Emilie M. Hafner‐Burton, Susan D. Hyde, and
Ryan S. Jablonski
When do governments resort to election
violence?
Article (Accepted version)
(Refereed)
Original citation:
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Hyde, Susan D. and Jablonski, Ryan S. (2014) When do governments
resort to election violence? British Journal of Political Science, 44 (1). pp. 149-179. ISSN 14692112
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123412000671
© 2013 Cambridge University Press
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WhenDoGovernmentsResorttoElectionViolence?
EmilieM.Hafner‐Burton
AssociateProfessor
SchoolofInternationalRelationsandPacificStudies
UniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego
[email protected]
SusanD.Hyde
AssociateProfessor
DepartmentofPoliticalScience
YaleUniversity
[email protected]
RyanS.Jablonski
PhDCandidate
DepartmentofPoliticalScience
UniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego
[email protected]
ConditionallyacceptedattheBritishJournalofPoliticalScience,author‐final
version:September6,2012.
Abstract:Whenaregovernmentsmostlikelytouseelectionviolence,andwhat
factorscanmitigategovernmentincentivestoresorttoviolence?Howdothe
dynamicsofelectionviolencedifferinthepre‐andpost‐electionperiods?Our
centralargumentisthatanincumbent’sfearoflosingpowerastheresultofan
election,aswellasinstitutionalizedconstraintsontheincumbent’sdecision‐
makingpowers,arepivotalinherdecisiontouseelectionviolence.Whileitmay
seemobvioustosuggestthatincumbentsuseelectionviolenceinaneffortto
fendoffthreatstotheirpower,itisnotobvioushowtogaugethesethreats,anda
centralpurposeofourresearchistoidentifysourcesofinformationaboutthe
incumbent’spopularitythatcanhelppredictthelikelihoodofelectionviolence.
Theobservableimplicationsofourargumentaretestedusingnewlyavailable
cross‐nationalevidenceonelections,governmentuseofpre‐andpost‐election
violence,andpost‐electionprotestsfrom1981to2004.
1
WhenDoGovernmentsResorttoElectionViolence?1
Onpaper,Azerbaijanisamultipartydemocracy,andhasheldperiodic
multi‐partypresidentialandparliamentaryelectionssincethecountryregained
independencein1991.Despitethenominalexistenceofdemocraticinstitutions,
tacticsofelectoralmanipulationusedbythegovernmentincludeovertelection
fraud,violence,andintimidation.Oppositionsupporters,oppositioncandidates,
andjournalistsrisktorture,arbitraryarrest,andpoliticalimprisonment—all
strategiesthegovernmentusesto“win”elections.2Forexample,intherunupto
the2005parliamentaryelectionsinAzerbaijan,facingthepossibilitythatthe
“colourrevolutions”ofGeorgiaandUkrainewouldspread,thegovernment
arrestedjournalistsandattemptedtopreventtheoppositionfromcampaigning.
Thepolicedetainedoverathousandactivistsbeforetheelection,andjailed
hundredswithoutcause.3Aftertheelection,amidaccusationsoffraud,the
governmentannouncedthattherulingpartywonanoverwhelmingmajority,
1SupportforthisresearchwasprovidedbytheLaboratoryonInternationalLawandRegulation
attheUniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego,theWoodrowWilsonSchoolofPublicandInternational
AffairsatPrincetonUniversity,andtheMacMillanCenterforInternationalandAreaStudiesat
YaleUniversity.ReplicationdataandOnlineAppendixareavailableathttp://__________.For
helpfulcomments,wewouldliketothankparticipantsatworkshopsatUCSD,George
WashingtonUniversity,YaleUniversity,andpanelparticipantsatthe2010ISAannualmeeting,
aswellasJasonBrownlee,SarahBush,GaryCox,DavidCingranelli,DanielaDonno,Christian
Davenport,ThadDunning,,ChristopherFariss,TomFlores,DavidLake,EllenLust,Irfan
Nooruddin,PhilipRoeder,KenScheve,andSusanStokes.WealsothankSarahKnoesenand
MichaelPlouffeforvaluableresearchassistance.Anyerrorsoromissionsareourown.
2U.S.DepartmentofState2006a.
3Osborn2005.
2
withthenextlargestoppositioncoalitionwinningonlyeightparliamentary
seats.Reputableinternationalobservers,whodocumentedfraudinmorethan
43percentofobservedprecincts,condemnedtheelections.4Opposition
supportersbegantoprotesttheresults,assemblingmorethan7,000people.Riot
policeandmilitaryforcesdisbursedtheprotestersusingclubsandwater
cannons,andseveraloppositionpoliticianswerebeaten.5Intheend,despite
internationalanddomesticbacklash,theincumbentremainedinpower.6
Government‐sponsoredelectionviolence—eventsinwhichincumbent
leadersandrulingpartyagentsemployorthreatenviolenceagainstthepolitical
oppositionorpotentialvotersbefore,during,orafterelections—iscommon.
Figure1depictstheyearlynumberofelectionsinoursamplecharacterizedby
pre‐orpost‐electionviolencefrom1960to2010.Theprevalenceofelection
violenceraisesseveralquestions:Whenaregovernmentslikelytouseelection
violence?Andperhapsmoreimportantly,whatcanmitigatetheincentivestouse
violence?
Althoughpoliticalviolenceoccursinmanyforms,thisarticlefocuseson
theuseofelectionviolencebyincumbentgovernments.Governmentsarethe
mostcommon—andoftenthemostbrutal—perpetratorsofelectionviolence.7
Usingcross‐nationaldataonelectionsandstate‐sponsoredelectionviolence
4OSCE/ODIHR2006.
5U.S.DepartmentofState2006a.
6Valiyev2006.
7Althoughthereareotherperpetratorsofelectionviolence,theyarenotthefocusofthisarticle.
And,atleastinSub‐SaharanAfrica,thevastmajorityofelectionviolenceisperpetratedbythe
incumbentStrausandTaylor2012.
3
(includingthreatsofviolencesuchasharassment),wepresentandtestatheory
ofwhenanincumbentgovernmentislikelytouseelectionviolencepriortoor
afteranelection.Ourcentralargumentisthatanincumbent’sfearoflosing
powerastheresultofanelection,aswellasinstitutionalizedconstraintsonthe
incumbent’sdecision‐makingpowers,arepivotalinherdecisiontouseelection
violence.Whileitmayseemobvioustosuggestthatincumbentsuseelection
violenceinanefforttofendoffthreatstotheirpower,itisnotobvioushowto
gaugethesethreats,andacentralpurposeofourresearchistoidentifysources
ofinformationabouttheincumbent’spopularitythatcanhelppredictthe
likelihoodofelectionviolence.Ourargumentappliestogovernment‐sponsored
violenceinboththepre‐andpost‐electionperiods,althoughtheelection‐related
threatstoanincumbent’sholdonpoweraredifferentbeforeandafterthe
election.
Inthepre‐electionperiod(leadinguptoandincludingelectionday),
incumbentgovernmentsmayuseviolenceinanefforttopreventanelectoral
outcomethatisunfavourabletotherulingpoliticalpartyorincumbent
candidate.Pre‐electionviolencecanaltertheelectionresultsintheincumbent’s
favourbyreducingherelectoralcompetition.Morespecifically,violencecan
provokethepoliticaloppositiontoboycotttheelectionand/orinfluencevoter
turnoutintheincumbent’sfavour,bothofwhichincreasetheprobabilitythatthe
incumbentstaysinpower.8Thus,agovernmenthastheincentivetousepre‐
electionviolencewhentheincumbentcandidateorpartybelievestheelection
outcomecouldbeunfavourable.However,fearoflosingpowerisnotsufficientto
8TheseresultshavebeendemonstratedinHafner‐Burton,Hyde,andJablonski2011.
4
provoketheincumbenttouseviolence.Evenwhenshehasreasontobelievethat
anelectionthreatenshersurvivalinoffice,institutionalizedconstraintsonthe
incumbent’sdecision‐makingpowersmakeviolentelectionstrategieshardto
implementandrisky;theyincreasetheoddsthatshewillbeconstrainedby
accountabilitygroupssuchasthelegislature,rulingparty,militaryorcourts.
Thus,whentheincumbentisuncertainabouthervictory,institutionalized
constraintsonherdecisionmakingpowermitigateherincentivesand
opportunitiestousepre‐electionviolence.
Figure1:ElectionViolenceOverTime
60
40
20
0
NumberofElections
80
Pre‐ElectionViolence
Post‐ElectionViolence
TotalNumberofElections
1960
1970
1980
1990
Year(1960‐2010)
2000
2010
Note:FigureisbasedupondatafromtheNationalElectionsAcrossDemocracy
andAutocracydataset.9Pre‐electionviolenceisacountofallelectionsinwhich
thegovernmentharassedtheoppositionorusedviolenceagainstcivilians.Post‐
electionviolenceisacountofallelectionsinwhichthegovernmentused
violenceagainstprotestorsfollowingtheelection.
Inthepre‐electionperiodthecentralthreattotheincumbentislosingthe
9HydeandMarinov2012.
5
election.10Inthepost‐electionperiod,however,acentralthreattothe
incumbent—whohassurvivedtheelectionorrefusestostepdown—ismass
protestagainsttheelectionprocessorresults.11Althoughpost‐electionprotests
arerelativelyrare,theincumbent’sdecisiontousepre‐electionviolence(and
otherfraudulentstrategies)tostayinpoweramplifiestheriskofpublic
demonstrationsagainstthehandlingoroutcomeoftheelectioniftheincumbent
wins.Protestscanbeathreattotheincumbentevenaftertheelectionbecause
theyindicatethatcitizenshavesolvedacollectiveactionproblemtomobilize
againsttheirgovernment.12Theyalsoincreasetheprobabilitythatthe
incumbentwillbeforcedtoholdnewelectionsorstepdown.13Proteststhus
provideincentivesandopportunitiesforincumbentsthatremaininpowerafter
anelectiontouseviolenceagainstprotesters—inotherwords,protestscan
10Inadditiontooutrightlosingtheelectionvote,thereareanumberofotherelectoraloutcomes
thattheincumbentmayviewasathreattoherpower.Forexample,inelectoralauthoritarian
regimes,electionresultsthatdonotyieldasufficientlylargemarginofvictorycanbea
devastatingblowtotheincumbent’sauthority.Additionally,anincumbentpresidentcanbe
madetolookweakandtherebythreatenedbytheresultsofalegislativeelectionthatdoesnot
matchtheirstatedexpectations,orbylower‐than‐expectedperformanceinasubsetofthe
country,eveniftheydonotrisklosinganexecutiveelection.See,forexample,Magaloni2006a;
Simpser2012.
11Otherthreatstotheincumbentincludecoupd’étatorforeignintervention.Wefocusonpost‐
electionprotests,whicharemuchmorecommonthreats.
12BunceandWolchik2006;Tucker2007.
13SeeFigure2fortrendsinpost‐electionprotestsandhowoftentheyleadtotheincumbent
steppingdownorcallingfornewelections.Forexamples,seeBunceandWolchik2006;Bunce
andWolchik2010;Tucker2007.
6
createalinkbetweentheincumbent’suseofviolenceinthepre‐electionperiod
andviolenceinthepost‐electionperiod.However,institutionalizedconstraints
ontheincumbent’sdecision‐makingpoweralsofactorintoherdecisiontouse
violenceagainstprotestors.Facingpost‐electionproteststhatcouldforceherout
ofpowerevenaftersurvivingtheelection,anincumbentwithoutstrong
institutionalizedconstraintsonherruleismorelikelytouseviolenceagainst
post‐electionprotestors.
Intheremainderofthearticle,webrieflysummarizehowourcentral
argumentbuildsonexistingresearchacrossseveraldistinctresearchagendas,
outlineourtheoryanditsobservableimplicationsingreaterdetail,provide
examples,introduceourstatisticalstrategy,andpresentthefindings.
DEMOCRACY,ELECTIONS,ANDREPRESSION
Scholarsofcomparativepoliticsgenerallyagreethatholdingelections
doesnotmeanthatacountryisdemocratic.14Infact,lessthanhalfofthe
governmentsthatnowholddirectelectionsfornationalofficedosowithina
contextofconsolidateddemocraticpoliticalinstitutionsandrespectforhuman
rights.15Yetthereislittledebatethatelections,likeprotectionsforhumanrights,
arenecessaryfordemocraticgovernance.16
Therelationshipbetweendemocracyandprotectionforhumanrightsis
enshrinedinnumerousinternationalagreements,includingtheUniversal
DeclarationofHumanRights.CountriesincludingtheUnitedStatesandmost
14Diamond2002;LevitskyandWay2010;LevitskyandWay2002;Mainwaring,Brinks,and
Perez‐Linan2001;Schedler2002a;Zakaria1997.
15Authors’calculation.
16Dahl1971;Huntington1991;Riker1965.
7
Europeanstatespromotedemocracygloballyinpartbecauseoftheideathatfull
protectionsforhumanrightsrequiredemocraticgovernment:democracy
increasesliberty,freedomandsecurityforcitizens.Evidenceshowsthatstable
liberaldemocraciesaremuchmorelikelythanothertypesofgovernmentsto
respecthumanrights,17althoughpoliticaltransitionsoftenincludehighlevelsof
coercionanddemocratizinggovernmentsdonotalwaysrespecthumanrights.18
Yet,aselectionshavespreadtonearlyeverycountryintheworld,sohave
complaintsabouttheroleofviolenceindemocratizationandtheuseofviolence
asanelectoraltool.Scholarshavearguedthatelectionsincreasepolitical
polarizationandpotentiallyincreasehumanrightsabusesincountrieswithout
well‐developedrespectfortheruleoflaw,andthatevenpoliticiansin
democraciescanhavestrongincentivestouseviolentelectoraltactics.19By
contrast,othershavearguedthatelectionsinilliberalstateseventuallybring
aboutbroaderpoliticalparticipation,civicengagement,andpolitical
accountability,allofwhichwillimproverespectforhumanrightsovertime.20
Cross‐nationalstatisticalstudiesofrepressionandelectionsare
abundant,butexistingdatahashamperedeffortstodistinguishbetween
17Henderson1991;HowardandDonnelly1986;PoeandTate1994;Zanger2000.
18Collier2009;Davenport2007;Snyder2000.
19Zakaria1997.;Collier2009;CollierandVicente2012;RobinsonandTorvik2009.
20Lewis‐Beck1990;Lindberg2006a;Lipset1983;SeligsonandBooth1995;Sisk1995.Arelated
literatureexplorestherolethatelectionsplayinbringingaboutpoliticalliberalization:Howard
andRoessler2006;Lindberg2006a;Lindberg2009;RoesslerandHoward2009.;andhow
partieshaveusedvoter‐initiatedethnicriotsasanelectoralmanipulationtactic(Wilkinson
2006.)
8
electionsinwhichincumbentsuseviolencefromthosethatdonot—leadingto
contradictoryfindings.21Inaddition,existingworkhaslargelyfocusedon
explainingwhenhumanrightsabusesincreaseduringelectionyears,ratherthan
explainingvariationintheuseofvariousformsofelectionviolencebetween
electionsandduringdifferentphasesoftheelectionprocess.
Forexample,inhispathbreakingstudyof49countriesfrom1948to
1982,ChristianDavenportfoundthatauthoritariangovernmentswere
statisticallymorelikelytoreducecensorshipandpoliticalrestrictionsduring
nationalelectionyears,perhapsinanefforttolegitimizetheregimebygiving
citizensaccesstopoliticalleaders.Hefoundnorelationshipbetweenelections
andpoliticalrepressionintransitionalordemocraticcountries.22Inafollowon
study,hefoundthatgovernmentsalsotendtoreducemediarestrictionsduring
electionyears,perhapsasawaytoinstitutionalizedissent.23DavidRichards,
however,inastudyofelectionsin74countries(includingsomeautocracies)
from1981to1987,foundthatthepresenceofnationalelectionshadnoeffecton
generallevelsofgovernmentrespectforhumanrightsinanelectionyearone
wayortheother.24Focusingondemocracies,DavidCingranelliandMikhail
Filippovarguedthatbothincumbentsandoppositionleadersstrategically
choosetoengageinorignorepoorhumanrightspracticesintheabsenceof
properelectoralincentives,andthatamongdemocracies,certainelectoralrules
21Contradictoryfindingsinthisliteraturemayalsobeduetodifferencesincaseselection.
22Davenport1997.
23Davenport1998.
24Richards1999.
9
areassociatedwithbetterprotectionsforhumanrights.25
Whatisclearfromtheresearchagendaonelectionsandrepressionisthat
thereisastrongconnectionbetweenstableliberaldemocracyandgovernment
protectionforcertainhumanrights,butthatagrowingnumberofelectionsare
takingplaceinlocationswheredemocracyhasyettobefullyconsolidated.To
datethisresearchdoesnotusemeasuresofelection‐specificviolence
perpetratedbyincumbentgovernments,nordoesitseparatethepre‐andpost‐
electionperiods.Instead,itmostlyreliesonaggregateannualmeasuresof
humanrightsabuses,whichmayormaynotberelatedtoelection‐specific
violence.Andithasproducedconflictingresultsabouttherelationshipbetween
repressionandelections.
PROTESTANDREPRESSION
From1960to2010thereweremorethan350uniquecasesofpost‐
electionprotest.26Althoughthereisarichliteratureonhowvariouskindsof
protestsincreasetheuseofrepressiongenerally,andasmallerliteratureonthe
roleofelectionsinsparkingprotests,fewpreviousempiricalstudieshave
examinedbothelectionprotestsandelection‐specificviolence.
Existingresearchon(non‐electoral)protesthasfoundevidencethat
governmentrepressionprovokesvariousformsofpublicdissent,including
protests,strikes,demonstrationsandrebellions.27Studiesalsohavefoundthat
theuseofrepressionhasledtoprotests.Davenportdocumentedthat
25CingranelliandFilippov2010.
26HydeandMarinov2012.
27Carey2006;DavisandWard1990;Gupta,Singh,andSprague1993;Machado,Scartascini,and
Tommasi2011;Moore1998;Moore2000.
10
governmentstendtorespondtodomesticthreatssuchasprotestswith
repressionandthattheyaremorelikelytoapplycensorshipandpolitical
restrictionsasthefrequencyandintensityofdissentrises.28SabineCarey,
however,foundthatonlyguerrillawarfareincreasestheriskofpolitical
repression,whereasnon‐violentorspontaneousformsofdissentdonotcreate
threatssubstantialenoughtowarrantaviolentgovernmentresponse.29Other
studieshaveshownthattherelationshipbetweenrepressionanddissentisnon‐
linear:governmentsoverreacttosmalldemandswithviolencebutasdemands
increasegovernmentsoftenexercisemorerestraint.30Insomecases,
governmentrepressionandaccommodationinresponsetoprotestshavebeen
substitutes.31
Aseparateresearchagendafocusesonelectionsthatprovokepost‐
electionprotest.Themostrelevantfindingforthisarticleisthatmanipulated
electionscanserveasafocalpointforcollectiveaction,andpost‐electionprotest
(orthethreatofprotest)canbeanimportantpartofself‐enforcingdemocracy.32
Electionfraudandviolenceinthepre‐electionperiodmakepost‐electionprotest
morelikely.
Webuilduponthesedifferentbodiesofresearchtoinvestigatetherole
thatpost‐electionprotestplaysinagovernment’sdecisiontouseviolence
28Davenport1995.
29Carey2010.
30GartnerandRegan1996.
31Moore2000.
32Fearon2011;Przeworski1991;Przeworski2006;Schedler2002a;Tucker2007;Weingast
1997.
11
followinganelectionwheretheincumbentremainsinpower,andalsoevaluate
therelationshipbetweenpre‐electionviolence,post‐electionprotest,andtheuse
ofviolenceagainstprotestors.
ARGUMENTANDIMPLICATIONS
Ourcentralargumentisthatinformationabouttheincumbent’s
popularityindifferentphasesoftheelectioncycleandinstitutionalized
constraintsonherdecision‐makingpowersworktogethertoinfluenceher
decisiontouseelectionviolencepriortoandafteranelection.Inbrief,ifan
incumbentanticipatesanunfavourableelectoraloutcome—suchasanoutright
winfortheoppositionoraresultthatmakestheincumbentlookweak—shehas
incentivestouseviolenceinthepre‐electionperiodasastrategytostayin
power.Pre‐electionviolencecanhelptheincumbentstayinpowerbyreducing
herelectoralcompetition:inducingoppositionpartiestoboycott,makingitless
likelythatapromisingoppositioncandidatewillrun,ormanipulatingvoter
turnout,allofwhichmakeamanufactured“victory”morelikely.However,notall
incumbentsactontheseincentives.Aswewillexplainbelow,accountability
groupsthatplaceinstitutionalconstraintsontheincumbentcanmitigate
incentivesforviolence.Oneimplicationisthatanincumbentthatisuncertain
aboutelectoralvictoryanddoesnotfacesignificantinstitutionalconstraintsis
morelikelytouseelectionviolence.
Theincumbent’sdecisiontouseviolence(orfraud)inanefforttoreduce
herelectoralcompetitionduringtheelectioncanleadtoanunintended
consequence:publicdemonstrationsagainstthehandlingoroutcomeofthe
election.Althoughitisrelativelywelldocumentedthatpre‐electionviolenceand
fraudcantriggerpost‐electionprotest,thisrelationshiphasnotyetbeen
12
evaluatedwithinthebroadercontextofwhenincumbentschoosetouseelection
violence.33Forourpurposesinthisarticle,protestsareimportantbecausethey
cantopplegovernments,leadingtoresignationoftheincumbentornew
elections.Thus,likethethreatofanunfavourableelectoraloutcomeinthepre‐
electionperiod,post‐electionprotestsareathreatthatcreatesincentivesfor
incumbentsfacingfewinstitutionalizedconstraintstoviolentlysuppress
protestersoutoffearoflosingpowerinthepost‐electionperiod.
Becausepre‐electionviolenceisonefactorthatcanleadtopost‐election
protest,andbecausepost‐electionprotestcanprovokepost‐electionviolence,
anotherobservableimplicationofourargumentisthatthedecisiontouse
violenceinthepre‐electionperiodcancreateincentivestouseviolenceinthe
post‐electionperiod.Finally,andconsistentwiththeimplicationsofour
argumentinthepre‐electionperiod,ifpost‐electionprotestsoccur,an
incumbentthatlackssignificantinstitutionalconstraintsismorelikelytouse
violenceagainstprotestors.
FearofLosingPower
Electionsputincumbentsinabind:theycanbringanumberof
advantages,suchasvalidatingaleader’sholdonpower,butelectionsalso
introduceuncertaintyabouttheoutcome.34Thefearoflosingpowerbecauseof
33BunceandWolchik2006;Fearon2011;HydeandMarinov2008;Magaloni2006b;Tucker
2007.
34Brownlee2009;Cox2008;LevitskyandWay2002;LevitskyandWay2010;Magaloni2006a;
Simpser2012.Notethatmostgovernmentsintheworldnowholdregularelections,although
somescholarsmodelthedecisiontoholdelectionsasanendogenousdecisionmadebyleaders
eachtimeelectionsareheld(Cox2008;GandhiandPrzeworski2009.)
13
anelection(losingthevote,facingpost‐electionprotest,orotherunfavourable
outcomes)canpromptanincumbenttorespondwithpoliticalrepressionof
varioustypes,includingviolence.35Threatsmotivateelectionviolence,butthese
threatstakedifferentformsinthepre‐andpost‐electionperiods,whichwe
describeinthenextsection.
Pre‐ElectionViolence
Priortoanelection,theincumbentgovernmentmustanticipatewhether
theoutcomeoftheelectionislikelytobefavourabletoherorherparty.Ifshe
believesthatsheispopularenoughtowintheelectionoutright(ortowinbya
largeenoughmargin),electionviolence—asonepotentialtacticinthe“menuof
manipulation”—isunnecessary,risky,andevencounterproductive.36However,
ifshecannotbecertainofadecisivevictory,orifshebelievesthattheelection
outcomeislikelytobeunfavourable,shemayresorttoelectionviolenceinan
efforttoreduceherpoliticalcompetition.
Inthepre‐electionperiodelectionviolenceisastrategytoreducethe
incumbent’spoliticalcompetitioninatleasttwoways.Harassmentofthe
opposition—forinstance,theincarcerationandtortureofopposition
candidates—increasesthelikelihoodthattheoppositionboycottstheelection
andtheincumbentwins.Whenoppositionpartieswithdrawbeforeanelection
takesplace,theincumbentgovernment’soddsofwinningimprove
substantially.37Asecondwayinwhichpre‐electionviolencemakesafavourable
35Davenport1995;Poeetal.2000.
36Schedler2002a.Notethatthemarginofvictoryacceptabletomanyelectoralauthoritarian
leadersismuchhigherthanthemajorityrequiredtostayinpower(Simpser2012.).
37Beaulieu2006;Lindberg2006b.
14
electoraloutcomemorelikelyisbyinfluencingwhoturnsouttovote.The
incumbentgovernmentmayuseviolenceinanefforttopersuadevoterstostay
homeonelectionday,coercewould‐beoppositionvotersintovotingforthe
incumbent,orthreatenvoterswhowouldotherwiseprefertoabstaininto
turningouttovotefortheincumbent.38Suchmethodsofintimidationthat
increaseturnoutfortheincumbentanddecreaseturnoutfortheoppositionare
oftencombinedwithothermethodsofelectionfraud.39
IntheUN‐administered1993electionsinCambodia—thecountry’sfirst
potentiallydemocratic,multi‐partyelections—theincumbentgovernment’s
CambodianPeople’sPartyfacedstrongchallengefromtheroyalistFUNCINPEC
party,andsoughttouseviolenceinanefforttointimidatetheircandidatesand
supportersasawaytoreducethecompetitionandwinthevote.Accordingto
oneoppositionpartyoperative,“theStateofCambodiaiscreatingtheterror
becausetheyknowthatFuncinpecwillwin.”40TheCambodiangovernmentwas
responsibleforover70documentedkillings–andmorethan100injuries–of
membersofthepoliticaloppositionpriortotheelection.41Theperpetrators
wereaffiliatedwiththegovernmentandthepoliticalpartiesthatweremost
threatenedbyelections:theCambodiaPeople’sParty(CPP),ledbyPrime
MinisterHunSen,andthepartyaffiliatedwiththe“KhmerRouge”,which
38Forexamples,seeBlaydes2010;HumanRightsWatch2010.
39Lehoucq2003;Schedler2002a.
40PhilipShenon,“CambodiaFactionsuseTerrorTacticsinCrucialElection.”TheNewYorkTimes,
May9,1993.
41U.S.DepartmentofState1994.
15
boycottedtheelections.42Ultimately,theincumbentparty’sfearswerejustified,
astheyfellfarshortofamajorityandonlymanagedtojointherulingcoalition
whenCPPleaderHunSenthreatenedtoreignitethecountry’scivilwar.
Incumbentsaremostthreatenedbyelectionswhentheymightlose,but
judgingwhentheymightloseisdifficult,particularlyincountriesinwhichthe
flowofinformationisrestrictedandexpressionislimited.Someincumbentsare
abletogaugetheirpopularitypriortoanelectionthroughpublicopinionpolls,
andthemoststraightforwardelectoralthreattotheincumbentisrevealedby
reliablepublicopinionpollsthatindicatethattheincumbentisunpopular.If
reliablepollsindicatethattheincumbentislikelytolosetheelection,shewillbe
morelikelytouseelectionviolenceinanefforttoreduceherpolitical
competition;ifreliablepollsindicatethatsheispopular,violentmanipulation
tacticsareunnecessary.
Yetalackofinformationabouttheincumbent’spopularitycanalsosignal
athreat.Ifpublicopinionpollsarenotavailableorpollsareknowntobegrossly
inaccurate,theincumbentmayhavedifficultyestimatingheractualpopularity
andherchancesofafavourableelectionoutcomewillbeuncertain.Weargue
thatifreliablepollspriortotheelectionarenotavailable,theincumbentwill
alsobemorelikelytoresorttoelectionviolence.Putanotherway,both
uncertaintyaboutherpopularityandreliableproofofherunpopularitypriorto
anelectioncanmotivateaworriedincumbenttouseelectionviolenceasa
strategytostayinpower.
Ofcourse,pollsarenottheincumbent’sonlysourceofinformationabout
42Inter‐ParliamentaryUnion1993.
16
herpopularity,andpublicstatementsabouttheelectioncanalsosignalthe
incumbent’sconfidenceofvictory.Theincumbent’sandoppositioncandidates’
ownstatementsabouttheirprobabilityofvictoryprovidecluesaboutwhether
theincumbentappearstobeconcernedaboutanunfavourableelectionoutcome.
Ingeneral,aleaderwhoisconfidentofvictoryhaslittlereasontouseelection
violence—gaugingtheincumbent’slevelofconfidenceisthusanotherwayto
gaugethreattotheincumbentandpredictthelikelihoodthatshewilluse
violence.
Post‐ElectionViolence
Evenafterelectiondayisover,incumbentswhoremaininpowermaystill
bechallengedbyanelection‐inducedthreat.Oneofthemainsourcesofthreats
comesfromprotests.Post‐electionprotestsindicatethatcitizenshavesolved
theircollectiveactionproblemandarewillingtomobilizeagainsttheregime.43
Post‐electionprotestcanreducetheincumbent’scredibilityandbuild
momentumtounseatheraftertheelection.
43BunceandWolchik2010;Tucker2007.
17
Figure2:HistoryofPost‐ElectionProtestsandProtest"Success"
AllElectionProtests
SuccessfulProtests
RepressedProtests
0
NumberofElections
5
10
1960
1970
1980
1990
Year(1960‐2010)
2000
2010
Note:Successfulprotestsincludeanycaseinwhichelectionprotestscontributedtoan
electionbeingcancelledoranincumbentbeingdeposed.Repressedprotestsarecasesin
whichthegovernmentusedviolenceagainstdemonstrators.44
Figure2showsthehistoryofpost‐electionprotestsandtheir“success”in
contributingtothecancellationofanelectionortheresignationofthe
incumbent.Anincreasinglylargeshareofprotestshasresultedintheousterof
theincumbentorthecancellingofanelection.Likepollsorotherinformation
abouttheincumbent’spopularityinthepre‐electionperiod,protestscanserveas
anindicatoroftheincumbent’spopularityinthepost‐electionperiod.
Existingscholarshipdemonstratesthatpost‐electionprotestsare
triggeredby(amongotherthings)electionviolenceandfraud.45Althoughan
incumbentusespre‐electionviolenceinanefforttoreduceherelectoral
competition,herdecisiontouseviolencecanhavetheunintendedconsequence
44AscodedbyHydeandMarinov2012.
45BunceandWolchik2010;Magaloni2006a;Tucker2007.
18
ofincreasingthelikelihoodofpost‐electionprotest.Becausepost‐election
protestsareathreattotheincumbentgovernment’spower,theycanprovokethe
incumbenttorespondwithviolenceinanefforttostayinpowerinthepost‐
electionperiod.46
InstitutionalizedConstraints
Wehavethusfarfocusedonhowthefearoflosingpower,eitherbecause
oftheelectionorbecauseofpost‐electionprotest,canprovideincumbentswitha
motivationtouseelectionviolence.Yetanumberofincumbentswhoarenot
confidentofadecisivevictorypriortotheelectionorwhofaceprotestsafterthe
electionneverturntoviolenceasastrategytostayinpower.Aleader’schoiceto
actonmotivestouseelectionviolenceisconstrainedbyherabilitytoengagein,
andtheanticipatedconsequencesofengagingin,violenceinbothstagesofthe
electioncycle.Bothincreasewith“institutionalizedconstraints”ontheauthority
oftheincumbentleader,whichmaybeimposedbyaccountabilitygroups
includinglegislatures,rulingparties,councilsofnobles,military,andcourts.
Giventhattheincumbentfearslosingpower,onewaythat
institutionalizedconstraintscanreducethelikelihoodthatshewillresortto
electionviolenceisbypreventingherfromtakingactionssuchasissuing
directives,mobilizingthepoliceforpartisanharassment,ormakingpolicy
decisionsthatwillresultinviolence.Anexampleofthisformofinstitutionalized
constraintisalegallimitationontheincumbent’sabilitytodeclareastateof
emergency.Agovernmentthatdeclaresastateofemergency,forinstance,can
46Carey2006;Carey2010.NotethatCarey’sfocusisnotonpost‐electionprotest,butratheron
protestmoregenerally.
19
legallyrestrictcertainhumanrights,oftenleadingtoviolence.47However,some
executivescannotusethispolicywithoutoversightfromnationalaccountability
groupssuchaslegislatures.InGuinea‐BissauandSouthAfricaonlythe
legislaturehasthepowertodeclareastateofemergency,whileinHaitithe
legislaturemustapproveastateofemergencyandthusactsasacheckonthe
executive’sdecision‐makingpower.48
Anotherwaythatinstitutionalizedconstraintscanmitigateviolencewhen
theincumbentisuncertainofvictoryorfacespost‐electionprotestsisby
threateningtoholdheraccountableforthedecisiontouseviolence.Violencecan
leadtolegalorpoliticalprosecution.Humanrightsabuses—suchastorturingthe
politicaloppositionoropeningfireoncitizenprotestors—areinmostcases
illegalandunpopularamongcitizens.Whentheyfacepowerfulaccountability
groups,perpetratorsofthesecrimesriskgettingcaughtandpunished,either
whiletheyareinoffice,oraftertheyarenolongerinpower.Legislaturesand
courtsmaypunishleadersforperpetratingviolence.Forexample,the
ExtraordinaryChambersintheCourtsofCambodia(whichinvolvesboth
nationalandforeignjustices)sentencedformerKhmerRougeleader,KaingGech
Eav,forcrimesagainsthumanityandwarcrimes,includinghisroleinoverseeing
thetortureanddeathofmorethantenthousandpeopleinthe1970s—atimein
whichhehadnoreasontobelievehewouldonedaybeheldaccountable.49He
wassentencedtolifeinprisonandrequiredtotestifyinthetrialsofthreeother
formerleadersintheKhmerRouge.Consistentwiththisexample,wearguethat
47Hafner‐Burton,Helfer,andFariss2011;Neumayer2011.
48Elkins,Ginsburg,andMelton2007.
49HumanRightsWatch2010.
20
electionviolenceisamoreattractivestrategyforleadersfacinganuncertain
electiononlywhenseriousconsequencesarenotanticipatedbecauseconstraints
ontheincumbent’sdecisionmakingpowersarenotdeeplyinstitutionalized.
ObservableImplications
Tosummarize,ourargumentgeneratesthreeobservableimplications
thatweexamineintheremainderofthisarticle:(1)anincumbentthatis
uncertainaboutelectoralvictoryanddoesnotfacesignificantinstitutional
constraintsismorelikelytouseelectionviolence;(2)anincumbentthatuses
pre‐electionviolenceorfraudincreasesthelikelihoodofpost‐electionprotest
againsttheirregime;and(3),facingprotests,anincumbentthatlackssignificant
institutionalconstraintsismorelikelytouseviolenceagainstprotestorsinthe
post‐electionperiod.Inthenextsectionweprovideexamplesofthese
implicationsinelectionsintwocountrieswithprominenthistoriesofelection
violence.
ILLUSTRATIVEEXAMPLES
Wehavechosenfiveelectionsintwoelectoralautocracies—Zimbabwe
andIran—toillustratetheobservableimplicationsofourargumentatdifferent
stagesintheelectionprocess.Inbothcountriesleadersfacedthethreatoflosing
powerasaresultofanelectionprocessandhadfewinstitutionalizedconstraints
preventingordiscouragingelectionviolence.Thecasesvary,however,inthe
factorsthatprovoked—andthetimingof—electionviolence.Foreachelection
described,wepresentdetailedmonthlydataoninstancesofelectionviolence
collectedfromananalysisofallreportsavailableonLexis‐Nexis,aswellas
supplementalmaterialsbyNGOsandelectionwatchdogsforthepre‐andpost‐
21
electionperiods.50
ElectionViolenceinZimbabwe
RobertMugabehasbeenpresidentofZimbabwe—anominal
parliamentarydemocracy—sincethecountrygainedindependencein1980.
Since2000,MugabeandhispoliticalpartyassociatesintheZimbabweAfrican
NationalUnion‐PatrioticFront(ZANU‐PF)havefacedoppositionfromthe
MovementforDemocraticChange(MDC)andtheirleader,MorganTsvangirai.
Presidentialandlegislativeelectionsin2000,2002,2005and2008show
variationinthedegreetowhichtheMDCthreatenedZANU‐PF’sholdonpower,
culminatingintheveryclose2008presidentialelectionsthatnearlyresultedin
anendtoMugabe’srule.Inadditiontousingdirectelectoralfraud,ZANU‐PFhas
regularlyriggedelectionsintheirfavourbyterrorizingpoliticalopposition
membersandsupportersinanefforttoreducethecompetition.51
ElectionsinZimbabweshowhowevenanautocraticleaderlikeMugabe
canfeelthreatenedbytheelectoralprocessandthereforebecomemotivatedto
employtacticsofelectionviolence.Reliablepublicopinionpollswerevirtually
non‐existentpriortoelectionsin2000,2002,2005and2008.Although
autocraticleaderslikeMugabetendtoprojectconfidencebeforeelections,a
50Wesearchedallavailablenewsreportsandhumanrightsreportsforcasesofelection‐related
andgovernmentsponsoredhumanrightsabusesinthepre‐andpost‐electionperiods(oneyear
beforeandafterelectionday).Thesedataincludethedateoftheincident,thealleged
perpetrator,thereportedvictim,andthenumberofpeopleaffected.Thesedataandsourceswill
beavailableonthecorrespondingauthor’swebsite.WethankSarahKnosenforinvaluable
researchassistance.
51Krieger2000;Kriger2005.
22
suppressedinformationalenvironmentgeneratesuncertaintyabouttheirtrue
popularityandcreatesincentivestousetacticsofmanipulationpre‐emptivelyin
ordertoavoidanyunfavourableelectoraloutcomes.
UncertaintyaboutMugabe’struepopularitycreatedincentivesforthe
ZANU‐PFtoviolentlyharassMDCcandidatesandtarget—evenkill—citizens
priortoeachelection.Theviolenceworkedtoreduceelectoralcompetition,
provokedseveraloppositionboycotts,andmanipulatedvotersintosupporting
ZANU‐PF.52Mugabe’sauthoritywasvirtuallyuncheckedbydomestic
accountabilitygroups:therewereveryfewregularlimitationsonthepresident’s
actions,constitutionalrestrictionsonhisactionswerelargelyignored,the
legislativeassemblyhadlimitedpowerorindependence,andrulebydecreewas
usedoften.53Theseconditions—uncertaintyabouttheregime’spopularity,a
potentialthreatfromanoppositionmovement,andfewinstitutionalized
constraints—explaintherepeatedboutsofpre‐electionviolenceinZimbabwe.
Toillustratethepatternsofelectionviolenceindetail,Figure3maps
monthlydataonstate‐sponsoredviolencebeforeandafterelectionsin
Zimbabwe.Thefigureshowstheincreaseinpoliticallymotivatedviolence,both
intermsofthenumberofeventsandnumberofpeopleaffected,acrossfour
elections:the2000parliamentaryelections,the2002presidentialelections,the
2005parliamentaryelections,andconcurrentpresidentialandparliamentary
electionsin2008,includingarunoff.
52TimbergandMugari2008a;TimbergandMugari2008b.
53U.S.DepartmentofState2001;U.S.DepartmentofState2003;U.S.DepartmentofState2006b.
23
Figure3:VariationinPoliticalViolencebyElectioninZimbabwe
Note:Thecountofeventsanddeathsarebaseduponasearchofallnewsreportsand
humanrightsreports,includingthoseavailableonLexis‐Nexis,forcasesofelection‐
relatedandgovernmentsponsoredhumanrightsabusesinthepre‐andpost‐election
periods(oneyearbeforeandafterelectionday).
Mugabewonthe1996presidentialelectionswithmorethan90percent
ofthevote.Theoppositionwasnotparticularlystrong,andthe2000elections
werethefirstinwhichanyoppositionpartyposedarealchallengetoZANU‐PF
dominance.AstheFinancialTimesreported,theMDC“managedtodefyastate‐
sponsoredcampaignofviolenceandintimidationtoattractvotersfromall
regionsandethnicgroups…”54Mugabesteppeduphiseffortstouseelection
violencepriortotheelectionand“showedsignsofnervousnessasvoteswere
counted…positioningarmedriotpoliceinHarareandthenearbysuburbof
Budiriro,”conceivablyinanefforttopreventpost‐electionprotests.55
AlthoughtheMDChadlittlechanceofwinningthe2000legislative
54Mallet2000.
55Ibid.
24
elections(inpartbecauseMugabecouldappoint30ofthe120legislativeseats),
thenewlyformedMDCwaswidelyviewedasaseriouschallengertoMugabe’s
authority.Asaresult,duringthe2000election,police,intelligenceofficials,war
veterans,andZANU‐PFsupportersmurdered,torturedandintimidatedMDC
supporters:thegovernmentreportedlykilledmorethan30peopleforpolitical
reasons.56Violencebeganseveralmonthspriorto,andspikedduring,the
election(Figure3).
Since2000,theMDC’shasthreatenedMugabe’sholdonpower,whichhas
beenparticularlyacuteduringelections.Inresponse,hisgovernmenthas
engagedinacampaignofelection‐relatedviolenceagainsttheMDC,especiallyin
presidentialelectionsinwhichhispersonalholdonpowerismostdirectly
threatened.In2002,priortoandduringthepresidentialelection,ZANU‐PFran
torturecampsacrossZimbabweto“re‐educate”oppositionsupporters.57The
TimesofLondonreportedthattheviolencecampaignledtodozensofdeathsand
disappearancesandhundredsofabductions,assaultsandtorturevictims.58Asin
2000,violencebeganin2002severalmonthspriortotheelection,andhundreds
ofpeoplewerevictimizedinthemonthsimmediatelyfollowing,including344
membersoftheYoungWomen’sChristianAssociationwhowerearrestedduring
apeacefulpost‐electionprotestagainsttheresultsofthepresidentialelection.59
NotincludedinthesefiguresareMDCsupporterswhofledZimbabweafterthe
election,fearingpersecution.
56AmnestyInternational2001;U.S.DepartmentofState2001.
57Schlink2002.
58Raath2002.
59U.S.DepartmentofState2003.
25
TheUSStateDepartmentaccusedZANU‐PFofmanipulatingtheelectoral
processinthe2005electionsthroughcorruptionandintimidation,including
unlawfulkillings,politicallymotivatedkidnappings,andstatesanctionedactions
bysecurityforcestotorturemembersoftheopposition,unionleaders,andcivil
societyactivists.60Mugabe’suseofviolencewassomewhatlowerthaninthe
otherelectionsshowninFigure3,inpartbecausetheZANU‐PFalsoreliedonthe
politicizationoffood‐aidduringaperiodofsevereeconomiccrisis,whichwedid
notcodeasaformofelectionviolence.61Inthiselection,thepartyalsoemployed
thesupportoftraditionalleaders,whothreatenedtheirsubjectswithevictionif
theyfailedtovotecorrectly.62
The2008electionsmarkedthefirstconcurrentpresidentialand
parliamentaryelectionsandalsothemostseriousthreattoMugabe.Beforethe
2008presidentialelectionMugabebannedallpoliticalralliesandarrested
Tsvangirai—ostensiblyforviolatingthebanwhileattendingaprayermeeting.
Tsvangiraiwasseverelybeaten,sustainedamassiveheadinjury,andwasdenied
accesstomedicaltreatment.63Nevertheless,thechallengeposedbyTsvangirai
andtheMDCwasgreaterthaninanypreviouselection,andtheMDCwona
parliamentarymajorityforthefirsttime,clearlyindicatingthatMugabe’sregime,
andMugabehimself,wereincreasinglythreatenedbytheelectoralprocessand
byincreasingpublicsupportfortheMDC.Thegovernmentdelayedthereleaseof
theresultsofthepresidentialelectionformorethanamonth,amoveperceived
60U.S.DepartmentofState2006b.
61Nolen2005;Thornycroft2005.
62Thornycroft2005.
63HearldSun2007.
26
tobeanefforttoremedyMugabe’spoorperformance.Whenofficialelection
resultswerefinallyannounced,ZANU‐PFreceived43percentofthevoteand
MDCreceived47percent,justshyofthe50percentmajorityneededtowinthe
firstroundoutright.BeforetherunoffMugabe’sagentsinstigatedadeadlywave
ofviolenceagainstMDCsupporters.Duetothedegreeofviolencedirected
towardhissupporters,withmorethan85confirmedmurderedandthousands
injured,Tsvangiraichosetoboycotttherunoffinanefforttoavoidriskingthe
livesofmoreofhissupportersinthis“violent,illegitimate,shamofanelection
process.”64
Insummary,thelackofinstitutionalizedconstraintsinZimbabwe
between2000‐2008,andMugabe’suseofelectionviolenceinresponsetohis
waningpopularityillustratespartofourargument.Electionviolencewas
triggeredbytherisingpopularityoftheMDCandwassuccessfulatgenerating
short‐termreductionsinpoliticalcompetition.
Post‐electionViolenceinIran
The2009electioninIranillustratesasituationinwhichthehighestlevels
ofviolenceoccurredinthemonthaftertheelection,asaresponsetopublic
protestagainstfraudulentresults.LikeZimbabwe,thechiefexecutivesinthe
Iraniangovernmentexperienceveryfewinstitutionalizedconstraintsontheir
decision‐makingpowers.Thiscombinationofunpopularityrevealedthrough
masspost‐electionprotestagainstagovernmentwithfewinstitutionalized
constraintshelpstoexplainwhythegovernmentresortedtosignificantviolence
againstprotestors.
64Geoghegan2008.
27
Typically,theIranianprocessofcandidatescreeningbytheGuardian
Councilguaranteesthatthemajorityofcandidatesareprohibitedfromrunning.
In2009,theincumbentpresidentAhmadinejadwasapparentlycaughtby
surprisewhenpopularsentimentturnedagainsthimjustbeforetheelection,and
(albeitunreliable)pollsconductedafewdayspriortotheelectionsuggestedthat
oneofthepermittedcandidates,Mir‐HosseinMousavi,couldgainenoughvotes
toforcearunoffelection.65
Followingtheelection,bothcandidatesdeclaredvictory.Inanabnormally
rapidvote“count,”authoritiesdeclaredtheincumbentpresidentthewinner.
Protestseruptedandmillionsofpeopletooktothestreetstodisputethe
fraudulentresults.Theprotestswereaclearindicationofthepeople’s
dissatisfactionwiththeincumbentandathreattothelegitimacyoftheregime,
andconsistentwithourargument,thegovernmentrespondedwithviolence.On
June14th,plainclothesforcesattackedaTehranUniversitydormitoryand
reportedlykilledfivestudentprotesters.OnJune16th,thegovernmentbanned
foreignjournalistsfromthestreets;andarrestedalmost100people,including
formergovernmentministersandseniorpoliticalfigures.Riotpolicedispersed
protestsinTehranandwerevideotapedkillingNedaAgha,ayoungbystander
whobecameaniconfortheanti‐governmentmovement.Protestscontinuedand
thegovernmentrespondedwithmoreviolence.Overthenextfewmonths4,000
protesterswouldbearrested,andotherswouldbekilledasadirectconsequence
ofelection‐inducedviolence.Figure4mapsmonthlydataonstate‐sponsored
violencebeforeandaftertheJune12,2009election,illustratingtheincreasein
65TheEconomist2009;RonSynovitz2009.
28
electionviolenceintermsofthenumberofeventsandnumberofpeople
affected.
AsPresidentAhmadinejadwasswornintooffice,governmentcontrolled
courtsbeganshowtrials,withmanydetaineesallegedlycoercedintoconfessing
thattheyparticipatedinaforeign‐backedattempttooverthrowthegovernment.
Securityofficialsshutdowntheofficesofacommitteecollectinginformation
abouttortureandotherabusesagainstprotestorsanddetainees.JournalistAli
RezaEshranghiwassenttoprison,followedbyacademicKianTajbakhshand
otherprominentintellectuals,politicalfiguresandjournalists.Manywere
sentencedtodeath.66Secrecysurroundingthetallyingofthevotesmeansthat
whatactuallyunfoldedisunknown,butobserversspeculatethattheIranian
leadership,havingalreadyscreenedthepresidentialcandidates,was
uncomfortablewithanyresultsthatwouldhavesuggestedacloseelection.
Facingaworse‐than‐expectedperformancebytheincumbent,theyengagedina
hurriedfalsificationoftheresults.
Inshort,theelectionrevealedthatanoppositioncandidateposeda
greaterthreattoAhmadinejadthananticipated,andperceivedelectionfraud
provokedapost‐electionprotestmovementthatfurtherthreatenedtheregime’s
griponpower.Inresponsetothisthreat,thegovernmentdiffusedprotestsby
committingwidespreadviolenceagainstprotesters,detainingandkillingleaders
oftheoppositionmovement,andcreatingaclimateoffear.TheleadersofIran
responsibleforthepoliticalviolence,liketheleadersofZimbabwe,hadfew
institutionalizedconstraintsontheirdecision‐makingpowersandcouldorder
66AmnestyInternational,“Iran:ElectionContested,RepressionCompounded.”Availableat
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE13/123/2009/en(accessedFebruary19,2010).
29
andcarryoutviolencewithlittlereasontofearaccountabilityfortheirpolicies.
Figure4:VariationinPoliticalViolenceinIran,2009PresidentialElection
Thecountofeventsanddeathsarebaseduponasearchofallnewsreportsandhuman
rightsreports,includingthoseavailableonLexis‐Nexis,forcasesofelection‐relatedand
governmentsponsoredhumanrightsabusesinthepre‐andpost‐electionperiods(one
yearbeforeandafterelectionday).
ElectionsinIranandZimbabweillustratehowunpopulargovernments
usepoliticalviolenceasatactictomanipulateelectionsinthepre‐election
period—provokingboycottsandmanipulatingvoters—andsuppressdissentin
thepost‐electionperiod—harassing,evenkilling,protestors.Inthenextsection
weevaluateourbroaderargumentusingnewcross‐nationaldataontheuseof
election‐relatedviolence.
CROSS‐NATIONALANALYSIS
Inordertosystematicallyassesstheobservableimplicationsofour
argumentweemployacross‐nationalanalysisofelectionsdatafrom1981‐
30
2004.ManyofthesedatacomefromthenewlyavailableNationalElections
acrossDemocracyandAutocracy(NELDA)dataset.67Thesedatacontain
informationonelectionsfornationalofficeforallsovereignstateswitha
populationgreaterthan500,000,includingdetailedinformationonthe
existenceofseveraltypesofelectionviolence,aswellasonpost‐election
protest.68SourcesfortheNELDAdataarediverse,andrelyprimarilyonnews
wirereports,newspaperarchives,academicresearchincludingthedata
handbooksonelectionseditedbyDieterNohlen,69archivesforspecific
countriesandfromintergovernmentalorganizationssuchastheInter‐
ParliamentaryUnion,andothersourceswhicharelistedinthedataset’s
codebook.70
Thesedataallowustoconductmorefine‐grainedtestsofthecorrelates
ofelectionviolencethanexistingcross‐nationalstudies,mostofwhichdonot
measureelectionviolencedirectlybutinsteadrelyonaggregateannual
indicatorsofvariousformsofhumanrightsabusesonentirecountry
populations71oraggregatecountsofdemonstrationsorprotestswhichmayor
67HydeandMarinov2012.
68Acompletelistofthecountriesinoursampleisavailableinourappendix,whichwewillmake
availableonlineandhaveprovidedtotheeditorwiththisresubmission.
69Nohlen,Krennerich,andThibaut1999;Nohlen,Grotz,andHartmann2001;Nohlen2005.
70HydeandMarinov2011.
71SeethePoliticalTerrorScale,at:http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/,theCIRIHumanRights
DataProject,at:http://ciri.binghamton.edu/;andFreedomHouse,at:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/.
31
maynotbeelectionrelated.72Incontrasttoannualindicesofpolitical
repression,whichmeasurehumanrightsabusesduringagivencalendaryear,
ourdatafocusonelection‐specificviolenceperpetratedbytheincumbent
governmentanddistinguishbetweenpre‐andpost‐electionviolenceagainst
civiliansandoppositionparties.Thesedataalsomeasureotherelectionor
regime‐specificcharacteristicscentraltoourargument,suchaswhetherpublic
opinionpollsareavailableandreliableandwhethertheincumbenthasmade
publicstatementsalludingtotheirconfidenceofvictory.Table1provides
summaryinformationforeachofthevariablesusedinthesubsequentanalysis.
Table1:SummaryInformation
Mean
SD
Min
Max
Pre‐ElectionViolence
Post‐ElectionProtest
Post‐ElectionViolence
VictoryUncertain
PollingUnfavorable
ExecutiveConstraints
PhysicalIntegrity(avg)
0.30
0.14
0.06
0.47
0.76
4.84
3.19
0.46
0.34
0.24
0.50
0.42
2.07
2.31
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
7.00
8.00
Mean
Mean
Non‐
Violent Violent
Elec’s
Elec’s
n.a.
0.36
n.a
0.33
0.82
3.93
4.64
n.a.
0.11
n.a
0.52
0.74
5.17
2.58
Polity(avg)
2.35
6.87
‐10.00
10.00
‐0.67
ExecutiveRecruitment(avg)
6.15
2.15
1
8
5.33
PoliticalCompetition(avg)
6.36
3.37
1
10
4.86
GDP(log)
2.85
2.16
‐1.77
9.33
2.30
Population(log)
16.16
1.50
12.47
20.80
16.26
CivilWar
0.18
0.83
0.00
7.00
0.44
ElectoralFraud
0.36
0.48
0.00
1.00
0.68
Demonstrations
1.33
3.22
0.00
43.00
2.09
Note:(avg)indicatesthethreeyearmovingaveragelaggedbyoneyear.
3.52
6.21
6.48
3.03
16.09
0.07
0.27
1.14
Pre‐ElectionViolence
Thefirstobservableimplicationofourargumentisthatanincumbent
72Banks2005.
32
whoanticipatesanunfavourableelectionoutcomeandlackssignificant
institutionalconstraintsonherdecisionmakingpowerismorelikelytouse
electionviolence.Totestthisimplication,weestimatethefollowingtwomodels
foreachelectioniincountryj:
Pr(Pre‐ElectionViolenceij=1)=f(β1PollingUnfavorableij*ExecutiveConstraintsij+
β2PollingUnfavorableij+β3ExecutiveConstraintsij+φXij+γi+εij)
(Equation1)
Pr(Pre‐ElectionViolenceij=1)=f(VictoryUncertainij*ExecutiveConstraintsij+
β2VictoryUncertainij+β3ExecutiveConstraintsij+φXij+γi+εij)
(Equation2)
where
isavectorofcontrolvariablesandγiarecountryrandom‐effects.
Theserandom‐effectsaccountforthelikelihoodthattheeffectofelectoral
uncertaintymaydiffersystematicallyforeachcountry,resultinginbiased
estimates.Sinceourargumentisaboutthethreatoflosingpower,welimitour
sampleintheseestimatestoanynationalelectioninwhichtheofficeofthe
incumbentisatstakeintheelection.73
Wecodeourdependentvariable,Pre‐ElectionViolence,asequalto1if
thegovernmentengagedinelection‐specificviolenceagainstcivilians(coded
fromNelda33)orharassmentofpoliticaloppositionmembers(Nelda15)and0
73Toensurethatwefocusonexecutiveelectionsinbothpresidentialandparliamentary
systems,werelyonNelda20,whichmeasureswhethertheofficeofthede‐factoleaderwasat
stakeintheelection(usuallythepresidentorprimeminister).
33
otherwise.74AccordingtotheNELDAcodebook,Nelda33includes“any
significantviolencerelatingtotheelectionsthatresultedinciviliandeaths.”
Nelda33includesnospecificthresholdfordeaths,butviolencemustbe
“significant”andatleastonecivilianmusthavebeenkilled.Violentattacks
againstcivilians,suchasbombings,donotcountunlesstheyresultincivilian
casualties.Harassmentofpoliticaloppositionmembers(Nelda15)mayinclude
amorediversesetofactivities,includingmurder,torture,beatings,violence
againstparticipantsinoppositionrallies,indefinitedetentionofcandidatesor
oppositionsupporters,forcedeviction,harassmentofmedia,andanumberof
othermethods.75TheNELDAdatadonotdefineanyspecifictimeperiodduring
whichelectionviolenceispossible,andthecodingisspecifictoeachroundof
anelectionratherthanmoreaggregatedunitslikecountry‐years.Violenceis
codedaselection‐relatedifreportsconnecttheviolenceorharassmenttothe
electioninanyway.Violenceunrelatedtoelectionsisnotcodedinanyofthe
NELDAmeasuresofelectionviolence.
Weusetwodistinctmeasuresofwhethertheelectionoutcomewasin
doubt.Thefirstmeasureusesinformationprovidedbypublicopinionpollsand
thesecondreliesonpublicstatementsalludingtotheincumbent’sconfidence
ofvictory.Eveninauthoritarianenvironments,publicopinionpollscan
74Whilealmostallcasesofharassmentinvolvethethreatofviolence,notallcasesinvolve
physicalinjury.Weshowlaterinthepaperthatourresultsarerobusttoonlyincludingelections
withciviliancasualties.
75Nelda15excludescaseswheretheoppositionwasmerelybanned,orwheretheopposition
boycotted(HydeandMarinov2011.)Inadditiontothecodebook,thenotestoNelda15withinthe
datasetwerealsousedtodeterminewhatactivitieswereincludedasoppositionharassment.
34
providereliableinformationaboutwhetheranincumbentiscertaintowinthe
election,andreliablepollsareavailableinover63percentofoursample.We
drawdataonpollingfromtwoNELDAvariables.Nelda25indicateswhether
“reliablepolls…indicatedthepopularityoftherulingpoliticalpartyorofthe
candidatesforofficebeforeelections.”Nelda26indicateswhetherthosepolls
were“favourabletotheincumbent.”76(Incumbentswinapproximately76per
centofelectionsinwhichpollingexistedandwasintheirfavour.)Usingthese
datawecreatePollingUnfavourable,whichequals1undertwoconditions:a)if
reliablepollsexistedthatdidnotfavourtheincumbentorb)ifreliablepollsdid
notexist.PollingUnfavourableequals0ifpollsexistedandfavouredthe
incumbent.
Thisvariableallowsustotesttheargumentthatbothaclearsignalthat
theincumbentisunpopularandanoisysignalthatcreatesuncertaintyaboutthe
incumbent’spopularitycreateincentivesforPre‐ElectionViolence,whichisthe
measurethatmostcloselytracksourtheory.However,wealsoestimateresults
excludingcaseswithoutreliablepolls(whereNelda25equals“no”)inorderto
evaluatewhetherthesamelogicholdswhenweexamineonlywhetherreliable
pollsexistedandfavouredtheincumbent.
OursecondmeasureisbasedonNelda12,whichindicateswhetherthe
“incumbentorrulingpartywasconfidentofvictorybeforetheelections.”
Nelda12equals“yes”incasesinwhichtheincumbentmade“publicstatements
expressingconfidence”ofvictory,theoppositionindicatedthattheywere“not
likelytowin,”ortherewerecasesinwhichthe“incumbentorrulingpartyhas
76Ibid.
35
beendominantforanumberofyearsandisprojectedtowininalandslide.”77
WecreateVictoryUncertain,whichequals1ifNelda12equals“no”and0if
Nelda12equals“yes.”78Asfacevalidationofthismeasure,whenVictory
Uncertainis1,theincumbentwinsapproximately56percentofthetime,
comparedtoarateof92percentwhenVictoryUncertainis1.79
Animportantpartofourargumentconcernsinstitutionalized
constraintsontheincumbent.TomeasuretheseconstraintsweuseExecutive
ConstraintsfromthePolityIVdataset.Thisindexrangesfrom1to7and
measures“theextentofinstitutionalizedconstraintsonthedecision‐making
powerofchiefexecutives.”80AtthehighestlevelofExecutiveConstraints,
accountabilitygroupssuchaslegislaturesandcourtshaveauthorityequalor
greatertothatoftheexecutive.ExamplesofExecutiveConstraintsincludethe
abilityofalegislatureorrulingpartytoinitiatemuchormostimportant
legislation.EvengreaterExecutiveConstraintsincludecasesinwhichan
accountabilitygroup,suchasalegislature,choosestheexecutiveandthe
executiveisdependentonitscontinuedsupporttoremaininoffice.Atthelowest
levelofExecutiveConstraintsleadershavevirtuallyunlimitedauthoritywithfew,
ifany,constitutionalorlegislativeconstraints.Examplesincludethefrequent
revisionorsuspensionoftheconstitutionbytheexecutive,casesinwhichno
legislativeassemblyexists,andtheexistenceofanassemblythatcanbecalled
77Ibid.
78Casesof“unclear”and“N/A”aretreatedasmissing.
79Becausesomeincumbentswillhavetheincentivetomisrepresenttheirownpopularityand
falselyprojectstrength,thisindicatorwillincludesomenoise.
80MarshallandJaggers2002.
36
anddismissedattheexecutive’spleasure.LowExecutiveConstraintsalsoinclude
casesofextensiveexecutivecontroloveraccountabilitygroups—suchasa
legislatureorcourts.
Sinceelectionviolenceismorelikelyinrepressiveregimes,weare
mindfulthatweruntheriskofestimatingwhichregimesaremorelikelytobe
repressiveratherthanwhichregimesaremorelikelytouseelection‐specific
violence.Also,sincedemocraticstatesaremorelikelytohavecompetitive
electionsaswellaslowerlevelsofrepression,anaı̈vemodelwouldlikelyyield
biasedestimatesoftherelationshipsmostrelevanttoourtheory.81Therefore,
wecontrolforthepre‐existinglevelofgovernmentrepression(asdistinctfrom
pre‐electionviolence)byincludingameasureofPhysicalIntegrityfromtheCIRI
dataset.82Thisvariableisanindex(0to8)thatmeasurestheannuallevelof
governmentsponsoredrepressiveactivity,codedmainlyfromAmnesty
Internationalreports.Sincethisvariableisintendedtocontrolforoveralltrends
inrepression,weusethethree‐yearmovingaverageandlagitbyoneyearto
ensurethatitisnotpickingupelection‐yearviolence.
Wealsowanttoensurethatourresultsarenotanartefactofthelevelof
democracyinacountry.Wethusincludemeasuresofpoliticalcompetitiveness
andexecutiverecruitmentfromthePolityIVproject.83PoliticalCompetitiveness
isanindex(1to10)thatmeasuresboththelevelofregulationofpolitical
participationandthecompetitivenessofparticipation.ExecutiveRecruitmentis
81PoeandTate1994.showthatdemocraticstatesarelesslikelytoengageinphysicalintegrity
violations.
82CingranelliandRichards2010.
83MarshallandJaggers2002.
37
anindex(1to8)thatmeasurestheopennessandcompetitivenessofexecutive
selection,aswellastheinstitutionalizationofexecutivepowertransitions.To
ensurethatPoliticalCompetitivenessandExecutiveRecruitmentpickupoverall
trendsindemocracy,andnotelectionspecificcomponents,weusethethree‐year
movingaverageofthesevariableslaggedbyoneyear.
Wealsoincludeseveraladditionalcontrolvariables.Becausewealthand
populationinfluencetheuseofviolence,weincludeGDP(log)andPopulation
(log),fromtheWorldDevelopmentIndicators.84Individualleadersmaybemore
likelytouseelectionviolencebasedontheirtimeinofficeortheirexperience,
andallmodelsthereforeincludeLeaderTenureandLeaderAgefromthe
Archigosdataset.85Becauseinternalconflictiscorrelatedwithhumanrights
violations,weincludeabinarymeasureofCivilWarfromtheMajorEpisodesof
PoliticalViolencedataset.86
AllmodelsincludeElectoralFraudtoaccountforanotherprominent
tacticofelectoralmanipulation.ElectoralFraud(Nelda11)isabinaryvariable
thatindicateswhethertherewas“significantconcernsthattheelectionswillnot
befreeandfair”;thismeasurerelatesto“domesticorinternationalconcern”
aboutthequalityoftheelection,includingwhether“electionswerewidely
perceivedtolackbasiccriteriaforcompetitiveelections,suchasmorethanone
politicalparty.”87WealsoincludeDemonstrationsinallmodelstoaccountfor
othertypesofcivicmobilizationdistinctfrompost‐electionprotest,andwhich
84WorldBank2006.
85Goemans,Gleditsch,andChiozza2009.
86Marshall2007.Dunning2011;Poe,Tate,andKeith1999.
87HydeandMarinov2011.
38
alsomaypredictpre‐electionviolence.Demonstrationsisacountofthetotal
numberofanti‐governmentdemonstrations,anti‐governmentstrikesandriots
duringayear(basedonBanksCNTScoding).88
WereportourestimatesinTables2and3,inwhichthecoremodelsuse
logitandincludecountryrandom‐effectstoaccountforcountry‐specific
correlationsintheestimates.Figure5presentsamoremeaningfulpictureofthe
estimatedeffectofuncertaintyonPre‐ElectionViolence:itplotstheinteractive
estimatesfromTable2,column1andTable3,column1.Eachpointestimateis
thefirstdifferencebasedonwheneithermeasureofUncertainofElectionVictory
(PollingUnfavourableorVictoryUncertain)changesfrom0to1,estimatedat
eachvalueofExecutiveConstraints.
88Banks1975;Banks2005.
39
Table2:LogitEstimatesoftheEffectofPollingUnfavorableonPre‐Election
Violence
(1)
Core
Model
(2)
Only
Reliable
Polls
(3)
Only
Civilian
Deaths
(4)
Fixed
Effects
UnfavorablePolls
2.37*
4.97*
2.40+
2.63*
1.07
2.15
1.43
1.29
Polling*Exec.Const.
‐0.49*
‐0.87*
‐0.58*
‐0.62*
0.20
0.37
0.27
0.27
ExecutiveConstraints
0.24
0.53+
0.48+
0.44+
0.21
0.31
0.28
0.26
PhysicalIntegrity(avg)
‐0.44**
‐0.61**
‐0.40**
‐0.34*
0.12
0.20
0.13
0.17
PoliticalCompetitiveness
(avg)
‐0.18+
‐0.38+
‐0.19
‐0.24+
0.10
0.21
0.13
0.14
ExecutiveRecruitment(avg)
0.31+
0.73*
0.34+
0.13
0.16
0.34
0.20
0.25
Population(log)
0.36
0.87*
0.81*
1.25
0.27
0.44
0.35
2.03
GDP(log)
‐0.28
‐0.60*
‐0.68**
1.03
0.19
0.30
0.25
1.03
LeaderTenure
0.00
0.01
‐0.02*
‐0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
LeaderAge
0.12
0.02
0.16
0.28
0.17
0.27
0.19
0.23
CivilWar
0.54*
0.53
0.75*
0.71
0.28
0.60
0.32
0.56
ElectoralFraud
1.60**
2.02**
1.10*
1.53**
0.42
0.76
0.48
0.50
Demonstrations
0.12*
0.09
0.12*
0.08
0.05
0.08
0.06
0.06
Observations
599
352
597
248
LogLikelihood
‐227.1
‐99.80
‐188.8
‐75.57
CountryRandomEffects
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
CountryFixedEffects
No
No
No
Yes
ExplicitCivilianViolenceOnly
No
No
Yes
Yes
ReliablePollsOnly
No
Yes
No
No
+significantat10%;*significantat5%;**significantat1%.Standarderrorsare
inparentheses.Allmodelsarerestrictedtoelectioninwhichtheofficeofthe
incumbentiscontested.
40
Table3:LogitEstimatesoftheEffectofVictoryUncertainonPre‐Election
Violence
(1)
CoreModel
(2)
(3)
OnlyCivilian FixedEffects
Deaths
1.46
1.50
1.36
1.56
‐0.30
‐0.23
0.24
0.27
0.07
‐0.06
0.18
0.18
‐0.32*
‐0.33+
0.13
0.19
VictoryUncertain
3.17*
1.32
Uncertain*Exec.Const.
‐0.52*
0.23
ExecutiveConstraints
‐0.11
0.15
PhysicalIntegrity(avg)
‐0.38**
0.11
PoliticalCompetitiveness
(avg)
‐0.16
‐0.17
‐0.21
0.11
0.13
0.17
ExecutiveRecruitment(avg)
0.27+
0.32+
0.12
0.16
0.19
0.29
Population(log)
0.30
0.80*
1.00
0.26
0.32
2.06
GDP(log)
‐0.16
‐0.51*
0.86
0.18
0.23
1.05
LeaderTenure
0.01
‐0.02
‐0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
LeaderAge
0.06
0.02
0.16
0.17
0.20
0.24
CivilWar
0.46+
0.72*
0.73
0.27
0.31
0.59
ElectoralFraud
1.55**
1.07*
1.42**
0.42
0.47
0.53
Demonstrations
0.11*
0.11*
0.08
0.05
0.06
0.06
Observations
550
548
216
LogLikelihood
‐207.5
‐173.9
‐68.96
CountryRandomEffects
Yes
Yes
No
CountryFixedEffects
No
No
Yes
ExplicitCivilianViolence
Only
No
Yes
No
+significantat10%;*significantat5%;**significantat1%.Standarderrorsare
inparentheses.Allmodelsarerestrictedtocasesinwhichtheofficeoftheincumbentis
contested.
Figure5providessupportforthefirstobservableimplicationofour
41
argument.TheleftpanelillustratesthatwhenExecutiveConstraintsareattheir
minimum,achangeinPollingUnfavourablefrom0to1increasestheprobability
ofPre‐ElectionViolencebynearly0.25,onaverage.Therightpanelillustrates
thatwhenExecutiveConstraintsareattheirminimum,VictoryUncertainis
associatedwithanincreaseintheprobabilityofPre‐ElectionViolenceofnearly
0.50onaverage.WhenExecutiveConstraintsareattheirmaximum,thereareno
significanteffectsofeitherPollingUnfavourableorVictoryUncertain.Incumbents
aremorelikelytoresorttoelectionviolencewhentheycannotbecertainofa
decisivevictory,however,thepresenceofinstitutionalizedconstraintsmitigate
theseincentivestouseviolence.
Figure5:EffectofPollingUnfavorableandVictoryUncertainonPre‐
ElectionViolence:
Note:Pointestimatesrepresentsimulatedeffects(firstdifferences,0to1)ofchanging
PollingUnfavorableandVictoryUncertainontheprobabilityofPre‐ElectionViolencefor
eachvalueofExecutiveConstraints.EstimatesarebaseduponTable2column1.Vertical
linesindicatethe95%confidenceinterval.
Tables2and3alsoprovideseveralalternativespecificationsofthecore
models.Thefiguresshowingthepredictedprobabilitiesofelectionviolencefor
theserobustnesschecksareprovidedintheappendix.
42
BeginningwiththepollingestimatesshowninTable2,Model2dropsall
caseswherereliablepollsarenotavailableoritisunclearwhethertheyare
available.Thislimitedsampleincludesonlycaseswherereliablepollsexisted
andprovidedaclearsignalthatpollswerenotfavourabletotheincumbent.The
coefficientsremainconsistentinsignandsignificancewiththosereportedin
column1.WhenExecutiveConstraintsareattheirminimuminthismodel,a
changefrom0to1(favourabletounfavourablepolls)isassociatedwithan
increaseintheaverageprobabilityofPre‐ElectionViolenceof0.25.
InTable2,Model3,werecodePre‐ElectionViolencetoexclude
harassmentofpoliticaloppositionmembers(Nelda15).Thisfocusesthe
analysisonwhetherthegovernmentengagedinelection‐specificviolence
againstcivilians(Nelda33),whichisamuchnarrowerconceptionofelection
violencethanourdefinition.Thecoefficientsareconsistentinsignand
significancewiththecoefficientsinModel1,althoughtheestimated
substantiveeffectissmaller.WhenExecutiveConstraintsareattheirminimum
inthismodel,achangefrom0to1inPollingUnfavourableisassociatedwithan
increaseof0.04intheaverageprobabilityofsignificantviolencerelatingtothe
electionsthatresultedinciviliandeaths.
Finally,inTable2,Model4,were‐estimatethemodelusingcountryfixed‐
effects.Thisspecificationvalidatesthatourresultsarenotjustdrivenbytime‐
invariantcharacteristicsofcountries,suchasunobservedinstitutionalor
geographicalcharacteristics.YetbecausemanycountrieshavenocasesofPre‐
ElectionViolence,countryfixedeffectsyieldresultsthatmustbeinterpretedwith
care.Allobservationsfromcountrieswithoutvariationinelectionviolencedrop
outofthemodel.Thecoefficientsonourvariablesofinterestremainverysimilar
43
tothosefromtherandom‐effectsmodels.Wedonotprovidepredicted
probabilitiesforthefixed‐effectsmodelsbecausedoingsoinacountryfixed‐
effectlogitmodelisproblematic.89
NextweturntothealternativespecificationsshownforVictoryUncertain.
InTable3,model2,werestricttheanalysistocasesofelection‐specificviolence
involvingciviliandeaths.Althoughthesignsonthecoefficientestimatesare
consistentwiththeestimatesreportedinmodel1,theestimatedeffectof
VictoryUncertainonPre‐ElectionViolenceisinsignificantforalllevelsof
ExecutiveConstraints.Inourview,includingharassmentandviolenceinvolving
civiliandeathsintheoperationalizationofpre‐electionviolenceismuchcloser
toourtheoreticalconceptionofelectionviolence.Limitingthemeasuretoonly
thosecasesofelectionviolenceinvolvingciviliandeathsisamuchnarrower,
conceptionofelectionviolenceandthesmallercoefficientisthusunsurprising.
InTable3,Model3,weprovideestimatesofourcoremodelusing
country‐fixedeffects,althoughlikeinModel2,thecoefficientonVictory
Uncertainissmaller.Giventhatthefixedeffectsmodeldropsmorethanhalfof
ourobservations,theseresultsarenotsurprising.Asabove,estimating
accuratepredictedprobabilitiesinthefixed‐effectslogitcontextis
problematic.90
Post‐ElectionProtestandViolence
Weanalysepost‐electionprotestsinthisarticlebecause,whentheyoccur,
89Whenusinglogisticregression,“firstdifferences,andindeedeveryquantityofinterestbut
one,areimpossibletocomputecorrectlyfromestimatesofthefixed‐effectsmodel.”King2001,
499.
90King2001.
44
protestsareacentralsourceofthreattoanincumbent’sholdonpowerinthe
immediatepost‐electionperiod.Wecontinuetofocusonviolencebythe
incumbentregime,andinestimatingpost‐electionprotests,therelevant
universeofelectionsthereforeincludesthoseinwhichtheincumbenthasnot
lostandconcededdefeatintheimmediatepre‐electionperiod.91Theexisting
literaturesuggestingthatfraudandpre‐electionviolenceincreasethe
probabilityofpost‐electionprotestmotivatesourmodelsofprotest.92Our
estimationapproachforpredictingpost‐electionprotestsisrepresentedbelow
foreachelectioniincountryj:
Pr(Post‐ElectionProtestij=1)=f(β1Pre‐ElectionViolenceij+φXij+γi+εij,)
(Equation3)
Pr(Post‐ElectionProtestij=1)=f(β1ElectoralFraudij+φXij+γi+εij,)
(Equation4)
where
isavectorofcontrolvariablesandγiarecountryrandom‐effects.We
measurePost‐ElectionProtestusingNelda29,whichindicateswhethertherewere
“riotsorprotestsaftertheelection”thatwere“atleastsomewhatrelatedtothe
outcomeorhandlingoftheelection.”93ElectoralFraud(Nelda11)measures
whethertherewereconcernsbeforetheelectionthatitwouldnotbefreeand
91Thissamplestillincludescases,suchasCôted’Ivoire2011,inwhichtheincumbentlostthe
electionbutrefusedtoexitpower.
92BunceandWolchik2006;Fearon2011;HydeandMarinov2008;Schedler2002b;Tucker
2007.
93HydeandMarinov2011.
45
fair.94Asinthepre‐electionmodels,wecontrolforthethree‐yearlaggedmoving
averageofPhysicalIntegrity,aswellasforGDP(log),Population(log),Leader
Tenure,LeaderAgeandCivilWar.Wealsocontrolforthethree‐yearmoving
averageofPolity,codedfromthePolityIVdataset.95
Table4:LogitEstimatesoftheEffectofFraudandViolenceonPost‐Election
Protests
ElectoralFraud
Pre‐ElectionViolence
PhysicalIntegrity(avg)
Polity(avg)
Population(log)
GDP(log)
LeaderTenure
LeaderAge
CivilWar
Observations
LogLikelihood
CountryRandom‐Effects
CountryFixed‐Effects
(1)
CoreModel
1.63**
0.31
‐0.12
0.08
0.00
0.03
0.26
0.20
‐0.26+
0.15
‐0.01*
0.01
‐0.10
0.13
0.04
0.14
966
‐347.1
Yes
No
(2)
Fixed
Effects
1.30**
0.34
‐0.14
0.10
0.01
0.03
‐1.51
1.33
1.01
0.72
‐0.01
0.01
‐0.03
0.16
0.04
0.19
482
‐179.2
No
Yes
(3)
CoreModel
(4)
Fixed
Effects
2.46**
0.30
‐0.11
0.09
‐0.02
0.03
0.24
0.22
‐0.24
0.15
‐0.02**
0.01
‐0.13
0.14
‐0.11
0.14
932
‐314.4
Yes
No
2.21**
0.33
‐0.13
0.11
‐0.02
0.04
‐1.70
1.41
1.10
0.81
‐0.02*
0.01
‐0.07
0.17
‐0.12
0.21
458
‐152.6
No
Yes
+significantat10%;*significantat5%;**significantat1%.Standarderrorsarein
parentheses.Allmodelsarerestrictedtoelectionsinwhichtheincumbentdidnotlose
theelectionandleaveoffice.
94Asdiscussedabove,thisvariableindicateswhethertherewas“domesticorinternational
concern”aboutthequalityoftheelectionorif“theelectionswerewidelyperceivedtolackbasic
criteriaforcompetitiveelections,suchasmorethanonepoliticalparty.”Ibid.
95MarshallandJaggers2002.
46
WepresentlogitestimatesoftheseequationsinTable4andillustratethe
resultsofourcoremodelsinFigure6,whichshowsthesimulatedeffectofPre‐
ElectionViolenceandElectoralFraudonthepredictedprobabilityofPost‐
ElectionViolenceProtestwhenallothervariablesareheldatmeanvalues.Our
coremodels(incolumns1and3)includecountryrandom‐effectsandweshow
thesamemodels(incolumns2and4)withcountryfixed‐effects.
Figure6:EffectofFraudandElectionViolenceonPost‐ElectionProtest
Showsthesimulatedeffect(predictedprobabilities)ofElectoralFraudandPre‐Election
ViolenceonPost‐ElectionProtestfromtheestimatesinTable4column1and3.Allother
variablesaresetatthemean.Verticallinesindicatethe95%confidenceinterval.
Consistentwiththeliterature,wefindthatbothelectoralfraudandpre‐
electionviolencearestrongpredictorsofpost‐electionprotest:bothvariables
areassociatedwithsizableincreasesintheprobabilityofprotestacrossboth
specifications.96AsshowninFigure6,ElectoralFraudincreasestheprobability
ofprotestsbynearly0.13.Pre‐ElectionViolenceincreasestheprobabilityof
96BunceandWolchik2010;Magaloni2006a;Tucker2007.
47
protestsbyover0.20.Thefactthatpre‐electionviolenceincreasesthelikelihood
ofpost‐electionprotestsuggeststhattheuseofpre‐electionviolencecanalso
haveunintendedconsequencesfortheincumbentaftertheelection.
Theexistenceofpost‐electionprotestsallowsustoevaluateafinal
implicationofourargument:giventhattheincumbentfacespost‐election
protests,sheismorelikelytouseviolenceagainstprotestorsinthepost‐election
periodifshelackssignificantinstitutionalconstraints.Ourapproachfor
estimatingpost‐electionviolenceagainstprotestorsisrepresentedbelowfor
eachelectioniincountryj:
Pr(Post‐ElectionViolenceij=1)=f(β2ExecutiveConstraintsij+φXij+γi+εij,)
(Equation5)
WemeasurePost‐ElectionViolenceusingNelda31,whichindicates,in
casesofpost‐electionprotest,whetherthegovernmentusedviolenceagainst
demonstrators.Thisvariableequals1iftheincumbentusedviolenceagainst
demonstratorsand0otherwise.Asintheabovemodels,controlvariablesinclude
thethree‐year(lagged)movingaverageofPhysicalIntegrity,Political
Competitiveness,andExecutiveRecruitment,aswellasGDP(log),Population(log),
LeaderTenureandLeaderAgeandCivilWar.WealsoincludePre‐Election
Violenceasanadditionalcontroltoensurethatwearenotpickinguptheoverall
likelihoodofincumbentstouseelectionviolence.97Sinceviolenceagainst
protestersisonlypossiblewhenprotestsoccur,weincludeinthissampleonly
electionsinwhichpost‐electionprotestsoccurred,regardlessofwhetherornot
97Only20percentofelectionswithpre‐electionviolencealsoinvolvetheuseofpost‐election
violence,however85percentoftheelectionswithpost‐electionviolencealsohadpre‐election
violence.
48
theincumbentdecidedtoexitpoweraftertheelection.
Table5:LogitEstimatesoftheEffectofExecutiveConstraintsonPost‐
ElectionViolence
ExecutiveConstraints
Pre‐ElectionViolence
PhysicalIntegrity(avg)
PoliticalCompetitiveness(avg)
ExecutiveRecruitment(avg)
Population(log)
GDP(log)
LeaderTenure
LeaderAge
CivilWar
Observations
LogLikelihood
CountryRandomEffects
CountryFixedEffects
(1)
CoreModel
‐0.45*
0.22
1.44*
0.60
‐0.21
0.17
‐0.19
0.15
0.32
0.22
‐0.52
0.36
0.47
0.30
‐0.01
0.01
0.58*
0.29
‐0.08
0.29
160
‐88.37
Yes
No
(2)
FixedEffects
‐0.58+
0.34
‐0.14
0.89
0.19
0.42
‐0.95*
0.43
0.77
0.47
6.63
5.16
1.41
2.31
‐0.03
0.03
1.13+
0.64
0.22
0.44
92
‐25.42
Yes
No
+significantat10%;*significantat5%;**significantat1%.Standarderrorsarein
parentheses.Allmodelsarerestrictedtoelectioninwhichpost‐electionprotests
occurred.
WereportlogitestimatesofthisequationinTable5.Column1reports
estimatesthatincluderandomeffects,andcolumn2reportsestimatesincluding
countryfixed‐effects.Ourresultsareconsistentacrossbothrandom‐effectand
fixed‐effectspecifications:thecoefficientsonExecutiveConstraintsarenegative
andstatisticallysignificant.Figure7showsthepredictedeffectsfromcolumn1
49
ofTable5.AdecreaseinExecutiveConstraintsfrom7to1increasestheaverage
probabilityofviolencefrom0.22to0.73,suggestingagainthattheincentivesto
repressprotestersaremitigatedbythepresenceofinstitutionalizedconstraints.
Figure7:TheEffectofExecutiveConstraintsonPost‐ElectionViolence
Showsthesimulatedeffect(predictedprobabilities)ofExecutiveConstraintsonPost‐
ElectionViolencefromtheestimatesinTable5column1.Allothervariablesaresetat
themean.Verticallinesindicatethe95%confidenceinterval.
CONCLUSION
Usingnewlyavailabledataforallelectionsheldintheworld,1981‐2004,
thisarticleevaluatedtheconditionsunderwhichgovernmentsaremostlikelyto
useviolenceasanelectionstrategy.Thesenewdatahaveseveraladvantages.
Theymeasurespecificformsofelectoralviolencedirectlyratherthanassuming
electionviolenceismeasuredbyannualmeasuresofpoliticalrepression.They
separatepre‐andpost‐electionviolence.Andtheymeasureimportantvariation
inthepopularityofincumbentsandtheinformationavailabletothemaboutthe
potentialthreatsinducedbytheelection.Incontrasttopreviousresearch,we
50
haveshownthatincumbentleadersaremorelikelytoresorttorepression—
specificallyviolence—againstpoliticaloppositioncandidates,voters,orcitizens
whentheyfearlosingpowerbuthavefewinstitutionalizedconstraintsontheir
decisionmakingpower.Wehavealsoshownthatpre‐electionviolencecanhave
theunintendedconsequenceofincreasingtheprobabilityofpost‐election
protest,andthatoncepost‐electionprotestsareinitiatedagainsttheincumbent
regime,institutionalizedconstraintsontheexecutivecanreduceincentivesfor
thegovernmenttorespondwithviolence.Usingnewmonthlydataandexamples
fromZimbabweandIran,weprovidedillustrationsforourcoreargumentthat
incumbentgovernmentsarelikelytouseelectionviolencewhentheyfearlosing
power—becausetheypossesssomeinformationthattheyareunpopular—and
facefewinstitutionalizedconstraints.
Itisclearisthataselectionshavespreadtonearlyallcountries,some
incumbents—includingthoseincountrieslikeAzerbaijan,Cambodia,Iran,or
Zimbabwe—haveusedastrategyofviolenceinanefforttostayinpower.In
effect,electionsexacerbatehumanrightsviolationsintheseplacesintheshort
term;withoutelections,theviolationswouldprobablybefewer.However,our
resultsdonotspeaktowhetherornotleaderswhouseelectionviolenceactually
succeedinstayinginpower,orwhetherperiodsofelectorallyinducedpolitical
violenceareinevitablepartsofpoliticalliberalization.98Manyoftheworld’s
longest‐standingconsolidateddemocracies,includingFrance,theUnited
Kingdom,andtheUnitedStates,experiencedperiodsofelectionviolence.99This
98AnalysisofthisquestionispresentedinHafner‐Burton,Hyde,andJablonski2011.
99See,forexample,Hoppen1984;Keyssar2009;Zeldin1958.
51
historyraisesfundamentalquestionsaboutthelong‐termrelationshipbetween
politicalviolence,elections,anddemocratization.Somescholarsandpunditsmay
betemptedtointerpretthefactthatleaderssometimesusepoliticalviolenceto
manipulateelectionsasconfirmationthatelectionsarenecessarily“bad”for
countrieswithoutahistoryofelectionsanddemocracy.Yetouranalysisdoesnot
supportthisconclusion.
Rather,severalimportantimplicationsfollowfromtheevidencewe
provideinthisarticle.First,thecountriesthataremostlikelytoexperience
electionviolencearepreciselythoseplacesinwhichtheincumbentgovernment
feelsthreatenedbyanorganizedandpotentiallypowerfulopposition.Although
allrepressionisclearlydetrimentaltodemocracyintheshortterm,competition
isnecessaryfordemocracyinboththeshortandthelongterm.Ifouranalysisis
correct,thenmoreoftenthannot,electionviolencemaybeasymptomofa
threatenedandpotentiallyweakeningincumbentgovernmentratherthanasign
thatdemocratization—andfutureprotectionforhumanrights—isdoomed.
Second,andperhapsmostimportantly,ouranalysisdrawsattentiontothe
factthatthereareavarietyofsourcesforinformationabouttheincumbent’s
popularity(thattoourknowledgehaveneverbeenstudiedsystematically)that
canhelppredictthelikelihoodofelectionviolence.Thoughitmayseemself‐
evidenttosuggestthatincumbentsturntoviolencewhentheyfeelthreatened,it
isnotobvioushowtogaugethesethreats.Thatiswhyanticipatingactual
electionviolenceintherealworldhasbeenextremelydifficulttodo;eventhe
mostdedicatedorganizationsthatsupportdemocraticelectionsarerarelyableto
predictwhenviolencewillbreakout.Predictingviolenceisnotjustanacademic
exercise;understandingtheconditionsunderwhichelectionviolenceismost
52
likelytooccurandhowitcanbemitigatedisimportantbecausesuchinformation
caninformthestrategiesofNGOs,internationalorganizations,andother
interestedactors,allowingthemtobetteranticipatewheremeasuresaimedat
preventingelectionviolencearemostlikelytobeuseful.
53
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