Public Administration Is Constitutional and Legitimate
Author(s): Charles R. Wise
Source: Public Administration Review, Vol. 53, No. 3, (May - Jun., 1993), pp. 257-261
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Society for Public
Administration
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could have chosen othernise. They could have-and in some
ways did-act out of something other than self-interest. To
see the documentas an expression of logic is both to let the
framers off the hook and to sell them short. As Friedrich
Nietzscheonce observed:
Whenthe inquirer,havingpushedto the circumference, realizeshow logicin thatplacecurlsaboutitself
andbitesits own tail,he is struckwitha new kindof
perception: a tragicperception,which requires,to
makeit tolerable,the remedyof art(1956,p. 59).
Storing's assessment makes a further observation that
Spicer and Terry mention but should have explored more
deeply: thatthe most fundamentalproblemwith the founding
argumentsis that they put too much emphasis on individual
rights, thereby "cuttingeach man off from his fellows and
fromGod"(1979, p. 232). He suggeststhatmakingindividual
rightsto life, liberty,and pursuitof happinessthe preeminent
moralrule leaves a "largeopening towardslavery"by making
the rights of others prudentialconstraintsinstead of moral
ones. Storingarguesthat the founderstended to reduce justice to self-preservation,self-preservationto self-interest,and
self-interest to "what is convenient and achievable"(1979,
226). Spicerand Terryhave falleninto a similartrap,equating
legitimacywith logic, and logic with self-interest.In so doing,
they have obscuredthe deepest concer raisedby theiressay:
the extent to which it is possible for politicians (including
to "livein truth"(Ash, 1990;Havel, 1986)-that
administrators)
is, to attainmoralexcellence.
As Vaclav Havel has reminded us, the greatest threat to
human freedom is not the classic dictator but the phenomenon of impersonal power: power that is rooted in
apparentlyneutraland objectivelogic. If so, then the responsibility facing public administratorstoday is to counterpose
impersonal power with personal responsibility,conscience,
and a politics growing from the heart ratherthan from a thesis. Havel urges us to renouncethe vision of a rationallycalculable and technologicallyachievable "welfare"in favor of
"practicalmorality,...service to the truth, [and] essentially
human and humanly measuredcare for our fellow humans"
(Havel, 1986,p. 155).
Havel's words warn public administratorsof the risks
attachedto a practicethat groundsitself in "pure"rationality.
It may be the case that the terms of public life (indeed, life
itself) ensure that the vast majorityof us will live in half-truth.
But we should not delude ourselvesthatwe can eliminatethe
questionof truthaltogether. Nor should we want to.
Camilla Stivers teaches public administration at The
EvergreenState College in Olympia,Washington. She is the
authorof GenderImagesin PublicAdministration:Legitimacy
and the AdministrativeState and a coauthor of Refounding
PublicAdministration.
Referenes
Adams, Guy B., Prisclla Bowerman,KennethDolbeare, and CamillaStivers,
1990. "JoiningPurposeto Practice: A DemocraticIdentityfor the Public
Service."In HenryD. Kassand BayardL Catron,eds., Imageand Identity
in PublicAdministration.NewburyPark,CA: Sage Publications.
Ash, TimothyGarton,1990. "Easter Europe:Apres le deluge, nous." New
Yor Reviewof Books,August16, pp. 51-57.
Forum:PublicAdministration
and the Constitution
Beard,CharlesA., 1941[1913]. An EconomicInterpretationof the Constitution
oftbheUnitedStates. New York: FreePress.
Bell, Derrick, 1987. And WeAre Not Saved: The Elusive Questfor Racial
Justice. New York. Basic Books.
Cooke, Jacob E., ed., 1961. The Federalist. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan
UniversityPress.
Gerth, H. H. and C. Wright Mills, 1946. From Max Weber. New York:
OxfordUniversityPress.
Harmon,MichaelM., 1981. Action Theoryfor Public Administration. New
Yorkand London: Longman.
Havel,Vaclav,1986. Livingin Truth. London:Faberand Faber.
Kelman,Steven, 1987. "'PublicChoice'and PublicSpirit."ThePublicInterest,
Spring,pp. 80-94.
Kerber,Linda K., 1980. Womenof tbe Republic: Intellectand Ideologyin
RevolutionaryAmerca.New York: W. W. Norton.
Nietzsche, Friedrich,1956. Tbe Birtb of Tragedyout of the Spiritof Music.
Trans.FrancisGolffing. GardenCity,NY:DoubledayAnchorBooks.
Rossi,Alice S., ed., 1973. TheFeministPapers: FromAdams to de Beauvoir.
New York: ColumbiaUniversityPress.
Storing,HerbertJ., 1979. "Slaveryand the MoralFoundationsof the American
Republic." In Robert H. Horwitz, ed., TheMoral Foundations of the
American Republic, 2d ed. Charlottesville,VA: Universityof Virginia
Press.
Public
Administration
Is
Constitomdaland
Igitimae
Indiana
CsasR.Wse,
UniiBSo itn n
mericangovernmentmay be one of the few for which
the legitimacyof its administrativecomponent is so
continuously an issue. Other nations seem to have
less preoccupationwith this matter,but it is an issue in the
United States nonetheless. It is appropriateto examine our
constitutionalstructurefor what it can reveal about the issue
and the role of public administrationin our government.Our
constitutionalsystemmay not be the ending place for such an
examination,but, given the centralplace of the Constitutionin
the minds of both citizens and those in government,it is an
essential startingplace. Spicer and Terrystake out one position of what the Constitutioncan mean for the legitimacyof
public administration.
The argumentby Spicerand Terryin its essentialsis:
1. Publicadministration
can not be legitimatedin terms
of the idealized vision of the Americanfounders of
the AmericanConstitutionin that their conduct and
characterwere in partsuspect.
2. The legitimacy of public administration is to be
found within the "logic"of a constitutionand not in
the constitutional argument of the American
founders.
3. Rationalindividualswould agree to a constitutionin
order to protectthemselves againstexploitativegov-
257
emnent by limitingthe discretionarypower available
to government officials and, thus, limit the costs
which governmentcan impose on them as individuals.
4. The centrallogic of a constitutionin general and the
American Constitution in particular is thus about
restrainingpower.
5. The legitimateconstitutionalrole of public administratorsis to be found in helping limit the discretion
of politicalleadersin imposingcosts on citizens.
While they were decidedly concerned about limiting the
possible uses of governmental power, the founders were
nonetheless fully cognizantof the fact that a responsibilityof
governmentis to use power, and they made no attemptto
hide this fromthe people. It would be a governmentof laws,
but a governmentnonetheless,not just laws. In Federalist15,
Publiusexplainsthata law is not a law withouta sanctionand
concludes that people have a choice between coercion by the
"courtsand the ministersof justice"and coercion by the military. Therefore,Publius implies that since coercion is necessary in government,the people should be glad to choose civil
execution"(Mansfield,1987).
ratherthan "military
The basic problem with this thesis is that it provides an
The legitimacy of executive and administrative power
inadequateconception of constitutionalgovernment.In addition, the implicationsfor the democraticlegitimacyof public understoodin terms of the founding does not rest as Spicer
agencies and public administratorsbased on such a concep- and Terrysuggest on the ideali7edvision or presumedmoral
tion could be most unfortunate.
superiorityof the founders,but on the relevancyof theirexperience as applied to real governing. The constitutionaldesign
which has perseveredfor our entirehistorywas based on their
blend of experienceand theorywhich fit the circumstancesof
The firstissue to be confrontedis whetherthe centrallogic governmentand governing,and which has proved adaptable
of a constitutionis about restrainingpower. The purpose of a to the change and growth of the nation. The constitutional
constitutionis to do that, but not only that.As Schochetput it, separationand specificationof powers may have permitted
"Itseems self-evidentlytrue thata society'sconstitution(taking cross-purposedaction and bureaucraticobstructiveness,but
the term in its traditionalsense) should define its political Americans have been largely spared swift and unforseen
institutions and processes and establish standardsfor their changes in law and policy causing instability, and have
evaluation....Modem constitutionalism,with the emerginglib- enjoyed multipleroutes of access ratherthan being confined
eralism whose ideology it shares, predicates naturallyfree, to a consolidatedhierarchy(Caldwell,1976, p. 486).
apolitical,and rights-bearingindividualswho need and thereThe express need for a strong executive originatedin our
fore establish governments that they can, may, and should constitutional
historicalexperience. It should be remembered
control (emphasisin original)"(1979, p. 4). In short,constitu- that what led to the
calling of the conventionin Philadelphia
tions establishthe institutionsof governmentas well as estab- were real
problems of governing under the Articles of
lish their limits. Further,that such institutionshave enforceConfederation,problemsso severe that the attendees quickly
ment powers vis-a-vis citizens is well understood. That abandonedthe taskof
amendingthe Articlesin favorof adoptconstitutionsare about establishingarrangementsthat will be
a whole new Constitution.As Corwinhas discussed, the
ing
enforced with respect to citizens is even explicitlyrecognized
powers theoreticallyavailableto Congressunder the Articles
by contractarian economists. As James Buchanan states, were practicallyunenforceable,because they depended on the
"Alongwith the limits on behavior and the rights of owner- actions of disparatestate legislatures,which at the time were
ship, the inclusive constitutional contract must also make busy not only denying obedience to Congressbut also tramexplicit the terms and conditions of enforcement.This set of pling on the prerogativesof each other and theirown citizens.
termswill specify in detail the operationand limitsof the pro- An excess of
legislativepower and an absence of executive
tective state that is establishedas the enforcingagent"(1975,
power was the chief defect (Corwin,1973, p.29). The experip. 72).
ence under the Articlesof Confederationof the nationalgovIn short, constitutionsare about establishinggovernments ernmentlacking a sufficientexecutive power to enforce the
before placing limitationson them. It is not romanticizingthe will of Congresswas so pervasivethatthere can be littledoubt
foundersto recognize that they understoodand intendedthat thatone of the majorobjectivesof those attendingthe convena government should be created to control those governed tion was to repairthis deficiency.This objectivewas bore not
and the citizens should be able to control the government. only out of experiencewith the nationalgovernmentunderthe
They also understoodthe difficultyof reconcilingthose objec- Articles,but in state experiencesas well. As Thatchand Wood
tives and the role of the Constitutionin establishinginstitu- have shown, the experiencesof citizensin the statescreatedat
tions to regulate the tension between them. As Madison's the time of the war proved to them that the state executives
were too weak (Thatch,1969;Wood, 1969).
famousexplanationin Federalist51 states:
But what is governmentitself but the greatestof all
reflectionson humannature?If men were angels,no
governmentwould be necessary.If angels were to
governmen, neitherexternalnor internalcontrolson
The supportersof the Constitutiondid not hide from the
wouldbe necessary.In framinga governgovernment
task of explaining the necessity of a strongerexecutive to a
mentwhichis to be administered
by men over men,
people who sufferedunder a monarchyand were suspicious
the great difficultylies in this:you must firstenable the
of the misuse of executive and administrativepower. They
governmentto controlthe governed;and in the next
knew theiropponents would chargethat the executive would
1961,p. 322).
placeobligeit to controlitself(Rossiter,
recreatethe evils of monarchyas a principle line of attack.
LegitimatingPower
Designing the Executive
258
Public
Review* May/June
Administation
1993,Vol.53,No.3
They assertedthe necessity of a strong executive for republican government.Publius explained in Federalist72 that both
the capabilityto respond in emergenciesand the durationin
administrationthat makes possible "extensive and arduous
enterprises"demanded an "energetic"executive. Mansfield
points out the criticalmeaningfor a republicangovernment:
The Federalist,then, constitutionalizesthe republican tradition.By findinga place for the necessities
of governmentwithin the constitutionof govemment it correctsthe foolish optimismof republicanism which thinks, in essence, that men can
live by the laws they choose and never have to
bow to the necessities they do not choose or
learn from their experience of such necessities
(Mansfield,1987, pp. 173-174).
In Federalist70, Hamiltonwrotethe well-knownexplanation:
Energyin the Executiveis a leading characterin
the definitionof good goverment. It is essential
to the protectionof the communityagainstforeign
attacks,it is not less essentialto the steadyadministrationof the laws; to the protectionof property
againstthose irregularand high-handedcombinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary
course of justice;to the securityof libertyagainst
the enterprisesand assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy(Rossiter,1961,p. 423).
It serves to remind us of the logic of the executive that
Hamiltonpresented,not to supportthe acceptanceof the primacy of the executive in protectingrepublicangovernment
that Hamiltonfavored,but for what it says about the constitutional legitimacyof the executive and administrative
function.
Again in Federalist70 Hamiltonwrote: "A feeble Executive
implies a feeble execution of the goverment. A feeble execution is but anotherphrase for a bad execution;and a government ill executed, whateverit may be in theory, must be, in
practice,a bad goverment" (Rossiter,1961,p. 423).
The considerationand deliberationgiven to the executive
at the constitutionalconventionwas most deliberateand proceeded over severalweeks with many differentdecisions and
modificationsas the participantscame to develop theirpractical idea of a constitutionalexecutive. The notion of the separationof powers was, of course, key, in thatwhat would there
be to check and balancean over-ambitiousCongressif not the
executive. However, the deliberationsover what powers to
give the executive furtherdeveloped the presidencyand the
notion of what was requiredfor adequateexecutionof policy.
The executive presented in the Virginiaplan with which the
delegates began was very weak, with Congresseven retaining
the power to appoint the Secretaryof the Treasury.However,
as the convention proceeded through a series of proposals
and modifications,the action of the delegates was to substantially strengthenthe executive. The delegates added the role
of the president as the Commanderin Chief, and gave the
presidentthe power to appointjusticesof the SupremeCourt,
ambassadors,ministers,as well as other officers alreadyprovided for-with the advise and consent of the Senate as well
as the power to make treaties.What was perhaps surprising
about the debate was the consensus that developed around
strengtheningthe powers of the executive and how littlecom-
Forum:
Public
Administration
andtheConstitution
T
I
e eecutivepoer
wasnotintended
en byit
most
ardent
tobeanunbridled
one,
supportes
houer.Thepopularelection
oftheciefexecutive
seetothat.
ofpowrswould
I andtheseparation
plaintwas voiced that the additionsmade the presidentmuch
too strong(Collierand Collier,1986, p. 231). Both the experience of the delegatesand the theoryof the separationof powers that they worked out at the convention convinced them
that they needed to explicitlyprovide for a significantexecutive power, and they did justthat.
The executive power was not intended even by its most
ardentsupportersto be an unbridledone, however, the popular election of the chief executive and the separationof powers would see to that.The popularelection of the presidentas
a controlon overreachingor unwise executive power was not
and still should not be minimized.AlexanderHamiltonwas
perhapsthe most explicit about the conception of the executive (Caldwell,1944).In Federalist72, Hamiltonspoke directly
about administration
or "executivedetails"and the position of
administrators
(assistantsor deputies) as being subjectto the
superintendenceof the president.In supportingthe position
thatthe presidentought to be eligible for reelection,Hamilton
argued that this would both encourage the presidentto "act
his part well" and the communityto observe his "measures"
and forman "estimateof their merits"(Rossiter,1961, p. 436).
He concluded, "Thislast is necessary to enable the people
when they see reason to approve of his conduct, to continue
him in his stationin order to prolong the utilityof his talents
and virtues,and to secure to the goverment the advantageof
permanency in a wise system of administration"(Rossiter,
1961, p. 436). In short, it is the electoratewho is the ultimate
arbiterof good administration
and its judgmentand action are
a centralpartof the controlon executivepower.
Further,Hamilton argued in Federalist27 that the more
people experienced the actual operation of government on
the common occurrencesof their lives, "themore it will conciliatethe respectand attachmentof the community"(Rossiter,
1961, p. 176). He arguedwith respect to the people "confidence in and obedience to a governmentwill commonly be
proportionedto the goodness or badnessof its administration"
(Rossiter,1961, p. 174). In short,the legitimacyof the federal
goverment ultimatelywould be proven by the experiencecitizens had with it as it affected them. To be sure not even
Hamiltonconceived this to be merelythe resultof the impact
of administrationin terms of the "executive details" but in
termsof administrationin the largersense of comprehending
all the operationsof the body politic. Nonetheless,he clearly
expected that administrationof the "executivedetails"which
included such details as the conduct of foreign negotiations
and the application and disbursementof public moneys in
conformityto the general appropriationsof the legislature,to
be key partsof the measuresthatthe people would judge.
It may be arguedthat this establishesthe legitimacyof the
executive, but not necessarilythat of subordinateadministra-
259
tors or agencies, that is, public administratorsdoing public
To a certainextent, this is hair splittingin that
administration.
neither the founders nor contemporaryAmericansexpect the
presidentto carryout the executive power alone. In addition,
to some extent the position of administration
has to be taken
as a basic assumptionof goverment. As Waldoput it, "Butall
states are administrative
else they are not states"(Waldo,1990,
p. 77). Nonetheless, the touchstone for legitimacyof public
administrationwithin our particularconstitutional scheme
derives in the main from its role in participatingwith three
specified branchesof goverment to provide for the furtherance of the public health, safety, and welfare.As Rabkindiscusses, the constitutionalsystem embracespublic administration within its political design (Rabkin, 1987, pp. 196-197),
which makes public administration
fully engaged in the development of public policy and in the acts of governing.Whether
one conceives of the role of goverment in society as either
leading a strong society or supplementingother institutions,
such as the privatemarketand nongovernmentalassociations,
public administrationmust play its primaryrole in complementing the actions of the institutionsspecified in the first
three articles of the Constitution.It is governing that public
administratorsare doing right along with the president,congressionalrepresentatives,and judges. The role is to participate with them in the full range of the developmentof public
policy and governance,not merelyto serve as watchdogsover
theirtransgressions.
The Separationof Powers
The other key limitationpermeatingthe constitutionalplan
of governmentas well as the deliberationsat the convention
itself was the separationof powers. It is true enough that the
draftersdid not explicitly specify the position of subordinate
administratorsin the struggle among the branches out of
which would come public policy. They did not specify the
position and roles of the congressional committees either,
which certainlyhave as significantan impacton public policy
as public bureaucraciesand are accepted as fully legitimate
elements of our constitutionalsystem, even though they are
not majoritarian in character (Freedman, 1978, p. 129).
Nonetheless,by the very structureof the governmentthat the
Constitutioncreated, while the roles of subordinateadministratorsbegin from their position in the executive, the allocation of powers to the other branches,which impactand control administrationas well, literallyput them in the middle,
subjectto the pullingand haulingof the actionsby the various
branchesand, in tur, participantsin the pulling and hauling
themselves.As Rohr(1986) has discussed,this does not make
public administrationa fourth branch of government,but it
does mean that in exercisingall three powers of government,
it does so in a subordinatecapacityand makes its contribution
in conformity with that subordinationto the institutionsof
government created in the first three articles of the
Constitution.Rohr argues that public administration(and by
extension public administrators)
does this by choosing which
of its constitutionalmastersto favor in the struggle.He sees
the position as balance wheel (Rohr, 1986, p. 182). The balance wheel metaphor may place more preeminence on the
position of public administrationthan experience would support, but the notion that decisions have to be made on which
260
branch to favor in the context of particularpolicy disputes
between the branchesis clearlyaccurate.Those decisions may
not win the day or even be very key to the final outcome in
particulardisputes, but over time they make a significantdifference in how the constitutionalsystemoperatesand fares in
a democraticsociety.
The Constitutionmay not have made public administrators
playersin the separationof powers in an explicit sense, but it
certainlydid so in an operationalsense. Does this in itself
confer constitutionallegitimacy on public administration?I
would argue that it does. A numberof institutionsand practices withinthe Americangovernmentalsystem are not explicitly referredto in the Constitution,including perhaps most
prominentlythe Supreme Court'spower of judicial review,
which it firstoperationalizedunto itself in Marburyv. Madison
(1803). In addition,the firstCongressof the United States,in
which many of those who draftedthe Constitutionparticipated, created the nation's original administrative agencies.
Further,the constitutionallegitimacyof public administration
in Americangovernmentrests upon those early understandings and practicesthat have been reinforcedby the decisions
of later Congresses, which created the agencies and added
powers to them (Freedman,1978,p. 127).
IndividualRights
Legitimacyrestsonly partlyon govermental processesand
structurebecause the constitutionalguarantee of individual
legitrightsalso comes into play. In orderto be constitutionally
imate,the institutionsof Americangovernmentmust also operate in conformancewith the rightsof individualsguaranteedby
the Constitution.Nonetheless,there is no a priori principlethat
on a more unfavorablefootwould place publicadministration
ing vis-a-visthe otherinstitutionsof government.
Little basis exists, however, to argue that they are on a
more favorablefooting either.Indeed a position which argues
are in a position to limit the discrethat public administrators
tion of politicalleaders in imposingcosts on citizens'presupposes a constitutionalpreeminencefor the guaranteeof citizens rights that the Constitution neither contemplates nor
assigns, and runs the risk of subvertingthe interplayof the
separationof powers that constitutesa real constitutionalsaferenounce their subordinate
guard.Once public administrators
position in favor of an independent position of interpreting
the Constitution,they forfeitthe legitimacythatthe actualconstitutionalscheme confers. It is hard to contest that public
administratorscan sometimes "modify, delay, or resist the
directivesof politicalleaders in a lawful manner,"whenthey
perceivepotentialviolationsof citizensrights.Some questions,
though, are, who is to ensure it is in a "lawfulmanner",and
what does thatmean when policy issues are in dispute among
the three branches?There is little doubt that to be legitimate,
public administrationand public administratorsmust respect
the constitutionalrightsof citizens (Rosenbloomand Carroll,
1990),but there is much room for debate on exactlywhat that
constitutesacting
requiresand what for a public administrator
lawfullyin a specific situation(Wise, 1985;O'Learyand Wise,
1991).
The largerissue, however, is what such a conceptiondoes
when such resistance
to the position of public administration
Public
Review* May/June
Administration
1993,Vol.53,No.3
is elevatedas the centralclaimof legitimacyof publicadministrators.This bypassesor overlooksboth the principlesof separationof powers and popularcontrol.
The administrative
systemworkswithin a structureof separatedbut blended powers and is not one that is solely dependent on virtuouspresidentialdirectionor virtuousadministrators. As Rabkinpoints out "it does displaythe logic which the
Federalist itself made famous, the logic of a system where
power is widely distributed, where 'ambition' is 'made to
check ambition'so there is less need to rely on 'enlightened
statesmen'and 'highermotives'"(Rabkin,1987,p. 199).
Summing Up
In the final analysis,the constitutionallegitimacyof public
administrationis not to be found in a claimed "logic"of constitutionalism.As Stillmanhas discussed, issues surrounding
the legitimacyof public bureaucraciesare not so much issues
of logic but issues of values and tradeoffsamong competing
values (Stillman,1987, pp. 265-294).Our constitutionaldesign
was created to establish a continuingframeworkfor making
those value tradeoffs.It requiresthat tradeoffsbe constantly
made between popular demands filteredthroughrepresentative processes, effective executive power, and the protection
of civil rights. Public administration,of necessity, is actively
engaged in fulfillingits purpose through participatingin the
makingof these tradeoffs.
It should be recognized that the Americanconstitutional
within it is a consystem and the role of public administration
one.
it
is
fruitless
to look for the
Thus,
tinually developing
final answerto the questionof legitimacyof public administration. If public administration
and public administrators
respect
the fundamentalconstitutionalprinciplesof popular control,
separation of powers, and constitutional rights and also
emphasizethe rightmix of the value traditionswithinour constitutionalsystem at a given time, both will be accordedthe
legitimacythey deserve.
* *-,
Kesler,ed., The FederalistPapersand theAmericanFounding.New York:
FreePress.
O'eary, Rosemaryand CharlesR Wise, 1991. "PublicManagers,Judges, and
Legislators: Redefiningthe 'New Partnership'."Public Administration
Review,vol. 51, pp. 316- 327.
Rabkin, Jeremy, 1987. 'Bureaucratic Idealism and Executive Power: A
In Charles
Perspectiveon The Federalist'sView of PublicAdministration.'
R. Kesler,ed., TheFederalist Papersand the AmericanFounding. New
York:FreePress.
Rohr, John A., 1986. To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy of the
AdministrativeState. Lawrence,KS:Universityof KansasPress.
Rosenbloom,David H. and James D. Carroll,1990. TowardConstitutional
Competence.Englewood Cliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall.
Rossiter, Clinton, ed., 1961. The Federalist Papers. New York: The New
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Meansin Our Time a
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Legitimizing Pubic
Administration:
A Distbed
Dissent
Lowi
Th7odore.
C,ornedi
Unsy
Charles R. Wise is professorof public and environmental
affairsat IndianaUniversity,Bloomington. His researchfocuses on public administrationand law, and organizationtheory. Efforts to legitimize public administrationgo back a long
way. In the past decade or so, these effortshave turned
He is a formermanagingeditorof PARand a previouswinner
towardlegitimizingpublic administrationas a separately
of the Mosherawardfor best PARarticleby an academician.
constitutedinstitutionof government.
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Forum:Public
Legitimizing public administration is something every
regimehas to do. The Federalistsprobablysaw administration
legitimized as long as "a few good men" were in place to
make a few good decisions. The Jacksonianshad a theory of
that was, in fact, a generaltheory of
legitimateadministration
within
which
administrationwas legitimized. In
government
effect, governmentshould not only be small within a strict
constructionof the Constitution,it should never be involvedin
any activitythat is beyond the abilityof the common person
to administer.Whatthe criticseventuallycalled the "spoilssystem" was actually a quite sustainable and logical argument
that administration
was legitimateas long as it was consistent
with democracy,and it was consistentwith democracyas long
as it was accessible to the common person. Rotationof officials in public office accordingto which political party was
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