A last step before the final solution of the Iranian nuclear
crisis?
Pierre-Emmanuel Dupont
Head of Public International Law and Dispute Settlement
London Centre of International Law Practice
Daniel Joyner
Head of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Nonproliferation Law
London Centre of International Law Practice
London Centre of International Law Practice
LCILP Brief – 001/2015
Date: 03/04/2015
© Pierre-Emmanuel Dupont, Daniel Joyner. All LCILP Briefs are for non-commercial research use only.
Distribution of content from this website for material interest, profit-making and/or commercial gain is strictly
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Brief 001/2015
Introduction
On 2 March 2015, a Joint Statement1 was delivered by EU High Representative Federica
Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif. It marked a decisive step towards the
successful outcome of the negotiations held for several years, and lastly in Lausanne
(Switzerland) between the E3+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom and the United States) and the Islamic Republic of Iran, aiming at ‘reaching a
comprehensive resolution that will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian
nuclear programme and the comprehensive lifting of all sanctions’. 2
The Joint Statement mentioned that the parties had ‘reached solutions on key parameters of a
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’.3 On that basis, the final text of the JCPOA
remains to be written, including its technical details, ‘at the political and experts levels’ 4, and
is expected to be agreed by 30 June 2015. This agreement on a solution to the Iranian nuclear
controversy comes after years of unsuccessful negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme5
and the imposition of sanctions against Iran by the UN Security Council, and unilaterally by
both the European Union and the United States.6 The path to a peaceful resolution of the crisis
had been paved in November 2013, when agreement was reached in Geneva on a Joint Plan of
Action (JPOA) which provided for an interim period during which confidence-building
measures were to be implemented by Iran in exchange for a suspension of some US and EU
sanctions.7
See ‘Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad
Zarif’, 2 April 2014, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150402_03_en.htm
1
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
For detailed treatment of the Iranian nuclear controversy, see e.g. S.N. Kile, ‘Nuclear arms control and nonproliferation’, in SIPRI Yearbook 2011. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (2011), 381; P.E.
Dupont, ‘The EU-Iran dialogue in the context of the nuclear crisis’ 3 Central European Journal of International
and Security Studies (2012) 97; N. Jansen Calamita, ‘Sanctions, Countermeasures, and the Iranian Nuclear Issue’
42 Vanderbildt Journal of Transnational Law (2009) 1393; Dupont, ‘Compliance with Treaties in the Context of
Nuclear Non-proliferation: Assessing Claims in the Case of Iran’ J Conflict Security Law (2014) 19(2) 161-210;
T. Rauf and R. Kelley, ‘Nuclear Verification in Iran’, Arms Control Today, September 2014, 8-17.
5
See e.g. P.E. Dupont, ‘Countermeasures and Collective Security: the Case of the EU Sanctions against Iran’
(2012) 17 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 301-336.
6
7
Joint Plan of Action, signed in Geneva, 24 November 2013, full text in 53 International Legal Materials 736
(2014), with a comprehensive Introductory note by H. Abtahi, 53 ILM 732 (2014), and at
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf. The duration of the interim period of the JPOA
had been extended by mutual agreement: see P.E. Dupont, ‘The Extension of the E3+3/Iran Joint Plan of Action’
LCILP Consultant Publications, 001/2014, available at http://www.lcilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/PierreEmmanuel-Dupont-Publication-updated5.pdf
Brief 001/2015
Key points on the future JCPOA
The agreed basis of the JCPOA, according to the Joint Statement, consists of the following
key parameters:
On Iran’s side:
-
As Iran pursues a peaceful nuclear programme, its enrichment capacity, enrichment
level and stockpile will be limited for specified durations, and there will be no other
enrichment facility other than Natanz. Iran's research and development on centrifuges
will be carried out according to the scope and schedule that has been mutually agreed.
-
Fordow will be converted from an enrichment site into a nuclear, physics and
technology centre. International collaboration will be encouraged in agreed areas of
research. There will not be any fissile material at Fordow.
-
An international joint venture will assist Iran in redesigning and rebuilding a
modernized Heavy Water Research Reactor in Arak. The reactor will not produce
weapons grade plutonium. There will be no reprocessing and the spent fuel will be
exported.
-
A set of measures have been agreed to monitor the provisions of the JCPOA, including
implementation of the modified Code 3.1 and provisional application of the Additional
Protocol. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be permitted the use
of modern technologies and will have enhanced access through agreed procedures,
including to clarify past and present issues.
-
Iran will take part in international cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy
which can include supply of power and research reactors. Another important area of
cooperation will be in the field of nuclear safety and security.
On the E3+3 side:
-
The EU will terminate the implementation of all nuclear-related economic and
financial sanctions and the US will cease the application of all nuclear-related
secondary economic and financial sanctions, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified
implementation by Iran of its key nuclear commitments.
-
A new UN Security Council Resolution will endorse the JCPOA, terminate all
previous nuclear-related resolutions and incorporate certain restrictive measures for a
mutually agreed period of time.
Brief 001/2015
Evaluation
The most important point of the agreement appears to be the recognition of Iran’s right to
proceed with uranium enrichment, which has until now proven to be the main point of
contention between Iran and some of its negotiating partners. The comprehensive solution
contemplated by the JCPOA in 2013 was supposed to ‘enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity
with its obligations therein’, and made clear that ‘[t]his comprehensive solution would involve
a mutually defined enrichment programme with practical limits and transparency measures to
ensure the peaceful nature of the programme’. The JCPOA will be in line with this provision,
as according to the Joint Statement it shall provide for Iran’s enrichment capacity, even if
such capacity is to be ‘limited for specified durations’ and there will be ‘no other enrichment
facility than Natanz’.
Regarding the sanctions in force against Iran and their lifting, an evaluation of the legal
aspects and implications of such termination will need to be undertaken, especially as regards
the impact of the lifting of sanctions on the performance of commercial contracts previously
affected, the legal status of persons and entities previously affected by sanctions, the fate of
pending judicial or arbitral proceedings related to sanctions, as well as issues of damages and
compensation.
On a more general level, it is likely that the final solution that the JCPOA is purposed to
outline, being the product of a political agreement, will leave unanswered some very
important questions related to the qualification and the lawfulness under international law of
the sanctions adopted during the previous years against Iran by the Security Council, the US
and the EU.
Other questions of continuing legal controversy include whether Iran has violated its legal
obligations under both the NPT and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and whether the
IAEA has acted within its legal authority in assessing these questions.
These legal questions have significance not only for the continuing case of the dispute
between Iran and the West over its nuclear program, but also for other cases of disputed
application of international law to civilian nuclear energy programmes.