Sacha Journal of Policy and Strategic Studies Volume 1 Number 2 (2011), pp. 13-28
AN APPRAISAL OF THE DARFUR CIVIL WAR
EDEKO, Sunday E.
Faculty of Law, Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Nigeria
ABSTRACT
The objectives of this research are to identify the causes of the Darfur civil
war, examine the management of the civil war, consider the humanitarian
problems associated with the war and identify solutions to the civil war. The
methodology is essentially based on the use of secondary data. It was found
that the cause of the war is linked to a long list of perceived or actual neglect
and oppression of the Darfur people by the central government in Khartoum.
It was equally found that many lives have ended due to the civil war and
many refugees and internally displaced persons have been created. Despite a
series of peace agreements, conflict in the Darfur region has not abated.
Consequently, a high level of humanitarian crisis remains. It is
recommended that the United Nations, the international community, the
African Union and the states that constitute the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development should work harder to restore order and security
in the Darfur region of Sudan.
Keywords: Civil War, Humanitarian Catastrophe, Crisis
1. INTRODUCTION
Darfur has an estimated population of about four to five million people. It is composed
of North, South and West. Darfur is located in the northwestern region of Sudan, bordering
Chad to the West, Libya to the Northwest, and Central African Republic to the Southwest. Most
of the ethnic groups in the Sudanese northwestern Darfur region are scattered on both sides of
the frontier between Chad and Sudan. The indigenous African peoples do not speak Arabic at
home and came to Sudan from the Lake Chad area centuries ago: those claiming Arab descent
are Arabic speakers. Another classification distinguishes between agriculturalists and
pastoralists. The settled, African ethnic groups known as “Zurga” or blacks, and include groups
such as the Fur, Masaalit, Tama, Tunjur, Berrgid, and Berti are farmers by occupation. The
region is rich in terms of natural and human resources enough to develop the region.
The sultanate of Darfur was founded in the fifteenth century and continued for about
half a century as an independent state. The descendants of Sultan Suliman ruled the state until it
was annexed to the other parts of the Sudan in the 19th century. It surrendered her sovereignty to
the Mahdi’s armies of Sudan in 1884.
Ali Dinar, descendant of the Fur kings and the Sultans of Darfur, took over, as the
Sultan of Darfur. He was made to go to Omdurman in 1879 and participate in the battle of
Atbara. He participated in the battle of Omdurman on the side of the Mahdists. When Ali Dinar
returned to Darfur, he drove the Khalifa’s agent out and proclaimed himself Sultan of Darfur. In
1900, the Sudan government recognized him as an independent but tributary sultan (Theobald,
1965:121). Tension between Ali Dinar and the Sudan government began in 1903 when he
lodged a series of complaints with the Governor-General in Khartoum. The crisis became worse
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in 1914 with the outbreak of the First World War. Turkey entered the war on the side of
Germany and Austria and called on the Moslems under British rule to rise against the British.
The Sudan government was afraid that this would affect its relations with its Moslem subjects.
As a result, some tribes and religious leaders proclaimed themselves on the side of the Sudan
government and the British (Belshir, 1997: 48).
Ali Dinar disagreed and held the view that the Sudanese government was part of the
world of Christianity and as such belonged to the enemies of Islam who had declared war on
Turkey and deposed Khedive Ismail of Egypt. He decided to oppose and fight the Sudan
government as part of the holy war against Christendom. He displayed his hostility in a letter he
sent to the Governor-General when the latter wrote to him announcing the outbreak of the war:
I used to have great confidence in your Government, and the benefits,
which I would get from it, but just before the outbreak of the war, we
became certain of your intention of conquering Darfur this year, as
you have declared publicly in the provinces and districts. From the
time, we know of your intention to occupy Darfur, we completed our
preparations and waited for whatever might come without fear. I
swear by God that I do not fear anybody except God, and I do not
intend aggression against anybody. However, those who seek to fight
us, we shall fight them, relying on God and we are sure we shall
defeat them. You say that you have done nothing against Islam, but
you have done everything to falsify it, and you have left nothing in
Islam untouched, and so we hope God will decide between you and
us, and He is the best judge (Theobald, 1965: 121).
Ali Dinnar went ahead and attacked loyal tribes, which threatened to undermine the
British and Sudanese authority in Kordofan (Theobald, 1965: 174). On April 1915, Dinnar
renounced his obligations to the Sudan and in effect declared his independence. Consequently,
the only path open to the British was to attack Dinnar. Darfur fell in May of 1916. Dinnar was
killed by a group of Sudanese soldiers. Darfur became a province of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan
on January 1, 1917 (Beshir, 1997: 19).
Efforts were made by the British and later by the post-1956 Sudanese governments to
treat the country as a primarily Arab with exotic side appendages (Prunier, 2005: 301). The
extension of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium authority over Darfur was smooth. Most of the
native civil servants who had served the Sultanate went on to work with the new authority. The
new authority was not very keen to do anything that would represent any form of change or
break with the past.
A most extraordinary administrative body called the Sudan Political Service ran the
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (Collins, 1972: 315). The Sudan Political Service recruited
mostly upper-middle-class graduates of Oxford and Cambridge Universities and had a definite
taste for athletic young men (Prunier, 2005: 97). Channeling Darfur’s discontent was easy since
the Khartoum administration did almost nothing, good or bad, in its late-acquired province. The
neglect paraded as cultural respect was embodied in the system of indirect rule. Darfur was a
prime example of Indirect Rule. Since the Sudan Political Service was so thinly spread, the
immense territory was divided into tribal homelands, which were roughly delimited and handed
over to a variety of leaders depending on the tribe and on the administrative level, to exercise
rule (Daly, 1986: 383).
Indirect rule while efficient at rendering justice did hardly anything else apart from
levying taxes. Economic and social underdevelopment contained the seeds of future conflicts,
which would eventually be much worse than the simple criminal cases or problems of pasture
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and water management that the tribal administration sponsored by the Condominium authorities
had to deal with. The first Sudanese civil war, between the Muslim government and the mostly
non-Muslim population of the southern Sudan started in 1955. This did not mark any sort of
watershed for Darfur. The interested most people in Darfur wanted was the extension of the
railway from El-Obeid to Nyala, on which work had started a few months before and life went
on much as it had before.
2. METHOD AND MATERIALS
The data used in this research are primary and secondary. Secondary data from the
major or core aspect of the research while the primary data from a minor aspect of the research
by way of focus group discussion aimed to reinforce the secondary data.
The primary data were gathered through focus group discussion among lecturers. They
are persons of great knowledge who constitute authorities in the areas of research. The
secondary data were collected from textbooks, journals, magazines and periodicals. In the
course of the research, the researcher will consult the internet, Ambrose Alli University Main
Library, Law Library of the Faculty of Law of Ambrose Alli University Ekpoma, University of
Benin Law Library, The University of Benin Main Library, and the Library of the Centre for
Strategic and Development Studies, Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma. The data will be
analysed in line with the research questions and objectives.
The research design of this study is informed by the very nature of the study. Therefore
the study used focus group discussion and content analysis. The effort to acquire primary
materials involved discussing questions in a focus group to obtain the views of participants. The
process of content analysis involved investigating, recording and analyzing past events with a
view to discovering generalizations that were significant in understanding of the past and the
present in order to predict and deal with the issue under consideration. To this end documented
literature was relied on. Documented literature was the major instrument of research, which are
deemed to be able to stand alone if the need arises. An examination of available literature shows
that the survey method and the regression analysis would be the most suitable instrument for
this study. Therefore the instrument developed: (a) Regression analysis of secondary data.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
3.1 THE CAUSES OF THE DARFUR CIVIL WAR
In November 1958, there was a strong sense of national crisis. Economic setbacks,
coupled with a sharp decline in foreign exchange reserves and a series of costly strikes in the
nascent industries weakened the new government. Moreover, constant floor crossing by
opportunistic parliamentarians in the weak coalition government, with the same government’s
inability to make any progress in controlling or extinguishing the continued rebelling in the
southern region and subversion or possible invasion from Egypt added to its collapse (Daly,
1986: 199). In November 1958, Brigadier-General Ibrahim Abboud took over power with the
tacit approval of many in a kind of flight from political responsibility. He appointed prominent
military figures to head all the ministries and put politicians from the two major parties under
their authority (Prunier, 2005: 97).
In Darfur the feeling was that the regime made no difference: civilian or military, the
men in power in Khartoum paid no attention to their distant colony, and the Nile Valley
remained their only preoccupation. The Umma with 76 seats out of 173 won the first postdictatorship elections, held in May 1965. In Darfur, the Mahdist party predictably won, with 16
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seats out of 24. This is worth noting because almost forty years later, north eastern Darfur
became the base from which the pro-fundamentalist Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
guerrilla movement organized itself among the Zaghawa, thereby reflecting a durable anchoring
of the radical Muslim electorate in the sub-region.
The Darfur region’s pastoralists are of Arab descent, and nomadic and semi-nomadic
camel herding tribes inhabit the northern belt, the most arid zones. Since the conflict in Darfur
intensified in 2003, the communities under attack, namely the fur, Masaalit and Zaghawa has
identified themselves as “African” in contrast to their former self-definitions as Sudanese or
Darfurians. This disposition supports the international opinion that the “black Africans” in
Darfur, nay the entire Sudan is labouring under oppression and marginalization; which is
gravitating towards genocide. The black communities, even though, largely of Islamic faith
increasingly see the attacks in their communities by the Sudanese government as racially and
ethnically motivated ones (HRW Report, 2004).
The on-going attacks on the Muslim black communities in Darfur by the Sudanese
government backed Arab militia; “the Janjaweed” is not new. Darfur has experienced
occasional rounds of conflict for decades before the present round of conflicts, which escalated
in 2003. Since mid-1980s, when much of the Sahel region was hot by recurrent episodes of
drought and increasing desertification, the southern migration of the Arab pastoralists provoked
land disputes with agricultural communities. Such disputes generally started when the camels
and cattle of Arab nomads trampled the fields of the non-Arab farmers living in the central and
southern areas of Darfur. Sometime the disputes were resolved through negotiation between
traditional leaders on both sides, compensation for lost crops, and agreements on the timing and
routes for annual migration. Later, clashes became bloodier through the use of automatic
weapons. By 1987, many of the incidents involved not only the Arab tribes, but also Zaghawa
nomadic cattle herders who tried to claim land from Fur farmers, and some Fur leaders were
killed. Moreover, the Arab tribes in Darfur felt that they were not adequately represented in the
Fur-dominated local administration and in 1986, a number of Arab tribes formed, what became
known as the “Arab Alliance’ aimed at establishing their political dominance and control of the
region. Meanwhile, Fur leaders distrusted the increasing tendency of the Federal government to
favour the Arabs.
The fear of Arab domination was made real by the Sadiq El Mahdi government (19861989) policy of arming Arab Baggara militias from Darfur and Kordofan known as
“Mujahedeen”. Similar to the militias currently involved in the Darfur conflict, the Mujahedeen
were a militia based in Darfur, employed by the El Mahdi government and its military
successors for almost twenty years as a counter insurgency force against the southern-based
rebels, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The Mujahedeen focused
on raiding, looting, displacing, enslaving, and punishing the Dinka and Nuer civilians living in
the South. They were largely drawn from the Rizeigat and Miserriya Baggara tribes of South
Darfur and Kordofan, and also became involved in attacks against the Fur community in Darfur
in the late 1980s. After taking power in a coup in 1989, the National Islamic Front (renamed the
National Congress) ruling party incorporated many of the Mujahedeen militias into the Popular
Defence Forces, paramilitaries whose atrocious human rights record has been documented by
many organizations. One of the differences in the fighting was that the Sudanese government
recruited volunteers to fight in the south on the basis of holy war, or a religiously sanctioned
war against the largely non-Muslim southerners (HRW Report, 2004: 8).
The occasional clashes in Darfur ballooned into full-scale conflict between the Fur and
Arab communities. It also developed a more political character. In keeping with its rabid Arab
nationalism since independence, the Khartoum government flamed tensions by arming the Arab
tribes and neglecting the core issues underlying the conflict over resources: the need for rule of
law and socioeconomic development in the region (HRW Report, 2004: 9).
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War erupted in Darfur in the beginning of 2003 when the allied rebel groups, the Sudan
Liberation Movement/Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), attacked
government military installations. The rebels took up arms to protect their communities against
a campaign by government–backed militias recruited among groups of Arab extraction in
Darfur and Chad. The militias called Janjaweed, have over the past three years received
increased government support to clear civilians from certain areas. Militia attacks and
government offensive led to massive looting and mass rape in contravention of Common Article
3 of the Geneva Convention prohibiting attacks on civilians. Moreover, the civil war was a
natural reaction to Khartoum’s tyranny, absence of good governance, ethnicity and
marginalisation of the Darfur people. The focus group explained the above factors contributed
to bringing the Darfur civil war within the structural conflict theory because there were defects
in the socio-political arrangement in the governance of Sudan whether intentional or otherwise.
The civil war, which risks inflicting irreparable damage on a delicate ethnic balance of seven
million people who are all Muslims, is multiple intertwined conflicts. One is between
government-aligned forces and rebels; in a second case, government militia raid civilians; and a
third involves a struggle among Darfur communities themselves. The civil war in Darfur began
in February 2003, when the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) forces attacked government military installations in frustrations at
the decades of political marginalisation and economic neglect illustrated in the following
analysis given by Fouad Ibrahim (2004: 6).
Facts and Figures – Comparison of Human Development in Sudan – Darfur 2000
School Rate (Primary School Level):
Sudan
47%
Darfur
31%
N. Sudan*
88%
S. Sudan
21%
Source: Fouad Ibrahim Ideas on the Background of the Present Conflict in Darfur
(Germany: University of Bayreuth 2004)
Sudan’s counter-insurgency operations had spilled across the border into Chad,
resulting in the deaths of approximately 200,000 people (mainly civilians) and forcing
approximately 1.2 million to flee their homes. Around 400,000 of these were estimated to have
crossed into Chad, while the majority remained internally displaced within camps in Darfur.
Between 240 and 440 people were dying daily because of the conflict. The situation, which the
western world described, the “most serious humanitarian emergency in the world today” (Benn,
2004: 275) has deteriorated further, with the number of estimated deaths rising to over 200,000.
The current conflict in Darfur involves the government of Sudan and allied militias; the
“Janjaweed” against an insurgency composed of two groups; the Sudan Liberation
Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Initially, the rebel
groups were mainly composed of three ethnic groups, namely: Zaghawa, Fur and Masaalit.
However, since the current conflict escalated in early 2003, members of some smaller tribes
such as the Jebel and Dorok people have also joined the rebellion following Janjaweed militia
attacks on the communities. Some Arab tribes and even some non-Arab tribes have also joined
the government-backed militia.
The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) came into focus February 2003. It was formerly
called the Darfur Liberation front (DLF) at the beginning. It was after it captured the town of
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Gulu that it changed its name to the SLA. Some of the political demands of SLA include the
following: socio-economic development in the Darfur region, an end to tribal militias, and
sharing of power with the central government. In early 2003, the SLA attacked the capital of
North Darfur and damaged several government aircraft and helicopters and looted fuel and arms
depots. In another major attack the SLA rebels again looted government stock of food and arms.
In May 2003, the Al-Bashir government dismissed the governors of North and West Darfur and
other key officials and increased military strength in Darfur (Benn, 2004:9).
In February and April 2003, the SLA struck and captured the towns of Gula and El
Fashir. The attitude of the government of al Bashir in Khartoum was to call the SLA “bandits”
and refused to negotiate with the leadership. Following subsequent attacks on several towns in
North and West Darfur, the government launched offensives against the SLA in Barou, Tine,
and Karnoi, in North Darfur (Benn, 2004: 49). The government was reported to have responded
with heavy bombing by aircraft and ground offensives of government troops and heavy
equipment, including tanks. The bombing raids in North Darfur prompted thousands of civilians
to flee the area. By August 2003, Chad was host to more than 65,000 Sudanese refugees
(UNCHR, 2004).
Later, the al-Bashir government gave the “correct” interpretation to the SLA and JEM
attacks on Darfurian authorities. Consequently, the Arab dominated government of al-Bashir,
civilians and military authorities in the government considered the Darfur rebellion as a “regime
threat”, and they believe that the Darfur rebels pose a far greater menace to their hold on office
than the SPLA rebellion, confined in its effects to the South, ever did.
The prospects of a United Darfurian coalition that could garner support among the other
tribes in the west, and states such as Kordofan is deeply worrying to the Khartoum government,
given that these groups are Muslim, and thus not easily vilified against as the southern “infidels”
(UNCHR, 2004:10).
Furthermore, the Sudanese government having been pressed by the international
community to make concessions to the SPLA rebel forces in southern Sudan, to end a separate
and much older war may not be in the mood to tolerate more threats to its authority, and the
consequent Balkanization of Sudan. However, the rebels and their communities on the other
hand believe that they are fighting against decades of marginalization by the Arab-dominated
government.
The Sudanese Arab dominated government of al-Bashir opted for a maximum use of
force to suppress the Darfur rebellion. Al-Bashir vowed to annihilate the rebellion (UNCHR,
2004: 10). Hence he resorted to disproportionate response to the uprising in Darfur. With its
Janjaweed militias, he sent some two million Darfur from their homes, killed tens of thousands,
and let many more die of hunger and disease because they have been unable to sow their fields
for fear of being murdered. A British report put the total death toll at 300,000, a figure the
Sudanese government furiously disputes. The UN’s emergency relief coordinator has put the
number of those who had died from hunger and disease over the past 19 months at 180,000, not
including those in the violence”. By the Sudanese government approach to the Darfur rebellion,
the government has equally breached Article 17 of the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions of 1977, which addresses the protections the warring parties must provide for
civilians in non-international armed conflicts, prohibits the forced displacement of civilians for
reasons connected with the conflict.
The Chadian authorities and members of the Chadian armed forces have not been left
out of the Darfur conflict. The reason is that Chad is a neighbour to Sudan, sharing similar
ethnic formation, religion and other socio-cultural and economic factors. More so, of all the
Sudan’s neighbours, Chad bore more of the burden of the refugee problems that heralded not
just the Darfur conflict but also the North-South conflict that lasted for over two decades. By
March 2004, more than 110,000 displaced people in Darfur were reported to be taking refuge in
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Chad (The Economist, 2005). The people of Chad supported both sides of the Darfur conflict –
the al-Bashir government forces and its proxies, armed Arab civilian groups (Janjaweed) and the
“rebel” black African groups of the SLA and JEM.
As a result of its resolve to annihilate the Darfur rebellion, and partly because of rabid
Arab nationalism, the al-Bashir government with its Janjaweed proxies has launched attacks on
civilian groups on increased scale, number, and the brutality and has been conducted on villages
and towns in the absence of rebel presence or military targets. Civilians sharing the ethnicity of
the rebel movement, namely the Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa and a few small tribes have
become the main targets of government military offensives aimed at destroying any real or
perceived support base of the rebel forces. Government forces and Janjaweed militias have
inflicted a campaign of forced displacement, murder, pillage, and rape on hundreds of thousands
of civilians over the past fourteen months (The Economist, 2005: 13). This has continued, albeit
at a low scale since the intervention of the forces of the African Union for peacekeeping in
Darfur. In line with the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, all parties
involved in the Darfur conflict are obliged to distinguish at all times between civilian property
and militia objectives. Acts or threats of violence intended to spread terror among the civilian
population, in particular murder, physical or mental torture, rape, mutilation, pillage, and
collective punishment, are prohibited. The destruction of objects indispensable to the survival of
the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for food production, crops,
drinking water installations and supplies, is also prohibited (HRW Report, 2004:13).
Many villages have been destroyed, usually burned, with all property looted. Assets,
such as water points and mills, have been destroyed in an apparent effort to render the villages
uninhabitable. Many civilians have been killed and injured by aerial bombardment and militia
raids. Militia and government forces reportedly raped hundreds of women and allied militias to
force rural civilians from their homes and render them destitute in government towns and camps
(HRW Reports, 2004: 14). Since the Sudanese government decided to attack civilians rather
than concentrate on crushing the groups of SLA and JEM, the conflict in Darfur started to
attract international sympathy to the extent that some sections of the international community
has branded the war activities of the Sudanese government as “acts of genocide”. At this stage,
an issue of great importance to us is how the international community has responded to and
managed the civil war.
3.2 MANAGEMENT OF THE DARFUR CIVIL WAR
The persecuted black population in Darfur Western Sudan has attracted international
sympathy to the point that the United Nations, the European Union, the United States of
America, and the African Union have all been attracted to the conflict. The United Nations
Organizations (UNO) did a lot of advocacy and campaign since the conflict escalated in
February 2003 to bring the conflict to the World’s attention. The United Nations Security
Council in 2004 passed Resolution 1556 of 30 July 2004. In resolution 1556, the Security
Council called on the Government of Sudan to fulfill immediately all of the commitments it
made to disarm the Janjaweed militias and international humanitarian law violations and other
atrocities (HRW Reports, 2004: 16). In view of the Security Council’s request that the
Secretary-general should report on progress regarding humanitarian relief and assistance to the
African Union with planning and assessment for its mission in Darfur, in November 2004, the
Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the Government of Sudan and the rebels
were still trying to take more territories in Darfur instead of complying with UN demands to end
the violence, disarm government-backed Arab militia blamed for many attacks and punish the
perpetrators (UN Security Resolution 1556, 2004). The Secretary-General recommended that
members take “prompt action” to get the government and rebels to comply with the UN
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resolutions and urged countries with influence to exert pressure on the parties to negotiate a
peace deal. At about the time of the report, a new rebel group that calls itself the National
Movement for Reformation and Development (NMRD) has attacked government troops and
threatened a small African contingent seeking to stabilize the area. The report also stated that
there are strong indications that war crimes and crimes against humanity have occurred in
Darfur on a large and systematic scale. However, it acknowledged that the Sudanese
government has deployed 12,000 (twelve thousand) police to the Darfur region, and thereby
stabilizing the humanitarian situation and bringing security under control (The Guardian 2004).
It is difficult to appreciate the reasons behind the UN’s soft response to the Sudanese
government’s recalcitrance in implementing the demands of the UN Security Council resolution
1556 of 2004. Indeed, with such a soft attitude of the United Nations, the al-Bashir Arabdominated government in Khartoum is emboldened. The regime has been speaking from both
sides of the mouth. Some of its officials said there is no deal with the Darfur rebels, and as such
no chance of Darfur autonomy as Southern Sudan may begin to enjoy as from 2011.
More than three years into the Darfur conflict, the western Sudanese region of Darfur is
acknowledged to be a humanitarian and human rights tragedy of the first order. More than
10,000 people are dying every month. The security, humanitarian and political situations
continue to deteriorate. Atrocious crimes are continuing, people are still dying in large numbers
of malnutrition and disease, and a new famine is feared; the international community is failing
to protect the people of Darfur.
The UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur described the massive scope of atrocities
carried out in the territory by the government and the militias. There are deteriorating security,
including the targeting of humanitarian workers, a credible threat of famine, mounting civilian
causalities, the negotiation process at a standstill, the rebel movements beginning to splinter and
new armed movements appearing in Darfur and neighboring States. Chaos and a culture of
impunity have taken root in the region.
In March 2005, the UN Security Council considered various aspects of the Sudan crisis
and established the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), extending the arms embargo in
Darfur to include the government and referring the situation in Darfur to the international
criminal court. Despite these resolutions, the situation remains grave and stronger measures are
needed to restore security and prevent further mass deaths. More effective measures are also
needed to preserve and implement the peace deal that was signed to end the long war between
the government and SPLA.
Moreover, there is the need to implement accountability in Darfur by effectively
applying decisions taken by the UN Security Council. In particular, the Sanctions Committee
must be made operational to ensure the arms embargo and ban on offensive flights are enforced
and those responsible for atrocities are speedily targeted for travel bans and asset freezes. In
addition it is necessary to build a Darfur peace process by holding a high level meeting with
representatives of the AU, EU, US and other key international and national actors to develop
and then act on a structure of negotiations in coordination with the implementation of the
comprehensive peace agreement.
More importantly, there is the need to protect civilians and relief supplied in Darfur
with a stronger civilian protection mandate for the African Union. The International Community
has not done much about the interconnected problems of humanitarian relief and security on the
ground. As many as two million civilians in Darfur need emergency aid, but many are not
receiving it because of bottlenecks created by the rebels. The capacity to provide humanitarian
assistance in terms of logistics, funding, and transport equipment is simply not adequate to
service those at risk.
The international response to the crisis in the western Sudanese region of Darfur has
been inadequate. History has shown that Khartoum will respond better to direct pressure, but
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this pressure must be concerted, consistent and genuine. Despite a series of high-level visitors to
Khartoum and Darfur, the Sudanese government has yet to fulfill its agreement to neutralize the
Janjaweed militias responsible for much of the violence. It has continued fighting rebels by
ground attacks and aerial bombardment including the use of the Janjaweed militias.
The focused group was of the view that the government’s reaction has been of a
combative nature instead of making reasonable attempts to look at the root causes of the
rebellion with the aim of getting a solution. The group equally viewed the involvement of the
Janjaweed militia as a deliberate act on the part of the government of Sudan to permanently
oppress and suppress the freedom-seeking people of the Darfur region. This is based on the
unimaginable degree of atrocities already acknowledged by the United Nations.
The UN Security Council passed its first resolution in July 2004 in response to the
atrocities, including killings and rape being committed in Darfur, but the resolution was most
notable for what it failed to do. It placed a meaningless arms embargo on the Janjaweed militias
who have caused so much havoc and the rebels alike, but directed no measures at the Sudanese
government for whom the Janjaweed have acted as a proxy and left officials in Khartoum
confident they could continue indefinitely to deflect pressure to resolve the crisis. The Darfur
crisis posed s threat to the finalized peace agreement that ended the largest and oldest civil war
between the government and the SPLA. As long as the Darfur crisis remains, the chance
remains for political forces in Khartoum opposed to the concession that have been made in that
agreement to turn government policy back to war.
The only bright spot today is AU’s increasingly energetic response. The regional
observers in Darfur have filed reports that demonstrate that the cease-fire is being violated. A
force of 300 Nigerians and Rwandan troops who will protect them has joined the AU’s more
than 100 observers. Also, it is planning for a much larger force of 3,000 troops that it wants to
use for the wider purpose of protecting civilians. The EU and United States of America have
expressed willingness to support logistically and financially. The deployment and maintenance
of such a force must demand that Khartoum accepts it and its mandate.
Therefore, it is important for the AU to enhance its efforts to mediate in the political
problems at the root of the Darfur crisis. The international community must provide full support
to the AU-sponsored Darfur talks such as those scheduled to begin. The AU should utilize the
terms of the deal that has been struck on the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile as a
starting point for its work on the Darfur negotiations. The international community must support
the process and the mediation teams should find ways to coordinate closely. If there had been as
comprehensive national peace process from the outset, the Darfur rebellion and the consequent
humanitarian catastrophe might well have been avoided.
3.3 HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Darfur is largely perceived as “a humanitarian crisis”, the humanitarian crisis calls for
charitable interventions. The Darfur situation is “a tragedy” and Sudan is “producing refugees as
it is making peace” (The Guardian, 2004). Sudanese Humanitarian Affairs Commissioner
responded that “the UN should concentrate on its field-work instead of issuing press
statements”. Tom Vraalsen, the UN Special Envoy declared:
The Government of Sudan’s (GoS) presentation of the situation as steadily
improving contrasts sharply with first-hand reports (Delivery of
humanitarian assistance is hampered by systematically denied access.
Khartoum authorities claim there is unimpeded access but they greatly
restrict access to the areas under their control while imposing blanket denial
to all rebel-held areas. Because of growing insecurity and denied access, the
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humanitarian crisis has reached unprecedented proportions, with one million
now war-affected (The Guardian, 2004).
There is an alarming growth of Global Acute Malnutrition Rates among the Internally
Displaced People (IDP) population, which the UN now estimated at one million. The problem
was typical of crisis management. The humanitarians were asked to venture into what was
political decision-making without being given the vital assurance that help would be
forthcoming if things went wrong (HRW Reports, 2004). Khartoum kept attacking the civilian
population of Darfur, while pretending at the same time to cooperate with the international
community in finding solutions to the southern Sudan’s problems. The world was prepared to
do little to stop the massacre, in lieu of the ongoing Naivasha peace settlement (HRW Reports,
2004). The Conflicts in Sudan have attracted the attention of the international community. The
prolonged conflict in the South of Sudan, which culminated in the signing of the Naivasha
Peace Agreement in Kenya, is an obvious example. Also there was the conflict in the Nuba
Mountain. In spite of the efforts by the international community, conflicts have remained part of
the social life in Sudan.
The first Security Council resolution on Darfur was Resolution 1547 made on 11 June
2004. It sets out the Council’s position in the Machakos/Naivasha peace process. Paragraph 6 of
the resolution also called upon the parties involved ‘to bring an immediate halt to the fighting in
Darfur’ and elsewhere, and to ‘conclude a political agreement without delay’. On 30 July 2004,
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council authorized Resolution 1556, which
imposed an arms embargo on the region, supported the deployment of the AU Protection Force
and gave the Sudanese government 30 days to disarm the Janjaweed or face sanctions
(Observer, 2004).
Amnesty International suggested that although the resolution ensured the continued
monitoring of the crisis, it failed to adopt measures that were urgent and essential to address the
appalling human rights situation. As one of Amnesty’s spokespersons stated, Resolution 1556
represented ‘the abandonment of the people of Darfur and an abdication of the Security
Council’s role as a human right enforcing agent (Observer, 2004). Others asserted that the
resolution went too far in threatening economic and diplomatic sanctions against Sudan. For
example, China and Pakistan explained their abstentions in the Security Council vote by
rejecting the need for ‘mandatory measures’ against Sudan. The Sudanese representative at the
Council likewise rejected the resolution as ‘an unfair and unjust policy of double standards’ that
was the result of a domineering, colonial mindset.
As a result of pressure from the international community, immediately after the
resolution’s passage, the Sudanese government relaxed visa controls for foreign aid workers but
provided nothing more in terms of support for humanitarian agencies. A UN report on
September 2004 noted that the Khartoum government had failed to meet ‘some of the core
commitments’. Specifically, reports arose that, far from demobilizing militia, the Sudanese
government was incorporating the militia into regular military and police forces. In addition, the
Security Council was informed that there had been no systematic improvement of people’s
security and no progress on ending impunity.
The EU’s response to the crisis relied on diplomatic and humanitarian instruments. The
European Commission had funded humanitarian programmes in Sudan for over ten years. As a
result of the drought; it provided an extra E14 million in assistance to western Sudan. In 2004,
the Commission allocated a whopping amount of E92 million for humanitarian assistance to
Darfur, in addition to its regular humanitarian programme in Sudan worth E30 million. Plans for
reconstruction and development were made, conditional upon a comprehensive peace agreement
and the resumption of bilateral cooperation between the government of Sudan and the European
Development Fund. Despite offering some technical and financial support, the EU left the AU
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to take the lead in conflict resolution and efforts to achieve delivery of relief supplies. The EU
threatened sanctions against the government of Sudan but showed no interest in deploying its
own peacekeepers to Darfur.
The position of the United Nations concerning the management of the Darfur civil war
was weak and the reasons for it are not far-fetched. Firstly, the UN was at the forefront of the
humanitarian effort both in Southern Sudan and in Darfur. Secondly, the Arab/Black African
split, which was implicit in the Darfur crisis, had many echoes inside the UN. Thirdly, it was
deeply involved in the Naivasha process where it had to boost the Inter Governmental Authority
on Development (IGAD) capacity. Finally, the European Union member states and America
kept pushing the world body to act as if they were not partly responsible for it (Prunier, 2005:
197).
As the conflict got aggravated, the UN seemed incapable of doing anything political
about it. However, at the humanitarian level it carried over 60% of the financial burden. This
situation demonstrated the UN’s practical limitations in crisis over which the heavyweight
member states do not want to act. The Report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on the Darfur
Violence had evidence of violations of human rights by people who probably acted with
genocide intentions. Although the situation was not genocide, it amounted to war crimes
(Prunier, 2005: 300). The United States refused to support or favour the prosecution of those
accused of war crimes in the Sudan in view of its ongoing war in Iraq. Therefore, the USA
suggested that a special tribunal be set up in Arusha on the model of the Rwanda tribunal.
The reluctance of the global community to threaten military intervention in Darfur
meant that the AU assumed centre stage in the international response. Despite clear evidence of
government complicity in the attacks upon civilians, the AU refused to act without the consent
of the Sudanese government. The civil war in Darfur’s presented the AU with a genuine
opportunity to find an African solution to this African problem by invoking Article 4(h) of its
new Charter. As a result, the slogan of ‘African solutions to African problems’ provided a
convenient façade behind which Western powers could wash their hands off committing their
own soldiers to Darfur.
In the beginning, the Darfur crisis went almost unnoticed by the media. In Sudan, the
media concentrated on the North-South peace negotiations in Naivasha, Kenya on which the
foreign media reported. Even in Khartoum, a few nomads shooting themselves in distant Darfur
did not draw much attention because the people had been fighting each other for a long time.
The chaotic situation in Darfur became known to the wider world by 1999, through specialized
publications such as African Confidential or the Indian Ocean's newsletter. In Sudan, the
national press began to give some space to the activities of the “bandits” around the middle of
2003.
The anti-Khartoum activist Eric Reeves concentrated on his denunciations of the evils
of the Government of Sudan (GoS) policy towards the South. He was the first foreign observer
to notice what was by then ominously developing in Darfur. However, he did not draw much
attention to the conflict that was perceived as a sideshow. Even, the usually well-informed
advocacy NGO Justice Africa did not mention Darfur in its October 2003 monthly brief. As a
result of media briefs, the NGO’s started noticing the unfolding conflict in the Darfur region of
Sudan. It was largely through the Amnesty International and the International Crisis Group that
the crisis came out of the shadows. The French media were among the first to give a separate
picture of the Darfur situation. In addition, the first US article on the subject focused
immediately on the Africans versus the Arabs side of the problem.
The Darfur problem attracted world attention with the interview given by the Human
Right Coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, to the UN’s own Integrated Regional Information
Network (IRIN) in March when he declared that Darfur was the world’s greatest humanitarian
crisis and that the only difference between Rwanda and Darfur is the numbers involved.
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Previously, few people had ever heard of Darfur. Its history was a mystery nobody
particularly wanted to probe. However, its story came up as the first genocide of the twenty-first
century. At the end of 2004 Darfur came to the fore as the worst humanitarian crisis and a
horror story of the year. However, it is necessary to examine how far the African Union and the
United Nations have gone of managing the civil war.
3.4 THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN UNION
The Darfur civil war is a glaring case where the inability or unwillingness to adopt the
integrated conflict management model has aggravated the existing humanitarian catastrophe at
level of genocide or at least ethnic cleansing. The African Union and the United Nations did not
adopt enough measures to prevent the civil war. Moreover, they have not adopted adequate
measures to abate or control the civil war in the way ECOMOG treated the Liberian civil war.
The role of the AU in Darfur was considered against the backdrop of its response to the crisis
after it has become a humanitarian disaster. According to Kagwanja (2004:1) the conflict in
Darfur had precipitated the worst humanitarian crisis since Rwanda. Moreover, he stated that
the crisis had claimed an estimated many lives, uprooted an estimated 1.2 million people, and
forced perhaps 200,000 more to flee across the border into Chad as refugees. In addition, the
Sudanese government and the Janjaweed militias targeted civilians in Darfur because they share
the same ethnic identity with the two rebel groups fighting the government in the region.
Efforts were made to negotiate a ceasefire between the warring parties as part of the
process to curtail the resultant effect of the humanitarian catastrophe. For example, the Chadian
President Idris Deby, in concert with the African Union, the United States and the European
Union attempted to manage the crisis. This led to the signing of the N’djamena Humanitarian
Ceasefire Agreement between the government and the two rebel groups in Darfur on 8 April
2004. The AU created a ceasefire commission to monitor violations.
The dialogue resulted in the establishment of a 120-person Ceasefire Monitoring
Commission together with 270 troops to protect the monitors. The mandate of the ceasefire
allowed the AU to ensure the implementation of the rules and provisions of the ceasefire. The
Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU gave a sweeping mandate that authorized all steps
deemed necessary to ensure effective monitoring (Rogge, 2004: 137). Kagwanja (2004: 2) also
observed that the ceasefire agreement was ignored, and salvaging it demanded concerted
international action. The Government of Sudan (GoS) failed to comply with the requirements
that all parties should provide humanitarian access to the displaced people and for the GoS to
disarm and neutralise the militias.
Rogge (2004: 132) was of the view that an expanded monitoring force if established
will provide necessary monitoring capabilities and that in the absence of this, opinions shifted in
favour of the AU monitors overseeing the disarmament and relocation of militias, as well as
ensuring that they were not given positions in government or in the police force. Incessant
violations of the ceasefire agreement have given credence to the view that future preventive
action must transcend neutralizing militias and other Attempts by AU to bring the warring
parties back to the negotiation table in Ethiopia on 15 July 2004 did not succeed because the
GoS found it difficult to accept the conditions set by the rebels. The AU made another attempt
at mediated dialogue by calling the government and the rebels to talks in Abuja in late August
2004. The talks emphasized the issue of civilian protection to the force. The failure of mediation
prompted demands for increased number of AU troops with a clear mandate to protect civilians.
The first international negotiations on the conflict took place in and were mediated by
Chad on September 2003 – following several failed internal attempts to mediate by Sudanese
officials. The talks in Chad produced an agreement between the government of Sudan and the
SLA. The peace meeting provided for a ceasefire, relocation of forces, control of the militias
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and pledges to increase social and economic development in the Darfur region. Although,
fighting between government forces and the SLA stopped temporarily after the agreement was
signed in September 2003, militia attacks continued in the Zalinger area in West Darfur and
near Nyala, capital of South Darfur, in early September and October 2003 (UN News, 2004).
However, the conflict received considerable attention on the agenda of world leaders who
repeatedly called on the Sudanese government to make peace with the rebels.
Although, the negotiations in Chad produced an agreement between the government of
Sudan and the SLA, the agreement soon broke down with the Janjaweed militia attacks of
communities in the Zalingei area in West Darfur and near Nyala, capital of South Darfur in
September and October 2003. The failure of the Chadian attempt at resolving the conflict
coupled with deplorable human condition of the displaced Darfurians naturally attracted the
United Nations, which had long time ago classified the situation in Darfur as the worst
humanitarian crisis in recent history. But the UN is working with the African Union (AU) to
find a solution to the Darfur conflict. Moreover, IGAD, AU and the Arab League are making
efforts towards negotiation and conciliation?
The African Union (AU) emphasized the fact that Chad has so far provided the only
international forum for negotiations acceptable to the government of Sudan and the rebel
groups. The September 2003 cease-fire was brokered by the Chadian government and despite
reluctance on the part of the rebel group to continue with Chad as the mediator since they view
Chad as not neutral, a new round of negotiations began between the rebels and the Sudanese
government on March 31, 2004.
The al-Bashir government in Khartoum said that it preferred an African intervention in
the Darfur conflict to intervention from forces outside Africa coupled with the AU’s resolve to
finding enduring solution to Africa’s myriad of problems – using the mechanism of the “Peace
and Security Council (PSC)”, which is expected to take over the functions earlier performed by
Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA) and later, from 1993, by the
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The general belief, which
tallied with those of Africa’s previous leaders who had an earlier vision about the need for a
PSC, is that the Council would enhance the organization’s ability to promptly respond to
matters affecting the peace and security of the continent (United Nations Department of
Information, 2002).
The Njamena Agreement or Peace deal contributed a great deal of drawing international
attention has been slow to mobilize due to the remoteness of the Darfur region, the lack of
access by international humanitarian agencies, journalists, international observers, and the news
blackout imposed by Khartoum. Darfur was considered an unhelpful distraction from the on going peace negotiations to settle the twenty-year conflict in Southern Sudan. The United States
of America and its Western allies eventually brokered the truce that ushered in a national
government in Khartoum in August 2005, with John Garang, the leader of the SPLA/M
emerging as the Vice-President of Sudan, while also the Southern Sudanese will hold a
referendum in 2011 to decide on its autonomy. Thus, the Darfur conflict is a potential threat to
the success of these peace talks as the demands of the Darfur rebellion underlined what critics of
the talks have said. According to the critics, the Inter-Governmental Development Authority
(IGAD) negotiations could not lead to real peace because they involved only the government
and the Southern-based SPLA rebels. The threat of the Sudanese government to abandon peace
with the south if it would not be allowed to pursue the war in Darfur was implied (UNDI, 2002).
The United Nations agencies had begun to mobilize western governments and
organizations to become more concerned about the sharp humanitarian deterioration and
intensified war in Darfur (Agubuzu, 2004: 39). The April 2004 N’djamena peace deal gave a
symbol of an African solution to an African conflict. Therefore the African Union (AU), which
though had made efforts to bring the warring factions in the Sudanese conflict, relied on the
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April 2004 peace deal to launch itself fully into the efforts to manage and resolve the Darfur
conflict (Egiabade, 2004: 65). In September 2004, Nigeria and Rwanda deployed troops as part
of the AU force mandated to provide security for the aide workers and peace mediators in
conflict-torn Darfur. Also in September 2004, the AU held peace talks in Abuja, which included
all the warring factions in the Darfur conflict, aimed at finding a political solution to the
conflict. Again, the talks were not quite successful. While the talks were going on in Abuja the
Janjaweed Arab militiamen were busy attacking civilians and the black African communities in
Darfur.
The al-Bashir government in Khartoum and its sponsored Janjaweed Arab militia
resisted the United Nations proposal for foreign troops. As a result the United Nations and the
Western powers quietly decided to give the mantle of leadership in the international effort to
resolve the Darfur conflict to the AU. Consequently, the AU became the arrow-head for this
peace effort, while the UN gives all the supports in terms of logistics, finance, diplomacy and
otherwise. Western nations like the United States, Canada and EU member countries are also
backing the AU and UN’s efforts in Darfur. In 2004, a UN plan presented to the AU provided a
blueprint for an expanded international presence in Darfur, “which could help improve the
humanitarian situation in Darfur in critical respects: decrease the level of violence, and enhance
the protection of the civilian population particularly those who have been displaced” (HRW
Reports, 2004: 10). To accelerate peace in Sudan, the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was
established.
3.5 THE AFRICAN MISSION IN SUDAN
The chairperson of the AU Commission dispatched an AU Assessment Mission in
Darfur from 7 to 13 May 2004 to assess the security situation and advise him on the
establishment of a Ceasefire Commission (CFC). The mission’s recommendation led to the
signing of two important agreements between the AU and the Government of Sudan (GoS), then
modalities for the establishment of the CFC and the deployment of Observers in Darfur on 28
May 2004, and the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) on 4 June 2004.
Although a build-up of the Military Observer’s (MILOB) strength began on 6 June
2004, the actual deployment in Darfur did not start until the end of July. Sector commanders
were appointed and assigned, initially to the six newly created sectors-El Fashir, Nyala, El
Geneina, Kabkabiya, Tine and Abeche (Chad) – on 22 July and ordered to deploy by 25 July
2004. Once in the field, sector commanders rented civilian accommodation, with the assistance
of GoS local authorities, to establish sector headquarters, from which operations were planned,
launched and monitored. Barely one month after the deployment of the Observers, the first
batch of MILOB protectors, consisting of a composite infantry company from Rwanda, arrived
in Darfur, followed by the deployment of a composite company from Nigeria to bring the total
number of the protection force to 300. In spite of the operational significance of this
deployment, especially for the high-risk sectors the arrival of the protection force puts enormous
strain on the already limited operational and logistical resources of the mission. In the light of
these arduous operating conditions the AU secured the services of the Pacific Architectural
Engineers (PAE) for logistical support, among others, including camp construction, and the
provision of water and food, as well as laundry services. Even though the engagement of PAE
affected the provision of accommodation facilities throughout the AMIS mission area, the PAE
managed to catch up in a remarkable way, to the extent that it was able to provide emergency
accommodation in localities designated for rapid deployment at short notice.
As the humanitarian and security situation continued to deteriorate, the PSC approved
the deployment of a 3,320-strong AMIS II, made up of 2,341 military personnel, 450 MILOBS,
815 civilian police and 26 international civilian staff/CFC members. At present, AMIS II is
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nearly at its authorized strength, with the exception of the civilian police (CIVPOL) and civilian
staff components. There has been significant corresponding restructuring and expansion at the
force headquarters and sector levels to reflect the current status of deployment.
The AU yielded to demands for more troops and enhanced capabilities as well as a
stronger mandate for its forces. African countries such as Tanzania, South Africa, Nigeria,
Ghana, Senegal and Mali contributed troops to serve in the AU peacekeeping force in Darfur.
The government of Rwanda declared that its 154 troops in Darfur would intervene if civilians
were threatened. Despite that the Rwandan contingent could not do much because it was
severely constrained by the size of its force and lack of a formal mandate from the AU to protect
civilians facing violence. Specifically, the Sudanese government needed to give approval for
any increase in number of troops.
4. CONCLUSION
Darfur is endowed with enough natural resources and the human capacity to develop
Darfur but that the civil war adversely affected the process of harnessing the potentials for
development. Darfur civil war is a good case for the application of the structural conflict theory.
This is based on the fact that the Darfur civil war started as a reaction to the oppressive Arab
government in Sudan. Having waited for many years to get redemption from the central
government, the people of Darfur have only experienced what could be regarded as
‘exploitation begets oppression’. This brings the causes of the Darfur civil war within the
application of the structural conflict theory. The oppression started a long time ago soon after
the fall of the Sultanate of Darfur. Also, we identified ethnicity, arms proliferation, lack of good
governance and inability to imbibe democratic practice as some of the causes of the civil war.
Many African states supported the idea of an expanded mandate to protect civilians
from violence. In addition to protecting monitors, the role of AU peacekeepers required
expansion to assist in disarming the rebels. An expanded AU force should disarm Darfur rebels,
as part of a deal that would see the government disarm the Janjaweed militia. This would help
the peaceful disarmament, demobilization and the reintegration of the various militias, back into
society. Sudan reacted that the AU peacekeeping force should be confined only to the protection
of the ceasefire monitoring team in Darfur. The government opposed the AU force conducting
any military action against any of the conflicting parties in the case of ceasefire violations. It
was a clear assertion of the sanctity of the Sudanese state, and it casts doubt on Khartoum’s
willingness to adhere to the terms of the N’djamena ceasefire agreement. The UN reported that
the government of Sudan ordered the suspension of all humanitarian activities at the camp and
AU observers were denied entry.
The GoS continued to assert its territorial independence. This defence of state
sovereignty by Sudan can only be guaranteed by its commitment to disarm the militias and give
equal protection to all of its citizens. However, Khartoum is only interested in allowing the AU
peacekeepers to solely deal with rebels, especially ushering them off the battlefield and into
their barracks. So far, the management has not succeeded. Generally, there is no adequate
cooperation and commitment of the part of the militias, government and the peacekeepers.
The humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan is one of the worst in recent history. The steps
so far taken by the international community are not adequate. Even the indictment of the
President of Sudan Omar Al-Bashir is not enough. The international community has an
obligation to protect the Darfur people as much as they protect the people of Libya.
Accordingly, more action should be taken in such a direction.
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