Who killed Sarajevo Spirit?
Structure, agency, nationalism and the case of Sarajevo
Andrea Teftedarija
0349380
July 2007
Master’s Thesis: International Relations
Coordinator: dr. T. Akkerman
University of Amsterdam
Faculty of Political Science
Table of contents
Page
Foreword
3
Introduction
4
1. The structure - agency debate and nationalism: a theoretical
7
framework
1.1 Nationalist dilemmas
7
1.2 The structure-agency debate
9
1.3 Structure and agency in nationalist theorizing
10
1.4 Hypothesis
12
2. Sarajevo: a journey through time
14
2.1 introduction
2.1.1 Inclusive versus exclusive types of identity
14
15
2.2 Sarajevo’s history
18
2.3 The war in Sarajevo
22
2.3.1 The Serbs of Sarajevo
23
2.3.2 The irrationality of violence
24
2.4 Dayton Peace Agreement
25
2.4.1 Annex 4 – The Constitution
26
2.4.2 Annex 7 – Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons
27
2.4.3 Annex 10 – Agreement on Civilian Implementation
27
2.4.4 Sarajevo and the Dayton Peace Agreement
27
2.5 Political situation after the Dayton Peace Agreement
28
2.5.1 First post-Dayton elections
29
2.5.2 The 2000 elections: shift away from nationalist issues
29
2.5.3 The 2006 elections: Silajdzic vs. Dodik; nationalism in disguise
29
2.5.4 The political situation in Canton Sarajevo and Sarajevo municipalities
31
2.6 Sarajevo after Dayton
31
2.6.1 Demography
32
2.6.2 Everyday life in post-Dayton Sarajevo
34
2.6.3 Dayton structures and the shift in Sarajevo’s character
36
3. Implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration – an evaluation
40
3.1 Introduction
40
1
3.2 Sarajevo Declaration
40
3.3 Return and educational issues and their implementation
42
3.3.1 Return issues
42
3.3.2 Implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration return provisions
44
3.3.3 Educational issues
49
3.3.4 Implementation of Sarajevo Declaration education provisions
50
3.4 Conclusion
52
4 Who or what is guilty? Sarajevo and the structure – agency debate
54
4.1 Introduction
54
4.2 Structural factors
54
4.2.1 The war and the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA)
55
4.2.2 Structural limits of the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration
56
4.3 Agency-related factors
56
4.3.1 Agency and return issues
57
4.3.2 Agency and educational issues
58
4.4 Discussion
58
4.4.1 Structuration theory: a reminder
59
4.4.2 Sarajevo and the structuration theory
59
5. Conclusion
5.1 Does anyone know CPR? – How to revive the Sarajevo Spirit? Some
62
65
policy recommendations
List of interviews and list of tables
67
Abbreviations
68
References
69
2
Foreword
‘Počinjem ovu svoju priču, nizašto, bez koristi za sebe i druge, iz potrebe koja je jača od
koristi i razuma, da ostane zapis moj o meni, zapisana muka razgovora sa sobom, s dalekom
nadom da će se naći neko rješenje kad bude račun sveden, ako bude, kad ostavim trag mastila
na ovoj hartiji što čeka kao izazov.’ (Meša Selimović, Derviš i smrt)
The thesis you are about to read is by no means an ordinary one. Its topic is born out of and
driven by a complex and sometimes uncomfortable combination of personal frustration, endless
and possibly impossible search for the resurrection of a lost youth and a quest for belonging on
the one hand and pure and utter academic curiosity on the other. There is a mysterious,
untouchable and to some extent annoyingly never-ending connection between the author and
the topic of the following thesis, a bond which has not been broken even though it has been
repeatedly challenged over the course of the past two decades. There exists a type of
unexplainable and crazy (sometimes even obsessive – in a positive sense though) fascination of
the author for the topic which some sometimes tend to explain in terms of outright diasporic
nostalgia. The author herself however likes to think of this link as real and mysterious at the
same time. It is real; it results from the academic drive to figure out complex events. It is
mysterious; not tangible, not understandable and indefinable for the ones who were never lucky
enough to feel it.
This thesis is dedicated to Sarajevans. Real Sarajevans; the ones who feel the not tangible, not
understandable and not definable feeling described above – but nevertheless carry it around
with great pride. Real Sarajevans; the ones who feel that Sarajevo has changed and wonder what
they can do to make a change for the better.
This thesis is dedicated to Dijana and Edib Teftedarija, randomly picked as examples of many
others who love Sarajevo as much as they do. Aside from being examples of real Sarajevans, they
are also the agents who have made me into what I am now, within the framework of a struggle
with structural factors which have inevitably shaped our lives – all because they love me as much
as they do. I sincerely hope Sarajevo awaits a similar destiny. A final note of gratitude goes out to
Fakica and Naim Džafić, real Sarajevans, for helping me complete the interviews and for
knowing how to cope with my sometimes unbearable obsession with Bosnian politics –
something what is an everyday reality to them and an academic challenge for me.
-A.T., Amsterdam, July 2007
3
Introduction
‘Good evening, dear viewers. Today is November 12th, 1995; you are listening to the news. On
this day, four years ago former and backward Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was
divided into East and West Yugoslavia. It is also three and a half years ago since the so-called
Sarajevo-issue was solved. More precisely, on this day Sarajevo, the geographically central city
of former Yugoslavia was divided into East Sarajevo and West Sarajevo by the so-called
Sarajevo Wall. In both countries this anniversary was widely celebrated.’ (Top Lista Nadrealista,
TV-show)
This excerpt from the satirical weekly TV-show Top Lista Nadrealista (‘Top list of Surrealists’),
extremely popular throughout Yugoslavia, is one of many portraying the division of
Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sarajevo along ethnic lines. The sketch is not that
interesting in itself until one finds out when it was made. This sketch about the Sarajevo Wall
comes from the time the one in Berlin was still standing and Yugoslavia was still a country.
The satirists depicted the city of Sarajevo as divided in two sectors, East and West and enacted
an escape from one side of the city to the other.
A few years later a war broke out in Sarajevo. Yugoslavia had disintegrated and Sarajevo was a
divided city, according to the prophecy of the ‘Surrealists’. Though there was no wall through
Sarajevo, the city was partly divided by the river Miljacka. The boundaries were also not so
much physical as they were mental; either way, the ‘Surrealists’’ prediction was correct. On 21
November 1995 (nine days after the date of the fictive ‘news broadcast’ of the ‘Surrealists’) the
Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed, ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina but
administratively dividing the country and Sarajevo in two parts. One of the two parts of
Sarajevo now has the official name of ‘East Sarajevo’, just like the ‘Surrealists’ had predicted
some six years before. The DPA not only partitioned the territory of the country, but the
people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its capital city have also been divided into three ethnic
groups; Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs.
When the sketch on divided Sarajevo was aired, many Sarajevans laughed about it and could
not imagine - not even in their wildest dreams - that something even close to that would ever
happen in their Sarajevo. Now, almost two decades later, many Sarajevans keep wondering
where they went wrong, why they misjudged the situation and most of all – how come that
4
Sarajevo is not what it once used to be. This thesis is about the shift in Sarajevo’s character
since the war in the first half of the 1990s. The aim of this thesis is to address the issues above
and most particularly the question: How come Sarajevo has changed? Many complain about
the loss of the Spirit of Sarajevo, the changed atmosphere in the city, the fact that the coffee
tastes differently, that the expression op people’s faces has changed (or perhaps that they have
changed themselves), or just simply that Sarajevo is not what it once used to be. Sarajevo has
altered drastically since the war in the 1990s; the fiction of the ‘Surrealists’ show at the end of
the 1980s has, tragically enough, become the reality of the present-day Sarajevans. In the light
of the circumstances outlined above, I will examine the means through which Sarajevo has
changed from a non-nationalist, multiethnic, tolerant city to an almost ethnically homogenous
and nationalistic place. The central question to be answered is which mechanisms are responsible for
the transformation of the city of Sarajevo from a city with a multiethnic, tolerant and cosmopolitan character to
a city in which ethnic cleavages prevail in daily realities of the city’s inhabitants?
The aim of this thesis is thus to attempt to uncover mechanisms which are responsible for the
identity shift of the city of Sarajevo since the war in the first half of the 1990s. It is expected
that an interaction between structural and agency-related factors is the reason why Sarajevo is
no longer seen as a cosmopolitan and multiethnic city. The research objective is thus focused
on uncovering the structural and agency-related mechanisms which are expectedly responsible
for a change in the city’s character. The question posed above will be answered through a
theoretical lens which assumes that structural and agency-related factors construct ethnic
identities and nationalism through a complex process of interaction between these factors. It
will be argued that the character of Sarajevo has altered due to a complex interplay between
structurally induced factors such as the war and the consequences of the DPA on the one
hand and agency-related aspects such as interests of political elites on the other. The
theoretical framework will be discussed in further detail in the first chapter. The second
chapter is devoted to the case of Sarajevo and its history up until the present day. Key
historical periods such as the Austro-Hungarian period, the Yugoslavias, the Olympic Games,
the war and the Dayton Peace Agreement including its aftermath shall be discussed in turn. A
historical overview of the city is indispensable in order to discover patterns or structural
factors which might have contributed to the change in Sarajevo’s character. The thesis will
however mainly focus on the period from the fall of communism and the beginning of the war
in the 1990s onwards. In trying to discover agency-related patterns which might have
contributed to changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capital city, the implementation of a
5
document will be evaluated. In chapter four an attempt will be made to discover whether
political action is responsible for the loss of cosmopolitan identity in Sarajevo by looking at the
implementation of the so-called Sarajevo Declaration from 1998. In the fifth chapter I will
reflect upon the findings of the preceding two chapters and engage in an attempt to explain
them with the theoretical framework of the structuration theory regarding nationalism. I will
conclude the thesis with an explanation of the mechanisms which have caused the shift in
Sarajevo’s identity and a final note will be devoted to recommendations for the future of
Sarajevo in particular and Bosnia and Herzegovina in general. The thesis relies on data from
sources from existing literature for explaining Sarajevo’s history, personal experiences to
illustrate key events and interviews and statistical and document research related to the
evaluation of the Sarajevo Declaration.
The choice for the case of Sarajevo was made because even though many speculations have been
circling around, there is been remarkably little research on the causes of the changes Sarajevo
underwent during the last decade. A good number of scholars and journalists have noticed the
shift in Sarajevo’s character, few of them have however engaged in an analysis of how this shift
came about. Taking this specific case into consideration is furthermore interesting with regard to
testing the structuration theory regarding nationalism. A shift from A (tolerant and multiethnic
city) to B (almost ethnically homogenous city with narrow-minded views) is evident and
structural and agency-related factors are present which are expected to explain this shift. The case
of Sarajevo is a relevant one for try to explain the interplay of these factors which is the core of
the structuration theory. The case of Sarajevo is however not only interesting from a theoretical
point of view, but also from a practical one. Sarajevo was often seen as a miniature Bosnia and
Herzegovina; a mixture of cultures which interact in many ways in daily practices. After the war
the country was divided and has gone through profound changes as a result of nationalism and so
has Sarajevo. If mechanisms responsible for changes in Sarajevo are discovered, this might have
interesting implications for the rest of the country as well. The Sarajevo Declaration appointed
the city of Sarajevo as a model of multiethnicity and tolerance; the rest of the country was to
follow its capital city’s example. It was argued that if this cannot be done in Sarajevo, it will not
be achieved elsewhere in the country either. It is thus important to seek for mechanisms which
have changed Sarajevo as it is only through their uncovering that they can be dealt with both in
the city itself as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
6
CHAPTER 1
The structure - agency debate and nationalism: a theoretical
framework
In the framework of this thesis an explanation is sought for the shift which has occurred in the
character of the city of Sarajevo. Before and even during the war, Sarajevo has been a multiethnic, tolerant city in which several ethnic groups coexisted together. After the end of the war in
1995, the city’s spirit has become more and more nationalistically oriented and the atmosphere
increasingly polarizing.
In this chapter the theoretical side of the question above will be addressed. What is nationalism?
Who are the nationalists and where does nationalism come from? It will be argued that
nationalism is constructed, both by structural factors and by individual or collective agency. The
so-called structure-agency debate will be outlined in more detail and it will be argued that
Giddens’ structuration theory offers the best solution to what is considered to be one of the
central issues in social sciences. Furthermore, the structure-agency problem will be addressed in
relation to nationalism. Following the structuration theory, it will be claimed that political elites
shape structures (such as institutions, rules, etc.) and that these structures in turn enable, shape
and constrain elite behavior. At the end of this chapter it will become more clear through which
theoretical lens I intend to answer the question posed above and a hypothesis will be formed.
1.1
Nationalist dilemmas
Nationalism has been hotly debated among scholars since the introduction of this concept in the
studies of political and social sciences. Its definitions, timing, origins and its place in society are
only a few of the topics discussed, examined and re-examined by political and social theorists.
What is the character of nationalism? Following among others Breuilly, nationalism will be
defined as inevitably political. He claims that nationalism is a ‘political movement seeking or
exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments’ (see Özkirimli’s
discussion of Breuilly 2000:105). Ramón Maíz emphasizes the importance of seeing the concept
nationalism as a highly political phenomenon (2003:252). Jack Snyder chooses to define
7
nationalism as an ‘elite movement’ (2000:46-66) and sees nationalism as instrumentalist: elites use
nationalism to achieve electoral success.
Definitions of nationalism have always been subject to debate. However, there has been some
consensus among scholars on the fundamental content of the definition in which Gellner’s
description is most commonly referred to. His definition holds that nationalism is the principle
that the cultural (the nation) and political unit (the state) is congruent (Kaldor 2004:163). The fact
that Gellner equates the cultural unit with the nation and the political unit with the state has
however been subject to some critiques (see for example Hechter 2000:6-7, Snyder 2000:22). It
has been argued that the nation should not be defined in strictly cultural terms, as this definition
excludes non-culturally based loyalties. Similarly, defining the political unit as ‘the state’ does not
take into account movements which aim at more autonomy but not sovereign statehood per se
(Snyder 2000:22). The political unit should thus not be equated with the state only, but it should
be more broadly defined as to include other territorial forms of organization. The definition of
‘nation’ should be broadened, because not all nations are defined in exclusively cultural terms.
Following Hechter, nation will be referred to here as ‘a relatively large group of genetically
unrelated people with high solidarity’, leaving open what kind of solidarity this precisely might be
(2000:11). Thus, to avoid the inconsistencies in Gellner’s definition, nationalism will here be
defined as the doctrine that the boundaries of the nation should be congruent with that of its political unit.
The next issue which has been fiercely debated among scholars is the issue of the timing of
nationalism. Hechter argues that the fact that nationalism is most commonly defined in terms of
the state points to the fact that nationalism is a modern phenomenon (2000:7). The modernist
paradigm has been criticized for linking nationalism to industrialization and the rise of the
modern state. This relation has been questioned on the one hand by so-called primordialists
Greenfeld and Hastings who hold that nationalism has existed in the pre-industrialist era and by
more state-oriented modernists, such as Mann who claims that the progression of nationalism
does not necessarily coincide with the rise of industrialism (Day 2004:52). Following Kaldor
(2000:163), this critique of modernist functionalism will be tackled here by pointing to the fact
that it is not so much the relation between nationalism and industrialism that modernists
emphasize, but rather the importance of (radical) structural change for the rise (or re-rise) of
nationalism. The structural argument will later on be addressed in further detail.
8
The last nationalist dilemma to be discussed is the one on the development of nationalism. As
noted above, nationalism is a modern phenomenon, closely linked to the rise of the modern state.
But where does nationalism come from in the daily practices and how is it preserved over time?
Here, a departure will be made from the deterministic assumption that nationalism is the
outcome of certain social conditions. It will instead be argued here that nationalism, nations and
ethnic identities are socially constructed. As Fearon and Laitin explain, the process of the
construction of ethnic identities (and following this, nationalism) can occur through two paths.
The first one holds that individuals are agents who construct ethnic identities and the second one
argues that the cultural systems are responsible for the creation of ethnic identity (2000:846). If
we generalize these two presumptions, it can be argued that the first one explains the
construction of ethnic identity in agency terms, while the other leans toward more structural
explanations. I will next discuss the structure-agency problem in more detail.
1.2
The structure-agency debate
The structure-agent problem is the outcome of the debate which situates agents and structures in
relation to one and other (Wendt 1987:337). As some approaches prioritize structure and others
agency, the debate mentioned above has been labeled a ‘problem’ by scholars of social and
political sciences.
Before going into the complex relation between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’, I will firstly attempt to
make sense of these two concepts. Structure is often seen as something of a mystery, an
unobservable and often negative constraint on human action (Callinicos 1989:9). Structure
implies stability, change is difficult to explain in strucuralist terms. Structures can be all sorts of
things, but mostly structures consist of social relations, rules and sources of power. A wide array
of things can be counted as ‘structure’, as long as they seem to limit or influence the opportunity
that agents have; from identities such as religion, class and ethnic structure to all kinds of
institutions, from structural factors such as demography and politics to important historical
events. As opposed to stability, there is change and as opposed to structure, there is agency.
Agents are often associated with change and intervention. Agency can be collective or individual.
Individual action is initiated by human agents, while collective action occurs through for example
organizations, such as states. Agents reproduce social reality by intentional and self-conscious
actions (Berejikian 1992:647).
9
Even though there is a growing trend towards assigning the two entities equal ontological status,
(see for example Wendt 1987, Saxton 2004, Pickel 2003, Levinger 2002) especially among
constructivist scholars, the two meta-theories which give one of the two entities primitive
ontological status are still popular. The first one contains approaches which fall under
methodological structuralism (MS). MS approaches consider structure to be the primitive,
unproblematic and given entity (Wendt 1987:348). Agency is nothing more than an effect of
social structures. Structures shape, constrain and influence agents. The other approaches fall
under methodological individualism (MI). Approaches which adhere to MI emphasize the
importance of agents and consider agency, in contrast with MS approaches, as ontologically
primitive. Agents are treated as rational utility maximizers. Social structures have, according to MI
approaches, ‘no meaningful impact upon the potential’ of individual and collective agents
(Berejikian 1992:650).
As noted earlier, there is a growing tendency to solve the structure-agent problem by a synthesis
of the two approaches outlined above. These kinds of approaches have arisen out of fundamental
critiques of the rigid approaches which assign primitive ontological status to one of the two
entities. Wendt for example argues that by giving either of the entities (structure or agency)
primitive ontological status, there is a risk of treating this entity as given and unproblematic. This
is a fundamental mistake, because in doing so one avoids having to make a theory of the
primitive unit in question (Wendt 1992:349). Structuration theory, developed by Anthony
Giddens among others, is such an attempt to avoid the critiques of the approaches of MS and MI
by integrating these approaches to some extent. By giving the two entities (structure and agency)
equal ontological status, theoretical accounts of both agents and structures can be developed.
Structuration theory treats agents and structure as mutually constitutive and analytically
inseparable entities (Wendt 1992:349-355). Giddens’ concept of the ‘duality of structure’ is central
to the structuration theory; ‘social structures are the result of the intended and unintended
consequences of human action, just as those actions presuppose or are mediated by an irreducible
structural context’ (Wendt 1992:360). Put simply, structures both condition human (or collective)
action and are at the same time a consequence of the powers and interests of the agents.
Moreover, structures should not exclusively be seen as constrains on action, but as outer limits to
action (Blecher 2000:241) and even as enabling factors (Callinicos 1989:84-5).
1.3
Structure and agency in nationalist theorizing
10
Following Giddens’ structuration theory, I will below outline an approach to nationalism which
takes into account the importance of both structure and agency in constructing national and
ethnic identities and following this, nationalism.
As noted above, national and ethnic identities are here considered to be socially constructed.
Fearon and Laitin explain what it means that an identity is socially constructed by referring to
social categories as ‘sets of people given a label’. Important here is that there are rules of
membership which decide who is and who is not a member of that category and that there are
certain characteristics which members are expected to have in certain situations (Fearon
2000:848). The question however is how these social categories are constructed. Fearon and Laitin
outline two sets of approaches which explain construction of social realities; one is structural and
the other is agency-oriented. Structural approaches point to the importance of ‘local political and
psychological consequences of macro-historical forces’ in constructing national identities (Fearon
2000:851) or to the importance of cultural discourses in developing national or ethnic
consciousness (Fearon 2000:852). Agency-oriented approaches argue that national identities and
nationalisms are the constructs of individual or collective actors seeking to maximize their own
interests (Fearon 2000:853). I will however argue that both of these approaches insufficiently
explain the construction of national and ethnic identities as they treat only one entity (either
structure or agency) as ontologically primitive. I will therefore, following the structuration theory
urge for a combined understanding of the construction of nationalism which takes into account
both structure and agency and gives them equal ontological status.
What are structural factors and who are the agents in the construction of national and ethnic
identities and following that, nationalism? Structural factors that can contribute to nationalism
can for example include the economic, demographic and political situation on a territory,
structural or historical changes (such as war or violent conflict) or institutional factors (such as
the legislative framework). When referring to agency, I will mean the political elite on a given
territory, which can include local, national or international political actors. The construction of
nationalism is seen as both a means and a by-product of elites’ efforts to acquire or keep hold of
power (Fearon 2000:853). Political elites are seen as rational actors who by means of nationalist
rhetoric aim at maximizing their interests (which are often closely related to power). Why do the
masses follow? Fearon and Laitin give a very satisfactory answer to this question; the public
becomes genuinely frightened by elites’ nationalist rhetoric and that fear is real (Fearon
2000:854). Kaufmann, in explaining his ‘symbolic politics’-theory also points to the ‘symbolic
11
vocabulary that leaders use(d) as tools for mobilizing support’ (2006:48). Ethnicity, national
identity and nationalism are in these theories thus seen primarily as constructed for political
advantage.
I have stressed the importance of agency (i.e. political elites) in constructing nationalism. It
should however be noted that without structure, which shapes, enables and constrains agency as
explained above, the political elites’ construction of nationalism would not be sufficiently
effective. Following the strucuration theory outlined above, I will argue here that nationalism is
constructed by political elites (agency). These political elites are enabled and constrained by
structural factors and these structural factors are in turn constructed by political elites (agency).
In his article ‘Structure, politics and ethnonationalist contention in Post-Franco Spain’, Gregory
Saxton argues that structure, politics and action are interactive in the generation of ethnic conflict
(2004:26). I will however also argue, following Saxton’s model, that structure and action (agency)
are interactive in the construction of nationalism. Saxton defines structure as ‘mobilizational
resources’, such as for example sociodemographic structural conditions (2004:27). Structures
offer identity, resources and motivation necessary for successful group mobilization. Political
opportunities then transform the structurally induced mobilization into political action. This
nature of the political action constructs and changes these political opportunity structures (Saxton
2004:26). Through this model it is evident how political elites (agency or action) and structural
factors are interdependent and mutually constitutive. This model also offers a clear account how
nationalism is constructed through the interaction between structural factors and political agency.
1.4
Hypothesis
How did the character of the city of Sarajevo move from a tolerant and multi-ethnic one to a less
and less tolerant and increasingly homogeneous one? In the remainder of this thesis, I will argue
that the increasingly nationalist (instead of cosmopolitan) identity of the Bosnian capital city
nowadays is generated by a complex interplay between structural factors and the interest of
political actors.
If Saxton’s (2004) model outlined above is applied, my argument looks as follows: The structural
factors such as demography, institutions and the post-conflict situation offer resources and
motivation necessary for mobilization of the masses for nationalist ends. Political action, in this
12
case local, national and international political elites use this structurally induced mobilization to
maximize their interests by constructing nationalism. Furthermore, it is important to note that the
structuration theory arguments are still standing; agency and structure are mutually constitutive,
the political elite constructs the structure and the structure shapes, enables and constrains the
behavior of the elites.
13
CHAPTER 2
Sarajevo: a journey through time
2.1
Introduction
‘For hundreds of years, Sarajevo had been a place where Muslims, Serbs, Croats, Turks, Jews and
others could peacefully coexist. Sadly this tradition of tolerance was pounded into rubble by Serbian
artillery during the mid-1990s war, leaving over 10,000 people dead and 50,000 wounded.’ (Lonely
Planet World Guide 2007)
‘The cityscape of Sarajevo has changed for good. (…) In the spring of 1992, a scribbled slogan
appeared overnight: "This is Serbia," it said. The nationalists were laying claim to the very centre of
the city. By the following morning the graffiti had been crossed out and replaced. "This is a post
office, you peasant," read the reply, cosmopolitan Sarajevo demonstrating its disdain for the
nationalist fervour of rural Bosnia. That cosmopolitanism was one of the first casualties of the war.’
(Kroeger 2002).
If one would take some time to read through all of the literature on the city of Sarajevo, one
would most definitely come across numerous descriptions which sound like the ones above.
When referring to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capital city, tourist guides, journalists, scholars and
others often tend to use key words such as ‘cosmopolitan’, ‘multiethnic’ and ‘tolerance’. Many
will probably mention the spirit of religious coexistence, not forgetting to point to its visible
marks like mosques, Orthodox and Catholic churches and synagogues which are built in close
proximity in Sarajevo’s city centre. It is however not only architecture and the city’s history which
amazes outsiders; this diversity is also apparent in Sarajevans’ everyday lives. Bhabha labels this
hybrid form of distinctive traditions which can be found in Sarajevo’s language, art, literature,
fashion and simple daily practices a ‘third space of Bosnianness’ (quoted in Markowitz 2007:49).
The newest trend in writing about Sarajevo is nostalgia, as these exceptional characteristics of the
city supposedly do not exist anymore. The most recent war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been
held responsible for destroying Sarajevo’s unique cosmopolitan character (see for example Donia
2006, Kaldor 2000, 2004, King 2000, Mahmutcehajic 2003, 2005).
To many Sarajevans, Sarajevo is not what it once used to be. The Spirit of Sarajevo (Sarajevski
Duh) was according to many killed during the siege of 1992-1995. Others argue that it has only
been wounded, but that it will arise again. Either way, people on the streets of Sarajevo believe
14
that something is different, that things have changed. They tend to look back with nostalgia,
however leaving open the question whether they would like things to be like they once were.
What is this ‘Spirit of Sarajevo’ and why did it stop wandering around the city?
2.1.1 Inclusive versus exclusive types of identity
According to some, the Spirit of Sarajevo cannot be defined. Others do try to make sense of this
phrase, but no universal definition has been adopted. ‘Spirit of Sarajevo’ is officially a contested
concept, but most of the definitions tend to contain one or more of the following elements;
urbanity, cosmopolitanism, a rare East-West blend, diversity, secularity in combination with
respect for religious communities, a special brand of humor, pluralism, coffee, ‘at ease’-mentality,
survival, tolerance etc. Sarajevo has always been a diverse city, like many other cities in the world.
What might distinguish Sarajevo from other cities with high diversity is what its citizens would
refer to as ‘common life’; a feeling of a shared life despite of the many religions Sarajevans adhere
to (Donia 2006:4). This idea of ‘common life’ has however been contested (see for example
Nijsten 2006). It has never been proven that Sarajevans actually share a unique identity. The fact
that the city was not able to resist nationalist pressures several times in its past is an argument of
the ‘common life’-skeptics who argue that Sarajevo is above all a city of separate ethnic groups. I
shall however argue that the idea of ‘common life’ has existed (or does exist), not because it has
been either scientifically or empirically proven, but precisely because it was perceived as such by
Sarajevans. By the same token, if the residents of Sarajevo feel that the Spirit of Sarajevo does not
exist anymore or at least is no longer what it once used to be, this matter is worth taking into
consideration. In the end, they are also the ones who construct this ‘Spirit’.
Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a contested, complex and multifaceted region for centuries.
The Bosnian spirit and the Bosnian identity have been, just like the Sarajevan ones, repeatedly
questioned. Is there such a thing as an overarching Bosnian identity, or is this identity only a sum
of the various segments of the Bosnian society? The presumed Bosnian and Sarajevan identity lie
close to one another as they both presume an overarching and collective (as opposed to
particularistic) loyalty as well as equality of all of the members its society. Branka Magas argues
that a Bosnian identity was in fact present in the early Middle Ages, but was never able to survive
properly because of mutually exclusive nationalist rhetoric of its neighborly states (2003:19-21).
Others, like Rusmir Mahmutcehajic argue that the Bosnian identity is in fact (still) present in
Bosnian society, even though this tends to be denied by Western scholars or by some segments
of the society who consistently point to the ‘hatred and unsustainability of common living’ of the
15
various ethnic groups (2003:57). Mahmutcehajic explains that the Bosnian society as a matter of
fact does have a ‘We’ which has survived throughout the territory of the country over its
thousand years history. This Bosnian ‘We’ is according to Mahmutcehajic based on the inclusive
logic of ‘both A and B’ rather than the exclusivist ‘either A or B’. (2003:9) He refers to this as the
‘Bosnian paradigm’ because of which Bosnia was able to survive and is actually still present (even
though it is not always tangible) in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina. (2003:63).
If one goes up another level, one reaches what used to be Yugoslavism. Bosnia and Herzegovina
has been a part of a South Slavic federation from WW I until the disintegration of the Socialist
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) in the beginning of the 1990s. The Yugoslav identity
was an inclusive one and it also formed an overarching allegiance as opposed to the particularistic
ethnic or national ones. The promotion of a Yugoslav identity has never been truly successful
among the Yugoslav citizens, but it is worth mentioning that Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of
the regions which had one of the highest numbers of citizens who declared themselves as
‘Yugoslavs’. Adherence to ‘Yugoslavism’ was a way of avoiding having to declare oneself as
belonging to a particular national group (Sekulic 1994:86).
These types of allegiance (to a city or to a country) discussed above all to some extent assume a
collective identity based on inclusivity; equal rights for all citizens, regardless of their ethnic
status. The last decade however, the trend in the region has been toward more particularistic
identities while the overarching, inclusive ones have been virtually non-existent as categories in
censuses (Markowitz 2007). The ‘new nationalism’ as Mary Kaldor labels the contemporary types
of nationalism, to be found in for example Bosnia and Herzegovina and Nagorno-Karabakh, is
exclusivist and particularistic as opposed to inclusive and cosmopolitan. These new, particularistic
nationalisms exclude members of a different nationality and are often defined in a religious
terminology (Kaldor 2004:168). Kaldor however argues that there are examples of cities in which
groups of citizens defend cosmopolitan values and refuse to give in to particularistic and
nationalist politics. To illustrate this she uses the example of resistance in Bosnian cities of Tuzla
and Sarajevo during the war in the 1990s (2000:117).
The fact that human diversity in Bosnia and Herzegovina in general and Sarajevo in particular can
result in tolerance and cosmopolitanism on the one hand and to fear and hate on the other, is
puzzling to many. Hodson et al. analyzed the patterns of tolerance in former Yugoslavia and came
to the conclusion that a high diversity in national or ethnic groups tends to lead to both tolerance
16
and conflict (1994:1554). Heterogeneity leads to tolerance because of intergroup proximity; in that
case there is increased contact between groups makes them realize that the members of the other
group can be trusted. On the other hand, heterogeneity can provide (nationalist) political elites
with motives and resources for mobilization of nationalism and ethnic violence. In case of high
diversity it is a lot easier for political actors to mobilize masses for nationalist purposes than is the
case in more homogenous parts.
That heterogeneity can lead to both peaceful coexistence and war is quite evident if one would
study the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its most diversified regions in more detail.
Kaldor agrees that Bosnia and Herzegovina is in fact a country with a tradition of tolerance and
coexistence as well as fear, hate and conflict. I would like to argue, following Kaldor, that fear
and hate are not common or everyday phenomena in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but that they are
rather mobilized for political goals and for the needs of the political elites. This goes for the
situation in Sarajevo as well and this becomes evident, as Kaldor argues, in the events of civic
activism during the run-up to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s (2000:42-3), WWII
and on other occasions on which the unique character of the city was threatened to be damaged.
I will argue that the political elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina and most importantly in its capital
city are to be held responsible for the mobilization of hate and fear during the wars in the 1990s.
This conflict has eventually led to the destruction of (perceived) Sarajevo’s cosmopolitan, tolerant
and multiethnic character. Even though I will argue that this is to a large extent the result of the
deliberate actions of the nationalist political elites, I will also emphasize the importance of the
structural factors which have facilitated the resources and motivation which are necessary for this
type of political action. Without these, the mobilization of the masses probably would most likely
have been impossible. Before discussing these factors it is required to take a closer look at
Sarajevo’s history and most importantly taking into account the political, economic, demographic
and social situation of the last few decades. I will first outline some historical facts essential to the
development of the character of Sarajevo up until the beginning of the war in the 1990s.
Secondly I will explain the beginning, course and the ending of the conflict in Sarajevo and
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton Peace Agreement1 (DPA) which ended the war in the
country and installed an Office of the High Representative (OHR) charged with the
implementation of this document, has been of great importance for the situation in the country.
After discussing the DPA I will move on and outline the political situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Sarajevo after the end of the war. I will end this chapter by reflecting on the
1
The official name is The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
17
situation in Sarajevo in the post-Dayton decade; what has changed since the disintegration of the
Yugoslav federation?
2.2
Sarajevo’s history
Sarajevo and the territory which is now called ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’ have been a mixture of
cultures, ethnic groups and religions from the very beginning. The Illyrians are the regions’
ancient inhabitants followed by Romans and finally the Slavs which moved to the area in the late
6th and early 7th century. Slav inhabitants were converted to Christianity by missionaries from
both Rome and Constantinople. During the Middle Ages the Bosnian Kingdom was one of the
most powerful ones in the region. The Bosnian medieval kingdom was however defeated by the
Ottoman Empire in the 1430s and by 1463 it was an Ottoman province with Sarajevo as its
capital city. For the next 400 years, Bosnia and Sarajevo were under Ottoman rule. During this
period many Slavs in the region converted to Islam. Sarajevo’s demographic picture changed
from being about 73 percent Christian in and 27 percent Muslim in 1485 to about 97 percent
Muslim in 1530 (Donia 2006:21). Life under Ottoman regime was organized according to the
millet system in which Muslims generally had more privileges than non-Muslims.
In 1878 the Ottoman Empire was defeated and succeeded by Habsburg rule. Bosnia and
Herzegovina was an autonomous administrative unit during the Austro-Hungarian regime and it
was in this period that a truly urban society had emerged in Sarajevo. During the forty years of
their rule, Habsburg authorities industrialized and modernized Bosnia and Herzegovina and its
capital city in a way which would suit their strategic interests in the region (Donia 2006:65). With
regard to politics, Habsburgs appointed Bosnians to local posts, distributing them according to
religious background. The religious communities became quite prominent in Sarajevo during
Habsburg rule, as authorities hoped to increase the growth of secular nationalism in the province
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Donia 2006:79). The national names ‘Serb’ and ‘Croat’ were
therefore banned from public life as the Habsburg authorities were concerned about a possible
outbreak of violent nationalism among their subjects.
The nationalist movements were however – just like in the rest of Europe – impossible to
contain. The ethno-confessional groups in Sarajevo became more and more directed towards the
neighboring countries; the ones of Orthodox faith felt increasing loyalty to Serbia, the Catholics
became more and more associated with Croatia and Muslims also developed some kind of group
18
consciousness. The ethno-confessional groups progressively kept pushing for more autonomy
and became more and more anti-Habsburg in their rhetoric. Behind this propaganda against what
was seen as the ‘oppressor’ was also the ideal of the unification of all South Slavs in one state
(Sachs 1994). The nationalist movements and anti-Habsburg uprisings reached their peak on June
28, 1914 when the Austro-Hungarian archduke and his wife were assassinated by Gavrilo Princip,
a Bosnian Serb during their visit to Sarajevo. After the assassination Sarajevo became deeply
divided along ethno-national lines (Donia 2006:123).
The demonstrations following the killing of Franz Ferdinand were pointed against Sarajevan
Serbs and their property. Soon after, WWI broke out. Habsburg rule was succeeded by a unitary
South Slav state which was a result of the prospect of unsatisfactory separate peace with AustriaHungary and the Allies pushing for a solution. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was a
constitutional monarchy under domination of the Serbian royal house (Pavkovic 2000:21). Bosnia
and Herzegovina was not recognized as a separate administrative unit within the new kingdom
and Sarajevo thus lost its importance as a major urban core in the region. Even though the
Sarajevans welcomed the reality of an unitary Yugoslav state, political Yugoslavism had largely
failed in the city during the interwar years at the expense of the three national parties representing
the three biggest ethnic groups in Sarajevo (Donia 2006:133). Aside from these national parties,
the social democrats also gained more and more popularity in the city. In 1929 the Kingdom was
renamed Kingdom of Yugoslavia in an attempt to do away with particularistic allegiances. All
organizations based on a national or religious affiliation were banned in order to promote a
unitary ideology (Pavkovic 2000:29). This effort however failed as Croats were pushing for more
independence and were in doing so supported by Mussolini’s government. Soon after, WWII
broke out, but fascism did not reach Sarajevo until 1941.
WWII was a major blow to Sarajevo’s coexistence and diversity as many Jews, Serbs and Roma
were either killed or displaced during the Croat Ustasha regime which was closely affiliated with
German Nazis and Italian Fascists. On the other hand, the resistance of Sarajevans against the
violent oppressors is a remarkable feature which is continuously present throughout Sarajevo’s
history. During the war there were two major oppositional movements, the Chetniks, a Serb
rebellion movement against foreign occupation and the Partisan movement (National Liberation
Movement of Yugoslavia), a movement of Yugoslav patriots with no specific national affiliation,
led by the Communist Party (Pavkovic 2000:39). In the end, the Partisan movement turned out
to be the ultimate victor in the efforts to liberate Sarajevo. Many Sarajevans joined the Partisans
19
and the Communist Party in their efforts to free their city of the aggressors. To them, diversity
‘was not an end in itself, but rather a means to achieve the unity of all peoples’ in order to resist
the fascist occupier (Donia 2006:202).
On November 29, 1943 the AVNOJ (Antifascist Council of People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia)
assembly decided to ban the king’s return to the country and gave the Partisan leader Josip Broz
Tito the rank of marshal. He would later on become the president of the newly born Socialist
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ). The new state was a federation of six equal republics
and two autonomous provinces. Bosnia and Herzegovina became one of the six republics with
Sarajevo as its capital city. Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most ethnically mixed of the six
republics as neither of the biggest three groups had a majority. SFRJ was in itself a cocktail of
various ethnic and religious groups which were all united in one state by a common ideology:
communism. Pavkovic explains this situation as following: ‘The communist recipe for national
reconciliation after the war was quite simple: national unity has been forged through the Partisan
struggle of national liberation in which all nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia equally
participated and in which all the forces of national hatred and conflict were successfully
defeated’(2000:44). All Yugoslav citizens had an overarching Yugoslav identity, but there was a
possibility to declare oneself in terms of the older, national identity (Robinson 2001:961).
Yugoslavia’s decennial censuses provided an opportunity for Yugoslav citizens to define their
identity in a range of possible categories, (next to the non-ethnic, hybrid and flexible Yugoslav
one); the Yugoslav state even granted recognition to groups whose members counted less than
percent of the population (Markowitz 2007:40). In 1963 Muslims were also recognized as a
nationality, which has in fact bolstered their group consciousness (Robinson 2001:962). Holding
together this immense ethnic diversity was an ideology expressed through the slogan of
‘brotherhood and unity’ (bratstvo i jedinstvo), invoked to rise above old hatreds between different
nationalities. Numerous checks and balances were built in the federal system to prevent the
mobilization of aggressive forms of nationalism. This is evident if one takes a look at the federal
structure of the country, but also in everyday matters, national diversity was taken into account;
there was a national key for practically every public office to make sure that the public
administration reflects the country’s pluriform reality.
Sarajevo was tremendously transformed during the socialist era. It underwent a massive physical
makeover and was vastly expanded to several times its previous size (Donia 2006:204). Sarajevo
became the political, economic, educational and cultural hub of the Republic of Bosnia and
20
Herzegovina and has as such brought a lot of advantages to its citizens. Many Sarajevans look
back to the socialist period with a large amount of nostalgia, and the economic and social
situation under Tito’s rule tends to be idealized rather often over a cup of coffee; it has become
common to claim that ‘everything used to be better when Tito was alive’. For many, the last
decades of socialism were among the best of their lives (Donia 2006:242-3). Sarajevans enjoyed
high salaries and a number of entitlements that came along with it. Yugoslavs were allowed to
travel abroad and many took up this opportunity.
Even though socialism was on the decline and nationalism was emerging as a potential threat to
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s unity, many Sarajevans were not aware of these developments, not
even after Tito’s death in May 1980. The slogan ‘After Tito, Tito’ was introduced to ensure
Yugoslav citizens of the continuity of Tito’s key policies after his death. Nationalism however
began to loom in most parts of the federation, including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sarajevo.
As cultural control was relaxed in the last decade of socialism, many intellectuals (mis)used this
opportunity to revive old national demands.
In 1984 Sarajevo was the host of the Winter Olympic Games. It was a fortnight which
demonstrated Sarajevo’s commitment to make the city’s diversity work and to show Sarajevo in
its best possible light. Donia refers to the two weeks of Olympic Games as ‘an ironic climax’
(2006:248) which squeezed out the last benefits of the old system before it finally declined in the
beginning of the 1990s.
During the 1980s socialism was on the decline in most parts of Europe. The wind of change did
not leave Yugoslavia untouched. In 1974 the Yugoslav federation adopted a new constitution in
which the key point was decentralization, anticipating on the outburst of nationalism and the
republics’ demand for more autonomy. In the last decade of socialism Yugoslavia was hit by
major economic stagnation, institutional problems and loss of legitimacy. Because of
decentralization measures which were implemented after the adoption of the new constitution,
new local elites were given the possibility to effectively gain power and spread their nationalist
rhetoric. In 1990 multiparty elections were held throughout the Federation and in November it
was Bosnia and Herzegovina’s turn. Next to non-ethnic parties such as Social Democratic Party
(SDP) and the Reformist Party (Savez reformskih snaga Jugoslavije) three national parties emerged on
the ballots, one for each major national group in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The national parties
were highly critical of the socialist order and saw one another as allies in their struggle against
21
socialist parties rather than as opponents. A few years later it would however turn out that the
demands of the three national parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina were incompatible.
The national parties of Bosnia and Herzegovina overwhelmingly triumphed at the elections in
November 1990. The Muslim party (SDA, led by Alija Izetbegovic, who would later become the
first president of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Croat party (HDZ) and the Serb
party (SDS) together gained the most votes in all municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
including Sarajevo, but excluding Tuzla (Donia 2006:262). Most Sarajevans are still puzzled by
the victory of the national parties at the first multiparty elections; a common remark is ‘If
everyone claimed that they did not vote for the nationalists, how come they have won?’. As early
as 1991 it became apparent that the national parties would have a hard time in agreeing upon
essential policy matters as SDS was pushing for more autonomy for Serbs and the SDA wanted a
unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina. SDS was proclaiming autonomous Serb regions, building
parallel institutions and ensuring that areas with Serb majorities were controlled by Serbs.
Meanwhile, SFRJ was disintegrating. Slovenia proclaimed its independence in 1990 and Croatia a
year after. Because these newly independent states defined themselves in exclusivist ethnic terms
while they had ethnic minorities living on their territories, ethnic conflicts broke out (see Hayden
1992). In March 1992 a referendum on independence was held in Bosnia and Herzegovina as
well. SDS boycotted the referendum as they were in favor of Bosnia and Herzegovina remaining
in the Yugoslav federation. The Bosnians voted in favor of the referendum. The aftermath of the
referendum was characterized by government clashes over the constitutional order of the new
state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. SDS wanted to divide the country among national lines, SDA
wanted a unitary and centralized Bosnian state and HDZ was in favor of independence in
combination with an exclusive control over Croat-populated parts (Pavkovic 2000:157).
A month after Bosnia and Herzegovina’s citizens voted in favor of independence and following
the European Commission’s recognition of the new state, a war broke out in Sarajevo.
2.3 The war in Sarajevo
By April 1992 Sarajevo was full of roadblocks placed by Serb militias. SDS leaders claimed that
these were put up for purposes of self-defense as Serb participants of a wedding were shot just
outside Sarajevo’s old Serbian Orthodox Church on March 1 (Donia 2006:278). Sarajevans
however demonstrated massively against these unnatural events in their city. They gathered daily
22
to peacefully protest against the roadblocks and to make an end to nationalist politics which were
taking over their lives. On April 5, 1992 50 – 10,000 demonstrators demanded for the
government to step down and asked for an international protectorate. One day later, on the
celebration of Sarajevo’s liberation of German and Ustasha rule during WWII and the day the
European Community recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina’s independence, the war in Sarajevo
began with Serb militias attacking civilians who were engaged in peaceful protests (Donia
2006:282).
The war in Sarajevo lasted until February 28, 1996. Sarajevo’s story of the war however has a
special component; the citizens of Bosnian capital city suffered a siege of more than three years
during which Sarajevo was mercilessly shelled, terrorized and starved. Thousands of Sarajevans
were murdered, wounded or forced to flee their homes.
2.3.1 The Serbs of Sarajevo
The aim of the Serb nationalists was to divide Sarajevo into Muslim and Serb parts and to
integrate the Serb parts of Sarajevo in the newly established Serb state as its economic centre
(Serb Sarajevo). This operation had its roots in the very beginning of the 1990s when Bosnian
Serbs were already setting up (military) controls over Serb-populated areas of Sarajevo and
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Muslims should control the core of the city (central city to old city) and
the rest of Sarajevo would be in Serb hands. To achieve this, there was also the need to physically
segregate the population (Donia 2006:290). Non-Serbs were to be expelled from areas which
were under Serb control and Serbs were instructed to leave non-Serb parts of Sarajevo and were
threatened to be forced out if they refused to do so. Many Serbs did in fact leave, fleeing the
shelling of Sarajevo and the threat of Bosniac2 and Croat irregulars threatening to kill them. A lot
of them however stayed, not willing to succumb to nationalist rhetoric of the ones who claimed
to represent them and willing to defend what they saw as their city. By the end of the war, the
number of Serbs residing in Sarajevo had reached a low point with only about twenty percent of
the pre-war Serb population remaining in the city (Donia 2006:323). A lot of Serb Sarajevans left
in 1996 as well after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in which Sarajevo was
assigned to the Bosniac-Croat Federation (Bollens 2001:171).
2
‘Bosniac’ is the label used for Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 onwards.
23
2.3.2 The irrationality of violence
“…the attacking forces are determined to ‘kill’ the city and the tradition of tolerance and ethnic
harmony that it represents.” (Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur for the UN Commission
on Human Rights, quoted in Kaldor 2000:44)
“The sowing of hatred emerged as the essential means of achieving the destroyers’ ultimate aim:
the destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” (Mahmutcehajic 2003:78).
“This is not a clash of civilizations; this is a barbarian assault on civilization.” (Boris Nilcevic, a
historian, quoted in Donia 2006:317)
Many scholars have argued that the violence in Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia and
Herzegovina has been directed towards the destruction of its unique traditions of trust, tolerance
and coexistence. This matter is also quite clear if one takes a closer look at the siege of Sarajevo;
the siege itself was not exclusively an instrument of gaining full control of Sarajevo. Neither side
has made a credible effort to take over the city during the 1395 days of siege. As Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s capital city, Sarajevo was of big strategic importance, but the main aim of the daily
shooting, shelling and outright terrorizing of Sarajevo’s citizens was aimed at creating an
atmosphere of fear and hate. As King argues, Sarajevo’s civilian population was for many
combatants ‘a chip in the game of Bosnian power politics’ (2000:235) and the siege of Sarajevo
was used as a distraction for atrocities in other regions (2000:273).
Nevertheless, Sarajevans refused to surrender or give in to threats to their common life. They did
not give in to nationalist violence but did everything in their power to continue business as usual.
Many kept going to work every day, despite of the possibility of being killed by snipers. Sarajevo
women never neglected their looks; they often preferred to buy new mascara instead of a loaf of
bread. Children were provided education in basements as it was too dangerous to attend class in
regular school buildings. During the war Sarajevans were increasingly creative in inventing new
means of survival. Oslobodjenje, the daily newspaper based in Sarajevo, continued to be printed
every day despite of the lack of resources and electricity. Many Sarajevans were forced to leave,
but many more decided to stay and defend their city’s urban diversity. Sarajevans seldom blamed
each other during the war; the blame was mostly pointed at nationalist parties which triggered the
war on the one hand and the Western democracies on the other, as they failed to intervene and
put an end to the siege for more than three years.
24
On August 28, 1995, the Markale Market, the central marketplace in Sarajevo was shelled. This
event came to be known as the ‘Markale massacre’; 68 people were killed and over 100 wounded.
Shelling was anything but unusual during the Sarajevo siege, but this particular shelling was of big
importance for the course of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Eighteen months earlier the
first major attack on the same marketplace triggered the first significant NATO intervention in
the war (King 2000:271). This time, strengthened by the fall of UN safe area’s Srebrenica and
Zepa in the eastern part of the country, the international community decided to engage in a
decisive effort to put an end to the atrocities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO air strikes began
on August 30 and were directed against Bosnian Serb positions surrounding Sarajevo.
On November 21, the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was initiated in the city of Dayton, USA
and signed a few weeks later by representatives of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (‘the Parties’). The siege of Sarajevo
was not ended until February 1996. Donia explains that the contrast with the end of WWII in
Sarajevo could not have been bigger. In 1945, an outright feeling of victory was widespread
throughout the city. Now, 51 years later, there was an atmosphere of defeat; ‘The war dealt a
severe blow to the city’s common life, notwithstanding the efforts of many Sarajevans to keep it
alive during the siege’ (2006:335).
2.4 Dayton Peace Agreement
The agreement reached at the military base in Dayton, Ohio ended the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Although far from satisfactory, it was probably the only possible outcome of the
summit at that point in time. The first of the two most important regulations of the DPA are
probably the establishment of a UN High Representative (HR), whose job is to supervise the
implementation of the DPA. The second regulation of the DPA which has had the most
consequences for Bosnia and Herzegovina and its citizens is the administrative division. The
country is territorially divided in two entities; the Serb Republika Srpska (RS) and the BosniacCroat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) which both have far-reaching powers. FBiH
is also divided into ten cantons (Sarajevo Canton is one of them) with a good share of autonomy
in several policy fields. The actual agreement is a two-page document and the rest is regulated in
the eleven Annexes which outline the areas of authority and assign these to various international
bodies which are in charge of the implementation. I will discuss the most relevant ones.
25
2.4.1 Annex 4 – The Constitution
The odd thing about the Bosnian Constitution is that it was never approved or ratified by a
representative body; it is instead imposed by governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its
neighboring countries as well as by representatives of the international community.
The preamble contains a commitment of the Parties to peace, justice, tolerance and reconciliation
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby stating the equality of its ‘constituent peoples, Bosniacs,
Croats, Serbs (along with Others)’3. Sarajevo is, as stated, the capital city of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, but the city has lost much of its importance due to the structure of the DPA; I shall
discuss this later on.
The Entities have, as stated earlier, been given a lot of autonomy on a range of policy issues. The
role of the central government has been significantly reduced; the institutions of Bosnia and
Herzegovina have the responsibility over foreign (trade) policy, customs policy, monetary policy,
finances, air traffic control and immigration. The Entities have extensive powers in the fields of
education, housing, refugee return and law enforcement. The political structure of the Bosnian
state as regulated by the DPA is complex and extremely bureaucratic. Not only are there three
levels of governance (state, entity and canton level), but the policy making process is highly
ethnicized as well. Both Entities have a complete administration of their own; a president, a
parliament and an executive. The positions are allocated ethnically; in the presidium there are
three presidents, one from each ethnic group. In the House of Representatives the seats are also
distributed ethnically; 28 seats are reserved for representatives from FBiH while 14 are for
Republika Srpska. In the House of Peoples there are 15 seats, 5 for each of the constituent
peoples. In FBiH attention has been paid to balanced representation of the two constituent
peoples, on entity as well as cantonal level (Bose 2002:60). Furthermore, the Constitution only
recognizes collective interests of the three constituent peoples; citizens as individuals do not have
any political power (Mujkic 2007:113). The entire political system post-Dayton Bosnia and
Herzegovina is equipped with checks and balances to facilitate the mechanism of power-sharing.
A multiethnic government was seen as necessary in order to resist aggressive nationalism of any
kind. Two key points of this politics of power-sharing are decentralization of political power and
procedures which ensure that vital interests of the three ethnic groups will be secured (Chandler
2000:66).
3
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4.
26
This kind of formulations can however form a rather big obstacle to the process of
democratization, but this kind of protection of collective ethnic rights was probably an essential
factor in the Dayton negotiation process. Though this kind of ethnicization of politics was
intended to be a transitory solution, the Constitution as agreed upon in Dayton has not been
revised since.
2.4.2 Annex 7 – Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons
This DPA Annex made the Parties commit to a safe return of refugees and displaced persons to
their pre-war homes and obliged them to compensate the returnees for any property that cannot
be restored to them. This Annex also stated that the Parties were to make sure that the returnees
can return to their pre-war homes without any risk of being harassed or discriminated in any way.
An independent Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees was to be established which
would decide on claims for real property on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina4.
2.4.3 Annex 10 – Agreement on Civilian Implementation
The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was established in order to ‘monitor the
implementation of the peace settlement’5. The High Representative has a large number of powers
including the possibility to enforce laws and to impeach politicians who are obstructing the
implementation of the DPA.
2.4.4 Sarajevo and the Dayton Peace Agreement
In the DPA it was decided that Sarajevo will continue to be the country’s capital city. The role of
Sarajevo as the most important city in Bosnia and Herzegovina was however diminished as the
Entities were awarded a great deal of autonomy and it was decided that the administrative centre
of the Republika Srpska was to be based in Banja Luka. On the other hand, Sarajevo did benefit
from the presence of international organizations which had their headquarters in the capital city.
Sarajevo has been segregated by the signing of the DPA and the drawing of the IEBL (Inter
Entity Boundary Line) which runs straight through Sarajevo. The territory of what used to be the
uniform Sarajevo was now divided between the two entities. FBiH got only about 61% of what
used to be the pre-war ten Sarajevo municipalities. The rest was assigned to Republika Srpska,
including the Serb-held suburbs, named Eastern Sarajevo (Istocno Sarajevo).
4
5
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 7.
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 10.
27
Furthermore, FBiH is, as noted earlier, divided into ten cantons. Sarajevo Canton (Kanton Sarajevo,
KS) is one of them. The cantons received considerable autonomy in some policy fields, for
example regulations and provision of education, making cultural policy, decisions concerning
housing policy and implementing social welfare policy. The cantonal bodies are clearly the
decisive layer in the political structure of the DPA (Bose 2002:79). The level of municipalities has
a rather inferior role in this framework. The City of Sarajevo has for example been stripped of
some important competencies a capital city is supposed to have (Krug99 2001) and was made
completely subordinate to the canton. Some vital functions of the were taken over by the
Sarajevo Canton and the city itself is in fact financed by the Canton budget and has very limited
resources of its own.
2.5 Political situation after the Dayton Peace Agreement
The constitutional structures as laid down in of the DPA have made a great impact on the
political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in general and Sarajevo in particular. The
administrative and political division of the country in entities and cantons and the ethnicization
of the political processes have had important consequences for the outcome of the elections, the
cooperation between ethnic elites and Bosnia’s road towards European and North-Atlantic
integrations.
In his article ‘We, the citizens of Ethnopolis’, (2007) Asim Mujkic has critically summarized the
political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the signing of the DPA. He argues that the
DPA Constitution is not the constitution of a democratic country because it is founded on ethnic
representation and thus ‘by virtue of its inner logic’ prefers ‘parties of the same ethnic principle’
(2007:112). The DPA regulation that Bosnian citizens should be represented in an ethnic manner
gives nationalist parties the opportunity to (by using nationalist rhetoric in order to convince the
public to elect them as only then their collective rights will be protected) win election after
election. As a result, there has been only marginal support for multiethnic or non-nationalist
parties in the post-Dayton elections. After winning the elections, the nationalist parties will then
generally tend to form ruling coalitions in which they fail to produce legislation beneficial for the
entire Bosnian population because they each represent partial interests. This way, Bosnian politics
is stuck in a vicious circle: because the DPA is focused on equality and representation of the
three constituent peoples rather than on the efficiency of state institutions, the nationalist parties
will manage to ensure electoral victory more often than non-nationalist parties. During their rule
28
they continue their inflammatory language as their main goal is to stay in power (Mujkic
2007:121) and to continue representing the ‘vital national interests’ of their constituent people.
This will make the Bosnian society very sensitive to nationalist rhetoric and the voters will
therefore keep rewarding ‘their’ politicians for using it. Nationalist parties will win the next
elections as well, making the vicious circle full again.
2.5.1 First post-Dayton elections
In the first few elections after the end of the war (elections were held every two years until 2002)
the nationalist parties were able to attract large amounts of voters. The three nationalist parties –
Bosniac SDA, Serb SDS and Croat HDZ – were however gradually cleansed of hard-liners over
the course of the years, either because were sought by the International Criminal Tribunal for
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or because of impeachment by the OHR as a result of their spreading
aggressive nationalism or because of obstruction of the implementation of the DPA. Still, as
Chandler argues, there is only so much the external actors can do to prevent mono-ethnic or
nationalist parties from winning, and this is mainly due to the DPA political structures in
combination with the division of the country and the insecurity about the protection of their
collective rights felt by the constituent peoples (2000:113).
2.5.2 The 2000 elections: shift away from nationalist issues
The 2000 elections showed a slight electoral success for non-nationalist and multiethnic parties
for the first time in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. A coalition (Alliance for Changes) of
SDP (Social-democratic Party) and SBiH (Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina) was formed and
these parties expressed their determination for economic, political and social reforms in Bosnia
and Herzegovina; that is, reform for the benefit of the entire country and not exclusively for one
of the three constituent peoples. Handicapped by the short ruling period of two years, the
Alliance for Changes did not manage to fulfill the promises of its long-term vision for Bosnia and
Herzegovina until the next elections in 2002. The nationalist, mono-ethnic parties were able, on
the bases of attacks of the Alliance, to win the 2002 general elections. There was widespread
disappointment in the country as well as within international organizations that multiethnic
parties did not manage to eliminate the popularity of mono-ethnic parties.
2.5.3 The 2006 elections: Silajdzic vs. Dodik; nationalism in disguise
During the 2006 campaigning general elections a few remarkable events occurred, but no decisive
changes were made to put Bosnia and Herzegovina firmly on the road towards European and
29
North-Atlantic integrations. In March of the same year an attempt has been made to revise the
DPA in order to make the Bosnian state institutions more efficient because the first post-Dayton
decade was up until then marked by political inertia caused by major ethnicization of politics.
Two opposing views of the Bosnian state however clashed and no agreement was reached on
constitutional amendments. Haris Silajdzic, the founder of SBiH6 and a prominent Bosnian
politician made a come-back into the political arena in 2006, just after the rejection of the
constitutional amendments. Silajdzic, the most important opponent of the amendments,
managed, with the help of the main daily in FBiH, Dnevni Avaz, to make his return a successful
one. Thanks to Dnevni Avaz Silajdzic managed to portray himself as a big patriot who came to
save Bosnia and Herzegovina from dissolution. He often accused the proponents of the
constitutional reforms of being anti-Bosnian. He decided to run for BiH Presidency as a Bosniac
representative and started a quite offensive campaign and his main discourse concentrated on
abolishing of the entities. Silajdzic’s most important opponent is Serb Milorad Dodik, the leader
of the SNSD (Union of Independent Social-democrats). He strongly reappeared in the Bosnian
political arena and became immensely popular in his entity for his no-nonsense talk on preserving
the Serb entity. At a certain point in the electoral campaign, Dodik even mentioned a possible
referendum on independence should be held in RS as ‘the potential independence of Kosovo
might remind Serbs in RS that they have the same right’ (OHR MRU 2006). Silajdzic and Dodik
had opposing ideas for the Bosnian state and their respective electorates were apparently fond of
these ideas. Silajdzic was elected as the Bosniac representative in the Presidency and Dodik’s
SNSD became the biggest party in the country.
True, the winning political parties in the 2006 elections are not the traditional nationalist parties
which dominated the political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina for a decade; however, the electoral
campaigns of the winning parties did focus on nationalist issues; while Silajdzic portrayed himself
as the patriot who came back to save the Bosnian state, Dodik was promising his constituents a
referendum on independence in order to protect the vital interests of the Serbs. These nationalist
issues are not as radical as ten years ago - as Gerard Toal argues there has been a shift from
‘paleo-nationalism to Euro-nationalism’ (2006:69-71). But it is however clear that both the
campaign on constitutional amendments as well as the electoral campaign were about winning
votes – and nationalist rhetoric is still, more than a decade after Dayton, a powerful tool for
getting as much as possible. The move away from old-style toward a kind of moderate
nationalism is diluted by the fact that politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina are still rewarded for
6
The identity this party claims to carry out is a multi-ethnic one. The party claims to be ‘100% for BiH’ (which was
also their slogan for the October elections), meaning a Bosnian state without entities: a citizen-based, unitary state.
30
their fight to increase autonomy for their own constituent people (Soberg 2006:49). The problem
thus in part lays with the Bosnian society which is still very sensitive to nationalist issues-rhetoric
in electoral campaigning. The lack of other cleavages within the Bosnian society combined with a
system which reinforces the existing ones, complemented with politicians with wrong
motivations lead to the dominance of nationalist issues within the Bosnian political arena.
Furthermore, in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is a general frustration with the political system
and an extremely low level of respect for politicians. There is however little incentive for change
and very few initiatives of citizens for protest (Soberg 2006:51-2).
2.5.4 The political situation in Canton Sarajevo and Sarajevo municipalities
The actions of the Bosniac-led government towards Sarajevo Serbs and the successful SDS
campaign of encouraging Serbs to leave the capital city in the immediate aftermath of the war
were highly embarrassing for the international organizations (Chandler 2000:83). In September
1997 assembly of Sarajevo Canton adopted a new constitution for the city which ensured the
multiethnic composition of the city. The new constitution stated that the city of Sarajevo7 is
comprised of four municipalities; Stari Grad, Centar, Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo. Each of
these municipalities is to send seven representatives to the city council and the seats were to be
allocated by ethnic key, ensuring a balanced representation of Bosniacs and Croats as constituent
peoples of FBiH as well as ‘others’ (Donia 2006:341).
The electoral results show continuing electoral successes for nationalist parties in Sarajevo
Canton, similar to the one at the entity and the national level. The exception are the cantonal
elections of 2000 when the social-democrat Alliance for Changes achieved electoral victory on all
levels. The 1997 and 2000 municipal elections in Sarajevo have shown slight voter preference for
non-nationalist parties over nationalist parties but the effect of non-nationalist electoral victories
in Sarajevo municipalities can be questioned as the major political decision making takes place on
cantonal level.
2.6 Sarajevo after Dayton
‘Is Sarajevo the capital city of Bosnia and Herzegovina or only the seat of Bosniac
nationalism? (…) The city with all its meanings doesn’t exist. It doesn’t exist as an idea, nor as
a spirit’s order, nor as an energy drink which will push this country forward. Sarajevo is
merely a political reality of Dayton, transformed into an arena of primordial inter-party
7
The city of Sarajevo is in this case only the part of Sarajevo which lies in FBiH.
31
arguing in which journalists are gladiators and politicians are caesars. Our beloved carsija is
reduced to most rigid political identities: ‘will the city be green or red after the elections?’ and
‘if you are not with us, you’re against us’. (…) Contemporary Sarajevo has lost its intuition of
diversity. The city has lost intuition for its advantages and if it doesn’t regain it, Bosnia and
Herzegovina won’t either. That means that Bosnia and Herzegovina will never exist or that it
will exist in an non-existent way. The Dayton way, that is.’ (Nerzuk Curak, professor of
political science at the University of Sarajevo in weekly Dani, 20 September 2002)
Sarajevo has changed immensely over the course of the past twenty years. One should however
be careful not to overstate the transformation in Sarajevo’s character as it is evident that every
city changes over time. Sarajevo and its citizens have however experienced a war which has, along
with its causes and consequences had a deep impact on the city and the everyday lives of the
Sarajevans. Struggling to overcome enormous traumas and fighting to build up anything what
could resemble normal life in a post-war situation and the trying to deal with new structures of
society which it has brought about, it is not unthinkable that Sarajevans have changed themselves.
What has changed in Sarajevo in the aftermath of the war in 1992-5? Which effect have these
changes had on the perceived cosmopolitan character of the city and the Spirit of Sarajevo? And
most importantly, which structural factors have brought about this new context?
Sarajevo’s Spirit was seriously wounded during the war . Sarajevo itself has however also been
physically damaged and this is visible from every corner in the city. Sarajevans are confronted
with the war and the fact that their country is a international protectorate every day. Many
buildings have not been restored yet, there are cavities caused by mortar strikes everywhere in the
city and huge cemeteries throughout the city are a constant reminder of the of the war casualties.
The presence of international peace keeping forces and the pictures of the High Representative in
daily newspapers are a constant reminder of the fact that Bosnians have proven incapable of
ruling themselves.
2.6.1 Demography
The demographic picture of the city of Sarajevo has changed profoundly since the beginning of
the war in 1992. Many factors have caused this shift, but the war and its aftermath are the
overarching and the most important reason for the changes in the city’s demographic make-up.
32
The last Yugoslav census was held in 1991. Sarajevo’s ethnic composition was as following8:
Table 2.1: Sarajevo’s ethnic make up in 1991
Sarajevo
Total
Muslims9
Croats
Serbs
Yugoslavs
Others
TOTAL
493,422
250,972
34,438
133,594
55,652
18,766
100 percent
50.8 percent
7.0 percent
27.1 percent
11.3 percent
3.9 percent
SOURCE: Kanton Sarajevo; Nacionalni Sastav Stanovnistva Kantona Sarajevo u Dejtonskim granicama po popisu od 31. 03. 1991. godine
Sarajevo was evidently a multiethnic city before the war. The city of Sarajevo had a high
awareness of Yugoslavism; 11 percent of Sarajevans declared themselves as ‘Yugoslavs’ back in
1991 and this was one of the highest percentages in the entire SFRJ (Sekulic 1994:86). The
category of ‘Others’ (Ostali) included the fourteen categories of peoples whose ancestral
homelands lie beyond the borders of Yugoslavia10 (Markowitz 2007:41). When the war began and
even before the war some major shifts in the demographic picture of Sarajevo have started to
take place. People started moving out of the city, others started moving in and Sarajevo lost a lot
of its citizens who became victims of the war and the cruel consequences of the siege of Sarajevo.
Many Sarajevans had fled the city during and in the immediate aftermath of the war for reasons
of personal security. Some decided to emigrate to neighboring countries or elsewhere in the
world. These people were generally Sarajevans who were brought up in an multiethnic and
cosmopolitan environment (often children from mixed marriages) and who could not handle the
pressure of nationalism and having to declare oneself as member of one of the three groups
(Bosniac, Croat or Serb). Others left the city because they chose to live (or fight) on the side of
‘their own group’ (mainly Serbs). Serbs who left Sarajevo to live in Republika Srpska mostly did
so in 1996 when the core of the city was assigned to FBiH. Large numbers of refugees from all
parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina fled to Sarajevo and moved into empty apartments of Serbs
who have left the city. Many families were forced to or chose to leave their homes in places
which were as a consequence of DPA ruled by another ethnic group than their own. Bosnians
who sought their refuge in Sarajevo were mainly Bosniacs from eastern regions of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and other parts of what was now Republika Srpska (for example Srebrenica and
Zepa). A major population exchange was thus taking place after the Dayton borders were
Ethnic composition of the city of Sarajevo in 1991 according to its post-Dayton borders (before the war Sarajevo
consisted of ten municipalities, the data in this table is the ethnic make-up of the four municipalities of FBiH parts of
Sarajevo.
9 In post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Muslim category has been replaced by ‘Bosniacs’. This particular
category did not exist before the war in official statistics.
10 Albanians, Czechs, Italians, Jews, Hungarians, Germans, Poles, Roms, Romanians, Russians, Ruthenians, Slovaks,
Turks and Ukrainians.
8
33
decided upon; Serbs were moving to Republika Srpska in large numbers and Bosniacs and Croats
who were caught in Serb parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina decided to move to FBiH. Annex 7 of
the DPA provides all refugees with the right to return to their pre-war homes and the local elites
were obliged to create conditions to facilitate this return. I shall come to the issue of refugee
return in the next chapter in discussing the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration.
Since 1991 no official census has been held in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some official estimates
have however been made public and FBiH has held a census in its cantons in 2002. It became
evident that Sarajevo’s demographic picture has changed dramatically. The ethnic composition of
the population on the territory of Sarajevo Canton in 2002 was as following:
Table 2.2: Sarajevo’s ethnic make up in 2002
Sarajevo
Total
Bosniacs
Croats
Serbs
Others
TOTAL
401,118
319,245
26,890
44,865
10,118
100 percent
79.6 percent
6.7 percent
11.2 percent
2.5 percent
SOURCE: Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine, 2003, Kanton Sarajevo u brojkama 2003, Federalni Zavod za Statistiku, Sarajevo, 2003, ‘Nacionalna
Struktura Stanovnistva’ p.10
The overall population of post-Dayton Sarajevo has decreased by almost 20 percent. The ethnic
make-up of the city has experienced a massive shift as well; Bosniacs (in 1991 ‘Muslims’) made up
50 percent of Sarajevo’s population when the last Yugoslav census was held. Eleven years later,
their share increased by almost 30 percent and they are now an outright majority in the city. The
share of people who declared themselves as ‘Croats’ stayed the same as in 1991, while the
percentage of Serbs in Sarajevo decreased with 16 percent. The number of the ones who declared
themselves as ‘Others’ (Ostali) has stayed roughly the same. The category ‘Yugoslavs’ had
disappeared; in this census there was no overarching category such as ‘Yugoslavs’ or ‘Bosnians’.
Bosnian citizens can be only Bosniacs, Croats, Serbs or otherwise fall into the meaningless
residual category of ‘Others’.
2.6.2 Everyday life in post-Dayton Sarajevo
It is difficult to escape from the reality of the importance of ethnic cleavages in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. If you are say, a Serb, you can choose to live in an exclusively Serb town, it is
possible to go to Serb café’s, read Serb newspapers, vote for Serb representatives, send your
children to a Serb school, watch Serb news, work in a Serb company and never even meet a
member of the other two ethnic groups. The entire country is pillarized, somewhat like the
34
Netherlands in the first half of the 20th century, however the territorial division makes matters
even more complicated in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Ethnic cleavages are evident in Sarajevo as well, even though this used to be the multiethnic and
cosmopolitan centre of the country in which ethnicity did not matter and in which common life
was emphasized. Just a simple stroll in downtown Sarajevo will reveal the new reality of
overemphasizing ethnicity. Old street-name signs in Cyrillic script and the ones which were
related to Serbs were removed and replaced with ones which are directly associated with Sarajevo
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, many of them referring to Bosniacs who are highly regarded in the
society today (Robinson 2001:967). Religious structures have become of very important; money is
invested in building new mosques, churches and religious centers (Donia 2006:345). One of the
largest mosques in the Balkan region is built in one of the Sarajevo suburbs and was a gift of
Saudi Arabia to Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sarajevans, under communism largely
secularized, nowadays keep re-emphasizing their religions; religious holidays are widely celebrated
and on Friday, business is for the most part put on hold as the male Muslim population massively
goes to the mosque for Dzuma (Friday) prayer. In parts of the old Ottoman quarter of Bascarsija,
no alcoholic drinks or pork meals are served. Religion seems to have made a come-back in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and more particularly in Sarajevo.
With regard to education, the DPA has in large part assigned the policy-making to the cantonal
Ministries. This has resulted in the three ethnic groups making their own curricula and in the
possibility for parents to send their children to a Bosniac, a Croat or a Serb school. In that way,
the children will interact with ‘their’ ethnic group only and be taught the language and the history
of ‘their’ ethnic group from teachers of ‘their’ ethnic group. Sarajevo has also lost its label as a
student city; Sarajevo University is no longer the exclusive place to study as other universities
have been set up to counter the ‘ethnicization’ of the university in Sarajevo, as most deans at
Sarajevo University have a Bosniac background. Nowadays, there are even two universities on the
pre-war territory of Sarajevo as a new university in the RS part of the city (Istocno Sarajevo) has
been opened recently.
The rigidity of ethnic cleavages also becomes evident if one would apply for a job position in the
public administration as the positions are largely distributed by ethnic key to ensure that the
members of the three ethnic groups have a balanced representation. One can for example only
become a member of the Presidency if one declares to be a Bosniac, Croat or Serb. This goes for
35
a number of other positions as well. This causes big problems for many citizens who are non-BC-S citizens, from a mixed marriage, or ones who simply do not feel affiliated with either of the
three categories and who refuse to be labeled as ‘Others’ in their own country.
2.6.3 Dayton structures and the shift in Sarajevo’s character
It can be argued that the character of the city of Sarajevo has changed over the past decade or
two as many things are not the way they used to be. Sarajevo and its citizens have gradually let go
of overarching, hybrid identities and have somehow succumb to more particularistic ones. This is
of course not only the case in Sarajevo and Sarajevo is not the biggest example of this shift. In an
interview with former Armija BiH general Jovan Divjak11, I was reminded that I should not focus
exclusively on Sarajevo as the same thing is happening in other big cities in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The western part of Mostar is almost exclusively Croat and Banja Luka is the
capital of the Serb parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and few people in these places see life in
Bosnia and Herzegovina as ‘common’. Many of them in fact do not even see Bosnia and
Herzegovina as their country, but increasingly focus their loyalties on Croatia and Serbia
respectively. Milorad Dodik, the Prime Minister of RS is often quoted for saying: ‘Sarajevo is
Teheran; I will only support Bosnia if it plays against Turkey’. What has happened in Sarajevo can
however to some extent be seen as distinctive because during the past century this city has in fact
had the label of a tolerant, multiethnic and cosmopolitan city in which common life was a natural
state of being. Even though Bosnia’s capital city has reinvented (and to some extend retained)
some of the institutions of its common life, such as the organization of festivals through out the
year (like the Sarajevo Winter Festival and the Sarajevo Film Festival) and the preservation of the
newspaper Oslobodjenje (Donia 2006:349-352), a good number of Sarajevans and external
observers will agree that many things have changed. Why is there a widespread feeling that the
‘Spirit of Sarajevo’ has disappeared?
Demography is most likely one of the major reasons; two dramatic shifts have occurred: 1) the
ethnic composition of the city has changed which has resulted in a shift from a multiethnic city to
an almost exclusively Bosniac one, 2) a lot of native Sarajevans have left during and in the
aftermath of the war and they now make up only about 2/3 of the city’s population. The rest of
Sarajevo’s population nowadays mostly exists of people from rural parts of Bosnia and
Herzegovina who have sought their refuge in the city and replaced the urban population which
has moved out. The fact that Sarajevo is no longer a multiethnic city thus has thus become
11
Interview by the author with former Armija BiH general Jovan Divjak, Sarajevo, 12 April 2007.
36
evident through the demographic shift which has taken place in the country and which has
caused an alteration in the ethnic composition of the city. The perceived loss of the cosmopolitan
character of the city is frequently assigned to the fact that much of the urban, native population
of Sarajevo has left the city and has been replaced by refugees from more rural parts of the
country who have different and more traditional values.
Aside from the demographic argument for the shift in Sarajevo’s identity, I will argue that the city
of Sarajevo has in large part changed due to the DPA and that the demographic shift itself can
also be assigned to the structures of Dayton. Nevertheless, the alteration of Sarajevo’s character
cannot be exclusively reduced to the Peace Agreement. The war in the country and the siege of
Sarajevo have caused major traumas because of which Sarajevo is deeply scared and will most
likely never be as it once was. But the DPA has certainly contributed to the constant
reinforcement of these scars; that is to say, the DPA has in-built mechanisms which tend to
freeze ethnic cleavages, make them prevail in daily realities and as a consequence make the civic
and cosmopolitan values inferior.
Firstly, the DPA has divided the country in two entities. This act of ethnoterritorialization has de
facto ruined Bosnia and Herzegovina’s chances of becoming a unitary state after the war and
destroyed Sarajevo’s chances of becoming the capital city of all Bosnian citizens. This has
furthermore caused the consolidation of the demographic changes triggered by the war; people
stayed in (or started moving to) places where they could be ruled by their own ethnic group
because they did not want to be a minority in their pre-war homes. This resulted in a massive
exodus of Serbs from Sarajevo to Republika Srpska on the one hand and caused many Bosniacs
to move to Sarajevo (and other places in FBiH) from Republika Srpska on the other.
Secondly, the DPA Constitution states that Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs (along with Others) are
the constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This particular structure of society in fact
denies a Bosnian society as such and only recognizes it as a sum of ethnic parts. Moreover, citizens
of Bosnia and Herzegovina are only recognized as members of a collective (an ethnic group) and
not as individuals (Mujkic 2007:113); according to the Constitution, individuals have no rights
unless they appeal to them as constituent peoples. Edin Sarcevic very well summarizes the
consequences of defining the nation in this particular way; ‘The ethnically-centered Dayton
Agreement has become the main obstacle to the establishment of civil society in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and at the same time serves as a means for ethnically disciplining the citizen of
37
Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (quoted in Mujkic 2007:115). The DPA thus leaves almost no room for
individual initiatives of citizens, because citizens are not recognized as such by the Bosnian
Constitution. Politics is only the domain of representatives of the three ethnic groups whose
main goal is to stay in power and keep the status-quo. Citizens’ initiatives are thus indirectly
discouraged by Dayton’s mechanisms. Furthermore, the principle of ‘constituent peoples’, which
assumes a permanence and rigidity of these categories, leads to exclusion of ones who are not a
part of the B-C-S triad. This particular way of ethnically defining who is a part of the nation and
who is not (as opposed to inclusive, civic types of citizenship) is obliging Bosnians to choose one
of the three ethnic identities because otherwise one will inevitably be an ‘Other’ in their own
country.
The consequences of the rigidity of the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s population in three
parts by the DPA Constitution for Sarajevo have become quite evident over the last decade.
Sarajevo’s multiethnic and cosmopolitan character was immensely damaged because the DPA
discourages civic initiatives and encourages and continuously keeps emphasizing ethnic identities
and cleavages. A good example of the latter is the trend of a conscious and systematic (re)invention of a Bosniac national identity. During the two Yugoslavias the (then) Bosnian Muslims
were as a national category marked by invisibility. In 1990s, at the time of the war and during its
aftermath, national differences were institutionalized and this caused a mobilization of ethnic
allegiances (Robinson 2001:961-3). This particular event moved Bosnian Muslims to actively
develop a sense of national consciousness to counter Croat and Serb nationalisms in the country.
This national consciousness was to be detached from religion and Bosnian Muslims were
transformed into ‘Bosniacs’ as Bosniacs are not necessarily (practicing) Muslims. Moreover, the
label ‘Bosniacs’ captures the direct link these people have with Bosnia and Herzegovina and
makes them distinct. These new quests for identity are also evident in Sarajevo; religion has made
a come-back as religious affiliation is one of the few things which distinguishes the three groups
from one another. A lot of Bosniacs are, even though the term ‘Bosniac’ does not refer to a
religious category, increasingly turning to religion. This also goes for Croats and Serbs in
Sarajevo.
The biggest issue however probably has less to do with the fact that the Constitution recognizes
three ethnic categories and more with the fact that it only recognizes three categories and thus
leaves no room for a multiethnic, hybrid and overarching collective Bosnian identity. In his article
‘Census and Sensibilities in Sarajevo’, Fran Markowitz argues that the census conducted in FBiH
38
and in Sarajevo Canton in 2002 does not entirely capture the reality of the Bosnian capital city as
the respondents were given only three options to chose from. By restricting the options, the
Bosnian government is forcing its subjects to reduce their identity to one of the three ethnic
categories and refuses them the right to choose a pan-Bosnian, hybrid identity. This causes huge
problems for individuals who feel not to fit into the B-C-S triad or for children from mixed
marriages. In post-Dayton Sarajevo, these individuals are thus forced to choose an ethnic identity
and they are denied the right to choose a pan-ethnic one.
To summarize, Sarajevo’s multiethnic and cosmopolitan character has disappeared because in
post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina there is no space for civic initiatives and because the
centrality and rigidness of ethnic identities which keep being emphasized and reinforced in many
aspects of Sarajevans’ daily lives leaves no room for a hybrid pan-Bosnian identity. It is not very
surprising that Sarajevo’s character has changed – it is by no means easy to be either
cosmopolitan or tolerant in a society in which particularistic, ethnic identities keep being stressed
through various political structures.
39
CHAPTER 3
Implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration – an evaluation
3.1
Introduction
In the previous chapter I have given an account of the post-Dayton situation in Sarajevo. Several
structural factors which have lead to the perceived loss of the multiethnic, tolerant character of
the city have been discussed. The war and the siege of Sarajevo have caused a lot of traumas and
may have alienated various ethnic groups from one another. The Dayton regulations have
however normalized these ethnic cleavages and made them prevail in the daily lives of the
Sarajevans. As a result, Sarajevo has lost its cosmopolitan identity, much as Bosnia and
Herzegovina has lost its multiethnic character as a consequence of violence and the partition of
the country along ethnic lines which has divided the country in separate national spaces.
Except for the structural factors which have caused an identity shift in Sarajevo, it is highly likely
that many changes which have occurred in post-Dayton Sarajevo have been caused by actions of
the local, national or international political elites. In this chapter an attempt will be made to
explain the role of agency in the changes which have been taking place in Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s capital city after the war. By evaluating the implementation of the so-called
Sarajevo Declaration initiated in 1998 to encourage returns to Sarajevo, I will try to uncover the
possible mechanisms used by the political elites (local, national and international) to obstruct the
implementation of this document.
3.2
Sarajevo Declaration
The right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their pre-war settlements was one of the
most important pillars and the key priority of the DPA. Annex 7 of the Agreement obliges local
authorities to facilitate suitable conditions for return of refugees and displaced persons. There
was a widespread belief that the re-mixing of the population and the return to pre-war ethnic
demography will in the end be the most beneficial for the reconciliation process. In the first few
years after the end of the war many refugees and displaced persons returned to areas which were
40
ruled by members of their own ethnic groups (Donia 2006:347). Minority return12 was however
extremely limited aside from a small amount of so-called spontaneous returns. When minorities
proved unwilling to return to their pre-war homes, this was generally seen as the result of
‘systematic intimidation and manipulation by nationalist politicians’ (Chandler 2000:104).
Gradually, the OHR acquired the power to remove obstructionist local politicians and return was
slowly but surely made politically acceptable (Toal 2004:446). Several projects have been issued in
order to jump-start the returns process. One of the first initiatives intended to speed up the
process and to overcome obstructionism from the side of local authorities resulted in a document
called the ‘Sarajevo Declaration’. According to a report of the International Crisis Group,
potential non-Bosniac returnees to Sarajevo faced several obstacles especially with regard to
property legislation, personal security and educational and employment discrimination (ICG
1998b:I) As a result, Carlos Westendorp, the High Representative at the time, decided to commit
the Bosniac SDA government in Sarajevo to implement their own rhetorical commitments to
making the city a multiethnic and tolerant place again (Donia 2006:348). Attended by members of
the Bosnian Presidency as well as Federal and Cantonal politicians and the representatives of the
international community, the Sarajevo Conference in February 1998 made the participants agree
that Sarajevo should be the model city in terms of the levels of return, multiethnicity and
tolerance. The purpose of the Declaration was twofold; Sarajevo’s multiethnic character was to
be revived and Sarajevo should serve as a showcase for the rest of the country. The general idea
was that if it cannot be done in Sarajevo, it will not be possible to achieve this goal in the rest of
Bosnia and Herzegovina either. The Declaration’s general principles stated that Sarajevo should
be a truly multiethnic Canton. All pre-war residents should be given the opportunity to return to
their homes in accordance with Annex 7 of the DPA. By signing the Sarajevo Declaration, the
local and Federal authorities committed themselves to enable conditions for safe return of ‘at
least 20,000 minority pre-war residents’ before the end of the year 1998, as proof of their
‘determination to act as a model for reconciliation, multiethnicity, freedom of movement and the
unconditional right to return throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (OHR 1998a). The
Declaration was intended to provide progress in several policy fields (legislative, housing,
education, employment and public order and security issues) in order to facilitate better
conditions for return. The implementation of the provisions of the document was to be carried
out by a Sarajevo Return Commission (SRC), appointed by the High Representative. It is agreed
Legally, Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs cannot be a minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina because they are all
constituent peoples of this country. In this paper the term ‘minority’ will be used for non-Bosniacs in Sarajevo
Canton in which others than Bosniacs are a considered a minority because Sarajevo is overwhelmingly Bosniac.
12
41
that the SRC is to supervise the work of the three sub-committees: the Employment and Return
Committee, the Education Working Group and the Sarajevo Housing Committee (OHR 1998a).
One year later, Sarajevo Declaration was officially declared to be a failure; the main goal of at
least 20,000 minority returns had not been reached and the failures were generally assigned to the
local authorities. The International Crisis Group (ICG) for example blames the failure of realizing
the ‘year of return’ on the Sarajevo (SDA) authorities and officials and their ‘stalling,
incompetence and general lack of will’ (ICG 1998b:I). The political elite in the capital city on the
other hand blamed the failure of the implementation of the Declaration on the lack of housing
space and the shortage of funds provided by the international community.13 Either way, the
Declaration’s key benchmarks were not met and the biggest post-Dayton effort to revive
Sarajevo’s multiethnic and tolerant character was far from not achieved. In the remainder of this
chapter I will evaluate the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration by taking a more detailed
look at the refugee return and education policies of the Sarajevo Canton. These two policy fields
have been chosen because return policy can easily fail due to structural factors (for example the
will of the people to return); its success does thus not only depend on the efforts of the ruling
parties. Education policy on the other hand heavily depends on the interests of the authorities. It
will thus be interesting to compare the two policy areas with regard to possible structural and
agency factors which might hinder its implementation. Moreover, the implementation of these
two policy fields proved to be the most problematic according to the OHR (1998b:1), so it is
interesting to take a look at what caused these problems.
I will outline the key provisions of the Declaration with regard to return and education issues. I
will also in turn discuss the implementation process concerning the two policy areas. The
emphasis will thereby be on the efforts of the (local) political elite(s); have they done enough to
put the Declaration into practice or did they (directly or indirectly) obstruct the implementation?
3.3
Return and educational issues and their implementation
3.3.1 Return issues
As shown in the previous chapter, the demographic structure in Sarajevo Canton has changed
significantly since the last Yugoslav census in 1991. Large numbers of internally displaced
persons from rural parts of the country have moved to Sarajevo and many educated Sarajevans
13
Interview by the author with former Minister for Refugees, Besima Boric-Maric (SDP), Sarajevo, 11 April 2007.
42
left the city during or after the war. Serbs are disproportionally represented in the population
which has left the city, while the share of Bosniacs in the population which have moved in the
city is disproportionally large (World Bank 2001). In the first two years after the signing of the
DPA, return to Sarajevo Canton has consisted mainly of Bosniacs (89,2%), while the number of
minority returns remained low; some 1,888 (5,9%) Croats, 1,343 (4,2%) Serbs and 240 (0,7%)
Others returned to Sarajevo in the period of January 1997 until July 1998 (ICG 1998b:5). Even
though more minorities returned to Sarajevo Canton than anywhere else in the country, this was
by far not enough to restore the city’s pre-war ethnic make-up as displaced persons of Bosniac
ethnic background were overrepresented in the numbers. Aside from the post-Dayton territorial
and administrative division of the country which caused unwillingness to return, a lot of potential
returnees faced a lot of problems when they wanted to return to their pre-war homes. Before the
Sarajevo Declaration was initiated there existed some serious obstacles to return. There was lack
of available housing, mainly due to multiple occupancy issues which generally remained unsolved.
Shamefully enough, some authorities benefited from this as well; there have been reports of
many cases in which government officials were occupying other people’s property (ICG 1998a:4).
Furthermore, minorities were confronted with at times extremely rigid legislature when they
wanted to regain their property rights. According to ICG, legislation for socially-owned property
generally favored temporary occupants (mainly Bosniacs) over original owners (1998a:6). The
OHR repeatedly called for urgent amending of the articles in question in order to bring them in
accordance with DPA Annex 7, but at the time of the Sarajevo Conference in 1998, no
agreement was reached. Some action in order to increase the return of minorities to Bosnia’s
capital city was necessary. On February 3, 1998 the Sarajevo Declaration was initiated.
The most important issues to be tackled in order to facilitate actual return of non-Bosniacs to
Sarajevo were legislative issues with regard to housing and property rights and housing issues
themselves. The provisions of the Sarajevo Declaration were directed at the amending of
discriminative laws concerning housing and property rights. FBiH legislation continued to block
returns (including those to Sarajevo) and had to be replaced by non-discriminatory laws and
regulations. The Sarajevo Declaration called for implementation of three laws: The Law on the
Cessation of the Application of the Law on Temporary Abandoned Real Property Owned by
Citizens, The Law on Taking over the Law on Housing Relations and The Law on the Cessation
of the Application of the Law on Abandoned Apartments. These laws had to be finally adopted
by February 17, 1998 otherwise non-compliance measures would be imposed. The Declaration
furthermore obliged authorities to make the potential returnees and the citizens in general aware
43
of the new legislation and ensure that they know that they can apply without the risk of
discrimination. Sarajevo Canton authorities had to make sure that the returnees would obtain the
necessary documentation within one week of registration. With regard to housing issues, Sarajevo
Declaration called for the establishment of the Sarajevo Housing Committee (SHC) whose
members had the task of bringing the decisions of the applications for the socially-owned
apartments in the city in compliance with Annex 7 of the DPA. Sarajevo Canton authorities were
to provide SHC with information on cases of multiple occupancy. Cantonal authorities were to
promote return to privately owned housing in the city as well. Finally, the international
community was to intensify its efforts to raising funds for reconstruction of unoccupied
apartments in Sarajevo Canton.
3.3.2 Implementation of Sarajevo Declaration return provisions
Table 3.1: Registered returns to Sarajevo Canton (01. 01.1998. – 31. 12. 2006.)
Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
TOTAL
Bosniacs
Croats
8,435
5,296
2,931
3,789
3,619
7,658
4,029
1,706
1,386
38,848
Serbs
2,947
1,626
1,478
1,987
1,760
918
227
154
230
11,328
Others
3,562
4,144
7,491
17,949
24,493
13,149
2,182
1,248
633
74,851
TOTAL
486
492
426
713
813
349
93
10
32
3,414
15,430
11,558
12,326
24,438
30,685
22,073
6,531
3,116
2,282
128,441
SOURCE: Sector for Return of the Ministry for Refugees and Displaced Persons, Registered returns to Sarajevo Canton (01. 01.1998. – 31. 12.
2006.)
The table above outlines the return to Sarajevo Canton from 1998 (the year in which the Sarajevo
Declaration was signed) until 2006, according to ethnic backgrounds of the returnees. The peak
was reached in the years 2001 – 2003, when a total of more than 77,000 people returned to
Sarajevo Canton, which means that 60 percent of all returns was achieved in these three years. In
the first two years, the share of Serbs returnees in the total number was rather low, but increased
explosively after 2000. At the end of 2006 it is evident that the number of non-Bosniac returnees
was rather high; as much as 70 percent of all returnees in these eight years belonged to a minority
group. Most minority returnees to Sarajevo were Serbs (58,3%), followed by Croats (8,8%) and
Others (2,7%).
The figures however also show that the provision of the Sarajevo Declaration on 20,000 minority
returns by the end of 1998 was not implemented on time; at the end of the year, Sarajevo Canton
44
managed to return only 6,995 non-Bosniac pre-war residents. In 1999 6,626 Serbs, Croats and
Others returned to the Canton – this means that target was still not met. Next, I will outline the
implementation of the Declaration during the ruling periods of three government coalitions
(1998 -2000, 2000-2002 and 2002-2006). At some point, the Sarajevo Declaration was declared
implemented as 20,000 minority returns were achieved. The OHR and the cantonal and federal
authorities however kept return high on their agendas (at least rhetorically) in order to achieve the
higher goal of Sarajevo as a multiethnic and tolerant capital of the country.
1998 – 2000: Obstruction and inertia
In the two years after the Sarajevo Return Conference, the implementation process was marked
by a lack of political will which has resulted in a failure to realize the return of 20,000 nonBosniacs to Sarajevo. During these two years, the OHR has repeatedly expressed its concerns
about the commitment of the ruling SDA politicians as numerous deadlines for new property
legislation had been missed and once they were adopted they were not carried out properly. In
the beginning, the emphasis was on amending discriminatory property laws as to give pre-war
owners a proper chance to reclaim their property. Solving multiple occupancy was also one of the
top priorities, just as the resolving of a number of special cases which were of concern to the
UNHCR. In 1998 the OHR released a number of Implementation Reviews which were
repetitively highly critical of the implementation of Declarations’ provisions regarding return.
According to OHR, progress in some other areas was frequently overshadowed by a lack of
progress in the fields of housing and return (OHR 1998d).
•
Property legislation: The Sarajevo Declaration had set the date for the adoption of
amendments on property legislation on February 17; this deadline was missed. The Laws
have eventually been adopted, but soon after it became evident that a number of
problems occurred with regard to their implementation (OHR 1998c, ICG1998b). For
returnees, troubles already started when they wanted to apply to return; it took the
cantonal authorities several months to finalize the forms and instructions for filling in
claims, so these were not available in the first months after the signing of the Declaration.
Furthermore, cantonal and municipal authorities asked for unnecessary documents and
fees before the claims were accepted. When the claims were filed, the authorities had a 30
day period to reach a decision – a deadline which was not met very often. Few decisions
were made on time. There were also incidents of cases in which the pre-war occupancy
holder and the temporary occupant of an apartment were summoned to appear in court
45
together; a practice which is seen as very intimidating and unnecessary. The OHR has
called for an immediate halt to these needless hearings.
•
Multiple occupancy: Double or multiple occupancy was seen as one of the most
important obstacles to return. Many families who lived in one settlement before the war
now illegally occupied additional housing. Sarajevo authorities have according to the
OHR failed to address the issues with regard to multiple occupancy in an effective way.
Many cases of multiple occupancy remained undiscovered and the authorities failed to
implement the necessary evictions with regard to alleged cases. In December 1998, the
OHR reported that less than 150 occupancy cases have been resolved since the signing of
the Sarajevo Declaration in February, while the target was 500 (OHR 1998d).
•
Specific case return: In the first few months after the signing of the Declaration, a very
limited number of UNHCR priority cases and Jewish community cases were resolved. In
December 1998, OHR stated that the number of unresolved cases was significantly lower
than in the spring, but was disappointed that not all specific return cases were dealt with
at the end of 1998 (OHR 1998d).
Following the failure to meet the 20,000 minority returnees target at the end of 1998, combined
with the lack of progress in some key fields as outlined above, the OHR stated that these failures
will most likely have an impact on international assistance for Sarajevo in the upcoming year. The
OHR started threatening with sanctions for non-compliance, as was agreed upon in the Sarajevo
Declaration. The UNHCR was also highly critical of the obstructionism of the cantonal and
municipal authorities during the first post-Declaration year. An UNHCR official stated that the
lack of political will and the political structure at the time were the most important factors the
20,000 target was not met14.
Sarajevo authorities on the other hand reacted defensively when confronted with the results of
the implementation. The most important defender of the efforts of Sarajevo Canton officials to
implement the Declaration has been Mirza Hajric, the President of the Sarajevo Declaration
Executive Board. When the OHR threatened to freeze the financial assistance to Sarajevo Canton
he was the first one to point out that this would be an action directed against refugee return
(OHR BHTV 1998). Hajric was furthermore very critical of the role of the OHR in
implementing the Declaration. He frequently pointed to the fact that Sarajevo was doing its part,
but that the authorities in RS were not implementing the Declarations of their responsibility and
14
Interview by the author with Liv Feijen, Head of Protection Unit, UNHCR, Sarajevo, 13 April 2007
46
that this is harming the two-way return. Hajric also stressed that it was unfair from the side of the
OHR to pressure Sarajevo authorities to implement the Sarajevo Declaration provisions while the
OHR was not doing enough to pressure other cantons and municipalities to implement the
necessary legislation (OHR RTRS 1999).
2000 – 2002: Alliance for Change and the famous Peak
In the 2000 elections non-nationalist parties managed to secure victory. SDP and SBiH, joined in
an Alliance for Change, received enough votes to form coalition governments on federal and
cantonal levels. Even though the Sarajevo Declaration was at some point declared implemented
(when the 20,000 minority returnees target was reached), the SDP in Sarajevo Canton was
determined to speed up the return process even further15. Their idea was that minority return
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina will have a moderating impact on the nationalist politics in
the country. It is not entirely clear whether the peak reached in 2001 and the two years after can
be completely assigned to efforts of the Alliance of Change or that this was the result of the
previous government’s policy, but it is evident that the process of returns rapidly accelerated,
especially when it comes to minority return.
On 18 May 2001, the SDP Minister for Refugees and Displaced Persons, Besima Boric-Maric
announced an ‘ambitious plan of the Alliance for Change for return of displaced persons and
returnees (…) the Government and the Ministries are engaged in an effort to return 7,000
families by the end of this year’ (Boric-Maric 2001). Furthermore, the Alliance introduced a new
approach towards return; the plan was to tighten direct cooperation with municipalities in RS as
to increase two-way return. When asked about the results of this cooperation, former Minister
Boric-Maric responded very disappointed: ‘Return of property went much faster in FBiH cantons
and municipalities than in RS which caused a huge imbalance. Bosniacs could not return to their
properties in RS’16. Boric-Maric was furthermore very critical of the role of the international
community, notably the OHR and RRTF17 at the time. She points to the fact that the Ministry for
Refugees and Displaced Persons, as well as the Ministry for Housing were repeatedly and severely
pressured by the two institutions to implement the property legislation in the shortest possible
period. The cantonal and municipal authorities had to carry out many evictions at that time. As a
result, they were forced to come up with creative solutions to prevent evicted families (mostly
Bosniacs) of ending up on the street, as they were on the other hand pressured by oppositional
Interview by the author with former Minister for Refugees, Besima Boric-Maric (SDP), Sarajevo 11 April 2007
Idem.
17 RRTF – Return and Reconstruction Task Force, OHR body.
15
16
47
SDA which threatened to use this potential housing chaos against the Alliance during the next
electoral campaign.
Nevertheless, the return figures for 2000-2002 looked very promising, especially the share of
non-Bosniacs in the amount of returnees to Sarajevo Canton. The international community in
Bosnia and Herzegovina had little to complain about when it comes to Sarajevo and could
proudly report to the rest of the world that it has managed to reach some important return
milestones in this period. There is a catch, however. The return figures and the ‘peak’ reached at
the time of the Alliance is not entirely what it seems as it contains large numbers of so-called
‘fictive returns’. It turned out that many pre-war Sarajevans registered as returnees in Sarajevo
Canton, privatized their socially-owned homes and – sold them. This practice was mostly
widespread among minorities; at that time, Serbs and Croats were massively selling their
apartments to Bosniac refugees who did not want to return to their properties in RS. Another
widespread practice at the time was applying for reconstruction assistance and then not returning,
selling the property or using it as a holiday home (ICG 2002:11). There were also examples of
minorities returning to Sarajevo and regaining their pre-war property, but finding themselves
leaving again as Sarajevo was ‘not what if used to be before the war’. Verifying these ‘fictive
returns’ is a costly and timely practice, so figures on this matter are largely unavailable and the
perpetrators are usually not evicted. Aside from the fact that these ‘fictive returns’ show the
unwillingness of people to return, the indifference of the OHR towards this problem is probably
even more worrying. Former Minister for Refugees and Displaced Persons, Hajrudin Ibrahimovic
(SBiH) expressed his concern about the role of the OHR and OSCE in the process of
repossession of property as they were according to him exclusively concerned that the relevant
legislation was implemented and less so with the actual (as opposite to fictive) returns18.
2002 – 2006: Staggering returns: chapter closed?
After 2003 returns to Sarajevo started declining and reached a low point in 2006 with 2,282 to the
Canton. A decade after the end of the war and the signing of the DPA including Annex 7 which
states that everybody has the right to return to their pre-war homes, some 300,000 people
continue to live in displacement. This raises questions about the limits of return (Toal 2004),
including the fact that people do not want to return.
18
Interview by the author with former Minister for Refugees, Hajrudin Ibrahimovic (SBiH), Sarajevo, 13 April 2007
48
That return is no longer a priority becomes evident through the fact that the international
(humanitarian) organizations are increasingly cutting on donations for reconstruction of property.
Edin Durakovic (SDA), the head of the Sector for Return of the Ministry for Refugees and
Displaced Persons argued that even though much return has been finalized, many displaced
persons keep living in alternative accommodation and that there is no funding available to solve
the temporality of their settlements. Durakovic pointed out that if there would be enough
resources, the job would be finished by 2010, but because the international community has
shifted its priorities it remains to be seen when the problem of the displaced persons will be
solved19.
3.3.3
Educational issues
While the implementation of the return provisions of the Declaration meant a lot for the direct
return of minorities, tackling the issues with regard to employment, security and educational
discrimination is essential for sustainable return. During the war each of the three ethnic groups
had adopted their own curriculum; pupils in RS were educated from Serbian textbooks, while
schools in Croat parts of the country took over Croatian books. Little had changed after the war;
children in Bosnia and Herzegovina were still educated in three supposedly different languages
(either Bosnian, Croat or Serb), Serb textbooks referred to Serbia as ‘our country’, while pupils in
Croat parts of the country learned that Bosnia and Herzegovina is ‘a foreign country, like Serbia
or Montenegro’ (Low-Beer 2001). As no single, non-ethnic curriculum is accepted by the three
ethnic groups, many potential minority returnees feared that their children would not be able to
be taught on their own culture and in their own language (ICG 1998a:17). On the other hand
however, the demand for separate curricula brings the risk of segregation. How is Sarajevo to reestablish its tolerant and multiethnic status if its next generation(s) of citizens are divided along
ethnic lines? This and other issues with regard to education were hoped to be solved by the
implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration.
The participants of the Sarajevo Conference agreed that education is one of the essential
elements for sustainable return of (minority) refugees and displaced persons to the city. They
furthermore argued that ‘the education system must ensure that all children are educated in a
manner that promotes tolerance and stability between people of different ethnic groups and
fosters understanding and reconciliation’ (OHR 1998a:3). Education in Sarajevo was to serve as a
model for the rest of the country. It was agreed that Sarajevo cantonal and city authorities were
Interview by the author with Edin Durakovic, Head of the Sector for Return of the Ministry for Refugees and
Displaced Persons of Sarajevo Canton, Sarajevo, 10 April 2007
19
49
to work together with Federation Ministry of Education to achieve this goal. Sarajevo
Declaration also called for the establishment of a multi-ethnic Education Working Group which
had to create a non-discriminatory education program and environment by the beginning of the
next school year in September 1998. The Working Group was charged with the implementation
of four points which would contribute to the goal of making education in Sarajevo an example
for the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first point was textbook review; the Education
Working Group had to ensure that textbooks used in the Sarajevo Canton contained no
discriminatory content. Secondly, the Group had the task to ensure that the education sector had
enough resources to provide education in an acceptable manner. The third point had to do with
democratization; the initiators of the Sarajevo Declaration agreed that children had to be
educated in a way that will foster tolerance and multi-ethnicity. Fourthly, the Education Working
Group had to track down discriminatory mechanisms in the educational system and find ways to
eliminate them.
3.3.4 Implementation of Sarajevo Declaration education provisions
Initially, the implementation process of the Sarajevo Declaration provisions regarding education
was one of the most successful ones. The OHR was extremely satisfied with the progress made
by the Education Working Group (EWG), established by the Sarajevo Canton authorities. The
Group consisted of four subgroups: subgroup on textbooks, subgroup on resources, subgroup
on democratization projects (to teach children about democracy and tolerance) and subgroup on
discrimination. The four subgroups started working devotionally on their projects. The subgroup
on textbooks decided that if would not be a good idea to withdraw books with offensive material
physically as this would leave teachers without teaching material and there were not enough
resources to buy new books before the beginning of the next school year. It was decided to black
out offensive passages and to re-write history of the recent war by an OHR-appointed expert by
the end of July 1998. The subgroup on democratization projects sent out invitations to 94
schools to come up with projects which will foster multiethnicity and tolerance in schools in
Sarajevo Canton. The subgroup received many ideas, but funding of these projects remained
problematic. The subgroup on discrimination initially had several problems with streamlining
competencies of FBiH on the one hand and cantonal competencies on the other. The members
of the subgroup visited schools in order to identify possible patterns of discrimination and to
find ways to eliminate them. The subgroup found the schools and teachers willing to cooperate.
50
In October 1998, a month after the nationalist parties re-ensured their victory in general
elections, the EWG and the Sarajevo Declaration itself received a major blow when the
preliminary decisions of the textbook subgroup in cooperation with UNESCO were leaked to the
press. This lead to an outright media hype. Newspapers complained about the involvement of the
international community in the educational reforms in the country and accused them of ‘seeking
to take away Bosnia’s history, teach children lies, and prepare the ground for further genocide’
(Low-Beer 2001:3). The international community was blamed for denying the facts of the recent
war because it called for the replacement of the word ‘crime’ with the word ‘mistake’. Dr. Hanka
Vajzovic, the author of one of the books which was according to the EWG in need of revision
told Sarajevo weekly Dani that ‘The crucial issue here is that Foreigners want to learn us to forget.
Crucial is also that we don’t want to do such a thing’ (Curak 1998). As a consequence, the
cantonal Government argued that the EWG has no legal standing and that their advices and
decisions will therefore not be followed. The OHR was appalled by this decision of the Sarajevo
Canton as they argued that their act undermined the validity of the Sarajevo Declaration itself as
the Declaration was signed by the authorities themselves and the EWG was established by
agreement with the Minister of Education (OHR 1998d). This act was to have major
consequences for textbook review in the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina and for educational and
curriculum reform in general.
In early 1999 another attempt was made at reviewing textbooks and removing offensive passages
from teaching materials. As a result of pressure from various international bodies (OHR,
UNESCO, UNICEF, Council of Europe) a coordinating educational group was established
which was to initiate educational reforms throughout the entire country. The implementation of
the provisions of this group started very slowly as there was much resistance from local
authorities, schools and teachers who kept blaming the international bodies for trying to make
them lie or forget about the past (Low-Beer 2001:4). Textbook review was evidently still a
sensitive issue with serious political stakes. Local Ministries of Education kept clinging to their
powers in the field of education and emphasized their autonomy and their right to fill in the
‘national subjects’ (history, language and literature, geography, nature and society, fine arts and
music) according to their standards in order to protect the legitimate rights of their ethnic group.
From 2002 onwards the educational reform is in the hands of the OSCE and was in fact rather
successful since. In 2003 all pupils in primary and secondary schools throughout Bosnia and
Herzegovina will study the same core curriculum (non-national subjects, that is) for the first time
51
since the end of the war. Biljana Radonjic from the think-tank Civilitas Research argued that this
was a significant step forward given the persistent nationalist obstruction to the formation of an
integrated curriculum (2003). The OSCE and the local and federal authorities have yet a lot of
work to do. In 2006 Sarajevo Canton Ministry of Education released a document on the progress
made in the field of educational reform stating that ‘(…) reform is a process, however we could
have moved a lot faster if there was no constant obstruction of and resistance to every decision
that has to be made on the national level’ and ‘a large number of documents have been signed,
but the provisions are generally not carried out in practice’ (MONKS 2006).
To summarize, some progress has been made lately with regard to educational issues, however
there are still eleven different education systems in the country; educational content varies from
canton to canton and RS has an education system of its own as well. Since DPA there has been a
failure to create a common system of education and the high level of autonomy in deciding
educational content in ‘national’ subject gives local authorities an opportunity to teach children in
a nationalist-like manner. Even though attempts have been made (such as the Sarajevo
Declaration) to eliminate or to reduce the danger of the next generation being brought up in an
intolerant way, the fact that there is no overarching education system leaves a window open for
tendencies of local nationalist authorities. This way local, national and international political elites
are able to keep blaming one another of the failure of various initiatives as it is not clear who is
responsible for which part of the educational sector. This back-and-forth blaming has become
evident in different forms over the course of post-Dayton years as discussed above; cantonal and
federal governments vs. international bodies, cantonal authorities vs. national authorities – the
post-war education systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been marked by good rhetoric in
combination with bad implementation and a shifting of responsibility instead of real progress.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have evaluated the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration in an attempt to
expose possible obstructionism from the side of political elites. It is clear that there has been
obstructionism from the side of local political elites. Local authorities frequently clashed with
national and international ones at the time of the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration and
during its aftermath. A distinction should however be made between ruling coalitions; it is
evident that there is a difference between nationalist and non-nationalist government coalitions in
their approach to return and educational issues. At the time of the Alliance for Change, higher
52
return figures were achieved and more progress was made with regard to educational issues. This
type of improvement however cannot last long because these two fields are extremely sensitive
for symbolic politics from the side of nationalist parties. With the help of the media nationalist
political elites can relatively easily achieve electoral success by appealing to the feelings of
insecurity of the three ethnic groups in the country. Fear of marginalization is widespread in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and as a consequence, the strategy of the nationalist parties works.
The initiative put forward during the 1998 Sarajevo Conference ended up as one of many other
euphoric and revolutionary documents in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina –
unimplemented. This raises doubts about the intentions of the political elites. Were they honestly
willing to devote their efforts to making Sarajevo a multiethnic and tolerant place again but could
not achieve this because of structural constraints or was the tolerant-and-multiethnic-Sarajevodiscourse only an empty promise and were the politicians more than ready to hinder its
implementation? Put differently, which factors are to be blamed for the failure of the Sarajevo
Declaration in particular and the identity shift of the city in general; structural or agency-related
ones? In the next chapter I will reflect upon matters discussed in the two preceding chapters and
engage in an attempt to answer this question.
53
CHAPTER 4
Who or what is guilty? Sarajevo and the structure – agency debate
4.1
Introduction
The Spirit of Sarajevo has been murdered, wounded or has just (temporarily) disappeared; either
way – something has deeply changed in the city. Nationalism and particularistic identities have
been normalized in Sarajevo since the end of the war and have to a great extent replaced the
city’s tolerant and cosmopolitan traditions. Who or what is to blame for this shift in Sarajevo’s
identity? In the first chapter I have argued following Kaldor, that hate and fear are not everyday
or normal phenomena in Bosnia and Herzegovina or Sarajevo, but rather that they are constructed
and mobilized for interests of (nationalist) politicians. I have also argued that this mobilization of
fear of others (for example members of other ethnic groups) and consequently mobilization of
nationalism are not possible without certain structural factors which political elites (mis)use in
order to mobilize nationalism.
The aim of this thesis is to investigate which mechanisms have contributed to the disappearance
or the weakening of the Sarajevo Spirit of multiethnicity, cosmopolitanism and tolerance. My
hypothesis is that a complex interplay between structural factors and interests of political actors is
responsible for the shift in Sarajevo’s character. I have argued that in this interplay structural
factors offer resources and motivation necessary for mobilization of the masses. Hereafter,
political elites can maximize their interests by successfully mobilizing the masses for nationalist
ends. This is how I expect Sarajevo’s identity has changed: structural factors have offered
motivations and resources which politicians have consequently used for achieving nationalist
goals and thereby (implicitly) eliminating the longstanding tradition of cosmopolitanism and
tolerance in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capital city. In this chapter I will test this hypothesis in
order to see to which extent it is correct for the case of Sarajevo. I will firstly outline the
structural and agency-related factors which have contributed to the alteration of Sarajevo’s
character. Secondly I will discuss these factors with regard to their relationship to one another
and lastly I will conclude this chapter by determining whether my hypothesis was accurate.
4.2
Structural factors
54
Sarajevo has been an intersection of religions, cultures and ethnic groups from the very
beginning. For centuries, the capital city of what is now Bosnia and Herzegovina has been the
example of multiethnicity, a place where people with different religious, ethnic and cultural
backgrounds peacefully coexisted and in fact existed together. During Ottoman and Habsburg rules
as well as at the time of the Yugoslav federations, various religious and/or ethnic groups of
Bosnia and Herzegovina were recognized as such and the country’s diversity was taken into
account with regard to politics and public administration. The same is true for post-war Bosnia
and Herzegovina, but in this case, the DPA constitution has rigidly divided the country along
ethnic lines, territorially, administratively and as a consequence also socially.
4.2.1 The war and the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA)
Though the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a major blow for Sarajevo’s tradition of
cosmopolitanism and multiethnicity, the DPA has normalized ethnic cleavages by freezing them
and making them prevail in the daily lives of Sarajevans. The mobilization of fear, hate and
nationalism during the war in and the siege of Sarajevo may have alienated members of ethnic
groups from one another and jeopardized the common life of Sarajevans, but the DPA, which
made an end to the war in 1995 has to some extent frozen this fear, hate and nationalism. The
war can be thus seen as one of the structural factors which have contributed to the loss of
Sarajevo’s multiethnic character. The structure of the DPA is however to a large extent
responsible for the continuation of this phenomenon by overemphasizing and normalizing ethnic
division of the country and by leaving no room for other identities and loyalties except for the
ones in the B-C-S triad. This emphasis on particularistic identities and the denying of an
overarching loyalty inevitably makes the reconciliation process extremely difficult and obstructs
the recovery of Sarajevo’s tolerance and multiethnicity. The DPA is thus (one of) the major
structural factors which have lead to the change in Sarajevo’s character. As discussed in chapter
two, the DPA structures have to a certain extent caused the demographic changes in Sarajevo
which have resulted in Sarajevo shifting from a truly multiethnic city to an almost exclusively
Bosniac city. Because of the construction DPA, which only recognizes Bosniacs, Croat and Serbs
(along with ‘Others’) as the constituent peoples of the country, little space is left for citizen’s
initiatives and even discourages them, leaving politics to the ethnic political elites. Furthermore,
the territorial and administrative division of the country, as agreed upon in the DPA makes the
central government extremely weak compared to entity and cantonal governments. This has
made local elites very powerful and has given them the opportunity to act for the benefit of their
particular interests, instead of the interests of the entire country. It has moreover given local
55
politicians the opportunity to blame the other entity or other cantons if something fails to
materialize.
4.2.2 Structural limits of the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration
With regard to the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration provisions on return and
education there are also some structural factors which have to be taken into consideration when
explaining the failure of its implementation. The implementation of the Declaration provisions
on return were hampered by several limits to the process of refugee return which are to be seen
as structural. On the one hand there are structural limits which have to do with the structure of
the DPA. Many people did not want to return to Sarajevo because the city has mainly been ruled
by Bosniac coalition governments since the end of the war because the territory of pre-war
Sarajevo has been assigned to FBiH. This has discouraged Serbs from returning as they would in
that case become a minority in their pre-war homes. Consequently, many potential minority
returnees did not want to return because of how they would be treated in the places of return;
will they be able to get a job, will they children be properly educated, will they be discriminated
against? On the other hand, there were also structural problems which hindered return which are
unrelated to the DPA. Some people simply did not want to return for other reasons than the
DPA; for example because they had built a better life elsewhere. In a lot of cases there was
simply no reconstruction assistance which would enable more return. The Sarajevo Canton has
often complained that if there were enough financial resources, the ‘job’ would have been
finished until 2010, but that this is an impossible goal now as many humanitarian agencies
stopped investing in return in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though this specific argument
might be just rhetorical, wanting to divert attention from the unsuccessful implementation of the
Sarajevo Declaration, it is highly possible that it is true to some extent.
4.3
Agency-related factors
It can be argued that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been caused by nationalist
propaganda from the side of nationalist political elites, and some scholars in fact argue in favor of
this instrumentalist argument (see for example Snyder 2000). The scope of this thesis does
however not allow me to discuss this matter sufficiently and I will therefore merely take post-war
agency-related factors into account.
56
4.3.1 Agency and return issues
Post-Dayton elections have been very successful for nationalist political parties. By emphasizing
the ‘vital national interest’ of their respective group, nationalist politicians have managed to win
election after election (with exception of the 2000 elections), leaving little room for parties which
do not stress the importance of ethnicity. Nationalist politicians can repeatedly get a big
proportion of the electorate behind them by appealing to fear and hate of other ethnic groups. By
appealing to the particularistic, ethnic identities of the electorate, by framing every political issue
in nationalist terms and by using hate-speech, the political elites however limit the possibility of
rebuilding Sarajevo’s tolerant and cosmopolitan character. But in the end – this might be their
goal after all. It can be argued that political actors have deliberately been creating an atmosphere
hostile to return in Sarajevo as well as in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By keeping
Sarajevo Bosniac and by keeping the atmosphere polarized, SDA politicians were to some extent
ensured of electoral victory. Consequently, it can be argued that the implementation of the
Sarajevo Declaration has generally failed agency-wise because the political elite had no interest in
encouraging returns. They did not want to expel Bosniac refugees from pre-war residents’ homes
because this act would cost them precious votes. This attitude has led to a variety of (sometimes
creative) mechanisms of obstruction of the return and educational provisions of the Declaration.
Firstly, the cantonal politicians were extremely slow with the adoption of property legislation.
Once the legislation was adopted or amended, the new laws were often not implemented
correctly and sometimes not implemented at all. Secondly, multiple occupancy issues were solved
with a lot of delay. Local politicians were reluctant to throw Bosniac refugees onto the streets in
order to make place for minority returnees. There was also the problem of blaming each other
when return figures were dissatisfying. Cantonal authorities started pointing fingers at the RS
when the OHR confronted them with the low number of returns using the ‘you-go-first’-rhetoric:
‘why should I let their people to return if my people cannot go back to their pre-war homes either’
(ICG 1999:6). The RS and HDZ on the other hand saw the low return rates to Sarajevo as a sign
of bad faith. Overall, pointing fingers has become an effective mechanism for prolonging
deadlock and inactivity with regard to the returns process. When the Alliance came to power
things somehow started to move faster; there was more willingness to implement the necessary
legislation and to encourage return. The cantonal Ministry for Refugees carried out an ‘ambitious
plan’ for return which held that there needs to be cooperation with the ‘other entity’ (meaning
RS) in order to achieve a higher return rate (Boric-Maric 2001). The problem with this ‘human
rights hero’-attitude, like the SDP’s one during their rule, is that it is unlikely that someone with
that kind of intentions will be in power for long. The opposition (mainly SDA) kept campaigning
57
against the SDP’s return policies arguing that they forced Bosniac refugees to leave their
temporary settlements without adequately providing alternative accommodation. By appealing to
feelings of fear of marginalization of their constituent peoples, nationalist parties have once again
managed to secure electoral victory in 2002.
4.3.2 Agency and educational issues
Sarajevo authorities were initially cooperating effectively with international bodies in order to
establish the Education Working Group (EWG) and the subgroups. Textbook review however
proved to be a major obstacle. The international community was blamed for wanting to deny the
past and teach the children lies. The EWG was abolished and textbook review postponed. Later
on, UNESCO decided to give review another try, but the implementation of the agreements met
a lot of resistance from local authorities and teachers. Cantonal authorities still kept emphasizing
their autonomy in deciding on educational issues. Political elites used the textbook issue to
emphasize the importance of teaching children in a separate way, the need for the pupils to learn
about ‘their’ history and ‘their’ culture and most preferably in ‘their’ language. This reveals the
heavily symbolic and political side of education as well as the importance of emphasizing identity
through education, as ‘the humble school textbook turns out to be the practical daily
manifestation of big political issues, [t]he very language and alphabet in which the book is to be
written carries a weight of political and social implication’ (Low-Beer 2001:2). Children of the
next generations are thus repetitively used as pawns in a (to a large extent symbolic) struggle for
more autonomy, more division and more intolerance. This struggle inevitably leads to more hate
and fear of non-members of a group and consequently to more power of the heroic nationalist
political elites who promise to ‘protect the vital national interests’ of their ethnic groups.
4.4
Discussion
I have outlined structural and agency-related factors which have contributed to the shift of
Sarajevo’s character from multiethnic and tolerant to almost ethnically homogeneous and largely
intolerant towards other ethnic groups. The main structural factors is firstly the war in the city
which has led to an emphasis of the division of the population in three ethnic groups and to the
alienation of these groups towards one another. Secondly, the DPA has normalized this division,
made it prevail in daily lives of Sarajevans and left no room for (the development of) other,
overarching loyalties. With regard to the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration, return of
refugees and education reform has been made extremely difficult by the territorial and
58
administrative division of the country, as agreed upon in the DPA. There were furthermore other
structural factors at play, such as the unwillingness of people to return and a lack of resources
which have held back the implementation of the Declaration. The main agency-related factor
which has lead to a shift in Sarajevo’s identity is the rhetoric and the actions of nationalist
political elites. By mobilizing fear of marginalization and hate of other ethnic groups and by
stating the importance of protecting the ‘vital national interest’ of their group the nationalist
politicians repeatedly manage to attract support of their respective electorates. With regard the
Sarajevo Declaration, political actors have to a large extent obstructed its implementation by
using a range of arguments to justify the continuing ethnic homogeneity of Sarajevo.
4.4.1 Structuration theory: a reminder
Structural and agency-related factors have by no means operated independently of one another to
achieve a shift in the character of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capital city. A complex interplay of
these mechanisms has resulted in the failure of the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration in
particular and a change of Sarajevo in general. The role of agency is indispensable in constructing
nationalism, but has insufficient power to achieve this goal without structural factors. Structural
factors (the war, the post-war situation as well as the provisions of the DPA: territorial,
administrative and consequently social division of the country) were shaped by political actors
and have since constrained and enabled political agency. Structural and agency-related factors
thus do not exist independently of one another, but shape and constrain one another back and
forth. Structural factors are shaped by political agents and in turn constrain and enable agents by
offering resources and motivation necessary for nationalist mobilization. I will below discuss this
complex interaction between structural and agency-related factors in relation to the case of
Sarajevo.
4.4.2 Sarajevo and the structuration theory
•
The war in Sarajevo and the DPA have as structural factors been shaped by local, national
and international political actors. The war is a result of nationalistic politics of local and
national political actors. The divisions which were the result of the war were codified in
the DPA by local, national and international political elites.
•
The war and the DPA have in turn offered motivations and resources which have
enabled and constrained political elites in mobilizing masses for nationalist ends. The
DPA has influenced political agency in post-war Sarajevo in many ways. Firstly, the DPA
has divided the country territorially and administratively, thereby weakening the central
59
government and giving local authorities a good share of power and autonomy in
important matters. Secondly, the DPA has frozen ethnic boundaries by dividing the
population in three parts, the so-called B-C-S triad. The political system is also equipped
with in-built checks and balances to ensure the equal representation and the protection of
‘vital national interests’ of these three constituent peoples.
•
The two Dayton provisions outlined above have facilitated some political elites with
resources and motivations to pursue their goals and have constrained others in doing the
same. The war has provided nationalist elites with a motivation to pursue nationalist
goals. The DPA structures have furthermore offered resources to achieve these goals.
The emphasis on particularistic identities and the denying of an overarching loyalty in
combination with large decentralization of competencies along ethno-territorial lines has
enabled local nationalists to, by appealing to fear of marginalization of their constituent
peoples, spread nationalism and do away with cosmopolitanism and tolerance. On the
other hand, the combination of these two provisions has constrained non-nationalist
elites in trying to achieve electoral success and holding on to it. It is very difficult to try
and represent a common or general interest in a political system which is created to favor
particularistic interests. It is also difficult to pursue common goals in a country in which
the central government has very few powers and in which the local political elites are
empowered to decide on a large range of matters.
•
The motivations and the resources provided by structural factors such as the war and the
DPA provisions have enabled nationalist politicians to mobilize masses for nationalist
goals and constrained non-nationalist politicians in trying to promote tolerance and nonparticularistic politics. Firstly, as a consequence of the Dayton provisions concerning
territorial and administrative divides of the country, local nationalist political elites can
manage to win electoral support by appealing to fear of marginalization of their ethnic
groups. This has also happened in Sarajevo where nationalist (Bosniac) parties have been
in power since the end of the war with the exception of the period between 2000 and
2002. Secondly, and as a result, nationalist local authorities have thus been able to contain
the status-quo, i.e. they have been able to keep Sarajevo a Bosniac city, promote
particularistic identities and limit tolerance and multiethnicity. Local authorities have, with
the assistance of structural possibilities provided by the DPA, been able to delay and to
obstruct the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration. They managed to come to
power and thus had a great deal of autonomy in deciding on return and educational
issues. They have been able to delay the implementation of property legislation, to hinder
60
the solving of cases of multiple occupancy and to slow down textbook review and
educational reforms. They were furthermore able to divert attention from their failures by
blaming the lack of successes in the implementation process on other levels of control,
like the international bodies, the other entity and/or the other cantons. In return issues,
Sarajevo Canton has pointed fingers to the RS because they were not doing enough to
facilitate returns in order justify the dissatisfying number of returns to Sarajevo
municipalities. Cantonal authorities have also blamed the OHR for not doing enough to
pressure RS to implement the necessary legislation. In educational issues, Sarajevan
politicians made a media hype out of textbook reviews and abolished the Educational
Working Group because the international community was ‘seeking to take away Bosnia’s
history’. When no progress was made in educational reform, cantonal, federal, national
and even international authorities could easily point fingers at each other because the
complex DPA structures have made it largely unclear who is responsible for which
particular issue. As there is a weak central government, lower governments will only look
after their own interests instead of a common one and this danger becomes evident in
educational and return policies.
To summarize, structural factors such as the war and the DPA have been shaped by political
actors. These structures have in turn facilitated motivations and resources which constrain and
enable political agency. Political agents have then, enabled by the structures of the war and the
DPA mobilized the masses for nationalist goals. Nationalist politicians were enabled to win
elections, while non-nationalist parties were constrained. The DPA structures have also enabled
nationalist political agency to obstruct and to delay the implementation of the Sarajevo
Declaration on the one hand and constrained non-nationalist actors in trying to realize progress
concerning return and educational provisions. An interplay of structural and agency-related
factors has thus lead to the failure of implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration in particular
and a disappearance of the ‘Sarajevo Spirit’ in general.
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Conclusion
“What would it be like, one wonders, if the political power in Bosnia and Herzegovina would not
be in the hands of a spectacular combination of criminals, incompetent or crazy persons and war
profiteers – sometimes all rolled into one.” (Aleksandar Hemon in Dani, 19 January 2007)
It proves to be very difficult to answer counterfactual questions; What would it be like if
Bosnia and Herzegovina was not ruled by the people it is ruled by? What would it be like if
there was no Dayton Peace Agreement? Would Sarajevo be a tolerant and cosmopolitan
centre?
Bosnia and Herzegovina and its capital city in the heart of the country have been a
multicultural, multiethnic and multireligious blend for centuries. The territory of what is now
Bosnia and Herzegovina have a long tradition of cosmopolitanism on the one hand and
particularism on the other. This distinction which can paradoxically be present at the same
place been present in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sarajevo since the very beginning. Oddly
enough, (ethnic) diversity can lead to both tolerance and cosmopolitanism and to fear, hate
and particularism. The city of Sarajevo went through both situations numerous times in its
vibrant past. From the celebration of ethnic and religious diversity during Ottoman and
Habsburg rules to calls for independence on the eve of WWI; from bratstvo i jedinstvo
(brotherhood and unity) during Tito’s Yugoslavia to aggressive nationalism and the war in
the 1990s – Sarajevo has experienced it all. But why is it that the period of particularism has
arisen again? And why is there a widespread feeling that it is here to stay? Why do people
have the impression Sarajevo Spirit has disappeared – possibly permanently?
The aim of this thesis was to investigate which mechanisms are to be held responsible for
the shift in Sarajevo’s character: why did the city move from being tolerant, cosmopolitan
and multiethnic to almost exclusively Bosniac, divided and particularistic? My expectation
was that a complex interaction of structural factors and agency are responsible for the
changes in Sarajevo’s identity. I have argued that nationalism is constructed in the run-up to
the war, during the war and its aftermath. The emphasis on the division of Sarajevo and
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the particularistic thinking which has resulted from it, have
damaged Sarajevo’s cosmopolitanism and were thereafter codified in the Dayton Peace
Agreement. The DPA has officially divided the country and the city on different levels and
62
in various aspects. Firstly territorially; Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sarajevo are divided in
two parts: a part of the Bosniac-Croat federation (FBiH) and the Serb part (Republika
Srpska, RS). Secondly, administratively; the DPA has made sure that the three ethnic groups
are equally represented on all three levels. Various checks and balances have been included
in the political system to avoid aggressive nationalism of any kind. Thirdly, the Bosnian
population has been divided in three parts, Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs. There is no
possibility to declare oneself as having a different loyalty without falling into the residual
category of ‘Others’. As a result, the demographic picture of Sarajevo has changed
immensely due to the war and the divisions consolidated by the DPA. As a consequence of
the war and the Dayton provisions, many urban, educated and non-Bosniac people left the
city and Bosniac refugees from rural parts of the country moved in. This has led to a
homogenizing of the city and the reducing of its pre-war multiethnic character. The war and
the DPA have thus as structural factors contributed to the changes in Sarajevo’s character by
emphasizing division and particularistic identities which are largely incompatible with the
city’s tradition of tolerance, cosmopolitanism and multiethnicity. These structural factors
have in turn provided motivation and resources for political agents. The structural factors
such as the war and the structure of the DPA constrain and enable political elites in Sarajevo
and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in achieving their goals. On the one hand, the nonnationalist political parties are constrained by the effects of the war and the post-Dayton
situation. It is difficult to push for common goals in a political system in which the emphasis
is on particularistic interests and the rights of three ethnic groups instead of the population
as a whole. On the other hand, nationalist parties are enabled by Dayton structures and by
the effects of the war in emphasizing the rights and the interests of one of the three
constituent peoples, promoting particularistic politics and achieving mobilization of the
masses for nationalist goals. Like the structuration theory predicts, in the case of Sarajevo the
structural factors thus offer resources and motivation for mobilization and in turn enables or
constrains political agency in achieving their goals, while the structural factors themselves are
also created by political agents.
A similar situation is evident with regard to the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration
in 1998. The Declaration aimed at reviving the multiethnic and tolerant character of the city
of Sarajevo and making it an example for the rest of the country, largely failed to materialize
due to a combination and interaction of structural and agency-related factors. Structural
factors, meaning a combination of the effects of the war, the DPA structure, the
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unwillingness to return and a lack of financial resources have enabled political agency (in this
case the SDA leadership in Sarajevo) in obstructing the implementation of return and
educational provisions of the Sarajevo Declaration. The effects of the war and the structure
of the political system as laid down in the DPA have provided nationalist elites with
motivation and resources to win the elections and remain in power for most of the postDayton period. The territorial and administrative divisions of the Dayton Agreement have
facilitated the local authorities with the possibility to point fingers and blame other levels of
authority for the failure of the implementation. The non-nationalist Alliance for Change,
which ruled from 2000-2002 was on the other hand constrained by structures of the war and
the DPA in trying to implement the Declaration. An attempt to cooperate with the RS in
two-way return failed because the territorial and administrative division of the country. The
Alliance was furthermore paralyzed by the short ruling term of two years and the damaging
rhetoric from the side of oppositional nationalist parties. The SDP-SBiH coalition was
punished during the 2002 elections for pursuing a common goal instead of looking after
particularistic interests of the three separate groups.
The structuration theory and my hypothesis on why Sarajevo’s character has shifted after the
war proved to be correct to a large extent. Sarajevo’s Spirit is no longer what it used to be
because of a complex interplay of structural factors on the one hand and agency-related
factors on the other. Structural factors such as the war and the DPA are constructed by
political agency. These factors in turn constrain or enable political agents in trying to achieve
their goals. Sarajevo has changed through the mechanism described by the structuration
theory; political elites have constructed a structural situation; this situation has enabled and
constrained political elites. The structures of the war and consequently, the DPA enable
nationalist elites which seek to emphasize particularistic factors of the Sarajevan society and
constrain non-nationalist ones which promote tolerance, multiethnicity and
cosmopolitanism. It is through this mechanism that Sarajevo has shifted from a multiethnic
and tolerant city to an ethnically homogeneous and particularistic one.
What would it be like if structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina would not enable nationalist
political parties, but non-nationalist ones in achieving their goals? Would Sarajevo in that
case be a tolerant, multiethnic and cosmopolitan city? Sarajevo will never be the city that it
was before the war. Too much has happened, too much hate and fear circulate through the
streets and through the peoples minds. But the situation Sarajevo is in at this very moment
64
most probably could have been different if the hate and fear mentioned earlier was not
frozen and did not prevail in the daily lives of the Sarajevans. Again, it proves to be difficult,
if not impossible to answer counterfactual questions. One could also wonder: does it matter
what it could have been like? The whole point of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is that
people looked back; they succumbed to symbolic, primordial rhetoric of nationalist
politicians. They clung to their particularistic identities and let go of the Sarajevo Spirit. The
minds of the Sarajevans should thus be focused on how to move on from here and instead
on how it has been or how it could have been.
5.1 Does anyone know CPR? – How to revive the Sarajevo Spirit? Some policy
recommendations
Before turning to the discussion of how to bring back Sarajevo’s multiethnic and
cosmopolitan character, a note on the desirability and the feasibility of such a project would
be in place. Bosnia and Herzegovina has changed, Sarajevo has as well. People do not
believe in a common life anymore; life is separate to a large extent. Reviving the Sarajevo Spirit
might not be desirable from some points of view. On the other hand, many Sarajevans long
back for the time of this common life, many think back with nostalgia to the time the
Sarajevo Spirit still existed. Letting go of particularistic identities might thus be something
many people would like to do, but simply cannot achieve under this specific circumstances
in which people are not citizens, but members of collectives, i.e. ethnic groups. Following
this, it is not feasible to argue that Sarajevo’s tolerant and multiethnic character will be
restored or re-established any time soon. As long as particularism is laid down in the political
and social system of the country, and as long as ethnic cleavages keep prevailing in the daily
lives of Sarajevans, it is difficult to escape the mechanism of framing every issue in
nationalistic terms.
Sarajevo’s identity can change. It has moved from particularistic to cosmopolitan and back
again many times in the past. A combination of structural factors and agency is however
crucial in this process. Structures are difficult to change, especially if agents who can change
them prefer to keep the status-quo. This is evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the
moment – in March 2006 a package of amendments to change the DPA Constitution was
rejected by the Bosnian Parliament and, since then – the deadlock continues. The stories on
the proverbial war between Dodik and Silajdzic every morning appear in the newspapers
65
throughout the country. Milorad Dodik wants to keep the territorial division of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Haris Silajdzic wants a unitary country, whatever the odds. So, the statusquo remains. There is no way out of this deadlock as the structure of the Dayton enables
political agency to veto every piece of legislation which might endanger the ‘vital national
interest’ of any of the three ethnic groups. Changing a structure is difficult; structures imply
stability. But change is a process and processes take time. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina
in general and Sarajevo in particular cannot afford to keep muddling through the same
status-quo for ever; the ship named ‘Europe’ is sailing away slowly and needs to be caught
before it is too late. Politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina realize this, but still want to hold
on to their piece of power as long as they can.
Sarajevo Spirit can be revived; the history has proof in favor of this argument. It just takes
the right structure and the right agency, and most importantly – the right interaction between
the two factors.
66
List of interviews and tables
Interviews
•
Edin Durakovic, Head of the Sector for Return of the Ministry for Refugees and
Displaced Persons of Sarajevo Canton, Sarajevo, 10 April 2007
•
Besima Boric-Maric, former Minister for Refugees, 2000-2002, (SDP), Sarajevo, 11 April
2007.
•
Jovan Divjak, former Armija BiH General, Sarajevo, 12 April 2007.
•
Hajrudin Ibrahimovic, former Minister for Refugees, 2002-2006, (SBiH), Sarajevo, 13
April 2007
•
Liv Feijen, Head of Protection Unit, UNHCR, Sarajevo, 13 April 2007
Tables
•
Table 2.1: Sarajevo’s ethnic make up in 1991
SOURCE: Kanton Sarajevo; Nacionalni Sastav Stanovnistva Kantona Sarajevo u Dejtonskim
granicama po popisu od 31. 03. 1991. godine
•
Table 2.2: Sarajevo’s ethnic make up in 2002
SOURCE: Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine, 2003, Kanton Sarajevo u brojkama 2003, Federalni
Zavod za Statistiku, Sarajevo, 2003, ‘Nacionalna Struktura Stanovnistva’ p.10
•
Table 3.1: Registered returns to Sarajevo Canton (01. 01.1998. – 31. 12. 2006.)
SOURCE: Sector for Return of the Ministry for Refugees and Displaced Persons, Registered
returns to Sarajevo Canton (01. 01.1998. – 31. 12. 2006.)
67
List of abbreviations
AVNOJ - Antifascist Council of People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia
DPA – Dayton Peace Agreement
EWG – Education Working Group
FBiH – Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
ICG – International Crisis Group
IEBL – Inter-entity Boundary Line
HDZ – Croat Democratic Union
RRTF – Return and Reconstruction Task Force
RS – Republika Srpska
SBiH – Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina
SDA – Party of Democratic Action
SDS – Serb Democratic Party
SFRJ – Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
SHC – Sarajevo Housing Committee
SRC – Sarajevo Return Committee
SNSD – Union of Independent Social-democrats
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
68
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