The North Atlantic Council
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)
Study Guide
Contents Topic A: Facing increasing Russian aggression ....................................................................................... 2 Introduction to the Issue ................................................................................................................... 2 History of the Problem ....................................................................................................................... 2 The Cold War ................................................................................................................................. 2 Russo-­‐Georgian War 2008 ............................................................................................................. 3 Current Situation ............................................................................................................................... 4 Ukraine and Crimea – Crisis Breakdown ........................................................................................ 4 Other Fears of Russian Aggression ................................................................................................ 7 Measures Taken in the Crisis ............................................................................................................. 8 Past resolutions and country positions .............................................................................................. 8 Questions a resolution should answer ............................................................................................. 10 Topic B: Operation Resolute Support: NATO in Afghanistan 2015 and beyond .................................. 12 History .............................................................................................................................................. 12 Soviet War in Afghanistan ............................................................................................................ 13 Taliban insurgence, 9/11, and the Bonn Agreement ................................................................... 13 The Continuing Conflict ................................................................................................................ 14 The Exit Strategy .......................................................................................................................... 15 Current Situation ............................................................................................................................. 16 Operation Resolute Support’s Goals and Aims ............................................................................ 18 Past resolutions and country positions ............................................................................................ 18 Questions a resolution should answer ............................................................................................. 19 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................... 19 Chair introductions .............................................................................................................................. 22 Imran Bhaluani – Director ................................................................................................................ 22 Joe Carroll – Assistant Director ........................................................................................................ 22 George Mullens -­‐ Assistant Director ................................................................................................ 22 © London International Model United Nations 2015
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Topic A: Facing increasing Russian aggression Introduction to the Issue NATO was founded in 1949 to face the threat of the Soviet Union in Europe; despite accusations of NATO’s increasing irrelevance after the end of the Cold War, history is repeating itself as we see Russia increasingly bolstering its activity, both politically and militarily, in Eastern Europe. Russia’s actions in Georgia, Ukraine and Crimea have been met with outrage from the international and particularly European communities, accusing them of infringing on the sovereignty of nations and overusing their power. However, these actions have also called into question other more complex issues such as self-­‐determination and under what grounds a people can be seen as legitimately separate from their home state. The instability in Eastern Europe caused by Russia’s increased activity affects all NATO nations from the UK to Turkey. Political manoeuvres and military activity have both escalated, e.g. through increased reconnaissance flights. The goal of the committee is now to respond to the situation at hand and Russia’s actions, and to form the next step for NATO operations and goals in Eastern Europe. History of the Problem The Cold War The Cold War is the clear starting point when analysing Russian expansion, as the Soviet Union expanded its borders after World War II to include most countries in what we today call Eastern Europe. The Cold War was in simple terms an ideological war between the two models of Capitalism and Communism, and lasted from the end of the Second World War until the early 1990s and the fall of the Soviet Union following Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of Perestroika. While no wars were fought directly on European soil between the two sides, there were conflicts and proxy wars around the world where the two sides fought each other through local actors. © London International Model United Nations 2015
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Map showing the Soviet Union countries in Eastern Europe following the Second World War Key examples of this include the Korean War, Vietnam, and Afghanistan where either side was directly involved in a local war fighting a regime of the opposing allegiance. There were also a number of internal conflicts such as the Czechoslovakian and Hungarian uprisings, in addition to several peoples in Europe rising up against their oppressive governments. While the details of these conflicts may be pertinent to the members of the committee whose history includes these incidents, they will not be discussed in detail here. Instead what is key to consider is that many Eastern European countries used to physically be part of the Soviet Union’s territory and almost completely under their control. This has clear consequences for the present day, as the dissolution of the Soviet Union was only around 20 years ago, leaving the memory of the Union fresh in the national and political consciousness of Russia and former Soviet states in Eastern Europe. It is worth remembering that Russia’s current president Vladimir Putin was born in the golden period of the Soviet Union in 1952, and has referred to its collapse as a ‘catastrophe’.2 Delegates should keep in mind the recent history of Eastern Europe when looking at Russia’s attempts to expand its influence, especially given that NATO’s original intention was as a military union of Western powers against the Soviet threat.3 Russo-­‐Georgian War 2008 In 2008 tensions between NATO and the Russian Federation reached a climax during the war between Russia and Georgia. The conflict had two main triggers: the consideration of Georgia and Ukraine for NATO membership, and the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia that identified themselves as Russian. © London International Model United Nations 2015
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Tensions steadily grew throughout 2008 following NATO’s statement that it would review Ukraine and Georgia’s cases in December of that year. A Georgian reconnaissance drone was shot down over Abkhazia, and thousands of Russian forces entered the reason under the guise of peacekeepers, leading to Georgian outcry. Following the blowing up of a Georgian police van with an IED in July, violence between Georgia and South Ossetia quickly escalated, with South Ossetia being backed by Russia’s 58th army.4 Following approximately a month of fighting between the two sides, Russian forces began to retreat in late August after agreeing to maintain buffer zones in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russo-­‐Georgian war is a key element of this topic, as it was a clear show of Russian military intervention in response to the wishes of a country in its sphere of influence to join NATO. Around the same time Ukraine’s participation in NATO was also being considered, and the war in Georgia can be seen as the precursor to Russian involvement in Ukraine. Considering the different perspectives and facts at play in this conflict and several parallels emerge with the current crisis in Ukraine. At the time, Russian media outlets suggested that Russia was being unfairly encircled by NATO. In South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which bordered Russia, lived many Russian passport holders (some of these quite recently) who the Russian government claimed were being prosecuted and needed protection from Russian armed forces. Conversely, the West saw Georgian accession to NATO as an exercise of freedom by a like-­‐minded nation. They saw the handing out of Russian passports as little more than a pretence for Russia to destabilise Georgia to avoid losing influence in a former Soviet state. Current Situation Ukraine and Crimea – Crisis Breakdown The Ukrainian crisis is arguably the most significant event in Europe of the 21st Century, and is still a contentious issue for the international community. Delegates are highly encouraged to do their own research on the crisis with particular regard to their own country’s involvement, outside of the general overview of this guide. The crisis began in 2013 when the pro-­‐Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, abandoned talks with the European Union over an Association Agreement in favour of stronger ties with Moscow.5 In opposition to the move, there were large-­‐scale protests across Kiev and by December 800,000 people occupied City Hall and Independence Square.6 © London International Model United Nations 2015
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One of the famous before and after pictures of Independence Square following the riots in Kiev. In January 2014 the protests spread across the country to other parts of Western Ukraine, which has traditionally been more pro-­‐European since the fall of the Soviet Union. On 20th February violence peaked as 88 people are killed in 48 hours in Kiev following harsh anti-­‐protest laws being passed. As a result of the clashes hundreds are wounded and government buildings are captured by rioters. Following this, parliament voted out President Yanukovych setting new elections for May, disbands the police unit blamed for many of the deaths and considers abolishing Russian as Ukraine’s second official language. This prompts outrage and counter-­‐protests in pro-­‐Russian Eastern regions of Ukraine. In late February, pro-­‐Russian forces seized key buildings in the Crimean capital of Simferopol. Crimea’s population of 2.3m mostly identify as ethnic Russian, following centuries of Russian involvement in the region both politically and militarily. It is later confirmed by Russia that its forces aided the rebels in taking control of the region.8 The following month the Crimean government voted to join Russia and a referendum was called, with supposedly 97% of voters voting pro-­‐Russia. This is later accused to be fabricated, with in fact only 50-­‐60% of voters favouring Russia.9 The international community responded to the Crimean referendum with sanctions including travel bans and freezing of assets, with the US, Canada and EU imposing these the day after the referendum.10 They cited the national sovereignty of Ukraine, the UN Charter and the Budapest Memorandum as documents infringed upon by the annexation. This was the first major step from the international community in the crisis. In April the separatist movement went east with the regions of Luhansk and Donetsk beginning to talk about gaining greater autonomy from Ukraine. There were also Russian military movements along the border with Ukraine in these regions. Following referendums in April, both Luhansk and Donetsk declare themselves independent ‘peoples’ republics’ with no recognition from the West or Ukraine, and mounting fears about a second Russian annexation. © London International Model United Nations 2015
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Map showing areas that declared independence following the May referendums. On the 25th May Presidential elections are held in Ukraine (although no polling stations were opened in Donetsk) and Petro Poroshenko is elected President. Following a short peace after the election, fighting in the east pushes the rebels into a smaller region containing the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. On 17th July 2014 Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 is shot down over the rebel territory, killing all 298 passengers aboard. The West immediately blames a Russian-­‐supplied missile to the rebels for the tragedy, while Russia insists a Ukrainian jet was involved. In the wake of this tragedy, accusations about Russia’s involvement in the conflict grow, with Ukraine insisting that Russia is supplying some highly trained forces as well as heavy weaponry to the rebels. Despite Russia vehemently denying this, it is confirmed by Alexander Zakharchenko (the leader of the Donetsk rebels) that thousands of Russians are aiding the forces in the east.12 Later in 2014, fighting continues, with a ceasefire called in Minsk being largely ignored and fighting beginning to intensify particularly around the airport in Donetsk. In October a new Parliament is elected in Ukraine which emerges as pro-­‐West, however this is boycotted by the rebels who hold their own elections in November. In early 2015 Donetsk Airport fell to the rebels, marking a major victory. However, the long term fighting on the site renders the airport largely useless aside from a morale boost. Fighting shifted to the town of Debaltseve, a major transport link between the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. February saw a diplomatic drive to end the conflict, and in February the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany met in Belarus to discuss terms. After reportedly marathon negotiations, a final © London International Model United Nations 2015
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agreement was made on 12 February, including plans for buffer zones and weapons withdrawals on both sides, and the deal is also signed by the rebel forces. At the time of writing, the ceasefires appear to have had little consequence; fighting continues in Eastern Ukraine and particularly around the town of Debaltseve, and the EU has threatened Russia with further sanctions if the peace deal is not respected. Other Fears of Russian Aggression With Russia becoming extremely involved in the Ukrainian Crisis and going as far as annexing Crimea, governments in other former Soviet states have expressed fear and uncertainty about potential Russian activity in the future – some of them calling upon NATO to station more troops in the Baltics. Latvia held elections in 2014 and voted in Nil Ushakov,13 an ethnic Russian, and with © London International Model United Nations 2015
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Russia vocally supporting the rights of ethnic Russians abroad this could lead to interesting developments in the future. Bulgaria also fears that it could be next on Russia’s agenda, as it has an extremely heavy reliance on Russian energy and yet has a Western-­‐favouring government.14 Russia has also been dramatically increasing reconnaissance flights across northern Europe, prompting enormous anger from many European nations such as Finland. 15 These flights often violate national airspace and have widely been regarded as a Cold War style act of aggression, often leading to the scrambling of NATO military jets to intercept and escort the aircraft.16 Measures Taken in the Crisis The primary form of Western and NATO involvement with recent Russian aggression has been public condemnation and sanctioning. Throughout the Ukrainian crisis NATO powers in alignment with the EU imposed heavy economic sanctions on Russia that are widely accepted as one of the causes of the current financial crisis in Russia. The sanctions have targeted many individuals in an effort to weaken the government’s support as well as encourage internal pressure to end the conflict. In addition, particular essential industries such as energy, arms trading and state finance have been targeted to increase pressure on the Russian state.17 Long term loans in the EU, arms deals and many aspects of oil trading are now severely limited. Such Western sanctions have encouraged the Russian state to look to China and other Asian countries for financing and energy markets. The second form of dealing with the crisis has been public condemnation of Russia and its increasing aggression. Barak Obama has referred to Russia as a bigger nation bullying smaller ones,18 Finland spoke out against the Cold War style actions of Russia in its territory, and the EU has issued several statements throughout the Ukrainian crisis thoroughly deploring Russia’s actions. Up until this point, military intervention in Eastern Europe has not been a measure considered by any of the NATO powers officially, and instead the response to the issues has remained largely rhetorical. However, it is not out of the question that following any future escalations nations may consider military action. It is also interesting to note that the EU is issuing statements on military issues for the first time in its history, and it may be possible that should Russia further escalate their aggressive actions an EU military response may come about. Past resolutions and country positions NATO resolutions On 24 November 2014, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly passed Resolution 411 dealing with Ukraine19. The Resolution emphasised NATO’s “obligation to support Ukrainian’s struggle for its territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as its chosen pathway towards greater Euro-­‐Atlantic integration”; condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea and involvement in Eastern Ukraine; © London International Model United Nations 2015
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affirmed support for the Ukrainian government and elections; reaffirmed that Ukraine and Georgia would receive NATO membership when the membership criteria are met; called upon NATO governments to support a diplomatic solution while countering Russian misinformation; and finally called upon Russia to stop destabilising Ukraine and engage with the government to reach a peaceful settlement. Relevant country positions Ukraine. Ukraine has had varied levels of engagement with NATO depending on the leanings of the government of the day. Ukraine applied to join the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 2008 but then reversed and officially maintained a non-­‐aligned position under Viktor Yanukovych. Following the fall of the Yanukovych government and Russian intervention in Ukraine, the new interim government dropped its non-­‐aligned status 20 and suggested that it would seek NATO membership21. The priority of the government, however, remains finding a solution to the current crisis and restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The current president Petro Poroshenko has said that the crisis will “spiral out of control” without a diplomatic solution soon, and that he is ready to take all necessary means to ensure security, including the introduction of martial law22. Germany. As the leading power in the EU, Germany has a central role to play in NATO’s positioning on Russia. Germany has historic, economic, and cultural ties with Russia which are far more extensive than those of some other NATO members. Since the Russo-­‐Georgian war, the German government has been very cautious about further NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe (some have suggested that Angela Merkel opposed NATO expansion to include Georgia). Angela Merkel has made a series of stronger condemning statements against Russia since the Ukraine crisis erupted, for instance by suggesting that further sanctions against Russia could be brought if the crisis is not resolved23, however she has stopped short of supporting “lethal aid” to Ukraine. In other public comments, she has maintained the need for a diplomatic solution in Ukraine based on the peace settlements that have been negotiated with Russia. Russia. The Russian government has generally protested as further NATO expansion into Eastern Europe since the early 2000s, arguing that it would simply destabilise Europe. The government has insisted that the uprising against the old Ukrainian government was an illegal coup, which is the cause for the current instability. The government has also insisted on the non-­‐aligned status of Ukraine to avoid further instability in Europe. President Putin has referred to the Ukrainian army as a “foreign legion” of NATO – remarks which NATO Secretary-­‐General Jens Stoltenberg dismissed as “nonsense”24 – and has accused the interim government of supporting neo-­‐Nazi extremists intent on exterminating Russian-­‐speaking people in eastern Ukraine25. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has also accused the Kiev government of trying “to derail the peace process”. United States of America. The Obama administration was quick to support the new Ukrainian government after it came to power, and equally quick to lay blame Russia for instability in Eastern Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea, using satellite imagery to show “deep Russian involvement,” including arms and troops26. The Obama administration has been an active participant in recent negotiations rounds with Ukraine, Germany, France, and Russia. They have yet to decide whether to © London International Model United Nations 2015
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support the idea of providing weapons to the Ukrainian government. In reference to Russia’s position, Obama said in a CNN interview on 3 February 2015: “What is absolutely true is that if you have a leader who continually drives past the off ramps that we've provided, given the size of the Russian military, given the fact that Ukraine is not a NATO country and so as a consequence there are clear limits in terms of what we would do militarily, you know, Mr. Putin has not been stopped so far”27 Questions a resolution should answer •
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Should NATO provide military support to the Ukrainian government, not a NATO member? If so, what level of support is appropriate? To what extent do Russia’s actions in Ukraine require a new approach to European security by NATO? What role should diplomatic means play versus military means? Are there any countries that should be fast-­‐tracked to NATO membership or should NATO offer to put in place a moratorium on future expansion to ease tensions with Russia? What military actions are necessary to counter the threat of increased Russian aggression – including cyber-­‐attacks and embargoes – against the Eastern European members of the alliance? Should NATO troops and equipment be moved to be stationed in the Baltics? What should NATO’s position be on the status of Crimea? How can NATO and the EU work together to reach a common military, political, and economic position? Which organisation should take the lead for future military leadership in Europe? 1
http://althistory.wikia.com/wiki/File:Soviet_influence_in_europe.png http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-­‐26769481 3
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independence-­‐square/ 8
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separatists-­‐n82756 9
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http://eur-­‐lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:078:0016:0021:EN:PDF http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐europe-­‐27308526 12
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dangerous-­‐military-­‐encounters-­‐-­‐report-­‐9850549.html 16
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http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐europe-­‐28400218 18
http://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-­‐aggression-­‐western-­‐talk-­‐1421971435 19
http://www.voltairenet.org/article186140.html 20
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1419339226 21
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http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-­‐crisis-­‐president-­‐petro-­‐poroshenko-­‐warns-­‐he-­‐
is-­‐ready-­‐to-­‐impose-­‐martial-­‐law-­‐as-­‐he-­‐arrives-­‐in-­‐belarus-­‐for-­‐talks-­‐10039975.html 23
http://uatoday.tv/politics/angela-­‐merkel-­‐says-­‐sanctions-­‐on-­‐russia-­‐scheduled-­‐for-­‐monday-­‐will-­‐come-­‐into-­‐
force-­‐409146.html 24
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http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/02/politics/us-­‐ukraine-­‐lethal-­‐aid/ 11
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Topic B: Operation Resolute Support: NATO in Afghanistan 2015 and beyond 28
Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan History For large parts of its history, Afghanistan has been subject to numerous invasions which eventually led Afghanistan to being called the “Graveyard for Empires”29. For thousands of years, many of the world’s largest and most powerful nations have attempted to control Afghanistan, from Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan to the British Empire and the Soviet Union. In the 19th century, Afghanistan eventually became the fulcrum of British and Russian attempts to gain control over Central Asia and India. These attempts to control Afghanistan eventually resulted in the first Afghan War from 1839-­‐42 and the second Afghan War from 1878-­‐81. In both of these instances, the British Empire failed for a number of reasons. According to Louis Dupree, the premier historian on Afghanistan, the British failed in Afghanistan for four principal reasons: “the occupation of Afghan territory by foreign troops, the placing of an unpopular emir on the throne, the harsh acts of the British-­‐supported Afghans against their local enemies, and the reduction of the subsidies paid to the tribal chiefs by British political agents.”30 These mistakes would be repeated in the second Afghan War and by the Soviet Union over a hundred years later. A third Afghan war was fought in 1917, it did not give the British any control over the country. After this war, the country returned to infighting within the different ethnic groups and war lords. By the 1970s, Afghanistan had become a scant memory for many western powers. However, it was the deposition of the last King of Afghanistan in 1973 which resulted in the perpetual cycle of war which is still going on to this very day. 12
Soviet War in Afghanistan The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 is seen as a crucial event in the Cold War31. The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan constituted the largest ever Soviet military action since the Second World War and eventually resulted in conditions which forced Gorbachev to seek re-­‐
engagement with the West. The invasion of Afghanistan occurred for a variety of reasons. Firstly, there was a large amount of infighting within the People’s Democratic Party (PDPA) due to the assassination of the Soviet backed Prime Minister Taraki32. The invasion occurred due to the lack of trust between the Soviet regime and the soviet-­‐backed government in Kabul. There were several attempts to implement a more communist system with legal and land reforms. However, these reforms resulted in an insurgency between the local populace and the Soviet fighters due to an unpopular government. It was clear that the atheist Soviet backed government would struggle to keep support in a predominantly muslim country where the staunchly conservative rebel fighters, the Mujahideen (soldiers of God) would increasingly threaten the Soviet government. This eventually led to the backing of the Mujahideen by the United States government33. The Carter administration decided to denounce the Soviet aggression and enacted economic and trade embargoes against the Soviet Union, even calling for the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. The conflict would last ten years and would in many ways signify the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow finally withdrew at the cost of billions of dollars and millions of lives. The Soviets left a country which had been shattered by a prolonged and painful insurgency in which the Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic group, seized control and provided terrorist groups and leaders such as Osama bin Laden with a base to launch terrorist operations worldwide. Taliban insurgence, 9/11, and the Bonn Agreement After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, the Communist government collapsed. Indeed, with an abundance of Soviet arms still remaining in Afghanistan, the local warlords continued to fight amongst each other. The Taliban insurgency was marked with the oppression of religious and ethnic minorities along with the institutionalisation of Sharia Law. With a lack of appetite to intervene in Afghanistan, their power remained unchecked during the 1990s. 13
Taliban fighters in Afghanistan34 In retaliation for the 9/11 attacks, the United States, along with support from other NATO members, invaded Afghanistan in order to overthrown the Taliban regime35. The Northern Alliance along with other anti-­‐Taliban forces managed to recapture vast areas of Northern Afghanistan. Within three months, the Northern Alliance managed to capture Kabul. By the end of the year, the Northern Alliance had managed to reclaim the majority of the country. The shattered Taliban had retreated south. For once it seemed that the Northern Alliance would be able to start with its reconstruction projects. This progress resulted in the Bonn Conference of December 2001 in which the UN gathered all the non-­‐Taliban opposition groups to discuss a variety of future frameworks36. These frameworks led to the transitional government and eventually the first democratic elections held in Afghanistan in 2004. The Continuing Conflict 14
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NATO coalition troops and locations in Afghanistan The newly formed International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) had continued to crack down on the remnants of the Taliban in Afghanistan. These large scale operations had been successful at first but their momentum had not been sustained due to the distraction of the Iraq War to the coalition forces. Many Taliban fighters had withdrawn back to Pakistan where supposedly the Pakistani Intelligence Services had helped train and supply many Taliban fighters38. With the distraction of Iraq, the Taliban had been able to recover to a certain extent. Many attacks on coalition forces occurred in isolation rather than attempting to have a full blown conflict. Tactics such as attacking isolated outposts, using suicide bombers and roadside bombs had been preferred in order to avoid direct confrontation with the heavily armed Coalition forces. The continued guerrilla style tactics resulted in a prolonged war in which the tactics changed, with the United States beginning to increase its use of drones for surveillance, reconnaissance and targeted drone strikes against key Taliban leaders and commanders. Some of these attacks occurred on Pakistani soil, resulting in an outcry against the United States and a deterioration in American-­‐
Pakistani relations. The Exit Strategy With the end of George W. Bush’s presidency and the election of President Barack Obama in 2008, the President promised to end the war in Afghanistan and aimed to “dismantle, disrupt and defeat Al-­‐Qaeda”39. The President aimed to build an effective and stable Afghan government rather than completely reconstruct the government as ‘it is Afghans who must build their nation’40. Obama essentially increased the US presence in Afghanistan through a new military escalation to reverse the Taliban momentum41. This new escalation of the conflict coincided with the height of the Taliban 15
insurgency and by 2010 and 2011, coalition casualties in those two years were much heavier than throughout the previous years of the conflict. The United States aimed to promote social and economic development along with a civilian insurgency to give the Afghan state a sense of legitimacy. 42
NATO ISAF troops in Afghanistan The US initiative was combined with strong leadership from NATO in order to help the transition to the Afghan government. By 2011, Obama announced the start of the withdrawal of US troops in Afghanistan43. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan began “according to the initial plan by which NATO and the United States had been preparing for a gradual transition to Afghan self-­‐reliance with regards to all three pillars: security, governance and development”44. The issue which this brought in practice was that the United States and NATO gave a quick transfer of power to an Afghan government which still lacked democratic legitimacy and security resources. Current Situation While progress has arguably been made in improving the economy and capability of the government since the start of NATO’s involvement, the starting point for Afghanistan was extremely low following the Taliban’s rule in the 1990s which gave little consideration to economic growth or societal development. Yet NATO could not stay indefinitely in Afghanistan, and in recent years steps have been taken to withdraw most of the coalition troops to hand power back to the central government. At the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO members agreed that it would end its presence in Afghanistan by 201445, agreeing to leave Afghanistan to the Afghan forces so that they could become fully responsible for security across their country. The Summit was vitally important, it set a final date for transition to Afghan self-­‐rule and the withdrawal of NATO troops. The issue which this strategy brought it that it based on leaving Afghanistan by a certain date rather than looking at the actual conditions which Afghanistan was left in. However, the future of the central state and democracy in Afghanistan is far from certain. NATO allies described holding the elections in Afghanistan as a crucial landmark. However, the 2009 and 2010 elections were filled with claims of political corruption, along with the stuffing of ballot boxes by various candidates. With voter turnout being lower than in previous elections, it is far from certain that the Afghan state will survive and thrive by 2024. Indeed, some critics say that these elections destroyed any “illusion that a realistic transition to some sort of centralised, responsive state would be possible”46. 16
Indeed, prior to the withdrawal of Allied forces, the Allied commanders and diplomats who arrived in Afghanistan in January 2002 were amazed by the devastation brought to Afghanistan by two decades of war47. Afghanistan had been left in a terrible state after the authoritarian Taliban rule with years of economic mismanagement, the Afghan economy had been left in a state of collapse. Afghanistan was left with a population which was largely illiterate with only 30% of people being literate48 and 80 per cent of schools had been destroyed by years of constant conflict. The Taliban had significantly limited the opportunities available to women and had completely restricted all female education. The costs of the war in Afghanistan have been considerable; for the United States, the war has gone on for more than ten years, with estimates stating that the United States has spent over $1 trillion in Afghanistan49. Spring 2011 marked three decades of continuous war in Afghanistan. Indeed, despite constant funds from western backers, the Afghan government still has little control over rural areas in Afghanistan. Criticism of the aid given has been mounting with critics stating that areas such as Bamiyan and Balkh complaining that “80% of international aid has flowed to the restive provinces, ignoring the needs of poor Afghans in peaceful areas”50. Although Afghanistan still suffers from severe democratic deficits, the country has progressed in areas not related to political development. Whereas nothing seems to have altered the systemic corruption in all layers of the Afghan state and the prevalence of electoral fraud51, there has been a quadrupling of GDP, a massive increase in literacy races and success in the recruitment for Afghanistan’s security sectors. Although NATO can provide capital and coercion, it cannot offer either national leadership or legitimacy in building the Afghan state. Indeed, the current Afghan government lacks basic fiscal capabilities which would allow it to enact policies outside of Kabul with governance in remote areas still proving to be a challenge52. Foreign assistance still accounts for around 90-­‐95 per cent of the entire state budget 53 and development expenditures. It is clear that if Afghanistan is going to succeed beyond Operation Resolute, it must get past its need for foreign assistance. On top of Operation Resolute support, NATO continue to operate counter-­‐terrorist missions in the region through drone strikes, amongst other means. On 9 February 2015, NATO confirmed that a NATO drone strike had killed Taleban leader Abdul Rauf who has pledged support for Islamic State54. 17
U.S. troops in Afghanistan55 Operation Resolute Support’s Goals and Aims Afghanistan clearly still faces many challenges, not only in the realm of political governance, but also security challenges56. NATO engagement post-­‐2014 will have three inter-­‐related components: “a NATO-­‐led Resolute Support mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions; a contribution to the broad effort of financial sustainment of Afghan security forces and institutions; and the NATO-­‐Afghanistan Enduring Partnership.” The Resolute Support Mission is a non-­‐combat, NATO led mission which is designed to allow the Afghan government to provide for its national security in a sustainable way57; it involves “training, advising and assistance activities”58. In a NATO document on its commitment to Afghanistan, NATO outlines 4 major functions of the mission: 1.
2.
3.
4.
“Supporting planning, programming and budgeting, Assuring transparency, accountability and oversight, Supporting the adherence to the principles of rule of law and good governance, Supporting the establishment and sustainment of such processes as force generation, recruiting, training, managing and development of personnel.” 59 The operation will have approximately 12,000 personnel from NATO allies and Partners. The mission was approved by Foreign Ministers from NATO members and partners. Past resolutions and country positions NATO Operation Resolute Support and the UNSC. NATO Operation Resolute Support was approved by NATO foreign ministers in June 2014 to follow the end of the multinational mission of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)60. It came into force after approval of a joint NATO-­‐
Afghan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which was signed in Kabul on 30 September 2014. It confirms NATO’s continued involvement in Afghanistan through a training and support mission of 12,000 NATO and non-­‐NATO personnel (see above for more details). The Operation has the support of the United Nation Security Council after the unanimous adoption on 12 December 2014 of UNSC Resolution 2189. Afghanistan. The Afghan government remains fragile. At the most recent NATO foreign minister’s regular summit on 5 February 2015, there was no representative to update the committee on the situation in Afghanistan because the government’s defence minister had not been confirmed by the lower house of the parliament61. It will be imperative for the Afghan government to do all it can to remain on the agenda of NATO governments which have lately had their attention focused on combatting Russian aggression and Islamic State. United States of America. Obama marked the end of combat operations in Afghanistan involving US troops in December 2014, however 10,000 U.S. troops remained as part of the NATO mission. There have been suggestions that the U.S. is looking to halve this number by the end of 2015, which raises questions for the capability of the NATO mission to fulfil its mission in the face of increasing threats from Islamic State and a potentially resurgent Taliban62. The administration expressed its confidence in the ability of the government to secure Kabul (but not the entire territory of Afghanistan)63. The 18
government will be keen to minimise its exposure to risk in Afghanistan while also attempting to avoid a relapse to violence, insecurity, and support for international terrorism from bases in Afghanistan (as some have suggested that the quick withdrawal from Iraq led to this outcome). This is a difficult balance. China. China has key interests in a stable Afghanistan as an illustration of China’s ability to play a greater regional security role in Asia. In December 2014, three way talks were held in London between the U.S., China, and Afghanistan. This followed an official visit by the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to Beijing in October 2014, and a visit by the Afghan Taliban to Beijing also in December 2014. China appears to be exploring options for a security role in Beijing to complement the $300m in economic aid that it has promised over the next 2 years – without contradicting the U.S. security presence in the region64. China has ruled out sending troops, unless they are part of a United Nations peacekeeping force. Questions a resolution should answer •
•
•
•
•
•
What actions can NATO take to support the Afghani government? Should NATO revisit the option of providing lethal aid? What conditions should NATO place on the government for continuing its support? What mix of military and training activities are needed in Afghanistan? How should NATO respond to the resurgence of the Taliban and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan? Should NATO revisit its strategy for involvement in Afghanistan after 2015 and 2025? How can NATO involve other regional and global powers in securing a prosperous future for Afghanistan? Bibliography Bearden, M. Afghanistan, Graveyard for Empires. Accessed 8/02/15. 2000. Available from: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57411/milton-­‐bearden/afghanistan-­‐graveyard-­‐of-­‐empires Gibbs, D. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Retrospect. International Politics 37 (2000), 233-­‐246 Morini, D. Why did the Soviet Union invade Afghanistan?. Accessed on 09/02/15. Available from: http://www.e-­‐ir.info/2010/01/03/the-­‐soviet-­‐union’s-­‐last-­‐war/ US Department of State. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. Response, 1978-­‐1980. Accessed on 10/02/15. Available from: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-­‐1980/soviet-­‐
invasion-­‐afghanistan 19
United Nations. The Bonn Agreement. Accessed on 10/02/15. Available from: http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un. org/files AF_011205_AgreementProvisionalArr angementsinAfghanistan%28en%29.pdf. Mezzofiore, G. 2014. Peshawar school attack: Has Pakistan ISI 'secret support for Taliban' backfired? Accessed on 10/02/15. Available from: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/peshawar-­‐school-­‐attack-­‐has-­‐
pakistan-­‐isi-­‐secret-­‐support-­‐taliban-­‐backfired-­‐1479762 White House. 2009. White Paper of Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. Accessed on 11/02/15. Available from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf Larsen, H. 2013. NATO in Afghanistan: Democratization warfare, national narratives and budgetary austerity. Accessed on 11/02/15. Available from: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/larsen-­‐
dp-­‐2013-­‐10.pdf Hill, M. Democracy Promotion and Conflict-­‐Based Reconstruction: The United States and Democratic Consolidation in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. (Oxon: Routledge, 2011) Collins, J. 2011. Understanding War in Afghanistan (Washington: National Defense University Press) Dyer, G. and Sorvino, C. 2014. $1tn cost of longest US war hastens retreat from military intervention. Accessed on 11/02/15. Available from: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/14be0e0c-­‐8255-­‐11e4-­‐ace7-­‐
00144feabdc0.html#slide0 Katzman, K. 2015. Afghanistan: Post-­‐Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy. (Washington: Congressional Research Service) NATO. 2014. NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan after 2014. Accessed on 11/02/15. Available from: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_09/20140901_140901-­‐Backgrounder-­‐
Afghanistan_en.pdf 28
Local Road Maps for Peace. 2014. Afghan People’s Dialogue on Peace: Building the Foundation for an Inclusive Peace Process. Accessed 11/02/15. Available from: http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Eng_%20Report%20-­‐
%20Afghan%20Peoples%20Dialogues.pdf 29
Bearden, M. Afghanistan, Graveyard for Empires. Accessed 8/02/15. 2000. Available from: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57411/milton-­‐bearden/afghanistan-­‐graveyard-­‐of-­‐empires 30
ibid 31
Gibbs, D. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Retrospect. International Politics 37 (2000), 233-­‐246 32
Morini, D. Why did the Soviet Union invade Afghanistan?. Accessed on 09/02/15. Available from: http://www.e-­‐ir.info/2010/01/03/the-­‐soviet-­‐union’s-­‐last-­‐war/ 33
US Department of State. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. Response, 1978-­‐1980. Accessed on 10/02/15. Available from: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-­‐1980/soviet-­‐invasion-­‐afghanistan 20
34
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9592715/Afghanistan-­‐war-­‐enters-­‐12th-­‐
year-­‐amid-­‐Taliban-­‐defiance.html 35
Farrell, T. and Giustozzi, A. The Taliban at war: inside the Helmand insurgency, 2004-­‐2012. International Affairs 89 (2013). 845-­‐871. 36
United Nations. The Bonn Agreement. Accessed on 10/02/15. Available from: http://unama.unmissions.org/portals/UNAMA/Documents/Bonn-­‐agreement.pdf 37
http://orientalreview.org/2013/05/06/nato-­‐and-­‐its-­‐future-­‐in-­‐post-­‐cold-­‐war-­‐scenario/ 38
Mezzofiore, G. 2014. Peshawar school attack: Has Pakistan ISI 'secret support for Taliban' backfired? Accessed on 10/02/15. Available from: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/peshawar-­‐school-­‐attack-­‐has-­‐pakistan-­‐isi-­‐
secret-­‐support-­‐taliban-­‐backfired-­‐1479762 39
White House. 2009. White Paper of Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. Accessed on 11/02/15. Available from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-­‐
Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf 40
ibid 41
Larsen, H. 2013. NATO in Afghanistan: Democratization warfare, national narratives and budgetary austerity. Accessed on 11/02/15. Available from: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/larsen-­‐dp-­‐2013-­‐
10.pdf 42
http://www.vocfm.co.za/us-­‐nato-­‐to-­‐mark-­‐end-­‐of-­‐afghanistan-­‐war/ 43
ibid 44
ibid 45
ibid 46
Hill, M. Democracy Promotion and Conflict-­‐Based Reconstruction: The United States and Democratic Consolidation in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. (Oxon: Routledge, 2011) 47
Collins, J. 2011. Understanding War in Afghanistan (Washington: National Defense University Press) 48
ibid 49
Dyer, G. and Sorvino, C. 2014. $1tn cost of longest US war hastens retreat from military intervention. Accessed on 11/02/15. Available from: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/14be0e0c-­‐8255-­‐11e4-­‐ace7-­‐
00144feabdc0.html#slide0 50
Katzman, K. 2015. Afghanistan: Post-­‐Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy. (Washington: Congressional Research Service) 51
Op. Cit., n11 52
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ibid 54
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐asia-­‐31290147 55
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NATO. 2014. NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan after 2014. Accessed on 11/02/15. Available from: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_09/20140901_140901-­‐Backgrounder-­‐
Afghanistan_en.pdf 57
ibid 58
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ibid 60
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm 61
http://www.khaama.com/afghanistan-­‐not-­‐on-­‐nato-­‐meeting-­‐agenda-­‐for-­‐the-­‐first-­‐time-­‐in-­‐13-­‐years-­‐9924 62
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http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-­‐u-­‐s-­‐exits-­‐china-­‐takes-­‐on-­‐afghanistan-­‐role-­‐1423539002 21
Chair introductions Imran Bhaluani – Director Dear Delegates, It is my pleasure to welcome you to NATO at LIMUN 2015. LIMUN has always been a highlight of my MUN calendar and I am sure that this year will be no different. I would encourage you to make the most of it by preparing well, taking part in the committee sessions, and making full use of the socials. I hope that you will find the weekend to be informative both in the topics that you will discuss and in the diversity of people that you will meet. I am a graduate of University College London, from where I have a master’s degree in International Public Policy, and Christ Church, Oxford, where I read a B.A. in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. MUN has been a constant interest of mine over my studies and has taken me all over Europe and beyond. If you have any questions please feel free to contact us at [email protected]. I look forward to meeting you all. Joe Carroll – Assistant Director I am a second year History student at King’s College London, originally from the West Midlands in the UK. I have been doing MUN for around a year and a half now, travelling around the UK and the world for conferences. It will be an absolute pleasure to co-­‐chair NATO this year at LIMUN, the size and the prestige of the conference always make it a special occasion in the MUN calendar, and the opportunity to discuss some of the most pressing issues for global security as part of one of the world’s most powerful organisations is one that all delegates should relish. I highly look forward to an exciting weekend of debate from all delegates. George Mullens -­‐ Assistant Director Dear delegates, My name is George and I am a third year Law with Politics student at the University of Sussex, I am British and Italian. I’ve been doing MUN since the age of 15, I am currently in my second term as President of the Model UN Society at the university, and I was the Secretary-­‐General of our first ever conference this year. This will actually be my first time attending LIMUN and it’s a great honour to be the Assistant Director and from what I’ve heard, it shall be an occasion to remember! I’m looking forward to meeting you all, the high quality debates and discussing some of the world’s most prevalent and important security issues. Regards, George Mullens 22