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The Six­Day War at 50 by Richard N. Haass ­ Project Syndicate
WORLD AFFAIRS
RICHARD N. HAASS
Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, previously served as
Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department (2001‐2003), and was President
George W. Bush's special envoy to Northern Ireland and Coordinator for the Future of
Afghanistan. He is the author of A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the
Crisis of the Old Order. MAY 23, 2017
The Six‐Day War at 50
NEW YORK – The world is about to mark the 50th anniversary of the June 1967 war
between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria – a con渄lict that continues to stand out in a
region with a modern history largely de渄ined by violence. The war lasted less than a week,
but its legacy remains pronounced a half‐century later.
The war itself was triggered by an Israeli preemptive strike on the Egyptian air force, in
response to Egypt’s decision to expel a United Nations peacekeeping force from Gaza and
the Sinai Peninsula and to close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Israel struck 渄irst,
but most observers regarded what it did as a legitimate act of self‐defense against an
imminent threat.
Israel did not intend to 渄ight on more than one front, but the war quickly expanded when
both Jordan and Syria entered the con渄lict on Egypt’s side. It was a costly decision for the
Arab countries. After just six days of 渄ighting, Israel controlled the Sinai Peninsula and the
Gaza strip, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and all of Jerusalem. The new Israel was more
than three times larger than the old one. It was oddly reminiscent of Genesis: six days of
intense effort followed by a day of rest, in this case the signing of a cease‐渄ire.
The one‐sided battle and its outcome put an end to the notion (for some, a dream) that
Israel could be eliminated. The 1967 victory made Israel permanent in ways that the wars
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The Six­Day War at 50 by Richard N. Haass ­ Project Syndicate
of 1948 and 1956 did not. The new state 渄inally acquired a degree of strategic depth. Most
Arab leaders came to shift their strategic goal from Israel’s disappearance to its return to
the pre‐1967 war borders.
The Six‐Day War did not, however, lead to peace, even a partial one. That would have to wait
until the October 1973 war, which set the stage for what became the Camp David Accords
and the Israel‐Egypt peace treaty. The Arab side emerged from this subsequent con渄lict
with its honor restored; Israelis for their part emerged chastened. There is a valuable
lesson here: decisive military outcomes do not necessarily lead to decisive political results,
much less peace.
The 1967 war did, however, lead to diplomacy, in this case UN Security Council Resolution
242. Approved in November 1967, the resolution called for Israel to withdraw from
territories occupied in the recent con渄lict – but also upheld Israel’s right to live within
secure and recognized boundaries. The resolution was a classic case of creative ambiguity.
Different people read it to mean different things. That can make a resolution easier to
adopt, but more dif渄icult to act on.
It thus comes as little surprise that there is still no peace between Israelis and Palestinians,
despite countless diplomatic undertakings by the United States, the European Union and its
members, the UN, and the parties themselves. To be fair, Resolution 242 cannot be blamed
for this state of affairs. Peace comes only when a con渄lict becomes ripe for resolution, which
happens when the leaders of the principal protagonists are both willing and able to
embrace compromise. Absent that, no amount of well‐intentioned diplomatic effort by
outsiders can compensate.
But the 1967 war has had an enormous impact all the same. Palestinians acquired an
identity and international prominence that had largely eluded them when most were living
under Egyptian or Jordanian rule. What Palestinians could not generate was a consensus
among themselves regarding whether to accept Israel and, if so, what to give up in order to
have a state of their own.
Israelis could agree on some things. A majority supported returning the Sinai to Egypt.
Various governments were prepared to return the Golan Heights to Syria under terms that
were never met. Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza and signed a peace treaty with
Jordan. There was also broad agreement that Jerusalem should remain uni渄ied and in Israeli
hands.
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The Six­Day War at 50 by Richard N. Haass ­ Project Syndicate
But agreement stopped when it came to the West Bank. For some Israelis, this territory was
a means to an end, to be exchanged for a secure peace with a responsible Palestinian state.
For others, it was an end in itself, to be settled and retained.
This is not to suggest a total absence of diplomatic progress since 1967. Many Israelis and
Palestinians have come to recognize the reality of one another’s existence and the need for
some sort of partition of the land into two states. But for now the two sides are not
prepared to resolve what separates them. Both sides have paid and are paying a price for
this standoff.
Beyond the physical and economic toll, Palestinians continue to lack a state of their own
and control over their own lives. Israel’s objective of being a permanent Jewish, democratic,
secure, and prosperous country is threatened by open‐ended occupation and evolving
demographic realities.
Meanwhile, the region and the world have mostly moved on, concerned more about Russia
or China or North Korea. And even if there were peace between Israelis and Palestinians, it
would not bring peace to Syria, Iraq, Yemen, or Libya. Fifty years after six days of war, the
absence of peace between Israelis and Palestinians is part of an imperfect status quo that
many have come to accept and expect.
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© 1995‐2017 Project Syndicate
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