Anna-Liisa Heusala, Emilia Pyykönen and Markku
Kivinen
Russian security policy Research in Finland and development
trends in Russia
Lokakuu 2016
Valtioneuvoston selvitysja tutkimustoiminnan
julkaisusarja 48/2016
KUVAILULEHTI
Julkaisija ja julkaisuaika
Valtioneuvoston kanslia, 27.10.2016
Authors
Anna-Liisa Heusala, Emilia Pyykönen ja Markku Kivinen
Julkaisun nimi
Venäjän turvallisuuspolitiikka – tutkimus Suomessa ja kehitystrendit
Venäjällä
Julkaisusarjan nimi ja
numero
Valtioneuvoston selvitys- ja tutkimustoiminnan julkaisusarja 48/2016
Asiasanat
Kansallinen turvallisuus, Venäjän politiikka, toimintapolitiikka, talous
Julkaisun osat
1 Johdanto
2 Suomalainen Venäjän turvallisuuspolitiikan tutkimus
3 Venäjän kansallisen turvallisuuden kehitystrendit ja Suomen valinnat
4 Johtopäätökset ja suositukset
Julkaisuaika
Lokakuu 2016
Sivuja 56
Kieli Englanti
Tiivistelmä
Kaksiosaisen hankkeen ensimmäisessä osassa on arvioitu vuosina 2011- 2015 Suomessa tehtyä
Venäjän turvallisuuspolitiikkaa koskevaa vertaisarvioitua tutkimusta. Toinen osa perustuu analyysiin
Venäjän turvallisuuspoliittisista trendeistä. Osiossa arvioidaan Venäjän päämääriä, keinoja (resursseja)
ja kykyä puolustuksessa, taloudessa, yhteiskunnallisessa ja valtiollisessa turvallisuudessa, sekä sitä
mitä nämä tarkoittavat Suomen valintojen kannalta. Raportissa suositellaan Venäjän
turvallisuuspolitiikan tutkimuksen strategian laadintaa, jossa keskitytään erityisesti kriittisiin, mutta
vähän tutkittuihin teema-alueisiin. Venäjän kehitystrendien perusteella annetaan suosituksia siitä mitä
asioita Suomen tulisi edistää omassa ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikassaan. Keskeistä on, että suomalaiset
päätöksentekijät arvioivat Venäjän kehitystä kokonaisvaltaisesti ja varautuvat erilaisiin vaihtoehtoihin.
Tämä julkaisu on toteutettu osana valtioneuvoston vuoden 2016 selvitys- ja tutkimussuunnitelman
toimeenpanoa (tietokayttoon.fi).
Julkaisun sisällöstä vastaavat tiedon tuottajat, eikä tekstisisältö välttämättä edusta valtioneuvoston
näkemystä.
2
PRESENTATIONSBLAD
Utgivare & utgivningsdatum
Statsrådets kansli, 27.10.2016
Författare
Anna-Liisa Heusala, Emilia Pyykönen och Markku Kivinen
Publikationens namn
Rysslands säkerhetspolitik – forskningen i Finland och
utvecklingstrender i Ryssland
Publikationsseriens namn och Publikationsserie för statsrådets utrednings- och forskningsverksamhet
nummer
48/2016
Nyckelord
Nationell säkerhet, Rysslands politik, verksamhetspolicy, ekonomi
Publikationens delar /andra
producerade versioner
1 Introduktionen
2 Finsk forskning om Rysslands säkerhetspolitik
3 Rysslands nationella säkerhetstrender och Finlands val
4 Slutsatser och rekommendationer
Utgivningsdatum
Oktober 2016
Sidantal 56
Språk engelska
Sammandrag
Den första delen av det tvådelade projektet har utvärderats refererad finska forskning på den ryska
säkerhetspolitiken i 2011-2015. Den andra delen är baserad på en analys av politiska trender i
Rysslands säkerhet. Avsnittet beräknas Rysslands mål, medel och förmågan i militära försvaret,
ekonomi, social och statlig säkerhet, och vad dessa innebär för Finlands val. I rapporten
rekommenderas att förbereda en forskningsstrategi på Rysslands säkerhetspolitik med särskild
inriktning på de kritiska, men föga studerade teman. Rapporten ger rekommendationer för åtgärder på
grundval av den nuvarande utvecklingen i Ryssland. Det är viktigt att beslutsfattarna i Finland bedömer
Rysslands utveckling på ett övergripande sätt och är förberedda för olika alternativ.
Den här publikation är en del i genomförandet av statsrådets utrednings- och forskningsplan för
2016 (tietokayttoon.fi).
De som producerar informationen ansvarar för innehållet i publikationen. Textinnehållet återspeglar
inte nödvändigtvis statsrådets ståndpunkt
3
DESCRIPTION
Publisher and release date
Prime Minister´s Office, 27.10.2016
Authors
Anna-Liisa Heusala, Emilia Pyykönen and Markku Kivinen
Title of publication
Russian security policy – research in Finland and development trends
in Russia
Name of series and number of Publications of the Government’s analysis, assessment and research
publication
activities 48/2016
Keywords
National security, Russian politics, operating policy, economy
Sections of the publication/
other produced versions
1 Introduction
2 Finnish research on Russian security policy
3 Development of Russia’s national security and Finland’s choices
4 Conclusions and recommendations
Release date
October 2016
Pages 56
Language English
Abstract
The first part of the two-piece project consists of an evaluation of peer-reviewed research on Russian
security policy, conducted in Finland in 2011-2015. The second part is based on an analysis of Russia’s
key security policy trends. In this part, Russia’s goals, resources and ability to carry out its goals in
defence, economy, societal and state security, and the effect on Finland are evaluated. The report
recommends the construction of a strategy on Russian security policy research, which would
concentrate on crucial, but less studied themes. Based on the evaluation of Russia’s security
developments, the report offers recommendations for Finland’s foreign and security policy. It is essential
that Finnish decision makers assess Russia’s development in a comprehensive manner and are
prepared for various alternatives.
This publication is part of the implementation of the Government Plan for Analysis, Assessment and
Research for 2016 (tietokayttoon.fi).
The content is the responsibility of the producers of the information and does not necessarily
represent the view of the Government.
4
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 7
1.1 Background ................................................................................................................. 7
Russia in a global context ................................................................................................. 7
Finnish research on Russian security policy .................................................................... 8
Russian national security as the starting point ................................................................. 9
1.2 Materials, methods and authors ................................................................................. 9
Finnish research on Russian security policy .................................................................... 9
Selection criteria for evaluated studies and research categories ................................... 10
Evaluation of development trends in Russian national security ..................................... 12
Authors ............................................................................................................................ 13
2. FINNISH RESEARCH ON RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICY 2011–2015 ............................ 14
2.1 Quantitative distribution of the research themes ...................................................... 14
Extensively researched thematic areas in Finnish research 2011–2015 ....................... 14
Medium-researched thematic areas in Finnish research 2011–2015 ............................ 15
Little-researched thematic areas in Finnish research 2011–2015.................................. 15
Rarely researched thematic areas in Finnish research 2011–2015 ............................... 16
2.2 Economy and the armed forces ................................................................................ 16
2.3 Internal security ........................................................................................................ 17
2.4 External security ....................................................................................................... 19
2.5 Doctoral dissertations published in Finland 2011–2015 ........................................... 20
2.6 Strategic development of research on Russian security policy ................................ 21
3. DEVELOPMENT TRENDS OF RUSSIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY .................................. 23
National security as the framework for state policymaking in Russia............................. 23
3.1 Russian economic and defence policy ..................................................................... 25
Objectives and resources ............................................................................................... 25
Russia’s ability to achieve its goals ................................................................................ 30
Implications for Finland ................................................................................................... 34
3.2 Russia’s external security ......................................................................................... 35
Objectives and resources ............................................................................................... 35
Russia’s ability to achieve its goals ................................................................................ 36
Implications for Finland ................................................................................................... 38
5
3.3 Russia’s internal security .......................................................................................... 39
Objectives and resources ............................................................................................... 39
Russia’s ability to achieve its goals ................................................................................ 41
Implications for Finland ................................................................................................... 45
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................. 47
Developing research on Russian security policy ............................................................ 47
Development of national security in Russia .................................................................... 48
Finland’s choices ............................................................................................................ 49
SOURCES AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL ...................................................................... 51
6
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Russia in a global context
For Finland, Russia is the single most important state whose development has an impact on
our external and internal security. In order to analyse the impact of Russia, its security
thinking must be understood, as well as how it also seeks to further its security by
transforming international structures. In the current international situation, the central
challenges for Russian national security are economic growth, state structures and defence.
These goals are supported by internal security and political stability, which is used as a
means for establishing strong governmental leadership.
In light of current knowledge, Russian foreign policy primarily follows a realist approach: in
Russian security thinking, foreign policy is seen as involving concrete, strategic and tactical
choices that are tied to time and place. In realist thinking furthering value-based (be it
Western values or something else) policies plays an instrumental role in furthering realpolitik
interests. Nevertheless, various integration goals are also central in Russian foreign policy,
and their impact should be assessed in relation to contradictory tendencies in international
relations (Rojansky 2014). In its foreign policy, Russia’s goal is to create a multipolar world
system, in which it is one of the central great powers. Russia opposes Atlanticism and the
military, economic and cultural hegemony of the United States of America.
Despite the political crisis in international relations, both Finland and Russia have been a part
of a global development in which transnational collaboration has sought to establish new
kinds of regional security areas (Buzan 1991). During the last 20 years, increased trade,
cooperation in the energy sector, cultural and educational exchanges and non-governmental
organisations are seen to have built a solid foundation for bilateral and European Union–
Russia relationships. Cross-border cooperation between authorities in the EU countries and
Russia has been an important cornerstone in internal security and environmental sector
activities, among others.
In regard to border security, Finland has been at the front line in developing national activities
as well as activities in accordance with the EU’s four-tier border security model (Niemenkari
1
2003; Heusala et al. 2008). Finland has thus built its relationship with Russia on a long term
and broad societal basis. The governmental and judicial development of Russia have brought
along cooperation opportunities as well as generating various new challenges and
unintentional side effects. The tension between Russian foreign policy and internal Russian
reforms (Gel’man 2015; Heusala 2013; Kulmala et al. 2014; Collier 2011; Skryzhevska et al.
2015) has had an impact on transnational collaboration, among other matters. In the
interpretation of Russia, it is crucial to comprehend and analyse its intentions, resources and
global preconditions (including judicial and other integration systems) in a balanced manner.
The analytical focus lies with a realistic interpretation of post-Soviet institutional change
(Mahoney & Thelen 2010).
1
Collaboration within border security and judicial administration has been complemented by legislative
and administrative harmonisation, as well as joint education and coordination activities.
7
Russian military build-up, military reform and changes in military thinking (Casapoglu 2015)
have in recent years been reflected in its ability to advance its own geopolitical goals in its
neighbouring areas. Foreign policy conflicts with the West – most recently, the EU – have led
to a rupture in dialogue and a situation resembling economic war, particularly after the
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia. Russia challenges the judicial view of the
international community that the incorporation of the Crimean Peninsula was unlawful. Russia
has experienced the Eastern Partnership of the EU, which was initiated in 2009 as a part of
Eastern Enlargement, as a challenge for its own integration goals in the former region of the
Soviet Union. Within the European Union, on the other hand, the establishment of the
Eurasian Economic Union has been seen to challenge the EU’s presence in the Southern
Caucasus. (Palonkorpi 2015.) In the Ukrainian crisis, two integration processes seemed to
transform into a battle of spheres of influence. The military and economic capacity of Russia
and changes in its security thinking have also influenced stability in Northern Europe. The
crisis has had a clear impact on the economic situation in Finland. The development cannot
be observed only through individual sectors of the economy, and it is not fruitful to perceive
Russia as an actor separate from the rest of the world. Its operational environment is global,
and the choices which have an impact on Finland are influenced by decisions and events
elsewhere. This is reflected in Russia’s own security policy documents and the objectives of
the Russian government. The impact of the Ukrainian crisis can be seen in Russian foreign
policy and in the growing tension in the Baltic Sea region. Simultaneously, the crisis has
increased the importance of Russia’s relations with China.
Finnish research on Russian security policy
The consequences of the current political crisis will probably be long-lasting. It is therefore
necessary to form a timely and comprehensive picture of the central development trends in
Russia and examine what Finnish research, in particular, says about the development of
Russia. This project analyses Finnish peer-reviewed fundamental research that can be
positioned within Russian security policy research. The studied time period is 2011–2015.
The project consists of two parts: 1) The state of Finnish research on Russian security policy,
2) Developmental trends in Russian national security.
Research on Russia has been the target of considerable investments in Finland. In addition
to the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki, central academic actors include the
University of Tampere, the University of Eastern Finland and Lappeenranta University of
Technology. Other universities and universities of applied sciences have also run research
projects related to Russia, and research interests have also been furthered by individual
researchers. Sectoral research institutes produce topical policy analyses regarding Russia. In
the field of Russian studies, the Finnish Centre of Excellence in Russian Studies – Choices of
Russian Modernisation (2012–2017), funded by the Academy of Finland, has utilised
international networks to make multidisciplinary openings, and has systematically
strengthened existing lines in fundamental research. RussiaHUB Helsinki activities,
coordinated by the Aleksanteri Institute, are an important means for increasing the societal
impact of research. These activities seek to bring together actors interested in Russia in the
corporate world of the Helsinki metropolitan area, public administration and the academic
world.
Overall, there is a lot of research knowledge in Finland related to Russia, but a qualitative
synthesis of the focal points of this knowledge has thus far been absent. One of the
objectives of this final report is to support the establishment of a more comprehensive
strategy for Finnish research on Russian security policy, so that the funding of these activities
can also lie on a more solid base. Our project has assessed the strengths of Finnish research
8
and identified areas that should be further developed in in order to ensure that the picture of
Russia is timely and comprehensive enough and provides an expert interpretation of the
overall development of Russia.
Russian national security as the starting point
The starting point for the project was the definition of Russian national security. The viewpoint
and goals of Russia are defined in security strategies and policy documents, security
2
legislation and the President’s annual keynote speeches. Decision-making is led by the
President and the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF). As of the mid-2000s,
the role of national security as a framework for political decision-making has grown stronger
(Antonov 2012). Within national security, societal and state security encompass a broad
range of issues that would be regarded as comprehensive security and internal security
issues in Finland. According to Russia’s own definition, central focal points include, in
particular, anti-terrorism, information security, regional, immigration, national and counternarcotics policy and border security.
In this project, economic growth, the capacity of state structures and the development of
national defence are highlighted as crucial factors shaping Russian national security. Within
domestic policy, Russia supports these goals through its internal security objectives, and
within its foreign policy, by establishing a multipolar system. The latter is connected to the
aim of strengthening the political, economic and military latitude of Russia. This project
recognises the actual interconnectedness of the different Russian policy segments as well as
the complexity of change, where Russian choices are also being strongly affected by
globalisation.
National security in Russia
Economic
capacity
Internal security
Societal security
Defence and
defenceindustrial
capacity
State security
External security
Multipolar system
Military
balance
Figure 1 Definition of Russian national security
1.2 Materials, methods and authors
Finnish research on Russian security policy
In this project, the evaluation of Russian development was preceded by a meta-analysis of
Finnish research, which examined the focal points, strengths and clear areas to be developed
within Finnish research on, or related to, Russian security policy. The meta-analysis sought to
2
The central decrees are: Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 31 декабря 2015 года N 683
"О Стратегии национальной безопасности Российской Федерации"; федеральные закон от 28
декабря 2010 г. N 390-ФЗ "О безопасности"; федеральные закон от 28 июня 2014 г. N 172-ФЗ "О
стратегическом планировании в Российской Федерации".
9
address the following questions: 1) In what respects does Finnish research reach a good
international level? 2) What are the gaps in knowledge that Finnish researchers could fill
themselves? 3) What kind of knowledge could be acquired or produced through good
networks?
The classification includes peer-reviewed studies on themes related to Russian security
policy conducted during 2011–2015 in Finnish universities. The gathered material has been
classified into categories, which help to illustrate the themes that have been studied most
extensively in academic research. The conclusions also outline the human resources
(research projects vs. permanent positions), methods and materials (multidisciplinary vs.
approach derived from a specific discipline) used in Finnish research.
Selection criteria for evaluated studies and research categories
3
All Finnish universities are included in the categorised sample. The JUULI portal served as
the primary reference service used for searching for peer-reviewed research and doctoral
dissertations published in 2011–2014. For studies published in 2015, the publication portal of
each university was used. The search terms were different forms of the word ‘Russia’ in
different languages: russ*, venä*, rys*, русск* and росси*. From a total of 2,200 publications,
461 were selected for more detailed categorisation. In addition to the publications’ titles and
abstracts, key words were utilised in making the selection. The categorisation does therefore
not represent disciplines, but all of the categories form a multidisciplinary whole.
In selecting the publications, the most important criterion was a publication channel that was
4
classified at level 1–3 in accordance with the JUFO classification of the Publication Forum.
In addition, the publication had to fit into the categories for peer-reviewed research
5
recommended by the Ministry of Education and Culture and used by the Finnish Academy :
A1 article in a scientific journal, A2 review article in a scientific journal, A3 book section or
chapter in research book, A4 conference proceedings, C1 scientific book, C2 edited book or
anthology, conference proceedings or special issue of a journal. Of the works selected for the
sample, a few publications were discarded in spite of their home university categorisation,
since their publication channel was classified at JUFO level 0. However, the sample includes
all doctoral dissertations published in 2011–2015, regardless of whether the dissertation was
published in the university’s own institution series or as a separate scientific publication.
The sample of this final report does not contain material produced as internal research work
or reports for public authorities, nor publications published in non-peer-reviewed publication
series of sectoral research institutes. Thus, the generated picture of peer-reviewed research
in Finland does not correspond to the whole Finnish expertise or topical knowledge regarding
themes that are central for Russian national security. The selection criteria for the sample has
been guided by the will to examine the state of peer-reviewed academic fundamental
research in the field of Russian security policy.
The selected sample was further categorised according to thematic categories. The
categorisation is based on Russia’s own definition of national security (see Figure 1). The
Russian definition of security policy is comprehensive. Drawing from this notion, this report
goes from the assumption that research on Russian security policy should encompass
3
In addition, peer-reviewed work published in 2011–2015 by the researchers of the Finnish institute of
International Affairs and the Finnish Defence Forces were included in the selection.
4
http://www.julkaisufoorumi.fi/
5
https://confluence.csc.fi/display/tutki/OKM%3An+julkaisutyyppiluokitus
10
themes related to internal as well as external security and their concrete connections with
one another. Accordingly, the understanding of security research utilised in this report is not
limited to the disciplines traditionally associated with the topic, such as geopolitics, thematic
fields within military science or foreign policy. Instead, the starting point has been that the
basis, decision-making and execution of Russian security policy should be broadly
approached through the themes that Russia includes in this policy segment.
The Russian National Security Strategy published on 31 December 2015 has served as the
central document for determining the categories. The strategy defines the policy sections
encompassed in national security as well as presenting special focal areas. In addition, the
need to examine the state of Finnish research on economic matters, armed forces and the
military industry, in particular, was taken into account when formulating the categories. The
special focal areas of Russian security policy and themes particularly important for the
current world political situation have been given their own categories. Such themes are the
Arctic, the Eurasian Economic Union, Russia and NATO, and armed conflicts. The categories
also include those that influence Russian security policy decision-making and execution, such
as government, authorities (including the Ministry of Defence) and law. Within domestic
policy, non-governmental organisations and political movements have been given their own
category.
The final main categories of the research were as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
Security policy, strategy and security thinking
Armed forces (Military)
Ministry of defence
Military strategy
Military leadership
Military economy
Russia and NATO
Military conflicts
Business and national economy
Oil and gas industry, energy
Eurasian Economic Union
Arctic
Environmental policy
Foreign policy
Geopolitics
Law
Government, authorities, politics
State and societal security:
 regional policy, welfare policy, border security, immigration policy, counternarcotics policy, anti-extremism policy, nationalities policy
Anti-terrorism action
Information security
Transportation
Culture
Education
NGOs and political movements
When compiling the final report, each of these categories has been divided into smaller
sections. For larger groups, in particular, this provided a means for examining how research
has been focused not only thematically, but also according to the publication channel. During
11
the project, the gathered data was publicly available on the project’s website
(http://blogs.helsinki.fi/venajankehitys/data/).
Evaluation of development trends in Russian national security
The methodology in the second section of this report was primarily based on a qualitative and
participatory approach. The new material was produced during two four-hour workshops in
May 2016. The analysis and conclusions of the final report are based on the workshop
material, which has been categorised in accordance with the Russian definition of national
security (Figure 1, p. 9). Eight academic experts and two experts at the Ministry of Defence
participated in the workshops.
Workshop 1 evaluated the economy, defence and foreign policy. The targets of evaluation
were:
 the development of military capacity and the modernisation of the military
economy,
 Russia’s activities in regard to the EU, the Eurasian Economic Union, the
Collective Security Treaty Organisation, Central Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation, and China,
 Russia’s energy economy, and
 the development of the Arctic.
Workshop 2 evaluated the internal development of Russia. The targets of evaluation were:
 regional policy,
 demographic development and migration,
 activities against serious transnational crime and terrorism,
 the development of political decision-making,
 information security,
 the reform of public administration, and
 legal development.
Based on their existing knowledge, the workshop participants outlined Russian development
trends by addressing the following questions:
•
What are Russia’s goals, means (resources) and capacities (political and
administrative performance) in defence and economic matters?
•
What are Russia’s goals, means (resources) and capacities (political and
administrative performance) in societal and state security?
•
What is their meaning for Finland’s choices?
In the workshops, the main questions of the project were reflected against Russian economic
development. The workshops utilised the Russia Statistics of the Bank of Finland Institute for
6
Economies in Transition. In addition, the working groups took into account the evaluation
7
indicators presented in the Russian Security Strategy. The indicators include the personal
safety of citizens, share of modern arms and technology in the Russian armed forces, life
expectancy, GDP, share of the poorest and wealthiest population of the total population,
http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit/seuranta/venajatilastot/Pages/default.aspx
Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 31 декабря 2015 года N 683 "О Стратегии
национальной безопасности Российской Федерации".
6
7
12
inflation, unemployment, GDP share of research, technology, education and culture,
geographical distribution and scope of environmental problems.
In other words, the work was based on a meta-analysis of the current central developmental
trends of Russian national security. The report highlights both internal and external security
issues that the experts participating in the workshops recognised as central issues
influencing Russian choices and actions. The highlighted development trends were also
evaluated in regard to how predictable, intended and welcome (Perri 2010) they were from
the Finnish perspective. The experts outlined a summary of their conversations in the form of
a matrix. The second section of the final report, Development of Russia’s national security, is
based on these discussions. The final analysis has been complemented with previous
research results, from which some direct quotes have also been selected for this report.
Authors
Professor Markku Kivinen, Director of the Aleksanteri Institute, acted as the administrative
leader of the project. Senior Researcher, Docent Anna-Liisa Heusala acted as the academic
principal investigator. Her responsibilities and duties included the project’s research plan, the
categorisation criteria for the Finnish research, acting as the chair at the workshops and
drafting the final report. Information specialist Emilia Pyykönen at the Aleksanteri Institute
was a central figure in the meta-analysis of Finnish research, as she conducted the basic
categorisation and selection from the 2,200 publications retrieved from the databases of
Finnish universities.
The experts at the workshops examining the development of Russian national security
represented broad expertise in the fields central for evaluating Russian national security. In
addition to Markku Kivinen and chair Anna-Liisa Heusala, the workshops were attended by
Finland Distinguished Professor Vladimir Gelman from the European University at St.
Petersburg and the University of Helsinki, Professor Pami Aalto from the University of
Tampere, Professor Tuomas Forsberg from the University of Tampere, Professor Marianna
Muravyeva from the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow,
Senior Economist Heli Simola from the Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition,
Researcher Anna Lowry from the University of Helsinki, Senior Advisor for Research
Charlotta Collén from the Ministry of Defence, and Special Advisor Janne Helin from the
Ministry of Defence.
The steering group of the project included Docent Kari Laitinen, Director of Research at the
Ministry of Defence, who acted as chair, and Charlotta Collén, Senior Advisor for Research at
the Ministry of Defence, who acted as secretary. The steering group members were Doctor of
Military Sciences, Docent, Lt. Col. Petteri Lalu from the Finnish Defence Research Agency,
Lt. Col. Pentti Forsström from the National Defence University, Doctor of Laws Jarmo
Koistinen from the National Bureau of Investigation, Doctor of Social Sciences, Docent Jyrki
Raitasalo from the Ministry of Defence, Mari Jaakkola from the Finnish Border Guard,
Eevamari Laaksonen from the Ministry of Defence, Sami Wacklin from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Doctor of Social Sciences Sinikukka Saari from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Katarine Lindstedt from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The steering group convened twice.
13
2. FINNISH RESEARCH ON RUSSIAN SECURITY
POLICY 2011–2015
The project sought to map how studies conducted in Finnish universities in 2011–2015 is
related to different categories of public policy in accordance with the definition of Russian
national security. The selection is comprised of 461 publications that fit the classification of
peer-reviewed scientific publications used by the Ministry of Education and Culture (see
page 10). The aim was to identify the strong themes within Finnish research, as well as those
themes relevant for Russian development where there is a need to develop Finnish expertise,
and the themes that require good international networks. The significance of the lessresearched themes for the monitoring and interpretation of Russian security policy was also
evaluated in the steering group.
2.1 Quantitative distribution of the research themes
Extensively researched thematic areas in Finnish research 2011–20158
53
Business and economy (118)
118
Foreign policy and geopolitics (112)
62
Society and politics (90)
Culture (64)
64
112
90
State (62)
Environment (53)
Quantitatively speaking, Finnish research has mostly been focused on the disciplines of
business, foreign policy and geopolitics. Within the field of economics, research has
concentrated on issues related to business activities, whereas research related to the
national economy has been scarce. In the foreign policy and geopolitics group, the number of
studies classified as geopolitics research totalled 29. In the group dealing with societal and
political matters, a significant number of works dealt with regional policy, nationality policy
and welfare. State-related research was defined as research dealing on some level with state
governance, administrative decision-making or their consequences. The sample also
included studies that examined the decision-making and execution of a specific governmental
sector.
8
The publications fit the following categories: A1 article in a scientific journal, A2 review article in a
scientific journal, A3 book section or chapter in research book, A4 conference proceedings, C1 scientific
book, C2 edited book or anthology, conference proceedings or special issue of a journal. In addition, the
report examined dissertations separately.
14
In our sample, cultural studies were the most diverse in terms of disciplines and themes.
Russian identity politics and historical perspectives on contemporary life in Russia stood out
as specific themes. Within environmental research, notable themes included the Russian
energy industry and forestry, the social responsibility of enterprises and the impact of climate
change.
Medium-researched thematic areas in Finnish research 2011–2015
Law (46)
22
Education (40)
46
22
Welfare policy (40)
Energy and energy industry (37)
25
40
31
Politics (31)
Regional policy (25)
37
Civil society (22)
40
Administration (22)
A total of 226 studies dealt with topics related to Russia’s internal development, such as law,
education, welfare policy, politics, regional policy, civil society, the state and administration.
With research dealing with culture and environmental issues, the total amounts to 343 studies
in a five-year period. From this perspective, it can be concluded that there is a large amount
of research in Finland dealing with matters related to Russia’s internal development.
However, the evaluation also has to take into account the precise thematic focus of the
studies. Particularly with studies regarding law and state/administration, which are relevant to
Finnish–Russian cooperation, it is important to determine the extent to which disciplinary
concepts and approaches have been utilized. A more detailed grouping also reveals
interesting blind spots in other categories. One of the most striking deficiencies was the lack
of research dealing with Islam, the Orthodox Church and faith.
Little-researched thematic areas in Finnish research 2011–2015
9
19
Information security (19)
Regional armed conflicts (17)
11
Media (11)
Transportation (11)
11
17
Security strategy and security
thinking (9)
15
In addition to broadly researched themes, the key goal of the project was to see which
themes related to the definition of Russian national security are less researched. Such
thematic areas were indeed numerous. Relatively little-researched themes included
information security, transportation and media, among others. Studies of armed conflicts
involving Russia are also scarce, even though studies on foreign policy and geopolitics form
a large group in Finnish research. There are also only a small number of studies on security
strategic thinking, and not one comprehensive study on the topic was published in
international publication channels by the end of 2015.
Rarely researched thematic areas in Finnish research 2011–2015
Armed forces (7)
Border security (4)
1
2
Russia and NATO (3)
7
2
Terrorism and drug crimes (3)
2
Immigration policy (2)
2
Eurasian Economic Union (2)
4
Security administration (2)
2
Military economy and industry (2)
3
3
Military strategy (2)
Military leadership (1)
There were several blind spots, and all of which are central for the monitoring and
interpretation of Russian national security. Blind spots are defined as research areas that
include only a few works during the entire observation period. Peer-reviewed research on the
Russian armed forces is practically only taking its first steps in Finland. Despite the volume of
foreign policy and geopolitics research, there are only a handful of studies on the Eurasian
Economic Union, border security, immigration and the Russian security authorities. Perhaps
one of the most startling gaps in research conducted in Finland was the lack of research on
Russian terrorism. The lack of peer-reviewed research within the field of border security
reflects the tendency of Finnish research to focus on more practical, policy relevant studies
and dissertations published in universities’ own departmental series.
2.2 Economy and the armed forces
Research on economy is almost completely focused on Russian trade and the development
of the business environment. Research dealing with business issues and the business
environment include case studies within different sectors and studies on foreign investments.
Among the Finnish universities, Lappeenranta University of Technology, in particular, has
specialised in research on Russian business.
Among the sample of studies, there is no work dealing solely with the national economy, but
there are some studies on general economic policy during the observed period. However,
there is no systematic academic research in Finland on this topic that is fundamentally
16
important for Russian security development. This is a rather significant shortcoming when
attempting to evaluate the execution of state reforms and defence economy in Russia, for
instance.
Finnish research on the diversification of economy has generated a good understanding of
the direction of the economy, particularly in specific fields such as the energy economy. In
general, Finnish energy-related research is strong, and this is an important theme for Finland.
Publishing is based on the works of a few researchers, and it has benefited from the ongoing
Finnish Centre of Excellence in Russian Studies, funded by the Academy of Finland (2012–
2017). However, regarding a comprehensive and comparative examination of the national
economy, even these well-represented themes do not eliminate the need to invest in
academic publishing within the field of national economy.
In Finnish research, the armed forces are a central blind spot. This goes for the military
economy as well as military leadership and military strategies. The first Finnish dissertation
on military strategies was published at the National Defence University in 2014. In the future,
research on the changes in the armed forces would benefit significantly from studies dealing
with security thinking, security legislation and the security authorities. Research on Russian
reforms utilizing also empirical methods and comparable theoretical concepts would support
the formation of a comprehensive picture of the conditions for decision making in Russian
government.
2.3 Internal security
In principle, Finnish research on Russian internal security is sufficient in quantitative terms.
Law, environmental issues, culture, state and politics, for instance, are well-represented
areas. However, it is a closer look at the actual thematic focus in this category is also
needed.
In accordance with the Russian security policy definition, central subcategories for state and
societal security include welfare policy and regional policy, which have been reasonably well
studied in Finland. Politics, non-governmental organisations and political movements are
likewise fairly well researched. However, all of these themes rely heavily on a few
researchers. On the other hand, research groups have been established around these
themes, and these researchers are devoted to their own area of expertise and their academic
careers. Regarding studies on Russian politics, the production of international monographs,
the lack of which was deemed problematic in the previous research review (Pursiainen 2013),
has gained momentum during the observed period.
Within cultural studies, research on religion and religious communities has been scarce
during the studied period. For instance, studies on Islam have been published only as of
2016, which illustrates how this is a budding research theme in Finland. Only one researcher
is focused on Russian Islamic communities, and research on the Orthodox Church and
religion also relies on a small group of researchers.
Within research on law, the majority of the works are case studies related to various
interactions between the judicial system and the surrounding society. There were only a few
more traditional legal dogmatic analyses in the sample. The most central blind spot is
systematic research on Russian criminal law and criminal procedural law, even though such
research would be of great use in Finnish–Russian border security cooperation. Regarding
17
Russian criminal law, only one doctoral dissertation and one peer-reviewed article dealing
with the topic have been published. Poor knowledge of this theme will pose a significant
future challenge, as it is impossible to understand the deep structures of Russian internal
security and security thinking in general without an understanding of the legal dimension.
Research on the Russian security authorities undeniably needs to be complemented with
legal examination.
Regarding civil law, themes related to the development of the business environment are
particularly well-represented, and there are also some studies on family law. Some studies
related to environmental law have also been conducted, some of them dealing with the
situation of ethnic minorities. Studies on the Russian judiciary seem to be a completely
missing theme within the studies in the sample. This can be considered surprising, as various
public appraisals regarding Russia’s internal development repeatedly emphasise the
permanence of the problems within the Russian judicial system and the unreliability of its
activities. Based on our sample, it seems that these conceptions are not based on Finnish
empirical research.
The category of research on Russian government and administration contains over twenty
studies whose primary or important research theme seems to be the Russian decisionmaking process and management, legislative changes, the execution of decisions or the
interaction between citizens and the government. However, only a few dealt with
governmental reforms as a whole or general changes within the Russian public sector. There
were no comprehensive studies on Russian governance written with an approach and
concepts derived from governance and administrative sciences research. Systematic and
comparative research on Russian public administration is indeed a clear blind spot in Finnish
research. This can be considered problematic from the point of view of both Finland’s own
economic interests and the balanced examination of changes in Russia. In light of current
research, the understanding of developments of the Russian state, its legislative work, policy
making and implementation is incomplete, and expertise is in some respect insufficient.
Within internal security, there are a number of themes that are dealt with in only in a couple of
studies. These themes are border security, immigration policy, counter-narcotics activities,
and terrorism and antiterrorism. The lack of research on financial crime, both in the form of
criminological studies and as a theme of criminal law, can be deemed a major deficiency.
Russian corruption is broadly discussed as an explaining factor, but there are no comparative
analyses of this topic in terms of concepts and terminology or empirical data. Likewise, a
shortcoming of international studies is that corruption is not approached as a comparable
financial crime, but the concept is used for explaining the special characteristics of the
Russian political system, often at a generalising level. The connection between Russian
cybercrime and financial crime is also a clear transnational security challenge. At present,
there is no Finnish academic expertise on these matters.
There is a lack of peer-reviewed research on border security – including research on
transnational crime and terrorism. This is a thematic area in which Finland has its own
interest to strengthen academic research in the future. It is rather astounding how these
themes are disregarded in studies related to Russian internal security. This could suggest
that they are deemed difficult to research for academic researchers with a civilian
background.
Transnational, in practice global, security threats, such as various forms of criminality
(including cybercrime), social challenges related to migration and themes related to
18
antiterrorism are thus a clear blind spot in Finnish research on internal security. Research on
the structures, management and activities of the Russian security authorities is a thematic
area that should be given more international academic attention. There is specifically a need
for analyses that use comparable concepts and terminology and avoid unverified political
interpretations.
During the recent European refugee crisis, a need has arisen for more knowledge on Russian
border security development, the activities of authorities and the immigration and refugee
situation. Research on immigration policy has only recently begun in Finland, and the sample
includes only a couple of studies related to issues within this theme.
2.4 External security
Among peer-reviewed articles and edited books categorised in the field of foreign policy and
geopolitics, ten specifically dealt with Russia’s own foreign policy strategy as a whole – in
other words, not the bilateral relationship of Russia and another party, another country’s
Russia-policy or some sector related to Russian foreign policy, such as the energy. A muchresearched theme during the studied period was energy policy. Russia’s relationship with
Europe and the whole EU has also been rather extensively researched. A comprehensive
examination of Russia’s own foreign policy is thus not a thoroughly researched area, even
though foreign policy and geopolitics are generally speaking among the central themes in
Finnish research. The majority of studies are focused on temporal or thematic cases.
In regard to more comprehensive security thinking, there were only a few published studies
during the studied period, of which most are focused on a specific area of Russian security
policy and its implementation. The category also contains publications that present
administrative or legal factors contributing to security thinking. During the studied period, no
international comprehensive studies on the foundation or changes of Russia’s own
comprehensive security thinking were published. This can be considered a shortcoming,
considering the attention given in Western discussions to explanations of Russian security
policy activities.
Within the category of foreign policy and geopolitics, a total of 41 peer-reviewed articles were
published. Slightly under half of them could also be classified as disciplinary works
(international relations, world politics). The remaining studies represent multidisciplinary
research or studies that cannot be labelled as international relations research. Of the
publications in foreign policy and geopolitics, the majority were articles in peer-reviewed and
edited volumes. During the studied period, there were 34 such works, of which roughly a third
can be grouped according to their discipline based on the author’s background and theme.
Thirteen international edited volumes were also published in Finland. Their themes varied
from historical analyses to works on energy, regions neighbouring Russia and Russia–EU
relations. Within the latter theme, a total of five international volumes with contributions from
several authors were published.
Russian relations with the United States, China, Central Asian states and Japan could be
identified as a blind spot in research conducted in Finland. Finnish research has focused on
EU–Russia relations, which in the future will not be sufficient for explaining Russian activities
on the global level where it aims to promote its strategies. Investing in maintaining good
networks and the establishment of new ones within these themes is a potential prospect.
19
2.5 Doctoral dissertations published in Finland 2011–2015
Regional and welfare policy (6)
NGOs and political movements (6)
1
1 1
Foreing policy and geopolitics (5)
6
2
Culture (3)
2
Law (3)
3
6
Business and business environment (2)
Environment (2)
3
5
Nationalities policy (1)
The Arctic (1)
Armed forces, strategy and leadership (1)
Our sample included a total of twenty doctoral dissertations, of which twelve were
monographs and eight article-based dissertations. Five of the dissertations were written in
Finnish. The illustration represents all of the categories in which each dissertation was
classified in the primary categorisation.
In the category of regional and welfare policy, three works dealt with social policy, one with
changes in industrial cities, one with environmental policy in the northern areas of Russia,
and one with the language policies of Finno-Ugric republics. Within foreign policy and
geopolitics, two dissertations discussed spheres of interest and geopolitical thinking, and one
dissertation focused solely on Russian foreign policy. The category of culture includes one
dissertation about religion, one about media and one about business culture. Legal
dissertations included research on civil law, comparative research on Russian criminal law
and legal sociological research on the practices of defending human rights.
In terms of themes, Finnish dissertation work is versatile. Many of the dissertations are based
on empirical work, which means that Finnish researchers have also gathered material in
Russia as part of longer research projects. This has contributed to the researchers’ extensive
knowledge base and the collected material can also be used in various further studies.
Among the dissertations, there are also topics that belong to less-researched areas in
Finland. Such topics include Russian military strategy, spheres of influence and criminal law.
However, some of the researchers are not focused on becoming professional researchers,
which means that further research on these themes will possibly not be advanced in near
future without separate investments in them.
20
2.6 Strategic development of research on Russian security
policy
Many themes of Russian national security have received insufficient attention in research
conducted in Finland. Among the missing and scarcely studied themes are the security
authorities and security governance, border security, immigration policy, the Russian military
economy, the armed forces as a whole, crime prevention and antiterrorism actions, Russian
law, religions and religious communities. Russian law, policy making and policy
implementation are also still quite poorly known. Within studies of foreign policy and
geopolitics, Russia’s relations with Asia and the United States have not been studied in
Finland, which leads to a Europe-centred examination of the current spheres of influence.
In the future, themes that have so far been rarely researched should be approached from
various disciplines, as these themes are often linked to each other. For instance, border
security is related to the security authorities and law, as well as transnational crime, terrorism
and immigration policy. Research on terrorism, for its part, requires in-depth knowledge on
the activities of the Russian authorities, regional conflicts and economic development in
Russia’s neighbouring areas, as well as religions and religious communities. In addition,
Russian immigration, social and labour policies and transnational crime (most notably drugrelated crime and financial crime in funding terrorism) need to be taken into account. In
addition, cybercrime is also related to the above-mentioned themes. In this context it should
be highlighted that research on financial crimes, from a criminological perspective, in
particular, is a missing thematic area. This is in general a problem in international peerreviewed research. Research on Russian religious life has likewise been scarce in Finland,
and this research within religious science is a clear shortcoming, considering how Russia
currently stresses its traditional values.
In the area of information security, media research has generated surprisingly few peerreviewed studies, even though the state of the media and its impact on Russian politics is a
constant topic of discussion. A comprehensive study on, e.g., the change of media legislation
is also missing in legal research, which in general is only rarely comparative or focused on
legal dogmatic issues. There is thus clearly a need for a strategy regarding research on
Russian law.
Finnish research on the armed forces has so far relied on non-peer-reviewed studies or
reviews. The examination of Russian economic goals could benefit from studies dealing with
the armed forces, as is also shown in the second section of this report. In addition, the
development of the Russian administration and authorities, and an in-depth observation and
comparison of the related legislation should also be taken into account in studying the armed
forces.
There were only a handful of comparative studies in the sample of research publications. In
the study of Russian security policy, comparison is undoubtedly necessary for concrete
understanding of changes and their proportions. Currently, researchers often take so-called
general understandings of the nature or change of Russia as their starting point without
independently examining the basis of these notions and testing them empirically. From the
perspective of strategic decision-making, research conducted from such premises only
partially addresses the issue of the development of Russia and its significance for Finland.
Conceptions can also be heavily loaded. Comparison of Russia with both the United States
21
and China is missing completely, which is problematic. A Sino–Russian comparison would be
central to examine reforms in public administration, economy, defence policy and legislation.
Based on what has been presented above, the development of deeper academic expertise
requires long-term planning and the establishment and maintenance of well-funded research
groups. Short-term projects can primarily produce limited reviews of various themes related
to security policy. It is questionable how productive such scattered funding is, compared to
sufficiently comprehensive funding which guarantees the development of ambitious and longterm academic expertise. Academic visibility, including an increase in citations, is hard to
reach if research groups cannot focus on building genuinely internationally relevant expertise
and producing publications for important publishing channels. In order to avoid internationally
saturated themes and bulk production, future endeavours should concentrate on strategically
central themes with a medium- and long-term focus. With the help of good networks, this
knowledge can be complemented with short-term projects related to topical issues.
22
3. DEVELOPMENT TRENDS OF RUSSIA’S
NATIONAL SECURITY
The purpose of our project was to establish what the most central Russian development
trends are, and examine what these potentially mean for Finland. The development trends of
Russian national security were considered in two international workshops on 17–18 May
2016. The workshops were based on specific themes and related questions, which were
given to the participants in advance. In total, eight academic experts and two experts from the
Ministry of Defence participated in the workshops. The thematic areas of developmental
trends, which were defined beforehand, were based on the project’s research plan that
utilised the definition of Russian national security. Accordingly, the central themes at the
workshops were economy and defence as well as internal and external security. Workshop 1
considered Russian economic, defence and foreign policy. Workshop 2 concentrated on
internal development in Russia, particularly themes related to the development of decisionmaking, state reform programmes, justice and internal security.
In this section of the final report, we gather the results of the evaluation of the experts
9
participating in the workshops. The analysis has been complemented with quotes from
research publications and with on-going research. The section will begin by briefly outlining
the concept of national security and its historical importance as the framework for decisionmaking in the Russian state. Thereafter, it will set out the most central concluding
observations from the workshops on the current goals of Russian national security, resources
for implementation, ability to execute goals, and the impact of these from the perspective of
Finland, in particular.
National security as the framework for state policymaking in Russia
The concept of national security emerged in official Russian state documents in 1881. At that
point, it served primarily as a synonym for societal security, which supported the aspiration of
Emperor Alexander III to solidify autocracy and traditionalism in state leadership. A more
comprehensive notion of national security, encompassing societal and state security, was
officially taken into use in 1934 (Malin 2007:1–2) as a crystallisation of the judicial and public
policy foundation of Joseph Stalin’s leadership ideology. During the first two decades of the
Soviet Union, the economic, political and judicial changes solidified the understanding that
individual security was a part of state security. The foundation of state security, for its part,
lay on a socialist planned economy, which was secured and steered by the established
Soviet judicial culture. In other words, the justice system served political interests in
accordance with the definitions of the decision-makers, and the constitution was not deemed
9
The experts participating in the working groups were Senior Researcher Anna-Liisa Heusala from the
University of Helsinki, who also acted as chair, Professor Markku Kivinen from the University of
Helsinki, Finland Distinguished Professor Vladimir Gelman from the European University at St.
Petersburg and the University of Helsinki, Professor Pami Aaltop from the University of Tampere,
Professor Tuomas Forsberg from the University of Tampere, Professor Marianna Muravyeva from the
National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Senior Economist Heli Simola
from the Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition, Researcher Anna Lowry from the
University of Helsinki, Senior Advisor for Research Charlotta Collén from the Ministry of Defence, and
Special Advisor Janne Helin from the Ministry of Defence.
23
to restrict legislative work. (Heusala 2015:104.) This historical background of security
concepts and their implementation influences state management in the post-Soviet era.
The comprehensiveness of contemporary Russian security policy is reflected in the
contemporary distribution into governmental-judicial levels, which all include both domestic
and foreign policy goals. These levels are state security (related to sovereignty and
independence), security of administrative areas, security on a regional level, private security
and the security of Russian citizens living abroad (Malin 2007: 1–2). The security strategy of
10
2009 , which preceded the current security strategy that came into force on 31 December
2015, can be considered as a document that compiled the challenges for post-Soviet era
societal development. The strategy reflects the history of reforms in state structures and
policies. As a result, national security is perceived as an umbrella concept, upon which public
policy relies. While Russia has reformed governance in the 2000s in accordance with global
liberal economic thinking, the goal of the state was nevertheless defined as securing the
wellbeing of the individual. In practice, this can be interpreted as the state, i.e., the federal
central government, defining the frame within which welfare policy is conducted.
Central concepts in Russian security strategical thinking include national interests and
national priorities. The former concept is primarily related to the political agenda, whereas the
latter refers to governmental and administrative planning and implementation. In the 2009
security strategy, the long-term national interests were defined as democratic order,
economic competitiveness, constitutional order, regional unity and autonomy, and Russian
position as a great power, which aims at strategic balance and a multipolar world order.
National interests were seen to be being threatened by demographic changes, environmental
problems, uncontrolled migration, drugs, arms and human trafficking, other forms of
transnational crime, domestic and foreign unrest, and corruption. The implementation of the
security policy was to be monitored through specific indicators, including unemployment,
income inequality, increase in consumer prices, domestic and foreign debt, GDP share of
health, education and culture expenses, amount of new armoury, equipment level of the
personnel of the armed forces, and level of income. The attractiveness of the Russian armed
forces was stressed as a specific social goal. (Heusala 2011.)
In studying the development of Russian institutions, the National Security
Strategy creates an important background against which the development can
be reflected. The security strategy and the complementary Federal Law on
Security are based on definitions in accordance with the concept of
comprehensive security. The security law is a framework law, which is
complemented by separate laws for various organisations. The security
strategy is so comprehensive that it extends development goals to encompass
the significant societal sectors and their basic premises. The goal is to define
the direction of Russia. (Heusala 2011, Kokonaisturvallisuuskäsitteen
käyttämisestä Venäjän turvallisuuspolitiikan tutkimuksessa.)
The impact of the current international political and economic crisis can be seen in the
11
reformed strategy of 2015 . The strategy constructs an image of a world where increased
juxtaposition threatens Russia’s national interests. Russia is seen as a target on which
foreign powers are focusing their activities in an attempt to undermine the Russian decision10
Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года, от 12 мая 2009
года, N 537.
11
Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 31 декабря 2015 года N 683 "О Стратегии
национальной безопасности Российской Федерации".
24
making system and societal peace. Despite this image, the strategy emphasises the need to
sustain opportunities for cooperation with the EU as well as the United States. In terms of
defence policy, strengthening Russian defence and securing constitutional order,
independence and regional unity are deemed as central national interests. National interests
concerning internal development include national consensus, political and social balance,
strengthening democratic institutions and cooperation with NGOs, developing quality of life,
health and the demographic situation, protecting Russian culture and traditional spiritual
values, and improving economic competitiveness. In addition to economic factors,
strengthening Russia’s great power status and strategic balance can be deemed as Russia’s
most central geopolitical goals. Newly introduced focal points include national unity and the
protection of Russian culture and traditional spiritual values, which formalise the nationalistic
domestic policy development of Russia.
The historical permanence of the strategy´s socio-political nature is manifested in the
indicators for monitoring implementation. The indicators include private security and the
security of Russian citizens, share of modern armaments and technology in the armed forces,
life expectancy, GDP, income inequality between the top and bottom 10 per cent, inflation,
unemployment, GDP share of science, technology, education and culture, and the
geographical distribution and scope of environmental problems. The addition of life
expectancy into this list reflects a focus on reducing mortality, which has increased
dramatically in the post-Soviet era, whereas increasing the birth rate has until now been a
particularly important domestic policy goal. The inclusion of environmental problems as an
indicator is probably related to the planning of regional policy. What is crucial about the
indicators is that they refer to comprehensive security thinking and the overall functionality of
society.
3.1 Russian economic and defence policy
Objectives and resources
The goal of the development of the Russian economy is to reform planning in order to
achieve more efficient implementation. The objective is to create a high-technology military
economy, which will act as an engine for sustainable development and economic growth, as
well as supporting the success of other public policy goals. Economic goals are intertwined
with educational reforms and investing in critical research activities. The goal is to expand
purely military technological development into civilian use (so-called dual-use), e.g., in
shipbuilding, nuclear power, the aviation industry, space technology and the arms industry.
The Arctic is geopolitically and economically central in Russia’s strategic thinking, and Russia
also has long-term expectations for the Eurasian Economic Union. The goal is to ensure
Russia’s interests in the north, both in terms of international law and presence of Russian
authorities. Russia’s central defence policy goals are related to securing its independence,
increasing its economic latitude as well as preventing the influence of neighbouring societies
and terrorist action. Current resources are affected by the balancing between social
responsibilities and state acquisitions required by the military economy.
Means for economic development
In 2014, 28 per cent of Russian state revenue and 51 per cent of the federal budget income
were derived from oil and gas taxes. The share of the national economy of the entire Russian
economy is currently around 38 per cent of expenses and just over 34 per cent of income.
25
The current crisis has forced a diversification of the economy through a programme for import
substitution. The programme seeks to diminish reliance on imports, increase domestic
production and diversify exports (Simola 2016).
Economic policy resources have been developed by organising the Russian planning system
and by enacting new laws. As of 2004, the Russian government has sought to stabilise the
macro-economy and has drafted strategic programmes for various areas of the economy.
The programme for import substitution, formulated in response to Western sanctions, can be
considered as the latest strategic programme related to the economy
The objectives of the current political leadership to strengthen the high-technology sectors
commenced with the establishment of enterprises in the military industrial complex and in
dual-use sectors. This was followed by shipbuilding and engine industry enterprises. A similar
logic was also followed in establishing more complex multi-industry structures, which include
Rosatom and Russian Technologies (subsequently renamed Rostec), among others (Pappe
& Drankina 2008). Regarding these very capital-intensive companies, the goal has been to
extend their scale in order to improve their international competitiveness and to support
product development (Crane & Usanov 2010: 118). The expansion of state ownership in the
above-mentioned sectors has attracted a fair amount of critique, but Russian leaders have
constantly emphasised how the lack of initiative on the private sector has partially contributed
to the development. President Putin has concluded that the objective has also been to
prevent the degeneration of key knowledge areas in Russian human capital and to preserve
scientific and production capacity (Putin 2012).
12
Several complementary strategy documents and planning organisations have been
established in order to improve the knowledge base, systematics and impact of economic
planning. The foundation for the current strategic planning was born in 2009 through a law on
the foundations of strategic planning and later through the Law “On Strategic Planning in the
Russian Federation”, which the parliament passed in June 2014. A significant related
legislative change was also the enactment of the law regarding industrial policy on
31 December 2014 (488-FZ 2014).
In October 2013, the Economic council was founded, which is a central decision-making
organisation under the President. The council supports a number of economic strategies,
from state-led stimulus to neoliberal economic policy (Ekspert 2016). The establishment of
the council diminished the impact of the Agency for Strategic Initiatives, whose purpose was
to create a direct link between the authorities and business life and improve implementation
(Monaghan 2014: 18). In June 2016, President Putin signed an order for the Council for
Strategic Development and Priority Projects. Its purpose is to draft Russia’s development
strategy together with the Economic Council (Ekspert 2016).
The reform of the armed forces as part of the economic and defence policy
st
At the beginning of the 21 century, the accumulation of problems in traditional Russian hightechnology industries, such as defence and space technology, posed a challenge that
required rapid rationalisation (Crane & Usanov 2010). The background for the reform of the
Russian armed forces is the new, post-Soviet geopolitical and economic situation. Long-term
12
Governmental programmes have been drawn up for all sectors of public policy, and are regularly
updated. (https://programs.gov.ru/Portal/) Programmes related to economic policy include Strategy
2010, Concept 2020 (a long-term socioeconomic planning concept until 2020), Strategy 2020 and the
May Laws.
26
planning had to be discarded, as adaptation to the emerging market economy required
reacting to urgent and accumulating issues (Päiväläinen 2016). The macroeconomic
development in the 2000s enabled the reform of the Russian armed forces, which began in
2008. The reform had been an objective as early as in the later days of Perestroika (Lannon
2011). The reform is also based on a publicly expressed evaluation of the changing nature of
war. The evaluation stresses regional tactical operations, as well as other forms than
13
traditional warfare in accordance with so-called next-generation warfare . Among the central
objectives of the reform were a radical decrease in personnel and a restructuring of the
administration (McDermott 2009). Personnel reduction was also related to the need to create
alternative employment and build a more efficient defence order system. The modernisation
of the Russian military industrial complex is thus nowadays not only aiming at reforming the
armament and equipment of the armed forces, but at the comprehensive development of the
entire Russian industrial system (Manturov 2013).
According to the textbook of the Russian presidential government, global
interests to be secured though the use of armed forces include resource-rich
[geographical] areas, transportation routes and nodes. In lieu of
straightforward occupation and use of force, it is recommendable to use
indirect methods and to seek to persuade the opponent into cooperation,
through either pressure or reflexive action. In the selection of armed
measures, the strategy is to avoid losses and to take into account the
interdependence of the fighting parties and the infrastructure’s susceptibility to
destruction. Success requires fast action and precision of impact. Armaments,
equipment, usability of forces and know-how need to support this, which is
why the mass army is being replaced by professional armies. (Lalu & Puistola
2016, Hybridisodankäynnin käsitteestä.)
Only in 1996 was the first post-Soviet development programme for armed forces drawn up,
for the years 1996–2005. A new feature was a GDP-based restriction on defence
appropriation. Simultaneously, there was a shift back to budgetary appropriation based on
the military branch and fighting arm. The chaotic environment of the transition economy made
planning extremely challenging. The gathered experiences were, however, further processed
into four development principles for the future: systematics, a realistic examination of needs
and (particularly economic) opportunities, comprehensive knowledge management
(knowledge-based centralised leadership), and constant management of the development
programme (situation consciousness and flexibility in planning). Partially as a result of the
crash of the rouble due to the monetary crisis of 1998, the need for economic and societal
risk management was also recognised. The first risk management guidelines were drawn up
in the early 2000s. (Päiväläinen 2016: 9–10.)
During 2001–2010, the rearmaments programme for the armed forces proceeded to a new
life span model, and the principle of iteration was also introduced into development
(Päiväläinen 2016: 10). This refers to an engaging usage of expertise, constant testing of the
functionality of reforms and phase-based development. In accordance with this new thinking,
planning involved a larger number of military and political experts from various governmental
areas, and funding was transformed into a three-level model. The goal was to prevent Russia
13
See, e.g., Giles 2016. So-called next-generation warfare is also referred to as sixth-generation
warfare, whose tactics also include hybrid warfare. In Russian military scientific and strategic
terminology, a central concept related to warfare and hybrid warfare is reflexive steering (refleksivnoye
upravleniye). Concisely put, this refers to the ability of party A to affect the thoughts and plans of
party B, as well as party B’s image of party A, resulting in the solutions of party B being based on false
knowledge. A similar, albeit narrower, US concept is perception management. (Thomas 2004: 242,
250.)
27
from falling behind its most important rival countries, and the minimum goal was set at
maintaining the existing system (Päiväläinen 2016: 10).
In the 2010s, Russia concluded that the ideological juxtaposition had
diminished, and instead, multi-polarity had gained ground; although on the one
hand, the political, economic and military influence of specific states (state
groups) had weakened. On the other hand, the increased influence of some
states hampered the increase of the previously mentioned dominance.
Globalisation was introduced as a new factor in world politics, which for its part
led to increased competition in some fields and, respectively, increased
tensions between different states and areas. Globalisation aggravated the
complexity of international relations and the volatility of different developmental
processes on both a global and regional level. However, in the mid-2010s, this
was seen to lead to a redistribution of influential power in favour of new power
centres. In this respect, Russia’s Military Doctrine 2014 sets a new strategic
objective for superpower policy. (Forsström 2016, Venäjän sotilasdoktriinien
kehittyminen Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen.)
The current military industrial complex of Russia indeed appears as a strategic, halfgovernmental security policy and technological actor (Päiväläinen 2016: 8). The armaments
programme, which extends until 2020, is based on a broad normative foundation, which
includes the National Security Strategy until 2020, the federal Military Doctrine, federal
policies regarding the development of science and technology until 2010, and the concept of
Russia’s socioeconomic development until 2020. (Burenok 2014; Kotov & Kozlanzhi 2012.)
Russia has also thoroughly invested in the realisation of these defence policy goals.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the share of
military expenditure as a proportion of state expenses has steadily increased from
14
9.9 per cent in 2008 to 13.7 per cent in 2015. The nominal increase of military expenditure
in the national economy during 2007–2014 was 18 per cent, and still in 2015, the increase
was as high as 28 per cent. In 2016, however, the increase of military expenditure has come
to a halt. According to the estimate of the Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in
Transition, the GDP share of Russia’s military expenditure is around 3.5 per cent
(Korhonen V. 2016).
Military expenditure share of state expenditure
15
Russia
10
%
USA
India
5
Great-Britain
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
14
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex) The data on the military
expenditure of different countries are derived from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic
Outlook. SIPRI has collected a database on the military expenditure of 171 countries since 1988. The
database is based on public sources.
*Compiled based on SIPRI’s Military Expenditure Database (2016). Chinese data is missing for the
years 2010–2014. For 2015, the estimated share of military expenditure of the state expenditure of
China was 6.3 per cent
28
According to SIPRI’s estimate, in 2015, the military budget of the entire world was
1,676 billion dollars. The US share was 596 billion dollars, the share of China 215 billion
dollars and the share of Russia 66.4 billion dollars. In 2015, the US’s share of the military
expenditure of the entire world was 36 per cent, whereas the share of Russia was 4 per cent
15
(Perlo-Freeman et al. 2016). However, no conclusions regarding the readiness of specific
countries to defend their national interests in different situations of crisis can be drawn from
these global power relations. In addition to the above-mentioned organisational and
economic changes, the development goals of the Russian armed forces should be evaluated
in relation to the United States and NATO. Some Russian political analysts harbour the
conception that the United States is waging a war against Russia on different fronts without
an open proclamation of war. The internal political pressure to reform the army and increase
military preparedness is a motivator in President Putin’s current defence policy. (Crooke
2016.)
The Arctic
The defence and development of industry are related to Russia’s activities in geographically
central focal areas, of which the most important is the Arctic. Within the energy economy,
Russia’s central goals are related to getting oil from Siberia and the Far East, diversifying its
own production, opening up to international cooperation and the high-technology usage of
nuclear power. In the Arctic, Russia is investing heavily in the activities of Rosneft and
Gazprom. It seeks to develop infrastructure, reopen military areas and increase military
capacity. The latter is in order to ensure a significant status in relation to NATO in the
northern area.
Russia has the world’s largest Arctic area, which encompasses a 17,500-kilometre coastline,
a nine million-strong population and production whose share of GDP is significant. Russia
has two central goals in the Arctic. The first is related to northern sea routes that might be
profitable for Russia. In order to secure them, Russia demands the right to monitor sea areas
which would normally within international law be considered areas of free navigation or
territorial waters with free transit. The navigating rights are related to the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides coastal states with the sovereign right to
the natural resources of the sea bottom within an exclusive economic zone, which extends to
200 nautical miles from the coastline. However, it simultaneously also grants states the right
to extend the width of this area by 150 nautical miles, if the geological limits of the continental
shelf can be proven to extend to that area. Russia is claiming the majority of the 1.2-millionsquare-kilometre area that extends to the North Pole. It was the first to deliver its petition to
the UN Commission that had the task of establishing the limits of the continental shelf. The
development of the Arctic is related to immense off-shore hydrocarbon reserves, which are
estimated to represent up to 30 per cent of the world’s unutilised natural gas and 13 per cent
of crude oil. (Flake 2015: 74.) Thus far Russia’s goals have been related specifically to
securing the economic potential of the Arctic, in contrast to, for example, a ‘great geopolitical
conflict’. Increasing tensions in the Arctic does not support Russia’s goals. At the same time,
it can be seen that defending economic interests in the Arctic that are deemed nationally
significant is taken seriously, for instance by developing administrative systems and by
intertwining the interests with the reform process of the Russian armed forces.
Policy announcements, budget allocations, and security developments
connected to the Arctic since 2009 have largely centered on enhancing
constabulary and conventional military capabilities. To this end, Moscow re15
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/EMBARGO%20FS1604%20Milex%202015.pdf
29
established units within the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk border guards to
patrol the NSR in 2009 and set the goal of creating a comprehensive coastal
defence infrastructure in the Arctic by 2017. [...] This infrastructure
enhancement aligns with plans to deploy by 2020 a combined-arms force to
include military, border, and coastal guard units to protect Russia’s economic
and political interests in the Arctic. (Flake 2015, Forecasting Conflict in the
Arctic: The Historical Context of Russia’s Security Intentions.)
The Eurasian Economic Union
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which officially started its activities at the beginning of
2015, is the most ambitious of President Putin’s projects so far. The goal is to create a
community based on the free mobility of capital, labour and goods that can compete in
specific economic areas in the global market. Russia’s aim to achieve a strategically stronger
position and resources in relation to the EU, which would also compensate for the problems
of the Russian national economy, can be seen as the background for the development of the
Eurasian Economic Union. The Eurasian Economic Union can also be seen as Russia’s
attempt at strengthening its negotiation position in its cooperation with China. (Dutkiewicz
2015: 6.)
The historical background of the union is the integration of the former Soviet republic area,
which began in the 1990s. This led to the Eurasian Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and
16
Kazakhstan, which started its activities in 2010. In addition to the above-mentioned
countries, the member states of the current Eurasian Economic Union also include Kirgizia
and Armenia. Russia has emphasised that the goal is to establish a competitive economic
17
and judicial integration, following the example of the EU. It has been flexible in regard to the
goals of the other member states, which has made the union a form of ‘client community’, in
which politics is as important as real economic interests (Kivinen 2016). Currently, the
Eurasian Economic Union is governed through the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council,
consisting of the heads of the member states, the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, the
Eurasian Economic Commission and the Court of the EAEU. In the current economic crisis,
the development resources of the Eurasian Economic Union have considerably diminished,
but its foundation nevertheless holds a strong position, particularly in the field of energy
production, in which it is among the globally leading producers of both oil and natural gas.
Russia’s ability to achieve its goals
Russia’s ability to implement its strategies for achieving its defence and economic objectives
is currently considerably undermined. The comprehensive picture, however, is contradictory.
The implementation of the ongoing policy for substituting imports is a lengthy process. The
overall economic constraints are significant, as economic growth is estimated at 1–2 per cent.
The price development of oil is a central short- and possibly also medium-term challenge,
which complicates finding a balance between financing internal development and defence.
Oil and gas taxes, i.e., oil and gas production taxes, as well as revenue from oil, oil product
and gas import customs have decreased dramatically. In addition, the increase of the GDP
share of military expenditure has stopped (Korhonen V. 2016).
16
http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#about-history
The political purposes of the project have been evaluated from various perspectives. Many
assessments stress the geopolitical goals of Russia and its will to influence the development of the
former Soviet states. The union is also associated with the Eurasian ideology. However, President Putin
has so far emphasised pragmatic issues. (Kivinen 2016.)
17
30
In the future, Russia will continue to invest in its Arctic in terms of both military policy and
global politics. The geopolitical importance of this area will increase if climate change
proceeds according to expectations and the price of oil starts to rise. The military economy
relies on state orders and exports, which thus far have been small. The military industry has
the potential for development in a limited international market. However, the growth of the
military economy will not necessarily proceed in accordance with Russia’s wishes due to, for
example, high investments in shipping and missile production. The objective of dual-use is
also challenging.
Economic change
Even though the price drop of oil, economic sanctions and the slow-down of the economy
have diminished the Russian government’s resources for achieving its goals (Connolly &
Hanson 2016: 18), they have simultaneously created strong incentives for Russia to change
its economic model. Russia’s own economic experts are, however, divided on what will
generate growth in the future. Some would opt for fiscal-political stimulus, some favour
structural reforms, and others prefer monetary action by the central bank. (Papchenkova &
Prokopenko 2016.) The struggle between these different lines is of course hampering the
selection of the course of action.
Industrial production has dropped since 2011, but in 2016, it has again shown signs of growth
within the metal industry, machinery and equipment and the production of transport
equipment. Researchers of economy are now pondering whether there might be a turn
coming up in the Russian economy. However, due to the drop in wages, consumer trust is
still low, and attracting solid investments is challenging. (Korhonen I. 2016.) At the moment,
the sanctions are being felt hard in the energy industry, which is crucially important for
Russia. Attracting investments in new sectors combined with the limitations for foreign
investors has proved challenging, and renewable energy is having trouble entering the
energy market. The development of liquefied natural gas and offshore opportunities is difficult
for Russia. It has an increasing need to implement Western technology in the northern areas,
where it is dependent on the activities of foreign enterprises.
During the last decade, Russia has succeeded in the development of a civilian nuclear
industry, among others, which is one of its internationally most successful fields (Crane &
Usanov 2010: 108). In 2006–2011, Rosatom’s investments in research and development
increased seven-fold (RBK Innovatsii 2015). Rosatom has also actively sought to increase its
significance in foreign markets. In 2014, Rosatom’s foreign portfolio doubled to 100 billion
dollars compared to 2012 (ITAR-TASS 2014).
Resuscitating Russia’s civil aviation industry and shipping industry has been a more
demanding challenge. Regarding these sectors, the Russian government’s operating policy
has been to expedite progress by using the most successful part of military industry for
launching civilian production (Hobson 2016). Despite the initial difficulties and slow progress,
it would seem the Russian aviation industry is finally building up speed. The City Jet order,
which landed Russian production in the European market, and the presentation of the engine
type MC-21 can be named as examples (Hobson 2016; Zhang 2016). Initial state
investments in the shipping industry also seem to have generated results.
The impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the enterprises in Russia’s military industry have been
contradictory. At first, delivery of orders suffered because the Russian military industry was
previously closely integrated with the Ukrainian military industry. The embargo on the export
of arms from Ukraine to Russia hampered the acquisition of chopper engines and power
sources used in naval ships, among others. It is hoped that the import substitution
31
programme will ease the situation for Ukrainian products within the embargo as soon as
2017. Substituting Western products, on the other hands, is more problematic. (Connolly
2016: 757.) There are, however, some success stories. The Russian pharmaceutical
industry, for instance, increased by 26 per cent in 2015. A significant share of the new deals
made during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum 2015 were within this sector.
Economic growth and the ‘securitisation’ of leadership undeniably influence each other in
Russia. Several estimates tend to believe the ‘securitisation’ of economic policy is hampering
normal economic development. A negative view of Russia’s ability to reform its economy
emphasises the system’s structural problems caused and maintained by its political nature,
such as poor transparency in decision-making, corruption and quasi-reforms. Critics stress
how the current import substitution programme is a conservative trend that undermines the
liberalisation that has been achieved in Russian economic life. Others, however, doubt
whether the neoliberal model – in its Russian form, in particular – is genuinely liberal, in the
first place. (Taliano 2016; Titov 2016.)
Russia’s ability to implement economic policy reforms can be studied through materialised
examples. The analysis should be based on evaluations that are not too straightforward or
based only on current assessments. For instance, among the internationally praised Russian
structural changes is the tax reform of 2000-2004, which generated a 13 per cent flat tax
(Collier 2011; Gel’man & Starodubtsev 2014) and for its part supported the establishment of
the stabilisation fund (Gel’man & Starodubtsev 2014). Subsequently, the modernisation of
national economic planning has been underway, striving to combine annual budgeting with
programme-based long-term planning. However, this reform has been more demanding to
implement (Zhavoronkova 2014) than a one-off tax reform.
What is noteworthy is that none of the economic policy trends that have gained support
among Russian decision-makers are directly conflicting with international cooperation, direct
foreign investments, technology exports or joint ventures with Western large-scale
enterprises. The current substitution of imports does not translate into a negative attitude
towards foreign investments in Russia, but includes an attempt to integrate foreign
companies into the Russian market so that they transfer production to Russia rather than
exporting to Russia. (Connolly & Hanson 2016.) The peak years of Russian competitiveness
in energy prices were also significantly affected by increased wages, which can be seen to
have diminished its advantage compared to other countries (Sutela 2012). After the
establishment of the economic sanctions, the wage level has again dropped, which means
reduced production costs from the perspective of foreign investors.
Western analyses often stress the view that Russian economic policy is divided into those
who wish to have ‘manual control throughout the economy’ and the liberal-technocrat elite
that seeks to defend Russia’s development in a more modern direction and broader
cooperation with the West (Connolly 2016: 770). However, in Russia, the differences in
approach cannot be labelled according to simple categories, such as liberal economic policy
versus state-led economic policy, or the economy versus security and bureaucracy (cf. Mau
2016). It can be said, however, that competition between different economic policy
perspectives is increasing. The situation can improve incentives to follow through existing
reforms, if different economic and political interest groups can find objectives in them that
they want to defend.
32
Military development
Russia will respond to NATO’s missile defence project. The new missile system, which can
penetrate possible missile defence systems (as in the case of Syria), developed new naval
ships (also Syria) and nuclear defence, which is being developed further, have been at the
centre of the development of the armed forces. Defence around Kaliningrad and Saint
Petersburg will be important as well. The implementation of the rearmament programme is of
course also affected by cuts in military expenditure, which are estimated to be up to
6 per cent in 2016. Orders are expected to decrease by 5–7 per cent. According to the
analysis of Pjankov (2015), from the very beginning, there has been a gap between the
efficiency objectives and results in the rearmament programme, which extends until 2020.
The main reasons are unclear military strategic, technical and war economic estimates, as
well as the decision-makers’ poor knowledge of the true potential of the military-industrial
complex. There has also been friction regarding the administration of the rearmament
programme. Challenges are posed, e.g., a silo-like preparation process between different
administrative areas, inadequate pricing systems, resistance to change within the
administrative hierarchies and compatibility issues with foreign weapons systems (Burenok
2012).
Until recently, Russian leaders did not believe in a traditional military threat from the West,
but this understanding has clearly changed. Operative-tactic Iskander-M missiles have
already been introduced. These are short-range tactical weapons, which are meant to be
able to destroy US and NATO military units and their equipment in Eastern Europe. The
introduction of the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile is also underway, which is meant
as a response to the US Prompt Global Strike tactic. The strategic torpedo Status-6 is
intended to target the US coast, when necessary, as well as the combat units of aircraft
barriers and the US naval bases.
Some military units have difficulties recruiting and committing personnel. Challenges related
to personnel within the reform of the armed forces are also related to the reform of the
Russian military service system. In principle, the military service system has been based on
the duty of 18–27-year-old men to perform a year-long military service, thus ensuring a large
reserve. Due to the shortness of the training of servicemen, they should not, in principle,
participate in cross-border activities, which should be performed by professional soldiers,
when necessary. In practice, there is no universal military service that would encompass all
men, since conscription can be avoided on various grounds (Gresh 2011). However, during
recent years, there has been increased investment in the training of regular soldiers,
including more drills. All in all, the reform of the armed forces has been successful in the
creation of more mobile troops, development of the speed, flexibility and automatisation of
the decision-making system and the usage of new kinds of preparedness drills. Russia thus
already has the will and high-level ability to use its military potential, in terms of both offence
and defence.
Russia’s interests in the Arctic
In recent years, Russia has managed to solve long-term problems with its neighbours. The
border treaty with Norway in 2010 finally calmed down one of the most significant bilateral
disputes in the area. In 2013, Russia attended the long-awaited negotiations on the
regulation of fishing in the central Arctic, which will significantly reduce the possibility of
increased tension between various countries due to fishing rights. Other border-related
disputes, such as the border between the United States and Russia on the Bering Strait, will
probably not seriously aggravate tensions. The Arctic Council has managed to further
common interests related to prospecting and oil destruction measures, which for their part
33
reduce conflict sensitivity. (Flake 2015: 74.) It would be in the interests of Russia to keep the
area isolated from the ongoing crisis, even though it is increasing the resources of its
authorities in the area. This seems to correspond with the interests of other actors, as well.
The US, for instance, has not sought to militarise or create additional tension in the Arctic.
The development of the Eurasian Economic Union
The development of the Eurasian Economic Union faces numerous challenges even outside
the current economic crisis. The first challenge is related to transnational decision-making,
where Russia is easily seen to lead the entire economic union. Other countries might
experience the asymmetric power relations in decision-making as a threat to their
sovereignty, which will slow down integration in decision-making and implementation.
Another challenge is related to the transnational, multi-layered (involving several societal
sectors) integration, which is related to immigration, private enterprises and exceptions to
customs legislation. The differences in the societal and economic situations between Russia
and its neighbours are also significantly slowing down such integration. The third significant
challenge is the ability of the member states to agree on the cultural, civilisation-related and
religious nature of the union. This will require purposeful dialogue and the establishment of
trust, which would serve as the foundation for all other cooperation. (Dutkiewicz 2015;
Kangaspuro & Heusala 2017.) In the current economic and political crisis, there are
necessarily no prerequisites for such rapprochement.
Implications for Finland
From the perspective of Finnish decision-makers, it is important to identify which
development trends related to Russia’s military policy and economy should be followed, so
that Finland’s own choices are not based on absolute evaluations or analyses of only the
current situation. In interpreting indicators on Russia’s development, it is wise to seek to form
a versatile, comprehensive and critical analysis, which also encompasses public discussion.
At the moment, Russia does not experience Finland as a military threat, but Russian- Finnish
relations are affected by Russia’s view regarding the expansion of NATO to its borders.
According to Russia’s current security thinking, if Finland were to join NATO, this would
create a security threat it could not bypass. Immediate political and economic reactions
should be distinguished from an analysis of how NATO membership would affect Finland’s
position in a war situation. In the case of increased tensions, Finland should be prepared for
various developmental courses and be flexible and quick in its own actions. Improving
Finland’s own flexibility would also mean increased defence and internal security
expenditure.
The modernisation of the Russian military economy does not have direct implications for the
Finnish economy, but if Russia succeeds at reforming its central economic sectors, this will
have an impact on Finland’s competitive environment. However, it is possible that the
substitution of imports may already be affecting Finnish high-technology companies, even
though the volume of such exports is low. Sanctions also affect Finland’s possibilities of
importing armaments from Russia. In general, the Western sanctions significantly limit
international cooperation in the military, energy economy and financing sectors.
Modernisation objectives are hampered and slowed down, as there are limited opportunities
for attracting financing from foreign creditors.
Russia’s current tactical options also include, when necessary, undermining the unity of the
EU–NATO collaboration, even though Russia is simultaneously seeking to enter into and
34
maintain cooperation with EU member states. From Finland’s perspective, it is important to
maintain the possibility of continuing economic collaboration, particularly if or when the
current crisis eases. The development of the Eurasian Economic Union must also be kept in
mind. Current international research as well as political analysis emphasises Russia’s
securitised and diminishing national economy (Connolly & Hanson 2016: 18), but relations
with Russia built on this view might also lead to opportunities going unnoticed. Perceiving
Russian economic development deterministically, for instance solely as increasing isolation,
the growing role of the state in the economy or the ‘revival of Soviet economics’ (Åslund
2013) can lead to misjudgements and surprises. Studies show that the industrial structures of
Finland and Russia are very different, which increases possibilities for cooperation. The
competitive advantages of Finland are centred on global technology companies, whereas
Russia is focused on energy- and natural resource-intensive factory industries.
Arctic climate change has provided new urgency for states to promote their
interest. Following record low ice extent in 2007, the region experienced even
greater decline in 2012, with the summer ice coverage measuring just
3.41 million square kilometers, compared to a 7 million square kilometer
average from 1979 to 2000. [..] The length of the ice-free season in the
Russian Arctic seas has increased from 84 in 1979 to 129 in 2006 and then
171 in 2007, allowing for greater maritime surface traffic as well as energy
exploration work. (Flake 2015, Forecasting Conflict in the Arctic: The Historical
Context of Russia’s Security Intentions.)
In the cooperation against climate change, it is important to keep research and technology
collaboration on the political agenda as well as striving towards practical collaboration.
For Finland, monitoring the Arctic development is a permanent interest, since if oil prices
increase, Arctic energy projects will be initiated. This will create a possibility for Finland to join
in. However, the participation of Finland in Arctic activities is affected by existing or emerging
tensions and disputes in this area. For now, it seems as if the biggest risks to the equilibrium
in the area are posed by disputes related to navigation in the Arctic and the ownership rights
over the seabed.
If the price of oil stays low for a prolonged period, various societal and political risks will
increase in Russia, and the importance of Finland’s own preparedness will become more
pronounced. Within energy policy, cooperation within the nuclear power sector will probably
not face significant change, but Finland should prepare for substituting its oil and gas
provision. Russia’s European markets are shrinking. The choices of decision-makers need to
be supported by long-term research on the key processes of the Russian economy and
society and the actual influence of various interest groups. Finnish solutions need to take into
account the contradictions of Russian developmental trends, and Finland has to strive to
maintain its own response readiness for different situations.
3.2 Russia’s external security
Objectives and resources
In recent years, the central objective of Russia has been to gain recognition as a great power
in international decision-making. However, foreign policy objectives have also been linked
with a realpolitik understanding of the economic advantages that are ultimately defended
through military presence and action. Russia aims for a multipolar international system; in a
global framework, it shares this objective with China. Simultaneously, Russia aims to gain
35
influence in former Soviet areas or countries with which it has a cultural and historical link. A
central objective of Russia is to prevent so-called colour revolutions near its border. Concrete
focal sectors in Russian foreign policy include global energy exports, international
antiterrorism action, the development of the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Arctic, among
others. Within external security, Russia strives to build strategically and tactically beneficial
ally relations on both political and economic shared interests. Increased activities with China
serve as an example.
Russia’s goal is to achieve actual recognition or de facto acceptance for its current
interpretation of sovereignty. Previously, Russia has harboured a sceptical attitude towards
humanitarian interventions, since they have been interpreted as interfering with state
sovereignty. From Russia’s perspective, Western interventions have justified practically
military activity. A similar view is reflected in Russian attitudes towards integration
endeavours which the EU has implemented in Eastern European states, and in a categorical
rejection of activities it deems as interfering with its internal issues. Maintaining strategic
independence in all cooperation is at the centre of Russian foreign policy thinking. Russia
compares itself to the status of the United States, which according to Russia’s impression is,
as a superpower, above international norms and law. (Igumnova 2011.) From Russia’s
perspective, its actions in Ukraine and the Crimea, which it partially justified with
humanitarian causes, were a demonstration of its strengthened role and ability to set
boundaries for the actions of other parties when these are deemed to seriously threaten
Russian national interests. As Russia categorically opposes the expansion of NATO near its
border, it interprets that the annexing of the Crimea was also a defensive action due to the
military importance of the area. Russian participation in the Syria crisis, for its part, is justified,
among other activity, by international antiterrorism activity, in which a great power is also
active outside its own borders.
The United Nations has been an important political resource for Russia to further its foreign
policy goals. A crucial resource in Russia–EU relations has been Russian energy exports to
Europe and cooperation within the energy sector. Global energy exporting includes acting as
a great power within the nuclear power sector. From a European perspective, the Russian
markets were attractive until the events in the Crimea in 2014. Lively cultural, scientific and
education cooperation has also built relations between Russia and Europe. These have not
been directly affected by the current crisis.
Russia’s ability to achieve its goals
Russia’s credibility in the United Nations, for instance, is based on its actual ability to
participate in solving regional conflicts. In its attempts to achieve its objectives, Russia, as a
superpower, has to address the question of what political and economic risks it is ready to
take in implementing its foreign and security policy. However, Russia’s capacity cannot be
explained with one factor. What is essential is that Russia can execute its own objectives
more quickly than NATO or the EU. Russia is also more agile in hybrid influencing.
The implications of the sanctions are both economic and political. The sanctions include
several limitations on economic cooperation, such as long-term credit for Russian banks,
energy companies and the military industry, as well as Arctic and offshore energy technology
exports to Russia, and arms exports. The sanctions also restrict Russia’s participation in
multilateral cooperation, such as G8 cooperation (Aalto & Forsberg 2015: 223), the EU–
Russia council and the Russia–NATO council. Persons related to Russian decision-making
have been put on a travel ban and their foreign accounts have been frozen. The dialogue
between the West and Russia has been weak or non-existent, and juxtaposition is increasing.
36
In this situation, Russia has sought to further its foreign policy through bilateral relations,
which already had a significant role before the crisis. In the European Union, Germany and
France act as the ‘political resources’ of Russia. Financial support from Russia to European
18
right-wing politicians is significant, through which it also strengthens its political relations
with central European countries. Russia is skilled at utilising international law for expanding
its own latitude by emphasising how it is open to various interpretations. It justifies its
activities by creating analogues to the United States. Russian foreign policy can be seen as
tactically flexible. Russia participates in various international policy ‘games’, in which its own
foreign policy doctrine is implemented with a varying emphasis.
The development of the Eurasian Economic Union, which officially started its activities at the
beginning of 2015, faces various economic, administrative, legislative and political
challenges. A crucial issue is whether Russia will succeed at combining the Silk Road policy
of China and the goals of the Eurasian Economic Union, which were agreed in principle in
spring 2014. Russia will probably actively pursue this goal, particularly if its relations with the
West continue to deteriorate or remain inflamed. In the sphere of influence battle with China,
Russia seeks to avoid a zero-sum game. After several years of negotiations, the countries
have signed energy agreements. China’s influence on Russian politics and society will
probably increase. An example of this is the restriction of Internet usage, which was planned
in collaboration with Prime Minister Medvedev and the Chinese. Like the Caucasus, Central
Asia is important for Russia in regard to antiterrorism. However, sanctions imposed by the
United States on specific persons undermine the ability of Russia to participate in
19
international crime prevention activity alongside the United States.
The problems of the Russian national economy are significantly slowing down an escalation
of the Ukrainian crisis. For this reason, it is probable that the Ukrainian crisis will come to a
halt at some point. The European Union is still important for Russia, as the EU stands for
40 per cent of its trade, whereas Russia only represents six per cent of average EU trade.
The current diversification activities are forced and time-consuming. Russian economic
development is still heavily dependent on the overproduction of fossil fuels. According to
current estimates, its economic development can generate an annual growth of around 1–
2 per cent, which is very low compared to Russia’s economic development of the past
decade. Its business environment is still not particularly attractive. Solid investments
20
decreased by 2.6 per cent in 2014, and by 8.5 per cent in 2015.
As to the assessments of foreign scholars, a first group of analysts predict dire
consequences for the Russian economy [...] Some note that the impact of the
sanctions depends on whether Russia’s former partners can maintain these in
the long run at potentially increasing costs [...] Others believe that the impact
of the sanctions may remain limited, noting that the Russian state is highly
resilient because the many non-globalised sectors of its economy co-exist with
more export-dependent sectors, such as energy, which are protected by
Russia’s Reserve Fund. [..] Russia can withstand major economic losses in
the short to medium run, while both the elite and society at large are likely to
rally behind President Putin’s countermeasures to the sanctions. (Aalto &
18
For instance, a quarter of the budget of the Front National is from Russia.
Sohibov Akmal & Heusala, Anna-Liisa (work in progress) The Unintended Consequences of Western
Sanctions for the US–Russian Institutional Cooperation in Counter-narcotics.
20
http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit/seuranta/venajatilastot/Pages/default.aspx
19
37
Forsberg 2015, The Structuration of Russia’s Geo-Economy Under Economic
Sanctions.)
All in all, Russia’s foreign policy development is nevertheless not inevitable. If the Russian
economy continues to decline, Russia might lean politically more towards the East. The
current economic capacity of the Eurasian Economic Union will not further the recovery or
growth of Russian resources in the short term, but the union has to be seen as a long-term
strategic key project. China wants free access to the area of the Eurasian Economic Union
(Dutkiewicz 2015). Cooperation with China also has domestic policy implications, as the
influence of China grows within the Russian economy and society. However, the countries
also share important foreign and trade policy goals. Both China and Russia see the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) as an instrument for a battle of
spheres of influence, and therefore oppose it. For now, China is primarily important for
Russia because of crude oil and armaments imports.
So-called soft power, through culture, education and research relations, is also important for
Russia, and Russia has invested in education exports in former Soviet areas. The 2014
Olympics were loaded with expectations of how it would serve as an international PR
campaign, as a window on the ‘new Russia’. This goal was hindered by events related to
legislative changes in Russia, which were broadly reported and discussed in the Western
media. Russia has interpreted Western criticism as part of a systematic information war
aimed at isolating Russia in international relations. So far, the chances of Russia restoring its
international reputation seem weak, unless the Ukrainian crisis takes a significantly different
turn.
Implications for Finland
The current crisis situation in Europe is a stress test for Finland, which points out the weak
links in our administrative system, among others. Finland has harboured a picture of itself as
a model country: as a Nordic welfare state, whose activities are well organised. The current
situation has, however, proved that the limited nature of the administrative resources are
becoming visible, and cooperation between authorities is not always as smooth as was
thought.
The EU sanctions have taken their economic toll on Finnish agriculture. Prior to 2014, there
were great expectations for Russian trade, and Russia was deemed a central partner in the
economic development of Finland. In the current situation, Finland supports maintaining unity
within the EU in regard to the sanctions. However, Finland must also prepare itself for the
post-sanctions era. If the conditions of the Minsk Agreement are sufficiently met, some of the
sanctions will possibly be dismantled. If, for instance, Germany proposes lifting the EU
sanctions, Finland will probably support such a proposition. The social and economic
advantages for Finland are large enough for there to be enough political support for
dissolving the sanctions. Nevertheless, Finland must develop its agricultural exports further;
Russia cannot be relied upon as it could previously.
The information war between the East and the West is so comprehensive that compiling a
realistic picture from single events and their interpretations in the media is difficult.
Throughout the whole of Finnish society, Finnish decision-makers are required to exercise
independent thinking and to be critical towards information sources. Future research on
Russian security and foreign policy goals should increasingly strive to support the formation
of a more comprehensive and comparable picture of Russian decision-making, goals and
realised development.
38
For the Finnish government and parliament, it is important to follow Russia’s Transatlantic
and trans-Asian relations. The development in the Arctic can provide opportunities for
Finland. Finland’s goal should be to prevent an increase in tension and to maintain peace in
the competition regarding national interests. The development of the Eurasian Economic
Union as well as the broader development of Central Asia will also have an impact on
Finland. If the states of this region escalate into a state of ferment, this can be reflected in
Finland in the form of weakened border security, allowing, for example, illegal migration or
transnational crime, of which drug trafficking to Russia and Europe is the most significant.
Finland’s goal should be to maintain and systematically strengthen cooperation with Russia’s
authorities.
Environmental issues have been a central aspect of the foreign policy interaction between
Russia and Finland – a sector in which efforts have led to significant results, as well. This
sector should also be invested in in the future, and during the sanctions, Finland should also
strive towards a political solution in which cooperation within the energy sector is not critically
undermined.
3.3 Russia’s internal security
Objectives and resources
The strategic long-term goal of Russia’s internal security has been to adapt to the economic
constraints brought on by globalisation by stabilising its macro-economy and by reforming
Russian state services by utilising also globalized means of the public sector. Concrete
measures have included improving capabilities in the economic and social policy
implementation, influencing the demographic situation through family, health and immigration
policy, and reforming crime prevention activities and legislation. In addition, strengthening
political consensus, cultural unity and acknowledging traditional values in the legislation and
implementation of policy reforms are seen to support internal security goals. Central strategic
means in state governance have included centralisation and an authoritarian, election-based
model. While the financing for security administration has increased, social policy is still the
most central focus point in internal security. Currently, it represents up to 35 per cent of the
national economy expenditure and 13–14 per cent of the GDP (Korhonen V. 2016).
National security
Behind the formation of Russia’s objectives lie two developmental lines, which have grown
stronger during the past 15 years. After the post-Soviet crisis years, which culminated in the
crash of the rouble in 1998, national security has developed into a central frame for public
policy planning. The goal has been that the President-led Security Council of Russian
Federation would act as the core of planning activities. It would take a broad stand on both
external and internal security issues and set the order of priority among them.
Central leadership-related objectives have included the establishment of a strong central
government through the so-called power vertical. In addition to the aim of focusing power in
Moscow, the goal has been to improve the planning and control of practical reform work,
partially by implementing international public sector techniques. The goals of internal security
are defined in the Security Strategy, and their implementation is also regulated in the Security
39
21
Law. Another concrete goal has been to reform public governance and administrative
systems.
Since national security has been established as the guiding principle for public policy, the
relation between international judicial norms and institutions has also undergone a change,
as Russian sovereignty has been emphasised. Sovereignty and the willingness to integrate
new kinds of judicial thinking into Russian legislation have been a topic of discussion ever
since the constitutional reform of 1993. President Putin’s rule cannot unequivocally be
regarded as opposing the development of the Rule of Law. During his first presidential term,
a number of reforms that significantly improved basic rights were enacted in the fields of
criminal law and criminal procedural law, among others (Kahn 2008). Russia has been
diligent in conforming with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights regarding
payments, albeit without institutional changes in Russia (Van der Vet 2014).
In recent years, there has, however, been a notable shift in Russia’s attitude towards foreign
jurisprudence. Decisions of international courts of human rights are not automatically deemed
binding in Russia. The principle of sovereignty is more broadly applied in the drafting and
implementation of legislation. The attitudes of Supreme Court judges also seem to be
changing in regard to sovereignty, national security and human rights.
[Unlike] the 2003 Decree, the 2013 Supreme Court Decree views ECtHR
jurisprudence only as complementary to domestic Russian legislation and
treaties: “legal positions” (pravovye pozitsii) of the European Court need to be
“taken into consideration” (uchityvaiutsia) when applying Russian legislation
and treaties of the Russian Federation in the courts of general jurisdiction.
(Antonov 2014, Conservatism in Russia and Sovereignty in Human Rights)
Legal developments and the pronounced role of the Security Council are also strengthening
the so-called securitisation of the political steering in Russia. This refers to a situation where,
in addition to comprehensive security thinking, practical steering in the actual implementation
is increased. Such measures have traditionally been taken in use when undesired
consequences of reforms have posed a serious political risk for the entire reform (Heusala
2013). The basic challenge for Russian domestic policy is indeed how far political and
administrative centralisation can be taken in the name of more efficient leadership and
national security.
Nevertheless, in internal security, social responsibility thinking is still central. The task of the
state is to provide social basic services, which legitimates the political system. This is also
reflected in the indicators of the Security Strategy, in which welfare-related issues are well
represented. Patriotism, great power foreign policy and globalisation are intertwined in
Russia’s internal security goals. Russia is investing in the development of the Eurasian
Economic Union, where the unification of immigration policy, economic policy and labour
policy in the member states is brought up on the political agenda. Immigration policy is
indeed among the high-priority issues in Russian security thinking, since it is related to the
creation of free labour markets among the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union
(Kangaspuro & Heusala 2017).
Until recent years, the macroeconomic stabilisation policy and the accumulation of reserve
funds have been the most important resources in the development of Russia’s internal
security. In the current situation, the importance of national unity is emphasised. This is
21
Федеральные закон от 28 декабря 2010 г. N 390-ФЗ "О безопасности".
40
furthered through the media, among others, and is used for strengthening the political
steering of decision-making as well as for averting opposition movements. Strong support for
the measures of the current political lead is understood as a prerequisite for goals related to
turning the course of the economy, such as the import substitution programme.
Structural changes in public administration as well as efforts to improve its functional
capacity, including complementary training and partial digitalisation of services, have also
aimed at generating a change in the administrative culture. However, the change in the
Russian administration can only be regarded as a process in progress, finances for which
were only available during the economic boom of the 2000s. Regarding administrative
systems in internal security, law enforcement organisations, in particular, have undergone
several structural reforms. The latest reform of 2016 is about unifying and transferring the
22
forces operating under the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the President-led National Guard .
This move has been explained as attempt to strengthen public order during a state of
23
emergency and counterterrorism activities, in particular. The Drug control agency and the
Immigration agency have also been integrated as part of the structure of the Ministry of
24
Internal Affairs, albeit under the principle that they retain their autonomy. In other words,
within Russian internal security, the administrative structure is accommodated to the political
leaders’ assessment of changes in the security environment.
Russia’s ability to achieve its goals
The strong characteristics of the Soviet administrative culture, the economic solutions of the
1990s, as well as general challenges related to the large changes within the public sector,
such as the partial or failed implementation of reforms, have posed challenges for the
reformation of Russia. Support for centralisation has been remarkably large in Russia, since
memories of the chaotic 1990s and unpaid wages have not faded. During the long economic
growth period, the implementation of long-term strategic thinking, macroeconomic
stabilisation and the restructuring of the administration was feasible. There was also some
improvement in the legal protection of citizens, as their chances of succeeding in legal
actions against the authorities improved. Russia was able to implement large structural
reforms; for instance, in 2004, the number of ministries, central committees and commissions
was reduced in the reform of the central government, and the first phase of the still ongoing
tax reform took place in 2000–2004.
In the current situation, public sector reforms occur partially under duress, similarly to the
1990s. The 10 per cent drop in real wages in 2015 (Korhonen I. 2016), unemployment and
worsened living conditions burden political decision-making and restrict its latitude. In 2015,
consumer spending dropped around 9 per cent due to the drop in real wages, according to
the Central Bank of Russia. Simultaneously, 2.3 million people plunged below the poverty
line. Unemployment has been addressed by cutting wages and working hours, while migrant
workers have simultaneously disappeared from the Russian cash-in-hand labour market due
25
to the weakened rouble. The inflation estimate for 2016 has been around 8 per cent.
Nominal increases in the public sector have been restricted or frozen as of 2014. Increases in
pensions have decreased from the usual 13 per cent to 4 per cent, and there are plans to
raise the retirement age. (Korhonen V. 2016.)
22
http://rosgvard.ru/o-vojskah/obshhie-dannye/
23
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51650
24
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51643
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/8-shades-of-crisis---russias-year-of-economicnightmares/553703.html
25
41
Military economic Keynesianism is thus not merely an economically stimulating development,
since Russia will have to make short-term choices between welfare state obligations and
developing the military industry, and the resuscitating effect from the military industry will not
be visible immediately. The effect may also require changing the entire structure of the
economy as well as the foundation of Russian security thinking. However, Russia is not ready
for a night-watchman state model, since welfare services are a central legitimating factor for
political activities and a central part of security thinking, where the security of the individual is
guaranteed by the state.
State reforms
The actual decision-making ability of a so-called hybrid system like Russia’s has been
interpreted by researchers in various ways. Academics often emphasise that there are no
time- or institution-related restrictions in a centralized system, meaning decisions can be
made without prior lengthy negotiations, and also by taking risks. Then again, researchers
also stress the slowness and rigidity of decision-making, corruption, resilient characteristic of
the administrative culture, pedantic legalism on the one hand and contingent interpretation
and implementation of the law on the other.
The symbiosis of the informal neopatrimonial “core” and the formal shell which
outwardly seems to share features with advanced states and markets, ranging
from legally independent courts to the commercial operations of state-owned
companies [...], maintains a stable yet inefficient equilibrium. (Gel’man 2015,
The Vicious Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism in Russia.)
There are thus various interpretations regarding state reforms and the ability of Russia to
carry them through. The normative foundation of the reforms are often well-prepared in the
sense that the content of central documents are coordinated. Their implementation faces
numerous challenges. (Monaghan 2014.) Plans can be derailed during large crises, such as
during the economic crisis of 2008–2009. The legislation itself, as well as rules for
implementation, may include significant holes and flaws. Strategy 2020 serves as an
example: in over 400 pages, there is not a single section dealing with a vision on national
industry policy. (Gurova & Ivanter 2012.) Last, but not least, challenges also include the
know-how of the authorities, the poor respect for the work of the authorities and poor
commitment of authorities, difficulties in developing incentive systems and efficiency
indicators, unrealistic goals, constant reforms, vague instructions, and strong opposition to
reforms within the administration (Monaghan 2014; Oleinik 2009; Goncharov & Shirikov 2013;
Heusala 2013; Ledyayev 2009).
Post-Soviet political regimes represent multiple varieties of authoritarianism,
both “hegemonic” and “electoral” [..] Post-Soviet market reforms contributed to
the rise of patrimonial “crony capitalism,” which is based upon ruling groups’
political control over key economic assets and economic actors [..] The quality
of governance in Russia and other post-Soviet states is much poorer than one
might expect given their degree of socioeconomic development [..] (Gel’man
2015, The Vicious Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism in Russia)
What we have seen in Russia under Putin, it will be argued below, can be
understood as a transformation from a “competing-pyramid” system where
multiple regional and corporate patronage pyramids actively competed for
support to a “single-pyramid” system where the president has effectively
combined the most important lower-level patronal networks into one large
nationwide political machine. This is very different from saying that Russia has
42
become an authoritarian state since a political machine, even a very large
nationwide political machine, behaves in ways that are quite distinct from
authoritarianism so long as it does not end elections in which at least some
real opposition is allowed to compete. (Hale 2010, Eurasian Polities as Hybrid
Regimes: The Case of Putin’s Russia.)
Demographic development and regional policy
Increasing birth rates has been one of the central goals of Russian social policy, but the
reasons behind low mortality have only recently been addressed. In demographic security
thinking, Russia follows the example of the United States and Canada in issues related to
birth rates, among others. Only a successful combination of a pronatalist social security
system and a social and health policy programme seeking to decrease the very high mortality
rate can reverse the decrease in the Russian population. Even in the best case scenario, the
impact of the 1990s will be seen in population development in the 2040s, as the small
generation of the children of parents born in the 1990s will reach the age of family formation
(RANEPA 2015: 120). Issues related to changing living habits and developing the health care
system will pose a challenge for the realisation of Russia’s demographic goals.
While Russia’s leaders claim to have facilitated a “miracle” in welfare
provision, an examination of the budget numbers shows that overall welfare
spending has not increased as much as general budget outlays. Because
there is little room for NGO or trade union involvement in decision-making,
policies support state interests rather than those of the broader society. For
example, Russian leaders have concentrated resources on raising the
birthrate and increasing pensions rather than addressing the pressing issue of
high male mortality. Paradoxically, however, in some cases, NGOs initiate the
provision of new kinds of services, such as for AIDS patients, which are then
taken over by the state. Federalism is important since there is wide variation
across regions in social welfare provision. Ultimately, Russia’s welfare policies
are neither purely statist nor neo-liberal since the state is expanding its role in
some areas, while shedding responsibilities in others. (Kulmala, Kainu, Nikula
& Kivinen 2014, Paradoxes of Agency: Democracy and Welfare in Russia.)
Regional development in Russia has been a challenge since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
and to this day, the situation still reflects many other political solutions. There is significant
regional variation in implementation in Russian regional policy. It can be said that there are
regions in Russia where life resembles Switzerland, but also other regions where
development has come to a halt and even dropped to the level of developing countries. The
Soviet legacy is visible in the regions’ own economic and social goals and resources. Putin’s
economic and social policy, which is implemented by regional administrations, has been
successful in reducing everyday crime. In this sense, the everyday life of the people has
improved. However, there are differences in how the regions are able to maintain their
economies. The central government also supports regions in accordance with security
thinking by strengthening unity, e.g., in Chechnya. In Murmansk, infrastructure has been
improved through road-building. As economic power has been delegated, the authoritative
decision-making culture of the regions has grown stronger, which can be considered a
paradox of administrative reform. While, for instance, Chechnya has been supported, its
political-institutional development has been weak from a liberal-democratic perspective.
Currently, 75 per cent of all budget financing goes through the central government. The
economically weak are subsidised from Moscow, which does not necessarily encourage the
regions to take independent responsibility for their development, but continues to support
nonviable communities. Simultaneously, the system also relies on semiformal agreements
43
between enterprises and local administrations. This serves as a new form of the tradition of
industrial communities built around one company. The communal responsibility of companies
is hence an important political lever in Russian regional policy.
Administrative systems and information security
Organisational changes and legislative reforms within immigration policy are continuing, as
are rivalling political goals (Abashin 2017). Authority resources within internal security had
been increased before the current crisis, and institutions were the targets of reform. For
instance, there were significant expectations of the reform of police forces, and resources
markedly improved during the 2000s. However, it has been challenging to change the
organisational culture, even though personnel at the Ministry of Internal Affairs have been
replaced and increased in the recent reforms. (Heusala & Koistinen 2016.) Economic
difficulties probably increase crime rates as unemployment increases, which hampers the
cultural reform of the law-enforcement organisations, challenging to begin with. This might
lead to stronger ‘law and order’ thinking. The economic crisis might also affect the technical
reform of authority operations; for instance, the possible digitalisation of border security has
been delayed.
The establishment of the new National Guard has provoked conflicting opinions both in
Russia and abroad. Some representatives of the Russian authorities have concluded that the
power of the National Guard overlaps with the power of other organisations, such as the
Federal Security Service (FSB). It has therefore been hoped that it would concentrate on
fighting radical terrorism. Some political commentators have seen the National Guard as a
result of the crisis of the current leadership and as a preparatory measure for the
consequences of unpopular economic and public policy decisions. An assessment has also
been voiced that the Russian leaders are preparing for a coup from within the public
administration by centralising the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs directly under the
26
President. The Russian Presidential government has denied this interpretation. The
accuracy of these estimates will, however, only be revealed as the actual focal points of the
activities of the new organisation are formed.
Counterterrorism and crime prevention activities show signs of international cooperation as
well as a protective attitude to Russian legislation and sovereignty. The weakened
international atmosphere has also had unintended implications. In counter-narcotics, the
economic sanctions have led to a halt in the cooperation between Russia and the United
27
States. Chechnya will also be a critical region in Russian security policy in the future. In
addition, Russian citizens who have participated in the Syrian combat increase the pressure
of authority activity in fighting extremist action within Russia.
Legal and information security tendencies will remain central in the development of internal
security. The reform of Russian law has faced increasing challenges, and the implementation
of laws has become more selective. Another issue related to the development of legal
security is the pressure to control access to information, which strives to control the Internet
(similarly to China), as a defence measure. The Russian state has the capacity to seize
complete control over the Internet in Russia, thus controlling both political activity and foreign
information and communication within the borders of Russia. Russia will continue to develop
its own information warfare and test its systems.
26
http://www.rbc.ru/politics/05/04/2016/5703f0759a7947abfa8c7b0e
Sohibov, Akmal & Heusala, Anna-Liisa (work in progress), The Unintended Consequences of
Western Sanctions for the US-Russian Institutional Cooperation in Counter-narcotics.
27
44
Implications for Finland
Russian internal security in accordance with its security strategy is important for Finland as a
whole. Internal security thus encompasses the following themes: regional policy, immigration
policy, counter-extremism activities, counter-narcotics activities, nationality policy, border
security and information security. These are also related to changes in Russian legislation
and state reforms, as well as the actual development of daily legal culture and Russian
authorities. It is in Finland’s interest to consider the concrete cooperation between sectoral
ministries, which has been going on for a long time, and for our foreign policy leaders’
relations with Russia. Concrete cross-border interaction between authorities can reduce
tension over spheres of influence and, at best, form a realistic picture of the relationship
between Russian institutions and Russian politics.
For Finland, it is important to know how regional capacities are developing in health policy,
particularly in regions near our borders. Antibiotic-resistant tuberculosis and HIV infections
are also possible risks for the Finnish health care system. Finland should therefore strive to
continue cross-border cooperation in social and health policy issues, even though they
currently depend on Russia’s choices. Finland should also try and keep health issues beyond
the scope of ‘securitisation’ on a political level.
In legal developments, Finland should be prepared for rapid and abrupt changes and
increasing risks due to ‘securitisation’. The impact of Russian state reforms for Finland
depends on the case. For Finnish companies, strict regulation and at times unpredictable
authority control cause additional expenses. There is also cooperation in other sectors, of
which the most important are border security and crime prevention activities. The long
established cooperation should be systematically developed through long-term goals, despite
the current political crisis. It is in Finland’s interest to gain high-level Russian political support
for the development ideas coming from the professionals in these fields.
Russia’s demographic development and immigration may also inflict pressure on Finland. It is
therefore important to continue the systematic monitoring and analysis of the Russian
immigration situation. If Russian border security fails, there is a risk that there will be a
broader migration pressure on Finland or elsewhere on Europe through Finland. In
monitoring border security, it is good to separate the political level and daily activities of
authorities. Concrete activities of authorities at the local level involve challenges that are
beyond political control, such as human trafficking and related corruption.
Regarding information security, increased Russian isolation from the rest of the world is
possible, and Finland should also be prepared for tightened legislation regarding the Internet.
In regional policy, the most critical phase from the perspective of Finland occurred in the
1990s, when there was a genuine possibility that Russia would disintegrate. Subsequently,
the central government has been able to strengthen legislative, political and administrative
stability through centralisation. Deliberately enforcing patriotism was also used for furthering
consensus, and has indeed been a successful strategy throughout the political field.
Patriotism may generate initiatives and changes that lead to limiting the rights of minorities,
e.g., in Karelia.
For a country neighbouring Russia like Finland, it is important to take the development of
Russian strategic (long-term) thinking into account, as well as monitoring the planning and
implementation of economic policy, in particular. However, poor knowledge of Russian
political decision-making among Finnish decision-makers will also pose a challenge for future
45
interactions. The informal characteristics of Russian decision-making processes and the
unreliability of information regarding these processes easily lead to Finnish decision-makers
listening to only a few experts and interest groups. The lack of comprehensive analysis blurs
the average evaluation regarding the activities of Russian administration and representative
organisations. This leads to a tendency to overemphasise individual events, which dismisses
Russian long-term development and systematic policy analysis that does not focus on day-today politics. A longer perspective would also help to lessen approximate and personified
estimates of the Russian leadership. All in all, Finland must also tend to its economic
interests in the future. Shared interests within internal security should be furthered and kept
outside the influence of increased international tension as far as possible. This will enable the
addressing and development of numerous day-to-day issues.
In a broader perspective, cooperation in fighting global security threats, environmental
problems and global crime (financial and drug-related crime and human trafficking) should
also be the central goals in the Finnish government’s Russian cooperation in the future.
Counterterrorism is also among the themes in which Finland should strive for the necessary
cooperation with Russia. These issues are not only questions of national security, but of
global security, in which borders between spheres of influence are blurred. In terms of
environmental policy, Finnish nuclear power policy is based on different advantages than
those of many other EU member states. This tension will pose challenges within the EU in
the future.
46
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Developing research on Russian security policy
The project sought to map how Finnish studies conducted in 2011–2015 are related to the
social and public policy categories in accordance with the Russian national security
definitions. From a total of 2,200 publications, 461 publications that fit the classification of
peer-reviewed scientific publications used by the Ministry of Education and Culture (see
page 10) were selected for the sample.
Many themes of Russian national security have been insufficiently researched in Finland. In
order to develop research, Finland must establish a strategy for research on Russian security
policy. The starting point must be basic research on an international level. The strategy
should include the following themes:

Critical research topics, which include
o the military industry as a part of Russian public policy,
o the armed forces,
o the Russian security authorities, security legislation and security
leadership,
o Russian law,
o internal security (border security, terrorism and counterterrorism,
transnational crime, financial crime, immigration policy),
o religious communities in Russia and traditional values,
o the Eurasian Economic Union as a part of Russian economic and
security policy,
o the Arctic as a part of Russian economic and security policy,
o information security,
o the planning and implementation of Russian legislation and policy
programmes, and
o global international relations of Russia, particularly in Asia.

Finland should rely on good international networks particularly in research on global
international relations, the Arctic, the Eurasian Economic Union and terrorism.

A cluster for academic research on security policy and comprehensive security. The
objective should be to ensure sufficient funds for the selected focal areas for
development, in order to establish long-term research groups and education. Shortterm financing can be utilised, but not as main funding. The activities of the cluster
should be supported by good international networks. The cluster should be based on
two permanent professorships, of which one is a military professorship. In addition, in
the near future, the cluster should include two long-term posts (3- and 5-year posts)
as well as 2–3 doctoral students.

Cooperation mechanisms between the academic world and the authorities should be
developed in order to ensure input from public administration to academia. The
RussiaHUB Helsinki concept offers a good starting point for this purpose.
47
Development of national security in Russia
The purpose of our project was to establish what the most central Russian development
trends are, and examine what these potentially mean for Finland. The development trends in
Russian national security were considered in two international workshops during spring 2016.
The workshops were based on specific themes and related questions, which were given to
the participants in advance. In total, eight academic experts and two experts from the Ministry
of Defence participated in the workshops. Development trends in Russian national security
were evaluated in regard to Russia’s goals and resources and its ability to achieve its goals.
Central trends are related to the following issues, among others:

Russian national security has developed into a central frame for public policy
planning and implementation, and maintaining a strong central government is
important in leading the Russian administration. The goal of economic development
is the intensification of planning and a high-technology military economy, which at
best would serve as a motor for economic development and growth and support
other public policy goals. While the financing for security administration has
increased and Russia continues to develop its administrative system, social policy is
still the most central focus in internal security.

Leading a country involves balancing between the economic conditions brought on
by globalisation and state-provided services through a hybrid system. Russia will
have to make short-term choices between welfare state obligations and developing
the military industry, and the resuscitating effect from the military industry will not be
visible immediately. The current diversification activities are time-consuming, and
Russian economic development is still heavily dependent on the overproduction of
fossil fuels.

The relation between international judicial norms and institutions has undergone a
change, as the principle of sovereignty is more broadly applied in the drafting and
implementation of legislation. Russia’s foreign policy goal is to achieve actual
recognition or de facto acceptance for its current interpretation of sovereignty. In this,
the United States is the main point of comparison.

National unity and traditional values have been established as official goals in the
Security Strategy. Unity is used for strengthening the political steering of decisionmaking as well as for averting opposition movements.

Russia aims for a multipolar international system, in which it is recognised as one of
the actors in the international system in various contexts. Russia looks to the BRICS
countries, China in particular, as a counterforce against US influence.

The Russian concept of the sphere of influence extends particularly to former Soviet
regions or countries with which it has a cultural and historical link. Russia strives to
build strategically and tactically beneficial ally relations on both political and
economic shared interests.
48
When evaluating Russia’s implementation capacity, the following factors need to be taken
into account:

Russia’s capacity cannot be explained with one factor only, and Russian foreign
policy will not necessarily develop along one path. Too simplistic indicators should be
avoided when Russia’s ability to achieve its goals is evaluated. Russia’s ability to
implement its strategies for achieving its defence and economic objectives is
currently undermined by the price development of oil. If the Russian economy
continues to decline, Russia might lean more towards the East. The import
substitution policy will take time, but Russia can also carry out long-term strategic
plans.

Russia can execute its own objectives more quickly than NATO or the EU. Russia
will respond to NATO’s missile defence project. Its central goals include protecting
Russia’s economic and political interests in the Arctic and the long-term development
of the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia categorically rejects activities it deems to be
interfering with or influencing its internal issues, such as political or nongovernmental
activities with foreign funding or so-called colour revolutions near its border. The
eastern expansion of NATO and the EU is seen as a containment strategy.

Russia is not ready for a night-watchman state model, at least not yet, since welfare
services are a main legitimating factor for the political system and a central part of
security thinking. State-guaranteed security of individuals is at the core of Russian
security thinking.

Concrete internal security goals have included improving the economic and social
policy implementation capacity of regions, influencing the demographic situation
through family, health and immigration policy, and reforming crime prevention
activities and legislation. The current economic crisis is very problematic for all of
Russia’s goals, as living standards deteriorate and actual unemployment increases.
The impact of the EU sanctions on reserve funds is experienced as an attack against
national security.
Finland’s choices

Finland must take into account the development of Russian long-term strategic
development and monitor the implementation of strategic programmes regarding
both the economy and the Russian administration. It is important that decisionmakers discern those areas of development which Russia uses to formulate its
strategic decisions. Finland’s own choices should not be based on absolute
evaluations or analyses regarding only current situations.

Finland should support its Russian policies and research by developing a strategy for
research on Russian security policy and by establishing a research cluster. Activities
should be based on the systematic development of academic international-level
expertise. It is crucial to focus on critical, yet little or not at all researched themes.
 From Finland’s perspective, it is important to maintain the possibility of continuing
economic collaboration, particularly if or when the current crisis eases up.
Evaluations of Russia should be field- or sector-based. Nevertheless, Finland must
49
develop its agricultural exports further; Russia cannot be relied upon as it was
previously.

It is in Finland’s interest to consider concrete cooperation between sector ministries,
which has been going on for a long time, and for our foreign policy leaders’ relations
with Russia. Concrete authority interaction can reduce the tension in the spheres of
interest and, at best, also form a realistic picture of the relationship between Russian
institutions and Russian politics.

Finland should monitor and, as far as possible, be active in the following issues:
o The immigration situation in Russia and Russian authority systems.
o Health policy, particularly in neighbouring areas.
o Legal developments, in which Finland should also be prepared for rapid
changes and increased risks in Russia.
o Border security, where cooperation should be systematically developed
through long-term goals despite the current political crisis.
o The crime situation in Russia and the development of authority systems. In
crime prevention activities, development ideas from the professionals should
receive political support.
o Information security, in which Finland should also be prepared for increased
legislative control.
 Cooperation within the nuclear power sector will probably not face significant change,
but Finland should prepare for substituting its oil and gas provision. Increases in oil
prices will further the initiation of Arctic energy projects, which might create
opportunities for Finland to join in.
 Throughout the whole of Finnish society, Finnish decision-makers are required to
exercise independent thinking and to be critical towards information sources. The
current crisis situation in Europe is a stress test for Finland, which points out the
weak links in our political and administrative system, among others. This report has
outlined some concrete suggestions for the situation, but the work must be
continued.
 The future of Europe cannot be based on permanent juxtaposition. However, Finland
should be prepared for various developmental courses and be flexible and quick in its
own actions. This would also mean increased defence and internal security
expenditure.

Finland should elevate global security challenges to the core of its cooperation with
Russia. In global challenges, the scale rises above battles over spheres of influence
and zero-sum games. Global challenges include the state of the environment, the
impact of immigration, various forms of transnational crime and the structural change
in societies due to digitalisation. Cooperation in the most crucial global challenge –
namely, climate change – should be emphasised, and Finland should strive towards
practical research and technological cooperation.
50
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