Lisa Hill’s Discovery of Adam Smith’s
‘Hidden Theology’
Dr James Alvey1
Department of Applied and International Economics
Massey University, Palmerston North
New Zealand
and
Department of Language and Information Sciences
University of Tokyo, Komaba
Tokyo
Japan
Refereed paper presented to the
Australasian Political Studies Association Conference
University of Adelaide, Adelaide
29 September – 1 October 2004
1
The author wishes to acknowledge the financial support of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science under
which he is a Postdoctoral Fellow for Foreign Researchers. He also wishes to thank the two anonymous referees for
their comments.
James Alvey: Hill’s Discovery of Adam Smith’s ‘Hidden Theology’
These days theology is detached from, and essentially irrelevant to, social science; yet in a
recent contribution, Lisa Hill makes an important (albeit controversial) case that a
coherent understanding of Adam Smith requires rejoining his theology to his other views
(Hill 2001). Hill claims that ‘Adam Smith’s social and economic philosophy is inherently
theological’ (p. 1). Whilst conceding the ‘apparent secularism of Smith’s cold
calculation,’ she claims that Smith believes in a ‘loving creative demiurge’;2 his ‘invisible
hand’ doctrine is not a ‘secular device,’ rather it is indicative of his ‘hidden or “secret”
theology’ (pp. 16, 22, 1; see 4-5).3 Contrary to the mainstream view, Smith’s
‘Providentialist underpinnings cannot be removed without impairing his theory’ (p. 1; see
p. 3). By removing its theological underpinnings, and hence its ‘integral
providentialism,’ the mainstream, secular interpretation has made ‘Smith’s optimism …
unwarranted, if not inexplicable’; his system is rendered incoherent and it collapses (pp. 1,
13 quoting Viner 1972, 81-2; see Klay and Lunn 2003). I agree that a sound interpretation
of Smith’s oeuvre requires a correct interpretation of his fundamental beliefs, including his
views on theology and teleology. Hill has addressed an important topic. Nevertheless,
I have some questions relating to gaps in Hill’s presentation; I also have some concerns
about the general nature of the theology and teleology attributed to Smith.
The remainder of the paper consists of six sections. The first section places Hill’s
contribution in the context of previous Smith scholarship. The second section
summarizes her interpretation. The third section discusses teleology and the ends of
nature. The fourth section discusses the teleological view of history which Hill finds in
Smith. The fifth section discusses ‘apparent’ defects in nature. The final section
provides a brief conclusion.
1. Hill’s Interpretation in the Context of Smith Scholarship Over Time
Although Hill presents a thorough literature review (pp. 1-4), it is organized thematically
whereas a chronological approach may have been more appropriate. Over the past two
hundred years, commentators have held widely differing views on the role of theology in
Smith’s work. A nice summary of the flow of these views is presented in Kleer (2000).
Kleer argues that the initial commentators through to the latter half of the nineteenth
century held that theology and teleology played an important role in Smith’s writings;
early in the twentieth century a more secular view arose;4 and after World War II a
2
Demiurge can refer to the creator of the world (Plato) or to a heavenly being subordinate to the supreme being
(Gnosticism) (OED).
3 ‘Smith’s apparently cold, utilitarian equations’ seem to be the product of ‘a secular mind’ but his ‘“invisible hand”
elaboration,’ according to Hill, is ‘his particular contribution to eighteenth-century theodicy’ (p. 22).
4 The view tended to be either that a) Smith held a teleological view in his first book but dropped it in his second, or b)
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James Alvey: Hill’s Discovery of Adam Smith’s ‘Hidden Theology’
thoroughly secular view was developed. I would add that, in the last decade or so, a
‘new theological and teleological view’5 has arisen which returns, in large part, to the
view of the early commentators. This characterization of the trend of the literature has
certain exceptions, such as Jacob Viner’s work in the period from the 1920s through to
some posthumous publications beginning in the 1970s. Hill’s contribution is consistent
with the ‘new view’ of Smith and she singles out Viner’s teleological interpretation of
Smith as her inspiration. Whilst the secular interpretation of Smith remains orthodox,
the ‘new view’ interpretations have started to undermine the orthodoxy.6
Obviously, over such a long period of commentary on Smith, there have been
various shades of interpretation and all of these nuances cannot be discussed here. The
simplest division of the numerous interpreters is between those supporting and those
opposing the view that Smith’s system rests on a theological foundation. In agreement
with Viner’s earlier suggestion, Hill says that there has been a gradual shift from the
theistic to the secular interpretation and that this reflects the general trend of thinking
within the social sciences (pp. 1, 22 citing Viner 1972, 81-2; see Kleer 2000, 26). Hence, the
chronological approach to the literature would have better demonstrated that the
interpreter’s own context impacts significantly on the interpretation offered. For
example, the publication and popularization of the Darwinian thesis led to the gradual
acceptance of evolution as a secular alternative to divine design and this obviously
impacted on the trend in Smith scholarship.
This latent contextualism becomes explicit when Hill suggests that one source of
the failings of the secular interpretations is their ‘insufficient knowledge of
eighteenth-century discourse’ (p. 3; see also p. 22; Rashid 1998, 3). She correctly points
out that ‘teleology and the argument from design were still intellectual staples in Smith’s
time’ (p. 3). Whilst David Hume opposed the teleological mainstream, he had little
impact in Britain at the time (see Hurlbutt 1985, 170, 177; Stewart 2003, 54). His insights
were only appreciated much later, when the teleological view was overturned by the
Darwinian view (which denied any divine purpose in nature).
Hill, and the ‘new view’ theorists generally, therefore propose a revisionist,
contextualist, reading of Smith. In order to maintain this theistic interpretation,
however, they reject Hume’s influence on this aspect of Smith’s thinking. In viewing
Smith as a theist, he becomes a more conventional eighteenth-century thinker; his views
become anachronistic with respect to, not foundational for, modern thought. Next, I will
Smith’s references to teleology could be removed without damage to his argument. On the former, see Section 5 below.
5 ‘New view’ contributions include Kleer 1995; Denis 1999; Kleer 2000; Waterman 2002; Otteson 2002; Tanaka 2003.
6 Secular interpretations of Smith include Haakonssen 1981; Minowitz 1993; Griswold 1999.
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James Alvey: Hill’s Discovery of Adam Smith’s ‘Hidden Theology’
outline the substance of Hill’s presentation of Smith.
2. Hill’s Interpretation in Brief
In this section I will summarize Hill’s interpretation of Smith. Several questions will be
addressed below. Does Smith believe in a monotheistic theology? What is the status of
his ‘invisible hand’ doctrine? Is his work a precursor of modern theories of evolutionary
and spontaneous order?
Let us begin by stating what Hill’s interpretation rejects. Contrary to prevailing
views, Hill says that Smith is neither a Humean nor a proto-Darwinian (see pp. 1, 3, 8-11,
15, 17, 21). Nor is he a proponent of ‘wholly secular, evolutionistic systems of
spontaneous order’ along Hayekian lines (p. 22; see Otteson 2002). Nor does Smith, as
many neoclassical economists suggest, consider the ‘invisible hand’ to be ‘a mere
euphemism for a profane competitive/equilibrium mechanism’ or ‘Pareto efficiency’ (pp.
19, 2). All of these interpretations distort ‘Smith’s intention’ by removing Providential
design from his system (p. 19).
Now let us sketch the positive side of Hill’s interpretation. For Hill, Smith is a
theist but eclectic, evasive and somewhat unorthodox in his theology (p. 4). Let us flesh
out these points. Hill’s third section addresses Smith’s views on the existence of God.
Contrary to the interpretations of Edmund Burke, Karl Marx, Peter Minowitz, and others,
Hill shows that Smith has ‘a genuine faith in the existence of God’ (p. 6; see p. 3; Minowitz
1993). Hill makes a significant contribution to scholarship, showing that Smith appeals
to four of the traditional proofs of the existence of God (the cosmological argument, the
teleological argument, the moral argument and the common consent argument); she
correctly points out, however, that Smith stresses the teleological argument (p. 6; see
Alvey 2003, 31-173).
Next, let us consider Smith’s eclecticism. Hill’s presentation brings out Smith’s
‘synthetic if somewhat patchwork theology’ (p. 4). Smith adopts natural theology; his
version of natural theology draws upon elements from ‘Aristotle, the Stoics, Christianity
and Newton, with the greatest emphasis on Stoicism’ (p. 4; see Waterman 2002). From
Aristotle, he accepted the conception of God as an ‘unmoved mover’ and a version of
teleology; from the ‘scientific religion’ of the Stoics, he adopted the design argument and a
version of their physics, cosmogony, and theodicy; from Christianity, he adopted
anthropocentrism, some version of ‘free will’ and the modern, ‘Protestant variant’ of the
teleological argument; and from Newton, he adopted the latter’s ‘approach to scientific
explanation,’ the view that ‘the miraculously balanced elements of Nature’ could not be
due to chance, and a version of teleology in which God operates through the laws of
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James Alvey: Hill’s Discovery of Adam Smith’s ‘Hidden Theology’
nature (pp. 5-7, 11; see Smith 1980, 115; Otteson 2002, 246-8)
As to his evasiveness, Hill says that ‘Smith seems to have been deliberately evasive
about his precise personal convictions’ (p. 4). No explanation for his evasiveness is
offered. An obvious hypothesis that comes to mind is that he felt his own unorthodoxy
was beyond the tolerable limits of the Scotland of his day.7 Next, let us consider Smith’s
orthodoxy.
Perhaps because of his evasiveness, Hill says that ‘establishing Smith’s precise
personal belief system is probably an impossible task,’ although he ‘may have thought of
himself as a “theist” … [or] even a sort of Christian,’ as self-identification as a Christian no
longer required acceptance of all of the Church dogmas (p. 3). Despite these ambiguities,
Hill generally presents Smith as a Desist and this is evident in her view that Smith rejects
divine interventions in nature (pp. 4-6, 17). His mix of views ‘distances him from
conventional Christianity while at the same time committing him to a belief in one God
who stands in some kind of unique relationship to human beings’ (p. 4 emphasis added).8
With this sketch in mind let us now fill in some details. Despite his unorthodoxy,
some of Smith’s views are quite traditional. ‘God exists, the world is the product of
design and the observable order of regularity in human affairs is a direct result of this
design and purpose in Nature’ (p. 5). Smith has: ‘a belief in first and Final Causes; a
belief in the existence of a benevolent “Providence”; [and] a belief in the limited extent of
human control over events’ (pp. 4-5). While God does not intervene directly in human
affairs through miracles, the operation of the laws of nature is, in itself, miraculous (pp. 6-7, 15,
17, 22 emphasis added). Thus Smith conceives the ‘universe in optimistic terms as
perfect and self-regulating’ (p. 7; see also pp. 12, 15-6, 21). It ‘is a coherent system:
“[E]ven the smallest of the co-existent parts of the universe, are exactly fitted to one
another, and all contribute to compose one immense and connected system”’ (p. 13
quoting Smith 1976, 289; see p. 11).9 Anthropocentrism and a type of chain of being
framework are two of the principles which give coherence to the system of nature (p. 13).
Given the excellent divine design, ‘human design is redundant’ (p. 7 emphasis in original).
For Hill, Smith is a Panglossian (see also Denis 1999).
Hill’s conclusion is that Smith has a ‘two-tiered model’ of human society, with a
As we will see, Hill generally presents Smith as a deist. Could deistic views be stated openly?
The ‘unique relationship’ is that humans are the peak of creation and, in the operation of nature, priority is given to
their well-being over that of other creatures. Humans, however, do not have ‘a direct, personal relationship with God’
(p. 17).
9 This is one of the strongest pieces of evidence that Hill finds to support her Panglossian reading of Smith.
The
difficulty with her use of this quotation (and the same problem occurs elsewhere) is that it is used as if it is Smith’s
view, whereas Smith is actually presenting his interpretation of the Stoic philosophy. His own view may differ.
7
8
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James Alvey: Hill’s Discovery of Adam Smith’s ‘Hidden Theology’
‘clear line of demarcation’ between the tiers (p. 14). The first tier, the ‘big picture,’ or
‘social systems level,’ is ‘the realm of Final Causes and therefore reserved for God’ (pp.
14-5 citing Smith 1979, 687). The second tier is the ‘individual goal level’ and some scope
for human free will exists there (pp. 14-5; see p. 11). ‘Individual agents represent
efficient causes in Smith’s system’; their ‘immutable, uniform instincts … trigger the
disclosure of the divine blueprint through time’ (p. 15). Given the superhuman
rationality of the ‘system’ level, Smith’s well-known disparagement of human rationality
makes perfect sense; the ‘feeble efforts of human reason’ fall well short of the ‘supreme
wisdom’ of God (Smith 1979, 803; Smith 1976, 166; see also Smith 1976, 225-6, 293).
Humans must follow their well-designed passions and exercise their limited rationality in
learning not to interfere in the operation of nature at the ‘system’ level; consequently, ‘their
sole duty is to respond to immediate drives [instincts] and to desist from social engineering
and large-scale planning’ (p. 14 emphasis added). Collective goals are a matter for God;
‘The grandiose schemes of “Great Legislators” are cast in a blasphemous light, as heresies
against an already perfect, divine order’ (p. 15 emphasis added). Thus, Smith recovered and
updated ‘[t]he resignation dimension of Stoicism’ (p. 15).
Despite the archaic, Panglossian character of this interpretation, Hill concedes that
Smith did, indeed, have some views which appear to be similar to modern notions of
evolution and spontaneous order. She makes several points which oppose a modern
evolutionary reading of Smith, two of which are worth noting here. First, Smith’s is not
an ‘open-ended, evolutionary theory of progress’; it is a modernized version of the chain
of being model ‘predicated on the design principle’ (p. 18). Further, while social
progress is ‘slow and gradual … what he [Smith] insists upon is that it is evolution by
design’ (p. 17 emphasis added).10
Second, for Smith, spontaneous generation and order are parts of the
comprehensive ‘divine blueprint’ (p. 9; see Otteson 2002, 239-48). The universe is
portrayed as ‘a vast equilibrium generated and upheld by divinely endued natural laws’;
‘spontaneous order rests on the “fact” that the world with all of its miraculous equilibria
is the product of a … loving creative demiurge’ (pp. 14, 22; see Klay and Lunn 2003,
556-7). For Smith, spontaneous order is the visible embodiment of the ‘invisible hand’
doctrine: the latter is Smith’s ‘shorthand’ for the former (p. 14). The ‘invisible
hand’/spontaneous order idea is central to Smith’s vision: he applied it ‘to every aspect of
his system of thought, including his moral and political theory, his historiography, his
explanation for the generation of social institutions and his model of human motive
forces’ (p. 13; see Otteson 2002).
10
If Occam’s Razor is applied to evolution, God becomes redundant.
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James Alvey: Hill’s Discovery of Adam Smith’s ‘Hidden Theology’
From spontaneous order let us move to spontaneous generation. Hill lists ten
examples of ‘natural laws of spontaneous generation,’ and even this list is ‘far from
exhaustive’ (p. 14). Some of these ‘laws’ are:
selfishness and greed inadvertedly produce universal abundance …; the division
of labour, which is responsible for so much human progress and material
abundance, emerges as an incidental by-product of the instinct ‘to truck barter and
exchange’; specialization, in turn, leads to amazing and infinite technical
developments …; the ‘gradual improvements of arts, manufactures, and
commerce’ destroyed the undesirable system of feudalism and the power of the
medieval Church …; the consumer’s [sic producer’s] natural preference for
domestic over foreign goods [sic production], benefits her/his own country…;
well-regulated government is the incidental effect of a peculiar aesthetic desire for
‘love of art and contrivance’ …; wealth stimulates population growth. (p. 14 citing
Smith 1976, 183-6; Smith 1978, 527; Smith 1979, 21-5, 98, 418-9; 422; 456, 566, 802-4;
see Kleer 1995, 281-2)
The reader should keep these ‘laws’ in mind and refer back to them. The conclusion that
Hill draws from these ‘laws’ is that ‘The uncoordinated, self-regarding acts of individuals,
ultimately form part of a wider beneficent pattern orchestrated by Providence’ (p. 14; Klay
and Lunn 2003, 554). Whilst order may appear to be due to efficient causes (as stressed by
Haakonssen (1981, 55-9, 77-9), and other ‘secular’ commentators on Smith), they are
‘actually triggered by first and Final Causes’ (p. 15). ‘The explanatory primacy of
secondary or “efficient” causes, is not, therefore, incompatible with a Providential view of
motion’ (p. 15).
Elaborations on three points would help to complete Hill’s account. First, did
Smith’s theological views change significantly over time? Second, given the accusations
of atheism against him by some commentators, was he perceived as orthodox during his
lifetime? Third, why was he evasive about his theological beliefs? Could he have
legitimately feared persecution for clearly stating them? We will return to the first
question subsequently.
Despite these gaps in her account, Hill makes her main points clearly. First, Smith
is a Deist who writes works of natural theology. Second, this framework is
indispensable for a sound interpretation of his works. Third, his ideas (including his
views on evolution and spontaneous order) are not modern; rather they are located ‘in a
transitional phase of the history of ideas’ (p. 11).11 In the next three sections I focus on a
‘[E]lements’ of an evolutionary theory exist in Smith’s work but he did not ‘link’ them together (p. 19). Overall,
his views are ‘much closer to traditional theological perspectives on the origin of the human species than … early
11
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James Alvey: Hill’s Discovery of Adam Smith’s ‘Hidden Theology’
small number of themes in Hill’s discussion, beginning with teleology.
3. Teleology and the Ends of Nature
In Sections 4 and 5 of her article, Hill presents Smith’s views on teleology and the telos.
What is teleology? What is the telos? What does Hill say about Smith’s views on these
topics?
The teleological doctrine refers to final causes or purpose in nature and it has been
alluded to above. For Hill, Smith ‘relies heavily on teleological arguments’; ‘Smith’s
entire vision is underpinned by the design principle and by a belief in Final Causes’ (pp.
10, 7; see pp. 4-5, 9). In doing so, Smith distanced himself from Hume. Hume fits more
comfortably with modern thought, whereas Smith is located at a ‘transitional’ stage of the
evolution of ideas. Although Smith was a close associate of Hume’s, contrary to any
‘type of “contagion” argument,’ he did not follow all of his doctrines (p. 3). This aspect
of Hill’s presentation is obviously rejected by the mainstream interpretation of Smith
today. A full discussion of Hill’s presentation of Smith’s differences with Hume is not
relevant to my present purpose. A few points should suffice. According to Hill, Smith
‘uses pre-Humean and anti-Humean arguments in expounding his theology’ (p. 10). She
stresses that Smith rejects Hume’s view of causation. In explaining Smith’s theories of
causation Hill says that the analogy to an acorn or a seed is apposite: ‘Causes are not
contiguous in space and time but may be better understood as seeds, gradually disclosing
and unfolding their potential towards a (softly) determined goal’ (p. 11; see pp. 10-1).
God ‘organized the human world via entelechy’ (p. 7). Contrary to Hume, the principles
and purposes of nature are discoverable and such knowledge is useful for human beings
(p. 9).
Not only does Hill adopt the minority, ‘new view’ on teleology, she actually
discovers two types of teleology in Smith. First, she finds teleology immanent in the
human constitution; instincts are nicely arranged to produce beneficial results without
human intention. Hence, Smith ‘believes that by acting through … base instincts …
humans “co-operate with the deity” and serve to “advance” his “plan”’ (p. 10 quoting
Smith 1976, 166). Whilst instincts are the efficient causes, they are designed in order to
achieve the various final causes (benevolent ends, which will be discussed shortly); there is
an ‘intimate and necessary … relationship between efficient and Final Causes’ in his
system (p. 11 citing Smith 1976, 293). ‘[T]he seeds of spontaneous [divine] order are
located in human psychic or biogenetic conditions’ (p. 15). Second, as hinted at earlier,
Hill also discerns teleology operating in history: human beings, as ‘the principal bearers of
evolutionism’ (p. 19 citing, amongst others, Smith 1979, 25-6).
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James Alvey: Hill’s Discovery of Adam Smith’s ‘Hidden Theology’
history … [are] engaged in fulfilling the Creator’s telic plans’ (p. 10; see pp. 10-3, 20-1).
We will discuss this view of history further shortly but let us now consider the logical
consequence of a teleological view of nature: the telos, or end.
Hill states that Smith has a notion of a telos. Indeed, this is the theme of her fifth
section. While the advocates of the ‘new view’ accept that a teleological view exists in
Smith, until Hill wrote this article, few took the step of speaking about the telos (see
Halteman 2003, 453, 470-1; Alvey 2003).12
Early in the fifth section Hill says that ‘The human constitution and the entire
human environment is designed’ to achieved ‘our happiness, prosperity, perpetuation
and material comfort’ (p. 11; see also pp. 5-6). A little later, she adds that God desires
‘our physical safety, security, prosperity and perpetuation’ (p. 16). Elsewhere, the
following are also mentioned (implicitly or explicitly) as ends of nature: ‘self-preservation’
(p. 16), ‘survival’ (p. 11), ‘perpetuation of our species’ (p. 11; see p. 12), ‘peace and order’
(p. 21), ‘good “order of society”’ (p. 21), ‘generalized order’ (p. 10), ‘well-regulated
government’ (p. 14), ‘material abundance’ (pp. 11, 14), ‘happiness’ (p. 11, 22), ‘human
happiness’ (pp. 11, 14, 19-20), ‘earthly “happiness”’ (p. 11), ‘happiness and well-being’ (p.
6), ‘prosperity’ (p. 20), ‘prosperity and happiness for all’ (p. 16; see p. 12), ‘progressivism
in human affairs’ (p. 10), ‘human progress’ (p. 14; see pp. 15, 18, 20), ‘[m]oral conduct’ (p.
17; see pp. 14, 16-7), a ‘distinctively human existence’ (p. 20), and even ‘the good life’ (p.
19). Despite all of this, Hill explicitly refers to Smith’s telos only four times. First, she
says:
The telos of human activity is not, as might be expected, the attainment of moral
perfection,13 a state of grace or some other desirable point of repose; Smith rejects
these more orthodox understandings of the Creator’s purpose by replacing them
with the definition of telos in anthropocentric and utilitarian terms as material
abundance and earthly ‘happiness.’ (p. 11 citing Smith 1976, 236)
Second, Hill says that: ‘Another important (though related) telos for Smith (later picked up
by F. A. Hayek …) is population growth’ (p. 12; see p. 14). Third, she says that ‘all of
Nature was created for the benefit of humanity and for its telos (happiness)’ (p. 13).
Finally, Hill says that Smith insists ‘on happiness as a telos’ (p. 19).
Actually, there has been interest in Smith’s ideal society in the literature but those who have written on the topic have
been on the fringe of the ‘new view’ (Werhane 1991, 155-75).
13 Elsewhere, Hill actually quotes Smith to the effect that perfection is an end of nature (p. 15 quoting Smith 1976, 166).
In my account, perfection is an end of nature, even if it is frequently poorly realized in reality and, when conflicts with
other ends occur, it may have to be sacrificed (see Alvey 2003, 1, 178-87; see also Smith 1976, 168). Hence, Smith’s ends
of Nature are broader and more likely to conflict in my interpretation than in Hill’s. Alternatively, much of what I call
‘perfection’ in Smith may be captured in Hill’s view that humanity is a progressive species (see pp. 10, 20).
12
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James Alvey: Hill’s Discovery of Adam Smith’s ‘Hidden Theology’
Obviously, in Hill’s presentation of Smith, there is ambiguity as to the exact
enumeration of the ends of nature. A clarification here is needed, listing and explaining
the human ends. Nevertheless, for Hill, in Smith’s account there is a complex and elevated
set of human ends that are promoted by the teleological process in Nature; the simultaneous
satisfaction of this set of ends, I assume, is what she means by ‘human flourishing’ (p.
11).14 A modern, evolutionary reading of Smith, however, rules out such an account.15
In a Darwinian system no purposes or ends can be attributed to nature, strictly speaking;
speaking rather loosely one may consider preservation and perpetuation as ends. Even
though nature is ‘blind,’ it is governed by a rule: the survival of the fittest. Similarly, the
philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who wrote a century before Smith, based his work on the
axiom that humans are driven by the passions, especially the fear of death. Joseph
Cropsey interprets Smith as a Hobbesian, where the only goal of nature is preservation
(see Cropsey 2001). Both the Hobbesian and the evolutionary readings of Smith are
implicitly rejected by Hill.
Despite the similarity of our views on this theme in Smith, I suggest that many
questions arise in relation to Hill’s account of the ends of human nature. There are at
least three sets of issues relevant to the collection of ends as a whole. First, are the ends to
be understood as applicable to the species, to individuals, or both?16 Second, given the
multiplicity of ends, are they actually mutually compatible?17 Third, how orthodox was
this set of ends?18 In addition, there are significant questions which arise with respect to
particular ends of nature. For Hill, does Smith accept that perfection is an end of nature
14
I am in broad agreement with this account of Smith’s ends and the notion of human flourishing implied by it, but
some complexities will be raised shortly. Elsewhere (Alvey 2003), I suggested that, for Smith, there are five explicit
ends (preservation, procreation, order, happiness and perfection) plus an implicit end (freedom); in addition, the whole
set is given coherence by his view that the ultimate end is ‘ease and tranquillity.’
15 Contrary to the evolutionary interpretation, Hill says that even if Smith had wanted to ‘promulgate a theory of
evolution, this would not explain why the order he describes delivers happiness and the good life as opposed to mere
survival of the fittest’ (p. 19). Consistent with Kleer, she argues that Smith’s adoption of happiness as a human end is
‘strong evidence of his Providentialism’ (p. 19; see Kleer 1995, 300).
16 For example, she indicates that both ‘perpetuation of our species’ and ‘prosperity and happiness for all’ are natural
ends (pp. 11, 16). Denis suggests that Smith’s final view is that the ends apply to the species, not individuals (1999; see
also Alvey 2003, 261-2, 275-8).
17 At the level of generalities, Hill has portrayed Smith as a Panglossian; nature operates as a ‘coherent system …
designed to generate and facilitate human flourishing’ (p. 11). When one turns to specific cases, and specific texts,
however, one discovers Smith’s concession that conflicts between ends occur (see Alvey 2003, 178-87). Given this, is
there some hierarchy of ends which will determine outcomes in such cases? Hill’s reference to ‘God’s ‘hindermost
goals,’ is suggestive in this regard (p. 21).
18 Hill says that Smith retains ‘Providentialism and teleology,’ but he ‘attempts to “modernize” these categories … to
mesh … with emergent liberalism’s humanism, utilitarianism and political economy’ (p. 11).
Was this
‘modernization’ consistent with the trends in mainstream theology?
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James Alvey: Hill’s Discovery of Adam Smith’s ‘Hidden Theology’
or not (cf. p. 11 with p. 15)? Could this be a case of a non-functioning end of nature (p. 2
citing Schneider)? Is true happiness a function of material possessions or not (cf. p. 12
with Smith 1976, 149-51)?
For Hill, Smith accepts a teleological view of the world. This teleology includes
an extensive set of human ends. In addition, for Hill, ‘under a Providential regime there
is good cause for unbounded optimism’ that these ends will be achieved over time (p. 12).
This takes us back to the teleological view of history which Hill finds in Smith.
4. The ‘Teleological’ View of History
In Hill’s view, Smith has a teleological view of history, which combines the stadial theory
of history with the view of continuing economic growth (see pp. 10-12, 17-20).19 While
the two issues should be separated as much as possible (continuing economic growth is
most associated with the final stage of history), it is impossible to do so completely. Let
us discuss the stadial view first.
In Smith’s view there is a sequence of four stages of history (hunting, shepherding,
farming and commerce), with each new stage an ‘advance’ on the previous one (Smith
1979, 689-95). In Hill’s view of Smith, ‘all societies had, or would move through a
sequence of distinct stages of development…. [Smith] perceived a distinct and universal
pattern to this development’ (p. 18 emphasis added). This ‘Providential’ pattern also
helped satisfy the ends of human nature; she contrasts ‘the forlorn poverty of the
“savage” age with the “general security and happiness”’ in the commercial stage (pp. 18,
12 quoting Smith 1976, 205). Now let us turn to the theory of economic growth.
Hill’s discussion of economic growth is analytically incomplete and should be
supplemented by Kleer’s excellent ‘new view’ account (see Kleer 2000). In Kleer’s
account of Smith there are at least four factors responsible for economic growth: the
division of labour; capital accumulation; order and good government (two preconditions
for capital accumulation); and discretion for capital owners to invest wherever they
choose. Kleer discusses these in turn, tracing them back to human instincts. I will
comment on the first three factors.
Kleer traces back the origins of the division of labour, initially to the unique human
‘propensity to truck, barter, and exchange’ and, ultimately to the desire to persuade (Kleer
19
Hill says that ‘the accumulation and consumption of material goods … is the very engine of progress and which is
partly responsible for the transition from one historical period to the next’ (p. 20). The fusion of economic growth
(caused by, amongst other things, the accumulation of capital rather than consumer goods) with the stadial progression is evident
in Smith’s account of the transition from the third to the fourth stage of history (and in this transition the obsession with
acquiring, and conspicuously-displaying, finely-crafted objects plays a critical role). While Smith’s account of the earlier
transitions is brief and fuzzy, perhaps the cause of these transitions was population growth (Smith 1978, 14-5, 459).
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James Alvey: Hill’s Discovery of Adam Smith’s ‘Hidden Theology’
2000, 17-8 citing Smith 1979, 27 and Smith 1978, 352, 493-4). Capital accumulation is
traced back to the ‘desire to better our condition,’ which, in turn, is traced back to two
other propositions: that humans derive pleasure from ‘mutual sympathy’ (namely, ‘when
they know that their own sentiments’ are ‘equal in intensity to the spectator’s sympathetic
emotions’) and that they have greater capacity to sympathize with joy than with sorrow
(Kleer 2000, 18-9 citing Smith 1976, 13-6, 45 and Smith 1979, 341). These factors are the
foundation of the admiration of the rich. Further, the ‘enjoyable sentiments produced by
owning or contemplating wealth derive mainly from a fascination with well-crafted
devices’ (Kleer 2000, 19 citing Smith 1976, 179-83). Finally, I consider ‘order and good
government’ (Smith 1979, 405); here even Kleer is forced to include material relating to
stadial progress through history. Both ‘order and good government, and their
concomitants, the liberty and security of individuals,’ were lost after the Fall of Rome;
feuding feudal lords came into control of much of Europe (Kleer 2000, 19 citing Smith
1979, 405). The weakening of the troublesome lords and the restoration of the control of
centralized authority (‘good government’) came about indirectly, and without human
design; the factors that Smith mentions include vanity and obsessive purchasing of
‘well-crafted devices’ on the part of the lords, and acquisitiveness on the part of the
traders.
If one reconstructs Hill’s reconstruction of Smith (see pp. 14, 18, 20 and the laws of
spontaneous generation above), one finds many of the elements outlined by Kleer. For
both Kleer and Hill, continuing economic growth is part of Smith’s model. In Hill’s
view, Smith accepts that ‘Human development is an infinite upward spiral with its broad
outlines planned stadially’ (p. 11 emphasis added).20 What is essential to note is that
continuing economic growth is linked by Hill to the satisfaction of divine purposes:
happiness and population growth. First, she states that, ‘for Smith, happiness is a
function of material prosperity’; hence, as the ‘divine order’ produces continuing
economic growth, it ‘infallibly delivers prosperity and happiness for all’ (p. 12 citing Smith
1979, 96; p. 16 emphasis added). Second, ‘population increases as a spontaneous
by-product of material prosperity’ (p. 12 citing Smith 1978, 159 and Smith 1979, 97, 99,
180).
While a Providential, or ‘optimistic,’ account of both Smith’s stadial and economic
20
Further, ‘[e]conomic activity is … a scene of infinite mutual enablement. Smith’s picture of market society is implicitly
normative, characterized …by desired and desirable goals: more and more material gain and more and more commodious
innovations’ (p. 12 emphasis added). Later, she adds that the division of labour ‘leads to amazing and infinite technical
developments’ (p. 14). As Hill believes that Smith accepts the possibility of infinite progress due to technical
innovations, she does not take the stationary state seriously. Smith is actually pessimistic on the possibility of
productivity advances in agriculture (see Smith 1979, 16).
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James Alvey: Hill’s Discovery of Adam Smith’s ‘Hidden Theology’
growth theories can be reconstructed from his work, elsewhere I showed how this coexists
with a ‘pessimistic’ account (Alvey 2003, 79-115, 215-27). A full restatement of the
‘pessimistic’ account cannot be given here; a few points will suffice. Concerning the
stadial theory, Smith indicates that a number of climatic and terrain factors prohibit many
societies from reaching the commercial stage (Smith 1978, 213, 220-3, 408-9; Smith 1979,
31-6). Concerning continuing economic growth, the stationary state, to which Smith
refers, stands as a fundamental flaw in the Kleer/Hill interpretation (Smith 1979, 99,
111-3). As land scarcity emerges, wages and profits are driven down; in the stationary
state, prosperity is lost, the working population find life ‘hard’ and ‘dull,’ and the
population is fixed (Smith 1979, 99, 111). At this stage the divine order’s allegedly
‘infallible delivery’ of the ends of nature breaks down. Hill seems unaware of this
‘pessimistic’ side of Smith’s historical writings.
In short, Hill’s teleological view of history is too optimistic. The next section
discusses the apparent ‘defects’ in nature.
5. Defects
As indicated in her abstract and conclusion, Hill stresses her discussion of what appear to
be ‘defects’ in nature (pp. 19, 22, 29).21 In Section 10, her thematic treatment of the topic,
she states that, for Smith, even the apparent ‘defects’ in human nature show a
providential design (pp. 19-21; see also pp. 15-6, 18). Hill’s discussion here is useful but I
contend that there are actually three types of ‘defects’ and she has addressed only the
first: ‘apparent’ flaws which purportedly serve some end of nature. Second, Smith
identified flaws which do not yield beneficial results; in such cases deliberate human
intervention is needed to ‘correct’ nature. Third, there are flaws that Smith does not see
or deliberately hides. Let us discuss these in turn.
In Section 10, she discusses two examples. The first example focuses on the
intellectual and moral defects inherent in ‘human progress,’ meaning both progress
through the stages of history and continuing economic growth (p. 20; see also p. 21). As
we saw also in Kleer’s presentation of economic growth, Hill grounds the pursuit of
wealth and social distinction in ‘aesthetics, conspicuous consumption and vainglory’ (p.
20). For thoughtful people, the pursuit of finely-crafted objects, or ‘trinkets,’ is
‘contemptible’; nevertheless, this ‘deliberate “deception” engineered by God … is the
most important source of human progress’ (p. 20 quoting Smith 1976, 181-3). Progress,
essentially continuing economic growth here, is due to various natural propensities, some
Thus far, few ‘new view’ adherents have addressed these aspects in Smith’s work (Kleer 1995, 288-9; see also Alvey
2003, 180-5).
21
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James Alvey: Hill’s Discovery of Adam Smith’s ‘Hidden Theology’
of which Hill calls ‘defects.’ The second example builds on the first and considers how
these defects, and our unmerited admiration for the rich and powerful, establish class
stability, ‘upon which depends the good “order of society”’ (p. 21 quoting Smith 1976,
226). It is not human calculation but our allegedly genuine sympathy with the rich and
powerful that underpins social stratification.22 She concludes, firstly, that Smith’s claim
that ‘defects’ were ‘deliberately and purposefully endued’ is ‘strong counter-evidence’
against an evolutionary reading and, secondly, that ‘all of Nature’s works, including
apparent defects, are accommodated within a vast, purposeful, beneficent perfection’ (p.
21). Whilst I agree that Smith presents certain ‘defects’ as socially useful, I dispute Hill’s
Panglossian conclusion.
Now let us consider what I call the second set of ‘defects.’ Hill does not discuss
these in Section 10; nevertheless, she does so twice (elsewhere, and briefly). In one case
she commented on the well-known deleterious effects of the division of labour (p. 18).
She notes that, for Smith, ‘on balance,’ the negative consequences of specialization are ‘far
… outweighed by the benefits’ (p. 18). For Hill, Smith saw the world as ‘neatly and
propitiously ordered’ and if ‘negative … side effects of that order’ existed, these were
‘generally correctable’ (p. 18). Hence, Smith does not suggest a limitation on
specialization or a dramatic change of the ‘existing social and political arrangements’; his
solution is merely the addition of ‘a state funded education programme’ to the
responsibilities of the government (p. 18 citing Smith 1979, 781-8). Even if Hill’s view of
the ‘correctability’ of the negative consequences of specialization is valid, one must ask
some tough questions. Is the ‘correction’ of nature automatic? Is ‘feeble’ human
reasoning the effective agent which ‘corrects,’ or even overcomes, nature so that a
socially-beneficial outcome is achieved? If securing the ends of human nature depends
on human reasoning and design, Hill’s central argument (which rests on the role of instincts)
is undermined.
Hill’s second discussion on this theme is also instructive. The context is a
presentation of Smith’s neo-Stoic resignation: humans must restrict themselves to their
own limited realm. Hill elaborates that this did not ‘lead Smith to a strictly
non-interventionist view of the state,’ citing his three well-known functions of
government (p. 25 n.24 citing Smith 1979, 689-947). She adds that ‘Smith’s further
acknowledgement that government intervention was sometimes necessary for the
correction of market behaviour errors (usury laws, monopolies) also presents a problem for his
theodicy which is difficult to reconcile’ (p. 25 n.24 emphasis added). As the actual list of
interventions that Smith proposed is considerable (see Viner 1927), this statement raises
22
Kleer gives a better presentation than Hill on this theme (1995, 284-6).
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James Alvey: Hill’s Discovery of Adam Smith’s ‘Hidden Theology’
serious problems relating both to the ‘coherence’ of the natural order and to the role of
human reasoning within the teleological system.23 By advocating the adoption of
particular public policies, Smith suggests that nature does not provide the solutions: in
Griswold’s words, ‘nature must be helped’ (1999, 328-9). Indeed, contrary to Hill, Smith
heaps considerable praise on the legislator and the great statesman (Smith 1976, 216).
This causes great problems for Hill’s presentation, even if teleology cannot be removed
without harming Smith’s argument.
Excluding these two discussions, Hill’s Panglossian reading leads to the conclusion
that Smith genuinely supported laissez-faire (see also p. 12). By contrast, secular
commentators in recent times have rediscovered the role of politics (and the legislator)
within Smith’s system (see Winch 1978; Haakonssen 1981). While human control over
events is limited, Hill overstates Smith’s ‘resignation’ to fate; the purportedly clear
distinction between the two tiers, in Smith’s ‘two-tiered model’ of society, turns out
actually to be fuzzy.24
Next, let us discuss what I have called the third set of ‘defects’: those flaws that
Smith does not see or deliberately hides. This category of flaws is not discussed by Hill
at all. Consider again the inevitable emergence of the stationary state. If material
prosperity, happiness and population growth are ends of nature, as Hill suggests, Nature
utterly fails at the end of history. The purportedly Providential path of history collapses.
Before concluding this section, another issue should be raised in the light of Hill’s
Panglossian interpretation of Smith. Hill finds no inconsistency between Smith’s books
(p. 4) and implies that his writings are consistent over time. Unlike Hill, other ‘new
view’ commentators have suggested that a ‘pessimistic’ side of Smith exists and have
sought to explain it. Evensky (1989) and Tanaka (2003, 144-7) have suggested that Smith
became progressively more pessimistic over his lifetime; perhaps in his early writings
Smith held that humans needed only to respond to ‘immediate drives’ (p. 14) to fulfil the
divine plan but he gradually abandoned this optimism. Therefore, according to them,
Smith allocated a more active role to the legislator, one which included the advancement
of collective goals. These commentators have seen the problem of Smith’s pessimistic
views and proposed a change of view as an explanation for his various views. Whist not
without problems,25 such interpretations seem to me to be an advance on Hill’s
23
While human reason may be incorporated into a teleological interpretation, Hill emphasizes only the role of the
passions (see pp. 12, 14-5, 20-1 and Kleer 1995; Kleer 2000).
24 Alternatively, her interpretation here is fundamentally flawed.
25 Whilst conceding a continuing role of statesmanship, Fitzgibbons (1995) suggests that Smith became progressively
more optimistic over his lifetime. The gap between this ‘new’ view and that of Evensky and Tanaka shows the difficulty
of making Smith’s writings consistent.
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James Alvey: Hill’s Discovery of Adam Smith’s ‘Hidden Theology’
Panglossian interpretation (see also Denis 1999).
I accept Hill’s claim that Smith presents certain flaws as useful in the divine plan.
What is in question, however, is Hill’s claim that Smith follows Marcus Aurelius’s view
that ‘[w]hatever happens, happens rightly’ (quoted in Hill p. 7; see also p. 12). What I
have called the second and third sets of flaws undermine this optimistic reading of Smith.
An enlarged role for human reasoning emerges to ‘correct’ nature on occasion. In other
cases, there are major flaws in nature which have no human solution (and no divine
solution either, if Hill is correct that divine interventions are excluded). Thus, the
Panglossian interpretation of Smith is invalid.
6. Conclusion
Hill has discovered Smith’s ‘hidden theology.’ Her article can be seen as a sort of
sermon on his theology; it also represents her opening salvos in two battles. First, by the
time that she wrote her article, the contributors of the ‘new theistic view’ of Smith were
already battling to replace the secular, mainstream view of Smith; she joins in this
crusade.26 Second, she aligns with Denis (1999), in a simultaneous civil war against those
‘new view’ heretics who cannot accept that Smith adheres to the Panglossian creed.
In the crusade, Hill rehabilitates the importance and divine status of Smith’s
‘invisible hand’ doctrine. Smith’s ‘Providential invisible hand is … the centrepiece’ and
‘the unifying principle … of his entire oeuvre’ (p. 2; see also p. 13). Advocates of
neoclassical economics and Austrian theories of spontaneous order fail to understand that
the ‘providential’ outcomes that Smith describes must be understood with a capital P.
Nevertheless, the ‘new view’ message is gaining support; recruitment is rapid.
In the internecine battle, Hill implicitly opposes other ‘new view’ theorists, such as
Evensky (1989) and Tanaka (2003), who have found pessimistic elements in Smith’s
theodicy. These latitudinarians have suggested that Smith became increasingly
pessimistic about divine design over time and have linked this view to his allocation of a
more active role to human rationality. Against such heretics, Hill and Denis also take up
arms. The latter pair are unswerving in their faith that Smith is a pure Panglossian,
unsullied by doubts or inconsistencies. Recruitment to the Panglossian cause seems to
be minimal.
I am more inclined to join Hill in the first than in the second battle. The
More precisely, this battle is fought on two levels. On the surface, there is a hermeneutic battle over the correct
reading of Smith’s theology. At a deeper level, the battle is over Smith’s status as a founder of modern liberalism.
The issues of teleology, divine design, and the like, have an archaic air about them but they are integral to the political
battle for Smith’s soul and status.
26
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James Alvey: Hill’s Discovery of Adam Smith’s ‘Hidden Theology’
overarching source of my disagreement resides in what I consider to be her overly
‘optimistic’ interpretation. This difference in view manifests itself particularly in our
divergent presentations of Smith’s view of history and the characterization of the ‘defects’
in nature. Where Hill finds Smith to be a Panglossian theorist, the evidence from Smith’s
texts suggests that he discerns flaws in the divine design and the path of history. I have
presented him as a theorist who uneasily (and at times inconsistently) combines
‘optimism’ with ‘pessimism.’ Hill’s account is also overly Stoic. There are aspects of
resignation in Smith’s writings but his views on the legislator and statesmanship indicate
that he saw a significant role for human rationality and design in ‘helping’ nature achieve
the ends of human nature. Finally, I disagree with her on the list of ends of human
nature.
Hill’s article is a thoughtful, well-argued, well-written, synthetic, and in areas
innovative, contribution both to the ‘new view’ of Smith and to Smith scholarship
generally. Whilst broadly sympathetic to the ‘new view,’ and Hill’s version of it, I
believe that some issues need further consideration. Some concerns that I have merely
require clarification or amplification. Others, represent substantive interpretive
differences.
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