaque. Among historians digging through musty diaries, military records and memorandums from President Truman's Administration, opinions about the bombing of Hiroshima are no less firm than the veterans'. "I think it can be proven that the bomb was not only unnecessary but known in advance not to be necessary," said Gar Alperovitz, a historian critical of the decision to drop the bomb and who has been studying the issue for some 30 years. Speaking in a telephone interview from Washington, he said, "The President fully understood and was advised that there were other ways to end the war." Mr. Alperovitz said he was planning to publish an extensive study on the subject this summer. By contrast, Robert Cowley, the editor of the Military History Quarterly, whose forthcoming spring issue is devoted to "The End of the War With Japan," said: "If you were in Truman's shoes and had this weapon and had the chance to end the war then and there, there's no question you would use the bomb. The problems of continuing the war were enormous." Barton J. Bernstein, a Stanford University historian who has figured in the Smithsonian uproar, said in a telephone interview that the bombing should be examined in the context of its time. Professor Bernstein said he was wary both of revisionist historians and the veterans. Many questions raised now, Professor Bernstein writes in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, "often fail to recognize that, before Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the use of the A-­‐bomb did not raise profound moral issues for policymakers." He explained: "By early 1945, World War II -­‐-­‐ especially in the Pacific -­‐-­‐ had become virtually total war. The firebombing of Dresden [ Germany ] had helped set a precedent for the U.S. air force, supported by the American people, to intentionally kill mass numbers of Japanese citizens. The earlier moral insistence on noncombatant immunity crumbled during the savage war." Professor Bernstein helped ignite the latest furor when he convinced Smithsonian officials that casualty estimates for an invasion of Japan should be about 63,000, not the previous estimates of at least 229,000. The question of projected casualties, Professor Bernstein said in an interview, "is so important to the vets" because any lessening of these numbers could be interpreted as raising questions about the need for the bombing and, in a sense, diminishing their own role. Casualty estimates have run as high as the half million cited in Truman's memoirs and the one million referred to by Winston Churchill. These figures were often taken by the public to mean that these many lives had been saved. But Professor Bernstein and other historians note that the term casualties includes wounded as well as dead. They also note that these postwar estimates appear to be far higher than the figures that military planners were using at the time. Historians caution that all the figures, even those at the time, were speculative. Professor Bernstein said that he revised his casualty estimates last spring, after rereading the diary of Adm. William Leahy, the equivalent of the Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff at the end of World War II. Admiral Leahy, he said, recounted how an estimate was advanced at a White House meeting of President Truman and his military advisers on June 18, 1945. Participants discussed a casualty figure of 35 percent. Professor Bernstein said the Army commander, Gen. George C. Marshall, had cited a 35 percent casualty figure for the entire invasion force, about 775,000 troops. But Professor Bernstein said his review of Admiral Leahy's diary indicated that the figure should have been applied only to combat troops, or about 190,000 men. The new calculation yielded 63,000 casualties. He conceded, however, that the 35 percent figure was made before American intelligence found indications of a large Japanese buildup in the Kyushu region, where an invasion was tentatively planned for the fall of 1945, which presumably would have meant more casualties. Truman and his advisers, who as veterans of World War I had their own memories of casualties, had seen troops devastated in Europe, and they knew that much of the Pacific battles were even tougher. "Considering the horrific fighting on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the prospect of invading Japan itself seemed nightmarish," Peter Maslowski, a professor at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, writes in the forthcoming Military History Quarterly. Professor Maslowski outlines four possible options for President Truman, each with "weaknesses and potential risks." These were the bombing, an invasion, a negotiated settlement (which would presumably hinge on the politically difficult question of allowing the Emperor, revered as a God by the Japanese, to remain in some position of authority), and strangulation through both intensified conventional bombing and a tightened blockade. "Looking back on the events of 1945 from a secure, peaceful, comfortable perch decades later, it is easy to criticize President Truman's decision to drop the atomic bombs," Professor Maslowski writes. "But considering the possible drawbacks associated with the other options, his choice was entirely logical and reasonable -­‐-­‐ the least undesirable of four unhappy alternatives." Mr. Alperovitz disagrees. He contends that the Soviet Union's decision in July 1945 to join the war against Japan was expected by Mr. Truman to spell the end of the war, and that the Americans were already aware of peace overtures. Instead, he contends, American policy shifted, largely under the influence of Truman's old Congressional mentor James Byrnes, the Secretary of State, who wanted to block the Soviets from moving into northern China and to deliver a warning for the future. Mr. Cowley, the editor of the Military History Quarterly, agreed that the challenge to the Soviet Union was important, saying that if the Soviets had moved into the area "this would have changed the geopolitical ball game; Tokyo would become an oriental Berlin." Professor Bernstein also said that the Soviet gambit had figured in Truman's decision to use the bomb. So did the momentum of the $2 billion Manhattan Project, he said. Had the bomb been ready in time, he believes, it would have been used on Nazi Germany. Mr. Alperovitz and Professor Bernstein note that many of the generals, raised with a nobler notion of war, had worried about the implications of using the bomb. Admiral Leahy called it "barbaric." But these warriors' qualms were swept away in what Professor Bernstein called a "redefinition of morality that made Hiroshima and Nagasaki possible and ushered in the Atomic Age in such a frightening way." "That redefinition of morality was a product of World War II," Professor Bernstein writes, "which included such barbarities as Germany's systematic murder of six million Jews and Japan's rape of Nanking. "While the worst atrocities were perpetrated by the Axis, all the major nation-­‐states sliced away at the moral code -­‐-­‐ often to the applause of their leaders and citizens alike. By 1945 there were few moral restraints left in what had become virtually a total war." Photo: Col. Paul Tibbets waves before his World War II B-­‐29 mission to drop the atomic bomb on Japan, as seen in the 1985 film "The Atomic Cafe." http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/31/us/hiroshima-­‐a-­‐controversy-­‐that-­‐refuses-­‐to-­‐die.html?pagewanted=all Understanding the Decision to Drop the Bomb on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki
AUG 10, 2012
By Nathan Donohue
This week marks the 67th
anniversary of the nuclear
bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. On August 6, 1945, U.S.
President Harry Truman informed
the world that an atomic weapon
had been detonated on the
Japanese city of Hiroshima.
Nicknamed Little Boy, the bomb
with a power of over 20,000 tons of
TNT destroyed most of Hiroshima,
killing an estimated 130,000 people.
Three days later on August 9, a
second bomb nicknamed Fat Man
was dropped on the Japanese city
of Nagasaki destroying most of
Nagasaki and killing roughly
between 60,000 - 70,000 people.
Six days after the bombing of
Nagasaki, Japan surrendered,
marking the end of World War II.
The destructive power of these
nuclear weapons and the subsequent casualties of the Japanese have continued to prompt questions over
whether the U.S. should have decided to use these weapons against Japan during World War II. Even 67
years after the event, the decision to drop the first atomic bomb continues to be widely debated.
Certainly, the power of this new weapon was understood before its use against Japan. President Truman
stated that “it was the most terrible thing ever discovered.” To that end, the decision to use this new weapon
was not taken lightly, nor was it made in a vacuum devoid of dissent, despite what historical accounts may
depict. Specifically, historian J. Samuel Walker purports that history has painted a false dichotomy which
posited that Truman had to choose between using the atomic bomb and risking hundreds of thousands of
American lives. Instead, as Walker highlights in his book “Prompt and Utter Destruction,” the historical records
show a much more complex situation.
To be sure, as the development of the atomic bomb was nearing its completion, the U.S. was still engaged in a
massive war with the Japanese. By all accounts, from the middle of 1944, it was clear to both the Japanese
and the United States that the Japanese were losing the war and that the question was when not if the
Japanese would finally capitulate. As the summer of 1945 began, the U.S. military campaign continued to
involve numerous aerial raids as well as large scale invasion of Japanese islands. Accordingly, before the
atomic bomb became available, the U.S. was planning another large scale invasion of Japan codenamed
Operation Downfall for the fall of 1945, which it hoped would overwhelm the Japanese and end the war.
Deciding to Drop the Bomb
In the lead up to the Trinity test, the top priority for President Truman was to end the war as quickly as possible
with the fewest U.S. casualties. For many, this had become the overarching purpose for using the atomic bomb
once it was completed. Walker notes five reasons why Truman chose to use the bomb.
Ending the war at the earliest possible moment - The primary objective for the U.S. was to win the war at
the lowest possible cost. Specifically, Truman was looking for the most effective way to end the war quickly,
not for a way to not use the bomb.
To justify the cost of the Manhattan Project - The Manhattan Project was a secret program to which the
U.S. had funneled an estimated $1,889,604,000 (in 1945 dollars) through December 31, 1945.
To impress the Soviets - With the end of the war nearing, the Soviets were an important strategic
consideration, especially with their military control over most of Eastern Europe. As Yale Professor Gaddis
Smith has noted, “It has been demonstrated that the decision to bomb Japan was centrally connected to
Truman's confrontational approach to the Soviet Union.” However, this idea is thought to be more appropriately
understood as an ancillary benefit of dropping the bomb and not so much its sole purpose.
A lack of incentives not to use the bomb - Weapons were created to be used. By 1945, the bombing of
civilians was already an established practice. In fact, the earlier U.S. firebombing campaign of Japan, which
began in 1944, killed an estimated 315,922 Japanese, a greater number than the estimated deaths attributed
to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The firebombing of Tokyo alone resulted in roughly 100,000
Japanese killed.
Responding to Pearl Harbor - When a general raised objections to the use of the bombs, Truman responded
by noting the atrocities of Pearl Harbor and said that “When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat
him as a beast.”
Alternatives to dropping the bomb
Nevertheless, until July 1945, the atomic bomb remained untested and the leading plan of the U.S. was to
invade Japan through Operation Downfall, beginning with an invasion of the southernmost island of Kyushu in
October 1945. In terms of the operation, there were numerous estimates as to the potential U.S. casualties.
President Truman received estimates from General MacArthur that upwards of 31,000 U.S. casualties could be
expected within the first thirty days. However, other estimates, particularly by the Joint Chiefs, projected
casualties to reach almost seven times higher. This is a far cry from the estimate of millions of casualties which
has been bandied about in the contemporary media. Nevertheless, Operation Downfall posed a definitive risk
to U.S. soldiers.
At the same time, alternatives to both the bomb and the invasion were discussed by the Interim Committee
established to advise the manner in which nuclear weapons should be employed against Japan. During these
meetings, the Committee discussed three specific alternatives:
Intensifying conventional bombing and the naval blockade - General MacArthur felt that air power alone
could force a Japanese surrender within six months with little risk to American lives. However, it was also
argued that this may be a best case scenario where in actuality it could take substantially longer.
Allowing the Japanese to retain the Emperor - This plan was predicated on mitigating the call for
unconditional surrender by Japan. Both Secretary of War Stimson and Acting Secretary of State Grew felt that
this was an essential policy because of the dedication and fanaticism of the Japanese people towards the
Emperor Hirohito, whom the Japanese believed to be a deity.
Waiting for the Soviet Union to enter the war - This had been a primary objective of President Roosevelt in
his negotiations with the Soviet Union at the Yalta Conference. Nevertheless, the Committee believed that a
Soviet invasion of Manchuria would be helpful but not decisive by itself.
In the summer of 1945, there was a distinctly changing dynamic within Japan. The war had already taken a
great toll not just on the Japanese military but also on its entire domestic infrastructure. Japan’s chief cabinet
secretary reported in April 1945 that “transportation, shipping, communications, and industry had been so
sharply curtailed that the national economy would grind to a virtual standstill,” factors that he predicted would
become acute by the end of the year. The destruction of Japanese cities through the repeated raids by U.S. B29’s, had caused conditions in Japan to diminish with an evaporating food supply and decreasing public
morale. As General Robert Eichelberger, a lieutenant of General MacArthur, wrote on July 24 of that year, “a
great many people, probably 50%, feel that Japan is about to fold up.”
To that end, if Hirohito’s decision to end the war after the bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima was predicated
on the desire to save the Japanese people, then the declining situation already evident in Japan could have
produced a similar decision to surrender without the use of the atomic bomb and that the alternative of
intensifying conventional bombing and the naval blockade would only have increased the likelihood.
In addition, the alternative idea of modifying unconditional surrender could have proved effective as well. By
June 1945 there were already divisions within the Japanese Supreme Council discussing how to end the war
with the Americans with the largest reservation being the desire to retain the national polity by allowing the
Emperor Hirohito to remain on his throne. In fact, in July 1945 the U.S. intercepted a Japanese cable from
Japan’s Foreign Minister Togo to Japan’s ambassador to the Soviet Union which stated that Japan wanted to
end the war and that the major impediment to Japanese surrender was the insistence on unconditional
surrender by the U.S. Concurrently, the U.S. was also deliberating offers of surrender for the Japanese.
Secretary of War Stimson, aware of the Japanese regard for the Emperor, was adamant that the offer include
the provision that the Emperor would be able to remain in power. However, he was continually overridden and
even with the knowledge that such a modification could prove amenable to the Japanese government, the U.S.
chose not to include it.
The third alternative of waiting for the Soviet Union to enter the war, presents an interesting issue in that it
actually occurred and it remains unclear what effect this had on the Japanese decision to surrender. President
Truman himself remarked in his diary on July 17, 1945, “Fini Japs when that [Soviet entry into the war] comes
about.” Between when the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and before the Japanese had decided
to surrender, the Soviet Union entered the war by invading Japanese-held Manchuria from the north, routing
the Japanese army there. Historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa argues that it wasn’t until the Soviet invasion that the
Emperor “was finally convinced that the moment had at last arrived to end the war.” If this is true, then it could
mean that in connection with the bombing of Hiroshima, the Committee’s assumption that a Soviet invasion
would be helpful but not decisive was correct, or instead, that it was just the opposite and that the Soviet
invasion was the decisive act to facilitate a Japanese surrender.
In the end, none of these alternatives were chosen. However, it does not rule out their possible efficacy nor
does it mean that the atomic bomb was the only way to produce surrender by the Japanese.
Additional Considerations
In terms of dropping the bomb, there were also various ideas for how it should be used against the Japanese.
This included the argument that it could be used specifically for targeting a military objective such as a
collection of factories and that the civilians around the target area should be warned before its use. Similarly,
the idea was suggested that an outside demonstration be made to the Japanese so that they could witness the
power of the weapon before suffering its use. However, neither Oppenheimer nor the military planners believed
that a demonstration of the weapon would be sufficient to create a Japanese surrender. More so, they worried
that any warning of the weapons usage would undermine the U.S. position if the weapon eventually failed to
work.
Another significant factor that I believe is continually overlooked is the issue of Kyoto. Kyoto was the ancient
capital of Japan which held a deep and powerful connection among the Japanese people. When the original
bombing plans were developed by General Groves and other U.S. officials, they continually noted Kyoto as
their preferred military target. Stimson, understanding the Japanese culture and the significance of such an
attack, unilaterally ruled out Kyoto as a target stating that if it were bombed, the Japanese would fight to the
last man and would never surrender. The significance of this is that although it is generally accepted that the
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused the Japanese surrender, if one of the targets had actually been
Kyoto, then the event that marked the end of the war may have instead created a resurgence of Japanese will
to fight.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is not to argue counterfactuals but is instead intended to highlight the complexities of
the situation. It is clear that there were multiple reasons for using the atomic bomb, but that at the same time
there were also alternatives which may have proved equally effective in prompting a Japanese surrender. One
could argue that by just modifying unconditional surrender, the U.S. could have saved both U.S. lives and the
lives of those Japanese residing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As noted in the biography of Henry Stimson,
“history might find that the United States, by its delay in stating its position [in regards to the Emperor] had
prolonged the war.” Similarly, it can be argued that correlation does not equal causation and that as Hasegawa
suggests, maybe the decisive factor was having the engagement of the Soviet Union, and not the dropping of
the two bombs. Or, as Walker noted, it seems reasonable to conclude that “a combination of B-29 raids with
conventional bombs, the blockade, the Soviet invasion, and perhaps a moderation of unconditional surrender
policy would have ended the war without an invasion and without the use of atomic bombs.”
Regardless, Truman decided to use nuclear weapons on both Hiroshima and Nagasaki and days after the
bombing of Nagasaki the Japanese did indeed surrender bringing an end to World War II.
Nathan Donohue is a research intern for the Project on Nuclear Issues. The views expressed above are his
own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Strategic and International Studies or the Project on
Nuclear Issues.
70 Years Later, The Bomb Still Casts Fear
On Aug. 6, 1945, the U.S. dropped a "super weapon" on Hiroshima, Japan, and
launched a fundamental shift in the way we wage war.
The dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan 70 years still haunts the world.
By Kenneth T. Walsh
Aug. 5, 2015, at 5:47 p.m.
At 2:45 on the fateful morning of Aug. 6, 1945, the Enola Gay took off from the tiny Pacific island of Tinian and
began its journey into history. After a six-hour flight that covered more than 1,500 miles, the American B-29
bomber began circling over the Japanese mainland, reaching 31,000 feet. At 8:15 a.m., the crew dropped the
first atomic bomb used in wartime, nicknamed "Little Boy," on the city of Hiroshima. What military
leaders called the "super weapon" detonated at 1,900 feet and leveled 60 percent of the city, sending a
mushroom cloud rising ominously into the sky; 70,000 people died in a matter of seconds.
This was the dawn of the atomic age, one of the most dangerous epochs in history.
From the beginning 70 years ago, The Bomb generated a profound sense that something fundamental had
changed and something dreadful had happened. Robert Lewis, the Enola Gay's co-pilot, wrote in the flight log,
"My God, what have we done?" When J. Robert Oppenheimer, a physicist who was considered the father of
the atom bomb, saw the results of an earlier test, he was awed and frightened by what he and the other
scientists had wrought. He referred to a Sanskrit morality tale when he quoted from the Bhagavad-Gita holy
text: "I am become death, destroyer of worlds."
Sixteen hours after the first nuclear attack, President Harry Truman, who had authorized it, captured the
moment. "It is an atomic bomb," he explained solemnly to the world in his unemotional Missouri monotone. "It
is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its power has been
loosed against those who brought war to the Far East."
But the Japanese military would not give up.
Three days later, on Aug. 9, a second bomb, "Fat Man," was dropped on Nagasaki, killing an estimated
70,000.
On Aug. 15, Japan's governmentsurrendered.
The 70th anniversary of Hiroshima is being marked in various ways around the world and the most noticeable
will be the many anti-nuclear protests. To this day, Truman's decision to use the bomb remains hotly debated
and widely criticized.
But Truman didn't second guess himself in the years that followed. He argued that he used the super-weapon
justifiably to avoid an invasion of the Japanese home islands and prevent the immense casualties that would
have resulted to both U.S. soldiers and Japanese armed forces and civilians. Most Americans agreed with him.
Certainly Paul Tibbets, the 30-year-old pilot of the Enola Gay (an aircraft he named for his mother), had no
remorse. "Do you have any idea how many American lives would have been lost had we launched a ground
invasion of Japan, instead of dropping the bomb?" Tibbets once said. "And how many Japanese lives? I sleep
so well because I know how many people got to live full lives because of what we did."
The context of the times is important in considering Truman's decision. The war in Europe had ended in May
1945, but the conflict against Japan remained brutal, with Japanese soldiers digging in and inflicting massive
casualties on American forces at Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
Some of Truman's critics say he could have ordered a blockade of the Japanese islands and didn't really have
to insist on a land invasion, so use of the bomb wasn't necessary. Others say Truman should have dropped
the super weapon on an unpopulated area as a demonstration of its devastating effects.
But Truman had only two atomic bombs ready for use, and he and his advisers couldn't be sure they would
both work, or that a demonstration blast or two would bring Japan to its knees. They also had little sympathy
for Japanese leaders or the Japanese people because Japan had launched what was widely called a sneak
attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, drawing the United States into the world war. Most Americans appeared to
agree that the Japanese, as with the Germans, deserved whatever they got.
Certainly there was little second-guessing about the U.S. military's firebombing of Tokyo weeks before the
Enola Gay completed its fateful mission, conventional attacks that killed more than 120,000 civilians. The
United States had used this same firebombing tactic against Germany before the Nazis surrendered, with no
big public outcry. So the bomb seemed to Truman simply a more efficient way than firebombing to force Tokyo
to give in.
In addition, Truman wanted to show the Soviet Union the extent of U.S. power in order to discourage military
advances by Kremlin ruler Josef Stalin.
And there was also the pressure Truman felt to continue the legacy of the beloved President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, whom he had succeeded after FDR's death in April 1945. "Truman could not ignore the fact that the
decision to build the bomb at a cost of $2 billion had been Roosevelt's," historian Robert Dallek wrote in "Harry
S. Truman," a biography. "If he had decided to rely on an invasion rather than atom bombs to force an end to
the war, and this became public knowledge, he would have lost public confidence in his leadership and all that
would mean for leading the nation for the next three years. He would have been seen as abandoning
Roosevelt's agenda and giving in to sentimental concerns about saving the lives of Japanese civilians at a cost
in American lives"--the death of up to 500,000 U.S. soldiers, according the military estimates.
Truman's conclusion was to use the bomb to end the war as quickly as possible, a decision that was really his
only recourse, Dallek says. Americans hated the Japanese, and Truman might have been impeached if he
hadn't used the bomb to hasten the end of the war and end U.S. casualties, Dallek says. adding: "He had no
choice politically in terms of the politics of this country. People wanted the war to end."
Yet even the most articulate defense of Truman's decision has not deterred critics, who say the bomb should
never have been used on population centers. Fueling this view were descriptions of the results of the attack,
especially "Hiroshima," John Hersey's shocking report on the devastation first published in The New Yorker in
August 1946 and released later as a book. It remains one of the most powerful accounts of the horrors of war
ever written.
The subsequent nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union generated even more fear
and dread for generations. Americans of a certain age--those who were children in the 1950s and 1960s-remember the precautions advised by the government, including the construction of fallout shelters, and the
training of children in the now-ridiculed practice of "duck and cover." This called for the kids to duck under their
desks at school and cover their heads with their arms in the event of a nuclear attack, as if this woud protect
them from the falling bombs and the radioactivity that would follow.
Many people wondered if nuclear war was inevitable, resulting in the end of civilization. The collisions of the
superpowers included the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, when the United States and the Soviet Union came
perilously close to Armageddon.
Nuclear fears pervaded everyday life in other ways. There were the nuclear nightmares of children reported by
their parents. There were the vivid and horrifying television images of open-air nuclear tests with ever more
devastating bombs on display, marked by spectacular mushroom clouds that were far more extensive and
fearsome than the ones at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There was an endless series of movies about nuclear war
and nuclear radiation that gripped the public's imagination, including "The Day the Earth Stood Still," "Godzilla,"
"Failsafe," "Dr. Strangelove," and "On the Beach."
Today, nuclear fear manifests itself in different ways. "The Cold War has been over since the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991, and the threat of nuclear Armageddon has largely faded from public
consciousness," Joel Achenbach wrote in the Washington Post July 15. "Yet...nuclear weapons have once
again leapt onto the front page, with the controversial agreement between Iran and a U.S.-led coalition that is
designed to push back a decade or more the development of the Iranian bomb. The Iranian deal is a reminder
that these weapons remain very much a presence on the planet."
In recent years, there have been various arms-control agreements and reductions in nuclear weapons by the
United States and the Soviet Union and Russia. And nuclear weapons have never been used again in war
since Hiroshima and Nagasaki
But those weapons remain a dire threat. By one estimate, the number of operational nuclear warheads has
been reduced from 64,500 in 1986 to about 10,000 today. This leaves an enormous number of such warheads
in existence, and there are nine nuclear powers, some of them in very volatile regions with a history of enmity
among neighboring nations. The nuclear club consists of the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China,
India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, according to the Federation of American Scientists and the Arms Control
Association and other sources.
Historian Dallek says, "The United States bears the historical burden of having used atomic bombs, used them
in anger." And there are so many more nuclear nations today that the concerns about the use of nuclear
weapons remains strong. "The nuclear issue won't go away," Dallek says. "It is a threat that hangs over
humankind because of the power of those weapons."
This is becoming clear, again, in the debate over President Barack Obama's nuclear deal with Iran, in which
the United States and five allies negotiated an agreement with Tehran to reduce or end economic sanctions in
return for curbs on the Iranian nuclear program. Many nations fear that program will lead to
a nuclear bomb. The deal is now being considered by Congress. And there are many concerns about whether
the United States is trusting Iran too much, whether the agreement represents too much of a risk for the United
States, and whether it's the best way to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Mideast.
Underlying today's concerns is the vivid image of that deadly mushroom cloud over Hiroshima in August 1945,
which changed the world 70 years ago and continues to resonate today.
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/08/05/70-­‐years-­‐later-­‐the-­‐bomb-­‐still-­‐casts-­‐fear