Order and Optimism:
Machiavelli on Man
and Nature
Senior Honors Thesis
Nitya Rao
Davidson College ‘13
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 3
MACHIAVELLI AS A PHILOSOPHER ................................................................................................. 5
THE MACHIAVELLIAN WORLD............................................................................................... 8
THE STATE OF NATURE ...................................................................................................................... 8
NATURE AND WAR ............................................................................................................................ 10
NATURE’S BOUNTY ........................................................................................................................... 14
LADY FORTUNE .................................................................................................................................. 17
HUMAN NATURE ...................................................................................................................... 20
MAN’S NATURAL DESIRES .............................................................................................................. 20
NATURE AND ART .............................................................................................................................. 26
MAN AND BEAST ................................................................................................................................ 31
THE PRINCE AND THE PEOPLE........................................................................................................ 34
FOUNDING REPUBLICS ........................................................................................................... 39
THE ACT OF FOUNDING .................................................................................................................... 40
THE IMPORTANCE OF REPUBLICS ................................................................................................. 41
ON THE MULTIPLICITY OF RULERS ............................................................................................... 42
ROMULUS: THE IDEAL FOUNDER .................................................................................................. 44
MACHIAVELLI’S OPTIMISM ................................................................................................... 49
ROME AND SPARTA ........................................................................................................................... 50
FEAR AND RENEWAL ........................................................................................................................ 51
ON THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD ............................................................................................... 54
AN UNLIKELY OPTIMIST .................................................................................................................. 58
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 62
A MULTIPOLAR REPUBLIC ............................................................................................................... 64
A FOUNDER AND A TEACHER ......................................................................................................... 65
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 68
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INTRODUCTION
In the dedicatory letter to The Prince, his treatise on the art of ruling, Niccolò
Machiavelli claims that “just as those who sketch landscapes place themselves down in the plain
to consider the nature of mountains and high places and to consider the nature of low places
place themselves high atop mountains, similarly, to know well the nature of peoples one needs to
be a prince, and to know well the nature of princes one needs to be of the people” (The Prince,
Epistle Dedicatory). Throughout both The Prince and his much longer Discourses on Livy,
Machiavelli repeatedly describes human nature. Thus if Machiavelli can claim to understand the
nature of the people, then he would seem to be a prince. Often cited as evidence of his ambition,
this phrase also hints at Machiavelli’s conception of nature and man’s interaction with the natural
world – a topic foundational to the question of the best form of government for man.1 In
claiming that one can actually “know” the nature of peoples, Machiavelli seems to imply here
that nature is knowable and thus constant insofar as there exists an order that is intelligible to
man – a formulation that the ancient thinkers would seem to agree with.2 Furthermore, that
different perspectives are necessary to understand the natures of either the people or princes
suggests that their natures are separate.
Machiavelli later claims that “in hereditary states accustomed to the bloodline of their
1
In his descriptions of the five regimes contained primarily in Book VIII of The Republic, Plato describes how each
regime is dependent on the particular natures of those in power; this would suggest that there is some connection
between the nature of the peoples and the government that they institute.
2
“In any subject which has principles, causes, and elements, scientific knowledge and understanding stems from a
grasp of these, for we think we know a thing only when we have grasped its first causes and principles and have
traced it back to its elements. It obviously follows that if we are to gain scientific knowledge of nature as well, we
should begin by trying to decide about its principles. The natural way to go about this is to start with what is more
intelligible and clear to us and move from there to what is clearer and more intelligible in itself. For the fact that
something is intelligible to us does not mean that it is intelligible tout court. So we have to proceed as I have said:
we have to start with things which are less clear in themselves, but are clearer to us, and move from there to things
which are clearer and more intelligible in themselves. The things which are immediately obvious and clear to us are
usually mixed together; their elements and principles only become intelligible later, when one separates them. That
is why we have to progress from the general to the particular; it is because it is whole entities that are more
intelligible to the sense, and anything general is a kind of whole, in the sense that it includes a number of things
which we would call its parts” (Aristotle’s Physics, 184a10-26).
3
prince the difficulties in maintaining them are much less than in new states” (The Prince, pg. 6).
Here too he hints that there is a natural order that rewards those who obey it. More importantly,
he asserts that the “natural prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it is fitting
that he be more loved; and if extraordinary vices do not make him hated, it is reasonable that he
will naturally have the good will of his own” (The Prince, pg. 7). The suggestion here seems to
be that the prince who rules in accordance with the natural order is secure. Because he ascended
to power in a manner that is harmonious with nature, he should face no threats.
Thus,
Machiavelli seems initially to agree with the ancients in characterizing nature as fixed,
knowable, constant, and ultimately friendly to man.3 However, a closer inspection of The Prince
and Discourses on Livy reveals a strikingly different position and one that explains why
Machiavelli is widely regarded to be the founder of modernity.4
Just a few short chapters (and one long one) after his discussion of hereditary princes,
Machiavelli writes that “states that come to be suddenly, like all other things in nature that are
born and grow quickly, cannot have roots and branches, so that the first adverse weather
eliminates them” (The Prince, pg. 26). Though treated in greater detail in the next sections, this
claim that natural entities grow too quickly to develop strong bases or extensive systems suggests
that nature is unstable, disordered, and transient. This rather dramatic about-face seems to
warrant further explanation as to what Machiavelli’s true conception of nature is. Attempting to
3
“Do we act in each of these ways as a result of the same part of ourselves, or are there three parts and with a
different one we act in each of the different ways? Do we learn with one, become spirited with another of the parts
within us, and desire the pleasures of nourishment and generation and all their kin with a third; or do we act with the
soul as a whole in each of them once we are started?” (The Republic, 436a-b). Socrates’ famous description of the
tripartite soul seems to imply a sort of order in nature and within man.
4
Strauss argued that “the fundamental modern project” was “man’s conquest of nature for the sake of the relief of
man’s estate” (Strauss2, pg. 225). In The City and Man, Strauss writes that “according to the modern project,
philosophy or science was no longer to be understood as essentially contemplative and proud but as active and
charitable; it was to be in the service of the relief of man’s estate; it was to be cultivated for the sake of human
power; it was to enable man to become the master and owner of nature through the intellectual conquest of nature”
(Strauss1, pg. 3).
4
accurately portray our world, does Machiavelli present the nature as harsh, chaotic, and
ultimately indifferent to man? He describes humans as fundamentally acquisitive and ultimately
self-serving. The popular conception of Machiavellianism supports this pessimistic outlook.
One particularly charitable scholar argues that if we “divide political thinkers into pessimists and
optimists, Machiavelli could be ranked with either group” (Parel, pg. 65). However, despite his
brutal characterization of man and nature, Machiavelli places great faith in the ability of man to
shape nature to suit his own ends and in fact to construct enduring republics that can better the
condition of all men while allowing them to pursue their own desires. That he has such great
hopes for man to reorder the chaotic natural world highlights Machiavelli’s extraordinary
optimism.
MACHIAVELLI AS A PHILOSOPHER
Machiavelli is not often treated as a political philosopher who comments on the human
condition in the way that thinkers like John Locke or Thomas Hobbes have.5 Few would argue
that “Machiavelli was gifted with profound theoretical insight into politics,” but that “he was a
full-fledged political theorist or philosopher, is a proposition that many find difficult to accept”
(Parel, pg. 59). However, if he puts forth a coherent and comprehensive doctrine of the natural
order, then Machiavelli must be recognized as a political philosopher who “is a teacher of the
whole human situation” (Mansfield1, pg. xvi).
Practically speaking, Machiavelli is also renowned for his deceptive and subtle writing,
which suggests that his works warrant close examination. One scholar asks us to consider
whether there exist “contradictions or confusions in Machiavelli’s texts that can only be
5
One scholar proclaims that he could “find no evidence to suggest that Machiavelli, despite his fascination with the
tactics of conquest and rule as employed by men of power, had worked out a battle plan for men of thought to enable
them to effect the re-education of a populace and, indeed, of a civilization” (Parel2, pg. 79).
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understood on the assumption that the author was intentionally devious” (Masters2, pg. 39).
Another argues ““that Machiavelli is speaking on two levels and that he has something to reveal
that he also wants to conceal” (Mansfield1, pg. xvi). In a letter to Francesco Gucciardini, the
author of The History of Italy, Machiavelli himself writes, “For a long time I have not said what I
believed, nor do I ever believe what I say, and if indeed sometime I happen to tell the truth, I
hide it among so many lies that it is hard to find” (Parel, pg. 70).6 Furthermore, Machiavelli is
widely cited as the father of modernity – his works contain the seeds of what has come to be
characteristic of modern thought.7 Francis Bacon, the English polymath who revolutionized the
field of science, claimed that “we are much beholden to Machiavelli and others, that write what
men do, and not what they ought to do” ("Of Proficience and Advancement of Learning Divine
and Human"). If that is true, then Machiavelli’s conception of nature did influence later thinkers.
Does Machiavelli depart from the classical conception of an orderly natural world and thereby
foreshadow the modern understanding of nature as disorderly?
Unlike the Christian thinkers preceding him, Machiavelli criticizes religion and devotes
much of his Discourses on Livy to providing a non-miraculous, rational explanation for the rise
of Christianity.8 If Machiavelli’s project was to practically refute revelation, then his conception
of nature would be the vehicle through which he accomplished that goal.9 If nature is revealed as
the agent behind the events described in the Christian Bible, then Machiavelli could provide a
6
Consider the claim that “Machiavelli’s answer to that question [of how the world is governed] is that the world is
governed not by miracles or by universal rules but by natural and ordinary necessity or universal causes” (Blitz and
Kristol, pg. 40).
7
One scholar stresses that “no other great philosopher, no great philosophical school before Niccolò, holds that men
are evil-prone by nature or stresses that this evil is magnified and distorted in desire, mind, and perception, and
compounded by choice” (DeGrazia, pg. 264).
8
Strauss admits that “Machiavelli was not the first man to assert that religion is both untrue and salutary” (Strauss3,
pg. 226). Furthermore, he cites Bacon as saying: “one of the doctors of Italy, Nicholas Machiavel, had the
confidence to put in writing, almost in plain terms, that the Christian faith had given up good men in prey to those
who are tyrannical and unjust” (Strauss3, pg. 176).
9
Strauss suggests that Machiavelli intends for his philosophy to “fulfill the function of both philosophy and
religion” (Strauss3, pg. 297).
6
non-religious account of the Christian religion. In fact, Machiavelli begins a chapter entitled
“How Much Fortune Can Do in Human Affairs, and in What Mode It May Be Opposed” by
claiming that “many have held and hold the opinion that worldly things are so governed by
fortune and by God, that men cannot correct them with their prudence, indeed that they have no
remedy at all; and on account of this they might judge that one need not sweat much over things
but let oneself be governed by chance” (The Prince, pg. 98). He then proceeds by claiming that
“this opinion has been believed more in our times because of the great variability of things which
have been seen and are seen every day, beyond every human conjecture” (The Prince, pg. 98).
He concludes by saying that “so that our free will not be eliminated, I judge that it might be true
that fortune is arbiter of half of our actions, but also that she leaves the other half, or close to it,
for us to govern” (The Prince, pg. 98).
Machiavelli begins that passage by claiming that “worldly things” are determined by
fortune and by God. However, he concludes the passage by saying that half of our actions are
governed by fortune and that she leaves the other half for us determine. Thus God gets removed
from this formulation. The absence of God and the stress on fortune and chance would seem to
emphasize Machiavelli’s focus on the indifferent and chaotic character of nature. The presence
of a benevolent, omnipotent God would seem to suggest that there is a rationale underlying the
natural world (thought it may not be one that we can divine), yet Machiavelli says that we cannot
possibly make sense of the vagaries of nature because there is no natural order. The lack of any
natural order suggests the lack of a divine order as well.
Finally, it is noteworthy that
Machiavelli replaces God with free will in his second formulation (while fortune remains
constant) – an important indication that Machiavelli is optimistic about the power of man and his
ability to shape the world.
In a sense, the intentional creation aspect that is traditionally
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attributed to God in the Christian perspective is instead the task of man in Machiavelli’s eyes.
He does believe that man is capable of designing and creating and improving upon what exists
by nature.
THE MACHIAVELLIAN WORLD
Any advocacy for a particular type of government is rooted in a conception of human
nature and the natural world.
Men do not just observe nature as it presents itself to us.
Machiavelli’s claim that “everyone sees how you appear” while “few touch what you are”
suggests that interaction with nature is inevitable and necessary (The Prince, pg. 77). Though
men may not be able to understand nature, they are still functioning within it. Machiavelli’s
uncharitable characterization of nature underscores the permanence of war and the indifference
of the natural world to the needs of man.
THE STATE OF NATURE
In a chapter entitled “Of New Principalities That Are Acquired by Others’ Arms and
Fortune,” Machiavelli argues that “states that come to be suddenly, like all other things in nature
that are born and grow quickly, cannot have roots and branches, so that the first adverse weather
eliminates them—unless, indeed, as was said, those who have suddenly become princes have so
much virtue that they know immediately how to prepare to keep what fortune has placed in their
laps; and the foundations that others have laid before becoming princes they lay afterwards” (The
Prince, pg. 26). Initially, it seems that Machiavelli is only referring to a certain aspects of the
natural world in saying “like all other things in nature that are born and grow quickly.” Yet the
discussion quickly shifts to take on a much broader aspect, and Machiavelli encompasses all of
8
nature in this discussion.
This is crucial because here he deviates from his earlier, more
charitable description of nature seen in Chapter 2 of The Prince. He writes that natural things
grow quickly, so these natural societies are not stable. Machiavelli’s claim that natural things do
not have roots seems to suggest that they are unsteady and superficial. His claim that they do not
have branches suggests that natural things are unable to expand with any consistency or stability.
This inability to form deep roots and extensive branches suggests that natural things not only
have an unstable basis but are also perhaps somewhat disordered or chaotic. The lack of a
coherent design is what hinders their ability to grow. Furthermore, it would seem that natural
entities are then transient – their lack of firm roots and inability to grow would seem to make
them, at best, vulnerable.
Machiavelli concludes that “as one would expect in a universe
constituted solely by matter in motion, chaos is natural and the norm, and order is as fragile as it
is artificial” (Rahe1, pg. 46).
Thus Machiavelli deviates rather abruptly from his earlier
discussion of nature as constant and knowable (and also from Aristotle who asserts that “nature
does nothing in vain”) and instead suggests that nature is disordered, chaotic, and unstable
(Politics, 1253a5).
The most important implication here is that organic political societies that come to be
spontaneously with no planning or forethought are not the most stable ones – those political
constructions that are founded by man are far superior because they have a coherent plan and
strong foundations. This is in sharp contrast to Aristotle who famously argues that “the city
belongs among the things that exist by nature, and that man is by nature a political animal”
(Politics, 1253a1).
The ancients viewed political society as organic and natural to man.
Aristotle actually asserts that “every city, therefore, exists by nature, if such also are the first
partnerships” (Politics, 1252a30). Machiavelli, however, argues that the products of nature, like
9
the mortal human body, are not lasting and are subject to decay. More importantly, he suggests
that cities do not come to be spontaneously; instead they result from conscious planning and
careful construction. Machiavelli believes that “the human world can afford man no stability, for
everything within it must also be in flux” (Rahe1, pg. 43).
In characterizing nature, Machiavelli likens it “to one of these violent rivers which, when
they become enraged, flood the plains, ruin the trees and the buildings, lift the earth from this
part, drop it in another; each person flees before them, everyone yields to their impetus without
being able to hinder them in any regard” (The Prince, pg. 98). Nature here is described as not
only chaotic and unstable but also as violent, arbitrary, and harshly indifferent to man. In short,
it would seem that “neither nature nor nature’s God have provided well for humanity” (Rahe2,
pg. 56). Thus if “nature is not kind” or benevolent, the question remains as to whether man can
trust that the natural order will favor him or whether he must overcome it (Sullivan2, pg. 185).
NATURE AND WAR
Machiavelli cautions that “a prince should have no other object, nor any other thought,
nor take anything else as his art but that of war and its orders and discipline; for that is the only
art which is of concern to one who commands” (The Prince, pg. 58). Perhaps the reason that
war is the most important art is that it is the natural state of human society. Though the state of
nature teaching is much more obvious in such later works as John Locke’s Second Treatise on
Government and Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, Machiavelli argues persuasively that men are not
naturally harmonious – their nature inclines them to war against one another. This might explain
his focus on force. Rather tellingly, Machiavelli states that “there cannot be good laws where
there are not good arms” (The Prince, pg. 48). Laws, a form of order, cannot exist without force
10
behind them because men are not naturally inclined to live in an ordered society. Instead, the
methods that persuaded men in their natural state—namely force—must be adapted to political
society, hence Machiavelli’s claim that “where there are good arms there must be good laws”
(The Prince, pg. 46). Furthermore, he argues that “the foundation of all states is a good military,
and that where this does not exist there can be neither good laws nor any other good thing”
(Discourses, III.31.4). The suggestion here seems to be that political communities (or states)
also exist in a state of nature in relation to each other; thus states too must rely on war as a tool to
persuade others. More simply put, force well used compels men and the communities they form
to live within the constraints of political society.
Machiavelli writes that Philopoemen, one of the heads of the Achaean League (a
collection of city-states, which suggests that this example also refers to the fractious relationships
between both individuals and communities), was praised by many writers because “in times of
peace he never thought of anything but modes of war; and when he was on campaign with
friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them…and he put before them, as he went along, all
the chances that can occur to an army; he listened to their opinions, gave his own, supported it
with reasons, so that because of these continued cogitations there could never arise, while he led
the army, any accident for which he did not have the remedy” (The Prince, pg. 60). However,
though others praise Philopoemen, Machiavelli himself does not. Instead, he faults Philopoemen
for being deceived by the illusion of peace – Machiavelli’s suggestion is that war is constant, and
again war here is not simply war between states. Philopoemen also believes that he has friends –
a dangerous assumption given the constant disharmony between all men. One scholar asserts
that “the intelligence of the prince—his virtù—includes the skill necessary to know when it is
possible to act as if the rules of morality (whose validity in itself is nowhere denied) were in
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force and to be relied on as governing the behavior of others, and when it is not” (Pocock, pg.
177). However, Machiavelli argues that a prudent prince “cannot observe faith, nor should he,
when such observance turns against him, and the causes that made him promise have been
eliminated” (The Prince, pg. 69). He continues by saying that “if all men were good, this
teaching would not be good; but because they are wicked and do not observe faith with you, you
also do not have to observe it with them” (The Prince, pg. 69). He concludes by saying “nor
does a prince ever lack legitimate causes to color his failure to observe faith” (The Prince, pg.
69). The suggestion here seems to be that since all men will eventually betray you, you should
betray them first – clear evidence that the world is warlike and thus that morality should never
act as a restraint.
Machiavelli says that “war is of such virtue that not only does it maintain those who have
been born princes but many times it enables men of private fortune to rise to that rank” (The
Prince, pg. 58). Significantly, it is one more sign of its inherent disorder that “nature does not
always assure that individuals are born into the rank to which their passions and abilities suit
them” (Sullivan1, pg. 44). Thus, wars can be between states—a prince losing his state to
conquest—or they can be between individuals, such as when a prince is overthrown in a
conspiracy led by ambitious men. It is clear that Machiavelli thinks that there is no natural
sociability. Humans always have the potential to war with one another, just as states are always
at war with each other or in a state of potential war. In fact, he writes that “a wise prince should
observe such modes, and never remain idle in peaceful times, but with his industry make capital
of them in order to be able to profit from them in adversities, so that when fortune changes, it
will find him ready to resist them” (The Prince, pg. 60). This example shows that peace is an
illusion; it is not the natural state. Instead, peace is an artificial creation of the human will.
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Somewhat paradoxically, Machiavelli emphasizes that this state of war can be
temporarily overcome but only through violent force. He argues that “a prince, therefore, so as
to keep his subjects united and faithful, should not care about the infamy of cruelty, because with
very few examples he will be more merciful than those who for the sake of too much mercy
allow disorders to continue” (The Prince, pg. 65). He states explicitly here that unity and order
are a result of force. Furthermore, he states that “of all princes, it is impossible for the new
prince to escape a name for cruelty because new states are full of dangers,” and it seems that the
only way to make the state safe is through the exercise of force (The Prince, pg. 65). Thus just
as stable states are not organic entities because they are founded by humans, peace too is an
artificial creation of the human will. Machiavelli seems to argue that unity is unnatural as well –
human beings are naturally contentious and warlike. He claims that the lack of dissension and
conspiracy in Hannibal’s vast army “could not have arisen from anything other than his inhuman
cruelty which, together with his infinite virtues, always made him venerable and terrible in the
sight of his soldiers; and without it, his other virtues would not have sufficed to bring about this
effect” (The Prince, pg.
67).
Cruelty is necessary for unity because men are naturally
disharmonious. Without the strength of Hannibal’s will and the force he used to keep his
soldiers in check, his army would not have remained united. Machiavelli reminds us that a
prince “so as to keep his subjects united and faithful, should not care about the infamy of cruelty,
because with very few examples he will be more merciful than those who for the sake of too
much mercy allow disorders to continue, from which come killings or robberies” (The Prince,
pg. 65). Though cruelty may seem harsh and unnecessary, it is necessary to tame warlike
humans and survive in a harsh and indifferent world. In this rather convoluted sense, cruelty
well used can be merciful because it will bring about peace.
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NATURE’S BOUNTY
Machiavelli advises that “so as not to have to rob his subjects, to be able to defend
himself, not to become poor and contemptible, nor to be forced to become rapacious, a prince
should esteem it a little to incur a name for meanness, because this is one of those vices which
enable him to rule” (The Prince, pg.
64).
This exhortation to stinginess is rooted in
Machiavelli’s belief in the parsimony of nature. Nature is not a benevolent force that is generous
to man; therefore a prince needs to worry about limited resources.
Generosity requires
abundance and provokes gratitude. Instead, he warns that “if one wants to maintain a name for
liberality among men, it is necessary not to leave out any kind of lavish display, so that a prince
who has done this will always consume all his resources in such deeds” (The Prince, pg. 63).
Because nature is not a provider, humans must fight amongst themselves for natural necessities.
In fact, Machiavelli explicitly argues that liberality can only be successful when it is
accompanied by greed when he tells us that “there is more wisdom in maintaining a name for
meanness, which begets infamy or hatred, than in being under a necessity, because one wants to
have a name for liberality, to incur a name for rapacity, which begets infamy with hatred” (The
Prince, pg. 65).
Machiavelli writes that there are two ways in which cities begin: “all cities are built either
by men native to the place where they are built or by foreigners” (Discourses, I.1.1). The first
case occurs “when it does not appear, to inhabitants dispersed in many small parts, that they live
securely, since each part by itself, both because of the site and because of the small number,
cannot resist the thrust of whoever assaults it; and when the enemy comes, they do not have time
to unite for their defense” (Discourses, I.1.1). In order to “flee these dangers, moved either by
14
themselves or by someone among them of greater authority, they are restrained to inhabit
together a place elected by them, more advantageous to live in and easier to defend” (Discourses,
I.1.1). Examples of cities formed in this manner are Athens and Venice. The second case is that
“of a city built by foreign races, whether free men or those depending on others, who are sent out
as colonies either by a republic or by a prince so as to relieve their lands of inhabitants or for the
defense of a country newly acquired that they wish to maintain securely and without expense”
(Discourses, I.1.3).
The Romans constructed many cities like this in their empire, as did
Alexander the Great, who constructed cities to glorify himself (Discourses, I.1.3). Yet, “because
these cities do not have a free origin, it rarely occurs that they make great strides and can be
numbered among the capitals of kingdoms” (Discourses, I.1.3). Machiavelli clarifies that “the
builders of cities are free when peoples, either under a prince or by themselves, are constrained
by disease, hunger, or war to abandon the ancestral country and to seek for themselves a new
seat” (Discourses, I.1.4). Thus cities begin either through cooperation for defense or in an
attempt to defend any territory or wealth that its residents may posess. The focus on defense is
not surprising given Machiavelli’s characterization of human society as one of war.
More importantly, a city “is more or less marvelous as the one who was the beginning of
it was more or less virtuous,” and the virtue of the founder “can be recognized in two modes: the
first is in the choice of the site, the other in the ordering of laws” (Discourses, I.1.4). This raises
the question of where to found a city: in a sterile location or a fertile site. Machiavelli tells us
that “men work either by necessity or by choice, and because there is greater virtue to be seen
where choice has less authority, it should be considered whether it is better to choose sterile
places for the building of cities so that men, constrained to be industrious and less seized by
idleness, live more united, having less cause for discord, because of the poverty of the site”
15
(Discourses, I.1.4). Thus it would seem that when driven by their natural desire to acquire, men
can form a functional political society. One scholar claims that “nature’s beneficence actually
comes to view through its provision of infertile places, for the existence of scarcity gives human
beings the opportunity to subdue their own nature—to subdue their passions” (Sullivan2, pg.
183). Yet Machiavelli seems to think that it is impossible to eradicate those passions because he
argues that choosing such a sterile site would only be prudent “if men were content to live off
their own and did not wish to seek to command others” (Discourses, I.1.4).
Machiavelli
continues by saying that “since men cannot secure themselves except with power, it is necessary
to avoid this sterility in a country and to settle in the most fertile place, where, since [the city]
can expand because of the abundance of the site, it can both defend itself from whoever might
assault it and crush anyone who might oppose its greatness” (Discourses, I.1.4). Now it seems
that fertile sites are better options because Machiavelli suggests that an able founder can prevent
the idleness that might result from such ready access to nature’s gifts through laws “ordered to
constrain it by imposing such necessities as the site does not provide” (Discourses, I.1.4). Thus
“it is a more prudent choice to settle in a fertile place, if that fertility is restrained within proper
limits by laws” (Discourses, I.1.5). In fact, laws in Rome were ordered “so that the fertility of
the site, the advantages of the sea, the frequent victories, and the greatness of its empire could
not corrupt it for many centuries,” and it was “full of as much virtue as has ever adorned any
other city or republic” (Discourses, I.1.5).
This contrast between fertile and sterile places raises the question of the benevolence of
nature. That there exist fertile places suggests that nature is not wholly unfriendly to man, yet
the existence of sterile places proves that it is not entirely friendly either. Instead, perhaps this
dichotomy underscores the extent to which nature is entirely indifferent to our needs. One
16
scholar argues that Machiavelli “seems ungrateful to nature but mitigates this harshness when he
readily accepts nature’s aid in another way: he embraces nature’s fertility” and “maintains a
respectful stance toward nature in acknowledging the manner in which human beings depend on
its provision” (Sullivan2, pg. 181). However, it does not seem that Machiavelli simply embraces
nature’s infrequent bounty. Because nature is not simply fertile, men must compete to secure the
few fertile sites available – this would seem to highlight the constancy of war in the natural
world. More importantly, he argues that laws are absolutely necessary for man to thrive in a
fertile site; in a sense, nature’s bounty can corrupt as well as nourish. This focus on natural
necessity highlights the inexorability of the human desire to acquire.
LADY FORTUNE
In a particularly perplexing chapter in his Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli claims that
“one sees by ancient and by modern examples that no grave accident in a city or in a province
ever comes unless it has been foretold either by diviners or by revelations or by prodigies or by
other heavenly signs” (Discourses, I.56.1). He gives four examples to support this claim: Friar
Girolamo Savonarola’s prediction of the invasion of Italy by King Charles VIII; the destruction
of the Florentine Duomo “by a heavenly dart” before the death of Lorenzo de’ Medici the Elder;
a lightning strike on the palace before the expulsion of Piero Soderini; and Titus Livy’s tale of a
plebian hearing an otherworldly voice predicting the French invasion of Rome (Discourses,
I.56.1). However, Savonarola’s prediction occurred two years before the French invasion, and
the lightning strike occurred one year before Soderini’s expulsion from Florence. Machiavelli
writes that “always after such accidents extraordinary and new things supervene in provinces”
(Discourses, I.56.1). However, the omens occur so far before the events that they foretell that
17
perhaps Machiavelli is suggesting here that new and extraordinary things will always happen
because accidents and tumult are inevitable. He claims that “in all human things he who
examines will see this: that one inconvenience can never be suppressed without another cropping
up” (Discourses, I.6.3). One scholar argues that “Machiavelli proceeded on the assumption that
situations dominated by fortune were not uniformly chaotic” (Pocock, pg. 161). However, it
would seem that any omen foretelling a disaster is bound to come true because of the wholly
chaotic nature of the world and that instead fortune “is Machiavelli’s major term for designating
the uncertainty and dependency of human affairs” (Parel, pg. 129).
A number of scholars have criticized Machiavelli’s notion of fortune as “totally
deficient” (Parel, pg. 151). Some have argued that “fortuna represents the breakdown of reason
in Machiavelli’s thinking” (Parel, pg. 150). However, it seems that fortune for Machaivelli
represents the chaos and unpredictability of the natural world. In a chapter titled “Fortune Blinds
the Spirits of Men When It Does Not Wish Them to Oppose Its Plans,” Machiavelli writes that
“if how human affairs proceed is considered well, it will be seen that often things arise and
accidents come about that the heavens have not altogether wished to be provided against”
(Discourses, II.29.1). In light of the title of the chapter, it would seem that the heavens are
simply another way to refer to fortune, and here Machiavelli gives fortune a fair amount of
agency. He later writes that when fortune “wishes to bring about great things it elects a man of
so much spirit and so much virtue that he recognizes the opportunities that it proffers him,” and
“in the same manner, when it wishes to bring about great ruin, it prefers men who can aid in that
ruin” (Discourses, II.29.1). Given Machiavelli’s earlier description of the natural world, it seems
unlikely that fortune would be such an active force. Instead, the suggestion here seems to be that
virtuous men can turn any opportunity to their advantage while men of little virtue cannot
18
recognize even the most advantageous opportunity. Perhaps a more accurate interpretation of
fortune is “that man ‘can weave her designs but cannot destroy them’” (Parel, pg. 138).
In short, a close reading of The Prince and Discourses on Livy reveals that Machiavelli
does not share the ancients’ conception of a friendly natural world that is both intelligible to and
welcoming of man. Instead, he argues that nature is, at its core, disordered, chaotic, unstable,
and constantly changing. More importantly, he describes nature as miserly and unfriendly, or at
best indifferent, to man. As a result, the natural state for mankind is one of war – a view that
Hobbes and even, in some measure, Locke later espouse.10 Peace and unity can only be achieved
through violent force and human construction of a political society. Unlike Locke and Hobbes,
Machiavelli argues that the state of nature is not something that man can escape. It seems to be
the perpetual condition instead of the original one. He writes that, “in thinking about how these
things proceed, I judge the world to have been in the same mode and there to have been as much
good as wicked in it” (Discourses, II.Preface.2). Thus the chaos and disorder of the natural
world is a constant. Machiavelli does admit that “since all things of men are in motion and
cannot stay steady, they must of necessity either rise or fall” (Discourses, I.6.4). He later echoes
this saying that “since human things are always in motion, either they ascend or they descend”
(Discourses, II.Preface.2). However, these “various propositions about motion seem to have no
10
"In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, not
culture of the earth, no navigation, nor the use of commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious
building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the
earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of
violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Leviathan, XIII.9); “If man in the state of
nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest,
and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? Why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to
the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he
hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all
being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the
enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a
condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out,
and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual
preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property (Two Treatises on
Government, 2nd Treatise §123).
19
antithesis: they say nothing about a point of rest, or stillness or inertia” (DeGrazia, pg. 242).
Therefore these claims seem simply to acknowledge that change is inevitable in a chaotic world;
the more important message here seems to be that while bodies are subject to change, the
fundamental character of the natural world is not. It seems that Machiavelli “assumed that the
basic order of things remains forever the same” (Rahe2, pg. lxi).
HUMAN NATURE
It is important to consider whether these characteristics of nature make men warlike or
whether men would be warlike independent of nature’s influence. For example, is “the natural
and ordinary desire to acquire responsible for both order and disorder, for both rules and
exceptions” (Blitz and Kristol, pg. 42)? More clearly, is it the case that “the cold necessities of
an uncaring world drive human beings to appropriate pieces of that world to themselves,” or did
the chaos of the natural world mold man’s constitutive desires (Rahe2, pg. 44)? How exactly
does human nature fit into this condition of natural instability? Have all men internalized this
tendency to war because it is what allows them to survive in our brutal world? Or is it the case
that nature is wholly indifferent to our existence, yet our innate combativeness has made the
world a hostile place? To answer these questions, we must consider Machiavelli’s description of
human nature. What is man like in his natural state?
MAN’S NATURAL DESIRES
Despite all of these descriptions of nature, it seems that the most important sign of the
unfriendliness or at least indifference of nature to man is that nature gives men the desire to
acquire, but it does not give them the ability to do so. Machiavelli assures us that “truly it is a
20
very natural and ordinary thing to desire to acquire, and always, when men do it who can, they
will be praised or not blamed; but when they cannot, and wish to do it anyway, here lie the error
and the blame” (The Prince, pg. 14). Thus the desire is natural or at least universal, but the
ability to fulfill that desire requires human art or contrivance. He writes that “the cause that
enables you to acquire it is to be a professional in this art” which suggests that the ability to
fulfill that natural desire is not universal (The Prince, pg. 58). More importantly, these “desires
are pre-rational in that their satisfaction is a matter of necessity rather than choice,” and thus
these “desires are not acquired, as such; they are constitutive” (Parel1, pg. 105). The implication
here is that men are defined by their all-consuming desire.
Machiavelli more fully explains this claim in Book I of his Discourses on Livy, arguing
that “nature has created men so that they are able to desire everything and are unable to attain
everything” (Discourses, I.37.1). He continues, saying that “since the desire is always greater
than the power of acquiring, the result is discontent with what one possesses and a lack of
satisfaction with it” (Discourses, I.37.1).
In fact, he says of man that “the fear of losing
generates in him the same wishes that are in those who desire to acquire; for it does not appear to
men that they possess securely what a man has unless he acquires something else new”
(Discourses, I.5.3). Astonishingly, Machiavelli here suggests that the desire to acquire is so deep
that it can never be satisfied; the act of acquiring is only a temporary balm. This single fact of
human nature seems to drive the human experience; Machiavelli argues that from it “arises the
variability of their fortune; for since some men desire to have more, and some fear to lose what
has been acquired, they come to enmities and to war, from which arise the ruin of one province
and the exaltation of another” (Discourses, I.37.1). Thus, fortune here is explained away as the
different reactions of different men to their own rapacious desire. More importantly, it seems
21
that the diversity of human experience simply results from the varied ways in which man deals
with his insatiable desire. This would seem to suggest that man’s nature shapes the natural world
far more than nature molds man’s nature.
In the preface to Book II of Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli repeats this formulation,
saying that “human appetites are insatiable, for since from nature they have the ability and the
wish to desire all things and from fortune the ability to achieve few of them, there continually
results from this a discontent in human minds and a disgust with the things they possess”
(Discourses, II.Preface.3).
Because men are unable to satisfy their desires, the resulting
unhappiness makes men “blame the present times, praise the past, and desire the future, even if
they are not moved to do this by any reasonable cause” (Discourses, II.Preface.3). Thus, it
would seem that men are fundamentally discontented beings who consequently place great and
irrational hopes in the future. Furthermore, their relentless desire inspires great ambition in all
men. Machiavelli writes that “whenever engaging in combat through necessity is taken from
men they engage in combat through ambition, which is so powerful in human breasts that it
never abandons them at whatever rank they rise to” (Discourses, I.37.1). Because men always
desire more, they continually strive to gain, and thus “the fundamental human condition is one of
competition and war” (Rahe2, pg. 100). In fact, Machiavelli claims that “the nature of men is
ambitious and suspicious and does not know how to set a limit to any fortune it may have”
(Discourses, I.29.1).
Furthermore, because men can never satisfy their own desires, they
continually covet what others have. He cautions that “the envious nature of men has always
made it no less dangerous to find new modes and orders than to seek unknown waters and lands,
because men are more ready to blame than to praise the actions of others” (Discourses,
I.Preface.1). It would seem that even the wealthy are not free from envy because “men are
22
desirous of new things, so much that most often those who are well off desire newness as much
as those who are badly off” (Discourses, III.21.2).
This deep-seated discontent explains
Machiavelli’s claim that the generality of men “are ungrateful, fickle, pretenders and
dissemblers, evaders of danger, eager for gain” (The Prince, pg. 66). In fact, it seems that men
never experience any respite from their desire because they “get bored with the good and grieve
in the ill” (Discourses, III.21.2). He repeats the statement saying that “men are wont to worry in
evil and to become bored with good, and that from both of these two passions the same effects
arise” (Discourses, I.37.1). Thus it seems that we can conclude that “human beings are by nature
self-regarding individuals who desire the goods of Fortune and Venus – preservation, glory,
power, wealth, and sexual pleasure – and whose minds are limited to serving these desires with
ingenuity and to stimulating them to grow through the imagination of ever greater delights, all of
which results in a ceaseless ambition that drives men in a limitless struggle for preeminence”
(Rahe2, pg. xxxv).
Machiavelli rather cryptically states that “men in general judge more by their eyes than
by their hands, because seeing is given to everyone, touching to few” (The Prince, pg. 71). This
is important because we are not just observing nature and studying it as it presents itself to us.
We are living in and fighting with and obtaining limited resources from a natural world that is, at
best, entirely indifferent to our presence. He asserts that because “everyone sees how you
appear, [and] few touch what you are… the vulgar are taken in by the appearance and the
outcome of a thing, and in the world there is no one but the vulgar; the few have a place there
when the many have something to lean on” (The Prince, pg. 71). Machiavelli emphasizes touch
because sight is misleading.
Sight might seem more panoramic and objective, but it is more
easily manipulated by humans and more easily deceived by nature. Most importantly, it seems
23
that touch is only reserved for the few. Therefore, it seems as though the few have access to
some higher faculty that the many do not have, and perhaps it is a faculty that allows them to
more clearly and effectively reorder natural entities. Significantly, it would appear that this
faculty is what enables great men to acquire all those things that nature has made them desire.
This clear dichotomy in abilities between those who see and the few who touch would seem to
be hugely illuminating in regards to Machiavelli’s clear distinctions between the princes and the
people. Is the difference between the prince and the people that the prince relies on touch instead
of sight and thus can more clearly comprehend the natural world?
The question then remains as to how the few have obtained or developed these abilities
that other men do not have and that they themselves did not always have. The emphasis on
personal agency is crucial insofar as the only external force—nature—does not give men these
abilities. The answer seems to lie in Machiavelli’s claim that “the nature of peoples is variable”
(The Prince, pg. 24). If the human nature is not a constant, then some men can be innately and
fundamentally different from other men. Perhaps the prince is one who has reordered his own
nature so as to gain the ability to fulfill his natural desire to acquire. If that is true, we must ask
ourselves what prompts that reordering. What predisposes and enables certain men to develop
the ability to acquire? Are these princes naturally different from other men, or has nature
somehow provided them with the impulse to reorder their own souls? More clearly, the question
that remains is that of agency. What impulse—be it internal or external—drives certain men to
reorder their own natures so as to gain the ability to acquire? In light of Machiavelli’s claim that
“the nature of peoples is variable,” it seems probable that the nature of these princes was
essentially different from those of other men. This is not to say that this divergent nature is
hereditary but simply that it is uncommon and that it has significant ramifications. Furthermore,
24
this variability suggests that the essential nature of the prince can perhaps change over time –
another suggestion that this ability or faculty is developed or acquired.
Though he paints a bleak picture of human nature, Machiavelli demonstrates that human
nature can and must be reordered – a clear endorsement of the power of human will to overcome
nature. In fact, he seems to suggest that this internal reordering is essential for fulfilling one’s
natural desire to acquire. One of the few religious leaders who seems to get even a modicum of
praise from Machiavelli, Pope Julius II was successful only because “the brevity of his life did
not allow him to feel the contrary, because if times had come when he had needed to proceed
with caution, his ruin would have followed: he would never have deviated from those modes to
which nature inclined him” (The Prince, pg. 101). In this same vein, Machiavelli says of Scipio
Africanus that “such a nature would in time have sullied Scipio’s fame and glory if he had
continued with it in the empire; but while he lived under the government of the Senate, this
damaging quality of his not only was hidden, but made for his glory” (The Prince, pg. 68). In
both of these cases, human nature was damaging and counterproductive, yet fortune (or perhaps
the political order of which they were part) allowed those two men to succeed. Machiavelli
rather succinctly summarizes the risk in saying that “one sees a given prince be happy today and
come to ruin tomorrow without having seen him change his nature or any quality” (The Prince,
pg. 100). As Machiavelli shows especially in Chapters 17 and 19 of The Prince, man must
change his own nature in order to tame or accommodate the constant changes in the natural
world.
Machiavelli writes that “as all those demonstrate who reason on a civil way of life, and as
every history is full of examples, it is necessary to whoever disposes a republic and orders laws
in it to presuppose that all men are bad, and that they always have to use their malignity of spirit
25
whenever they have a free opportunity for it” (Discourses, I.3.1). Thus it seems that human
nature is merely the baseline and that the ability to change is likely a good one. There is little
indication that man can alter his nature to make it more destructive. However, remaining
inflexible can be harmful. More precisely, the prince should consider when it is prudent to
emphasize particular aspects of his nature over others – for example, caution over boldness.
While Machiavelli never describes human nature as helpful or says that adhering to one’s nature
can be beneficial, he is confident that men can still succeed by changing their nature.
NATURE AND ART
To summarize, while some men are gifted with natures that (perhaps indirectly) aid in
acquisition, man must change his nature if he wants to succeed in fulfilling his natural desires. If
human nature is damaging, perhaps by changing his nature, man can develop the ability to
acquire what he desires. A constant theme in The Prince is the difficulties facing new princes,
and Machiavelli cautions that “a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe all those
things for which men are held good, since he is often under a necessity to maintain his state, of
acting against faith, against charity, against humanity, against religion” (The Prince, pg. 70).
Crucially, he follows by saying that a prince “needs to have a spirit disposed to change as the
winds of fortune and variations of things command him, and as I said above, not depart from
good, when possible, but know how to enter into evil, when forced by necessity” (The Prince,
pg. 70). Here it seems that Machiavelli elides nature and fortune to an extent. Insofar as both
are in total flux, fortune and nature are simply external forces that humans must contend with.
Perhaps the motive here is to underscore the extent to which the natural world is a product of
fortune or chance and not intentional design. In that sense, nature and fortune are linked because
26
fortune is a manifestation of essential characteristics of the natural world. Therefore, as with the
formulation of fortune and free will governing the world in the beginning of Chapter 25, the
focus here is again on accommodation of the whims and vagaries of nature instead of total
mastery. Humans cannot expect to fully master an indifferent and chaotic natural world, but they
can through foresight and cultivation of personal skills tame nature and impose some order. It is
impossible to wholly master the natural world, and one important indication of that is that
Machiavelli “does not seek liberation from the passions engendered by human nature”
(Sullivan2, pg. 183). Unlike earlier thinkers, Machiavelli believes that “the presumption that
men are educable and capable of moral improvement is not a proper starting point for political
reflection;” instead, he suggests that “one begin with a sober appreciation for human defects and
a determination to put them to the best possible use” (Rahe1, pg. 45)
Machiavelli claims that “the prince who leans entirely on fortune comes to ruin as it
varies,” but “he is happy who adapts his mode of proceeding to the qualities of the times; and
similarly, he is unhappy whose procedure is in disaccord with the times” (The Prince, pg. 100).
The focus here is again on accommodating nature. Given the constant changes in the natural
world—the tides of fortune, if you will—man must be flexible and must alter his thinking or his
actions as the world changes around him. Machiavelli repeatedly emphasizes that the natural
world is in a state of flux, and his constant admonishments to change with the times are a
reminder that relying on the constancy of the natural world or the constancy of human nature
might be a mistake. He also says later that “if one governs himself with caution and patience,
and the times and affairs turn in such a way that his government is good, he comes out happy;
but if the times and affairs change, he is ruined because he does not change his mode of
proceeding” (The Prince, pg. 100). This hearkens back to Machiavelli’s claim that fortune and
27
free will are the two arbiters of the natural world. While fortune may be beneficial for a little
while, she will inevitably harm you. Thus man must exercise his own will in an attempt to stave
off any harm.
Machiavelli then says that “nor may a man be found so prudent as to know how to
accommodate himself to this, whether because he cannot deviate from what nature inclines him
to or also because, when one has always flourished by walking on one path, he cannot be
persuaded to depart from it; and so the cautious man, when it is time to come to impetuosity,
does not know how to do it, hence comes to ruin: for if he would change his nature with the
times and with affairs, his fortune would not change” (The Prince, pg. 100). Interestingly,
Machiavelli first seems to suggest that men are constitutionally incapable of changing their
natures, yet he finishes by hinting that it is actually possible. Regardless, the theme of changing
or deviating from one’s nature persists, but Machiavelli emphasizes here that changing one’s
nature can have huge effects. One scholar argues that “it is essential to his whole theory of
fortune that men cannot change their natures, except perhaps at the infinitely slow rate indicated
by the concept of custom” (Pocock, pg. 165). However, Machiavelli claims that through prudent
manipulation of our nature, we can mitigate the effects of fortune. He argues that “those who by
bad choice or by natural inclination are in discord with the times most often live unhappily, and
their actions have a bad outcome; but it is to the contrary with those who are in concord with the
time” (Discourses, III.28.2). Here Machiavelli claims that different times call for different
natures, and presumably if times change (and they will), then men must change their natures.
Thus not only must man change his nature, he must do so in response to external change. In fact,
Machiavelli claims that “the cause of the bad and of the good fortune of men is the matching of
the mode of one’s proceeding with the time” (Discourses, III.9.1). This would seem to explain
28
why men must at different times emphasize different aspects of their nature. He says that “some
men proceed in their works with impetuosity, some with hesitation and caution,” and yet,
“because in both of these modes suitable limits are passed, since once cannot observe the true
way, in both one errs” (Discourses, III.9.1). However, he concludes by saying that “he comes to
err less and to have prosperous fortune who matches the time with his mode, as I said, and
always proceeds as nature forces you” (Discourses, III.9.1). Thus any change in one’s nature
must be purposeful and in response to a particular change. The claim that men always proceed
as nature forces them is confounding – if nature bestows you with a particular temperament and
you do not attempt to overcome your nature, then any change in the times might doom you to
failure. Instead, Machiavelli here seems to hint that while changing one’s nature is often the
most prudent course, it is equally prudent to recognize that nature cannot always be overcome.
Instead of mastering fortune, one should accommodate it.
Though Machiavelli emphasizes the need to accommodate fortune, the focus is on
internal reordering of human nature as the means through which one can actually accomplish this
task. Interestingly, he claims that cruelty and avarice “always brought about the ruin of those
emperors who by nature or by art did not have a great reputation such that they could hold both
in check” (The Prince, pg.
76).
Here he draws a distinction between nature and art –
presumably an artificially cultivated skill. The prince has some faculty that was independent of
his nature which suggests that he can somehow reorder his own nature. Machiavelli concedes
that “it would be a very praiseworthy thing to find in a prince all of the above-mentioned
qualities that are held good” but admits that “because he cannot have them, nor wholly observe
them, since human conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be so prudent as to know
how to avoid the infamy of those vices that would take his state from him and to be on guard
29
against those that do not, if that is possible; but if one cannot, one can let them go on with less
hesitation” (The Prince, pg. 62). As discussed earlier, the focus here is on choosing qualities
that are beneficial to the situation instead of responding instinctively. Here Machiavelli seems to
caution princes against acting as society would lead them to think is correct. Though society
would tend to laud princes who are “good,” it may be more prudent and thus more beneficial to
indulge in those vices that will allow a prince to rule more effectively. Thus a prince must resist
the impulse to act as society tells him to. Most importantly, Machiavelli concludes by arguing
that “one should not care about incurring the fame of those vices without which it is difficult to
save one’s state; for if one considers everything well, one will find something appears to be
virtue, which if pursued would be one’s ruin, and something else appears to be vice, which if
pursued results in one’s security and well-being” (The Prince, pg. 62). Though a quality may
appear to be virtuous—which really seems to mean that it is in accordance with some seemingly
natural moral order—it may not help one fulfill his natural desires. Machiavelli would argue that
there is no natural moral order or that men are not primarily motivated by moral passions and
that to pursue some idea of virtue is foolish or counterproductive.11 Secondly, what is instinctual
may not necessarily aid your pursuit of your natural desires.
This is in accordance with
Machiavelli’s argument that nature is not ordered – those activities or impulses that are natural to
us do not always serve our natural desires. The obvious question here is why society has a moral
code that is unnatural – perhaps Machiavelli would argue that religion or political institutions
enforce particular moral codes in order to maintain power and quell our innate belligerence.
Perhaps the most obvious examples of princes altering their natures come from
Machiavelli’s famous advice that princes should emulate both foxes and lions. He argues that
11
Machiavelli might argue that “necessity makes it impossible for men always to obey what we would call the moral
law” (Strauss, pg. 245).
30
“to have as a teacher a half-beast, half-man means nothing other than that a prince needs to know
how to use both natures; and the one without the other is not lasting” (The Prince, pg. 69). The
clearest example of a man who was able to cultivate the beastly aspects of his nature is Septimus
Severus. Machiavelli writes of him, “and because the actions of this man were great and notable
in a new prince, I want to show briefly how well he knew how to use the persons of the fox and
the lion” (The Prince, pg. 78). A captain in the Roman army, Septimus successfully conspired
against and overthrew Emperor Julianus. He persuaded the Senate to accept his rule and
remained in power until his death. Machiavelli says that “whoever examines minutely the
actions of this man will find him a very fierce lion and a very astute fox, will see that he was
feared and revered by everyone, and not hated by the army, and will not marvel that he, a new
man, could have held so much power” (The Prince, pg. 79). This discussion of Septimus
Severus as both a lion and a fox raises a number of questions about human nature: do princes
need to go out of “human” nature?; is human nature simply one part of a continuum that includes
animals as well?; what implications does this have for the status of humans in relation to other
creatures?; what distinguishes humans from animals?.
MAN AND BEAST
Machiavelli is optimistic about the power of man. For example, in his formulation at the
beginning of chapter 25, he replaces the power of God to govern the natural world with man’s
free will. Despite this focus on the creative power of man, there do seem to be a number of
important differences between Machiavelli and the ancients on the topic of human reason.
Machiavelli focuses on how man and beast are not that different or at least how it might be
beneficial to cultivate our beastly characteristics.
However, the ancient thinkers try to
31
distinguish humans from animals, and they do this through pointing to human reason as the
distinguishing characteristic.12 Machiavelli instead exhorts princes to “know how to use both
natures” (that of man and beast) because “the one without the other is not lasting” (The Prince,
pg. 69). His mention of a teacher who is “half-beast, half-man” is reminiscent of the description
of Jesus as half-man and half-God.13 However, Machiavelli then argues that “since a prince is
compelled of necessity to know well how to use the beast, he should pick the fox and the lion”
(The Prince, pg. 69). Here, there is a shift from half-beast to all beast. Perhaps the suggestion
here is that if humans are not made in the image of God, then they are wholly animal-like.
In the classical conception, beasts are creatures of only passion while humans have the
potential for rational thought.14 Thus Machiavelli does not think that reason alone is enough for
man (or that men are wholly rational beings) – he needs passion. Machiavelli “asserted that
reason is the slave of the passions, for the turmoil that he had in mind was not just political: it
was fundamental to human psychology” (Rahe1, pg. 43). This hearkens back to Machiavelli’s
suggestions to accommodate nature instead of mastering it. The passions are natural to man, and
they can be used in service of his acquisitiveness instead of being completely subjugated to
reason. Unlike the ancients, Machiavelli does not believe that the philosophic life is man’s
highest calling.15 Instead, he seems to suggest that only the political life with its opportunities to
12
“For [speech] is peculiar to man as compared to the other animals that he alone has a perception of good and bad
and just and unjust and other things [of this sort]” (Aristotle’s Politics, 1253a15).
13
“Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: /Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery
to be equal with God: /But made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in
the likeness of men: /And being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death,
even the death of the cross” (Philippians 2:5-8, KJV).
14
“For living appears to be something common to even plants, but what is peculiar [to human beings] is being
sought. One must set aside, then, the life characterized by nutrition as well as growth. A certain life characterized
by sense perception would be next, but it too appears to be common to a horse and cow and in fact to every animal.
So there remains a certain active life of that which possesses reason; and what possesses reason includes what is
obedient to reason, on the one hand, and what possesses it and thinks, on the other” (Nichomachean Ethics,
1097b30-1098a5).
15
“So, if, among the virtuous actions, the political warlike ones are preeminent in nobility and greatness, they are
nonetheless without leisure and aim at some end—that is, they are not choiceworthy for their own sake—whereas
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gain power and glory can fulfill our natural desires. However, in his famous letter to Francesco
Vettori, Machiavelli writes that nightly, “I enter the ancient courts of ancient men, where,
received by them lovingly…I am not ashamed to speak with them and to ask them the reason for
their actions; and they in their humanity reply to me” – a suggestion that he learned much from
the ancients but not that he agreed with them (The Prince, pg. 109-110). Similarly, Machiavelli
implies that what is natural is what is instinctual to man, but the ancients held that those things
that were done through art or developed faculties were also natural.16
Machiavelli draws a sharp contrast between nature and art and suggests that developing
these other faculties requires reordering our natures. If reason is one of those developed faculties
that is not natural to man but also not present in beasts, then Machiavelli would not view it as a
necessarily distinguishing characteristic between men and beasts. Furthermore, he seems to
suggest that the passions can benefit man even after he has developed the faculty of reason.
However, Machiavelli writes that “infinite examples read in the remembrances of ancient
histories demonstrate how much difficulty there is for a people used to living under a prince to
preserve its freedom afterward, if by some accident it acquires it, as Rome acquired it after the
expulsion of the Tarquins” (Discourses, I.16.1). He then says that “such difficulty is reasonable;
for that people is nothing other than a brute animal that, although of a ferocious and feral nature,
has always been nourished in prison and in servitude” (Discourses, I.16.1). He concludes by
saying that “if it is left free in a field to its fate, it becomes the prey of the first one who seeks to
the activity of the intellect, because it is contemplative, seems to be superior in seriousness, to aim at no end apart
from itself, and to have a pleasure proper to it (and this pleasure helps increase the activity), such that what is selfsufficient, characterized by leisure, and not subject to weariness to the extent possible for a human being, and all
else that falls to the lot of the blessed person, manifestly accord with this contemplative activity—if this is all so,
then this activity would constitute the complete happiness of a human being” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1177b15-25).
16
“Hence these things are also held to be natural, and though nobody is held to be wise by nature, a person is held to
have judgment, comprehension, and intellect by nature. A sign of this is that we suppose these accompany the
various times of life, and that a given time of life is possessed of intellect and judgment, on the grounds that nature
is the cause of them” (Nichomachean Ethics, 1143b6-10).
33
rechain it, not being used to feed itself and not knowing places where it may have to take refuge”
(Discourses, I.16.1). If only men unused to freedom are like beasts, then perhaps men who live
in the correct conditions can develop the use of reason – this too suggests that reason is an
acquired faculty that only develops in certain conditions.
In describing the masses, Machiavelli writes that “the multitude is often bold in speaking
against the decisions of their prince; then, when they look the penalty in the face, not trusting one
another, they run to obey…for on one side there is nothing more formidable than an unshackled
multitude without a head, and, on the other side, there is nothing weaker; for even though it has
arms in hand, it is easy to put it down provided that you have a stronghold that enables you to
escape the first thrust” (Discourses, I.57.1). He follows by saying that “when the spirits of men
are cooled a little and each sees he has to return to his home, they begin to doubt themselves and
to think of their safety, either by taking flight or by coming to accord” (Discourses, I.57.1).
Machiavelli’s description here of the masses suggests that they are beast-like, insofar as they are
controlled mostly by their passions. This raises the question of whether rational thought (instead
of passionate impulse) is a distinguishing characteristic of the prince.
THE PRINCE AND THE PEOPLE
Machiavelli says that Ferdinand of Aragon “can be called an almost new prince because
from being a weak king he has become by fame and by glory the first king among Christians;
and if you consider his actions, you will find them all very great and some of them
extraordinary” (The Prince, pg. 88). He seems to suggest here that the transformation that
Ferdinand underwent was an internal reordering. Perhaps he changed his mode of proceeding to
be in accordance with the times. Thus the prince is someone who has in some sense changed his
34
own nature so as to gain the ability to acquire.
This examination of Machiavelli’s examples of princes sheds new light on his earlier
claim that “just as those who sketch landscapes place themselves down in the plain to consider
the nature of mountains and high places and to consider the nature of low places place
themselves high atop mountains, similarly, to know well the nature of peoples one needs to be a
prince, and to know well the nature of princes one needs to be of the people” (The Prince, Epistle
Dedicatory). Perhaps the reason why the prince can so capably understand the nature of the
peoples is because he has departed from the average human by altering his own nature. In
addition to new perspective, this alteration might also impart the ability to satisfy the natural
desire to acquire that is present in all men. Furthermore, there is some suggestion that natural
entities cannot endure – Machiavelli asserts that “in the antiquity and continuity of the dominion
the memories and causes of innovations are eliminated; for one change always leaves a dentation
for the building of another” (The Prince, pg. 7). Princes recognize that the impermanence and
instability of nature will not easily allow their memories or their acquisitions to be preserved –
another impetus to reorder nature.
Ultimately, it seems that “the natural prince” is not a genuine prince because he cannot
adapt to the vagaries of nature. Machiavelli argues that “if such a prince is of ordinary industry,
he will always maintain himself in his state unless there is an extraordinary and excessive force
which deprives him of it; and should he be deprived of it, if any mishap befalls the occupier, he
reacquires it” (The Prince, pg. 7). If a ruler cannot adapt to the changing fortunes, then he will
lose his power. In short, a prince is one who reorders his own nature in service of his natural
desires. Here too we see that the focus is on accommodating, ordering, and shaping nature
instead of subjugating it. Machiavelli does not advise princes to forget or transcend their natural
35
desires. Instead, he encourages them to find ways to fulfill the desires that nature gave them
instead of ignoring or transcending them. As one scholar notes, “the political satisfaction of
these desires is what constitutes the summum bonum of Machiavellian politics” (Parel1, pg. 105).
Regardless of how it came about, there is some suggestion that princes are fundamentally
different from other men. In describing Cesare Borgia’s conquest of the Romagna, Machiavelli
explains that the great cruelty of the battle arose “from the wickedness of those princes, not from
the wicked nature of men” because “those princes were poor and wished to live like the rich,
they were necessitated to turn to much pillaging and to use it in various modes” (Discourses,
III.29.1). This seems to be an inadequate explanation because all men want wealth and are not
satisfied with their own possessions. However, Machiavelli writes that “a small part of [the
people] desires to be free so as to command, but all the others, who are infinite, desire freedom
so as to live secure” (Discourses, I.16.5). Similarly, he cautions that “so great is the ambition of
the great that it soon brings that city to its ruin if it is not beaten down in a city by various ways
and various modes” (Discourses, I.37.3).
Finally, he reminds us that “in Rome the
inconvenience of creating this tyranny arose for those same causes that the greater part of
tyrannies in cities arises; and this is from too great a desire of the people to be free and from too
great a desire of the nobles to command” (Discourses, I.40.5). One scholar suggests that “this
contrast might be taken as an indication that peoples and princes somehow differ in character,
but, as we have seen, this is not Machiavelli’s view” (Rahe1, pg. 54). However it would seem
that princes are those who desire power over all else (unlike the people who desire security and
stability), which does suggest a change in character. Rather tellingly, he cautions that ”if one
considers the ends of the nobles and of the ignoble, one will see great desire to dominate in the
former, and in the latter only desire not to be dominated” (Discourses, I.5.2). Machiavelli
36
explains that man’s avarice can have different objects, and princes are those who lust after power
over wealth or security.
Machiavelli writes that “great men are always the same in every fortune,” while “weak
men grow vain and intoxicated in good fortune by attributing all the good they have to the virtue
they have never known” (Discourses, III.31.1). It would seem that princes can deal with the
blows of fortune, and when “it varies—now by exalting them, now by crushing them—they do
not vary but always keep their spirit firm and joined with their mode of life so that one easily
knows for each that fortune does not have power over them” (Discourses, III.31.1). Thus,
princes are so capable and so adaptable that they can thrive no matter what the character of the
time. This would seem to suggest that the chaos of the natural world is not so confusing if great
men are able to stand firm (but not inflexible) during times of great change. Furthermore, this
would seem to suggest that princes are immune to the vagaries of fortune.
The opposite is true of the people; Machiavelli claims that “a people is seen to hold a
thing in horror and to stay with that opinion for many centuries, which is not seen in a prince”
(Discourses, I.58.3).
This suggests that the people are inflexible and unable to adapt.
Furthermore, Machiavelli many times emphasizes how easily the multitude is deceived. He
writes that “many times, deceived by a false image of good, the people desires its own ruin; and
if it is not made aware what that is bad and what the good is, by someone in whom it has faith,
infinite dangers and harms are brought into republics” (Discourses, I.53.1). He also claims that
“when gain is seen in the things that are put before the people, even though there is loss
concealed underneath, and when it appears spirited, even though there is the ruin of the republic
concealed underneath, it will always be easy to persuade the multitude of it; and likewise it may
always be difficult to persuade it of these policies if either cowardice or loss might appear, even
37
though safety and gain might be concealed underneath” (Discourses, I.53.2). He says that “so
much are peoples blinded in these mighty opinions,” that a prince can easily manipulate them
(Discourses, I.53.2).
One scholar argues that “Machiavelli makes a display out of asserting the wisdom of the
people, but after this consideration their wisdom appears to be founded in the very gullibility that
made them so vulnerable to the deceptions of the great” (Sullivan1, pg. 55). Despite their
gullibility though, the people are not wholly bad. Machiavelli devotes an entire chapter in
Discourses on Livy entitled “The Multitude Is Wiser And More Constant Than A Prince” to
explaining the virtues of the people as a whole. He refers to “the restless spirits of the plebs,”
which suggests that the people experience the same insatiable desires that princes do
(Discourses, I.5.2). Furthermore, it seems that their virtues complement those of the princes.
Machiavelli writes that “if princes are superior to peoples in ordering laws, forming civil lives,
and ordering new statutes and orders, peoples are so much superior in maintaining things ordered
that without doubt they attain the glory of those who order them” (Discourses, I.58.3). He also
that if “one is reasoning about a prince obligated to the laws and about a people fettered by them,
more virtue will always be seen in the people than in the prince; if one reasons about both as
unshackled, fewer errors will be seen in the people than in the prince—and those lesser and
having greater remedies” (Discourses, I.58.4). This is because “a prince who can do what he
wishes is crazy; a people that can do what it wishes is not wise” (Discourses, I.58.4). He then
writes that “the cruelties of the multitude are against whoever they fear will seize the common
good; those of a prince are against whoever he fears will seize his own good” (Discourses,
I.58.4).17 Machiavelli explains that this poor opinion of the “peoples arises because everyone
speaks ill of peoples without fear and freely, even while they reign; princes are always spoken of
17
This seems to be another suggestion that Machiavelli wrote in a deceptive manner.
38
with a thousand fears and a thousand hesitations” (Discourses, I.58.4). Therefore it seems that
princes pose more of a threat than the people. Machiavelli writes that “a prince unshackled from
the laws will be more ungrateful, varying, and imprudent than a people” and that “the variation
in their proceeding arises not from a diverse nature—because it is in one mode in all, and if there
is advantage of good, it is in the people—but from having more or less respect for the laws
within which both live” (Discourses, I.58.3). Machiavelli does admit that “everyone who is not
regulated by laws would make the same errors as the unshackled multitude” (Discourses, I.
58.2). However, because they have so little respect for the law, “there is no one who can speak
to a wicked prince, nor is there any remedy other than steel” (Discourses, I.58.4). In short,
Machiavelli is careful to highlight the differing strengths of the prince and the people and
emphasizes that “the nature of the multitude is no more to be faulted than that of princes, because
all err equally when all can err without respect” (Discourses, I.58.2).
FOUNDING REPUBLICS
Machiavelli writes that “one cannot satisfy the great with decency and without injury to
others, but one can satisfy the people; for the end of the people is more decent than that of the
great, since the great want to oppress and the people want not to be oppressed” (The Prince, pg.
39). If the great men desire to wield power over others, then the most obvious path to that would
be through some sort of political power. Thus it seems that princes can fulfill their natural desire
to acquire through ruling. However, a prince can only rule for as long as he lives. Perhaps
princes recognize that the impermanence and instability of nature will not allow their memories
to be preserved and thus desire power and glory which are perhaps more enduring than the
human body.
Is the act of founding what then fulfills that desire? A prince who founds a
39
political order can extend his rule past his life and therefore, in some sense, live on after he is
dead.
THE ACT OF FOUNDING
Because political society is naturally chaotic and unstable, those desiring lasting power
must reorder human society. Accordingly if men want to fulfill their desires, they need to better
nature or reorder nature through the act of founding. However, does the conquest of one’s own
human nature have to precede the shaping of natural political society? It would seem so because
Machiavelli describes founding as an act of the imagination, given that “political institutions do
not grow out of rock and wood but out of the minds of men” (Parel, pg. 61). He writes that
“many have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist in
truth; for it is so far from how one lives to how one should live that he who lets go of what is
done for what should be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation” (The Prince, pg. 61).
Perhaps a reference to Socrates’ description of the ideal city in The Republic, this point
emphasizes the extent to which organized, enduring political structures are not natural. It also
seems to be an attack on purely imagined republics – Machiavelli seems to condemn those
imagined republics that try to subjugate nature or that try to work around human nature instead
of with it. However, as mentioned earlier, any act of founding would seem to be a product of
imagination – a prince who founds a state is creating something that never existed in nature.
The institutions that a new prince would found are not entirely rooted in nature – they are
products of his mind. It is rather telling that Machiavelli attributes the creation of republics and
principalities to the imagination. Imagining would seem to be the act of designing or creating
things that do not exist in the natural world. The imagined things may take inspiration from the
40
natural world, but they are entirely unnatural insofar as they are a product of the human mind.
Furthermore, if it is in fact true that “it is so far from how one lives to how one should live,” then
we can conclude that Machiavelli does not have a high opinion of how man lives naturally. This
might provide us with some hint as to what Machiavelli’s grand project is – perhaps it is to
improve the lives of men by highlighting the need for political society and one type of political
organization in particular: republics.
THE IMPORTANCE OF REPUBLICS
To summarize, founding is the act of imposing order on nature, but the focus seems to be
on accommodation instead of total mastery of nature. As mentioned above, Machiavelli argues
that a prince “needs to have a spirit disposed to change as the winds of fortune and variations of
things command him, and…not to depart from good, when possible, but to know how to enter
into evil, when forced by necessity” (The Prince, pg. 70). The focus here is on adaptation and
flexibility. He argues that “when fortune varies and men remain obstinate in their modes, men
are happy while they are in accord, and as they come into discord, unhappy” (The Prince, pg.
101).
Princes must change their practices as fortune changes.
Perhaps this explains
Machiavelli’s praise of armed princes. He writes that “without its own arms no principality is
secure; indeed it is wholly obliged to fortune since it does not have virtue to defend itself in
adversity” (The Prince, pg. 57). An armed principality is one that takes advantage of any
opportunities that fortune hands out.
Though it seems clear that founding is an imperative for princes, the question remains as
to which form of government is most stable and enduring. Though Machiavelli styles these
founders as princes, it is unclear if he endorses principalities or hereditary monarchies as the best
41
form of government. In fact, he cautions that when the people are well-treated, “they are yours
offering you their blood, property, lives, and children…when the need for them is far away; but,
when it is close to you, they revolt” (The Prince, pg. 66). The people are fickle and thus
unreliable. Any form of government—such as a principality or a hereditary monarchy—that is
built on their loyalty to an individual will crumble. Machiavelli then says that the “prince who
has founded himself entirely on their words, stripped of other preparation, is ruined; for
friendships that are acquired at a price and not with greatness and nobility of spirit are bought,
but they are not owned and when the time comes they cannot be spent” (The Prince, pg. 66).
Thus it seems that personal bonds of loyalty and friendship to an individual ruler do not form a
solid basis for continued rule because of the natural antagonism of men.
ON THE MULTIPLICITY OF RULERS
In discussing Scipio, Machiavelli claims that “such nature would in time have sullied
Scipio’s fame and glory if he had continued with it in the empire; but while he lived under the
government of the Senate, this damaging quality of his not only was hidden, but made for his
glory” (The Prince, pg. 68). Crucially, he points out that what saved Scipio from certain ruin
was the type of government of which he is a part – a republic. The suggestion here seems to be
that a republic can make use of different natures in a positive or productive way. An individual
ruler cannot channel both the unaltered natures of the masses and the reordered natures of the
princes into something productive. Instead, he must rely on his strength of will and perhaps also
on those vices that would make him infamous. However, republics can utilize different natures
without having to subjugate them; thus it seems that the best princes are those who found
republics. Within republics, “the multiplicity of their leadership made them more flexible and
42
adaptable to the shifts of fortuna that could be expected of the single personality of the ruling
individual” (Pocock, pg. 212).
The question of who actually chooses these rulers is left
unanswered. In light of Machiavelli’s claim that a “people is more prudent, more stable, and of
better judgment than a prince,” it seems that all parties in a republic (both the people and the
nobles) would be capable of making a prudent choice (Discourses, I.58.3). In fact, Machiavelli
reminds us that “not without cause may the voice of a people be likened to that of God”
(Discourses, I.58.3).
The story of Scipio arises again in the Discourses on Livy. In speaking of Rome’s victory
over Hannibal, Machiavelli reminds us that “a man who is accustomed to proceed in one mode
never changes,” and that “it must be of necessity that when the times change not in conformity
with his mode, he is ruined” (Discourses, III.9.2). Fabius Maximus, consul during Hannibal’s
invasion of Italy, always “proceeded hesitantly and cautiously with his army, far from all
impetuosity and from all Roman audacity, and good fortune made this mode of his match well
with the times” (Discourses, III.9.1). However, as the war wore on, Fabius did not realize that
“the times had changed for him and that he needed to change the mode of war” (Discourses,
III.9.1). However, both he and Scipio had the good fortune to live in a republic “where there
were diverse citizens and diverse humors; as it had Fabius, who was the best in times proper for
sustaining war, so later it had Scipio in times apt for winning it” (Discourses, III.9.1). Therefore,
though Fabius “did not know how to vary his procedure as the times varied,” Rome was still
saved because Scipio came to power and boldy went “to Africa with the armies to put an end to
the war” (Discourses, III.9.1). Though neither of the rulers in this episode were able to adapt to
changes, the Roman Republic persisted because it was able to make use of the many resources
available to it. Machiavelli writes that “a republic has greater life and has good fortune longer
43
than a principality, for it can accommodate itself better than one prince can to the diversity of
times through the diversity of the citizens that are in it” (Discourses, III.9.2). This is tremendous
praise of the flexibility and adaptability of republics.
As mentioned before, Machiavelli showered Septimus Severus with a rare amount of
praise, arguing that he had manipulated his nature so as to be able to use the fox and the lion
well. However, the problem that prevented Severus from being a truly great leader was his son –
Antoninus Caracalla. Machiavelli says that “his ferocity and cruelty were so great and so
unheard of—for after infinite individual killings he had put to death a great part of the people of
Rome and all of the people of Alexandria—that he became most hateful to all the world” (The
Prince, pg. 79). In fact, Caracalla “began to be feared even by those who he had around him, so
he was killed by a centurion in the midst of his army” (The Prince, pg. 79). Though Severus
was an exemplary ruler, his rule could not continue after his death; his rule couldn’t continue as
that of a parlement could. Institutions, on the other hand, are more permanent. They can
manipulate the natures of others while princes can only reorder their own natures. Furthermore,
republics specifically “should do so much more, as through mode of electing, it has not only two
in succession but infinite most virtuous princes who are successors to one another” (Discourses,
I.20.1). In a principality or hereditary monarchy, there is no real control over succession, but the
citizens of a republic can work to choose the most able leader.
ROMULUS: THE IDEAL FOUNDER
Machiavelli entitled his chapter in The Prince devoted to conspiracies “Of Contempt and
Hatred.” Intriguingly, it seems that this chapter serves more to highlight the dangers of tyranny
than to highlight the chaos of the natural world.
Significantly, there are no examples of
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conspiracies against republics, just against tyrants such as Nabis the Spartan, Annibale
Bentivoglio, prince of Bologna, and a whole host of Roman emperors: Pertinax, Alexander
Severus, Julianus, Antoninus Caracalla, Commodus, Maximinus, Heliogabalus, and Macrinus.
Thus those who found republics would seem to be less vulnerable to the threat of conspiracy (but
not wholly invincible – Caesar overthrew the Roman Republic, though Machiavelli hints that the
Republic itself was to blame). Machiavelli claims that “men are infamous and detestable who
are destroyers of religions, squanderers of kingdoms and republics, and enemies of the virtues, of
letters, and of every other art that brings utility and honor to the human race, as are the impious,
the violent, the ignorant, the worthless, the idle, the cowardly” (Discourses, I.10.1). He writes
that of the many men “deceived by a false good and a false glory, almost all let themselves go,
either voluntarily or ignorantly, into the ranks of those who deserve more blame than praise; and
though, to their perpetual honor, they are able to make a republic or a kingdom, they turn to
tyranny” because they do not realize “how much fame, how much glory, how much honor,
security, quiet, with satisfaction of mind, they flee from by this policy; and how much infamy,
reproach, blame, danger, and disquiet they run into” (Discourses, I.10.1). Thus it is clear that the
greatest founders are those who order republics.
The foremost example of a founder of a republic is Romulus. Machiavelli reserves high
praise for Romulus, saying that of “those who have become princes by their own virtue and not
by fortune, I say that the most excellent are Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and the like” (The
Prince, pg. 22). Furthermore, he writes that “if a prince seeks the glory of the world, he ought to
desire to possess a corrupt city—not to spoil it entirely as did Caesar but to reorder it as did
Romulus,” and that “the heavens cannot give to men a greater opportunity for glory, nor can men
desire any greater” (Discourses, I.10.6). In short, founding republics makes princes “live secure
45
and after death renders them glorious” while starting monarchies or becoming tyrants makes
them “live in continual anxieties and after death leaves them a sempiternal infamy” (Discourses,
I.10.6). Machiavelli recognizes that “many will perhaps judge it a bad example that a founder of
a civil way of life, as was Romulus, should first have killed his brother, then consented to the
death of Titus Tatius the Sabine, chosen by him as partner in the kingdom—judging because of
this that its citizens might, with the authority of their prince, through ambition and desire to
command, be able to offend those who might be opposed to their authority” (Discourses, I.9.1).
However, Machiavelli explains that “it never or rarely happens that any republic or kingdom is
ordered well from the beginning or reformed altogether anew outside its old orders unless it is
ordered by one individual” (Discourses, I.9.2). Therefore, because the “prudent orderer of a
republic, who has the intent to wish to help not himself but the common good, not for his own
succession but for the common fatherland, should contrive to have authority alone,” Romulus’s
fratricide is excused (Discourses, I.9.2). Furthermore, Machiavelli argues that Romulus’s later
actions prove his virtue. He explains that “if one individual is capable of ordering, the thing
itself is ordered to last long not if it remains on the shoulders of one individual but rather if it
remains in the care of many and its maintenance stays with many” (Discourses, I.9.2). On a
practical level, men do not live forever, so any institution that depends on one man cannot persist
after his death. More importantly, this seems to be a warning that monarchies or dictatorships
are not stable or enduring.
Perhaps there is some quality of one-man rule that makes it
vulnerable to decay.
Therefore, that Romulus “deserves excuse in the deaths of his brother and of his partner,
and that what he did was for the common good and not for his own ambition, is demonstrated by
his having at once ordered a Senate with which he took counsel and by whose opinion he
46
decided” (Discourses, I.9.2). Furthermore, “the authority that Romulus reserved for himself will
see that none other was reserved except that of commanding the armies when war was decided
on and that of convoking the Senate” which shows that he prioritized the good of Rome over his
own glory (Discourses, I.9.2). One scholar asserts that “Romulus failed to render the kingship
perpetual but did his work well enough to permit its transformation into an exceptionally
successful republic” (Pocock, pg. 189). However, it was because he founded the Senate that
Machiavelli labels Romulus as the founder of the Roman Republic, even though he was a king.
Rather shockingly, Machiavelli claims that “among the well-ordered and governed
kingdoms in our times is that of France; and in it are infinite good institutions on which the
liberty and security of the king depend” (The Prince, pg. 75).
The primary institution
responsible for this stability is the parlement. Machiavelli praises the French founders, saying
that “the one who ordered that kingdom, knowing the ambition of the powerful and their
insolence, and judging it necessary for them to have a bit in their mouths to correct them, and on
the other side, knowing the hatred of the generality of people against the great, which is founded
in its fear, and wanting to secure them, intended this not be the particular concern of the king, so
as to take from him the blame he would have from the great when he favored the popular side,
and from the popular side when he favored the great; and so he constituted a third judge to be the
one who would beat down the great and favor the lesser side without blame for the king” (The
Prince, pg. 75). He claims that this institution “could not be better, or more prudent, or a greater
cause of the security of the king and the kingdom” (The Prince, pg. 75). Just as a prince must
share power in a republic, the French king strengthens his own power by sharing power with the
parlement. This praise of institutions over individuals is telling – it suggests that Machiavelli did
value republics as the preeminent form of government. It also suggests that it can be in a
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founder’s interest to limit his own authority because “princes should have anything blameable
administered by others” and only “favors by themselves” (The Prince, pg. 75).
Machiavelli writes that “the virtue of Romulus was so much that it could give space to
Numa Pompilius to enable him to rule Rome for many years with the art of peace” (Discourses,
I.19.3). Machiavelli continues by saying that a founder who “is like Numa will hold it or not
hold it as the times or fortune turn under him, but he who is like Romulus, and like him comes
armed with prudence and with arms, will hold it in every mode unless it is taken from him by an
obstinate and excessive force” (Discourses, I.19.4). In short, he writes that Roman history
testifies to Romulus’s excellence as a founder because it shows “that all the first orders of that
city were more comfortable to a civil and free way of life than to an absolute and tyrannical one”
(Discourses, I.9.2). In short, the best founder is one who can not only reorder his own nature but
also create a lasting external order that accommodates men’s nature and imposes some order on
nature. So a founder can reorder just his own nature (like Achilles and Severus) or he can
reorder political society (like Romulus and Moses). Though both are driven by the same desire
to acquire, it is those princes who reorder their internal nature and human society that are the
greatest, and of those princes, it is those who are willing to share power that can be certain that
their acquisitions will persist.
To conclude, perhaps the greatest praise that Machiavelli provides of republics shows up
earlier in The Prince. In describing how princes should best administer conquered territories,
Machiavelli writes that “whoever becomes patron of a city accustomed to living free and does
not destroy it, should expect to be destroyed by it; for it always has as a refuge in rebellion the
name of liberty and its own ancient orders which are never forgotten either through the length of
time or because of benefits received” (The Prince, pg. 21). However, when those states that are
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accustomed “to living under a prince, and his bloodline is eliminated—since on the one hand
they are used to obeying, and on the other they do not have the old prince—they will not agree to
make one from among themselves and they do not know how to live free” (The Prince, pg. 21).
Thus, people used to living under single rulers are “slower to take up arms, and a prince can gain
them with greater ease and can secure himself against them” (The Prince, pg. 21). However, “in
republics there is greater life, greater hatred, more desire for revenge; the memory of their
ancient liberty does not and cannot let them rest, so that the most secure path is to eliminate them
or live in them” (The Prince, pg. 21). This is great praise of republics; because they are so vital,
the only way to conquer a republic is to destroy it.
MACHIAVELLI’S OPTIMISM
Machiavelli writes that “the Romans did in these cases what all wise princes should do:
they not only have to have regard for present troubles but also for future ones, and they have to
avoid these with all their industry because when one foresees from afar, one can easily find a
remedy but when you wait until they come close to you, the medicine is not in time because the
disease has become incurable” (The Prince, pg. 12). Machiavelli then says that “it happens with
this as the physicians say of consumption, that in the beginning of the illness it is easy to cure
and difficult to recognize, but in the progress of time, when it has not been recognized and
treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to recognize and difficult to cure” (The Prince, pg. 12).
The same is true of political affairs, “because when one recognizes from afar the evils that arise
in a state (which is not given but to one who is prudent), they are soon healed; but when they are
left to grow because they were not recognized, to the point that everyone recognizes them, there
is no longer any remedy for them” (The Prince, pg. 12). The Romans excelled in this regard
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because “seeing inconveniences from afar,” they “always found remedies for them and never
allowed them to continue so as to escape a war, because they knew that war may not be avoided
but is deferred to the advantage of others” (The Prince, pg. 12). Machiavelli’s praise of the
Romans for their foresight and ability to solve problems is extremely telling. That problems can
be solved and that remedies exist suggests great optimism.
ROME AND SPARTA
Machiavelli opens the third book of his Discourses on Livy with a claim that “all worldly
things have a limit to their life; but generally those go the whole course that is ordered for them
by heaven, that do not disorder their body but keep it ordered so that either it does not alter or, if
it alters, it is for its safety and not to its harm” (Discourses, III.1.1). His mention of heaven
seems tongue-in-cheek; men are the ones who make order out of the chaos of nature.
Regardless, this would seem to suggest that “a worldly thing” could persist if either it does not
change or if it changes in a prudent manner. The ability of worldly things to persist without
changing would suggest that it is possible to remain static in the face of a tempestuous nature and
also implies that bodies—which are part of the natural world—can remain stable and
unchanging. If that is true, then perhaps the world is not a dynamic place because it is hospitable
to those bodies (either natural or manmade) that do not change.
In the very beginning of the Discourses, Machiavelli seems to praise Sparta for its static
laws, saying that “among those who have deserved the most praise for such constitutions is
Lycurgus, who in Sparta ordered his laws so as to give their roles to the kings, the aristocrats,
and the people and made a state that lasted more than eight hundred years, achieving the highest
praise for himself and quiet in the city” (Discourses, I.2.6). Sparta would seem to be the prime
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example of a body that lasted without changing and thus perhaps superior to Rome because
“Romulus failed to render the kingship perpetual but did his work well enough to permit its
transformation into an exceptionally successful republic” (Pocock, pg. 189).
However,
Machiavelli concludes that brief first paragraph of the third book by saying that “it is a thing
clearer than light that these bodies do not last if they do not renew themselves,” and he
emphasizes that Sparta did not change over time (Discourses, III.1.1). Earlier, Machiavelli
asserted that only those bodies that change can survive and devotes much of his time “to a
discourse of what were the orders of the city of Rome and what accidents led it to its perfection”
(Discourses, I.2.2). Rome changed continually throughout her long existence, and Machiavelli
lauds Rome as a perfect republic. Furthermore, Machiavelli reveals later that Sparta “showed its
weak foundation upon the one slightest accident; for when other cities rebelled, following the
rebellion in Thebes, caused by Pelipodas, that republic was altogether ruined” (Discourses,
I.6.4). Thus it seems that the stagnant Spartan state did not persist through the many tumults and
accidents that changed but also strengthened the Roman Republic. Because it was able to adapt
to the vagaries of fortune, the Roman Republic outlasted the static Spartan city-state, and
Machiavelli very explicitly discusses what particular types of alterations led to the success of the
Roman Republic.
FEAR AND RENEWAL
Machiavelli specifies that the most prudent “mode of renewing [bodies] is, as was said, to
lead them back toward their beginnings” (Discourses, III.1.2). Renewal is necessary because
“all the beginnings of sects, republics, and kingdoms must have some goodness in them, by
means of which they may regain their first reputation and their first increase” (Discourses,
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III.1.2). The goodness to which Machiavelli is referring is likely the audacity and cunning that a
new prince must use to gain power and establish a state. Furthermore, because of its roots in
conquest, the formation of a new state is necessarily difficult and fearful. New states, new
princes, and new citizens are vulnerable and must work to consolidate their standing amongst
other states and to gain security. However, “in the process of time that goodness is corrupted,
unless something intervenes to lead it back to the mark, it of necessity kills that body”
(Discourses, III.1.2). Presumably the cause of the loss of goodness is the loss of the new prince
and the degeneration of the orders he instituted. Thus renewal is necessary because decay is
inevitable; a body cannot remain in the same condition for an extended period of time. Not only
do all princes die, the institutions they set up to govern a state do not remain stable or even
functional.
More specifically, Machiavelli writes that “as the memory of that beating is
eliminated, men began to dare to try new things and to say evil; and so it is necessary to provide
for it, drawing [the state] back toward its beginnings” (Discourses, III.1.3). The cause of this
decay is rooted in the forgetfulness of men – as men feel secure, they forget the troubles they
faced in the past, and without the fear of those troubles to motivate good behavior, they act
badly. As a solution, Machiavelli has “a particular confidence in the inculcation of fear that
originates in the recognition of human vulnerability in relation to the power of the state”
(Sullivan1, pg. 79). He claimed that “having fear that if the plebs were treated badly it would not
take their side, the nobility behaved humanely toward them; but as soon as…fear fled from the
nobles, they began to spit out that poison against the plebs that they had held in their breasts, and
they offended it in all the modes they could” (Discourses, I.3.2). Corruption here is linked with
the loss of fear – the source of the Machiavellian formulation that fear makes men good.
Because fear fades over time, it is inevitable that “men begin to vary in their customs and to
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transgress the laws” (Discourses, III.1.3). One scholar states that “what makes people operate
well, according to Machiavelli, is the immediate fear of the direst consequences—a threat to their
mortal existences” (Sullivan2, pg. 188). As the citizens of a particular political body start to
degenerate, it only follows that the state itself deteriorates. Therefore, “if a well-ordered republic
is to endure, at frequent intervals, perhaps even on a daily basis, the primordial fear that animates
it must be renewed” (Rahe1, pg. 47).
Machiavelli writes that “men never work any good unless through necessity, but where
choice abounds and one can make use of license, at once everything is full of confusion and
disorder” (Discourses, I.3.2). The fear that men felt in times of danger and uncertainty fades
when their state becomes powerful, and without that fear to motivate their actions, men act
imprudently and carelessly. Because all states experience the ups and downs of political life,
men will not always live in fear. When they are faced with the threat of war or civil strife (and
they recognize that threat), men will act prudently; yet once the trouble is resolved and the
memory of it vanishes, fear no longer guides men’s actions. This could be indicative of an
extremely pessimistic outlook, for Machiavelli suggests that stability is a difficult state to reach
in our chaotic world. While a state may be founded through the virtue of men, that virtue is
fleeting and will dissipate as soon as the need for it diminishes. Thus for fear to persist and men
to remain virtuous, the memories of dangerous times must persist – a seeming impossibility
according to Machiavelli.
In fact, Machiavelli devotes an entire chapter titled “That The
Variation of Sects and Languages, Together with the Accident of Floods or Plague, Eliminates
the Memories of Things” to a discussion of the impermanence of memories (Discourses, II.5).
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ON THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD
Machiavelli says “to those philosophers who would have it that the world is eternal, I
believe that one could reply that if so much antiquity were true it would be reasonable that there
be memory of more than five thousand years—if it were not seen how the memories of times are
eliminated by diverse causes, of which part come from men, part from heaven” (Discourses,
II.5.1). Apparently, it is only inevitable that memories do not persist. He claims that memories
are regularly erased by two types of events: man-made and heavenly. Those causes “that come
from men are the variations of sects and of languages” (Discourses, II.5.1). Remarkably, he
claims that religion is a product of man – perhaps he is suggesting that all religions are simply
orders created by men to gain power and glory. In fact, he claims that “among all men praised,
the most praised are those who have been heads and orderers of religions” (Discourses, I.10.1).
Machiavelli explains that “when a new sect—that is, a new religion—emerges, its first concern is
to extinguish the old to give itself reputation; and when it occurs that the orderers of the new sect
are of a different language, they easily eliminate it” (Discourses, II.5.1). It is noteworthy that
Machiavelli labels the rise of a religion as a man-made cause. As an explanation, he offers that a
new religion is first and foremost concerned with enhancing its reputation. In fact, he says
explicitly that a new religion’s “first concern is to extinguish the old to give itself reputation”
(Discourses, II.5.1).
Machiavelli proceeds to explain that the causes that come from heaven “are those that
eliminate the human race and reduce the inhabitants of part of the world to few” (Discourses,
II.5.2). He argues that this purging of the human race “comes about either through plague or
through famine or though an inundation of waters” (Discourses, II.5.2). He argues that “all the
histories are full of” references to these types of natural disasters – a clear allusion to the Biblical
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accounts of floods and plagues wreaking havoc (Discourses, II.5.2). It is evident that this
allusion is not incidental; it suggests that Machiavelli is trying to conflate both man-made and
heavenly causes and trying to imply that there is very little difference between them. This raises
the question of what the true relation between these two causes is.
Rather tellingly, Machiavelli argues that floods are the most devastating natural disasters
“because [they are] more universal and because those who are saved are all mountain men and
coarse, who, since they do not have knowledge of antiquity, cannot leave it behind to posterity”
(Discourses, II.5.2). He concludes this seemingly cryptic line of thought by stating that if
“someone is saved who has knowledge of [ancient memories], to make a reputation and a name
for himself he conceals it and perverts it in his mode so that what he has wished to write alone,
and nothing else, remains for his successors” (Discourses, II.5.2).
In this single example,
Machiavelli makes it clear that what actually eliminates memories is not the flood itself but the
men who remain after it – here again, we return to men as the cause of memories being
eliminated. In fact, this might imply that our knowledge of what eliminates memories is warped
the men who remain.
Machiavelli’s categorization of religion as a man-made cause of memory elimination also
suggests that it is man (and thus not nature) is who eliminates “every memory of that ancient
theology” (Discourses, II.5.2). The focus in both cases of memory elimination is on man. In the
first case, Machiavelli gives the example of “the modes taken by Saint Gregory and other heads
of the Christian religion” who “persecuted all the ancient memories, burning the works of the
poets and the historians, ruining images, and spoiling every other thing that might what convey
some sign of antiquity” (Discourses, II.5.1). It was not God who erased the memories of the
religions before him. It was men. In the second case, Machiavelli suggests that the natural
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disasters allow for the few with knowledge of the ancient times who remain simply use the
opportunity to “to make a reputation and a name” for themselves (Discourses, II.5.2). Here
again, the focus is on men as the destroyers of memory.
On the surface, this chapter seems extremely pessimistic – it suggests that because of the
imperfection of man, nothing, including political orders, can persist and that eventually, all
bodies must change.
Machiavelli repeatedly argues that “since human things are always in
motion, either they ascend or they descend” (Discourses, II.Preface.2). Similarly, he earlier
claims that “all things of men are in motion and cannot stay steady, they must either rise or fall;
and to many things that reason does not bring you, necessity brings you” (Discourses, I.1.6).
Given Machiavelli’s description of nature, it seems unlikely that cities will rise indefinitely:
nature is unforgiving “because in the process of time that goodness is corrupted” which founded
the city (Discourses, III.1.2). Furthermore, because “nature has created men so that they are able
to desire everything and are unable to attain everything,” conquest by another power is an everpresent danger (Discourses, I.37.1). On a more basic level, perpetual ascent would seem to be an
impossibility – the most powerful state would have no option apart from decline; in that sense,
decline is inevitable and natural. This gloomy outlook is not surprising in light of Machiavelli’s
uncharitable description of nature as chaotic and indifferent. However, a continuing examination
of the fifth chapter of the second book of Discourses on Livy reveals an alternate interpretation.
In both cases given of memory elimination, the examples given are of men rising to
power by eliminating old memories, so perhaps it is really men, who motivated by voracious
desires, change the world.
Though Machiavelli lists floods and other natural disasters as
heavenly causes of memory elimination, he explains that the men who remain after the natural
disaster who appropriate ancient memories for their own purposes. He categorizes religion as a
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man-made cause of memory elimination, saying that men who wish to institute new religions
ruthlessly destroy any memories of the old ones. That men can accomplish such momentous
tasks as erasing the memory of entire religions or historical events would seem to be a sign of
optimism or at least faith in the will of man as a tool to reshape the world. If it is men who fuel
change instead of nature, though change may be inevitable, men can manipulate changes to their
own benefit. More importantly, that change is the product of man’s efforts would seem to lessen
the gravity of the situation created by the fall of the Roman Republic. If change is inevitable,
then we cannot expect any single republic to last forever. Instead, that collapse leaves room for
new republics. More importantly, if the Roman Republic was born out of and extinguished at the
hands of men, then we can have faith that men will create another republic. This belief that man
can shape nature might shed light on Machiavelli’s own motives. An optimist at heart, perhaps
Machiavelli’s goal in describing the failures and successes of the Roman Republic is to inspire
other men to create an enduring political order.
Machiavelli concludes his description of heavenly causes by stating that “nature many
times moves by itself and produces a purge that is the health of that body, so it happens in this
mixed body of the human race that when all provinces are filled with inhabitants (so that they
can neither live there nor go elsewhere since all places are occupied and filled) and human
astuteness and malignity have gone as far as they can go, the world must of necessity be purged
by one of the three modes, so that men, through having become few and beaten, may live more
advantageously and become better” (Discourses, II.5.2). Perhaps we are meant to conclude that
it is in fact men who repeatedly purge the world of its malignity (though they in fact are also the
cause of that malignity). More importantly, Machiavelli’s benevolent characterization of these
purges suggests that perhaps the constant change in the world is not cause for despair. Instead, it
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provides more opportunities for the ambition of man to better the condition of man.
AN UNLIKELY OPTIMIST
Machiavelli also gives hope that there can be enduring orders, saying that “if a republic
were so happy that it often had one who with his example might renew the laws, and not only
restrain it from running to ruin but pull it back, it would be perpetual” (Discourses, III.22.3).
Thus, a republic could survive for an indefinite amount of time simply if it were continually
renewed, and the “mode of renewing them is, as was said, to lead them back toward their
beginnings” because the “beginnings of sects, republics, and kingdoms must have some
goodness in them, by means of which they may regain their first reputation and their first
increase” (Discourses, III.1.2). Over time, however, because “that goodness is corrupted, unless
something intervenes to lead it back to the mark, it of necessity kills that body” (Discourses,
III.1.2). Machiavelli writes that this renewal “is done through either extrinsic accidents or
intrinsic prudence” (Discourses, III.1.2). Thus, it is entirely possible that a republic could
continue indefinitely if it was extraordinarily fortunate or if, more likely, it had a series of
prudent princes who continually drew the republic back to its beginnings. It seems the people
are eminently capable in this respect – “as to judging things, if a people hears two orators who
incline to different sides, when they are of equal virtue, very few times does one see it not take
up the better opinion, and not persuaded of the truth that it hears” (Discourses, I.58.3).
Machiavelli writes that a “virtuous succession will always exist in every well-ordered republic,”
so perhaps it is possible that this perpetual republic could come to be (Discourses, I.20.1).
Machiavelli asserts that “all worldly things in every time have their own counterpart in
ancient times…because these are the work of men, who have and always had the same passions,
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and they must of necessity result in the same effect” (Discourses, III.43.1). Here he admits that
human nature is constant, and given his characterization of our nature, that could be cause for
concern. However, in a chapter titled “In Diverse Peoples the Same Accidents May Often Be
Seen,” Machiavelli tells us that “whoever considers present and ancient things easily knows that
in all cities and in all people there are the same desires and the same humors, and there always
have been” (Discourses, I.39.1). He then asserts that “it is an easy thing for whoever examines
past things diligently to foresee future things in every republic and to take the remedies for them
that were used by the ancients, or, if they do not find any that were used, to think up new ones
through the similarity of accidents” (Discourses, I.39.1). He concludes by saying that “because
these considerations are neglected or not understood by whoever reads, or, if they are
understood, they are not known to whoever governs, it follows that there are always the same
scandals in every time” (Discourses, I.39.1). This is an explicitly progressive statement insofar
as it acknowledges man’s ability to avoid past mistakes. If the same problems reoccur in every
time simply through either neglect or lack of understanding on the part of rulers, then perhaps an
able ruler (or a well-educated ruler who has read Machiavelli’s works) could use knowledge of
past problems to prevent future ones. Not only does this suggest that the natural world is not
wholly impenetrable to human reason, it also evinces great confidence in the ability of man to
better his condition. Machiavelli admits that “time sweeps everything before it and can bring
with it good as well as evil and evil as well as good,” but he explains that “the Romans, seeing
inconveniences from afar, always found remedies for them and never allowed them to continue”
(The Prince, pg. 13, pg. 12). The Romans used foresight to prepare for any coming trials and
thus “enjoyed the benefit of their virtue and prudence” (The Prince, pg. 13).
Machiavelli’s optimism is perhaps most evident in Chapter 25 of The Prince.
As
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mentioned earlier, he likens fortune “to one of those violent rivers which, when they become
enraged, flood the plains, ruin the trees and the buildings, lift earth from this part, drop in
another; each person flees before them, everyone yields to their impetus without being able to
hinder them in any regard” (The Prince, pg. 98). Here he suggests that there is no way to fend
off the staggering blows dealt by fortune. However, he follows by arguing that “it is not as if
men, when times are quiet, could not provide for them with dikes and dams so that when they
rise later, either they go by a canal or their impetus is neither so wanton nor so damaging” (The
Prince, pg. 98). Thus with foresight, men can not only withstand fortune but almost entirely
mitigate her effects. Rather tellingly, Machiavelli then says that fortune “demonstrates her
power where virtue has not been put in order to resist her and therefore turns her impetus where
she knows dams and dikes have not been made to contain her” (The Prince, pg. 98). Perhaps we
are meant to conclude that only those who are not armed for the onslaught of fortune are
susceptible to her blows. Thus, man is wholly capable of thwarting fortune if he prepares
properly.
Machiavelli concludes Chapter 25 of The Prince by saying that “it is better to be
impetuous that cautious, because fortune is a woman; and it is necessary, if one wants to hold her
down, to beat her and strike her down” (The Prince, pg. 101). He claims that fortune “lets
herself be won more by the impetuous than by those who proceed coldly,” and “so always, like a
woman, she is the friend of the young, because they are less cautious, more ferocious, and
command her with more audacity” (The Prince, pg. 101). It would seem that impetuosity is a
symptom of optimism. Men should be bold because they have the ability to shape the world, and
the focus in this chapter is on men acting (by holding and beating and striking). On the contrary,
caution results from a pessimism that fears that men have no hope of taming nature. Machiavelli
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does seem to discourage reckless or imprudent impetuosity, most particularly one rooted in
religious hopes. The most obvious example of reckless impetuosity would seem to be Pope
Julius II, “whose course of thrusting himself entirely into the hands of a foreigner, when he
wanted Ferrara, could not have been less thought out” and who once “put himself with a single
guard in the hands of his enemy” (The Prince, pg. 54; Discourses I.27.1). However, though the
Pope was reckless, his schemes succeeded. In short, Machiavelli seems to argue that men,
though imperfect in many ways, are still capable of completely reshaping a harsh and chaotic
world, and he aids in that mission by trying to educate us about the reality of the world.
In describing the manner through which bodies renew themselves, Machiavelli writes,
“but as to sects, these renewals are also seen to be necessary by the example of our religion,
which would be altogether eliminated if it had not been drawn back toward its beginning by
Saint Francis and Saint Dominick” (Discourses, III.1.4). Thus it would seem that the renewal of
Christianity occurs through men, not God. Again the focus here is on the actions of men.
Furthermore, Machiavelli cautions that “nothing is more necessary in a common way of life,
whether it is sect or kingdom or republic, than to give back to it the reputation it had in its
beginnings, and to contrive that it be either good orders or good men that produce this effect, and
not have an extrinsic force to produce it” (Discourses, III.1.6). Machiavelli again mentions here
the necessity of bringing a republic back to its beginning, but he also emphasizes that a renewal
should not be the product of an external force. It would seem that God is an extrinsic force, as is
nature. Men, however, should rely on their own ingenuity and their own abilities to shape
political life and construct some sort of political order out of the chaos of nature.
More
importantly, the thrust of the argument here seems to be that men are more than able to order the
harsh and chaotic natural world – a fantastic optimism in light of Machiavelli’s brutal
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descriptions of the natural world and human nature!
CONCLUSION
Machiavelli reveals his ambition in the first line of Discourses on Livy; he states that
“although the envious nature of men has always made it no less dangerous to find new modes
and orders than to seek unknown waters and lands, because men are more ready to blame than to
praise the actions of others, nonetheless, driven by that natural desire that has always been in me
to work, without any respect, for those things I believe will bring common benefit to everyone, I
have decided to take a path as yet untrodden by anyone, and if it brings me trouble and difficulty,
it could also bring me reward through those who consider humanely the end of these labors of
mine” (Discourses, 1.Preface.1). Rather tellingly, he then writes that “if poor talent, little
experience of present things, and weak knowledge of ancient things make this attempt of mine
defective and not of much utility, it will at least show the path to someone who with more virtue,
more discourse and judgment, will be able to fulfill this intention of mine, which, if it will not
bring me praise, ought not to incur blame” (Discourses, I.Preface.1). Further into his analysis of
the Roman Republic (which he ultimately concludes was corrupted), Machiavelli claims that “if
a prince seeks the glory of the world, he ought to desire to possess a corrupt city—not spoil it
entirely as did Caesar but to reorder it as did Romulus,” and he is arguably attempting to perform
exactly this task – reforming a corrupt peoples (Discourses, 1.10.6). However, if his real goal is
lasting glory, Machiavelli faces a problem – memory elimination. To return to an earlier
discussion, Machiavelli argues that the causes of memory elimination that come from man are
new religions which eliminate ancient knowledge. The causes of memory elimination that come
from heaven are natural disasters that purge men, but men are the ones who possess ancient
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knowledge. Perhaps that implication is that natural disasters eliminate the memories of ancient
knowledge by killing off those who possess that knowledge while the emergence of new religion
does so by implementing a new language that will erase the ancient knowledge. Regardless of
these minor differences, both of the causes return to the ambition of man as the reason that
ancient memory is erased, and it is hard not to think that Machiavelli highlighted the small
differences to underscore the real and pervasive threat posed by unfulfilled ambition. It seems
that the dichotomy that Machiavelli creates between the two types of causes that eliminate
memories is a deliberately false one that reveals that the ambition of man is the only thing that
eliminates knowledge of antiquity.
Put concisely then, the problem that Machiavelli faces in founding a new order is that
history suggests that his new order will not survive because memories are regularly erased by
ambitious men wishing to make a name for themselves. The story of the men left behind after
natural disasters reveals one possible way out of this cycle – if Machiavelli can convince the
coarse mountain men to found a republic instead of a new religion, perhaps his memory will not
be erased. The implication here is that religions are far more destructive than any order that
Machiavelli wants to establish. Republics, particularly the republic that Machiavelli wishes to
found, are based on reason. Any deception that Machiavelli encourages does not depend on
revelation. Instead, Machiavelli provides a rationale for any deception that he encourages.
Perhaps Machiavelli’s truth here is that because his order is based on reason, it, unlike emergent
religions, is not threatened by ancient knowledge. Thus Machiavelli can preserve his glory.
However, the problem with this option is that Machiavelli cannot ensure that a religious man will
not erase his memory and claim Machiavelli’s insights for his own. In Machiavellian terms, that
would be the prudent course of action. While Machiavelli seems to hide his ambition, the
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question remains as to whether a true student would be fooled by Machiavelli’s attempts to
disguise his ambition.18
A MULTIPOLAR REPUBLIC
There also remains the question of the Christian conquest of Rome. Rome was a republic
but was still conquered by Christianity, a new religion.
Christianity is a republic, yet
Machiavelli is attempting to conquer it. In light of that occurrence, how can Machiavelli claim
that ambitious men do not threaten republics? Perhaps the answer to this question is that
Machiavelli aims to found the ideal republic, one that by virtue of its construction will last
indefinitely. That is what makes Machiavelli’s contribution invaluable and also what could
ensure his survival. It is not just any republic that will survive the emergence of a new religion
or natural disasters – it is the ideal republic that Machiavelli has constructed. The ideal republic
will allow all men an outlet for their ambition, enough so that they will not feel the desire to
destroy ancient knowledge, and also prevent the general decay of its citizenry.
One scholar argues that “in the simpler but sufficiently terrible world of the Renaissance
[Machiavelli] could afford to see the prince as launched on a career of the indefinite
maximization of his power, with no more final question to be asked than what would become of
him if he should achieve universal empire—and Il Principe does not ask that question” (Pocock,
pg. 166). However, it seems that Machiavelli’s ideal republic—the one that will gain for him
lasting glory—will be multipolar and thus ideally universal and indefinite. This is a sharp
departure from traditional politics and explains the inclusion of an argument about why “it is
18
Consider the competing claims from a number of different scholars. One scholar claims that Machiavelli “was
ambitious – there can be no doubt – but a founder he was not” (Rahe2, pg 169). Another argues that Machiavelli “is
both minister and prince,” saying that “to have written a book that is in the reader’s interest, whatever the level of
his brain, is to have written a book that has to be read, that is an instrument of rule” (Mansfield1, pg. x and xii).
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necessary to be alone if one wishes to order a republic anew or to reform it altogether outside its
ancient orders” (Discourses, 1.9). A multipolar republic will allow for external checks on moral
decline and provide ample outlets for ambition.
Machiavelli’s reference to the “Christian
republic” also suggests that his ideal republic will be one composed of many states in constant
competition with each other. Furthermore, Machiavelli praises Rome effusively when he says
that “there has never been a republic that has made the profits that Rome did” because there
never was another republic “that has been ordered so as to be able to acquire as did Rome”
(Discourses, 2.1.1). However, this praise is double-edged – Machiavelli argues that “the Roman
Empire, with its arms and its greatness, eliminated all the republics [including its own] and all
civil ways of life” (Discourses, 2.2.2). This devastating criticism of Rome’s success seems to
lead to the conclusion that the “perpetual republic” must be a multipolar one (Discourses, 3.17).
Thus it would seem that “Machiavelli endorsed the notion of perpetual refounding, praising
Rome’s succession of kings and nobles, with their ever-new modes and orders” (Rahe2, pg. 244).
In conclusion, though Machiavelli explains the particulars of his ideal republic, he also takes
time to explain his motivations. Perhaps the purpose of his oddly philosophical digression in
Book II, Chapter 5 of Discourses on Livy is to simply explain the necessity of founding a new
order – it is the only way to ensure that his memory will persist.
A FOUNDER AND A TEACHER
Machiavelli’s ambition seems to accompany a desire to educate. In the dedicatory letter
to The Prince, Machiavelli writes, “I have found nothing in my belongings that I care so much
for and esteem so greatly as the knowledge of the actions of great men, learned by me from long
experience with modern things and a continuous reading of ancient ones” (The Prince, pg. 3).
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He continues by saying that ““no greater gift could be made by me than to give you the capacity
to be able to understand in a very short time all that I have learned and understood in so many
years and with so many hardships and dangers for myself” (The Prince, pg. 4). Similarly,
Machiavelli writes in the dedicatory letter to his Discourses on Livy, “I send you a present that, if
it does not correspond to the obligations I have to you, is without a doubt the greatest Niccolò
Machiavelli has been able to send you” (Discourses, Epistle Dedicatory). He says of that book
that “in it I have expressed as much as I know and have learned through a long practice and a
continual reading in worldly things” (Discourses, Epistle Dedicatory).
It seems clear that
Machiavelli sees himself as a teacher and that his works are intended to share knowledge. Later
in The Prince, Machiavelli confesses, “because I know that many have written of this, and that in
writing of it again, I may be held presumptuous, especially since in disputing this matter I depart
from the orders of others” (The Prince, pg. 61). He clarifies, saying, ”but since my intent is to
write something useful to whoever understands it, it has appeared to me more fitting to go
directly to the effectual truth of the thing than to the imagination of it” (The Prince, pg. 61).
Here Machiavelli reveals that he is sharing novel information or at least that his teachings are
dramatically different from those who precede him. More importantly, he clearly states that he
intends for this information to be useful, which would imply that he would like his advice to be
put into practice. In fact, Machiavelli claims that unlike those who “have gone outside the
common usage of those who write, who are accustomed always to address their works to some
prince and, blinded by ambition and avarice, praise him for all virtuous qualities when they
should blame him for every part worthy of reproach,” he has not chosen as recipients of his
knowledge “those who are princes but those who for their infinite good parts deserve to be; not
those who could load me with ranks, honors, and riches but those who, though unable, would
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wish to do so” (Discourses, Epistle Dedicatory). Thus it would seem that aspiring princes are his
target audience.
Machiavelli later writes that in an attempt prevent errors, he has “judged it necessary to
write on all those books of Titus Livy that have not been intercepted by the malignity of the
times whatever I shall judge necessary for their greater understanding, according to knowledge
of ancient and modern things, so that those who read these statements of mine can more easily
draw from them that utility for which one should seek knowledge of histories” (Discourses,
I.Preface.2). He then says, “although this enterprise may be difficult, nonetheless, aided by those
who have encouraged me to accept this burden, I believe I can carry it far enough so that a short
road will remain for another to bring it to the destined place” (Discourses, I.Preface.2). Here
again, Machiavelli suggests that he intends for his work to be expanded on. He later says, “I will
be spirited in saying manifestly that which I may understand of the former and of the latter times,
so that the spirits of youths who may read these writings of mine can flee the latter and prepare
themselves to imitate the former at whatever time fortune may give them opportunity for it”
(Discourses, II.Preface.3). He explains that “it is the duty of a good man to teach others the good
that you could not work because of the malignity of the times and of fortune, so that when many
are capable of it, someone of them more loved by heaven may be able to work it” (Discourses,
II.Preface.3). It is evident that Machiavelli sees himself as more than just a teacher, but also as a
benefactor of humanity. Perhaps the most telling evidence of Machiavelli’s optimism is that he
intends for his teachings to better the condition of the world.
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