Private Giving in the Welfare State
Author(s): Jeffrey Obler
Source: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Jan., 1981), pp. 17-48
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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17
B.J.Pol.S.
II,
17-48
Printed in Great Britain
Private Giving in the Welfare State
JEFFREY
OBLER*
If the welfare state embodies a collective obligation to give to those in need, it
also attests to the failure of individual, private giving, which from the advent
of industrialization has been far too modest and capricious to care adequately
for the sick and indigent. Private, individual giving simply cannot compete with
state help when it comes to guaranteeing people's welfare. But its failure to do
ajob better handled by the state does not mean that private giving is an irrelevant
anachronism. Even the welfare state's most ardent supporters should appreciate
its value. Private giving has intrinsic worth. It reveals how humane society is.
Giving and helping palpably enrich public life, although, unlike high per capita
income or low crime rates, they elude statistical composites of collective
well-being. Private giving also has instrumentalvalue. In so many ways - ranging
from assisting an old lady off a bus to saving a drowning stranger - people can
help each other when the state may be helpless. Privately-given funds, time,
attention and ideas can supplement what the state offers; limited state resources
inevitably leave some people with less than they need, and the gaps in state aid
can be filled, at least in part, by private efforts.
Thus any society should be disturbed by a weakening in personal generosity
and kindness. If the impulse to give should dry up, it would be a sad, irretrievable
loss. And this is why even the defenders of the welfare state should be concerned
by the charge made by critics of public assistance that state social policies not
only displace but also destroy private giving.
Paying particular attention to the impact of state aid on different forms of
giving, I shall consider this charge by firstly, reviewing the various interpretations
of the link between the welfare state and private giving; secondly, contrasting
the levels of charitable donations in the United States and Britain; and thirdly,
exploring the evolution of giving in an English village.
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF THE IMPACT OF THE WELFARE STATE ON
PRIVATE GIVING
Laissez-faire libertarians and anarchist critics of social policy argue that the
welfare state discourages private giving. They agree that state help replaces
private help, and that the more the state helps people, the less people help one
another. Beyond this agreement, however, they are divided on the connection
between the state and giving.
*
Department of Political Science, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I would like
to thank Donald Haynes for his help in preparing the map of Penridge, and Donald Searing and
Ivor Crewe for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
0007-1234/81/2828-2680
$02.00
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198I
Cambridge University Press
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OBLER
I8
Laissez-faire libertarians such as Milton Friedman1and Robert Nozick2 are
primarily concerned with the philanthropic (unilateral) giving that the affluent
extend to the poor, aged and infirm. They prefer private to public philanthropy
because it provides aid to the needy without compromising the benefactor's
liberty.3 They assume not that altruism is an integral element in human nature
but, more modestly, that some people are sometimes moved to alleviate others'
suffering.As the state usurps the philanthropic role, the opportunities for private
giving simply dwindle.4 The implication of this position is that while private
philanthropy should vanish or become negligible in those areas of public life in
which the state actively intervenes, it should continue to thrive in those spheres
in which the state does not become involved. Thus when, in 1948, the British
government acquired ownership of the nation's voluntary, charitable hospitals,
private philanthropy in the health field, which hitherto had been indispensable,
contracted precipitously.5 The British government, on the other hand, does not
provide a rescue service for boats in distress along its shores. Hence, the Royal
National Lifeboat Institution, established in 1824, continues to do the work,
done in the United States by the Coast Guard, on an entirely voluntary basis,
relying exclusively on private contributions.6
According to the anarchist tradition, representedby Peter Kropotkin, human
beings, like other animals, have a natural tendency to help each other, not so
much in the form of charity given by the rich to the poor but as mutual
(reciprocal) assistance among interdependent members of a community. In the
absence of the state, Kropotkin argues, people manage to create and sustain
organic communities in which public needs are met through mutual aid and
voluntary co-operation. But with the emergence of the state, coercive institutions
gradually supersede those based on spontaneous co-operation, thereby transforming organic communities into loose collections of atomized egoists.7 The
Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
2 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, I974).
In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick defends the feasibility and viability of philanthropy (pp.
265-28) and complains that most theories of distributive justice focus exclusively on the rights of
the recipient and neglect the rights of the person to make gifts to another person (p. I68).
4
Writing about relief for the poor, Friedman noted in Capitalism and Freedom: 'One resource,
and in many ways the most desirable, is private charity. It is noteworthy that the heyday of laissez-faire,
the middle and late 19thcentury in Britain and the United States, saw an extraordinary proliferation
of private eleemosynary organizations and institutions. One of the major costs of the extension of
governmental welfare activities has been the corresponding decline in private charitable activity'
(p. I90). It is interesting to note that this difficulty was anticipated before the emergence of the
modern welfare state. Writing in the early 1930s, Elizabeth Macaden commented,' It was commonly
expected that the extension of the different forms of social services in the pre-war years would
speedily see the extinction of private benefaction' (The New Philanthropy: A Study of the Relations
between the Statutory and Voluntary Social Services (London: Allen and Unwin, 1934), p. 244).
5 In the late 1940s, the British government considered the possibility of taking over charity
properties in the same way that the National Health Service incorporated the voluntary hospitals.
See Christopher P. Hill, 'England and Wales', in Klaus Neuhoff and Uwe Pavel, eds., Trusts and
Foundationsin Europe (London: Bedford Square Press, I971), p. 215.
6 See David Owen, English Philanthropy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, I965),
pp. 176-8.
7 Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (London: Allen Lane, 1972), pp. I96-7.
3
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Private Giving in the Welfare State
I9
state thus undermines people's sociable, co-operative instincts. Yet, writing
at the turn of this century, Kropotkin still believed that people's inclination
towards mutual aid was resilient enough to survive the baleful effects of the
state.8
Writing in the I970s, Michael Taylor, in his reformulation of Kropotkin's
position, is not nearly as sanguine.9 He asserts that as the state takes over more
responsibility for the provision of public goods, altruism and voluntary cooperation will atrophy without remission. He contends that people come to
depend on the state; when they are in trouble, they look to the state for help,
and they assume that others in trouble would and should do the same. People
come to believe, he goes on, that their obligation to aid others is satisfied when
they pay taxes which the state uses to aid the needy. As a result 'In the presence
of a strong [welfare] state, the individual may cease to care for, or even think
about those in the community who need help'.10 Thus people simply carry out
fewer personal, voluntary helping acts. Without practice, they lose the habit of
helping. As helping becomes rarer, there are fewer models of helping for them
to imitate.11The decline in altruism is general and pervasive, not restricted, as
the libertarians suggest, to those fields in which the state offers extensive services.
The decline in altruism occurs in all facets of public life. No longer able or willing
to draw on their own resources to resolve common problems, people turn
increasingly toward the state's coercive institutions, thereby extending their
dependency and accelerating the demise of altruism and voluntary co-operation.
For Taylor 'the state is like an addictive drug: the more of it we have, the more
we "need" it and the more we "depend" on it. '2 The state, and especially the
welfare state, becomes a community of callous, faceless strangers indifferent to
each other's welfare.
This cynical position, however, is rejected by Richard Titmuss, in favour of
a more benign interpretation of how the welfare state shapes the way people treat
and view one another. in his celebrated study, The Gift Relationship,he attempts
to support this interpretation by contrasting the British and American systems
of blood donation.13 For Titmuss, the gift of blood is an altruistic gift of life.
He shows how the impulse to make this gift in Britain is sufficiently strong and
common to satisfy the demand for blood, while it is woefully inadequate in the
United States. He describes how Britain has been able to rely exclusively on
voluntary donors whose generosity has kept pace with the demand for blood.
But the United States, unable to secure sufficientsupplies from voluntary donors,
8
Kropotkin, Mutual Aid, p. I98.
9 Michael
Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation (London: Wiley, 1976), pp. 134-6.
10 Taylor,
Anarchy and Cooperation, p. 135.
1 Robert Goodin argues that available social-psychological evidence indicates that Taylor's
argument is at least plausible. Thus experiments show that people who have helped in the past are
more likely to help in the future and that people who see another make a donation are likely to
make a donation. See 'Moral Atrophy in the Welfare State' (unpublished paper, 1978). See also
Daniel Bar-Tai, Prosocial Behavior: Theory and Research (New York: Wiley, 1976), pp. 66-71.
12 Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation, p. I34.
13 Richard
Titmuss, The Gift Relationship (New York: Random House/Vintage Books, 197I).
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20
OBLER
has had to depend, for the most part, on paid donors and donors in blood
insurance schemes.14
One reason why so few Americans give blood voluntarily, Titmuss contends,
is that blood in the United States can be sold in private markets. Presumably,
any person who knows that others sell blood, and that any donation he makes
may be sold to the recipient, will not be inspired to give. The commercialization
of blood in the United States promotes self-interest, stifles selflessness, and
generally, adversely affects people's disposition to give.15The British are more
inclined to give blood because it cannot be sold as a commodity; there is no
private market to dissuade them from giving. The private market, then, moulds
people's values; it erodes altruism.16
But there is another, and for Titmuss, more important reason why the British
give. The National Health Service (more particularly, the National Blood
Transfusion Service and more generally, the welfare state) fosters altruism in
Britain.'7 It is not immediately self-evident how the NHS, which, after all,
replaced in I948 a medical care system that had been funded to a considerable
extent by individual beneficence and which is now funded by compulsorily
collected contributions and taxes, encourages private, voluntary giving. Indeed,
14
Titmuss, The Gift Relationship, p. 94. As a result of more recent efforts by the United States
government, inspired, in part, by Titmuss's attack on the American blood donor system, the
proportion of blood supplied by voluntary donors has increased. See Harvey M. Sapolsky and Stan
N. Finkelstein, 'Blood policy revisited -A new look at "The Gift Relationship", The Public
Interest, XLVI(1977), 15-27.
15 For an excellent discussion of how market relations
replace and destroy communal ties, see
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation(New York: Reinhart, 1944). Social psychologists have
offered evidence to support Titmuss' claim that the market undermines altruism. Studies have shown
that the middle classes, and particularly the entrepreneurial middle classes as distinguished from
the bureaucratic middle classes, are more likely to behave according to exchange rather than
altruistic norms. These studies assume that middle-class people are more inclined to accept the
exchange ethos of the market. One study reported that middle-class women were more likely than
working-class women to say that they would stop helping those who refused to offer help in return.
See Donal E. Muir and Eugene A. Weinstein, 'The Social Debt: An Investigation of Lower-Class
and Middle-Class Norms of Social Obligation', American Sociological Review, xxvii (I962), 532-9.
In another study, entrepreneurial middle-class subjects, but not bureaucratic middle-class and
working-class subjects, regulated their helping behaviour towards a person according to how much
that person had helped them. See L. Berkowitz and P. Friedman, 'Some Social Class Differences
in Helping Behavior', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, v (I967), 217-25.
16 This
argument provoked a considerable controversy. Kenneth Arrow argues that the market
does not necessarily erode altruism; instead it merely increases the options available to the individual
who is able either to donate or to sell his blood. See 'Gifts and Exchanges', Philosophy and Public
Affairs, I (1972), 349-50. Nathan Glazer also doubts that the market has adverse effects; he thinks
that people do not consider whether others sell blood when they make their decision to give. See
'
Blood', The Public Interest, xxiv (1971), 89. But Peter Singer, in a rejoinder to Arrow, vehemently
defends Titmuss' argument. Singer says, 'The idea that others are depending on one's generosity
and concern, that one may oneself, in an emergency, need the assistance of a stranger, the feeling
that there is still this vital area in which we must rely on the good will of others rather than the
profit motive - all these vague ideas and feelings are incompatible with the existence of a market
in blood.' See 'Altruism and Commerce: A Defense of Titmuss Against Arrow', Philosophy and
17 Titmuss, The Gift Relationship, p. 225.
Public Affairs, II (I973), 3 8.
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Private Giving in the Welfare State
21
the link between the NHS and altruism is not spelled out as carefully as one
might expect, given its central role in the over-all analysis. Yet pieced together,
the argument that a link exists is original and intriguing. Titmuss says that the
British who donate blood have adopted the values of the NHS. These values
specify that gifts should be offered firstly, as unilateral grants rather than as part
of exchanges, and secondly, on the basis of universally held human needs rather
than on the basis of a personal identity between donor and recipient. Gifts should
be made to strangers in distress. The NHS conforms to these values by making
its services available to all on the basis of a universal need for medical care and
by resisting social divisions in the treatment of its patients. In providing its
services, the NHS makes no distinction on the basis of income, class or race;
the sole criterion for help is the person's need for medical attention. The NHS
thus establishes a model of giving for people to emulate. As Titmuss puts it 'This
case study of blood donor systems demonstrates the extent to which the policy
values of the Service are held in common by the individual voluntary donor in
Britain'.18 Social policy, too, moulds people's values; it breeds altruism.19
Still another view is that the welfare state has no impact on private giving.
This view is implied by the social psychologists who try to explain variations
in the extent and form of altruism and helping behaviour. They look at almost
every imaginable condition that might affect altruism. A short list of conditions
would include: the donors' and recipients' age, sex, race, class, personal
appearanceand relation to one another; demographic,personality and situational
attributes; and personal and cultural norms regarding exchange, dependency
and self-reliance.20But not one study focuses on the possible role of the state.
Even when helping behaviour is studied comparatively in nations where the
welfare function of the state varies considerably - the United States, Japan, and
Sweden - the researchersmake no effort to explain the cross-national differences
in subjects' responses in terms of the role of the state in public life.21
While I believe they are mistaken to ignore the state, the social psychologists
are, of course, correct to alert one to the social and economic conditions that
might determine whether and how much people give. Such conditions as the size
and homogeneity of the community, the level of personal prosperity, the degree
18
Titmuss, The Gift Relationship, p. 238.
19 Glazer and Singer also believe that the existence of the NHS fosters altruism in Britain. But
their explanation for this is much more banal. They suggest that that NHS strengthens community
bonds. As Glazer puts it: 'I am convinced that some part of the explanation is to be found in the
fact that there is one National Health Service, open to all on the same basis, making no distinctions
in health care between rich and poor, and because blood is costless to the consumer, freely given
on the basis of need.' See 'Blood', p. 93.
20 In the
major reviews of the literature such as Bar-Tai, Prosocial Behavior, Dennis L. Krebs,
'Altruism - An Examination of the Concept and a Review of the Literature', Psychological Bulletin,
LXXIII (1970), 258-307, and Derek Wright, The Psychology of Moral Behaviour (Harmondsworth,
Middx.: Penguin, 1971), pp. I26-51, no reference is made to the possible impact of the state. This
is also the case for the leading anthology in the field; see J. R. Macauley and L. Berkowitz, eds.,
Altruism and Helping Behavior (New York: Academic Press, 1970).
21 Kenneth J. Gergen, et al., 'Obligation, Donor
Resources, and Reaction to Aid in Three
Countries', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, XXXI(1975), 390-400.
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Alternative Views of the Impact of the Welfare State on Private Giving
CHART I
The View
The Impact
Type of Giving
Titmuss in defence of the
welfare state
Promotes giving
Impersonal giving to the
stranger
T
Laissez-faire libertarians
Discourages giving
Philanthropy
A
Anarchists
Discourages giving
Mutual aid, self-help,
voluntary co-operation
T
Social psychologists
No impact on giving
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W
Private Giving in the Welfare State
23
of political and economic modernization, as well as the nature of class relations
may have such a direct and strong bearing on private giving that the presence
or absence of the welfare state might not matter at all. The various positions
I have presented are summarized in Chart I.
THE VALUE OF ALTERNATIVE
FORMS OF GIVING
To assess how the welfare state might alter people's inclination to give, it is useful
to delineate the different forms that giving assumes. Theoretically, at least, the
welfare state might discourage one type of giving while at the same time it might
encourage, or have no impact on, another type. Moreover, how the welfare state
affects alternative types of giving may not be accidental. If some types of giving
are compatible and other types are incompatible with the basic values that
underscore the welfare state, architects of social policy may strive to preserve
the former while allowing the latter to wither.
One type of giving is unilateral and impersonal. The gift of blood, Titmuss
argues, falls in this category. It is unilateral inasmuch as blood donors do not
expect repayment from recipients; it is impersonal inasmuch as donors do not
know the recipients' identities. As noted above, Titmuss believes that this type
of giving most faithfully embodies the ethos of the welfare state. He also
considers it intrinsically better than other types of giving. He is wary, for
example, of unilateral,personal giving whereby the donors offer gifts to those
whom they know. (Libertarians such as Friedman and Nozick stress the value
of private unilateral giving, but, unlike Titmuss, seem insensitive to the
distinction between personal and impersonal giving.) Titmuss suspects that
unilateral, personal giving may be motivated by considerations other than the
recipients' welfare, and that, indeed, it may serve the interests of the donor at
the expense of the recipient.22In this connection, radical observers suggest that
unilateral, personal gifts may subordinate recipients and help to legitimize and
perpetuate stratification systems that make such gifts possible in the first place.
Howard Newby, for example, argues that the gifts British farmers give to their
employees, although usually of slight monetary value, may induce farm workers
to become more deferential and to identify more closely with their employers'
interests.23 These gifts may imbue the farmers with such positive personal
attributes as kindness and generosity. They thus encourage the farm workers to
draw a distinction between the farmer as employer and the farmer as magnanimous human being. By offering gifts, farmers acquire an image of paternal
benevolence. And the gratitude kindled by this image may mute the frustration
22
Titmuss, The Gift Relationship, p. 5.
Howard Newby, The Deferential Worker (Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, I977), pp.
429-3I. It has been argued that the state has taken over this role of social control through the
allocation of gifts in the form of relief. Not only does the state become more generous when the
disadvantaged become especially obstreperous and more stingy when the poor are placid, but aid
is often given in such a way as to control the behaviour of the recipients. See, for example, Frances
Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor (New York: Random House, 197I).
23
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24
and resentment that may be intrinsic to the hierarchical relations between
farmers and their employees.
Social exchange theorists also appreciate how unilateral, personal gifts impose
a burden on recipients. They argue that for those people who adhere to a norm
of reciprocity, the failure to repay a gift may be humiliating. They recognize that
such gifts may demean recipients, making them dependent on donors, who, in
turn, are honoured for their generosity. As George Homans puts it, the man
who fails to repay a gift 'confesses himself neither the giver's enemy nor his friend
but his inferior. He loses status relative to the giver. What is more, he may, in
becoming an inferior, become also a subordinate: the only way he can pay his
debt is to accept the orders of the giver.'24 And Titmuss is only too eager to
point out that such rueful effects do not intrude when donors and recipients are
not known to each other; that is, when the gift is impersonal.
Titmuss also believes that unilateral, impersonal giving is more purely
altruistic than reciprocal giving. While the former is inspired primarily by the
donors' concern for anonymous victims, reciprocal giving, as described by
Marcel Mauss and Claude Levi-Strauss is fuelled, in great measure, by social
compulsion and self-interest.25Reciprocal giving requires donors and recipients
to appreciate that those receiving gifts incur an obligation to offer counter-gifts.
It initiates and sustains social and economic exchanges, and thus, as Titmuss
suggests, it has more in common with the marketplace than with social policy.
Voluntary co-operation or, in the language of social work, self-help giving
(although not treated by Titmuss) ostensibly also departs from the spirit of the
welfare state. It entails that people join forces to resolve a common problem or
to achieve a common goal. As with reciprocal giving, self-interest overshadows
altruism as its driving force. People act to help themselves and not others,
whether strangers or friends. People may unite to get a stop sign installed at a
dangerous intersection in their neighbourhood, but they are unlikely to become
agitated over similar intersections in other areas of town. If others are helped
it is an incidental by-product of self-interested individuals acting collectively. It
appears, then, that Titmuss considers unilateral, impersonal giving to be morally
superior to unilateral personal, reciprocal, and (by inference) self-help giving.
Whilst sharing his cynicism about unilateral, personal giving, I have two
reservations about his over-all position on giving. Firstly, he views unilateral,
impersonal giving too uncritically and defines it so narrowly that it is hardly
relevant. Thus if the unilateral, impersonal gift is morally superior to other gifts,
it is also less common. Titmuss is hard pressed to proffer examples other than
blood donations. Patients who allow themselves to be research subjects in
teaching hospitals are, according to Titmuss. making such gifts. But, as he
acknowledges, patients rarely make this gift freely and spontaneously; instead,
24
George Homans, Social Behaviour. Its ElementaryForms(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
I96I), p. 319.
25 Titmuss, The Gift Relationship, pp. 7I-4. He draws most heavily on Marcel Mauss. The Gift,
translated by I. Cunnison (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954) and Clause Levi-Strauss,
Elementary Structures of Kinship, revised edn. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).
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Private Giving in the Welfare State
25
they are usually 'captive volunteers'.26He also places foster parents in the same
category as blood donors; but, surely, foster parents get to know the object of
their benevolence - the foster child - quite well, and thus might expect gratitude
and deference in return for their generosity. Of examples cited by Titmuss, only
organ donors seem to give under circumstances similar to those who donate
blood.27
It is odd that Titmuss studiously ignores more traditionalforms of philanthropy
(so admired by the libertarians), much of which could certainly qualify as
unilateral, impersonal giving. (True, many philanthropists are not 'impersonal'
in the sense that they conceal their identity from the public; but their gifts are
usually 'impersonal' in the sense that donors and recipients are not known to
one another.) Perhaps he neglects philanthropy because his zeal for blood donors
does not extend to more conventional benefactors. He surely knows that in some
quarters philanthropy has a bad name. Radical critics impugn the motives of
philanthropists. They suggest that as philanthropy is inspired not so much by
altruism as by a range of far less savoury motives, one should rejoice rather than
lament to see it wither in the face of state intervention. Brian Harrison, for
one, offers an especially unflattering view of Victorian philanthropists. He raises
the possibility that for many affluent Victorians giving served to fill the empty
lives of bachelors, widows, or childless couples; to ease the torment of those
haunted by obsessional guilt; to present a glowing public image for those who
were so often unkind and autocratic in their own homes; or to enhance social
status and accelerate social mobility.28The observations of Harrison and many
others suggest that Titmuss may be naive to assume that unilateral, impersonal
giving is always motivated by altruism.29
Not only is it often rooted in considerations other than altruism, but
unilateral, impersonal giving may not always have a benign impact on its
recipients, particularly those who are physically or mentally handicapped. It
tends to highlight the recipients' attributes that make them dependent and
preclude them from reciprocating the help they receive. Such recipients are, in
relation to the giver, stigmatized; and stigmatized persons, Erving Goffman tells
us in his classic study, desperately strive for acceptance and self-respect by
demonstrating their ability to perform those activities that comprise 'normal'
living.30
How unilateral, impersonal giving might frustratethe efforts of the stigmatized
26
Titmuss,The Gift Relationship,
p. 215.
Titmuss, The Gift Relationship, pp. 215-I6.
Although Titmuss does not mention them,
donations to private groups funding research into cancer and heart disease may be impersonal gifts
in the sense that, as with blood donations, those who might benefit include strangers as well as the
donors.
28
Brian Harrison, 'Philanthropy and the Victorians', Victorian Studies, ix (I966), 362-8.
29 See Lord
Beveridge, VoluntaryAction. A Report on Methods of Social Advance(London: Allen
and Unwin, 1948), pp. 356-80; Betsy Rodgers, Cloak of Charity. Studies in Eighteenth Century
Philanthropy(London: Methuen, I949), pp. 7-I0; and Lord Beveridge and A. F. Wells, eds., The
Evidencefor VoluntaryAction (London: Allen and Unwin, 1949), p. 57.
30
Erving Goffman, Stigma (Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, I968), pp. 19-20.
27
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26
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person to achieve acceptance can be seen in the fund-raising methods used by
some charities. In their quest for funds, charities representing sick and disabled
persons appreciate that their most valuable asset is their clients' affliction. This
affliction, they realize, evokes in the public the empathy and sympathy that
induce people to give. The more distressing and debilitating the affliction is made
to appear and the more pathetic the clients are depicted, the more likely people
will be moved to give; any intimation that the clients' affliction is not so grave
or that they can live 'normal' lives is counter-productive and must therefore be
avoided. Such methods, of course, sabotage the attempts made by those afflicted
to gain acceptance and to avoid being treated as pitiful cripples. And this is
precisely why cerebral palsy victims recently protested at a New York telethon
that sought to raise funds for a cerebral palsy charity. Benedict Nightingale, in
his study of British charities, makes a similar point: 'The Muscular Dystrophy
Society of America actually rushes a slowly dying boy about the country for
publicity purposes; our Muscular Dystrophy group, the second largest in the
world, refuses to do this. Its advertising is distinctly muted as is the Multiple
Sclerosis Society's, too.'31 To be sure, American aggressiveness attracts the
charity dollar. But at what cost? Generous state aid might minimize the need
to acquire private charitable funds through the public degradation of the
handicapped. The point to stress is that the gift of blood may be unique in that
its recipients are not socially mortified; but those receiving other kinds of
unilateral, impersonal gifts may not always be as fortunate. They may suffer
shame and embarrassment.
My second criticism of Titmuss's position is that it underestimates the worth
of reciprocal self-help giving. These are the forms of giving deemed so valuable
by the anarchists. Their worth should not be unduly denigrated simply because
they involve exchange and are stimulated by self-interest. After all, they are more
likely than unilateral, impersonal giving to flow not from hierarchical relations
but from a community of people who share similar needs and spontaneously
help each other to meet these needs. Indeed, reciprocal giving and voluntary
co-operation may strengthen personal bonds within families and among friends
and neighbours, making such relations more enduring. They do not offend or
subordinate recipients who can retain their self-respect by repaying a kindness
or making a contribution to a joint effort. Such giving has a moral quality,
involving exchanges with a personal, human touch free of the harsh, impersonal,
indifference of market exchanges.32
Titmuss is convinced that the welfare state encourages unilateral, impersonal
giving. Perhaps so. But this may be true only for such relatively isolated examples
as blood donations. It is not at all clear, however, whether the welfare state
promotes conventional philanthropy, a far more common, if less appealing,
form of unilateral, impersonal giving. The libertarians' simple charge that the
Benedict Nightingale, Charities (London: Allen Lane, 1973), p. I90.
For discussions of the alleged salutary effects of reciprocity see Mauss, The Gift, pp. 63-81;
and Bronislaw Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1926), p. 46-9.
31
32
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Private Giving in the Welfare State
27
development of state social services for the needy drastically reduces the chances
for private, philanthropic giving is more plausible. Titmuss ignores this charge.
He also says nothing about whether the welfare state impinges on other forms
of private giving. Perhaps he does not consider the survival of such giving to
be urgent. Yet cultural anthropologists as well as anarchists have made a
compelling case for the value of reciprocity and voluntary co-operation.
Whether, as the anarchists claim, the welfare state destroys such giving is far
from self-evident. It is these issues I shall consider in the subsequent sections
of the paper.
THE LEVEL OF CHARITABLE
DONATIONS
One way of finding out how the welfare state affects philanthropy is to compare
the level of charitable donations in Britain and the United States. While the
British do give more blood voluntarily, Americans give more money to charities.
In I973, for example, Americans gave, per capita, ?50-60 while the British gave
only ?6-90!33Why did the Americans give seven times as much as the British?
One possible explanation is that Americans had more money to give away. Yet
this cannot be the whole story, for the gap in per capita income was not nearly
as wide as it was for per capita giving; while Americans donated seven times
as much in 1973, they had, per capita, only about twice as much income (?2,659
against ?I,I 5).34 One might counter that since the marginal propensity to make
donations probably varies directly with income, Americans, being twice as
affluent, may be wont to donate more than twice as much. Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that the striking discrepancy between the differencesin per capita giving
and per capita income can be explained entirely by the link between expanding
income and the marginal propensity to give alms.
Another possible reason why Americans give more may be that the American
tax system subsidizes charitable contributions more generously. This is not to
say that the British government fails to encourage philanthropy. It exempts
charities from paying national income taxes.35 It also encourages giving by
paying the tax that the taxpayer would owe on his or her gross donation directly
to the charity. Thus it allows taxpayers who pay taxes at the 30 per cent rate
to make, say, a ?Ioo donation by giving only a ?70 contribution. In effect, the
government deducts the tax the taxpayers owe on the gross donation of? Ioo - in
this case ?30 - and then gives it to the charity.36
Although similar in general outline to the American procedure, the British
tax expenditure policy is in several respects more restrictive and less generous.
33 These figures are drawn from a 1973 supplemental edition of the 197I Wells Collection of U.K.
Charitable Giving Reports (London: Wells International Donors Advisory Services Ltd., 1973),
p. 5. Figures are calculated on the basis of an exchange rate of ?I = $2.00.
34 Wells Collection, p. 8.
35 J. R. M. Willis and P. J. W. Hardwick, Tax Expenditures in the United Kingdom (London:
Heinemann Education Books, 1978), p. 58.
36 Willis and
Hardwick, Tax Expenditures, p. 59.
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28
OBLER
Firstly, the British government will only pay to the charity the tax the taxpayer
owes on his gross donation if the taxpayer agrees to give a specified sum of money
to the charity for at least seven successive years. This agreement is called a deed
of covenant, and it can be cancelled only with the consent of the beneficiary.
The justification for this practice is that only charities' incomes and not people's
incomes are tax exempt, and donations become the charities' incomes only when
the donor agrees to give for at least seven years.37Who exercises control over
income, then, seems to be the guiding criterion for the determination of tax
exemptions. Insisting on a seven year commitment is, of course, arbitrary, and,
in fact, the Goodman Report recommended that it be reduced to four years.38
The American taxpayer is in a far more advantageous position. Not required
to make any commitment beyond his initial donation, he merely deducts his
charitable contribution from his gross income.
Secondly, the British government pays to the charity only the basic tax owed
to the taxpayer's donation and not the surtax. Currently, the basic rate is 30 per
cent and the highest surtax rate is 60 per cent. This means that if a person paying
the basic rate wishes to make a ? oo donation, he must set aside ? Ioo - ?70 for
the charity and ?30 for the taxes owed to the government. But the person paying
the highest surtax rate must set aside ?175 to make a ?Ioo donation - ?70 for
the charity and ?Io5 for his taxes.39In the United States, the tax expenditure
policy on charitable contributions encompasses the highest marginal tax rates;
consequently, as the donor's rate of taxation climbs, the government subsidy
to the object of his benevolence increases.
Thirdly, in Britain only the donation of income and not of property entitles
the charity to receive a government subsidy. In contrast, in calculating his
taxable income, the American taxpayer may deduct the value of property as well
as income given to a charity.
Fourthly, the way in which the American tax expenditure for charitable
contributions is administered might serve as a slight psychological inducement
to give. The tax benefit accorded charities appears to be shared by the donor
as well as the recipient. Thus the person who makes a $Ioo donation in
November can often look forward to a $30 refund the following May. And in
soliciting funds, American charities invariably remind prospective benefactors
that their donations are tax deductible. In Britain, the procedure used reveals
more clearly how the benefit accrues to the charity. The taxpayer who agrees
to give ?70 for seven successive years can expect no tax refund; instead, his
donations will permit the charity to collect each year an additional ?30 from
the government.
One suspects that the British would give more to charities if the United
Kingdom would adopt a tax expenditure policy identical to the one used in the
United States. Yet the Goodman Committee doubts this; it, in fact, believes that
37
Hilary Blume, Fund Raising by Charities (London: Bedford Square Press, 1973), pp. 26-9.
Report of the Goodman Committee, Charity Law and Voluntary Organisations (London:
Bedford Square Press, 1976), p. 54.
39 Goodman
Report, Charity Law, p. 52.
38
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Private Giving in the Welfare State
TABLE I
29
Alternative Sources of CharitableGiving in the United States and
the United Kingdom, 1973
Per capita
giving
(?)
Total giving
(%)
Source
UK
USA
UK
Living individuals
Legacies and bequests
2'54
I6I8
37'46
6-31
37
74
17
I2-5
5'35:
Companies
0o63
4
3-II:I
Charitable trusts
Total
2'54
6-90
9'5
I00
1-92:1
7'33:I
1I96
4'87
5'060
9
37
I00
USA
Ratio of giving
in USA
compared
with UK
14.72:1
Note: Figuresbasedon ?I.oo = $2.40, and a UK populationof 55 millionand USA population
of 202 million.
Sources. Adapted from a 1973 supplementary edition of I97I Wells Collection, pp. 5 and 8.
the introduction of the American procedure would stifle giving in Britain.40But
the scanty data available suggest that the Goodman Committee is wrong. The
differences in tax expenditure policies should influence gifts made by living
individuals. Tax policies regulating other forms of giving - corporate donations,
legacies, and charitable trusts - do not differso dramaticallyin the two countries.
If the British tax expenditure policy discourages giving, one would expect that
the gap between the level of giving for the two nations would be narrower for
sources of donations other than living individuals. And, as shown on Table I,
this is indeed the case. While per capita giving by living individuals in I973 was
fifteen times greater in the United States than Britain, per capita donations
derived from legacies, corporations, and trusts were, respectively, only six, three
and two times greater.Furthermore,donations from living individualsconstituted
a far greater proportion of charitable funds in the United States (74 per cent)
than in Britain (37 per cent). These figures support the notion that giving is
stimulated more in America than in Britain by the nations' tax expenditure
policies.
These differences in the American and British tax expenditure policies are
consistent with what is usually taken to be the differencesin the countries' basic
socio-political beliefs. The British accept that the primary, if not exclusive,
responsibility for assuring that all people have a decent standard of living rests
with the state and not with individuals or private institutions. The British also
accept that the state rather than the private sector should set the priority of
community needs and should control the allocation of public funds to meet these
needs. Given these beliefs, it is not surprising that the British tax expenditure
policy, compared to its American counterpart, restricts the ability of individuals
40
Goodman Report, Charity Law, p. 54.
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30
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to determine, through their charitable donations, how some public funds are
used. In the United States, on the other hand, where the state has assumed the
welfare function more haltingly and grudgingly, many people cling to the belief
that private persons and groups can and should continue to play a substantial
part in caring for the disadvantaged. And to promote the private sector, the
United States is willing to allow taxpayers to dictate the allocation of considerable sums of public funds.
Yet another explanation is that Britain's welfare state reduces the opportunities for philanthropic giving. If this is so, then Titmuss's contention that the
welfare state promotes giving may not extend beyond such relatively isolated
cases as blood donations. Realizing that the welfare state does make compulsory
money transfers, people might decline to give on the grounds that the state
already helps those in need with coercively collected funds. This rationale cannot
be used to justify one's refusal to give blood because the welfare state does not
tax blood, it does not tamper with the gift of blood; in Britain, one either gives
voluntarily or does not give at all. Americans give more money than the British,
so libertarians would argue, because in the United States a higher proportion
of such institutions as hospitals and universities continue to rely on private
funding. For libertarians, the simple truth is that in Britain, state aid has driven
private donors away.
But given the differences in British and American tax laws, it is difficult to
determine whether this is so; for the more modest giving in Britain may be
attributed to restrictive British tax expenditure policy and not to Britain's fully
developed welfare state. Nevertheless, the libertarian position seems plausible
in the light of the pattern of giving in the two countries. Accordingly, giving
in Britain, as compared to the United States, is especially weak in those areas
where the state is especially involved, even though donors in nearly all areas of
charitable giving operate under the same tax provisions. Hence, private donations
to health and welfare groups were nine times greater in the United States than
in Britain.41But in those areas in which the state plays a more negligible role,
private giving has been more robust. Thus private giving to religious groups was
only six times greater in the United States. Moreover, a higher proportion of
charitable funds went to religious groups in Britain (50 per cent) than in the
United States (41 per cent).42 This relative strength of religious giving is
remarkableinasmuch as proportionately fewer Britons than Americans consider
themselves religious.43It is probably attributable not so much to the British zeal
for religious causes as to their lack of enthusiasm for those charities whose efforts
more directly overlap with state help.
Anarchists, taking the case against the welfare state a step further, would argue
that as state responsibilities grow, people generally lose interest in private giving.
41
Wells Collection, p. 5.
42 Wells Collection, p. 5.
43 Thus a 1975 Gallup International survey found that 58 per cent of American respondents
but only 23 per cent of British respondents said that their religious beliefs were important to
them. Reported in Public Opinion, II (1979), 38.
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Private Giving in the Welfare State
31
If this were so, one would expect British giving to lag far behind in all areas. Yet
there are exceptions. Per capita giving for cancer research, to cite one example,
was in 1973 less than twice as great in the United States; if one considers the
resources available for charity, then, the British appear to be more generous than
the Americans in their support for the attempt to find a cure for cancer.44
That the British do not support charities as generously as Americans does
not, of course, refute Titmuss's claim that voluntary blood donations in Britain
are promoted by the welfare state. It does suggest, however, that any positive
impact on giving that the welfare state might have is quite limited; and, indeed, it
shows that the welfare state might have an adverse effect on other, and more
common, forms of giving. On the other hand, the welfare state has not, as libertarians and anarchists fear, destroyed the more general impulse to give. That
certain forms of giving are alive and well in the British welfare state is
revealed in the case study that follows.
PRIVATE GIVING
IN AN ENGLISH
VILLAGE
In an effort to convey a more qualitative picture of British giving, I will report
the findings of a case study of private giving in an English village. This case study
focuses on how the development of the welfare state has impinged on different
forms of private giving, and how the impact of the welfare state on giving has
been tempered by social relations among village residents. Information about
private giving was gathered from open-ended, informal interviews, records of
local voluntary organization, and observations of voluntary organizations'
meetings and fund-raising activities.
The village, which I call Penridge, is located in East Anglia, about 52 miles
northeast of London and is home to about 1,300 people. As in most other East
Anglian villages within commuting distance from London, there is in Penridge
a marked split between 'locals', who were born and raised in Penridge and whose
families, in some instances, have lived in Penridge for several generations, and
'newcomers', who have come to Penridge since the Second World War. Locals
are for the most part shopkeepers, farm workers, domestic servants, artisans,
or retired from one of these occupations. Although few locals received any
education beyond the age of 16, some have become fairly well-off by selling land
or cottages to newcomers at inflated prices. Most locals live either in the older,
central section of the village or in the Council estate located on the village's
northern periphery. The newcomers are split between the (I) upper middle-class
bankers, solicitors, stockbrokers, and civil servants - most of whom commute
to London or to one of East Anglia's larger cities - and retired businessmen and
military officers, who live in the old quarter, either in handsomely renovated
cottages dating back to the sixteenth century or in newly constructed homes that
conform to the village's architectural decor and (2) middle-class and lower
middle-class teachers, social workers, and white collar employees who have
44
WellsCollection,pp. 8-I9 and GivingUSA (New York: American Association of Fund-Raising
Council,
1975), p. 37.
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I- III
lJ
Firehouse
o
Old Kalt
residence
r
I i
Stour tributary
PENRIDGE
Post
Office
Fig. i. Map of Penridge
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Old-age
bungalows
Private Giving in the Welfare State
33
settled in the large private estate (120 homes) built in the mid-1960s and situated
adjacent to the Council estate. The divisions between locals and newcomers as
well as between the two groups of newcomers have a substantial bearing on
private giving in Penridge.
The presence of the welfare state is felt by locals and newcomers alike; it
intrudes even into Penridge's bucolic, medieval setting. There are 120 Council
houses, eight state-operated bungalows for the aged, an NHS surgery,and family
allowances and pensions distributed from the village post office. What is the
impact of this presence? Does it make the people of Penridge passive consumers
of state services, unwilling to help one another through voluntary giving?
In considering these questions, I will first present a general overview and then
look at two facets of giving in more detail. Chart II lists the non-state groups
in Penridge that rely, in part or entirely, on private support and voluntary help.
An examination of these groups reveals three notable patterns.
Firstly, the private groups that seek to improve the economic security and
well-being of the local residents were, with one exception, established prior to
the Second World War. The exception, Meals on Wheels, which delivers lunches
to the aged and infirm confined to their homes, works closely with state agencies;
state hospitals prepare the meals and welfare agencies reimburse volunteers for
their expenses. Besides Meals on Wheels, no private welfare group has been
formed since I945. Apparently, Penridge's relative prosperity as well as the
security offered by state statutory services have undercut the need for additional
private welfare groups.
In fact, what is surprisingis not that new welfare groups have failed to appear,
but that the old ones still survive. Of those that do survive, two are engaged
in unilateral personal giving. The Penridge Charity, which will be discussed in
greater detail below, survives only because the trust continues to generate
income that must be allocated in the village for specified purposes. The Over
6os Club, which was started by a local philanthropist as a vehicle through which
the aged indigent could be helped, has evolved since 1945 into a self-help social
group that raises money to provide various services to its members. Unilateral
personal giving has therefore gradually faded from the Penridge scene.
Mutual-aid welfare groups have fared somewhat better. Indeed, the Ancient
Order of the Foresters, a friendly society that uses members' dues to pay
sick-leave and other medical benefits, is prospering: since I972 its energetic
secretary has managed to increase membership from 102 to 398. Explaining why
such a friendly society is still necessary in a welfare state, the secretary simply
says that when a person is sick every penny counts. And given the society's rising
membership, this simple pitch is evidently convincing. The local British Legion
branch, which provides a wide range of modest welfare benefits to its members,
is not doing as well. Its membership of seventy-five is dwindling as it is unable
to recruit new members to replace those who pass away.
Secondly, while the welfare state may have made unilateral personal giving
superfluous, it has not discouraged the development of unilateral impersonal
giving. Since the early 1970s, the branches of two prominent Britishcharities - the
2
JPS
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II
CHART
II
VoluntaryGroupsin Penridge
Unilateral giving
Reciprocal giving
Established before 1945
Penridge Charity
Kaley-Love Charities
Over 6os Club
Established since I945
Kalt Charity
NSPCC
Action Research
Mentally Handicapped
Association
Meals on Wheels
_
?
..
?.....
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The Foresters
British Legion
Church of England
Catholic Church
Non-Conformist Church
B
B
P
V
B
F
Ju
Q
C
V
C
P
W
Private Giving in the Welfare State
35
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) and Action
for the Crippled Child - have been formed in Penridge. The work done by these
charities overlaps with services provided by the state. The NSPCC employs
inspectors who investigate charges of child abuse and, if deemed necessary,
initiate administrative and judicial proceedings that can result in children being
placed in the care of state-run homes. Action for the Crippled Child funds
research into the causes of and treatment for crippling diseases that strike
children. Surely, one reason why these charities continue to function in the
British welfare state is that at least some of the people most intimately involved
with them believe that voluntary assistance can significantly supplement services
available from the state. Thus public funds to support medical research are
limited, and many potentially valuable research projects might go unfunded if it
were not for the effort of Action for the Crippled Child. As for the NSPCC,
parents who might be reluctant to permit social workers into their homes might
allow NSPCC inspectors to help them with their family problems.
Another reason why these charities have been established in Penridge is that
the upper middle-class newcomers are attracted to this kind of philanthropic
work. For them, these charities not only provide the opportunity to help others
but also offer acceptable social entertainment. Their energies are consumed by
planning and attending fund-raising coffee mornings and strawberry lunches.
One local woman contrasted her involvement in the Over 6os Club and the
NSPCC by stating that work for the latter was 'simply more fun'; she went on
to say that she was able to wear her 'second best jersey' to the NSPCC's
social functions. The cause for which these people work is almost incidental, as
long as they consider it a 'worthy' one. Whether the charities in which they
are engaged duplicate functions performed by the state is an issue they rarely
consider. They have no contact with those who benefit from their generosity.
One cynical ex-member of the NSPCC observed that her former colleagues had
never seen a battered child and that if they ever did, they would probably flee
in horror. At a lavish barn supper and craft sale held on a farm overlooking
Penridge there was absolutely no indication that the guests had gathered to help
crippled children; the organizer thanked the guests for coming and then simply
said that she hoped everyone had had a good time. Of course, the funds raised
were no less valuable to the recipients because they were collected by affluent
people having a good time.
The recipients' anonymity may remove the ugly realities of battered and
crippled children that might spoil the fun of fund-raising social gatherings. Thus
while the anonymity of the recipient may be, as in the case of the gift of blood,
an indication of the donors' altruism, it may serve, in the case of the NSPCC
and Action for the Crippled Child, to preserve the purely social and pleasurable
experience of private giving. Given the importance of the social element of giving,
it is not surprising that the NSPCC and Action for the Crippled Child
committees tend to be socially exclusive. Although members deny that anyone
is excluded, they do admit that since they co-opt their friends, the committees
are socially homogeneous.
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36
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The capacity of these Penridge charities to prosper suggests that the welfare
state may not destroy unilateral, impersonal giving because people engaged in
such giving are attempting to enjoy themselves and are not about to let state
services get in their way. If pressed, they can justify their efforts by noting simply
that charities do usefully complement state help.
The third and most striking pattern is the proliferation of self-help groups
since the Second World War in the area of recreation and leisure time. One
reason for this proliferation is that in Penridge the government provides
practically nothing in the way of recreational services; the welfare state just does
not assume the obligation to provide such services. And the crucial point is that
the gap left by the state is filled by groups that rely on private giving through
subscriptions and fund-raising functions. The Penridge case suggests that the
impulse to co-operate spontaneously and voluntarily is not destroyed when the
state accepts the responsibility to care for its citizens' basic social and economic
needs. Where the state is not involved, people still take the initiative to help
themselves. Another reason for the development of private, self-help groups is
the arrival in Penridge of middle-class newcomers who felt that there was not
enough going on in the village and who were willing to take on the administrative
chores necessary to form and sustain these groups.
More generally, it should be noted that private giving is an integral part of
public, social life in Penridge. Hardly a week goes by when there is not a coffee
morning, whist party, village fte, fashion show, concert, wine and cheese party,
show and sell stall or an open garden day to raise money for some cause.
THE PAINFUL
DEMISE OF UNILATERAL,
PERSONAL
GIVING
Penridge of the I920s and I930S, as recalled by older residents, was a smaller,
more isolated, and self-sufficient village. Most of the adults among the 450 or
so people who lived in Penridge also worked in the village or in the immediate
vicinity. They were shopkeepers or labourers on the surrounding farms, or
gardeners, domestic servants, and chauffeurs for the few well-off village families,
or employees at the local building firm. Penridge offered its people not only
employment but also most of the goods and services they required. Old-timers
fondly reminisce about the time when Penridge boasted five general stores, two
butchers, two bakers, a blacksmith, not to mention its six public houses. But
the old-timers also remember, less fondly, that Penridge was a poor village.
Wages were pitifully low, keeping most people at the edge of subsistence, housed
for the most part in dilapidated cottages with no indoor plumbing or electricity
and with scant reserves for such crises as illness or unemployment. For these
poor, Penridge's few affluent families, who were not indifferent to the poverty
around them, were one source of help. This help assumed several forms.
First, some affluent families gave gifts to their domestic servants. These
families clung to a feudal tradition whereby employers accepted the responsibility
for their employees' general welfare and expected, in return, loyalty and
gratitude. They supplemented their workers' low wages with such gifts as
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Private Giving in the Welfare State
37
heating coal, old clothes, surplus food, and Christmas bonuses. A Mrs Thornby,
for example, who was known to be especially generous to those in her charge,
provided cottages and a small income to loyal servants upon their retirement.
The giving of such gifts is certainly less common today, simply because fewer
families have large, full-time domestic staffs. Undoubtedly, the part-time
domestic helps who now work in the village receive gifts from their employers,
but probably on a far more modest scale.
A second, and less common, kind of giving was the personal philanthropy that
extended beyond the household to the poor throughout the village. Mrs Kalt,
the best-known Penridge philanthropist, devoted part of the fortune she had
inherited from her husband in the I920S to helping the poor, and especially the
aged poor, of Penridge. She started the Over 6os Club, gave coal to the aged
poor, and operated a soup kitchen. One old-timer relates how each morning he
fetched soup from this kitchen for his grandmother and how the supply of
soup was cut off as soon as his grandmother died. Other well-heeled ladies held
annual parties for local children; one such lady gave each child a penny after
the party; another, who must have had an ample garden, hired a roundabout
to entertain the youngsters. Mrs Thornby looked after those who were
particularly disadvantaged. She saw to it that a deaf and dumb village boy
received a special education and then established him as a local cobbler.
Why these women helped the poor is not clear. Several upper middle-class
newcomers, many of whose parents were philanthropists in other parts of
Britain, stress the importance of social obligation and duty. Several old-time
residents suggest that the established families used philanthropy to acquire social
status in the village; they competed to see who could do more for the village.
Yet regardless of what inspired it, village charity seems to have induced among
its recipients a respect and gratitude for those who gave it. Most of those who
received help remember the rich ladies as kind, caring people. And the deference
nurtured by village charity may have legitimized the social and economic
distance that separated donors and recipients. Yet traces of resentment linger.
One woman recalled that Mrs Kalt had had a reputation for not treating her
servants well. Another woman remarked that Mrs Kalt enjoyed feeling superior
toward the elderly poor who flocked about her.
The village philanthropists have slowly disappeared. Mrs Thornby died
several years ago; Mrs Kalt went into a nursing home in the I950S and died in
1973. And, as one might expect, they have not been replaced. There is no longer
any equivalent to this kind of unilateral, personal giving to the poor. Security
provided by the welfare state and greateraffluencemake such giving unnecessary
and inappropriate.
The third source of help was the charitable trusts that had been established,
in part, to aid the poor of Penridge. The larger of the two main village trusts,
the Penridge Charity, secured the bulk of its assets from a fairly unique source.
In the mid-sixteenth century, townspeople managed to raise about ?Ioo for the
Charity by selling the Church plate, ornaments, and other sundry items before
they were confiscated by Edward VI as part of his Protestant reformist crusade
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38
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that was sweeping through England. This money, subsequently supplemented
by local legacies bequeathed by the village's richerinhabitants to relieve poverty,
was the financial backbone of the Charity. The Charity was administered by local
trustees called Feoffees who each year distributed funds to maintain the
almshouses, subsidized the Parish Church, and assisted the poor. Over the years,
some of the Charity's assets were sold to finance capital projects (such as the
construction of a workhouse in the nineteenth century), thereby reducing the
income available for annual allocations. By the eve of the Second World War,
the Charity still looked after the almshouses and the Parish Church but was only
able to offer modest assistance to the poor which took the form of a 'Christmas
Dole' amounting to about 3s. 6d. (17'5p) as well as occasional bread coupons.
The other major trust, the Kalt Charity, was formed in 1974 through the
amalgamation of two small, older legacies dating back to the sixteenth and
eighteenth centuries and the ?1,ooo legacy left in 1973 by Mrs Kalt to aid the
poor of Penridge.
While other forms of unilateral, personal giving have faded, these charitable
trusts survive as a reminder of a more feudal past in the midst of one of the
most highly developed and self-conscious welfare states in the world. And they
are not exceptional; as of 1974 in East Suffolk, 228 of the 374 parishes had trusts
for the benefit of the poor, and, in all, 396 charities had an income of ?22,540.45
Why these trusts persist is no mystery. Philanthropists pass away. Their values
may become anachronistic. But their trusts continue to generate income that the
trustees are required to spend according to the original donors' instructions. It
is true that after the Second World War, some welfare state enthusiasts
considered nationalizing charitable trusts and using the income to supplement
taxes and rates. This notion was soundly rejected by the Nathan Committee,
which had been charged in 1950 with investigating ways of reforming charitable
trusts. Instead, the Committee recommended in its I952 report that charitable
trusts should remain under the control of trustees who should co-ordinate their
efforts with the statutory social services and initiate innovative social reforms.46
Accordingly, the Suffolk County Council has urged trustees to abandon the
archaic practice of Christmas doles on the grounds that the disbursements usually from ?I to ?2 - were too small to provide any meaningful help. The
Council wants the Charities' funds to be used to fill the gaps in the welfare state's
security net by offering the kind of help that is not available from the state (e.g.,
to pay the travelling expenses of poor people visiting relatives in the hospital).
The Council is thus making a deliberate attempt to persuade private charities
to adapt to the changing circumstances created by the welfare state.
Sympathetic to the Council's position, the trustees of the Kalt Charity asked
the district welfare officer and district nurse to suggest how they might use their
annual income, ranging from ?1oo to ?170, to help those who most need
assistance. They received no response. And since, until now, they have been
45 E. H. Barker, Report on the Review of Parochial Charities other than Ecclesiastical in East
Suffolk (Ipswich: Community Council for Suffolk, 1974).
46
Hill, 'England and Wales', p. 216.
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Private Giving in the Welfare State
39
unwilling to establish a permanent administrative apparatus to channel funds
to needy residents, they continued to disburse Christmas doles, giving ?2 to aged
residents of longest standing and ?2 to those people in particulardistress. Income
not spent on Christmas doles was used in 1975 and 1976 to subsidize a Christmas
party for the Over 6os Club and in 1975 to purchase a bench for the old-people's
bungalows bearing a plaque to the memory of Mrs Kalt.
In I978, the trustees finally abandoned the Christmas dole. But instead of
providing relief for those with special needs, they spent nearly all their money
to hold a Christmas party for all the pensioners of the village regardless of
income. The justification for this change in policy was that a Christmas dinner
would be a far more memorable and positive experience than a paltry gift of
a few pounds. No mention was made of what to an outsider appears to be an
awkward and indelicate procedure used to allocate doles whereby trustees with
local roots, who are most familiar with the circumstances of the village poor,
go through the electoral list to decide who needs help. Some older residents were
disappointed when they received no dole. They noted that the dole, although
small, was better than nothing at all. They also complained that it was so cold
on the night of the Christmas dinner that many older people were unable to
attend. And even the trustees, who are still considering alternative outlets for
the funds, were not entirely satisfied with the way they had spent the Charity's
money.
By abandoning Christmas doles, the trustees have rejected (perhaps unwittingly) the unilateral, personal giving embodied in most village charitable
trusts whereby local philanthropists are able to perpetuate after their deaths the
hierarchical, paternalistic relationship between prosperous donors and dependent recipients. In its place they have introduced a more innocuous form of
giving, still unilateral but far less personal; recipients are no longer singled out
for help but are now free to choose whether to attend a communal dinner. By
using the trust's funds to organize a Christmas dinner open to all older residents,
the trustees have violated the spirit of the donors' instructions to use the money
to help the aged poor. But in keeping with the spirit of the welfare state, they
have also erased some of the lingering traces of Victorian paternalistic charity.
While the trustees of the Kalt Charity have at least attempted to adapt, the
trustees of the Penridge Charity, ignoring the suggestions of the County Council,
cling to the practices that originated with the establishment of the trust in the
sixteenth century. Following their predecessors' precedent, they continue to
spend the Charity's annual income (about ?400) on Christmas doles, educational
scholarships for poor children, apprenticeship grants, the almshouses, and the
Parish church. The trustees have resisted change, I believe, because they
recognize that the Penridge Charity defines and regulates social relations within
the village and serves as a palpable and functioning symbol of the continuity
of village life, a direct link with Penridge's medieval origins. With the possible
exception of the Parish Church, the Penridge Charity remains the quintessential
village institution that has been immune to the profound social and economic
changes that have transformed village life.
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But the trustees are under pressure to alter their ways, pressure that comes
not so much from the state as from the new social elements in the village. This
pressure has sparked an ugly dispute between the upper middle-class newcomers
and the trustees, who, with one exception, are part of the distinct local
subculture. In accent, life-style, education, consumption patterns, and values,
if not in income, the trustees differ markedly from the newcomers but are not
so dissimilar to the local people who benefit from the Charity's Christmas
disbursements. A controversy over the four small almshouses, maintained by
the Charity and situated in the centre of the village just a hundred or so feet
from the Parish church, has crystallized this dispute. The newcomers complain
that the almshouses are in such deplorable condition - damp, shabby, and
lacking indoor plumbing - that they are unfit for human habitation. They place
the blame for the sorry condition of the almshouses on the trustees, who have
refused to make necessary improvements. The newcomers consider the trustees
as an incompetent, self-perpetuating local oligarchy who abuse the village by
mismanaging the Charity's funds. There is an element of Victorian paternalism
in these complaints made by people who show little enthusiasm for expanding
the number of or improving the quality of tax-supported council housing in the
village but who become so agitated by the apparent failure of a private charity
to maintain almshouses properly. There may also be an element of self-interest
in these complaints. Some of the newcomers who live close to the almshouses
fear that if the almshouses are allowed to rot away they will be replaced by
modern bungalows, further destroying the village's medieval charm.
For their part, the trustees resent what they view as the unwarranted
interference on the part of the newcomers who are using the almshouses as a
pretence to take over the Penridge Charity. The trustees do not share the
newcomers' concern over the condition of the almshouses, for they recall when
most of Penridge's houses were in no better shape. They also point out that the
almshouses' tenants, who pay no rent and prefer to live in the village centre,
have not lodged any complaints. And even if they wanted to make improvements,
it is not clear where the Charity would find the money required.
In I969, arguing that the Penridge Charity should be treated as a village trust
accountable to the people through their elected representatives on the Parish
Council, newcomers requested the Parish Council to break up the trustees'
oligarchy by appointing its own trustee. The Parish Council was willing to go
along with this request. But the Feoffees would have none of it. And they had
the complex law governing charitable trusts to back up their resistance.
According to this law, Parochial Charities - those (such as the Kalt Trust)
established to help the poor in a particularparish - are accountable to the Parish
Council. But the Penridge Charity is not a Parochial Charity. It is instead an
Ecclesiastical Charity because part of its funds are used to support the Parish
church. And Parish Councils have absolutely no authority over Ecclesiastical
Charities.
Unable to penetrate the Charity directly, the newcomers sent letters to the
Feoffees asking them to bring the almshouses up to modern standards. This
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Private Giving in the Welfare State
4I
approach was no more successful. The Feoffees responded 'Mind your own
business!' To this day, the dispute over the almshouses remains unresolved. At
a meeting of the Parish Council of July I979 a newcomer threatened to bring
the decrepit condition of the almshouses to the attention of the Charity
Commissioners in London. A local, who is not a trustee, retorted angrily that
such a move would only further antagonize the Feoffees and thus assure that
no action would be taken on the almshouses.
Most unilateral, personal giving, whereby the affluent care for the poor, has
dried up in Penridge. Only the charitable trusts remain. And they survive not
because of any lingering concern for the plight of the poor, but rather because
they continue to produce income that must be spent. But the income is no longer
significant, thanks to inflation and the more generous support available from
state agencies. Attempts to persuade the trusts to use their meagre income to
supplement state services have not been successful. Trustees of the Penridge
Charity have been unwilling and the trustees of the Kalt Charity have been
unable to co-ordinate their efforts with state services.
THE COMMUNITY
CO-OPERATION
COUNCIL:
STATE SUPPORT
FOR VOLUNTARY
By seeking to establish an economic floor below which citizens cannot fall, the
British welfare state obviously reduces the need for private aid to the poor.
Equally apparent is that the resources of the British welfare state are limited;
and thus there are areas of public life in which it plays at most a negligible role.
By not offering a particular service, the state gives citizens the chance to help
others and themselves through voluntary action. The key question is whether
people are slow to take advantage of these opportunities because the welfare
state promotes dependency and discourages private giving.
In Penridge, the most glaring gap in state services is in recreation. There is
one village playground located on land donated to Penridge by a local aristocrat
who owns much of the surrounding land. The playground is the responsibility
of the Parish Council whose resources are so meagre that it can just barely
maintain it. The Parish Council also cares for the public footpaths. But that is
its entire contribution to the village's leisure life. No state agency provides
playing fields, public meeting places, or organized recreational activities. Until
quite recently, the tiny, ill-equipped Church Hall was the only public meeting
place in the village.
Even before the Second World War, the people of Penridge voluntarily took
steps to ameliorate public facilities. They raised ?500 to build a village hall. But
the project never saw fruition, and the funds were placed in trust under the
control of the Parish Church. Then, again, in the mid-1960s another effort was
initiated to collect money for a village hall. This time a Community Council was
established to organize the collection and allocation of funds. Since its primary
object was to 'benefit the community' (by providing recreational facilities and
other amenities), the Community Council was considered a charitable
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organization and was thereby eligible for several benefits from the state. It was
exempt from national income taxes. And it was entitled to receive from the state
the tax owed on those donors' contributions that were made through deeds of
covenant. This benefit was not very significant because the state made it
contingent on the contributors' commitment to give for at least seven successive
years. Not surprisingly, then, the Community Council collected only about
2 per cent, less than ?200, from deeds of covenants. It is reasonable to assume
that if British tax policy supported private giving as generously as its American
counterpart, individual donors would have been a far more fertile source of
revenue.
Yet through an alternative mechanism, the Community Council did receive
support from the state. Soon after it had been formed, the Community Council
discovered that the District Council, the County Council, and the Department
of Education and Science (part of central government) would be willing to
contribute, respectively, I2-, I21, and 50 per cent of the cost of building the village hall if, firstly, these agencies had revenue to spare; secondly, the plans for
the hall were legally and technically feasible, and thirdly, the people of the village demonstrated their ability to raise at least part of the money required. With
the prospect of government grants, the Community Council had to raise only
enough money to cover 25 per cent of the cost, a far more manageable task.
Relying primarilyon annual village fetes and weekly lotteries in which the money
raised by the sale of tickets was split with the weekly winners, it managed to
raise about ?8,000 in six years. It paid ?4,500 toward the ?I8,ooo cost of the
hall and used the remaining funds to purchase the land for the hall as well as
adjoining playing fields, the latter with the help of a grant from the National
Playing Field Association, a charitable grant-making organization.
The District and County Councils would not have made these grants if the
?8,000 had been raised by the Parish Council through higher rates. (Within
certain limits, the Parish Council, Penridge's official, duly elected governing
body, determines its own revenue by setting the supplement to county rates on
village property.) These agencies were only willing to make these grants to a
voluntary group that raised enough money privately to pay for at least 25 per
cent of the cost.
Why do these grant-making agencies insist that part of the expense of the hall
be met by voluntarily-raised funds? It is not because they want to reduce their
outlays; if this were the main reason, they would simply make the grants directly
to the Parish Council. Their primary purpose, I believe, is to promote self-help
and voluntary co-operation in the villages, at least in the relatively innocuous
areas of recreational and social facilities. The way in which these agencies offer
grants almost compels villages to collect money for a hall voluntarily rather than
through higher rates. In Penridge, for example, the Parish Council would have
had to raise ?21,500 through higher rates to achieve the goal that was realized
by a mere ?8,o00 raised voluntarily. Since the people of Penridge pay the income
taxes and rates that help finance these government grants, they were naturally
eager to reap the benefits of these grants. Thus it is not surprising that in the
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Private Giving in the Welfare State
43
mid-1960s no one even seriously considered the possibility of building a village
hall with funds raised through the rates.
These grants not only provide an incentive for villages to raise money
privately, but they may also promote voluntary co-operation in the long run.
By the time the village hall is completed, the Community Council (having
acquired a constitution and officers)will have become fairly institutionalized and
thus may continue to serve as a fund-raising organization for the village. And,
indeed, the Penridge Community Council continues to prosper five years after
the completion of its hall. Moreover, now that the village has a decent public
meeting place and playing fields, voluntary groups may be encouraged to become
more active and new groups may be established. Without the Penridge village
hall and its adjacent playing field, there would be no venue for the playschool,
football club, or the amateur theatre company.
In offering these grants, then, the British welfare state is making a conscious
effort to promote private giving. This contrasts with Britain's tax policy, which,
compared with that of the United States, does not go out of its way to
encourage philanthropy. There are, I think, several plausible explanations for
the difference between Britain's welfare and tax policies. Firstly, by specifying
the size of government grants, the state is able to regulate how much money it
spends in support of private giving. In contrast, there is no way to limit the cost
to the national treasury of a liberal tax expenditure policy on charitable
contributions. Secondly, by specifying the objects for which grants can be made,
the state is able to define and limit the goals of private giving. It is therefore
able to subsidize only that part of private giving which it considers to be for
a worthy cause. Since the state is unable to exercise this kind of control when
it pays charities the taxes owed on charitable donations, it may be forced to
support with public funds causes it sees as unimportant or even as undesirable.
Thirdly, by making grants in response to demands rooted in collective voluntary
co-operation, the state may be trying to induce a spirit of mutual interdependence,
which is compatible with the ethos of the welfare state. The state may, on the
other hand, be reluctant to support more conventional forms of philanthropy
which often embody the privatization of giving, whereby charities compete for
charity pounds in the charity marketplace. The state may believe that this more
private, atomized form of giving is not compatible with the spirit of the welfare
state.
To state officials, efforts to build village halls may be especially appealing
because they are collective, self-help projects which normally entail that a wide
range of social groups in the village mobilize their energies to obtain something
they want and need. Such projects may serve to integrate the village. And state
officials may be less enthusiastic about unilateral giving whereby the affluent and
strong help the poor and weak, because such giving accentuates social differences
and exacerbates social tensions.
From the outset, the plan to build the village hall enjoyed support from all
parts of the village, although the middle-class newcomers on the private estate
were its most energetic backers. Today, the Community Council draws on locals
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and newcomers alike in carrying out its fund-raising activities; in fact, in no other
village institution, with the possible exception of the Parish Council, do locals
and newcomers work together on such a sustained basis.
Yet even the ostensibly innocuous work of the Community Council has
triggered subtle social tensions in the village. For some (and only some) of the
local people who have lived in the village all their lives, the village hall symbolizes
the newcomers' attempt to take over the village and to alter its traditional
character. To these locals, the newcomers' eagerness to build the hall revealed
how dissatisfied they were with the absence of social amenities and the general
dullness of Penridge. It was apparent to the locals that the newcomers would not
be able to enjoy the simpler and, for them, more authentic pleasures of village
life. Some of the locals also resented what they saw as the self-satisfaction exuded
by the newcomers who managed to succeed where they had failed. The
newcomers' success contrasted unpleasantly with their own earlierbut unrealized
attempts to provide the village with a social centre. And the newcomers did not
help matters when they pointed out that the administrative know-how required
to raise sufficient money and to secure government grants was not available in
Penridge before their arrival.
Some of the upper middle-class newcomers who live in the old quarter of the
village also have reservations about the village hall and the Community Council.
They complain that the village hall, which is situated in the old section, is a
suburban intrusion into Penridge. For them, the village hall and the activities
it accommodates epitomize the bland, shallow character of modern suburban
living, and therefore contaminate Penridge's medieval, bucolic charm. They
came to Penridge to escape suburban sprawl, and now even this last refuge of
'old' England is being spoiled by such institutions as the village hall and the
Community Council and by the suburban-minded zealots who support them.
Not surprisingly,then, they plan to lead the resistance to plans to raise additional
funds to enlarge the village hall so it can accommodate a permanent men's social
club, equipped with a bar and billiard tables.
Their distaste for the village hall is matched by their affection for Penridge's
beautiful sixteenth-century church, which, they believe, with its precious
Constable painting among its holdings, embodies continuity and tradition in the
village. They regret that the village hall has replaced the Parish church as the
centre of village social life, even though few of them were actually around when
the church was truly the focus of public activity. Some even regret that the church
has not been better adapted to cater to more secular groups so as to have
obviated the need for a village hall. They have seen support for the Church fade
and they fear that the maintenance of the Church as a viable institution is an
uphill, and perhaps futile, battle. To some, this battle is made more arduous by
the Community Council, the rival fund-raising institution in the village, which
drains charity pounds that might, in its absence, go to the Church. Each holds
an annual fund-raising fete; if the Church fte faced no competition, some feel,
it could raise far more money. And while the fetes are primarily social events,
some Church supporters indicate that they purposely spend more at the one held
to benefit the Church.
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Private Giving in the Welfare State
45
Despite such hard feelings, the Community Council is the focal point for
private giving in Penridge. It is a private government that rivals the Parish
Council in importance. It raises and spends nearly as much money - ?I,ooo
compared to ?1,300 for the Parish Council. And since much of the Parish
Council's budget is allocated to such fixed expenses as the clerk's salary, street
lighting, and the upkeep of the cemetery, the Community Council has a greater
say over the distribution of more money in the village.
The Community Council, consisting of representativesfrom most of Penridge's
voluntary organizations as well as several independent representatives, has
exclusively relied since the completion of the village hall on the annual fete to
raise money. It has been holding these fetes since I967. With the help of about
a hundred volunteers mobilized for the most part by its affiliate organizations,
the Council now runs these fetes routinely and effortlessly. At the fete, money
is collected in small amounts that add up, so families find that they have spent
several pounds and the Council finds that it has realized a net profit of ?i,ooo.
The exchange element in this form of fund-raising is quite apparent; by giving,
people receive an afternoon's entertainment and often take home an array of
second-hand items ranging from plants to books.
Oddly enough, spending the money has been more troublesome than collecting
it. The Council continues to give small subsidies for the upkeep of the village
hall, but most of its revenue is available to support other voluntary groups. Yet
the demand for Council funds is surprisingly and disconcertingly weak. The
Council would rather spend its money than see its value eroded by inflation. The
Council also fears that with no concrete project to support, people will tire of
raising money for the sake of raising money. Demand is weak because, with a
few exceptions, Penridge's voluntary groups have no trouble raising their own
money and prefer to be self-reliant. Moreover, members of these groups enjoy
the wine and cheese parties, coffee mornings, and other social functions that help
raise funds. Indeed, for many of these people, the process of collecting money
has as much value in terms of sociability as the actual spending of the money.
Nevertheless, the Council has made numerous grants to Penridge's voluntary
organizations. In making these grants, it seems to be guided by several criteria.
First, the Council is eager to help those groups that have helped it to raise funds.
For example, in explaining why it was willing to give the Foresters ?50 to take
its retired members to dinner, the Council stressed that the Foresters' stall had
been one of the best money-raisers at the most recent fete. This norm of
reciprocity is an important feature of relations among Penridge's voluntary
groups. People invariably say that one of the reasons they go to a group's
fund-raising function is that members of that group had attended a function they
had held or that they hope to count on their support for any function they may
hold in the future.
A second criterion is how badly a group wants a grant. If there is any doubt,
the Council may ask the requesting group to raise on its own a sum equal to
the amount requested. This practice parallels the one used by government
agencies that make grants to Community Councils for the purpose of building
village halls.
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Thirdly, the Council only makes grants to organizations. It refuses to make
grants to individuals. Accordingly, the Council refused to help the deaf-dumb
cobbler to repair his sewing machine. The Council makes no effort to help the
poor and needy; it would not give any money to repair the almshouses on the
grounds that the almshouses are the responsibility of the Penridge Charity. It is
thus not engaged in unilateral, personal giving.
Finally, the Council does not shy away from offering help in those areas
normally considered the responsibility of the state. It gave ?300 to help enlarge
and improve the local doctor's surgery. Itjustifieci this grant on the grounds that
it would ensure the continuation of the doctors' services in the village. It has
also paid for equipment for the village playground which is under the jurisdiction
of the Parish Council.
These grants, as well as the grants the Community Council received from
government agencies, suggest that it would be wrong to assume that a rigid line
separates private and state giving. State funds are used to support voluntarily
inspired efforts, and voluntarily raised funds are used to bolster services
normally provided by the state.
CONCLUSIONS
The review of charitable donations in the United States and Britain as well as
of private giving in Penridge permits some tentative assessments of the various
attempts to relate the development of the welfare state to the evolution of private
giving.
Milton Friedman and other libertarians argue that if the state neglects the
disadvantaged, private philanthropy will flourish, but if the state usurps the
function of caring, people will lose interest in caring for those who benefit from
state assistance, and private philanthropy will wither.
In certain respects, this position is borne out by the British experience. After
the National Health Service replaced private medicine, the village fetes and
bazaars that had been held so often to support local, voluntary hospitals
virtually disappeared. More generally, the British give per capita about nine
times less than Americans to welfare and health charities. This discrepancy can
be attributed in part to differences in the nations' per capita incomes and in their
tax expenditure policies; but clearly an additional reason is that the more highly
developed British health and welfare services make private charity less necessary
and therefore less common. If the welfare state does have an adverse effect on
the level of charitable donations, one would expect that the gap in donations
between the United States and Britain would be narrower in those areas of
public life in which the state plays no major role. This expectation is confirmed;
the British gave only six times less to religious groups, even though the British
are generally considered to be less religious than Americans. In Penridge, the
welfare state (helped by greater prosperity) has superseded private, informal
welfare. Besides the anachronistic charitable trusts, which are unable to die a
natural death, unilateral, personal giving to the village poor has faded away.
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Yet there are exceptions to this pattern. In Penridge, the most notable
exceptions are the local branches of the NSPCC and Action for the Crippled
Child. Established in the early I970s and still prospering, these charities offer
unilateral, impersonal support to those who also receive help from the state. In
these instances, then, state aid has not deterred private giving. One reason for
this is that at least some of the people who work for these charities realize that
private charity can supplement rather than compete with state assistance. The
libertarian position that state aid automatically precludes private giving is
inaccurate. It is also naive. The libertarians incorrectly assume that concern for
others' welfare is the sole reason why people do charity work. Yet many of the
upper middle-class newcomers to Penridge have become involved in charities not
only because they sympathize with the disadvantaged but also because they enjoy
such fund-raising activities as coffee mornings and strawberry lunches. And
strawberry lunches are no less fun when battered and crippled children are also
assisted by the state. By helping those in distress, the welfare state may undercut
one function of charity work - caring for the needy - but it does not tamper with
another of its functions, offering donors acceptable social entertainment. As long
as entertainment remains one of its primary attractions, charity work should
survive the welfare state.
The NSPCC and Action for the Crippled Child survive especially well in
Penridge because they are inoffensive. And they are inoffensive because recipients of their aid reside outside the village. Offering impersonal assistance, these
charities do not link the affluent and poor of Penridge in hierarchical and
potentially awkward relations. Most of the more indigent locals pay little
attention to these charities which they consider to be the harmless pastimes of
the more affluent newcomers. Within Penridge, these charities are not irritating
reminders of Victorian paternalism.
Following the anarchist tradition of Kropotkin, Taylor maintains that state
services make people so dependent on government that they are no longer able
to resolve their own problems or to help one another. The erosion of voluntary
co-operation, he contends, permeates all parts of public life, including those in
which the state plays no role. The case of Penridge does not lend credence to
Taylor's argument. When it became apparent to the people of Penridge that the
state would not provide a decent public meeting place, they took the considerable
initiative and effort to raise privately substantial funds to build a village hall.
The incontestable point is that the people of Penridge did not behave as passive
charges of a stifling state apparatus unable to help themselves or to control their
destinies.
Furthermore, their private efforts were abetted by the state in the form of
generous government grants. State officials are apparently anxious to keep alive
people's capacity to co-operate voluntarily. Once again, the form and purpose
of aid are pertinent. While state officials may wish to ensure that the poor, aged
and infirm are no longer dependent on private unilateral giving, they certainly
do not want to discourage community efforts to secure such 'frills' as a village
hall. They realize that if such private community efforts were to fail, the
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consequences would not be catastrophic. They also appreciate that not only do
such collective self-help projects have few of the objectionable features of
unilateral giving, but that they may have intrinsic worth in the form of
promoting social integration and self-reliance as well as tapping private
resources to meet worthwhile, if not urgent, public needs.
For Titmuss, the welfare state encourages private giving by creating a model
for citizens to emulate. This model places particular value on unilateral
impersonal giving as embodied in the gift of blood. But the record of giving in
Britain suggests that Titmuss may have overstated the significance of the blood
metaphor. Apart from the donation of human organs, there are few examples
of unilateral, impersonal giving beyond conventional charity. Yet Titmuss
chooses to ignore charitable giving. If he had looked at charitable donations,
many of which are impersonal and unilateral, he would have found that the
British give per capita far less than Americans. This indisputable fact does not
mean that Titmuss is wrong to argue that the welfare state promotes blood
donations. Nor does it deny that the gift of blood may be more altruistic and
valuable than other kinds of charitable giving. But it does suggest that the gift
of blood is an isolated case not applicable to a broader range of acts of giving.
Blood is special. The welfare state has no compunction about taxing income and
then distributing that taxed income in such a way as to reduce the need for
private charity. But the welfare state is understandably reluctant to tax blood,
and therefore it must ultimately rely on the magnanimity of its private citizens
for this precious resource.
Hence none of these arguments is entirely persuasive. They all miss the mark,
I believe, because they do not consider carefully how the welfare state affects
differentforms of private giving. A more plausible account would be that:
(I) unilateral, personal giving aimed at the disadvantaged is to a great extent
replaced by the social services of the welfare state;
(2) universal, impersonal giving survives better, albeit not entirely unscathed,
even in those areas of public life in which state support is available;
(3) self-help voluntary co-operation can prosper especially in those phases of
public life in which the state takes no more than a negligible interest;
(4) with a few possible exceptions, the model of giving embodied in the welfare
state does not actively promote private giving.
But the most important conclusion to be drawn from this study is that a
society need not sacrifice private benevolence when it takes on the commitment
to assure its citizens the right to economic and social security.
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