The Power of the Veto and the Power of Legitimacy
An Experiment on the Impact of UN Security Council Authorization Failure
Atsushi Tago
Kobe University
Maki Ikeda
University of Tokyo
CROP-IT Working Paper Series
[Official Website: http://www2.kobe-u.ac.jp/~tago/cropit/]
No. 002
This is a copy right protected document. Do not cite without permission.
Abstract
Authorization for the use of force by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is
believed to affect public opinion and increase public support for military action. The
effects are empirically confirmed both within a state leading the use of force, such as the
United States of America (Fang 2008; Chapman 2007, 2011; Thompson 2006, 2009;
Grieco, Gelpi, Reifler and Feaver 2011), and in third-party countries like Japan (Ikeda
and Tago 2014; Tago and Ikeda 2014). Scholars argue that there are numerous causal
paths explaining this phenomenon. Specifically, i) cost, ii) consequence, iii) intention and
iv) legitimization are widely accepted as co-motivating factors to induce a state to seek
UNSC approval. While these past studies have done excellent research both in theory and
empirics, there is still much that we do not understand. In particular, we believe that it is
necessary to conduct a further study on “failed authorization cases,” which most past
studies have ignored. Rather than a comparison of yes/no for UNSC authorization of the
use of force, there is information to be gleaned from the way in which the failed
authorization occurs. As Chapman (2007; 2011) points out in his theoretical framework,
the general public can derive valuable information based on which of the five permanent
members of the Council casts a veto (information short-cut); this in turn affects public
attitudes towards the use of force. We hypothesize that the power of the veto to change
people’s perceptions is conditioned by the state casting it. Expected vetoes (such as by
China and Russia to a US proposal) would not add information to the public; it would not
change public perceptions. However, if the veto is cast by an allied state (i.e. the UK to a
US proposal), the negative vote functions as an information short-cut that signals the use
of force would come with limited legitimacy. This leads to smaller levels of support for
an unexpectedly vetoed use of force. We show evidence from an internet survey
experiment in Japan.
(8067 words; including Tables and Figures)
2
Introduction
Authorization of the use of force by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is
believed to affect the general public’s opinion and increase their support for military
action. The effects are empirically confirmed both within countries leading the use of
force, such as the United States of America and in third-party countries like the United
Kingdom and Japan.
Scholars argue that there are numerous causal paths leading to this phenomenon.
For instance, some argue that the general public will regard successful UNSC
authorization as a signal that the use of force will be carried out with large levels of
support by an international coalition. Presumably, this creates an image of a “cheaper”
(and therefore better) use of force (even though this may not be true in reality). By
extension, it will be expected that the intervention will end in success, in part because
there is no clear opposition from the major powers (the permanent members of the
Council: Voeten 2005). Furthermore, other scholars place emphasis on the information
communicated by a state initiating the use of force (Thompson 2006; 2009). The
authorized use of force will convey the signal of the benign intentions vis-à-vis the third
party states. Additionally, a final argument focuses on the power of the Council to confer
legal justification and legitimization (Thompson 2006; 2009). Domestic audiences
3
consider the authorized use of force to be more appropriate and suited to international law.
These four arguments, then – i) cost, ii) consequence, iii) intention and vi) legal
justification/legitimization – are widely accepted as co-motivating factors encouraging a
state to seek UNSC approval.
While we acknowledge that these earlier studies have done excellent research
both in theory and empirics (indeed, a large number of fine theoretical and empirical
studies exist on why states seek UNSC authorization and what kinds of information will
be provided by it), there is still
more to do. In particular, we believe that it is necessary
to conduct a further study on “failed” authorization cases, which previous studies have
ignored. News agencies file reports when the UNSC fails to adopt an authorizing
resolution; it is even more likely that they would report the news sensationally if there
was a veto by one of the permanent members. As Chapman (2007; 2011) points out in his
game-theoretical research, the identity of the state casting the veto in the Council can
bring valuable information to the general public by creating an information short-cut,
which can affect the public’s attitude toward the use of force. While past studies on how
the UNSC (and international organizations in general) exercise their influence through
domestic politics tend to care about only successfully authorized cases, this study focuses
on how non-decision (i.e. failed authorization) of the UNSC affects people’s perceptions
4
regarding the military action disapproved by it.
We argue that the power of the veto to change people’s perceptions is conditioned
by the state casting it. Since the expected veto would not add information to the public, it
would not change public perceptions. However, if the veto is cast by a state which would
not usually cast a negative vote but abstain, this creates an information short-cut which
signals to the public that the use of force would come with limited legitimacy. This leads
to smaller levels of support for the failed (i.e. unexpectedly vetoed) use of force.
Success and Failure of UNSC Authorization
Under the current international order that prohibits “the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations” (Article 2, United Nations Charter),
successful authorization of the use of force by the UN Security Council can be justified
as an exceptional measure which therefore sends positive information on the military
action to its own audience (Fang 2008; Chapman 2007, 2011; Thompson 2006, 2009;
Grieco, Gelpi, Reifler and Feaver 2011), as well as to and foreign audiences (Johns and
Davis 2014; Ikeda and Tago 2014; Tago and Ikeda 2014). UN authorization has the
potential to inform the audience that the use of force was carried out for noble purposes.
5
Also, it would enhance the perception of the legality and legitimacy of the use of force.
For instance, Thompson (2006: 3) looks at the “notion of strategic information
transmission.” When a state consults with a “sufficiently neutral” international
organization, its multilateral approach sends information to both foreign leaders and their
publics. He assumes that there are at least two kinds of information. First, the cost of
working through an international organization allows a state to send a costly signal
regarding its benign intentions vis-à-vis third party states. That is, seeking authorization
leads to an impression that the use of force is better intended and ultimately in the interests
of international society, rather than for its own parochial national interest. Second, foreign
general publics can take advantage of this information short-cut and the successful
authorization enables them to judge possible (desirable) consequences of the military
action and its legality/legitimacy.
By contrast, Chapman (2007; 2011) makes an important contribution by
highlighting a different type of information that can be generated by successful
authorization. He emphasizes that a more informative authorization can be given by
international organizations composed of member states with more heterogeneous
preferences. When it is difficult to acquire authorization, such as when conservative states
have access to a veto, this can lead to higher levels of support among the domestic public.
6
According to this argument, this is why authorization the UN Security Council matters
than authorization by NATO. Also, Chapman’s informational perspective suggests that
the failure to adopt an authorizing resolution by a conservative institution like the UNSC
is unlikely to affect public opinion because it is a “noisy” signal about the merits of
proposed military action (Chapman 2011: 107). Indeed, the last suggestion is confirmed
by an experimental study in Japan. According to Tago and Ikeda (2014), failed
authorization due to Chinese and Russian vetoes does not negatively change the
perception of the Japanese public toward American use of force. However, they find that
the US’s self-withdrawal of an authorizing draft resolution significantly damages
domestic perceptions on use of force.
Accordingly, we need to carefully distinguish and further study how different
types of failure in multilateral diplomacy affect public perceptions regarding a proposed
military action. It seems quite plausible that there are clear differences between a vetoed
case and a case where a proposer withdraws a draft resolution to authorize the use of force.
For instance, failure in multilateral approval might send a signal to foreign
domestic audiences in terms of intentions. If authorization failed due to a veto, the general
public recognizes that a vetoing major power country considers that the proposed use of
force is not done for international society but mainly for a country proposing the military
7
action. The denial is a proof of the judgment that there is more of self-serving aim and
intensions. Since a veto is costly to cast (because of a high likelihood of deterioration of
diplomatic relationship), once it has been cast, this sends a clear message to all.
Furthermore, self-withdrawal of an authorizing resolution with an anticipation of strong
opposition from the member states of the Council implies that there are multiple countries
that share the judgment about self-serving intentions regarding the use of force.
As to the costs and consequences of the use of force, failure can be perceived
negatively. In particular, if the veto is cast by a major power that is close to a proposer
country (e.g. an allied state like the UK), that is a clear message that there will be no help
from a key major power allied state. No support from it could easily increase the cost of
military operation because burden sharing with it is impossible and other allied/friendly
countries may cease helping a proposer state because of the explicit opposition by the
vetoing country. The same logic can be applied to a case when a state proposing the use
of force withdraws a draft authorization resolution. This is because the general public can
expect that there are more than five or six states opposing the proposal, which could
decrease the chance of burden sharing and a successful outcome. By contrast, if a veto is
cast by China or Russia, a major power country that will not usually assist American use
of force in terms of military operations, cost and consequence information would not be
8
generated.
Furthermore, as to the legality, any failed authorization followed by military
action would result in a violation of international law in the strict sense. The UN Charter
makes an exception for its use of force prohibition rule and Article 51 (self-defense) and
UNSC approval are the only two cases in which a state is allowed to use armed force
internationally. No matter who cast a veto the fact of violation of international law would
not be changed. Self-withdrawal also would not change the fact. Therefore, by
comparison with a successfully authorized case, any failure would harm the perception
of the general public in terms of the use of force’s legality.
However, legitimacy of the use of force would be different from legality.
Legitimacy is a “quality of ‘oughtness’, of being right and proper, that is attributed to
some political object” (Brewer 1972: 76) and the term “legality” could be interpreted by
people more narrowly than legitimacy. They would think something as “right and proper”,
i.e. legitimate, in a political and general moral sense rather than in law. In line with what
Chapman argues (2007; 2011) that we consider pre-known/pre-expected opposition from
perpetual nay-sayers, for instance like China and Russia for the US, would not harm a
legitimacy perception among the foreign public. Their oppositions are politically and
morally biased from the beginning and do not damage American efforts to foster
9
international support and bolster its image of political/moral legitimacy. An expected veto
would therefore not increase opposition to the military action among the general public.
However, when an unexpected, surprise veto by the UK or France is cast, the legitimacy
of US use of force would be in question, both in political and moral grounds. A democratic
allied state that shares the core principles of political norms is casting a negative vote to
the US’s proposal (even by paying a cost for future deterioration of diplomatic tie with
the US). The general public would regard such military force as a less legitimate action.
In short, no surprise information is transmitted to the Japanese domestic audience
by the perpetual naysayers (conservative states, in Chapman’s term) like China and
Russia (Chapman 2007, Tago and Ikeda 2014). The audience knows that they would not
agree with US use of force in general. By contrast, besides legality information that is
narrowly defined, a surprise veto by revisionist states like France and UK will generate
strong negative perceptions; in particular, people would think that they will not help the
US, which is crucial to the success of the use of force. Also, people would regard this it
as a probably-failed and less legitimate use of force. Only in cases like a French and
British veto will there be significant and negative change of perception on the likelihood
of success.
10
Hypothesis
An unexpected veto either by the UK or France on a proposed American use of force will
significantly increase opposition to the military action among the general public because
the public receive negative information regarding cost, consequence, intention and
legitimacy from the veto.
Research Design
We use the same scenario as Tago and Ikeda (2014) have done their experiment in 2011.
The scenario is on a military intervention involving a regime-change in state “A” in the
Middle East. The authoritarian regime in country A faces a popular movement demanding
democratization. The government of A orders the armed forces to kill the people involved
with this movement, resulting in mass political killing in the country. Because country A
is a major oil producer, the price of crude oil rapidly increases after the media reports the
mass killing and flood of refugees leaving the country. The incident destabilizes the
security of the entire region. The United States asks the UNSC to adopt a resolution that
authorizes the member states to take all necessary measures to stop the mass killing and
recover regional peace and security.
For this hypothetical scenario, the UNSC makes a decision regarding the
11
proposed draft resolution made by the United States. There are six different manipulations
– i) successful authorization by the UNSC, ii) failed authorization due to the veto by
China, and iii) failed authorization due to the veto by Russia, iv) failed authorization due
to the veto by France, v) failed authorization due to the veto by the UK, and vi) failed
authorization due to self-withdrawal of a draft resolution by the US. These are listed in
Table I and formed our key independent variable, having been randomly assigned to each
respondent. In the scenario, regardless of successfully obtaining a resolution from the
UNSC, the US government, with overwhelming support from its domestic audience, has
started multinational military operations against the country.
We conducted survey experiments from September 4-10, 2014 through Nikkei
Research Inc. (http://www.nikkei-r.co.jp/english/). The survey covered 2149 individuals
between the ages of 20 and 69. Table II shows the sample size, mean age, gender balance,
income level, education level, and the mean scores for two different questions regarding
1) level of interest in international relations and 2) level of acceptance on using force as
a mean of conflict resolution, for the six manipulations. The table and figures clearly
show that the random assignment of the six manipulations was implemented successfully
and that there is therefore no systematic difference among the four sample groups in terms
12
of basic attribution and key political positions and attitudes.1
[ Table I Six Manipulations ]
[Table II Sample Size and Mean Value of Key Variables ]
Nikkei Research Inc. has a nationwide pool of respondents; however, our study
inevitably suffers from some sampling biases since it is based on an internet survey.
Individuals in our sample had to have internet access and voluntarily preregistered with
the survey company. We should not and do not claim that the results of this experiment
can be extended to the whole Japanese population. However, by carefully observing the
differences among people with randomly assigned stimuli, we are able to claim that the
test provides valuable information about how different stimuli on multilateralism can
affect support for a military action.
To measure the level of foreign domestic support for use of force in our survey,
two questions were prepared. First, respondents were asked if they approved of the use
of force initiated by the United States (Q1). Possible choices were: 4) approve, 3)
somewhat approve, 2) somewhat disapprove, 1) disapprove, and 0) do not know. Second,
respondents were asked if s/he approved of the material support of sending the Japanese
1
In order to omit the non-serious respondents who did not read the scenario and questions, we
decide to drop a person who did not use at least 25 seconds in the first page with full scenario and
the first two questions. By this procedure, the sample size of the data later analyzed is reduced to
1962. The reduced sample is also well balanced.
13
Self-Defense Forces to a military coalition led by the United States (Q3). Again the same
five choices were given.
In addition to those two questions, we set nine questions to capture what kinds
of information is delivered to the Japanese public via UNSC authorization success/failure
manipulations (Q2-1 to Q2-9), after we made a question on attitudes toward American
use of force:
Q2-1. Do you think this use of force has legal problems? (a question on illegality)
Q2-2. Do you think this use of force will be expensive? (a question on costliness)
Q2-3. Do you think this use of force is done for the sake of international society? (a
question on the public goods)
Q2-4. Do you think this use of force will be prolonged? (a question on duration)
Q2-5. Do you think this use of force will lead to a lot of casualties? (a question on
casualty)
Q2-6. Do you think this use of force has limited legitimacy? (a question on
illegitimacy)
Q2-7. Do you think this use of force is being carried out for the sake of US interests?
(a question on American national interest)
Q2-8. Do you think this use of force can be avoided by pursuing diplomatic
14
negotiations further? (a question on the possibility to avoid using force)
Q2-9. Do you think this use of force will fail? (a question on outcome)
Respondents are asked to choose 5) agree, 4) somewhat agree, 3) cannot say
either, 2) somewhat disagree, 1) disagree for each question. We randomized the order of
the nine questions. We adopt the ANOVA and Tukey-Kramer method to test significance
of the mean difference of each pair of manipulation conditions.
Results
Tables III and IV summarize the mean scores to the eleven key questions by the six UNSC
manipulation conditions. First off, we find that, on average, Japanese respondents tend
give higher levels of support for US military action than for Japanese military contribution
to a US-led military operation in the Middle East. This suggests that the Japanese
audience takes a position in line with free-riding to its hegemonic ally. Moreover, Table
III shows that full UNSC authorization obtains the highest level of support for both
American use of force and Japanese SDF troops deployment. A successful UNSC
resolution makes a clear difference in general perception on the military option. In cases
of vetoes, we see two groups: first, Chinese and Russian vetoes tend to return to positive
perception (the mean score are 2.38 and 2.33 respectively); second, French and UK vetoes
15
increase some negative perceptions and end up with the support score as 2.26 and 2.22
respectively. Finally, the worst situation for the US and Japanese government is a case
when the US government withdraws its draft resolution (the mean score ends with only
2.10).
If we try to explain the variations of those two attitudes towards the use of force
as a means to solve international security issues, what would be the important driving
forces to change people’s support for the military action? Table IV presents the data to
answer this question. Also, Figure I shows the results of pairwise comparisons of means.2
[Table III Mean score for Q1 and Q3 ]
From Table IV, we can see that there are questions that do not make any
meaningful (and statistically significant) variation by manipulations. For instance, Q2-2,
Q2-4 and Q2-5 are such that they do not vary in their answers. That is, it does not matter
2
Panel A corresponds to Q1: Do you approve the use of force initiated by the United States, and
panel K corresponds to Q3: Do you approved of the material support of sending the Japanese SelfDefense Forces to a military coalition led by the United States. Panel B corresponds to Q2-1: Do you
think this use of force has legal problems? (a question on the illegality), panel C corresponds to Q22: Do you think this use of force will be expensive? (a question on costliness), panel D corresponds
to Q2-3: Do you think this use of force is done for the sake of international society? (a question on
the public goods), panel E corresponds to Q2-4: Do you think this use of force will be prolonged? (a
question on duration), panel F corresponds to Q2-5: Do you think this use of force will lead to a lot
of casualties? (a question on casualty), panel G corresponds to Q2-6: Do you think this use of force
has limited legitimacy? (a question on illegitimacy), panel H corresponds to Q2-7: Do you think this
use of force is being carried out for the sake of US interests? (a question on American national
interest), panel I corresponds to Q2-8: Do you think this use of force can be avoided by pursuing
diplomatic negotiations further? (a question on the possibility to avoid using force) and panel J
corresponds to Q2-9: Do you think this use of force will fail? (a question on outcome).
16
how the UNSC authorization is successful or unsuccessful in order to judge cost, duration
and expected number of casualties by this military operation. The legality (Q2-1) and
legitimacy (Q2-6) questions, however, show some clear differences by manipulations. For
instance, legality is clearly high in successful authorization cases but not in others, no
matter how it failed.
Moreover, it is clear that the legitimacy perception matters in determining
support for American use of force (see panel A and panel G in Figure I). In both panels A
and G, meaningful differences of the mean score of attitudes exist in comparisons of US
Self-Withdrawal (USW) against Full UNSC Support (S), Russian Veto (RV) and Chinese
Veto (CV) respectively, and in comparisons of Full UNSC Support (S) against French
Veto (FV) and UK Veto (UKV) 3 respectively. That is to say, a higher support for
American use of force exists in Full UNSC Support, Russian Veto and Chinese Veto
conditions when we compare them against US Self-Withdrawal condition. And, we can
also see the perception difference in terms of legitimacy; i.e. US Self-Withdrawal
condition has a lower perception of legitimacy than Full UNSC Support, Russian Veto
and Chinese Veto conditions. In a similar vein, a higher support for American use of force
exists in the Full UNSC Support condition, when compared with the French Veto and UK
3
For the UK Veto condition, it was not significant at 95% CI but it was very close to be significant.
It was obviously reach to the significance at 90% CI.
17
Veto conditions. Again, we can confirm the statistically significant difference in
legitimacy perception as well. Full UNSC Support condition has a higher perception of
legitimacy than the French Veto and UK Veto conditions.
We could not find similar trend in other panels. That is, we can say it was neither
the perception of cost, public goods, duration, casualty, self-interest to the US, nor
outcome that leads to changes in public support for the US use of force depending on the
variety of UNSC authorization success and failure. The changes in support for the use of
force depending on the UNSC resolution success/failure manipulations are caused by the
legitimacy perception. It is important to confirm that it is not the legality perception either
(see panel B) – legality is only high in the successful authorization manipulation against
unsuccessful ones.
[Table IV Mean score for Q2-1 and Q2-9 ]
[Figure I Difference of the respondents’ attitudes by manipulations: Pairwise
comparisons (Tukey’s test).]
Conclusion
We have hypothesized that an unexpected veto either by the UK or France on a proposed
American use of force would significantly increase opposition to the military action
among the general public because the public receive negative information from their veto
18
regarding cost, consequence, intention and legitimacy. We do not find the same for the
case of Russian and Chinese vetoes. Also, our experiment, with its series of questions on
public perceptions of the use of force, has revealed that it is only legitimacy that
consistently explains why people support the American use of force under the particular
conditions of UN authorization success and failure. It was not cost, expected consequence,
intention but it was legitimacy that matters to Japanese public to decide if s/he decide to
support an American use of force.
It is surprising that there is no difference in terms of cost of the military
operations and intention of the coalition leader state even if there is a successful or failed
UN authorization. Thompson (2006, 2009) argues that the information on cost and
intention will be transmitted to the general public through the successful UNSC
resolutions. However, this study shows clearly that it was not the case. Japanese survey
respondents did not consider that it would be a less costly operation and it would be a
restricted, less coercive operation if there is a successful authorization by the UN Security
Council. It is possible that Japanese, who has been under its Peace Constitution for nearly
70 years and shared a stable, high level of confidence to the UN (Norris 2009), tends to
believe the power of UN authority and perceives more of legitimacy of the UNSC
resolution than other countries’ citizens. While we admit that Japan could have been a
19
likely case to observe the power of legitimacy, it must be surely noted that the
conventional wisdom that UN resolution would bring a better perception in terms of cost
and intension is clearly denied by the survey experiment in Japan. Further studies are
needed to see how our results are robust through other countries’ respondents.
Furthermore, the contribution of this study can be claimed in finding of
significant difference between legality and legitimacy perception generated by the
different manipulations of UNSC’s successful and unsuccessful authorization of use of
force. Those two terms can often be mixed, and they may not be clearly distinguishable
for many people, but Japanese respondents in our survey experiment did see an obvious
difference between them. Successful adoption of the resolution was legal and legitimate.
Failed authorization due to expected vetoes of Russia and China is not legal but
legitimate; by contrast, failed authorization due to unexpected vetoes of the UK and
France is not legal nor legitimate. We consider this as a curious difference between
somehow similar concepts – legality and legitimacy. Also, it was legitimacy that
generates an overall support for the use of force but legality. The difference between the
legality and legitimacy needs to be further studied in the following research.
20
Tables and Figures
Manipulations:
Is there a resolution?
Is there an affirmative majority?
Was UNSC bypassed?
Was it a surprise veto?
Note: Authors
[ Table I Six Manipulations ]
Full UNSC Russian Chinese
Support
Veto
Veto
(S)
(RV)
(CV)
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
French
Veto
(FV)
N
Y
N
Y
UK
Veto
(UKV)
N
Y
N
Y
[Table II Sample Size and Mean Value of Key Variables ]
Full UNSC Russian Chinese French
UK
Manipulations:
Support
Veto
Veto
Veto
Veto
(S)
(RV)
(CV)
(FV)
(UKV)
Interest in international relations
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
Cannot accept use of force as a
2.9
2.9
2.8
2.9
2.8
mean of conflict resolution
Age
45
46
45
46
47
Gender (1=male, 0=female)
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
Education level
5.9
5.9
5.9
5.8
5.7
Income level
2.9
3.1
2.8
2.9
2.9
N
340
363
337
391
362
N (after reduced) *see footnote 1
308
332
309
355
332
Note: Authors
Manipulations
Mean score for Q1:
approval of US
use of force
[Table III Mean score for Q1 and Q3 ]
Full UNSC Russian Chinese French
UK
Support
Veto
Veto
Veto
Veto
(S)
(RV)
(CV)
(FV)
(UKV)
US SelfWithdrawal
(USW)
N
N
Y
-
US SelfWithdrawal
(USW)
2.4
US SelfWithdrawal
(USW)
2.48
2.33
2.38
2.22
2.26
2.10
N
261
276
248
287
273
261
Mean score for Q3:
approval of JSDF
troops deployment
2.14
1.94
2.03
1.81
1.81
1.75
262
284
264
312
288
286
(4 = support,
1= do not support)
(4 = support,
1= do not support)
N
Note: Authors
21
2.9
45
1.5
5.7
2.8
356
326
Manipulations
Mean score for Q2-1
[Table IV Mean score for Q2-1 and Q2-9 ]
Full UNSC Russian Chinese French
Support
Veto
Veto
Veto
(S)
(RV)
(CV)
(FV)
2.94
3.46
3.40
3.45
UK
Veto
(UKV)
3.55
US SelfWithdrawal
(USW)
3.50
(a question on illegality:
5 = agree, 1= do not agree)
Mean score for Q2-2
4.25
4.16
4.13
4.19
4.18
4.27
3.17
3.07
3.14
3.04
2.95
2.83
3.87
3.78
3.84
3.88
3.82
3.87
4.03
3.97
3.93
3.98
3.91
4.08
3.00
3.23
3.18
3.32
3.35
3.48
3.52
3.67
3.66
3.73
3.71
3.77
3.05
3.03
3.08
3.10
3.13
3.01
3.20
3.29
3.23
3.36
3.41
3.36
(a question on costliness:
5 = agree, 1= do not agree)
Mean score for Q2-3
(a question on the public goods:
5 = agree, 1= do not agree)
Mean score for Q2-4
(a question on duration:
5 = agree, 1= do not agree)
Mean score for Q2-5
(a question on casualty:
5 = agree, 1= do not agree)
Mean score for Q2-6
(a question on illegitimacy:
5 = agree, 1= do not agree)
Mean score for Q2-7
(a question on American self-interest:
5 = agree, 1= do not agree)
Mean score for Q2-8
(a question on possibility of avoid using
force: 5 = agree, 1= do not agree)
Mean score for Q2-9
(a question on outcome:
5 = agree, 1= do not agree)
Note: Authors
22
Q1 Attitudes toward US Use of Force
Q2_1 Perception on Illegality of Use of Force
USW/UKV
USW/FV
USW/CV
USW/RV
USW/S
UKV/FV
UKV/CV
UKV/RV
UKV/S
FV/CV
FV/RV
FV/S
RV/CV
CV/S
RV/S
USW/UKV
USW/FV
USW/CV
USW/RV
USW/S
UKV/FV
UKV/CV
UKV/RV
UKV/S
FV/CV
FV/RV
FV/S
RV/CV
CV/S
RV/S
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
-.2
95% confidence limits are shown
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
95% confidence limits are shown
Panel A
Panel B
Note: For Figure I, the abbreviations S, RV, CV, FV, UKV, and USW mean following;
Q2_2 Perception on Cost of Use of Force
Full UNSC Support (S)
USW/UKV
USW/FV
USW/CV
USW/RV
USW/S
UKV/FV
UKV/CV
UKV/RV
UKV/S
FV/CV
FV/RV
FV/S
RV/CV
CV/S
RV/S
Russian Veto (RV)
Chinese Veto (CV)
French Veto (FV)
UK Veto (UKV)
US Self-Withdrawal (USW).
If it is USW/UKV, the figure shows the difference between respondents’ support rate for
US Self-Withdrawal manipulation and (i.e. minus) UK Veto manipulation.
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
95% confidence limits are shown
Panel C
Figure I
Difference of the respondents’ attitudes by manipulations: Pairwise comparisons (Tukey’s test).
23
Q2_5 Perception on Casualty of Use of Force
Q2_3 Perception on Contribution to International Public Goods
USW/UKV
USW/FV
USW/CV
USW/RV
USW/S
UKV/FV
UKV/CV
UKV/RV
UKV/S
FV/CV
FV/RV
FV/S
RV/CV
CV/S
RV/S
USW/UKV
USW/FV
USW/CV
USW/RV
USW/S
UKV/FV
UKV/CV
UKV/RV
UKV/S
FV/CV
FV/RV
FV/S
RV/CV
CV/S
RV/S
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
-.4
95% confidence limits are shown
-.2
0
.2
.4
95% confidence limits are shown
Panel D
Panel F
Q2_6 Perception on Low-Legitimacy of Use of Force
Q2_4 Perception on Duration of Use of Force
USW/UKV
USW/FV
USW/CV
USW/RV
USW/S
UKV/FV
UKV/CV
UKV/RV
UKV/S
FV/CV
FV/RV
FV/S
RV/CV
CV/S
RV/S
USW/UKV
USW/FV
USW/CV
USW/RV
USW/S
UKV/FV
UKV/CV
UKV/RV
UKV/S
FV/CV
FV/RV
FV/S
RV/CV
CV/S
RV/S
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
-.2
95% confidence limits are shown
0
.2
.4
Panel E
Figure I
.6
.8
95% confidence limits are shown
Panel G
Difference of the respondents’ attitudes by manipulations: Pairwise comparisons (Tukey’s test), cont.
24
Q2_7 Perception on Contribution to US Interest
Q2_9 Perception on Possibility of Failure
USW/UKV
USW/FV
USW/CV
USW/RV
USW/S
UKV/FV
UKV/CV
UKV/RV
UKV/S
FV/CV
FV/RV
FV/S
RV/CV
CV/S
RV/S
USW/UKV
USW/FV
USW/CV
USW/RV
USW/S
UKV/FV
UKV/CV
UKV/RV
UKV/S
FV/CV
FV/RV
FV/S
RV/CV
CV/S
RV/S
-.2
0
.2
.4
-.2
.6
0
.2
.4
95% confidence limits are shown
95% confidence limits are shown
Panel J
Panel H
Q2_8 Perception on Possibility of Diplomatic Solution before the Military Action
Q3 Attitudes toward Japanese SDF Deployment
USW/UKV
USW/FV
USW/CV
USW/RV
USW/S
UKV/FV
UKV/CV
UKV/RV
UKV/S
FV/CV
FV/RV
FV/S
RV/CV
CV/S
RV/S
USW/UKV
USW/FV
USW/CV
USW/RV
USW/S
UKV/FV
UKV/CV
UKV/RV
UKV/S
FV/CV
FV/RV
FV/S
RV/CV
CV/S
RV/S
-.4
-.2
0
.2
-.6
.4
-.4
-.2
0
.2
Panel K
Panel I
Figure I
.4
95% confidence limits are shown
95% confidence limits are shown
Difference of the respondents’ attitudes by manipulations: Pairwise comparisons (Tukey’s test), cont.
25
Reference
Brewer, Thomas L. 1972. “Collective Legitimization in International Organizations
Concept and Practice.” Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 73-88.
Chapman, Terrence L. 2007. “International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and
Institutional Legitimacy.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51:134–66.
——. 2011. Securing Approval: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Authorization for War.
Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.
Claude, Inis. 1966. “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United
Nations.” International Organization 20:367–79.
Fang, Songying. 2008. “The Informational Role of International Institutions and
Domestic Politics.” American Journal of Political Science 52:304–21.
Grieco, Joseph, Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reifler, and Peter Feaver. 2011. “Let’s Get a
Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War.”
International Studies Quarterly 55:563–83.
Ikeda, Maki and Atsushi Tago. 2014. “Winning Over Foreign Domestic Support for Use
of Force: Power of Diplomatic and Operational Multilateralism.” International
Relations of the Asia-Pacific 14: 303–324.
Johns, Robert, and Graeme AM. Davis. 2014. “Coalitions of the Willing? International
Backing and British Public Support for Military Action.” Journal of Peace Research
51: 767-781.
Norris, Pippa. 2009. “Confidence in the United Nations: Cosmopolitan and Nationalistic
Attitudes.” Pp. 17-48 in The International System, Democracy and Values, edited by
Yilmaz Esmer and Thorleif Pettersson. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis.
Tago, Atsushi and Maki, Ikeda. 2014. “An ‘A’ for Effort: Experimental Evidence on UN
Security Council Engagement and Support for US Military Action in Japan.” British
Journal of Political Science in press.
Thompson, Alexander. 2006. “Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic
of Information Transmission.” International Organization 60:1–34.
——. 2009. Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq. Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press
Voeten, Erik. 2005. “The Political Origins of the Legitimacy of the United Nations
Security Council.” International Organization 59: 527–557.
26
Appendix: Scenario to Respondents (original Japanese; translated in English)
Now we will have you read a certain scenario concerning international relations. Please
answer the questions following this scenario.
There have been reports from a major news outlet that the government of Country A in
the Middle East has ordered a military crackdown on national meetings demanding
democracy. It is reported that many civilians have been killed in Country A, and many
have become refugees and internally displaced peoples. Country A is one of the few oil
producers in the world, so with the news of the military crack down the price of oil has
surged.
After this news, a United Nations Security Council meeting was convened, and the
situation regarding Country A was discussed. America proposed a Security Council
resolution to stop the killings in Country A.
---------------- Randomly Assigned Section (one of them were assigned) ----------------
[Full UNSC Support] After several hours of discussions, the board of directors carried
out a vote on the resolution. All council nations agreed to the resolution, so it was
unanimously adopted. Now the United Nations Member Countries including America
have gained an authorized resolution to undertake ‘whatever means necessary’ in Country
A, including military action, to recover regional stability.
[Veto Cases] After several hours of discussions, the board of directors carried out a vote
on the resolution. While thirteen of the fifteen member countries agreed, the resolution
was rejected because **** vetoed it. Therefore the United Nations Member Countries
including America have not gained an authorized resolution to undertake ‘whatever
means necessary’ in Country A, including military action, to recover regional stability.
Note: **** was replaced by a country name depending which country cast a veto, i.e.
China, Russia, France and the UK.
[US Self-withdrawal]After several hours of discussions, there was strong opposition to
America’s proposal from the other member countries. America withdrew its proposal,
believing it would not be able to gain any consensus. Therefore the United Nations
Member Countries including America have not gained an authorized resolution to
undertake ‘whatever means necessary’ in Country A, including military action, to recover
27
regional stability.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A few days after the discussions concerning the situation of Country A at the UN Security
Council, America began military action against Country A with the absolute support of
its citizens and congress. This military action is composed of military personnel from
other countries as well as multinational forces.
28