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The Graduate School
2012
Veterans at War: The American Legion and
Civilian Mobilization in World War II
Christopher W. (Christopher Wayne) Griffin
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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
VETERANS AT WAR: THE AMERICAN LEGION AND
CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR II
By
CHRISTOPHER W. GRIFFIN
A Dissertation submitted to the
Department of History
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree Awarded:
Fall Semester, 2012
Christopher W. Griffin defended this dissertation on October 22, 2012.
The members of the supervisory committee were:
Jonathan Grant
Professor Directing Dissertation
Mark Souva
University Representative
James P. Jones
Committee Member
Michael Creswell
Committee Member
The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and
certifies that the dissertation has been approved in accordance with university requirements.
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Over the course of any graduate career, one accrues many debts. As a student who took a long
time to finish, the list of debts I owe are correspondingly lengthy. Though it would take an essay
nearly as long as this dissertation to thank them all fully, there are those whose contributions
have been so vital to this project that they must be specifically addressed. The Franklin
Roosevelt Institute’s generous grant made my research at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential
Library in Hyde Park possible. The archivists there, particularly Kirsten Carter, Virginia
Lewick, Matt Hanson, and Mark Renovitch made my first archival experience both rewarding
and pleasant. Without their guidance through the inner workings of the Roosevelt
administration, this would be a very different dissertation. I would like to thank the staff at the
American Legion Library in Indianapolis, especially Debra Brookhart and Howard Trace, who
were always quick to answer the multitude of questions I brought to them. Anne Marie West
spent endless hours helping me develop grant proposals in the bowels of Strozier Library,
bringing my research topic into sharper focus. In the Graduate School at FSU, Lynn Burgess
made the manuscript clearance process painless, in spite of my best efforts to the contrary. My
research could not have been conducted without funding for travel from the Florida State History
Department and the Florida State University Dissertation Research Grant. I must also take the
time to thank the Graduate Committee for the History Department, which saw enough value in
my teaching and research abilities to fund me every semester of my graduate career. I can only
hope the career that follows does justice to the investment they have made.
Poverty, though temporary, is one of the unwelcomed and inevitable necessities of
graduate living. For me, that poverty was offset by the unflinching generosity I encountered
throughout my doctoral studies. Joe Dos Santos provided lodging during my stay in Hyde Park.
Carla Hartman was a great roommate, landlord and friend to me during my stay in Indianapolis.
At a time when I had nowhere else to go, Erica and Sonja Dawsey and their parents, Angela Wall
and Sanford Dawsey, opened their home to me and treated me like a member of their rather
remarkable family. Aurora and Michael Kurpicski provided food, transportation, and great
company during my many trips to the National Archives in Maryland. Despite the many
iii
inconveniences I caused them, they never once made me feel like a burden. No brother could
ask for a better sister, nor a better brother-in-law. When the opportunity comes, I hope that I am
as unselfish and welcoming.
I have had the great fortune to find exceptional mentors throughout my graduate career.
Jonathan Grant, my major professor, has shaped this topic through careful critiques, advice, and
a door that has always been open. Jim Jones gave me support and friendship at a time when
nothing was going my way, helping me get through the roughest part of my life. His lectures are
the standard by which I will always measure my own. Max Friedman has always thought more
of me than I deserve. His excellent scholarship is exceeded only by his capacity to nurture the
abilities of his students. Michael Creswell, Ron Doel, Elna Green, Sally Hadden, Neil
Jumonville, and Heike Schmidt have been role models that demonstrated the best qualities of
scholarly pursuit and academic community. Their example provided me with ample proofs of
how far I had to go to live up to the requirements of the profession. Pam Robbins, who never
gets the credit she deserves for turning raw TAs into exceptional teachers, has also been a good
friend to me. Debbie Perry and Chris Pignatiello made the red tape easier to deal with and the
department a far friendlier place.
Perhaps the greatest benefit of a long career in graduate school is the many students you
meet. I have benefited from many great graduate students with whom I have had the pleasure of
studying. Michael Douma, Amy Carney, and Elizabeth Bryant became more than just
colleagues, they are life long friends.
Finally, as so many acknowledgements before me have shown, great tasks like a
dissertation are made possible by the sacrifice of an entire family. My family has patiently
endured my many long hours of study for far longer than could be reasonably expected. It is no
easy task living with an aspiring scholar. Alison still has yet to experience life without student
loans, ridiculously tight budgets, and a father for whom every hour is a work hour. She has been
the greatest joy in my life and making her life better has, at times, been the only thing keeping
me going. It is to her I dedicate this dissertation, in the hopes that the years spent in bringing it
to fruition will make her life a better one and help her expand her horizons beyond mine.
Christopher Griffin
Tallahassee, FL
October 2012
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables............................................................................................................................vii
List of Abbreviations ...............................................................................................................viii
Abstract .....................................................................................................................................ix
1.
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
2.
THE AMERICAN LEGION AND THE ORIGINS OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE................. 21
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
3.
The American Legion and Neutrality....................................................................... 21
The Origin of the American Legion’s Role in Civilian Defense ............................... 24
Lend-Lease and the Origins of the Legion Mission to Great Britain......................... 27
Mission to Great Britain .......................................................................................... 37
The Warner Report .................................................................................................. 43
THE AMERICAN LEGION AND THE EARLY OCD .................................................... 46
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
4.
Veterans and American Society ................................................................................. 5
The American Legion as Voluntary Association ...................................................... 13
Legion Historiography............................................................................................. 16
Why the American Legion? ..................................................................................... 17
Sources and Chapters............................................................................................... 18
The Clamor for Civilian Defense ............................................................................. 46
Establishment of the OCD ....................................................................................... 51
Controversial Appointment...................................................................................... 54
The Role of the American Legion in the OCD ......................................................... 60
The Aftermath of Pearl Harbor ................................................................................ 62
OVERHAUL OF THE OCD............................................................................................. 71
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
Public Criticism of the OCD Grows......................................................................... 71
A New Role For the Legion..................................................................................... 76
The Mayris Chaney Episode .................................................................................... 82
The American Legion and the New Leadership of the OCD..................................... 90
The New Look of the OCD...................................................................................... 93
v
5.
THE AMERICAN LEGION AT WAR............................................................................. 98
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
6.
SCRAP CAMPAIGNS AND THE AMERICAN LEGION ............................................ 128
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
6.8
6.9
6.10
7.
Organization of the Air Raid Warden Schools ...................................................... 100
Lack of Resources ................................................................................................. 105
Civilian Defense in Action..................................................................................... 111
Winding Down ...................................................................................................... 117
The America Alert Campaign ................................................................................ 121
Origins of the Salvage Drives ............................................................................... 129
Junkies and the Politics of the Local Salvage Drives.............................................. 130
The Scrap Aluminum Campaign............................................................................ 132
Scrap Metal Drives ................................................................................................ 143
War Trophies......................................................................................................... 146
Scrap Rubber......................................................................................................... 154
National Scrap Harvest .......................................................................................... 160
The “Jalopy Roundup” .......................................................................................... 162
Surplus and the National Scrap Bank Campaign .................................................... 166
Other Materials...................................................................................................... 168
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 171
APPENDIX ............................................................................................................................ 177
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 179
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH................................................................................................... 192
vi
LIST OF TABLES
5.1
American Legion Civilian Defense Activities Through May 20, 1942 ........................... 99
5.2
American Legion Civilian Defense Activities Through December 31, 1942 ................ 112
5.3
Major Services of the Citizens Defense Corps ............................................................. 120
7.1
Number of U.S. Men Enrolled in Large Veterans Associations.................................... 175
vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
OCD = Office of Civilian Defense
OPM = Office of Production Management
WPB = War Production Board
NDC = National Defense Committee, American Legion
NLC = National Legislative Committee, American Legion
NEC = National Executive Committee, American Legion
VFW = Veterans of Foreign Wars
Alcoa = Aluminum Company of America
NSRB = National Security Resource Board
FDRL = Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY
ALA = American Legion Archives, Indianapolis, IN
NARA I = National Archives I, Washington, DC
NARA II = National Archives II, College Park, MD
JWV = Jewish War Veterans Archive, Washington, DC
viii
ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes the role of the American Legion in the mobilization of World War II,
focusing on its civilian defense and salvage programs. These programs demonstrate the contest
between voluntary associations and the federal government to shape and control the development
of federal programs as state responsibility expanded into new areas of American life. Though
ultimately unsuccessful in its efforts to control the programs the American Legion exerted
tremendous influence on them. Its size and presence in nearly every community ensured the
American Legion positions and influence at every level of the federal civilian defense and
salvage programs. Expertise gained through early civilian defense exercises and the exploratory
Mission to England in 1941 positioned Legionnaires well to become leaders within civilian
defense. The Legion’s strong local and national structure made it one of the most successful
organizers of salvage drives.
Veterans experienced the Second World War in unique ways that were directly linked to
their military experiences in previous wars. They had wartime memories of what life was like on
the front lines and tried to use those experiences to better the lives of the new generation of
soldiers and to improve home front support of military personnel. Animosities created during
World War I toward war profiteers, “shirkers,” and subversive forces, greatly influenced the
Legion in World War II. Veteran studies, which have viewed veterans as post-war actors, would
benefit from considering the activities of veterans in future wars.
ix
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Grasping the shaky railing for support, Milo Warner ascended the narrow stairs that led to the
passenger cabin. As he reached the top platform, he peered through the gloom of the predawn
morning at the plane warming its engines in the next bay. The swastika of the German Reich
blazed across the hull of the neighboring plane, its bleary-eyed passengers boarding their
transport to Germany. As the German plane soared above occupied France, the defunct Maginot
Line and the wide green fields of Germany on its way to Berlin, Warner and three companions
would be making their way across the vast expanse of Europe’s Atlantic coasts on their way to
Berlin’s enemy capital: London.
Cintro Airport, soon to be replaced by Lisbon Portela Airport, bustled in the cold, heavy
air of the early morning.1 In the seventeen months since war erupted in Europe, Lisbon had
become the most important neutral transportation hub in Europe, the last free port of entry to the
continent. Refugees seeking safe haven in the Americas, spies and go-betweens for the warring
nations, and businessmen seeking their profits in the chaos, made Lisbon a town of excitement
and rumor. For those accustomed to the blackouts, darkened windows and anxious air of the
cities and town of Europe, the bright lights and expansive windows of Lisbon seemed a dream.
For Warner and his men, however, it was away from those lights that they were determinedly
bound. They sought the blackouts; the lightless, nighttime driving; and the ambivalence toward
air raids that British men and women affected as the German bombing attacks became a part of
their daily routines.
As their plane flew north, Warner was introduced to the realities of the new war. Too
high and too far west to see the scars of the war upon the land, he nevertheless experienced some
of the dangers and inconvenient precautions that had become part of the everyday existence of
many Europeans. Procuring tickets to and from each point of the expedition had been uncertain
1
It was Lisbon Portela Airport that was famously portrayed in the movie Casablanca as the destination of safety for
Victor Laszlo and Ilsa Lund as they fled Nazi hunters.
1
and expensive. After each leg of the journey, the group frantically contacted agents throughout
the area to find further transportation, never knowing how long they might be stranded; their
morning flight out of Lisbon had only been reserved the afternoon before. Several hours into the
flight, the claustrophobia of the cabin set in as the plane’s windows were boarded to prevent
spying. Heavy turbulence as the aircraft took unconventional flight paths to avoid the conflict
along the French coast resulted in cracked ribs for Warner. By the time they landed, Warner’s
nerves were frayed, as, no doubt, were those of his companions.
Warner was no stranger to European war. In 1918, as Captain of an American field
artillery battery during the Allied counterattack in the Second Battle of the Marne, Warner had
been wounded outside of Chateau Thierry.2 As he flew to London, Warner was once again
leading the American soldiers of 1918, this time as the head of the United States’ largest
veterans’ organization. The American Legion, with a membership over a million members and
powerful connections at every level of society, politics and the economy, was one of the standard
bearers for veteran politics. In September 1940 the Legion had elected Warner as National
Commander, the organization’s highest position. Within months of his election, Warner
embarked on a whirlwind tour of the U.K. to investigate British civilian defenses and morale.3
As he traveled across the United Kingdom, Warner carried with him the aspirations of a
million Legionnaires. Legionnaires hoped his voyage, which came at the height of the
Congressional Lend-Lease debates, would impress upon the American public the importance of
material support for the British, while also gaining valuable expertise in civilian defense that
would allow the American Legion to assume a leadership role in future American civilian
defenses plans.
Warner’s mission to Great Britain was not the beginning or the pinnacle of the American
Legion’s wartime programs. The mission had developed from the National Defense and
Americanism Programs that were nearly as old as the Legion itself. However, the mission
represents the key moment in the Legion’s mobilization during the United States’ period of
neutrality. The Legion was seeking an important role in the coming war that would aid national
2
“Milo Warner, Home For Visit, Explains Mission to Britain,” Toledo Blade (January 27, 1941): p. 13.
The details of the travel to England by Warner and his three colleagues are based upon Milo J. Warner,
“Chronological Statement by Milo J. Warner of American Legion Mission to England.” Mission to England,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
3
2
defense while confirming its position as the United States’ preeminent veterans’ organization.
The mission was its most determined action to fulfill that goal.
Ultimately frustrated in the bid to lead national civilian defense, Warner and the
American Legion leadership remained highly involved in its development. Civilian defense was
the cornerstone of the American Legion’s wartime agenda. The Legion dedicated immense
resources to the study, training, and implementation of millions of civilian defenders during the
war. Other programs, notably the salvage program, support for the new generation of soldiers
and their families, and aiding Federal Bureau of Investigation’s efforts to eliminate subversion
(which, despite Legion rhetorical emphasis on saboteurs, overwhelmingly dealt with draft
delinquency and evasion), demonstrated the heavy activism and support of the American Legion
in World War II.4
The actions and words the Legion during the war also demonstrated feelings of veterans
for younger generations of soldiers that were both paternal and fraternal (including feelings of
rivalry). The wartime programs demonstrated the veterans’ desire to help the new generation
avoid the mistakes and annoyances they had suffered during their own service. Recalling their
own intense boredom and lack of recreational opportunities, Legionnaires and other veterans
actively supported recreational initiatives for soldiers.5 They were also highly active in the
formulation of the G.I. Bill of Rights, seeking to avoid the Bonus controversy that dominated
veteran politics from 1920 to 1936.
The influence of the Legion in significant wartime programs demonstrates the need of
historians to broaden veteran histories beyond the view of veterans as postwar actors. It is, of
course, intuitive that historians have focused on veterans during the postwar period for each
respective era, when the political activity on veterans’ issues is at its zenith. However, as this
dissertation will demonstrate, historians will also find value in looking at the role veterans played
in future wars.6
4
For example, in 1942, the Legion was asked by the F.B.I. to assist them in locating the more than 50,000 draftees
that failed to report for service. “Report of the National Americanism Commission,” Reports to the Twenty-Fourth
Annual National Convention of the American Legion, Kansas City, MO (September 19-21, 1942): 21. ALA
5
They were even invited to join the United Services Organizations (U.S.O.) but declined, deciding to support the
U.S.O. activities while maintaining independent programs. On Legion recreational support programs for soldiers
during the war, see Richard Seelye Jones, A History Of The American Legion (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, 1946), 116-117.
6
This should not to be confused with the student organization known as the Veterans of Future Wars, which formed
in mockery of the Adjusted Service Compensation and in protest against warfare in general in the 1930s. See
3
It is no accident that a dissertation investigating veterans’ organizations appears today. In
a culture that loves round numbered anniversaries, the fiftieth anniversaries of the great events of
World War II elicited tremendous popular and scholarly interest in the war. The perception that
memories of the war were dwindling as veterans of that generation passed on added to the
significance of the celebrations. From the nostalgia of those celebrations emerged the ‘greatest
generation’ phenomenon in the late 1990s. The celebration and memorialization of the veterans
of World War II through films such as ‘Saving Private Ryan’ and the widely acclaimed ‘Band of
Brothers’ mini-series became a key feature in American culture. A natural progression of
scholarship led historians and other scholars to turn their attention toward the men and women
who made and lived the history and their influence on the postwar and the memory of the war.
In the next few years, the centennial anniversaries of the First World War will also be celebrated.
Scholarly interest in the men and women who participated in that war will likely rise as well.
This dissertation explores the American Legion’s wartime programs with an eye toward
addressing three sets of historiographies. First, the American Legion programs reflected a dual
belief that it was the protector of civic values and virtues, and that society had obligations to both
veterans and soldiers because of their service. This is the largest and broadest of the three
historiographies, encompassing the many studies addressing the relationship between veterans
and society from the Tudor period in England to the present. Second, the American Legion
participated in the war as a voluntary association. Though I am not the first to explore veteran
organizations from this perspective, the discussion of voluntary associations and their role in
shaping politics and society greatly influenced the trajectory of the project.7 The Legion’s
wartime programs were enacted within the context of a revolution in the federal government’s
relationship with society. The federal government took on new or expanding responsibilities in
the 1930s and 1940s as the country struggled to cope with unprecedented domestic and global
challenges. The Legion’s wartime programs, especially its civil defense program, exemplify the
Donald W. Whisenhunt, “The Veterans of Future Wars in the Pacific Northwest,” The Pacific Northwest Quarterly
Vol. 85, No. 4 (Oct., 1994): 130-136.
7
It was Ortiz’s work on veteran organizations in the 1930s that convinced me to explore this avenue. Stephen R.
Ortiz, Beyond the Bonus March and the GI Bill: How Veteran Politics Shaped the New Deal Era (New York: New
York University Press, 2010), 212n10. Skocpol includes the VFW and American Legion in her research on large
voluntary associations. Theda Skocpol, et al., “How Americans Became Civic,” in Theda Skocpol and Morris P.
Fiorina, eds., Civic Engagements in American Democracy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 2771; Theda Skocpol, et al., “Patriotic Partnerships: Why Great Wars Nourished American Civic Voluntarism,” in Ira
Katznelson and Martin Shefter, eds., Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American Political
Development (Princeton University Press, 2002): 134-71.
4
effort by voluntary organizations to shape that expansion to suit its goals and agenda. Finally,
this dissertation addresses the historiography of the American Legion itself, moving the Legion
story away from the well-traversed topics of the Bonus issue and the G.I. Bill of Rights and
placing them within the larger historiographies mentioned above.
1.1 Veterans and American Society
Veterans occupy a unique space in American society. More than any other social cohort,
veterans connect civilian society to the military. Respect for military traditions and history are
regularly infused into society through civic events like parades and memorials to servicemen and
their fallen comrades.8 The central position of veterans and veteran organizations in parades
continuously connected veterans to community identity and history throughout the United
States.9 Veterans also inhabit social spaces created by and for soldiers. R. Claire Snyder shows
that post-drill socializing was a fundamental element of American militia tradition where soldiers
and veterans create social connections for themselves and their families.10 In the twentieth
century, veterans’ organizations hosted other organizations like Boys State, the Boy Scouts of
America, and the Ladies’ Auxiliary societies, fostering social ties between the children and
spouses of veterans. Veteran organizations also participate heavily in support and social
networks for spouses of deployed soldiers.
Veterans returning from service abroad often brought back with them “foreign” cultural
practices and ideologies that fundamentally shaped post-war culture. Union soldiers returning
from the Civil War spread baseball as a past time throughout America’s communities. The
Doughboys of World War I brought back a thirst for boxing matches, which most states banned
professionally. In the 1920s, boxing experienced a renaissance after veterans and their
8
Kurt Piehler explores the struggle in America over memorialization of war in G. Kurt Piehler, Remembering War
the American Way (Washington, DC.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995). On the origins of parades and their
meanings in American society, see: Susan G. Davis, Parades and Power: Street Theatre in Nineteenth-Century
Philadelphia (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986; Mary Ryan, “The American Parade. Representation of
the Nineteenth-century Social Order,” in The New Cultural History, ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1989); David Glassberg, American Historical Pageantry: The Use of Tradition in the Early
Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990).
9
Kevin Coyne recounts the position of veterans in parades in his wartime history of Freehold, New Jersey, a town
“remarkable only for how fully it mirrored in one place the lives of so many other towns in so many other states.”
See for example his account of the 1941 Memorial Day Parade, at the front of which was a color guard from
American Legion Post 54, wearing their uniforms and holding the flags high. Kevin Coyne, Marching Home: To
War and Back with the Men of One American Town (New York: Penguin Group, 2003), 18.
10
R. Claire Snyder, Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors: Military Service and Gender in the Civic Republican
Tradition (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), 80-86.
5
organizations deluged state legislatures with endorsements to clean up and legalize the sweet
science.11 Many African American veterans that served in Europe returned to the United States
determined to transform their communities. Wartime experiences in Europe, unfettered by the
suffocating oppression of Jim Crow racism, inspired African American soldiers during World
War II to become activists for civil rights.12
Veterans have often viewed themselves as the protectors of civic virtues and values.
Upon demobilization, veterans in the United States have striven to create a more perfect society
in the communities they fought so hard to defend or advance. The relationship between former
soldiers and their community is a direct result of the demands of colonial life in America.
Colonial settlements depended upon local militias made up of ordinary citizens to defend against
the dangers of living on the periphery of European civilization. The military might of the British
government was often dozens of miles or even an ocean away. Local defense was vital to the
life of colonial settlements, which throughout the seventeenth century frequently battled with
regional tribal communities.13 As fear of British tyranny replace the threat of Native Americans,
American proto-nationalists began to look upon militias as a check on perceived British
oppression.14 With every new generation down to the present, veterans and veteran
organizations have explicitly and inexplicitly taken up that mantle of civic protector.
The American Legion defined its role defending civic virtue and values in its
“Americanism” doctrine. The Legion defines Americanism as “an unfailing love of country,
loyalty to its institutions and ideals, eagerness to defend it against all enemies, individual
allegiance to the flag, and a desire to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity.” Legionnaires generally interpreted those values through a conservative perspective,
upholding flag reverence, faith and duty, while opposing for much of its history immigrant and
11
Dixon Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1944), 270-71.
Maggie M. Morehouse, Fighting in the Jim Crow Army: Black Men and Women Remember World War II (New
York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 202. See also Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemna: The Negro Problem
and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper, 1944); Jennifer E. Brooks, Defining the Peace: World War II
Veterans, Race, and the Remaking of Southern Political Tradition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2004); Brenda L. Moore, To Serve My Country, To Serve My Race: The Story of the Only African American WACS
Stationed Overseas During World War II (New York: New York University Press, 1996); Neil Wynn, The AfroAmerican and the Second World War (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1993).
13
Douglas Edward Leech, Flinklock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip’s War (East Orleans, MA:
Parnassus Imprints, 1958), 103-11; Michael D. Gambone, The Greatest Generation Comes Homes: The Veteran in
American Society (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005), 4.
14
Gambone, The Greatest Generation Comes Homes, 4; Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study in American
Military History (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1984). 13-25.
12
6
minority efforts to “secure the blessings of liberty,” or free speech by groups it defines as
radicals.15 When piety appeared to be under threat from secularists after World War II, the
Legion adopted a “Back to God” campaign to promote integration of religious ideals in all
American Legion programs, encouragement of regular attendance to religious institutions, and
establishment of the week of February 3 as “Go-to-Church” Sunday.16 Americanism, thus
defined, serves as the basic social platform of the Legion and shaped its popular image.
As this dissertation demonstrates, veterans also served as community mobilizers during
times of crisis. The American Legion assumed that role as a natural extension of its
Americanism and Disaster Relief programs.17 The Disaster Relief Program was created to aid
communities during natural disasters like the 1933 Earthquake that struck Southern California,
the Mississippi and Ohio River Floods of 1937, and a gas explosion that rocked the Texas town
of New London.18 Though they at times butted heads with other organizations over jurisdiction
and roles, Legionnaires proudly reported that their posts were often the first units to respond to
community crises.19
15
On Legion efforts to limit academic freedoms and the rights of enemy aliens see Roger W. Lotchin, The Bad City
in the Good War: San Francisco, Los Angeles, Oakland, and San Diego (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 2003), 104-110. On race and the Legion, see Steven Rosales, “Fighting the Peace at Home: Mexican
American Veterans and the 1944 GI Bill of Rights,” Pacific Historical Review 80, No. 4 (November 2011): 618;
Howard A. Droker, “Seattle Race Relations During Second World War,” The Pacific Northwest Quarterly 67, no. 4
(October 1976): 173; Henry A. Singer, “The Veteran and Race Relations,” Journal of Educational Sociology 21, no.
7 (March, 1948): 397-98. For a counter example of Legion racial policies, see Russel Lawrence Barsh, “American
Indians in the Great War,” Ethnohistory 38, No. 3 (Summer, 1991): 295-96; Michael E. Weaver, “The Volunteers of
1941: The Pennsylvania National Guard and Continuity in American Military Policy,” Pennsylvania History 72, no.
3 (Summer 2005): 347-86.
16
Summary of Proceedings, Thirty-Third Annual National Convention of the American Legion, Miami, FL (October
15-18, 1951), 52. February 3rd was chosen because in 1943, four chaplains (Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant),
surrendered their life jackets to four enlisted men aboard the doomed transport U.S.S. Dorchester. They died, “in
the icy waters of the Atlantic...with locked arms, each uttering his own prayer, together [going] to their watery
graves, and to their God...” Their deaths were widely reported and mourned, but also celebrated as an example of
inter-faith camaraderie and fellowship.
17
Letter, Frank Samuel (National Adjutant) to Voting Members of the NEC, (June 18, 1941), 3. ALA.
18
L.F. Olson (Disaster Relief Commission, Department of CA), “Report of Special Committee on American Red
Cross Coordination,” (undated). Disasters, American Red Cross, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 93-9007; Digest
of Minutes, National Executive Committee Meeting, (May 1937), p. 14, 80. ALA; Letter, Fred E. Young
(Department Adjutant, Texas) to Frank Samuel (National Adjutant), March 30, 1937. Disasters, American Red
Cross, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 93-9007. See also “By the Legion For the Town” American Legion
Magazine (April 1935): 32-35, 69-70.
19
The American Red Cross in particular seemed to resent the Legion’s Disaster Relief program and enthusiastic
efforts to provide leadership in emergencies. During the floods and New London disasters in 1937, reports of
acrimony between Legionnaires and Red Cross workers convinced the leadership of both organizations to hold talks
to come to terms on their respective roles and responsibilities during crises. Ultimately the Legion agreed to
recognize the Red Cross as “the agency chartered by Congress to represent the American people in carrying on
disaster relief,” to subvert its first-aid program within and under leadership of the Red Cross, and to focus their
7
By virtue of the honor, respect, and obligation society accorded to them based on their
service, veterans have also been one of the most important political cohorts in American society.
After the American Revolution and throughout the first two centuries of United States’ history,
in periods when veterans were at their most influential, military service and leadership was often
essential for public office. Famous generals, including Washington, Jackson, Harrison, Taylor,
Grant, Garfield, Hayes, McKinley, and Eisenhower, used their military accolades to vault to the
presidency with scarce political background. Of the Presidents before 1900, only four lacked
military experience, and one of those, John Adams, served as chairman of the Board of War
(equivalent to the War Department) in the Continental Congress.20 After the Presidency of
Theodore Roosevelt, the next six Presidents lacked military experience, largely because of the
backlash against militarism after World War I (although like some of their predecessors, Taft and
Franklin Roosevelt had held civilian positions in the Departments of War and Navy).
The United States’ brief involvement in the war also played a role in the lack of postWorld War I veteran presidents. The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) was on the frontlines
enforce only from May to November 1918, too short a period to create many national heroes.
The best-placed candidate for such accolades was the commander of the AEF, John J. Pershing.
Elements of the Republican Party approached Pershing concerning the party’s nomination for
1920, some as early as November 1918.21 However, Pershing flatly refused to actively pursue
candidacy and by January, talk had turned toward the Senator from Ohio, Warren G. Harding.
independent organizational program on providing “adequate patrol and traffic squads.” See William S. Konold,
“Report of the Red Cross Coordination Committee,” Digest of Minutes, National Executive Committee Meeting,
(November 1937): 35. ALA; William G. McKinley, “Report of the Red Cross Cooperation Subcommittee,” Digest
of Minutes, National Executive Committee Meeting, (May 1938): 82. ALA. The disappointing role in emergency
relief presaged their eventual civilian defense program during the war, in which the Legion, aside from their specific
assignment of training Air Raid Wardens, had to work within and under the leadership of the OCD. See Chapter III.
Several documents on the relations between the Red Cross and American Legion are found on Disasters, American
Red Cross, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 93-9007.
20
Those lacking military experience: John Adam and his son John Quincy Adams, Martin Van Buren, and Grover
Cleveland. Abraham Lincoln’s military experience was limited to a three-month period during the Black Hawk War
of 1832. He was elected Captain by his company but saw no action, besides serving on a burial detail. Lincoln
nevertheless remembered his service fondly and with dry, self-deprecating humor. His successor, Andrew Johnson,
held the rank of Brigadier General, but was military governor of Tennessee and never saw combat; similarly,
Chester Arthur held the rank of Brigadier General in the New York State Militia, but was employed solely in
administrative duties and never saw combat.
21
“Boom Gen. Pershing For President In 1920: Ohio Republicans Plan to Incorporate--Do Not Know Whether The
General Would Run,” New York Times (November 26, 1918): p. 3.
8
Major General Leonard Wood, a popular veteran in both the Philippines and World War I, also
garnered interest, but the party believed a civilian would do better in the post-war climate.22
From World War II to the end of the Cold War, military service once again became
standard for Presidents. Although non-veterans have run successful Presidential campaigns since
the end of the Cold War, candidates’ service records have been major campaign issues in each
election. Congress was also affected by the political clout of veterans. Almost half of the
Congressional representatives in 1946 were war veterans.23 In part this is due to the sustained
political power vocal and conspicuous veterans groups continue to wield.
Having sacrificed their livelihood, health, and mental well-being in defense of the nation,
veterans have held certain claims upon the state. Those claims date back to the late sixteenth
century and the emergence of monarchical power under the Tudors. During the reign of
Elizabeth I the responsibility of the state to care for its veterans was established in English
tradition. Before the ascent of the Tudors, feudal lords and the monasteries had generally cared
for poor, sick, and maimed soldiers. Elizabeth’s father Henry VIII had abolished the monasteries
in his quarrel with the Catholic Church. Under the Tudor monarchs, the power of the crown
surpassed the power of the nobles, leading to centralization of state control of military resources.
Soldiers no longer served under feudal lords, they served the crown. This had important
implications for veterans. Without the monasteries and the obligation of nobles to care for their
vassals, former soldiers damaged by their service had no one to care for them. Unemployed and
desperate veterans took to rioting, looting, and committing violence acts or else became
vagabonds and beggars. The situation became so dire that Parliament passed the first statute “for
the reliefe of Souldiours” in 1592-3 to care for the veterans of the fight against Spain and its
Armada.24 Although charitable institutions would continue to play a role in caring for disabled
or destitute veterans, the state never relinquished its obligation to care for its former soldiers.
The state’s new obligation occurred just before the establishment of the English colonies
in North America and it was within that system that the American colonies created their own
veterans’ policies. Along with preventing social chaos due to dissident veterans, colonial
communities enacted veterans’ legislation promising medical care and financial support in the
22
For a summation of the candidates in January 1919, see “Roosevelt’s Death Upset 1920 Plans,” New York Times (
January 7, 1919): p. 12.
23
Gambone, The Greatest Generation Comes Home, 31.
24
Glasson, Federal Military Pensions in the United States, 9-10. Glasson cites E. P. Cheyney, A History of
England. From the Defeat of the Armada to the Death of Elizabeth I (New York: Longmans, 1914, 1926), 184-185.
9
event of injury or disability to promote service in militias. The dangerous frontiers of colonial
settlements required community and colonial governments to have citizens serve in militias
during times of war against local tribes. In 1836 the Pilgrims enacted the earliest pension laws in
America. Their court established a provision to encourage colonials in the fight against the
Pequod Indians then at war with the settlers.25 General assemblies in Maryland, New York, and
Rhode Island made similar laws to elicit enlistments for battles with local native American tribes
or to fight in the colonial wars against other European states (as occurred in King William’s War,
Queen Anne’s War, and the French and Indian War).26
Care for the veterans of the Revolution was an immediate concern of the newly formed
United States government.27 Veterans were clearly heroes to be lauded for their service and at
the same time potentially dangerous threats to society and the government. If not handled
properly and successfully reintegrated into society, these men trained in combat represented a
threat to stability. Throughout the history of the United States, government at the state, local,
and federal levels have struggled to avoid that threat by implementing an ever-evolving
apparatus of veteran healthcare, pension, and welfare programs. This system has kept veterans
in the public eye well past the end of the wars in which they fought.
Shays’s Rebellion in western Massachusetts, in which many veterans took part,
illustrated the potential dangers dissident veterans posed to the new Republic.28 In response,
Congress in the 1790s provided funds for disabled veterans and established the precedent of
25
Glasson, Federal Military Pensions in the United States, 13-14. Glasson notes that the general assembly of
Virginia Company sent a body of laws to England for ratification by the courts of the Virginia Company in 1624,
which included a article (number 32) that stated “That at the beginning of July next the inhabitants of every
corporation shall fall upon their adjoyning Salvages, as we did last year-Those that shall be burte upon service to be
cured at the publique charge; in case any be lamed to be maintained by the country according to his person and
quality.” This body of laws from the general assembly arrived in England after the King had made Virginia into a
royal colony, usurping the Virginia Company’s charter. So the law was not ratified and it was only in 1644 that
Virginia officially established a pension for wounded soldiers. See also Alexander Brown, The First Republic in
America: An Account Of The Origin Of This Nation, Written From The Records Then (1624) Concealed By The
Council, Rather Than From The Histories Then Licensed By The Crown (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1898), 606607. Microfilm AC1.P25 no. 274.
26
Glasson, Federal Military Pensions in the United States, 14-17.
27
On veterans of the American Revolution, see Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home; John Resch,
Suffering Soldiers: Revolutionary War Veterans, Moral Sentiment, and Political Culture in the Early Republic
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999); Laura Jansen, Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins of American
Social Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
28
See Leonard L. Richards, Shays’s Rebellion: The American Revolution’s Final Battle (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2002).
10
recompensing soldiers for their service by awarding land grants.29 The issue of government
remuneration for veterans of the American Revolution continued beyond the War of 1812. In
1818, after years of tumultuous political debate, James Monroe signed a bill establishing a
Federal pension for aged, impoverished veterans of the American Revolution. The Pension Act
was a departure from the uncertain and uneven local support of aging veterans. It redefined the
Federal Government’s obligations to veterans to include welfare. It also constituted an
expression of “enforceable virtue” embodying a new national standard for public morality and
civic responsibility.30 The Pension Act, foreshadowing the uneven coverage that haunts
veterans’ legislation and practices even today, was applied selectively and unevenly.31
Pensions have been one of the federal government’s largest budgetary expenditures, so
that expansion of pensions to include widows and children in the decades after the American
Revolution, were major national issues. Glasson shows that liberalization of pensions was
intimately tied to contentious Congressional debates on budget surpluses, protective tariffs, and
the burgeoning divide between the north and south during the antebellum period.32
Other historians have covered the substantial evolution of government programs to honor
its former soldiers and to ensure society can handle the massive number of soldiers reintegrating
into society. The Civil War expanded the number of pension beneficiaries to encompass all
dependents, including mothers and sisters of soldiers.33 The sheer number of soldiers, relative to
29
See Oliver, “History of Civil War Pensions,” 7; Jansen, Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins of American Social
Policy, 4-5, 212-213.
30
Laura Jansen argues that veteran entitlement policies demonstrate that the origins of the Federal social policies
predate the Constitution of 1787. Using the military pensions debate, Jansen shows that the pensions, public lands,
and entitlements for veterans played a major role in American political history and our understanding of the state.
Jansen’s research requires historians to reevaluate scholarship that places the origins of Federal social policy in the
1930s, or even the more recent scholarship placing the origins of that role in the 1860s. Jansen, Patriots, Settlers,
and the Origins of American Social Policy, 3-4. See also John Resch, Suffering Soldiers: Revolutionary War
Veterans, Moral Sentiment, and Political Culture in the Early Republic, 118.
31
Gambone notes that the War Department only had complete records for militia service in the Revolutionary War
from Virginia and New Hampshire. Gambone, The Greatest Generation Comes Homes, 7.
32
Glasson, Federal Military Pensions in the United States, 77-81.
33
Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, 101-254; Glasson, Federal Military Pensions in the United States,
123-280; Stuart McConnell, Glorious Contentment: The Grand Army of the Republic, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Richard F. Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization,
1877-1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Mark W. Summers, Party Games: Getting, Keeping,
and Using Power in Gilded Age Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Patrick J. Kelly,
Creating a National Home: Building the Veterans’ Welfare State, 1860-1900 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1997); Theda Skocpal, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy (Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press, 1992); Ann Shola Orloff, The Politics of Pensions: A Comparative Analysis of Britain, Canada,
and the United States, 1880-1940 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993); K. Walter Hickel, “War, Region,
11
earlier American wars, and the more inclusive definition of beneficiaries meant that the pension
system would have to expand tremendously to cope. The initial pension legislation budget in
1862 estimated an annual expenditure of $7 million; by 1893, that budget would be more than
$158 million.34 The holes in the system, frauds to take advantage of it, and bureaucracy that
befuddled those who were dependent on it, were political landmines for the fifty years after the
war. As detractors of veterans’ legislation predicted, the pension system made many veterans
and the families dependent upon the government.35 When the United States once again
contemplated major war in 1917, Congress sought to address many of the problems that plagued
veterans’ legislation after the Civil War.36 The consolidation of the veteran’s benefits system
into one organization, the Veterans’ Bureau was an attempt to overcome the bureaucratic
nightmare of the previous decades. Rehabilitation of the disabled was a major focus of
Progressives seeking to improve the lot of veterans.37 However, the corruption that had
undermined veteran affairs after the Civil War (particularly in the Grant administration),
beleaguered the new Veterans’ Bureau during the Harding years. A generation later, Americans
and Social Welfare: Federal Aid to Servicemen’s Dependents in the South, 1917-1921,” Journal of American
History 87, no. 4 (March 2001): 1362-1391.
34
Gambone, The Greatest Generation Comes Homes, 8.
35
Glasson, Federal Military Pensions in the United States, 83.
36
On veterans of World War I see: Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, 255-453; Nancy Gentile Ford,
Americans All! Foreign-born Soldiers in World War I (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001);
Stephen R. Ward, et al., The War Generations: Veterans of the First World War (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat
Press, 1975); William P. Dillingham, Federal Aid to Veterans, 1917-1941 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press,
1952); Stephen R. Ortiz, “The ‘New Deal’ for Veterans: The Economy Act, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the
Origins of New Deal Dissent,” Journal of Military History 70.2 (2006): 415-438; Ortiz, Beyond the Bonus March
and the GI Bill; Alan Brinkley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression (New
York: Knopf, 1982); Jennifer D. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis of the Old
Order (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957); Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal Order
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958); William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940
(New York: Harper and Row, 1963); David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression
and War, 1929-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World
War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Frank Friedel, Franklin D. Roosevelt:
Launching the New Deal (Boston: Little Brown, 1973); James E. Sargent, Roosevelt and the Hundred Days:
Struggles for the Early New Deal (New York: Garland, 1981); Julian E. Zelizer, “The Forgotten Legacy of the New
Deal: Fiscal Conservativism and the Roosevelt Administration, 1933-1938,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 30.2
(2000): 331-358; Roger Daniels, The Bonus March: An Episode of the Great Depression (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1971); Donald J. Lisio, The President and Protest: Hoover, MacArthur, and the Bonus Riot (New York:
Fordham University Press, 1994); Paul Dickson and Thomas B. Allen, The Bonus Army: An American Epic (New
York: Walker, 2005); Lucy G. Barber, Marching on Washington: The Forging of an American Political Tradition
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
37
On role of Progressivism in World War I, see: Robert H. Zieger, America’s Great War: World War I and the
American Experience (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2000); Alan Dawley, Changing the World: American
Progressives in War and Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Nancy K. Bristow, Making Men
Moral Social Engineering During the Great War (New York: New York University Press, 1996).
12
found themselves again at war, facing the demobilization of sixteen million soldiers. Politicians,
businessmen, veteran organizations, and millions of families had seen the dangers of dissident
veterans in the fascist movements in Europe and Asia. Some, such as Columbia University
professor Willard Waller, predicted chaos reminiscent of the Civil War and World War I postwar
eras that saw elevated crime rates and veteran delinquency.38 They endeavored to make a new
system that would reward the men and women who had defended the country and avoid
instability veterans could cause. The G.I. Bill of Rights program, though not perfect, was an
exceptionally successful legislative effort that avoided the worst failings of past programs.39
1.2 The American Legion as Voluntary Association
In his famous exploration of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville claimed that
the abundance of American civil associations contributed to the stability of American
democracy.40 "If the inhabitants of demo-cratic countries...did not learn some habits of acting
together in the affairs of daily life,” he argued, “civilization itself would be in peril." The
tremendous growth of voluntary associations in the century after Tocqueville, has caused
38
Gambone, The Greatest Generation Comes Home, 29. Willard Waller, The Veteran Comes Back (New York:
Dryden Press, 1944).
39
Mark Van Ells, To Hear Only Thunder Again: America’s World War II Veterans Come Home (Lanham, Mass.:
Lexington Books, 2001); Gambone, The Greatest Generation Comes Homes; David H. Onkst, “First a
Negro...Incidentally a Veteran’: Black World War II Veterans and the G.I. Bill in the Deep South, 1944-1948,”
Journal of Social History 31 (Spring 1998): 517-544; William E. Leuchtenberg, A Troubled Feast: American
Society Since 1945 (Boston: Little Brown, 1983); William Graebner, The Age of Doubt: American Thought and
Culture in the 1940s (Boston: Twayne, 1991); William L. O’Neil, A Democracy At War: America’s Fight At Home
and Abroad in World War II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); John C. Sparrow, History of Personnel
Demobilization in the United States Army (Washington, DC.: Center of Military History, 1994); Tom Englehardt,
The End of the Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1995); Keith W. Olson, The G.I. Bill, the Veterans, and the Colleges (Lexington: The
University of Kentucky Press, 1974); Michael J. Bennett, When Dreams Come True: The G.I. Bill and the Making of
Modern America (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1996); Edwin Amenta and Theda Skocpol, “Redefining the New
Deal: World War II and the Development of Social Provision in the United States, “ in Margaret Weir, Ann Shola
Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, eds., The Politics of Social Policy in the United States (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1988); Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Suzanne Mettler, “Bringing the State Back in to Civic Engagement: Policy
Feedback Effects of the G.I. Bill for World War II Veterans,” American Political Science Review 96 (June 2002):
351-365; Suzanne Mettler, “The Creation of the GI Bill of Rights of 1944,” Journal of Policy History 17.4 (2005):
345-374; Margot Canaday, “Building a Straight State: Sexuality and Social Citizenship Under the 1944 G.I. Bill,”
Journal of American History 90 (December 2003): 935-57; David R. B Ross, Preparing for Ulysses: Politics and
Veterans During World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Harold M. Hyman, American
Singularity: The 1787 Northwest Ordinance, the 1862 Homestead and Morrill Acts, and the 1944 GI Bill (Athens,
GA: University of Georgia Press, 1986); Milton Greenberg, The GI Bill: The Law That Changed America (New
York: Lickle, 1997).
40
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed., J. P. Mayer; trans., George Lawrence (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1969; orig. pub. 1835--840), 514.
13
scholars to invest heavily in the study of American associational culture. Of particular relevance
is the relationship between the federal government and civic volunteer organizations like the
American Legion. As the federal government expanded throughout the twentieth century,
particularly into areas of welfare, opponents have argued that voluntary groups have suffered in
consequence, their roles in society being usurped by government agencies.41 Theda Skocpol, the
coordinator of the Civic Engagement Project at Harvard University, argues that voluntary
associations find ways to work within the systemic federal expansion, thus sustaining their
usefulness. Her project traces the history of large national associations in the United States,
finding that “democratic governmental and political institutions encouraged the proliferation of
voluntary groups linked to regional or national social movements. Increasingly, groups were tied
into translocal organizational networks that paralleled the local-state-national structure of the
U.S. state.”42
The history of veterans’ organizations follows the general path laid out by Skocpol. Like
most civic groups, veteran organizations from the American Revolution to the Civil War tended
to be small, informal, local, inward-looking, and apolitical outside of the community.43 With the
establishment of the U.S. Post Office, one of the only centralized agencies in the early national
period, association life in America developed across regions.44 Lyceums, moral crusades and
temperance movements spread throughout the country, coinciding with the growth of national
political parties and movements.45
As voluntary society blossomed into associational life, veterans formed powerful national
and local civic organizations devoted to establishing and continuing the fellowships created
under arms and in the heat of battle. In the aftermath of the Civil War, powerful regional and
41
George Will, “Look at All the Lonely Bowlers,” Washington Post (January 5, 1995): A29; Michael S. Joyce and
William A. Schambra, “A New Civic Life,” in Michael Novak, ed., To Empower People: From State to Civil
Society, 2nd edition (Washington, DC.: AEI Press, 1996. Cited in Skocpol, “How Americans Became Civic,” in
Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina, eds., Civic Engagements in American Democracy (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 32-33.
42
Theda Skocpol, “Advocates Without Members: The Recent Transformation of American Civic Life,” in Theda
Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina, eds., Civic Engagements in American Democracy (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 1999), 475.
43
On voluntary associations in the colonial era, see Richard D. Brown, “The Emergence of Voluntary Associations
in Massachusetts, 1760-1830,” Journal of Voluntary Association Research 2, no. 2 (1973): 64-73; Brown, “The
Emergence of Urban Society in Rural Massachusetts, 1760-1820,” Journal of American History 61, no. 1 (1974):
29-51. In the early Republic: Richard R. John, Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to
Morse (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).
44
Richard R. John, Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1995), p. 3-5.
45
Skocpol, Civic Engagements in American Democracy, 43-46.
14
national veteran associations blossomed. The largest and most influential veterans’ group before
World War I was the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR), made up of Union veterans. The
GAR acted very much the “kingmaker” in late nineteenth century politics, its support a
prerequisite for political appointment in many communities (not to mention state and federal
office). The GAR’s political influence allowed it to shape policies on civil rights for African
Americans, Southern reconstruction, and especially military pensions.
The American Legion was the first major successor to the GAR, emerging from the
discontented Doughboys languishing in European and state-side camps after the fighting
subsided. The trends in associational life deeply influenced the Legion’s structure and agenda.
The advances in communication and transportation in the nineteenth and early twentieth century
enabled the Legion to maintain strong, regular connections between state and national leadership
and the rank and file Legionnaires. The salvage drives discussed in Chapter Five show that the
Legion could and did rapidly mobilize over ten thousand posts in nearly every community across
the United States during times of need. In the 1940s mass transit had improved to such a degree
that the Legion leadership was forced to consider dividing the annual national convention
because most cities were incapable of handling the conventions that attracted tens of thousands
of Legionnaires.46 In the 1920s and 1930s, national voluntary associations like the American
Red Cross were negotiating with federal, state, and local governments to determine the roles they
would play in public life.
The federal government in the 1930s was experiencing a fundamental change in its
relationship with society and the communities of America. No longer restrained by doctrines
limiting the role of government in everyday life, the federal government tried to assert itself in
education, infrastructure, welfare, and disaster response. As it did so, organizations like the
American Legion, not always opposed to such federal expansion, sought to direct that growth in
ways that would benefit its members and position themselves within the new power structure so
as to shape the policies and programs in ways that they saw fit. Civil defense was an area that
observers saw as a natural avenue for state control, particularly military control. Yet, throughout
46
See for example the 1943 National Convention in Omaha, Nebraska. Questions about the feasibility of having
such a large convention there lingered until two months before the convention. Robert Storz, Chairman of the
Omaha Convention Corporation (the Legion’s subcommittee in charge of arranging the convention) reported that
those pre-convention questions proved to be justified by the serious lodging shortage. Robert H. Storz, “Final
Report of the American Legion 1943 Convention Committee of Omaha,” Digest of Minutes, National Executive
Committee Meeting, (November 1943): 40. ALA.
15
World War II and the subsequent post war years, the War Department and its successor, the
Department of Defense, refused responsibility for civilian defense. The War Department
believed its resources and personnel were better used in military capacities and refused all
attempts to move civilian defense under the department. However, although the military did not
want control of civilian defense, the federal government was not willing to allow specific groups
like the American Legion to dominate civilian defense or any civilian defense programs. Thus,
groups like the American Legion were never satisfied with government programs on civilian
defense during World War II and were never successful in their efforts to control civilian
defense. Yet they considered civilian defense to be so important to national security and their
own vision of America, that they repressed their reservations and reluctantly accepted the roles
in civilian defense that the federal government allowed.
1.3 Legion Historiography
Since the end of World War I, the American Legion has been the largest veterans’
association in the United States. As such, the history of the organization has been the topic of
several historians, professional and amateur. Professional scholars have overwhelmingly
focused upon the Bonus issue and the G.I. Bill of Rights.47 These two issues serve as bookends
for the first epoch of Legion history and as major national issues, have attracted ample scholarly
attention. Outside of Legion advocacy for national defense, scholars have largely ignored the
wartime programs of the American Legion. The Legion has always been careful to cultivate its
public image and championed a traditional/conservative view of American history. As such, it
has made historical production a part of its mission. Thomas Rumer and Richard Seelye Jones
have written the official views of the Legion’s history.48 Jones wrote his at the end of World
War II; Rumer’s history came in 1989, a key moment in the veterans’ history: the fiftieth
anniversary of the Second World War’s beginning. Both of these histories are what one might
47
Stephen Ortiz is by far the best on the Bonus Issue and Veterans. Ortiz, Beyond the Bonus. See also: Marcus
Duffield, King Legion (New York: J. Cape & H. Smith, 1931); Katherine Mayo, Soldiers What Next! (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934).
48
Richard Seelye Jones, A History Of The American Legion (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1946);
Thomas A. Rumer, The American Legion: An Official History, 1919-1989 (New York: M. Evans, 1990). See also
Raymond Moley, The American Legion Story (New York: Duell, Sloan And Pearce, 1966); Victor Lasky, The
American Legion Reader: Fiction, Articles, Humor, Cartoons (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1953); Thomas M.
Owen Jr. The Alabama Department Of The American Legion, 1919-1929 (Birmingham: Birmingham Printing
Company, 1929); Walter Wilson, The American Legion And Civil Liberty (New York: American Civil Liberties
Union, 1936).
16
call the company line: neither really tackled the dirty parts of the organization’s history, glossing
over complex and potentially damaging episodes like the Centralia Massacre and racial policies
of the Legion, while giving a whitewashed, but informative narrative of the leadership.49 Rumer
does not cover the wartime programs. Jones discusses some wartime programs briefly, but,
reflecting the purpose of the book, focuses on organizational details, not the contest within the
war or the struggles with the government. Both Jones and Rumer presents the Legion’s
relationship with the federal government as one of wise, sagely advice, often ignored.50
1.4 Why the American Legion?
The American Legion wartime programs share a great deal in common with other veteran
organizations. Many veteran organizations participated actively and enthusiastically in civilian
defense, salvage campaign, raising funds through war bond and stamp campaigns, and by
providing entertainment for soldiers.51 However, the American Legion has certain unique
characteristics that justify historical analysis. The most obvious is that the Legion was the
largest veteran organization during the Second World War by a rather large margin. The
Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), which began as an organization for Spanish –American War
veterans, had a membership of only 20,000 in 1920.52 It tended to draw its members from the
less affluent and connected classes. Because it championed early payment of the Adjusted
Service Certificate Bonuses far more vociferously than the American Legion, its membership
49
For example, see Katherine Mayo, Soldiers What Next!; C. Calvin Smith, War and Wartime Changes: The
Transformation of Arkansas, 1940-1945 (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 1986). On the Centralia
Massacre, see Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World (Urbana:
Quadrangle Books, 1988), 455-56; Tom Copeland, The Centralia Tragedy of 1919: Elmer Smith and the Wobblies
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993). For an example of battles between the American Legion and the
NAACP, see Carolyn Wedin, Inheritors of the Spirit: Mary White Ovington and the Founding of the NAACP (New
York: Wiley, 1998), 193.
50
Jones, A History Of The American Legion, 106-121; Rumer, The American Legion, 224-243.
51
In fact the VFW complained to the OCD, protesting against the Legion getting all the credit for aiding civilian
defense. Although reassured by the OCD that they recognized the participation of all ex-servicemen, the VFW felt
that the Legion was taking too much credit and getting too many of the best wartime jobs. Letter, L.C. Abel to
James M. Landis, January 21, 1942. RG 171, Box 20. American Legion 080 Folder II: Jan 1-Feb 28 1942. National
Archives II, College Park, MD (hereafter NARA II); Letter, John A. Lapp to LaGuardia, January 26, 1942. RG 171,
Box 20. American Legion 080 Folder II: Jan 1-Feb 28 1942. NARA II. Posts of the Jewish War Veterans signed
up for the Air Raid Warning Service, auxiliary police and fire departments, and as Air Raid Wardens. “Executive
Committee Minutes,” December 13, 1941. Jewish War Veterans Archives, Washington, DC (hereafter JWVA).
52
Ortiz, Beyond the Bonus March and the GI Bill, 18.
17
grew substantially, reaching 70,000 in 1927 and 200,000 by 1940.53 In contrast, the American
Legion had a membership in the 1930s and early 1940s near or above one million.
Stephen Ortiz shows that the difference between the organizations went beyond mere
numbers. A 1935 membership survey that showed 22.4 percent of Legionnaires came from the
professional and managerial classes. Small business owners constituted 22.2 percent; 20.8
percent were clerical workers, 16.1 percent skill workers; only 6.2 percent were unskilled
workers; and 3.8 percent farmers.54 More importantly, much of the original leadership within the
American Legion, veterans from the elite of America, such as Theodore Roosevelt Jr., Bennett
Champ Clark, and Ogden Mills, formed a nucleus of power, often called by the rank and file “the
kingmakers.” The powerful connections of the leadership at the National and Department level,
coupled with the connections of the membership at the local level, provided the American
Legion with access to power that no other veterans’ organization could match.55 While by no
means from the gutters of society, the VFW membership came from humbler origins. Absent
were the Wall Street executives and heirs of political families. In their place were men of the
middle and lower middle class. Ortiz demonstrates that the VFW’s social status proved
beneficial to the growth of the organization because VFW leaders were more responsive to the
needs of the rank and file veterans suffering during the Great Depression.56
1.5 Sources and Chapters
The Legion’s access to power pays dividends for historical researchers because their
records can be found among the archival collections of other powerful groups and individuals.
The archive at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library in Hyde Park has many collections
that demonstrate the high level of contact between Legionnaires and administration officials.
Record collections at the National Archives in College Park, MD and Washington, DC show that
those connections are also present between Legionnaires and the many federal agencies during
the 1930s and 1940s. The expansive and well-run American Legion archive in Indianapolis also
makes the Legion a boon to historical researchers. The archival resources of the VFW, in
53
Ortiz, Beyond the Bonus, 29, 191.
William Gellerman, The American Legion as Educator (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College,
Columbia University, 1938), 24-24, 270. Ortiz, Rethinking the Bonus March, 19-20. A 1938 survey showed that
64% of Legionnaires earned at least $2,000 annually, at a time when the average family income was $1,244. Ortiz
cites William Pencak, For God & Country (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1989), 80-83.
55
Ortiz, Rethinking the Bonus, 17.
56
Ortiz, Rethinking the Bonus, 19.
54
18
comparison, are far more difficult to reach. The VFW lacks a centralized archive and its contact
with the agencies and leading political figures of the period are not as numerous, relatively
speaking. While further research on other organizations during the war mobilization is certainly
warranted, for the purposes of this dissertation, the American Legion was the best choice as a
subject.
While the archives in Washington, DC, College Park, Hyde Park, and Indianapolis
provided a deluge of materials, they also present limitations. This dissertation, like the research
before it, is fundamentally the story of the national organization and its leadership. The voice of
rank and file Legionnaires is generally found only in their relatively sparse communications with
the national leaders.
Chapter One through Four explore the American Legion’s civilian defense program. In
Chapter One, the early efforts of Legionnaires to establish and shape a national civilian defense
program during America’s neutrality resulted in national exposure to the issue and a reputation
for experience in civilian defense matters. Warner’s Mission to England in 1941 was at the
center of the Legion’s national media campaign to bring attention to what most Legionnaires
considered a vital national security issue. Chapter Two analyzes the contest between the
Roosevelt Administration and the American Legion in 1941 as each sought to control the process
of establishing the nationwide program while maintaining the support of the other. Though one
must be careful not to overstate the political weight of the Legion and veterans, Roosevelt was
careful not to alienate such influential constituencies. Although Roosevelt created a program
most Legionnaires found deficient, the Legion leadership in Washington, DC and Indianapolis
achieved limited success in having Legionnaires placed in important positions throughout the
Office of Civilian Defense (OCD). In Chapter Three, Legion headquarters struggled to
determine the organization’s proper course as OCD leaders it believed to be inept and
controversial came under intense fire after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The fear that inundated
America after the Japanese attack thrust civilian defense from the nether-regions of national
consciousness into the headlines. At the same time, the Legion succeeded in procuring a
wartime assignment for civilian defense that it desperately desired. That assignment, to operate
Air Raid Warden Training programs, is discussed in Chapter Four. The limitations of the OCD
and the fear in the early months of the war that attacks on civilians were imminent was a great
19
source of anxiety for the Legion leadership. When those attacks did not materialize, the Legion
and OCD worked to maintain public interest in their civilian defense initiatives.
The final chapter turns toward the Legion’s wartime salvage drives. As with civilian
defense the Legion found itself working with government officials and agencies that denied the
Legion the leading role it sought in American communities, while never quite satisfying
Legionnaires that they could get the job done. Public criticism by Legionnaires, particularly
regarding the role of local junk yard and scrap dealers in the campaigns, were a persistent
headache for the federal agencies that oversaw the salvage programs. The unique wartime
experiences of the soldiers of World War I, particularly the hostility toward civilian war
profiteering that so embittered during their service, deeply influenced such criticisms.
The civil defense and salvage programs of the American Legion required tremendous
resources and manpower by posts, departments and the national headquarters. Though it is easy
to dismiss civilian defense for a country that almost never used it, such a teleological view
ignores the events of the war as it was experience by those who lived it and denies to possibility
of what could have been. Civilian defense was also important because it connected many
civilians to the war in a positive way and made them feel as though they were doing their part.
Likewise, the effort of nations to compensate for wartime armament demands through salvage
programs and ersatz materials were a part of the wartime experience and efforts of millions of
civilians. United States endeavored to achieve preponderant military production in both Europe
and Asia, while supplying the arsenals of its allies, and maintaining a standard of living for its
soldiers and civilians. Without salvage production to bridge the gap between natural resources
and the extreme demands from production facilities, the ability to accomplish those goals would
have been severely threatened.
These American Legion programs demonstrate that veterans and veterans’ organizations
can instigate, influence, and shape federal wartime programs and policies. The war experiences
of veterans, including the needs of soldiers and the latent feelings of resentment for civilians,
played an important role in the relationship between veterans and other civilians. Reorienting
the field of veteran studies beyond the postwar to include veteran experiences in future wars will
give historians a more inclusive understanding of the veteran experience.
20
CHAPTER TWO
THE AMERICAN LEGION AND THE ORIGINS OF CIVILIAN
DEFENSE
This is a chapter on the origins of the American Legion’s influence in civilian defense. The
Legion’s early collaboration with the U.S. Army in Air Raid Warning Services and its strong
platform in favor of national defense created an early interest in civilian defense in the Legion.
In February 1941, the Legion’s work in civilian defense gained national exposure when it
sponsored a Mission to England to study the British Home Guard and civilian defenses. From
the information the Legion gathered during the Mission and the subsequent material produced,
the Legion gained a reputation for expertise in civilian defense matters. It is from these
beginnings that the Legion claimed its most important role of the war. The subsequent chapter
will cover the Legion’s conflicted relationship with the Office of Civilian Defense and part the
Legion played in America’s civilian defense mobilization.
2.1 The American Legion and Neutrality
Since the 1930s The American Legion has been the largest veterans organization in
America. At the start of World War II, the Legion had more than 1,130,000 members in over
11,000 posts. The American Legion was truly a national organization, with posts in nearly every
American community and members drawn from all walks of life. It had tremendous influence in
state, local and national politics, not only because of its size, but also because it had members in
positions of power throughout America’s political system and business class. The President, 21
senators, many of the members of the House and several state governors were Legionnaires.1 As
1
There has long been debate about Roosevelt’s membership in the Legion. Roosevelt was a member of Lafayette
Post No. 37 in Poughkeepsie, NY. His membership was based on his service as Under Secretary of the Navy, a
civilian position. As such, he should not have been eligible for membership. Because his position afforded the
American Legion greater prestige and access to power, the Legion never challenged Roosevelt’s membership
(though others do question it from time to time). See Letter, Bruce Chapman to Thomas D. Blake, February 7,
1945. President’s Personal File 350. Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY. (hereafter FDRL);
21
an organization of veterans of the First World War, the American Legion also had important
connections within the military. In the period from 1939 to 1942 America transformed from a
peacetime society still struggling with the vestiges of a depressed economy into a country with a
powerful military and an economy that was the envy of the world. The American Legion was
determined to utilize every bit of its influence to ensure it would play a major role in that
transformation.
When the Japanese attacked the naval base at Pearl Harbor in the last weeks of 1941 they
did not encounter an enemy completely unprepared. As the drums of war beat ever louder in
Europe and Asia, Franklin Roosevelt led an unwilling nation to strengthen its military forces,
improve its defenses, and increase military production. Unlike so many of his countrymen,
Roosevelt believed America could not turn a blind eye to the aggressive military developments
in Germany, Italy, and Japan. He moved to prepare the nation for war as quickly as public
opinion would allow. The slow pace frustrated those, like General George C. Marshall, who
shared Roosevelt’s beliefs on national defense, but found the President’s willingness to trade
months of military growth for political support maddening.2 Despite earlier clashes over federal
support for veterans in his first term, Roosevelt found a strong ally in the fight for military
preparation in The American Legion during his second term.
The Legion had insistently advocated stronger defensive forces since its inception after
World War I. The enemies of the Legion often labeled them as war hawks because of it, though
Legionnaires were as heavily divided in their feelings about American intervention in European
or Asian conflicts as the rest of the country. Their stances toward neutrality and isolationism
versus interventionism generally reflected the shifting opinions of the rest of the nation. When
demand for neutrality laws dominated public opinion in 1936, the Legion issued a resolution
advocating a “strict policy of neutrality” at that year’s national convention in Cleveland. Legion
support for neutrality continued until Pearl Harbor. However, unlike pacifist organizations, The
Legion believed America could avoid war best by maintaining strong defenses to deter any
Letter, Eben A. Ayers to Bruce Chapman, February 9, 1945. President’s Personal File 350. FDRL. According to
Milo Warner, when he met with Roosevelt in January 1941, Roosevelt was quite proud of his Legion membership.
Milo Warner, “Memo of Meeting with President,” January 17, 1941: 2. Mission to England, ALA Microfilm
Collection, reel 91-7003. The Lafayette Post was equally proud to have the President as one of its members. But
Roosevelt rarely mentioned his membership otherwise, perhaps because his qualifications were dubious.
2
William L. O’Neill, A Democracy At War: America’s fight at Home and Abroad in World War II (New York: The
Free Press, 1993), 20-21.
22
potential enemies. Even isolationists within the Legion ranks, and this was no small number,
supported the growth and expansion of a strong defensive force.
The Legion’s stance on neutrality evolved with the international situation. As the global
situation worsened, the complexities of neutrality became increasingly apparent. The New York
national convention in September 1937 passed a resolution supporting “a proper administration
of the neutrality legislation.”3 Just what that meant became harder to determine.
On October 6th, following the President’s famously inflammatory “Quarantine Speech” in
Chicago, the State Department issued a formal statement condemning the Japanese attacks on
China and accusing the Japanese of violating the Kellogg-Briand Treaty and the nine-power
pact.4 When the Legion’s National Executive Committee (NEC) met in November 1937, a
special subcommittee was tasked with creating an interpretation of what neutrality entailed in
light of the foreign policy shift that had occurred after Roosevelt’s speech.5 After endless
debate, the subcommittee could not come to an agreement and was tabled. The following May,
the Legion’s World Peace and Foreign Relations Committee, commenting on the national
convention’s mandate of “A proper neutrality policy” said, “it is now apparent that even the
word ‘neutrality’ is a relative term.”6 Within the Legion and the country at large it was difficult
to determine what America’s neutrality would entail during the conflict.
The German invasion of Poland in September 1939 turned the Neutrality issue from a
hypothetical question into a matter of urgency. In June Roosevelt and his supporters in Congress
had led a sharp, unsuccessful struggle to have the arms embargo resolution of the Neutrality Law
lifted. With German forces swarming toward Warsaw, Roosevelt tried again. At a special
session of Congress convened on September 21, the President argued that an arms embargo to all
belligerents was in fact a form of aid to aggressor states.7 For the next six weeks, Congress met
to deliberate on revisions to the Neutrality Law. On November 3rd, the President’s arguments
prevailed: Congress adjourned, having approved a revised Neutrality Law, sans arms
3
“Report of the National Legislative Committee,” Reports to the Nineteenth Annual National Convention of the
American Legion, New York, NY (September 20-23, 1937): 229. ALA.
4
Bertram D. Hulen, “Two Pacts Cited: State Department Says Tokyo Breaks 9-Power and Kellogg Treaties,” New
York Times (October 7, 1937): p. 1.
5
Digest of Minutes, National Executive Committee Meeting, Indianapolis, IN (November 18-19, 1937): 16-17.
ALA.
6
Digest of Minutes, National Executive Committee Meeting, Indianapolis, IN (May 5-6, 1938): 45. ALA.
7
“The President's Address,” New York Times (September 22, 1939): 1, 14.
23
embargoes.8 The Legion leadership believed that in light of the repeal of the arms embargo, its
statement of general support for neutrality was sufficiently clear.9
The German invasion also marked an important turning point for the Legion’s national
defense and neutrality platforms. The Legion’s National Convention, which also met in the last
days of September, called for an immediate expansion of the armed forces to maintain America’s
neutrality and “views with gravest concern the apparently widespread belief that this Nation
must inevitably become involved in the present European conflict.”10 But for the first time, the
Legion advocated an American defense “strong enough to meet any intended invader before it
arrives.”11 This meant not only defending the oceans, but establishing a national defensive
perimeter that extended to the shores of Europe. This new direction in Legion policy would
mirror the later arguments of the President for aiding Great Britain.
2.2 The Origin of the Legion’s Role in Civilian Defense
At the same time that the Legion was declaring its support for neutrality, Legionnaires
were working with the armed services to improve the nation’s defenses. The American Legion,
more than any other civilian organization, devoted itself to the early development of civilian
defenses. The Legion saw itself as one of the central pillars of American communities by taking
on the mantel of leadership during crises. Legion leaders believed that to establish the
supremacy of the American Legion as the premier veterans’ organization they needed to carve
out a heroic role in the defense of the nation. As an outgrowth of the Legion’s Disaster Relief
Services and Americanism Programs, civilian defense was a natural choice for the Legion’s goal.
Its involvement in civilian defense planning began in the mid-1930s. As war in Europe started to
look inevitable, the Legion and U. S. Army began working together to lay the foundation for
civilian air defense networks.
Their first collaboration was the Aircraft Warning Service (AWS), at Camp Bragg, North
Carolina in 1938. This initial project was successful and became a part of the air branch of the
8
U. S. Congress, House, Committee of Conference Report on Neutrality Act of 1939, House Joint Resolution 306,
76th Congress, 2d session, 1939, p. 11.
9
“Report of the National Legislative Committee,” Reports to the Twenty-First Annual National Convention of the
American Legion, Chicago, IL (September 25-28, 1939), 308-309. ALA.
10
“Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations,” Summary of the Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual
National Convention Chicago, IL (September 25-28, 1939), 51. ALA.
11
“Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations,” Summary of the Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual
National Convention Chicago, IL (September 25-28, 1939), 38. ALA.
24
U. S. Army. During Army maneuvers in 1940 and 1941, Legion Posts local to training areas
often participated by providing air raid warning services.12 The First Interceptor Command, with
the cooperation of the Legion, established observation posts in 26 counties in North Carolina
before there was an established State Civilian Defense Board. The Army-Legion relationship
worked well until the AWS was removed from Army control and placed under the jurisdiction of
the Office of Civilian Defense in 1941.13
The Legion took the lead in establishing observation posts in other states too, notably
Virginia, where it ran the entire AWS operation. In all, the Virginia AWS operated 6,000
observation posts and a central information center with almost 30,000 volunteers. Virginia’s
governor, Colgate Darden, was a Legionnaire and the Director of Defense of the State as well.
Under him, the state director, executive assistant state director, all five deputy state directors, all
ten of the district directors, and 112 of 116 of the sub-district directors were Legionnaires. The
Virginia Protective Force was similarly staffed.14 In Vermont, Albert A. Cree, executive vicechairmen of the Vermont Council of Safety reported that the Legion headed the organization of
the AWS for the state. It was responsible for creating and manning of some 260 observation
posts called for by the U. S. Army Air Corps plans.15 In Oklahoma, Legion Posts selected the
County Air Raid Warning Officers and Chief Observers for the Air Raid Warning Observation
Posts.16 Legion preparations for civilian defense were so successful that several states asked the
Legion to assume full responsibility for the training and operation of their various protective
services.17 Until 1942, the federal, state and local governments had not created an adequate
training manual on civilian defense that was accessible for civilians. The Legion, because of its
size, wealth and reach into nearly every American community was able to produce and
proliferate training manuals on civilian defense that were readily available to state and local
defense organizations. Because they were the only training manuals on civilian defense
12
General Drumm reported to Roosevelt that the American Legion was entirely responsible for Air Raid Warning
operations during Army maneuvers in northern New York. Warner, “Memo of Meeting with President,” January 17,
1941: 2. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003. See also R. Ernest Dupuy and Hodding
Carter, Civilian Defense of the United States (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1942), 25.
13
Bryce P. Beard, “Report: Coordination and Liaison Civilian Defense,” to Lynn U. Stambaugh, January 6, 1942, 1.
14
Letter, W. Glenn Elliot to Warren Atherton, April 16, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
15
National Publicity Division, Press Release by LaGuardia Regarding Veterans in Civilian Defense, December 3,
1941: 3-4. Council of Defense State and Local, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
16
Letter, Milt Phillips, (Department Adjutant of Oklahoma) to Milt Campbell, September 26, 1941. Council of
Defense State and Local, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
17
Letter, Franklin Roosevelt to Lynn Stambaugh, December 17, 1941. RG 171. Box 21. NARA II.
25
available to many defense boards in 1940 and 1941, state and local agencies deemed the manuals
quite useful.18
The Legion saw its early interest in civilian defense pay off in influence and
appointments in 1941. There were Legionnaires throughout the leadership of the civilian defense
organizations across the country. In the Office of Civilian Defense, the federal agency
responsible for training and coordinating civilian defense organizations, the first National
Director and his deputies were Legionnaires, as were seven of the nine Regional Directors, two
of whom were former National Commanders of the Legion. In almost all of the state civilian
defense councils, between 1/3 and 3/4 of leadership committees were Legionnaires. In Colorado,
Governor Ralph L. Carr established the Home Defense Organization in 1941 as the state defense
organization; it was made up entirely of ex-service men.19 By the end of January 1942, 56 of the
60 towns and cities in Colorado had set up Defense Councils. There were Legion posts in each
of the towns and cities, and all but two of the posts had offered the mayors their aid and support
in civil defense. Of the 357 local Defense councilmen in Colorado 152 (43%) were
Legionnaires.20 In Nevada, out of twelve Executive Committee Members of the State Defense
Council, nine were Legionnaires. Large proportions of the County and Community leaders in
Nevada were also Legionnaires. In Reno for example there were eight Legionnaires among the
seventeen Community Council members.21
The large presence of Legionnaires early in the formation of defense councils and the
AWC gave the Legion experience, authority, and influence in civilian defense matters. That
influence extended to other federal agencies. Paul McNutt, head of the Federal Securities
Agency, was a former National Commander of the American Legion. As rumors about a
prospective federal agency on civilian defense circulated throughout Washington, many expected
McNutt would be named Director or that the new agency would report to the FSA.22 Frank
18
Letter, Frank Samuel to NEC, “Exhibit A,” June 18, 1941. National Defense Division, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 91-7003.
19
National Publicity Division, Press Release by LaGuardia Regarding Veterans in Civilian Defense, December 3,
1941: 4. Council of Defense State and Local, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
20
“What Colorado American Legion Posts Are Doing on Local Civil Defense Councils,” January 29, 1942. Council
of Defense State and Local, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
21
“State Council of Defense of Nevada,” January 13, 1942. Council of Defense State and Local, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
22
Milo Warner, “Memo of Meeting with President,” January 17, 1941. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 91-7003. McNutt would, in 1942, be placed in charge of the War Manpower Commission. Rumors
26
Bane, the Director of the Office of Emergency Management, was also a Legionnaire. In May
1941, after meeting with Legion National Commander Milo Warner, Bane agreed to allow
American Legion Posts to serve as recruiting centers for observers, citing the Legion’s long
experience in cooperating with the Army in setting up and operating such networks. He further
called on state and local defense councils to make use of that experience when setting up their
defense plans.23 Warner issued a directive to all Department commanders to confer with their
state defense councils immediately on plans to enroll volunteers for the proposed nationwide
aircraft warning networks projected by the War Department. By June of 1941, only Colorado
(March 1943), Idaho (March 1942), Nevada (March 1943), and South Dakota (1943) had failed
to establish State Defense Agencies.24
Though the American Legion was integral to the prewar civilian defense programs, it was
in 1941 and 1942 that the Legion would play its most important roles.
2.3 Lend-Lease and the Origins of the Legion Mission to Great Britain
In December 1940, the war in Europe was already sixteen months old and the German
Wehrmacht seemed invincible. Adolf Hitler’s campaigns into Poland and France had been
stunning successes. Great Britain had been chased off the continent and was barely holding on
in a desperate struggle against the combined forces of the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine. The
Luftwaffe carried out a devastating bombing campaign of Great Britain from July 10th to Oct 30th,
1940. The Royal Air Force succeeded in blunting the German aerial attack, delivering such
heavy losses to the Luftwaffe that after October, the Germans only attacked at night, a phase of
the war Londoners called “the Blitz.”25 At the same time, the Kreigsmarine’s offensive against
British shipping in the Atlantic had seriously constricted British importation of vital supplies.
Though the British, and later their American Allies, eventually won the Battle of the Atlantic (a
linking McNutt to the Director position of the OCD did not stop in May 1941. See Daniel M. Kidney, “Hint M’Nutt
For Civilian Defense, LaGuardia ‘Flop’,” Indianapolis Times (September 2, 1941): p. 2.
23
National Publicity Division, “American Legion Press Release,’ May 20, 1941. Office of Civilian of Defense,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
24
“The States and the War: State Councils of Defense” Reprinted from The Book of the States, 1941-1942 edition,
33-42. P 78-83. United States Office of Civilian Defense, Washington DC. RG 287: Publications of the Federal
Government - Beginning Pr 32.4401-Pr 32.4402 Box No. Pr 273. NARA II.
25
John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 1990): 88-102.
27
term Winston Churchill coined on March 6th, 1941), the situation in December 1940 looked
bleak for Great Britain.26
In early December, President Roosevelt escaped the crisis weary rooms of the White
House for a two-week Caribbean cruise aboard the U.S.S. Tuscaloosa. The rigors of his
successful third election campaign and his delicate act of balancing America’s cumbersome
neutrality laws while trying to aid the enemies of the Germans and Japanese had exhausted the
President. On December 9th, Roosevelt received a 4,000 word personal letter from Winston
Churchill asking for aid. Churchill would later call the letter, “one of the most important I ever
wrote.”27 The German attacks, Churchill lamented, had taken a heavy toll and Great Britain was
in desperate need of material aid. At the same time, Churchill warned Roosevelt that the British
were running out of financial resources to pay for materials.
Roosevelt sympathized with the plight of the British and wished to give them all the aid
they needed, but the American public would be difficult to convince. The Gallup polls indicated
that 90% of Americans favored more aid to Great Britain, but nearly the same amount, 88%, still
wished to remain neutral.28 Roosevelt’s experience told him that repealing the Neutrality Law of
1939 would be a contested fight. The type of aid, how much, how it would be delivered, and
method of payment would each be hotly debated in Congress. He spent the remainder of his
vacation mulling over solutions to Britain’s needs.
Ever the master of molding public opinion, Roosevelt announced at a press conference
upon his return to Washington that America’s first line of defense was Great Britain and to shore
up that defense, America needed to lease the materials the British needed to fight their enemy.
The next day at his oval office desk he justified his position to the American people with a
simple parable: if a neighbor’s house was on fire and he needed a garden hose to put it out, no
one would quibble over terms. A person would lend the neighbor a hose and it would be
returned when the fire was put out. Roosevelt advocated America take over British orders for
American goods and then lend or lease the materials to Britain for the duration of the conflict. In
26
Sir Winston Churchill, The Churchill War Papers: The Ever-Widening War, Volume III: 1941, edited by Martin
Gilbert (W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 314.
27
Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), 558.
28
O’Neill, A Democracy At War, 23.
28
these replies to Churchill’s message was born the lend-lease proposal.29 Roosevelt followed the
initial proposals with his famous “Arsenal for Democracy” fireside chat of December 29th, 1940.
In his “chat” Roosevelt did not directly refer to Lend-Lease, but chose instead to appeal to
America’s fear of its own security.30 He characterized the support for Great Britain as a matter
of national security, not war.31 The lend lease policies would be undertaken as a means to stay
out of war. By becoming “the great arsenal of democracy,” America would ensure the British
victory over the Germans and their allies, keeping America from an invasion that would surely
result otherwise. That invasion was extremely unlikely was less important than framing the new
program in a way that was agreeable to an American public that was already sympathetic to the
British struggle.
It was in this context that the American Legion’s Mission to Great Britain was born. On
December 30th, 1940, the Legion Headquarters in Indianapolis received an open letter from
retired Major Breckinridge Estes. It is unclear whether the Fireside chat motivated Estes to make
his proposal or if the timing was coincidence. Estes called the Legion out for failing to live up to
its raison d’etre. He attacked the Legion for being passive and complacent toward the rising
totalitarian forces gaining power in Europe and Asia during the 1920s and 30s. He urged the
Legion’s National Commander Milo Warner to make up for those failings by becoming
proactive. Among other proposals, Estes recommended the National Commander travel to
England to verify the causes and extent of the emergencies to justify American support. He also
advocated an invitation and sponsoring of a Charles De Gaulle lecture tour of America.32
The Legion leadership received Estes’ letter with some trepidation. The Legion, which
has always seen itself as a national organization made up of leaders within local communities,
normally heralded Legionnaires outside the Department and National leadership who were
responsible for national Legion programs. However, they were unsure of Estes’ dependability
29
Robert A. Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry Into World War II, 2nd Edition (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1979), 108-111; see also David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in
Depression and War, 1929-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 465-69.
30
Samuel I. Rosenman, editor, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. IX, War and Aid to
the Democracies (New York: Random House, 1941), 633-44. Roosevelt always disapproved of the name “LendLease Bill,” and always referred to it as the “aid-to the democracies bill.” Samuel I. Rosenman, Working with
Roosevelt (New York: 1952), 272.
31
Full transcript of the speech: “President's Call for Full Response on Defense: Sees New Crisis for America Quotes
Words of Hitler,” New York Times (December 30, 1940): p. 6.
32
Letter, Major Breckinridge Estes to American Legion National Headquarters, December 30, 1940. Mission to
England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
29
and how much reliance they could be place on his communications, particularly given how
critical Estes had been of the Legion. Frank Samuel, the Legion’s National Adjutant sought
information on Estes from Legion circles. No one in the Indianapolis Headquarters knew Major
Estes, nor apparently did any one in his home Department of Missouri. His letter to the national
leadership had not come up through the normal department channels.33 In the end, though they
adopted Estes’ Mission to Great Britain proposal, the Legion leadership credited “numerous
Legionnaires” rather than give credit to an unknown and potentially dubious source.34
Milo Warner, Frank Samuel, Edward McGrail (Legion’s National Publicity Officer) and
Donald Glascoff (the Assistant National Adjutant, in charge of membership) put together the
initial plans for the Mission. Their proposal called for as many as seven men to journey to
unoccupied France and Great Britain to study civilian defense, the role of veteran organizations
in the war effort, and to view the conditions of the countries at war. They planned for a two
week stay in England to study civilian defense and “Consider how best to make effective the
resolution adopted at Boston in September of last year to the effect that a sound national defense
for our country calls for the rendering of all practical aid to Great Britain at this time.”35 They
hoped to visit several of the Channel ports, especially Dover, and if possible, unoccupied
France.36
On January 15th, Warner met with Secretary of State Cordell Hull to discuss the
advisability of requesting Presidential permission for the Legion Mission to Great Britain.37 His
meeting with Hull could not have come at a better time. In the days following the President’s
33
Letter, Frank Samuel to Fred A. Bettger (Past Department Commander Missouri), January 10, 1941. Mission to
England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
34
That Estes was the source of the idea is hard to doubt. Nothing in the Legion’s archival records suggests any one
other than Estes as the source of the idea. No other documents at the American Legion Archive in Indianapolis
contain suggestions for the mission and the Legion attempts to verify Estes’ loyalty demonstrated the importance the
Legion placed on his letter. Donald Glascoff, the Assistant National Adjutant, wrote to the National Commander
Milo Warner on January 7, 1941 that the “original idea came from one of those semi-screwball letters we get on
National Defense.” This shows that the original idea came from one source, not several, and the date makes it very
likely that it was in reference to the Estes letter. Letter, Donald Glascoff to Milo Warner, January 7, 1941. Office of
Civilian of Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
35
“Warner Report, Section I,” March 14, 1941: 4. Office of Civilian of Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7003.
36
Letter, Milo Warner to Cordell Hull, February 1, 1941. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 917003. It is unclear when the proposal to visit France was dropped from the Legion’s Mission Proposal. It seems to
be that once Warner met with Roosevelt that part of the plan was discarded, though it is merely by its absence from
later discussions that such a conclusion is made.
37
Letter, Milo Warner to Cordell Hull, January 14, 1941. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 917003.
30
fireside chat, the administration was eager to give publicity to the British plight while
highlighting their ability to win the war against Germany. Throughout the first weeks of 1941,
the Roosevelt administration sent several Federal missions to England and Europe to study the
war rooms, defenses and conditions of war torn Europe. These missions were meant to be
conspicuous and persuasive. Roosevelt hoped they would garner heavy media coverage and the
emotional imagery of the missions would strengthen the support for aiding Britain and amending
the Neutrality Laws.
On New Year’s Eve, two days after his Fireside chat, the President dispatched Harry
Hopkins to London as his personal envoy. Hopkins was in London from Jan. 5 to Feb. 11. He
spent most of that month shadowing Churchill, sitting in on the War Cabinet meetings and
establishing the exceptionally close connections between the British and American governments
that would come to characterize the war years. Articles, editorials and pictures of Hopkin’s visit
were carried in every major newspaper throughout his visit.
In late January Wendell Willkie, Roosevelt’s Republican opponent in the 1940 election,
traveled to London for a ten-day mission. Though on opposite sides of the partisan spectrum,
Willkie agreed with the President that America’s best defense was to give “all aid to Britain.”38
Among those who accompanied Willkie were John Cowles, President of the Minneapolis Star
Journal, and New York Daily News reporter Donald MacKenzie. Cowles asserted that he went
to England doubting the likelihood of German invasion as an exaggeration aimed at stimulating
war production and unifying public opinion. The tour with Willkie convinced him their fears
were genuine and they believed Hitler could not win the war if he did not occupy the British
Islands. With American supplies, Cowles said, the British were confident of victory.39
MacKenzie reported that two German Heinkel planes escorted the British plane for 200 miles of
the trip from London to Lisbon on the return trip. The Portuguese censor in Lisbon told him the
point of the escort was to show that the Germans could have destroyed the plane and Willkie if
they had the inclination.40 These two reports certainly created the picture of desperation,
heroism, and danger that Roosevelt desired. Upon his return from the mission, Willkie stated
38
John Cowles, “Invasion Held Key to Hitler Victory,” Minneapolis Star Journal (Feb. 25, 1941). Willkie’s
support for preparedness and aiding Britain meant that he was a soft option for isolationists in the 1940 election. It
severely cut his credibility with Old Guard Republicans and he was soundly beaten by Roosevelt. O’Neill, A
Democracy at War, 22.
39
Cowles, “Invasion Held Key to Hitler Victory,” Minneapolis Star Journal, (Feb. 25, 1941).
40
‘Says Nazi Plane “Escorted” Willkie, New York Times (Feb. 27, 1941).
31
that the aid the British needed did not include manpower or sending armies to Europe in the next
year. Rather than drawing America farther into the war, Willkie argued, the passage of lendlease was America’s best insurance of staying out of it.41 Churchill had made a similar point in a
radio broadcast speech on Feb. 15 to the British people and the world at large which he
concluded with a appeal to Roosevelt: “Give us the tools and we will finish the job!”42
The U. S. War Department sent its own mission to England in February. The mission,
led by Dr. Thomas Parran, Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, consisted of American
experts in aspects of civilian defense. It was popularly speculated that the group would
recommend a new Federal Board be created in the likeness of British Ministry of Home Security,
headed by Herbert Morrison.43 Like the other missions, the Parran Mission endeavored to show
the British needed aid, but was strong enough to hold off the German invasion. He stated that the
health of Great Britain was fine and there were no epidemics there.44
On January 14, Milo Warner traveled to Washington. Warner had been elected National
Commander at the Legion’s National Convention in Boston in November. Richard Seelye Jones,
the new Legion National Publicity man in Washington, had arranged a meeting with the
President on December 20th so Roosevelt could meet Warner and discuss national defense
programs and the Legions role in them. Lowell Mellett, Roosevelt’s Executive Assistant in the
Office of Government Reports, recommended the meeting, saying the Legion could be a benefit
or hindrance in the approaching months and this meeting could help determine which.45
Warner found the Secretary of State receptive to his proposal. However, despite the
Federal government’s desire to publicize the British situation, disturbing messages from the
British arrived in Washington at the same time Warner did. The British were growing weary of
having to wine and dine so many American missions at a time when resources were already
scarce. They worried about an influx of individuals and committees that could arrive with good
intentions but force the British to play host. Hull promised to bring the proposal up during the
Cabinet meeting held that afternoon. Later that evening, Hull called Warner at the Mayflower
41
Anne O’Hare M’Cormick, “Europe: Impact of Two American Visitors on Mr. Churchill, New York Times
(February 16, 1941): p.16.
42
“Churchill's Broadcast on Britain's Growing Strength in War,” New York Times (Feb 10, 1941): p. 8.
43
“Mission Develops U. S. Civil Defense,” New York Times (February 14, 1941): p. 6.
44
“D’Olier Report to NEC,” Digest of Minutes, National Executive Committee Meeting, Indianapolis, IN (March
1941): 15-16. ALA.
45
Letter, Lowell Mellett to Franklin Roosevelt, December 20, 1940. Official File 64: American Legion. FDRL.
32
Hotel in Washington DC with news that the Cabinet had approved the Legion trip.46 At the same
time, the Cabinet decided to limit the number of American missions to only those essential to
American security.
The next morning, Warner met the President in the oval office for half an hour. President
wanted his opinion on “what he loosely referred to as a home defense commission to centralize
and correlate home defense activities of a general nature.”47 During a discussion on air raid
defense and air raid warning precautions, Warner mentioned the proposal for the Mission to
England. The President brought up the Cabinet meeting discussion of the previous afternoon and
said the British were bothered with the missions. Warner assured the President that the Legion
was not going over to be “wined and dined.” Roosevelt stated that he thought the Mission would
be good for determining what British veterans of the World War were doing in home defense.
After General Edwin Watson, one of Roosevelt’s secretaries came into the meeting, the size of
the Mission was discussed. The Mission had to be small because of difficulties in getting from
Lisbon to London. Warner suggested four or five, but Roosevelt and General Watson whittled
the number down to three. Warner specifically asked for his aid to be included, but they stayed
at three. Roosevelt then told Watson to tell Secretary of War Henry Stimson that he would like
three representatives of the American Legion to go on the Mission.
The National Executive Committee of the Legion was the final body that needed to be
consulted. Because the next NEC meeting was not scheduled until March and it would be nearly
impossible to assemble them on such quick notice, Frank Samuel and Warner had to contact the
58 members by telephone. They spent the afternoon of January 17th reading a memo Samuel
drafted, laying out the justifications and goals of the Mission. Samuel noted that many other
organizations had asked for and been denied passports for similar missions by the State
Department.48 Surprisingly, they succeeded in contacting 51 members of the NEC. 48 approved
the Mission, one withheld his vote, one gave a conditional approval, and one voted no.49
The replies to the vote give an interesting look into what the Legion hoped to get from
the Mission. Many of the NEC replies to the phone vote made specific reference to the Lend46
Frank Samuel, “National Adjutant Confidential Office Memo,” January 17, 1941. Office of Civilian Defense,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
47
Milo Warner, “Memo of Meeting with President,” January 17, 1941. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 91-7003.
48
Frank Samuel, Phone Memo, January 17, 1941. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
49
Telegram, Milo Warner to George G. Levy, January 17, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
33
Lease legislation pending in Congress. NEC member Sam Rorex urged Warner to make his trip
to England immediately. Rorex worried that if the trip were delayed until after a test-vote on the
Lend-Lease Bill the trip would be useless and the Legion would be accused of indecision and
procrastination.50 J. Bryan Hobbs also believed the Mission needed to happen immediately so
the “general public can be informed of the Legion’s attitude prior to congressional action on the
Lend-Lease Bill.”51 Some NEC members noted the Mission would help the Legion demonstrate
its leadership in American communities.52 Others argued it would give the Legion the authority
needed to shape public opinion and the legislation for aid to Britain.53 George G. Levy wrote,
“Nothing that has heretofore been done by the Legion, or will be done any time in the near
future, will give us the prestige and influence that this impartial investigation contemplated by
you will.”54 Donald Glascoff, in one of his early drafts of the Mission Proposal, had noted: “This
[Mission] is distinctly publicity promotion from the Legion standpoint, although such a fact
would not be for general consumption. The attention of the nation would be focused upon such a
Mission for a considerable length of time and it would be the finest publicity this organization
has ever had.” The Mission would “dramatize the efforts of The American Legion to be of
service to the country at this time of crisis…At present we lack such dramatization and much of
the publicity play is taken from us by self-starting committee such as No Foreign War, Keep
America Out of War, Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies.”55 Edward McGrail
wrote that a Mission would stimulate Legion membership in support of civilian defense efforts.56
Warner and Samuel had given strict instructions to their staffs to keep word of the
Mission out of the press before it was fully approved. McGrail had adamantly recommended the
50
Telegram, Sam Rorex to Milo Warner January 14, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
51
Letter, J. Bryan Hobbs (NEC) to Milo Warner, January 22, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
52
Letter, Sam Rorex to Milo Warner, January 25, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003; Letter, Clary Simpson (NEC Department of Canada) to Milo Warner, January 24,
1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
53
Letter, George G. Levy (NEC) to Milo Warner, January 20, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
54
Letter, George G. Levy (NEC) to Milo Warner, January 20, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
55
Memo, Donald Glascoff to Milo Warner, undated. Mission to England, Letters Approving, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 91-7003.
56
Letter, Edward McGrail to Milo Warner, January 15, 1941. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7003. Growth of the Legion was especially difficult as veterans of World War I were dying at a rate of one
hundred per day and that number figured to only grow as time passed. Edward McGrail (National Publicity Officer),
“Press Release,” March 4, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
34
Mission idea get no publicity in the press or public before approval was decided. He believed
such publicity would put the decision to go into the public forum, which was highly
undesirable.57 It would allow isolationists and opponents of the Legion to rally against them and
could have potentially forced the government to oppose the Mission. Once the Federal
government and the NEC approved the Mission, the Legion’s National Publicity Division went
into high gear to ensure the Legion received strong media coverage throughout the journey. The
Legion’s ties to important social positions gave them access to media. Particularly in
Indianapolis, where the Legion’s headquarters is located, the Legion was a constant presence in
the media. After the meetings in Washington and the NEC phone survey, Legion headquarters
used its contacts in the media to advertise its great publicity victory. The United Press
Association and Associated Press carried regular updates of the journey. Like the Hopkins and
Willkie missions, though perhaps to a lesser degree, the Legion was well-covered in the national
newspapers.
Speculation over the members constituting the Mission was contentious. It had been
proposed since the beginning that Warner lead the Mission. As National Commander, he
commanded the greatest prestige and publicity, so he was a natural choice. There was worry that
the schedule of the National Commander would be irreparably disrupted for the time he is gone
and there was no certainty of when he would return.58 However, Donald Glascoff noted that if
the Mission extended to the Legion’s birthday period, the Commander could broadcast a
message via short-wave radio “which would be a prime publicity feature in itself.”59
The other two spots were much more controversial. There was a tremendous amount of
prestige and influence attached to these positions within the Legion. Among many of the phone
survey of the NEC, respondents sought to make suggestions from within their own Departments
and allies.60 John Watkins and Isadore Levine of the Department of Indiana were emphatic in
57
Letter, Edward McGrail to Milo Warner, January 15, 1941. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7003.
58
Letter, Frank Samuel to Raymond Kelly (NEC and Former National Commander), February 8, 1941. Mission to
England, Letters Approving, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003; John R. Decker (Department Commander,
Colorado) to Milo Warner, January 24, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7003; J. Bryan Hobbs (NEC) to Milo Warner, January 22, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
59
Memo, Donald Glascoff to Milo Warner, undated. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
60
Letter, James P. Logan (NEC) to Milo Warner, January 23, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003; Letter, George F. Metcalf to Milo Warner, January 26, 1941. Mission to
England, Letters Approving, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
35
their request to have Glen R. Hillis of Indiana appointed to the Mission. They even offered to
have the Department of Indiana pay all of his expenses.61 In the end, Warner and Samuel
decided on Colonel Franklin D’Olier and Major General Frank Parker. D’Olier had been the
first full-time National Commander of the Legion back in 1919; during his term of office, many
of the basic rules and policies of the Legion were established.62 He was also the President of the
Prudential Insurance Company. His wealth also gave him many contacts in American and
abroad that were helpful to the Mission. In World War I, he had served in France as a member
of the General Staff of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), where he organized the salvage
service. D’Olier was popular with many Legionnaires for his refusal to take money for his work
with the Legion. During the Great War D’Olier refused to cash his pay vouchers, instead turning
them over to charitable organizations.63 He covered the cost of his own expenses during the
Mission to Great Britain, $1,300, a considerable amount for that period.64
Frank Parker had been recommended for the Mission based on his military knowledge,
observation skills, and ability.65 Parker had graduated from West Point in 1894 and served in the
military until 1936. He commanded the 1st Division of the AEF from October 1918 until the end
of the war. In 1933 to 1935, Parker commanded the military department of the Philippines and it
was as that Department’s representative that he served on the National Executive Committee of
the American Legion.66 His knowledge of the military leadership in Washington and his
contacts within the military were both valuable assets for the Legion. Both D’Olier and Parker
were chosen because they possessed strong military and Legionnaire qualifications and both
were free from any tinge of factionalism and prejudice within the Legion.67
Some time in the final week of January, Warner was able to get a fourth member added to
the party. When he had requested the inclusion of his aid Joseph Deutschle in the Mission
61
Telegram, John Watkins and Isadore E. Levine to Milo Warner, January 18, 1941. Mission to England, Letters
Approving, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
62
“Warner Report, Section I,” March 14, 1941: 4. Office of Civilian of Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7003.
63
“Warner Report, Section I,” March 14, 1941: 4. Office of Civilian of Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7003.
64
Letter, Frank Samuel to Frank D’Olier, March 8, 1941. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 917003.
65
Letter, Robert J. Shaw to Milo Warner, January 23, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
66
“To Study British Defense: D’Olier and Parker Are Named to American Legion Mission,” New York Times
(January 22, 1941): p. 10.
67
Letter, Frank Samuel to James P. Logan (NEC), February 8, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
36
during his the meeting with President, Roosevelt had refused. However, his contacts within the
State Department, notably Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles had pulled the necessary
strings to have Deutschle added.68 Though he looked quite young, Deutschle had fought in
France for fourteen months. After the war he had worked with the Associated Press for sixteen
years before devoting himself exclusively to the Legion.69 Deustchle’s addition to the Mission
came so late that many of the newspapers covering the departure failed to note him and others
misspelled his name.70
2.4 Mission to Great Britain
The trip to England was potentially hazardous. German ships, u-boats and fighter planes
threatened travel lanes to and from London. As Donald MacKenzie had noted in his trip with
Wendell Willkie, German fighters had escorted their flight from London to Lisbon for two
hundred miles. The Legion Mission would put the four men in the heart of a country under
nightly aerial attacks. Should the Germans launch the invasion that so many believed was
imminent, the Legionnaires might become casualties. Life insurance policies of $12,500 were
taken out for each of the Mission members through Lloyd’s of London.71
Aside from mortal danger, there was a strong likelihood that the Mission would be
stranded in England. They only planned for a two-week tour of England but Warner had been
told they might not get a return flight until May.72 Should the Germans renew the “Blitz” while
they were in England, air travel for civilians might be grounded for weeks at a time.73 When Pan
American Airways issued their tickets they had round trip tickets from New York to Lisbon and
one-way tickets for Lisbon to London. Because of the uncertainty created by the war, they did
not sell roundtrip tickets from Lisbon to London.74 Contact between the Mission and the Legion
68
Letter, J. B. Deutschle to Sumner Welles, January 29, 1941. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7003.
69
“Warner Report, Section I,” March 14, 1941: 4. Office of Civilian of Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7003.
70
“Milo Warner, Home for Visit, Explains Mission to London,” Toledo Blade, January 27, 1941.
71
Letter, R. C. Nunn to Frank Samuel, February 24, 1941. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 917003.
72
“Warner Report, Section I,” March 14, 1941: 9. Office of Civilian of Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7003.
73
Letter, Frank Samuel to Raymond Kelly, February 8, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
74
Memo, Robert Seelye Jones to Glenn Crawford, January 25, 1941. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 91-7003.
37
headquarters would be minimal. Aside from indirect contact and a few telegrams, the Mission
would be cut off.
So with some trepidation, Warner left his hometown of Toledo, Ohio aboard a train
bound for Washington DC. After some final meetings with government officials and last
meeting with Samuel, he made his way to LaGuardia Seaplane Base in New York. The luggage
restriction for the Lisbon to London trip was only 44 pounds, so he traveled light.75 At 8:30am,
on February 5th, the Mission and some twenty other passengers boarded the Dixie Clipper to
Bermuda. Their trip to England was not simple. During the early war years, transatlantic flights
were often routed through Bermuda, and then to the Azores before they reached mainland
Europe. When the American Legion contingent reached Bermuda, they were uncertain when
they would be able to secure a berth on the next leg of their voyage to the Azores. Fortunately,
weather favored them and the military situation was calm at the time, so they were able to secure
berths on a courier plane to Horta in the Azores.76 The next day, February 6, they arrived in
Lisbon.
Portugal was officially neutral during World War II. Though it had semi-fascist
government under Antonio de Oliveira Salazar and maintained friendly ties with fascist Spain
and the Axis states, Portugal also exported goods to Great Britain and its allies. German and
British citizens could be found uneasily supping at neighboring tables in Lisbon’s restaurants as
the belligerents of the war had to maintain their peace within the neutral country’s borders.
Rumors abounded that spies were everywhere. Hugh Wilson, a member of the U.S Foreign
Service and recent Ambassador to Germany, reported to the Legionnaires that he was quite
certain the representative and photographer of LIFE magazine stationed in Lisbon was a German
spy.77 While they settled in Lisbon easily enough, when they contacted the British Overseas
Airways they were not assured of a time of leaving Lisbon. They received word that afternoon
that they had secured reservations for travel to Bristol the next morning.78 On Saturday morning,
they rose early to make a 5 a.m. flight.
75
Memo, Robert Seelye Jones to Glenn Crawford, January 25, 1941. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 91-7003.
76
See Milo J. Warner, “Chronological Statement by Milo J. Warner of American Legion Mission to England,” 1.
Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
77
Warner, “Chronological Statement by Milo J. Warner of American Legion Mission to England,” 3. Mission to
England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
78
See Hugh Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1970).
38
The plane to Bristol took eight hours. Two hours before they got to England, the
windows were boarded up to prevent the passengers from viewing the landscape. Warner
suffered a cracked rib when the plane experienced a sudden drop during the flight. Upon
arriving in Bristol Warner was immediately struck by the level of damage. Of all the places they
would visit, including Coventry, Bristol was the heaviest hit. This had an obvious impact on the
delegation, showing them how serious the situation was.79 After touring Bristol for a few hours,
the Legionnaires took a train to London, arriving in the late evening, some eighty hours after
leaving New York. Because the U.S. Embassy was alerted to expect them, word of the coming
trip reached London before the Mission departed. The Hotel Claridge, which had sent word to
D’Olier welcoming the Legionnaires to stay there, became the Mission’s base of operations for
the duration of their stay.80
Immediately upon arriving in London, the Mission had to begin working to secure
passage home. Wartime transportation restrictions meant that foreign travel required “priority”
to go abroad. Traveling west was especially difficult because of the large numbers of travelers
and refugees seeking to escape the war in Europe and North Africa. Travel west was further
restricted by damage to some of the plane facilities in Lisbon by a hurricane while the Mission
was in London.81
The Legionnaires experienced a bit of wartime culture shock on their first night in
London. London, of course, was in a blackout. That did not stop Londoners from driving
however. They drove the dark streets without the aid of light and did not let that dampen their
speeds. Traffic lights had been covered with the exception of tiny hairline openings that showed
very thin red and green crosses.82 The Legion used this and similar stories to impress upon their
audiences in America the situation in England. It showed a people dealing with the unpleasant
necessities of war, but adapting well enough.
During their stay, the Legionnaires sought to visit vital cities, military units and anything
related to the infrastructure of civilian defense. They toured the port cities heavily damaged
79
Warner, “Chronological Statement by Milo J. Warner of American Legion Mission to England,” 4. Mission to
England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
80
Telegram, Frank D'Olier to Milo Warner, January 24, 1941. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7003.
81
“Warner Report, Section I,” March 14, 1941: 9. Office of Civilian of Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7003.
82
Warner, “Chronological Statement by Milo J. Warner of American Legion Mission to England,” 4. Mission to
England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
39
during the air raids. They visited Coventry and Birmingham in the midlands; Bristol on the west
coast; and Portsmouth, Southampton, Bournemouth, Folkestone, and Dover on the Channel
coast. They spent several days with each branch of the military and with two home guard
battalions. The Ministry of Home Security allowed them to make study of the air raid
precautions, observation posts, control areas and control stations, air raid shelters, communal
feeding and canteen services. While in London they visited the docks, damaged areas, hospitals
and the tubes that were being used for underground shelters. They also toured the City Council
Fire Brigade, investigating the auxiliary fire system. They studied the telephone and telegraph
communications centers and met with British Red Cross and the American Red Cross contingent
in London, led by Daniel Grant. They met with Women’s Voluntary Services and with Lady
Edward Spencer Churchill, head of the Women’s Division of the British Legion at her home in
Windsor. The Legionnaires were also keenly interested in the military and civilian counter
espionage setups.83
While they were there, the American Legion Mission was often escorted and hosted by
the British Legion. In many ways the two Legions were like siblings. Both were the largest
veteran organizations in their respective countries and both were active in civilian defense. Most
importantly, each saw the other as its equal. However, there were important differences: the
British Legion was open to all British veterans, even those who were recently in the armed forces
were welcome to join. The American Legion was only open to veterans of the First World War.
This meant that the British Legion had a younger, less homogeneous membership and it had far
more men fighting in the war. The British age limit for service was also higher that the
American age limit, so more British veterans of World War I served again in World War II. The
British Legion had been alerted to the American Legion’s visit and had sent telegrams ahead,
welcoming the four American Legionnaires.84 When the Mission arrived, the British Legion
83
Warner, “Chronological Statement by Milo J. Warner of American Legion Mission to England,” 6-7. Mission to
England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
84
Letter, Ashwandan (Chairman of the British Legion) to Milo Warner, undated. Mission to England, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003; F.D. Bone, Secretary of the British Legion, was a regular correspondent with Jack
Cejnar, the American Legion’s Assistant National Publicity Officer. Cejnar sent the American Legion
Headquarter’s press communications to Bone regularly. Letter, F. D. Bone to Milo Warner, February 15, 1941.
Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
40
invited the delegation to a luncheon in their honor with a group of about 35 British Legionnaires
at the Savoy Hotel.85
On Feb. 21, 1941, word came from Buckingham Palace that the King wanted to see
Warner and his crew at the Palace the following morning. The British Legion accompanied the
American Legion delegation.86 So on Saturday morning, the four Legionnaires made their way
to Buckingham Palace to witness an investiture in the “44 Room” of 250 British people who had
been decorated. Afterward, they met with the King for 20 minutes.87 They also met with
Winston Churchill at 10 Downing Street in the Cabinet Meeting Room.88 They spent 25 minutes
with the Prime Minister discussing the shared problems facing the British and Americans and the
Mission the Legionnaires were on. These two meetings were particularly important to the
American Legion from the aspect of publicity and prestige. American media outlets in London
covered the meetings and carried the stories and photographs of them in their papers in the
United States.
Those meetings came at the end of the Mission’s stay in London. The Legionnaires had
secured the “priority” needed to leave and booked passage from London to Lisbon on February
24th. Weather conditions over Lisbon were again prohibitive, so the Mission did not leave
London for Lisbon until two days later. They arrived too late to take the Clipper in Lisbon they
were booked on, so they spent the better part of three days in Lisbon awaiting the next available
clipper. On March 1st they departed Lisbon on the Yankee Clipper traveling on a southerly route
via West Africa, Brazil and Trinidad.89 The southerly route was necessary to escape the fighting
in the north Atlantic and the tropical systems in the central Atlantic. They made a stop in
Bolama (Portuguese Guinea in west Africa), where, the itinerary noted, hippopotamuses often
had to be shooed away from the landing strip. Then they flew to Belem in Brazil, at the mouth
85
“Warner Report, Section I,” March 14, 1941: 7. Office of Civilian of Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7003.
86
Letter, G. Thomas to Colonel G. R. Crosfield, February 21, 1941. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 91-7003.
87
“Warner Report, Section I,” March 14, 1941: 8-9. Office of Civilian of Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7003.
88
“Warner Report, Section I,” March 14, 1941: 8. Office of Civilian of Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7003.
89
On board with them was Spanish Grand Duchess Assunta Habs-Borbon-Hofinger, Sister of Archduke Franz Josef
of Austria and Palm Beach and cousin of the late King Alfonso XIII. “Legion Head Back From British Tour,” New
York Times (March 7, 1941): 7.
41
of the Tocantins River, to Port of Spain, Trinidad and finally on to New York.90 They arrived at
LaGuardia Seaplane Base at 6:18am on March 6th, after circling the airfield for 45 minutes due
to poor lighting.91 It had taken the Legion Mission nearly eight days to get home.
To maximize the impact of the Mission, the Legion leadership and the Roosevelt
administration tried to make the return as newsworthy as possible. The media had carried stories
keeping pace with the Legion activities in England, but it did not receive the coverage of the
Hopkins and Willkie missions.92 While the Legion Mission was in transit Lowell Mellett
contacted Richard Seelye Jones to arrange for Warner to meet with the President on March 5th.93
The delays on the return trip prevented the meeting, costing the Legion a much desired photo
opportunity.94 Instead the response they got was a brief, non-committal reply from Roosevelt
that he dictated on a train to Florida.95 Jones had contacted Ed McGrail and Frank Samuel on
March 1st, to urge them to have Warner “take a very positive position on SOMETHING that
would make more talk.” Otherwise, he feared, the value and praise for the trip will be lost. If he
makes a “nothing to say until I report to the executive committee” attitude in his first statement,
“he might as well have stayed home.”96 Much to Jones’ chagrin, when he returned Warner
refused to make any definitive statements to the press on Legion plans, saying he had to wait
until he spoke with the NEC.97 Jones and others were also frustrated because on March 4th,
Congress passed the Lend-Lease Bill. They had hoped an arrival of the Mission before or on the
date it was signed would have produced great headlines for the Mission.98 Thus, to some degree
the Legion was disappointed in the results of the Mission. While it did bring some fanfare and
90
Memo, Edward McGrail to Frank Samuel, February 28, 1941. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7003.
91
“Warner Report, Section I,” March 14, 1941: 9. Office of Civilian of Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7003.
92
“Atlantic Clipper Delayed,” New York Herald Tribune (March 3, 1941); "Awaiting the Legion Report,"
Marshfield News Herald (March 7, 1941).
93
Memo, Richard Seelye Jones to Edward McGrail and Frank Samuel, March 1, 1941. Mission to England,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
94
Attempts to reschedule immediately after the Legion returned were thwarted by a cold, which took the President
out of action for a few days. “Legion Head Back From British Tour,” New York Times (Mar. 7, 1941): p. 7.
95
Letter, Franklin Roosevelt to Milo Warner, March, 19, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
96
Memo, Richard Seelye Jones to Edward McGrail and Frank Samuel, March 1, 1941. Mission to England,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
97
“Legion Mission Back, Praising British Resolve,” New York Herald Tribune (Mar. 7, 1941).
98
Letter, W. S. Sollenberger (NEC) to Milo Warner, January 25, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
42
publicity to the Legion, bad luck in timing prevented them from making the splash they truly
desired.
2.5 The Warner Report
Before he left, Warner had promised to call an emergency meeting of the NEC as soon as
he returned.99 Partly this was because NEC members were anxious to have a statement before
the passage of the Lend-Lease Bill.100 But it was also because they wished to have a final report,
which Legion policy dictated must be approved by the NEC, out to the media as soon as
possible. Warner and his delegation delivered their reports to the NEC on March 14 and 15. The
Warner Report was divided into three sections. The first section focused on impressions of
British morale and ability to fight. It was the only section meant for public consumption and was
aimed at supporting the resolution of “all aid to Britain” from the Boston National Convention.
Section Two and Three were technical observations of civil defense in Britain and
recommendations for Legion policy on Home Defense and Aid to England, respectively. These
two sections were not released to the press, though they were included in the Report given to the
President.
Section One of the Mission report was designed to show that the British needed aid
desperately, without portraying the British situation as hopeless. The report also aimed to show
that aiding the British was in America’s best interests. The Mission reported that the British had
made a remarkable recovery from the severe punishment suffered during the Battle of Britain.
The British were not cowed by their losses; they were more determined to win the war. To do
so, more than anything else the British sorely need war materials, munitions, and certain food
supplies. British leaders and vast majority of British people appreciated that without American
aid they could not hope to win. The Report stated: “It is definitely in the balance whether they
can win without our aid, i.e., the actual delivery to them of these much-needed munitions and
food supplies. With these munitions and food supplies their ultimate victory is practically
certain.”101 However, the Mission stipulated that aid should be given only so long as the
99
Frank Samuel to James P. Logan (NEC), February 8, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
100
Letter, James T. Logan to Milo Warner, January 23, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
101
“Warner Report, Section I,” March 14, 1941: 11. Office of Civilian of Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7003.
43
interests of the US were not impaired. The Mission also advocated providing American convoys
to ensure the materials reach their destination.102 Giving the British more American ships to
convoy the goods was insufficient because the British lacked the trained manpower to operate
them.103 Section One concluded “All this should be done not because of any sentiment for Great
Britain but on purely patriotic basis of the best possible defense of our own country.”104
The day after the NEC meeting Warner went on the radio to broadcast section one of his
report.105 Many major newspapers, including the New York Times and Chicago Sun Tribune,
carried detailed articles on the Legion Resolutions.106 In the media, three points were
emphasized: 1) all practical aid should be delivered to Great Britain and her allies in the fight for
freedom, consistent with the building of the National Defense of America; 2) the American
people were urged to support the President and all of the government officials in its “all-out”
effort for National Defense; 3) all bottlenecks in production and delivery of munitions and
supplies to Great Britain and her allies cannot be tolerated and must be eliminated as once.107
The resolutions of the Legion’s Mission did not fundamentally transform public opinion.
It would be an exaggeration to say it tipped the scales on aid to Britain or the convoy issue.
However, after being divided on those issues, the Mission Report galvanized Legionnaires who
were now solidly in favor of aid and convoys. The Legion’s unified support of the President
came at a time when public and Congressional debates were most contentious. In the future that
support would pay dividends.
At the beginning of April, the NEC tasked Henry Dudley with studying the findings of
the Legion’s mission to England. Dudley was born in Helena, Montana, but grew up in Fargo,
ND and El Paso, TX. In Feb 1912, his family moved to Omaha, NE, where he made his home
since. In June 1917, he has enlisted in 6th Nebraska Infantry. In 1919 he was discharged after
102
The convoy issue was one of the most heated aspects of the Lend Lease Debates. Senator Burton Wheeler of
Montana, one of the staunchest isolationists in Congress, declared “everyone recognizes the fact that convoys mean
war.” William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940-1941 (New York: 1953), 367. For the
convoy issue see Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent, 111-119; T. R. Fehrenbach, F. D. R. ‘s Undeclared War, 19391941 (New York: David McKay Company Inc., 1967), 204-227.
103
“Warner Report, Section I,” March 14, 1941: 13. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
104
“Warner Report, Section I,” March 14, 1941: 14. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
105
Warner Radio Broadcast, Blue Network, NBC, 6:45-7:00pm CST, March 16, 1941. Mission to England, Letters
Approving, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
106
“All Aid to Britain Backed by Legion,” New York Times (March 16, 1941); ‘Legion Demands “Delivery” of All
Aid to England,’ Chicago Sun Tribune (March 16, 1941).
107
“Special Committee of Resolutions Report,” March 15, 1941. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7003.
44
serving as a 1st Lieutenant of the Chemical Warfare Service in France and Germany. He was
recalled into Active service in December 1940, but relieved of duty in February because of
physical disability.108 In his new position, Dudley produced a new civilian defense handbook
and a series of specialized pamphlets on Air Craft Warning Services and other jobs within
civilian defense. He incorporated the many pamphlets, bulletins and detailed documentary
information on air raid precautions, home guard and general civilian defense precautions and the
British Legion the Legion had collected while in England with the second and third sections of
the Warner Report.109 The American Legion Headquarters believed the positive reception the
manual received justified the Mission.110 When the Legion began its civilian defense work in
earnest in the summer of 1941, the work done by Dudley formed the basis for many of its
programs and activities. As noted earlier these pamphlets and the handbook came at a time when
quality information on civilian defense was exceedingly scarce. The government would not
begin to produce adequate information on civilian defense that was accessible to state and local
defense councils until nearly a year into the war. Dudley’s work and the material from the
Mission were the most important things that gave the American Legion influence and authority
in civilian defense.
108
National Publicity Division, “Defense Division Press Release,” July 1, 1941. National Defense Division,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
109
“Warner Report, Section I,” March 14, 1941: 13. Mission to England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003;
Letter, H. L. Chaillaux (Director, National Americanism Committee) to Milo Warner, January 23, 1941. Mission to
England, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
110
Letter, Frank Samuel to Voting Members of the NEC, June 18, 1941: 5. National Defense Division, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003. On Legion pamphlets see also Dupuy and Carter, Civilian Defense of the United
States, 25-26, 40, 101, 103.
45
CHAPTER THREE
THE AMERICAN LEGION AND THE EARLY OCD
This chapter analyzes the contentious relationship that developed between the American Legion
and the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) in 1941. In the weeks following the American
Legion’s Mission to England, the National Headquarters in Indianapolis sought to extend its
influence into the burgeoning field of civilian defense. National Commander Milo Warner and
his colleagues envisioned a close collaboration with the War Department, where the American
Legion would have official status as the organizers and leaders within a civilian defense program
trained and led by the U. S. Army that would instill military discipline.1 Instead, Franklin
Roosevelt appointed civilians to lead the program he established. In this and many other matters
involving civilian defense the Legion would be disappointed. Civilian defense was the American
Legion’s largest program of the war and the one where it had the most influence. However, the
combination of Rooseveltian politics and the fortunes of war ultimately thwarted the Legion’s
attempts to achieve the grand status it desired.
3.1 Clamor for Civilian Defense
The origins of the American Legion’s interest in civilian defense were discussed in the
previous chapter. The Legion’s platform for national defense and its close ties to the military
had led to an early collaboration with the U. S. Army in Air Raid Warning during military
maneuvers. When war had seemingly become inevitable in the summer of 1939, others began to
contemplate civilian defense measures in the event of attack. As with all defense and military
preparations, Roosevelt was slow to move without public opinion supporting him. So the initial
civilian defense programs were established at the state and local levels, usually coinciding with
key German victories in Europe. The German invasion of Poland in September 1939 convinced
the Governor of New Jersey, A. Harry Moore, to appoint an emergency defense committee that
1
“Extract of Minutes of Department Executive Committee Meeting,” St. Louis, MO, January 11, 1942. Office of
Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
46
would coordinate civilian defense plans with the military.2 In May 1940, as the Wehrmacht
overran Belgium and northern France, State Defense Councils were organized in Tennessee and
Virginia. Similar councils were created in Arizona, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Louisiana,
and Maine after the French surrendered at Compiègne in June. The Battle of Britain had
convinced most other states and more than 1,000 communities to organize defense councils by
April 1941.3 Because of the absence of a federal agency to coordinate the programs, civilian
defense in the United States was a hodgepodge of uncoordinated local programs distributed
unevenly across the country.
Throughout the first eighteen months of the war, several states had expressed the need for
united action on civilian defense. On January 31st, the United States Conference of Mayors sent
a report to the President that reflected a growing demand for the creation of a centralized federal
agency for dealing with defense problems. The Conference of Mayors desired a federal civilian
defense board with regional offices and local boards that could provide guidelines for civilian
defense based on recommendations from the War and Navy Departments. The report claimed to
be based on careful study and drew upon the experience of the British civilian defense program.
Civilian defense, the mayors argued, “is not a dilettantes job, and it cannot be left to purely local
committees.” They also emphasized the cost of equipment, which especially for local councils,
was prohibitive.4 Other organizations, like the International Association of Fire Fighters, made
similar demands.5
The realities of civilian defense planning also necessitated action. To make an effective
blackout of New York City, it would take manually operating 28,000 switches. It would also
cost $43,000 to equip each permanent fire engine company to fight fires, including those caused
by incendiary bombs, during the war.6 In Alaska, the U.S. continental territory closest to Japan,
defense programs were only just starting. Air bases there would not be ready for another nine
months, though they rushed construction and worked through winter, when construction costs
2
Office of Civilian Defense, “Civilian Defense Review,” (February, 1944), p. 1. RG 287: Publications of the
Federal Government, Beginning Pr 32.4401-Pr 32.4402, Box Pr 272. NARA II.
3
Office of Civilian Defense, “Civilian Defense Review,” (February, 1944), p. 1. RG 287: Publications of the
Federal Government, Beginning Pr 32.4401-Pr 32.4402, Box Pr 272. NARA II.
4
Charles Hurd, “Mayors Call for Civilian Defense Plan, Telling President of Air Raid Needs,” New York Times
(February 2, 1941): p. 1.
5
Office of Civilian Defense, “Civilian Defense Review,” (February, 1944), p. 2. RG 287: Publications of the
Federal Government, Beginning Pr 32.4401-Pr 32.4402, Box Pr 272. NARA II.
6
Article, “Civilian Defense Plans,” Messenger Fort Dodge, Iowa, June 24, 1941. Office of Civilian Defense,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
47
were much higher.7 Studies of British civilian defense planning revealed that preparations there
began in 1935 and in 1940 were still incomplete. The time required to enact plans, create and
distribute necessary civil defense materials, and to train civilian volunteers would be one of the
resources in shortest supply for American civilian defense planners.
Though the President did not immediately respond to the Conference of Mayors report, it
had come to the President at a time when he was already considering such an agency. During the
First World War, Woodrow Wilson had created a federal agency to coordinate civilian defense,
the Field Division of the Council of National Defense. However, this came only in October
1918, as the war was about to end. It was disbanded as soon as the armistice was signed. The
lack of federal direction or guidance had led to uneven civilian defense planning and coverage
that was generally regarded as inadequate for the circumstances of the 1940s.8 Coordinated
federal funding, organization, and supplies were needed if the country was to have an effective
civil defense network.
Roosevelt did not expect a direct attack on the United States, but he had used rhetorical
imagery of German bombers launching from the airfields of Great Britain to strike the eastern
seaboard to justify his proposals to the public for increased involvement in the war.9
Anticipating the ‘domino theory’ of the Cold War, Roosevelt fed the public imagination with
scenarios of invasion and threats to national security should the German’s win their war in
Europe. The President had to therefore back up such justifications with policies that would help
America defend itself, even if the threat was imagined. Civilian defense was a clever way to
build up defenses with relatively little political cost to Roosevelt. Civilian volunteers would feel
they were participating in the war effort (a good way to gain their support in that arena), and
Roosevelt did not have to do more than authorize the creation of an agency and appoint someone
generally agreeable to lead it.
7
Letter, Roland H. Stock (Department of Alaska, NEC) to Milo Warner, February 5, 1941. Mission to England,
Letters Approving, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
8
A Council for National Defense oversaw civilian defense in August 1916, but it had done little work prior to the
declaration of war. Following the declaration of war, each state governor was asked to establish a state council of
defense. Over one million men and women volunteered for civilian defense. However, their activities differed
greatly, on the whole, from their counterparts in World War II. Instead of Air Raid Wardens and Aircraft Warning
System Observers, most “civilian defense workers” had liberty gardens, held scrap metal drives, or collected
materials for the soldiers. Neal Fitzsimons, “Brief History of American Civil Defense,” in Who Speaks for Civil
Defense? Edited by Eugene P. Wigner (New York: Charles Schribner’s Sons, 1968), 30-31.
9
“President's Call for Full Response on Defense: Sees New Crisis for America Quotes Words of Hitler,” New York
Times (December 30, 1940): p. 6.
48
Even so, establishing a civilian defense organization proved quite complicated.
Roosevelt said of the new agency: “That’s one of the most difficult things to put together in
administrative form that I have yet had because it covers so many different things in life.”10
Civilian defense would involve state and local governments; civilian volunteers that numbered in
the millions; local civilian organizations; the military for training and supplies; Congress; a
network of federal agencies with similar or overlapping sphere of influence; and a federal
civilian defense agency to oversee it all. There were many different groups to accommodate!
When Warner met with Roosevelt on January 17th, the President opened the conversation
with a discussion of a home defense commission. Roosevelt told Warner he was considering two
alternatives: 1) To make the commission part of the Federal Security Agency (FSA) under the
leadership of Paul McNutt, the former Legion National Commander or 2) to create an
organization led by McNutt, but independent of the FSA.11 In subsequent discussions with
Lowell Mellett, Warner found out that the President had tapped Mellett to oversee the
development of the home defense commission. William C. Bullitt, former ambassador to France,
and Wayne Coy, McNutt’s assistant in the FSA also worked on the home defense program from
February to May.12 Warner believed that the civilian defense organization would be a civilian
organization under the direction of the War Department. He even tried to establish some form of
liaison with the War Department in the weeks after the Mission so that the Legion would be in
the loop on civilian defense decisions.13 His belief, and the Legion’s belief, that civilian defense
was crucial to national security led them to overestimate the priority it would receive from the
President, a misconception the President did nothing to dispel in early 1941.
Roosevelt’s handling of the proposed home defense commission reflects the consensus
on Washington politics under his administration. William O’Neill describes Washington during
mobilization:
Everywhere in Washington there existed duplication and confusion, overlapping
grants of authority, and divided tasks. A host of agencies fought each other to
gain power, funds, and breathing space. Decisions were made on the basis of
10
Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, ed. Samuel I. Rosenman,
(New York: 1941), 44. Cited in Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 639.
11
Milo, “Warner Memo of Meeting with President,” January 17, 1941: p. 1. Mission to England, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
12
National Publicity Division, Press Release, March 1941. Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7003.
13
Letter, W. M. Bryden (Major General U. S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff), to John Thomas Taylor (National
Legislative Commission), May 28, 1941. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
49
immediate or local needs, rather than according to an overall design, or anything
resembling one. What planning did take place was short-term and specific.14
O’Neill does not castigate Roosevelt for his leadership style, arguing that it was born of his
personality. Roosevelt was, as James MacGregor Burns describes him, at once “bold or
cautious, informal or dignified, cruel or kind, intolerant or long-suffering, urbane or almost
rustic, impetuous or temporizing, Machiavellian or moralistic.”15 The conflicting dualities of his
personality made Roosevelt a hard fellow to nail down, but also helped make him agreeable to
most people. He based appointments to agencies on who was loyal to him and pliable, rather
than who was best fit to do the job well. Roosevelt regularly appointed people of opposing
political leanings to head up agencies that had duties that overlapped with other organizations
and competed with other organizations for resources.16 He once told Frances Perkins, “A little
rivalry is stimulating, you know. It keeps everybody going to prove he is a better fellow than the
next man. It keeps them honest, too.”17 O’Neill finds parallels between Roosevelt’s leadership
style and the chaotic competition that characterized the Third Reich under Adolf Hitler.18
However Hitler, who abhorred the heavy workload of incessant meetings and policy making
decisions, only meddled in sectors of government when the mood struck him, leaving the day to
day operations of the government to ministers and party leaders.19 Roosevelt, despite media
criticism of his “frequent” holidays, held the reigns of government power far tighter than Hitler.
Eliot Janeway quips “What Roosevelt delegated…was always responsibility and never
authority.”20 “Sitting in the middle of his spider’s web,” O’Neill says, “Roosevelt knew all,
controlled all, and gave away nothing.”21 In this context, Roosevelt’s handling of home defense
14
O’Neill, A Democracy at War, 98.
James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom, 1940-1945 (New York: 1970), 9.
16
O’Neill, A Democracy at War, 78.
17
Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom, 342.
18
O’Neill, A Democracy at War, 99-100.
19
For discussion of Hitler’s leadership style, see Jackson J. Spielvogel, Hitler and Nazi Germany: A History. Fourth
Edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001), 82-90; Martin Broszat, The Hitler State: The Foundations
and Development of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich (New York, 1981); Jane Caplan, Government Without
Administration: State and Civil Service in Weimar and Nazi Germany (Oxford: 1988); Ian Kershaw, Hitler: Hubris
(London and New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991); Volumes II and IV of Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham,
eds. Nazism, 1919-1945, 4 volumes (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1998).
20
Eliot Janeway, The Struggle for Survival: A Chronicle of Economic Mobilization in World War II (New Haven,
1951), 7.
21
O’Neill, A Democracy at War, 82. Despite his criticism of Roosevelt, O’Neill argues that given the complex and
chaotic political atmosphere of the American democracy at the time, Roosevelt managed the biggest problems of
15
50
mobilization makes sense. The president delegated the busy work of organizing the agency to a
trusted official, Mellett, while retaining the power to make important decisions himself. The
result of that setup was an organization that had all the appearances of achieving something most
Americans supported, while limiting personal culpability and being banal enough to discourage
hostility.
3.2 Establishment of the OCD
On May 20, 1941 Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8757, creating the Office of Civilian
Defense (OCD). Rather than establishing it under McNutt and the FSA, as was widely expected,
or under the War Department as the Legion hoped, Roosevelt placed the OCD under the Office
of Emergency Management. Much to the dismay of the American Legion, the Director of the
OCD was not a military official or a civilian from the War Department. Roosevelt chose Fiorello
LaGuardia, Mayor of New York City, to head the OCD. The choice of LaGuardia was
immediately controversial. He had no expertise in civilian defense and his other duties were,
according to Harold Ickes, bound to obstruct him from devoting himself fully to the civilian
defense task. LaGuardia was already mayor of America’s largest city and chairman of the U.S. –
Canadian Joint Defense Board. To make matters worse, he was also up for re-election in the
autumn and would have to devote much of his time to his campaign.
The President picked LaGuardia because he genuinely liked the feisty, energetic Mayor.
Although he was a Republican, LaGuardia had favored Roosevelt and the New Deal throughout
the 1930s.22 The New Deal brought federal funds into New York City, aiding LaGuardia’s
agenda there; his support of the New Deal brought Roosevelt important electoral votes in his
home state and the impression of bi-partisanship. LaGuardia did not particularly want the OCD
directorship. He had been pressuring the President for an important war assignment, especially
one that came with a cabinet position. There was heavy opposition from several key
administration officials and some Republicans to the Mayor becoming Secretary of War or head
of the defense mobilization.23 The OCD seemed a good fit for LaGuardia. In May of 1941, most
mobilization as quickly as he could. Despite all that went wrong, the actions required to get America in a position to
successfully fight the war were taken, if maddeningly slow.
22
LaGuardia had switched parties several times in his political career, often putting him at odds with the Republican
Party leadership. But during the war years, he was a Republican.
23
Joseph P. Lash, Eleanor and Franklin: The Story of Their Relationship, Based on Eleanor Roosevelt’s Private
Papers (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1971), 640.
51
Americans did not take civilian defense seriously, so the likelihood of opposition to the
appointment was rather low. More importantly, LaGuardia had presided over the Conference of
Mayors in January. His appointment would smooth relations with the cities and towns where
civilian defense would largely be implemented. Also, as a Legionnaire, LaGuardia would likely
appease the American Legion, whose recommendations for the leader of civilian defense were
not followed. Two of the most influential organizations calling for civilian defense were thus to
be placated.
LaGuardia took office on June 1st. Almost immediately he began to court the American
Legion, attempting to mollify Warner and the Legion Leadership that were displeased that all of
their recommendations had been discarded.24 LaGuardia was well aware that the support of the
American Legion would go far in making the OCD acceptable to the American public, while
Legion opposition to his administration could be devastating. One of his first acts as Director
was to set up a meeting to confer with Warner. On June 5th, Joe Walker, Edward McGrail,
Henry Dudley, John Thomas Taylor and Warner met with LaGuardia at New York’s City Hall.
LaGuardia did enough in the meeting to win the Legion’s tacit, if unenthusiastic support.
Warner described the meeting as “exceedingly cordial” and was impressed by the great deal of
knowledge on the Legion’s civil defense activities demonstrated by LaGuardia. The meeting
established three important elements of the Legion-OCD relationship: 1) LaGuardia suggested
the Legion take the leading role in air raid precaution because of their experience in that area.
This was an area that the Legion desperately wanted to dominate and so they were satisfied.
2) As before, when he tried to establish a liaison within the War Department, Warner suggested
that a Legionnaire ought to be appointed to as a full time liaison to the OCD. LaGuardia agreed,
giving the Legion the access to the inner workings of the OCD it so desired. It also gave
LaGuardia (and later OCD Directors) a defense against those who argued that the Legion ought
to have a bigger role in civilian defense. 3) The Legion agreed to provide the OCD with all of its
printed material on civilian defense, which became the basis for much of the OCD’s future
24
Warner, having received word that a federal civilian defense council was eminent, sent a letter to the President
laying out the capabilities of the Legion in civilian defense, particularly for the Aircraft Warning Service and the
recruitment of observers. Warner also had urged Roosevelt to appoint Legionnaires to the home defense council.
The President responded with a positive, but non-committal reply on May 19th. Letter, Milo Warner to Franklin
Roosevelt, May 5, 1941. Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003; Letter, Franklin
Roosevelt to Milo Warner, May 19, 1941. Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
52
publications.25 LaGuardia also informed them that all those who volunteered would be required
to work through the official set up and not be controlled or governed by their organizational
people.26 LaGuardia emphasized this last point several times during the meeting and it was
important for the relationship. The meeting, which Warner regarded as “highly satisfactory,”
was an important early victory for LaGuardia.27
LaGuardia was aided to some degree in efforts to stir up support for civil defense by the
developments in Europe. On June 22nd, the Wehrmacht invaded the Soviet Union, sweeping
aside the poorly led Soviet troops by the millions. The seemingly unstoppable Nazi onslaught
convinced several governors and state defense councils to take definitive steps toward
establishing county and local defense committees. In Iowa, for example, Governor George
Wilson sent a recruiting letter to local leaders across the state in August, asking them to accept
appointment to local defense councils. While some declined, most thought it their patriotic duty,
and their responses showed a mixture of fear, patriotism, and willingness to serve, even among
those who opposed the President.28 The growth of local and state interest in organizing civilian
defense made LaGuardia’s task easier.
The OCD was not intended to supplant or control the state and local Defense Councils.
Its main tasks were to establish uniform training, supply the necessary equipment, maintain the
morale of forces, and advise state and local defense councils.29 Decision-making on the
organization and planning of civilian defense remained decentralized and in the hands of the
state and local governments. The main office of the OCD was in Washington DC and it had nine
regional branches that corresponded to the nine domestic military zones of the U. S. Army. Each
branch had a Regional Director. Franklin D’Olier, a former National Commander and member of
the Mission to England and Raymond Kelly, also a former National Commander of the Legion,
were appointed Regional Directors for Region II and Region VI, respectively.
25
Letter, Milo Warner to John Thomas Taylor (also sent to Dudley, Glascoff and Larry Gardiner), June 5, 1941.
Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
26
“Memorandum of Conference with Mayor La Guardia,” June 5, 1941. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 91-7005.
27
Letter, Milo Warner to John Thomas Taylor (also sent to Dudley, Glascoff and Larry Gardiner), June 5, 1941.
Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
28
Lisa L. Ossian, The Home Fronts of Iowa, 1939-1945 (Columbia and New York: University of Missouri, 2009),
14-15.
29
Fiorello LaGuardia, “It’s Everybody’s Job,” undated (060541?). Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7005.
53
Nor was the OCD intended to replace the military defense forces. National defense was
divided into two domains: active and passive defenses. Active defenses consisted of anti-aircraft
batteries, pursuit planes, anti-submarine mines, defensive fortifications and other military forces
of that sort. The purpose of active defense was to meet enemy attacks directly and to prevent
bombs from falling and enemies from landing. Those duties were the province of the War
Department and Navy Department. Civilian defense organizations controlled passive defenses.
Passive defenses were not militias, established with the intent to fight the enemy; rather, they
were defensive forces organized to respond to the damage the enemy inflicted during an attack.
Their main tasks were to handle casualties, put out fires and gas attacks, and to maintain order in
civilian areas to prevent chaos.
Like the American Legion, the OCD sent a mission to England to study civilian defenses
there. From July 12th to August 17th, a mission of civilian defense experts consisting of two
police officers, two city engineers, a health commissioner and an expert on housing and building,
toured Great Britain. This mission was not meant to sway public opinion on intervention, so the
press did not give it much coverage. Each member submitted a report in their area of expertise
and prepared a detailed technical pamphlet. Many of the mission’s recommendations merely
confirmed practices already in operation or under consideration. The mission approved of the
OCD’s organizational set-up of Regional Directors. It recommended that necessary civilian
defense personnel, including fire and police services, be exempted from military service.30
3.3 Controversial Appointment
The OCD’s first year was its most controversial, largely because of the Volunteer
Participation Committee (VPC). The VPC was composed of twenty people (later amended to
45), appointed by the President.31 It was established to encourage and coordinate the volunteer
civilians, who would do most of the work in civilian defense. When LaGuardia met with
Warner, he warned that if they wanted to make recommendations for the appointments, the
American Legion would need to move within the week. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt had taken
a keen interest in the VPC and had the ear of the President. LaGuardia expected there would be
30
“American Civil Defense Mission Report,” August 28, 1941. National Defense Division, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 91-7003.
31
Executive Order No. 8799. “Enlarging the Volunteer Participation Committee of the OCD,” June 20, 1941.
Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, 91-7005.
54
many women appointed to the VPC.32 His warning was justified. Of the 45 people named to the
Volunteer Participation Committee only one was a legionnaire; thirteen women and several
people with clear connections to labor organizations (which were frequently at odds with the
Legion) were listed.33
The First Lady’s “interference” (as the Legion saw it) on the VPC was the beginning of a
series of unpopular moves in her controversial interaction with civilian defense. Throughout her
time in the capitol, Eleanor had devoted herself to aiding her husband’s work, particularly on the
New Deal. But she craved a career of her own.34 She had done extensive work for rescue
agencies in the first two years of the war, but volunteer work did not satisfy her need for a job in
the war effort. Like the Legionnaires, Eleanor drew inspiration from Great Britain. Lady Stella
Reading, the founder and chairwoman of the Women’s Voluntary Services, was using her
organization to mobilize women for civil defense and to advocate for social justice in the war
effort.35 Eleanor intently followed Lady Reading’s programs and hoped they could be replicated
in the United States.
Eleanor’s interest in the OCD was not one-sided. LaGuardia, when informed of the First
Lady’s interest in his agency in June, encourage her to join him. He believed she would bring
prestige and positive publicity to the OCD, as well as access to the Presidents ear.36 The
President believed LaGuardia and his wife would work well together. They had collaborated
successfully to avert A. Philip Randolph from leading Black workers to march on Washington in
1940. Despite her interest, Eleanor declined, fearing that her celebrity would cause more harm
for civilian defense than benefits. She continued to work with OCD behind the scenes where she
was removed from criticism and effective as a facilitator. However, deficiencies in the OCD’s
volunteer program forced her to reconsider. Though the President had considered the social and
community aspects of civilian defense to be a part of the OCD’s mandate, LaGuardia was
32
Letter, Milo Warner to John Thomas Taylor (also sent to Dudley, Glascoff and Larry Gardiner), June 5, 1941.
Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
33
Letter, Edward McGrail (National Publicity Officer) to Milo Warner, July 22, 1941. Civilian Defense, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005; “Civilians Named Defense Planners” New York Times, July 20, 1941. LaGuardia
also apparently promised Warner he would be on the VPC. He mentioned in an undated article titled, “Its
Everybody’s Job,” undated: p. 6. Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
34
Maurine H. Beasley, Eleanor Roosevelt and the Media: A Public Quest for Self-Fulfillment (Urbana and Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1987), 68-81; Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 635.
35
Eleanor and Lady Stella Reading became acquainted during the First World War when Lord Reading served as
the British Ambassador to the United States and Franklin Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy. They
remained friends throughout the interwar period and in World War II were regular correspondents.
36
Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 640.
55
entirely focused on the protective services within civilian defense. He referred to the nonprotective activities as “sissy stuff” and derided the community programs as “community singing
and basket weaving.”37 Eleanor said of the Mayor, “[he] was more interested in whether there
were good fire engines, but he was not interested in other sides of OCD morale building.”38
Eleanor was also openly critical of his disinterest in the roles women and children could play.
LaGuardia took her rebukes in stride, declaring to the President that he was going to
“draft America’s Number 1 volunteer” for the OCD.39 Eleanor fretted later that night, writing to
Joseph Lash, “I’m worried about the civilian defense job, because I don’t want to do it but if the
Mayor asks me I’ll have to try.”40 Roosevelt was aware of Eleanor’s desires to help in national
defense, but also, according to Anne Rosenberg, wanted to “channel [Eleanor’s] energies into
one area so that she would leave him alone in other areas.”41 In September 1941, Franklin
Roosevelt reorganized the OCD into two branches, the Protective Services Division and
Voluntary Participation Division, with the former led by Director LaGuardia and the latter
controlled by Eleanor, the new Assistant Director.
This was Eleanor’s first and last attempt to hold a government position as First Lady. On
her first day, some of the journalists made headlines by reporting she had arrived ten minutes
late. Despite the reports of other journalists, like Ruby Black of the United Press, that she was on
time, the impression of the First Lady as a “dabbling do-gooder” stuck.42 All of her reasons for
turning LaGuardia down in June were quickly proven to be correct. Eleanor was a lightning rod
for criticism during her time in the OCD.
Much of the criticism can be drawn back to Eleanor’s determination to use the OCD as a
means to continue the New Deal. She, like many other liberals and supporters of the New Deal,
was distressed about the composition of the new agencies charged with mobilizing the country.
Businessmen, overwhelmingly conservative in their outlook, dominated the agencies. There was
a tremendous fear in 1940 and 1941 that the opponents of the New Deal would use the war crisis
as a means to roll back the progress made in the New Deal programs and reinstate the
37
Thomas J. Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S.: Bandaid for a Holocaust? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 15-19.
Tamara K. Hareven, Eleanor Roosevelt: An American Conscience (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), 176.
39
Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 642.
40
Letter, Eleanor Roosevelt to Jospeh P. Lash, September 3, 1941. Quoted in Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 642.
41
Anne Rosenberg Interview with Joseph P. Lash. Quoted in Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 642.
42
Beasley, Eleanor Roosevelt and the Media, 141. The New York Times reported that it was LaGuardia, not Mrs.
Roosevelt that was late. This did nothing to help the image of the OCD as an amateurish operation. See “OCD Job
Assumed By Mrs. Roosevelt,” New York Times (September 30, 1941): p. 28.
38
56
conservative status quo of the past. Her vision of the Volunteer Participation Division was one
that continued to improve the wellbeing and happiness of American society and was inclusive of
women, children and minority ethnic groups. “Real defense,” she believed, “is making, day by
day, a way of life which we would gladly do all we can to preserve.”43 To her, exercise, healthy
diets, and community service were all integral parts of national defense. For many Americans,
including most Legionnaires, her broad definition of defense went beyond the needs of the
country. More importantly, who she brought in angered critics. Sarcastic editorials lampooned
the staffing of the new participation division. When the famous rowing champion John B. Kelly
Sr. was named director of National Physical Fitness, one reporter referred to him as the “director
of the ‘Bulgin biceps and deep breathing’ in national defense.”44 Eleanor hired tennis champion
Alice Marble and Jack Dempsey for physical education. Her staffing of the participation
division with celebrity athletes and community organizers, particularly the female ones, resulted
in endless bad press. Critics argued that nurses and bandage makers were needed for civilian
defense, not exercise instructors and movie stars. New Deal policies for national happiness were
fine for debates during peaceful times, but in a national war crisis, they did not belong. The
American Legion, especially at the local level, became one of the First Lady vocal critics on
those grounds during her time in the OCD.45
In the last months of 1941, the Legion found itself in a difficult position. It had fulfilled
its agenda to create a powerful position for itself within the civil defense organizations. This was
to be their greatest role in the war, one that no other veteran group and no other civilian group
could duplicate. But it was playing that role within an organization it opposed. It was quickly
apparent to most observers that LaGuardia was not up to the job appointed him. As Ickes had
warned, LaGuardia’s mayoral duties and reelection campaign took up most of his time. He was
frequently out of Washington and late to meetings. Washington insiders speculated that
43
Pan-American Coffee Hour, September 28, 1941. Eleanor Roosevelt: Recorded Speeches and Interviews, 19331962, FDRL.
44
Lee Carson, “Fiorello Away, So Ladies Move in- for U. S. Defense,” Chicago Daily Times (September 20, 1941.
Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
45
Martin V. Coffey, the Department Vice-Commander for Ohio, joked with Milt Campbell, “if you so much as
come near this damn plant of mine with any program of physical exercise, I will lead you right out into the factory,
turn you loose and then I will run like hell!” Coffey to Campbell 011542. Microfilm 92-7019: Scrap Metal. ALA.
Ray Murphy, Director of the American Legion Citizens Defense Corps Training Program, clearly refers to the First
Lady’s program when defending the Office of Civilian Defense before the NEC, claiming it had “been laboring
under many handicaps, some of which fortunately have recently been removed.” See Ray Murphy, “Report on
American Legion Citizens Defense Corps Training Program,” Digest of Minutes, National Executive Committee
Meeting, Indianapolis, IN (April 30 - May 1, 1942): 80. ALA.
57
LaGuardia was going to be replaced and the OCD would be divided into two sections with
McNutt heading Home Defense and Col. William Donovan heading Civilian Morale. This
would leave LaGuardia free and unfettered to seek reelection in New York City and carry on as a
member of the Canadian American Defense Board. The American Legion headquarters had long
considered McNutt a natural choice to head OCD. He had a good relationship with Warner and
had supported the Legion’s Mission to Great Britain.46 Their hopes were dashed when McNutt
responded to the rumors telling reporters that President Roosevelt had said nothing of such a
plan.47
To the Legionnaires, who saw civilian defense as critical to national security, these were
crucial failings. The OCD was decentralized, with all the real power residing in the state and
local defense councils, which the Legion believed would be inefficient and inadequate. The
ability to prepare for and react to invasion required strong, centralized leadership. But the
Legion could not publicly advocate for a new organization when it was so deeply involved with
the old one. To do so invited criticism of the Legion as duplicitous, and more importantly, if
such advocacy failed, the Legion would have alienated the civilian defense administration and
lost its high position. As bad as the current federal leadership was in the eyes of the Legions,
they had a legionnaire in charge, legionnaires in powerful positions, a high level of input in the
training and publications of the OCD and a dominant position in the Aircraft Warning Service.
It was a lot to risk on a position that they were not sure (probably correctly) the President would
support. After meeting with LaGuardia and Roosevelt in June, Warner was convinced that the
set up of the OCD would not change.48 So rather than openly undermine the OCD, the
American Legion sought to make the best of the situation.
In July the American Legion set up a Division of Defense at the National Headquarters.49
Henry Dudley became Director of the Division. The Division of Defense had three tasks
initially. The Division’s first task was to provide a volunteer personnel force for the Aircraft
Warning Service (AWS), which functioned under the Army Air Corps. To man posts around the
46
Letter, Paul V. McNutt to Milo Warner, January 25, 1941. Mission to England, Letters Approving, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
47
Daniel M. Kidney, “Hint M’Nutt For Civilian Defense, LaGuardia ‘Flop’” Indianapolis Times (September 2,
1941): p. 2. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
48
Letter, Frank Samuel to Voting Members of the NEC, June 18, 1941: p. 4. National Defense Division, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
49
Letter, Frank Samuel to Voting Members of the NEC, July 18, 1941. National Defense Division, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
58
clock across the country more than one million observers were needed. In seven states, the entire
preparation of the AWS had been turned over to the Department organizations of the Legion. In
other states, the state defense councils and Legion were cooperating closely. The Legion
Headquarters predicted the Departments would exclusively handle AWS in fifteen to twenty
states.50 The second task of the Division was to distribute civil defense materials. Dudley
correctly believed that the inefficient federal setup would delay production and distribution of
necessary materials to the state and local defense councils. The pamphlets that he had created
from the Mission materials were sent to civil defense forces and Legion posts around the
country, providing useful information at a time when federal resources were desperately lacking.
The final task was to develop air raid response precautions, such as auxiliary fire and police
forces and first aid.51 These would evolve from the Legion’s Disaster Relief Program, through
which Legionnaires had been working as first responders in American communities for over a
decade.52
Dudley’s work with the Division of Defense was short lived. In August LaGuardia asked
Warner to transfer Dudley to the OCD to serve as Director of the new Veterans Division.
Dudley was hesitant to take the job. He had already turned down Dwight Griswold, the
Governor of Nebraska, who wanted Dudley to work in civilian defense for him. Dudley
preferred then to work for the Legion, despite Griswold’s offer of better job security.53 He
accepted the OCD job, he later said, against his own judgment, because Warner though it
essential that the Legion have a contact within the OCD.54 He was worried about job security in
the OCD and was allowed to keep his position as nominal director of the Division of Defense.55
50
Letter, Frank Samuel to Voting Members of the NEC, June 18, 1941: p. 5. National Defense Division, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
51
Roger Lotchin shows that in San Francisco and Los Angeles veteran organizations played a key role in
supplementing police forces by participating in large numbers in the auxiliary police forces. While they were
mostly utilized in directing traffic in congested areas and as security for public events, some units were also used in
crime prevention work. Roger W. Lotchin, The Bad City in the Good War: San Francisco, Los Angeles, Oakland,
and San Diego (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003), 203-04. Laura McEnaney shows that in the post
war, the Legion’s ambition to run the auxiliary police continued. Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home:
Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 95-96.
52
Letter, Frank Samuel to Voting Members of the NEC, June 18, 1941: p. 4. National Defense Division, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
53
Letter, Donald Glascoff to Milo Warner, May 29, 1941. National Defense Division, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7003.
54
Henry Dudley, “Address to Department Commanders and Adjutants Conference,” Digest of Minutes Department
Commanders and Adjutants Conference, November 3, 1941: p. 6. ALA.
55
Letter, Donald A. Glascoff (Assistant National Adjutant) to Milo Warner, August 15, 1941. National Defense
Division, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
59
Dudley’s service in the OCD gave the Legion valuable information on the inner workings of the
Washington DC offices on Dupont Circle. When it came under criticism, the OCD would use
his employment as proof that it had the Legion’s support.
3.4 The Role of the American Legion in the OCD
One of the biggest concerns of Legionnaires regarding the OCD was the role they would
play within it. In April 1941, Assistant National Adjutant Donald Glascoff wrote, “We do not
believe the best Legion reaction can be secured as a result of any program which could mean the
effort on the part of our national headquarters to have the Legion membership lose their identity
as such and be merged into any general local defense pool.” 56 The American Legion had
expended tremendous resources on civilian defense at every level. There were many who
believed their work would be in vain if Legionnaires became faceless individuals within civilian
defense organizations. Much of the hostility toward the OCD within the Legion was rooted in
those concerns. In his meeting with Warner in June, LaGuardia had emphasized, “that
organizations as such would receive no special recognition.”57 The official policy of the OCD
was established in July in an Administrative Circular that declared, “It is not the policy of the
National Organization…to assign specific tasks to any organization. Better procedure and more
effective effort lies in the utilization of the services of the membership of these organizations in
their State and local subdivisions where planning and operation of such plans merge under the
direction of their defense agencies.”58
In September, the American Legion National Convention in Milwaukee elected Lynn
Stambaugh to succeed Warner as National Commander. Stambaugh’s first action was to meet
with LaGuardia to determine the nature of the relationship between the OCD and the Legion.
They agreed upon a compromise policy where Legionnaires could be utilized in two ways: 1)
state defense councils could assign specific duties to the Legion Departments and Posts as an
organization to be carried out under the general overseership and direction of state and local
defense councils with complete understanding that Legion organization when used as a group
56
Donald Glascoff “Things to Consider with Frank Bane,” undated. Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
57
Letter, Milo Warner to John Thomas Taylor (also sent to Dudley, Glascoff and Larry Gardiner), June 5, 1941: p.
3. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
58
OCD Administrative Order No. 2 “Policies Under Which the Office of Civilian Defense and the Offices in its
Designated Areas Will Function,” July 10, 1941. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
60
become a component part of the state and local defense councils; 2) Legionnaires could serve
individually to become active and influential elements in state and local defense councils.59 The
Legion was still not given a specific task as a national organization, but Legionnaires were
mollified by the ability to work within their posts and departments.
The weakness of the compromise, that many state and local defense councils might chose
to deny posts and departments of the Legion to work as units, was addressed by LaGuardia in a
letter he sent to the State Governors on November 14th:
In civilian protection work there is an opportunity to utilize to great advantage the
experience gained in the last World War by ex-service men throughout the
country. Many of these men having been under fire would, in the event of an
emergency, prove most useful in leadership, as well as to great advantage in
instructions. I have no doubt that many of these ex-service men are already used
by you in the organization of these protective services. It is my belief that their
increasing use would tend to develop their full leadership and if they should be
chosen, first for instructions, and the utilized by the states and localities, you
would be able to get the maximum benefit from them. All of the veterans’
organizations have tendered their services to me, which I now in turn urge you to
use. While I would not restrict their services just to protective branches, I would
certainly see to it that they are given a particular mission to do on this very
essential and important branch of civilian defense. (emphasis mine) For the
immediate utilization of the services as air-raid wardens and aircraft warning
service they may be called upon to take the lead and may be asked to urge
younger men exempt from military service to join them. This will encourage men
of non-military training to join in the effort.60
LaGuardia’s letter to the governors was meant to satisfy the Legionnaires, but it revealed one of
the greatest weaknesses of the OCD. LaGuardia lacked the ability to make mandates. Like so
many of Roosevelt’s government agencies, the OCD could make recommendations, but without
the power to determine policies, it was impotent. In the end, LaGuardia had nothing with which
he could coerce the governors. Eleanor touched on this difficulty in one of the news conferences
she held regularly at her OCD office on Dupont Circle: “Under the executive order and under the
whole setup of our country, we have states and localities with a certain amount of jurisdiction
which they jealously control.” Illustrating her point, she went on to say, “The mayor could say,
59
“Policy Statement Governing the Relationship of the American Legion Departments and Posts to State and Local
Defense Councils,” (Fall 1941). Council of Defense State and Local, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
60
Letter, Fiorella LaGuardia to State Governors, November 14, 1941. Council of Defense State and Local,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
61
‘I think it would be a wise thing for you to do,” but that doesn’t mean that one night it will
happen. I think in a little while it probably will happen.”61
As November gave way to December in 1941, the military situation for the United States
was incredibly tense. The U-Boat attacks on the USS Kearny and USS Reuben James in October
highlighted the virtual state of war that existed in the Atlantic between the United States and
Nazi Germany. In the Pacific, the discussions between the Roosevelt administration and
Japanese Embassy had reached an impasse. The hawkish Japanese cabinet, led by Lieutenant
General Hideki Tojo had set a November 25 deadline for the American government to make
concessions in the negotiations. The deadline was known to the War Department and Roosevelt
administration because the Japanese diplomatic codes had been broken. They had also received
word of the Japanese plans of attack from Joseph C. Grew, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan. News
reports from both sides of the Pacific illustrated wide spread pessimism about the peace talks.
Senator Claude Pepper (D-FL) had warned on November 24th “we are only waiting for Japan to
cross a line before we start shooting.”62
Up to this point, when war was still only a possibility, most Americans viewed civilian
defense as a sideshow. Though reporters and critics of the administration made sport of
LaGuardia’s excited bluster and the first lady’s well-intentioned missteps, there were usually
bigger targets available. Civilian defense was hardly front page news and for most Americans,
just another new agency amongst the myriad already littering the federal landscape. Germany
and Japan, while dangerous, were nevertheless still obstructed by the vast expanse of oceans and
already at war with other countries. Fear of attack on mainland America was, despite the best
efforts of groups like the American Legion, still viewed as an unlikely scenario. Had American
neutrality ended with another “Reuben James” or Japanese attack on British Malaysia, the advent
of war may have been relatively un-traumatic for the United States. The manner in which
American neutrality was violated was pivotal for civilian defense.
3.5 The Aftermath of Pearl Harbor
As with so many aspects of American life, the attack on Pearl Harbor changed everything
regarding civilian defense. Many Americans, particularly isolationists, dismissed threats of
61
“Strayer Transcript: Jan. 5, 1942 Conference at White House,” in Maurine Beasley, ed. The White House Press
Conferences of Eleanor Roosevelt (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1983), 239.
62
“Pepper Says War is Near,” New York Times (November 25, 1941): p. 8.
62
invasion as the fantasies of warmongerers and the sycophants of Roosevelt. Although Oahu
Island was merely part of a territory that was far from the continental United States, the Japanese
strike was an attack on American soil nonetheless. The Japanese had destroyed the comfortable
myth that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans were unbreachable defenses. The sneak attack aspect
of it, the way the Japanese naval force had been able to dart in and slink away undetected and
with little cost, raised the specter of Japanese carrier forces and submarines parking off the west
coast or German submarines along the Atlantic. Worse still was the vision of spies and saboteurs
lurking around dark alleyways, ready to detonate bombs or steal valuable information. For
Americans after Pearl Harbor, the war was not just a far off danger: it was an imminent threat.
Lost in the fear following Pearl Harbor was that the civilian defense forces at Pearl
Harbor had reacted fairly well during the crisis. The Mayor of Honolulu had established a Major
Disasters Council (MDC) in April 1941 in response to the news of Hitler’s invasion of
Yugoslavia and the five-year Neutrality Pact signed by Japan and the Soviet Union. The MDC
had 23 subcommittees covering everything from utilities to food production and protection
against incendiary and chemical weapons attacks. The most important result of the MDC’s
preparations occurred in medical preparations. Twenty first-aid stations were established
throughout Honolulu, with local physicians assigned to each. Dozens of trucks were fitted to
convert easily to ambulances during an attack, and a training program was established which in
the months leading up to the Japanese attack had certified over 3,000 adults in first-aid. The
Hawaiian civil defense organizations had enough foresight to import huge orders of first aid and
medical supplies in the months leading up to the attack.63
The value of that training programs and medical preparations in Hawaii were
demonstrated during the attack. There was enough panic and confusion already. A disorganized
and poorly supplied medical and first aid service would have been catastrophic. The MDC had
established contingency plans for large-scale attacks and responded to the crisis quickly. The
responsibility of civilian defense in a military zone was to maintain civilian order, assist firemen
and police, and aid the military in handling casualties.64 Within twenty-five minutes of the
63
On Hawaii’s civilian defense preparations in 1941 and civilian defense actions during the attack on Pearl Harbor,
see Stanley D. Porteus, And Blow Not the Trumpet: A Prelude to Peril (Palo Alto, CA: Pacific Book Publishers,
1949), 100-87. Porteus noted the lack of blood plasma for transfusions was one of the only areas where medical
preparations had been deficient. People balked at giving blood because a direct assault seemed an unlikely
contingency. “That seemed to be playing war game too realistically.” Porteus, And Blow Not the Trumpet, 128.
64
O’Neill, A Democracy at War, 4-5.
63
beginning of the attack, the Emergency Medical and Ambulance Committee’s headquarters was
manned and sending out orders. When the first call for support from the military came at 9:10
A.M., the Committee was able to dispatch 45 truck-ambulances, each with a driver trained in
first-aid, within ten minutes.65 Auxiliary police and fire fighting units on Oahu were also
immediately mobilized and went to work directing traffic and tending to casualties. There were
several fires outside of the naval base. Honolulu, eight miles from Pearl Harbor, suffered 103
civilian casualties, despite not being directly attacked. Although many people in the city
reported seeing bombs fall, official records record only one Japanese bomb landed in the city.
The rest of the casualties were the result of misfired American anti-aircraft guns.66 Major
General Norman Kirk, Surgeon General of the U.S. Army later expressed his admiration for the
civilian medical forces during the attack at Pearl Harbor: “they were ready for it and we
weren’t.”67
For the American Legion, which for so long had advocated stronger national defense,
universal service, and military preparedness, Pearl Harbor was a vindication. “The events of the
war demonstrate beyond the possibility of question,” the Legion’s National Defense Council
asserted, “that the defense principles enunciated by The American Legion at Milwaukee [1941
National Convention] were right. Had they been followed in time, there might not have been a
Pearl Harbor and the South Pacific might not now be a Japanese Lake.”68 Legionnaires believed
that the Japanese attack and the subsequent mobilization at breakneck speed validated their
national defense programs and at last the country would begin to listen, as they should have
done.
The Legion leadership reacted to the crisis quickly. Stambaugh was already en route to
Washington, DC on December 7th to attend National Defense Committee meetings scheduled for
December 9th.69 He immediately dispatched a letter to the White House pledging the total
support of the Legion to the war effort. Throughout the country, they were mobilized for civilian
65
Porteus, And Blow Not the Trumpet, 169; Gordon W. Prange, December 7, 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked
Pearl Harbor (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1988), 245.
66
Paul Joseph Travers, Eyewitness to Infamy: An Oral History of Pearl Harbor (Lanham, MD: Madison Books,
1991), 106.
67
Dr. Harold L. Lyon, “Why a Diversified Crops Committee, Hawaiian Sugar Producers Association,” cited in
Porteus, And Blow Not the Trumpet, 173.
68
“Advanced Report of the National Defense Committee to the National Executive Committee,” April 30, 1942: p.
5. National Defense Committee File. Folder: “National Defense Committee-1940-1942.” ALA.
69
“Advanced Report of the National Defense Committee to the National Executive Committee,” April 30, 1942: p.
1. National Defense Committee File. Folder: “National Defense Committee-1940-1942.” ALA.
64
defense and the Aircraft Warning Service. Stambaugh explained to the President the national
defense programs of the Legion that would be useful in the war mobilization effort.70 N.B.C.,
whose vice-president Frank Mason was also Secretary of the Navy’s chief public relations
adviser, approached Stambaugh to address the nation on the situation that night. Stambaugh
spent the afternoon and evening preparing his speech with his staff, Naval personnel, and even
some Congressmen, who met him for dinner at the National Press Club. His delivered a speech
that reassured American that it could surmount this latest national test, but that hard work and
sacrifice were needed in the days ahead.71 From the National Defense Committee meeting on
December 9th Stambaugh issued a call to all Legionnaires and all departments to report at once
for civilian defense work and to aid in recruitment of soldiers.72 In his call to arms for the
organization, Stambaugh stated:
As I view the situation there is a minimum of heroics in the work that the Legion
will be called upon to do. Any idea that we still as individuals can win stars and
bars by going over the top once again should be abandoned. For most of us the
day for that type of action is past. There is more need now for protection and the
protection of production. That means production of all the essential elements of
civilian life, added to the need to give our military and naval forces complete
freedom from worry about the lack of anything they may need to do their jobs.73
Over 100,000 members of the American Legion served in the armed forces during World War
II.74 However, for most Legionnaires, their role in the fight was one the home front.
As is often the case when unthinkable attacks occur, hysteria followed the Japanese raid.
In towns like Highland Park, IL, about 30 miles outside of downtown Chicago, the Mayor
advocated a heightened sense of urgency to the civil defense because the town was vulnerable as
70
Letter, Lynn Stambaugh to Franklin Roosevelt, December 13, 1941. Official File 64. Box 4. File I: American
Legion, 1942. FDRL. Many posts and departments of the Legion also sent telegrams and letters to the President
pledging their loyalty and support. Letter, G.H. Stordock (Department Adjutant, Wisconsin) and H.V. Higley
(Department Commander, Wisconsin) to All Legionnaires, December 10, 1941. Civilian Defense, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
71
Richard Seelye Jones, A History Of The American Legion (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1946), 109.
72
National Publicity Division, Press Release, December 12, 1941. Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 91-7003.
73
Letter, Sam Brolund to Harry Keener (Post Commander, Wichita, KS), February, 13, 1942. Council of Defense
State and Local, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
74
Jones estimates that of the 70,000 reserve officers recalled into service from 1940 to 1942, a majority were
Legionnaires. He does not provide statistics to support the assertion. Richard Seelye Jones, A History Of The
American Legion (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1946), 110.
65
a target due to its closeness to Chicago’s industrial district and Ft. Sheridan.75 In Detroit,
Commander William F. Goodrich of the General William Mitchell Post #349 wrote to LaGuardia
that the city was vulnerable to a Japanese bomber strike “coming down through the wilds of
Canada” or a German/Italian attack coming via “Greenland and from the northeast.”76 The
namesake of Goodrich’s post, William Mitchell, had described such an attack in his 1925 book
Winged Defense.77 Goodrich demanded nearby Siegfried Field, which had been deprived of air
units be defended against the air attack he was sure would come. Dudley was tasked with
answering such letters from veterans, each time informing them that the OCD had no jurisdiction
over the military.78
Along the Pacific coast, panic reached a fevered pitch resulting in several casualties. On
December 8th, the city of Oakland closed all public schools in response to rumors of a Japanese
aircraft carrier in the vicinity. Military officials warned the local populace that “death and
destruction” from bombs were possible in the San Francisco Bay area.79 In response to reports
that Japanese planes had been spotted 100 miles off the coast, Lieutenant General John L.
DeWitt, chief of the Western Defense Command, rebuked those who dismissed the attack: “Last
night there were planes over this community. They were enemy planes! I mean Japanese
planes! And they were tracked out at sea. You think it was a hoax? It is damned nonsense for
sensible people to assume that the Army and Navy would practice such a hoax on San
Francisco.”80 DeWitt went on to claim that the phantom planes might have done the city a
service had they dropping their bombs: “It might have awakened some of the fools in this
community who refuse to realize this is a war.”
Up the coast from the Bay, in Washington State, wide-eyed rumors of arrows of fire in
burning fields pointing toward Seattle circulated throughout the area in the week after Pearl
75
Legion Post News Vol. 2, No. 3, January 19, 1942. Official Monthly Newspaper of the Dumaresq Spencer Post
No. 145, Highland Park, IL. Council of Defense State and Local, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
76
Letter, William F. Goodrich to Fiorello LaGuardia, December 19, 1941. RG171. Box 20. American Legion 080
Folder II: January 1-February 28, 1942. NARA II.
77
William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development And Possibilities Of Modern Air Power - Economic And
Military (New York, London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1925).
78
Letter from Henry Dudley to William F. Goodrich, January 15, 1942. RG171. Box 20. American Legion 080
Folder II: January 1-February 28, 1942. NARA II.
79
Lawrence E. Davies, “Carrier is Hunted Off San Francisco,” New York Times (December 10, 1941): p. 20.
80
Davies, “Carrier is Hunted Off San Francisco,” 20.
66
Harbor. The Navy followed up on the rumors but found no signs of conflagration anywhere.81
An editorial in the Seattle Times argued that “It is not altogether impossible that a Jap aircraft
carrier could slip through close enough to our coast to conduct a foray upon our airplane and
shipbuilding plants.”82 Rumors to match that fear emerged as some Washingtonians mistook
Canadian and American ships in the Strait of Juan de Fuca for Japanese warships.83 When air
raid sirens were installed in northern Seattle, residents were not forewarned and the testing of the
sirens created a panic among residents.84
During these invasion scares Eleanor Roosevelt and LaGuardia were on a plane to the
west coast to review civilian defenses there. While on the trip, the pilot received a radio message
saying that San Francisco was under attack from Japanese aircraft. For several hours, they were
unsure what horror’s awaited them upon their arrival. It was only when they landed that the First
Lady and the Mayor were told the attack was a false alarm.85 It turned out that the civilian
defense forces had not been alerted to military flyovers in the area.
Not all of the fear was groundless hysteria of the masses. The President was to blame for
some of it. In order to gain support for his programs to prepare the country for war, particularly
those involving the military, required Roosevelt to demonstrate credible dangers to the
America’s national security. The war in Europe was presented as an immediate threat to
American communities, should Great Britain fall. In his fireside chat on December 29th, 1940,
when he went to the American people asking for support for Lend Lease, Roosevelt warned that
modern bombers in England had the range to fly from the British Isles to New England without
refueling.86 In March 1941, reports that German air squadrons were seen flying over the east
cost of Greenland fueled rumors (some from British propaganda mills) that Germans were
constructing airbases in Greenland to protect their u-boats in the North Atlantic and to threaten
North America.87
81
James R. Warren, The War Years: A Chronicle of Washington State in World War II (Seattle: History Ink, 2000),
3.
82
V.R. Cardozier, The Mobilization of the United States in World War II: How the Government, Military and
Industry Prepared for War (Jefferson, NC: McGarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1995), 50.
83
Warren, The War Years, 3.
84
Warren, The War Years, 5.
85
Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 635.
86
“President's Call for Full Response on Defense,” New York Times (December 30, 1941): p. 6.
87
“Reports Nazi Planes in Greenland Flights,” New York Times (May 9, 1941): p. 3.
67
The military also fed the anxieties of the population. General Robert H. Tyndall, the
defense director for the Indianapolis region, said an air raid in Indianapolis was “well within the
realm of possibility…it could not be anything more than a token raid, the main purpose being to
create panic.”88 In Seattle, Major Willard A. Johnson advised civil defense workers of the
potential for air raids and the need to build up defenses. Anti-aircraft guns were established in
Puget Sound by the end of December, to protect the many industrial plants and shipyards in the
Seattle area. “If we have air raids now,” he warned, “they will be token raids carried out at long
distance just because the Japanese want to show us they can do it. But if the outer defenses – the
Philippines, Hawaii and Alaska fall, then the war might well come closer to this coast.”89
Throughout the country, thousands of local civilian defense units mobilized for action. In
many communities on the west coast, police and sheriff departments were put on twelve-hour
shift. Since the Japanese attack never materialized, many of the local defense forces turned their
sights on the thousands of men, women and children who were suddenly enemy aliens and
sabotage threats. The round up of Japanese Americans and Japanese citizens was one of the first
war time activities for many of the civilian defense forces. Fear of people with Japanese
ancestry of citizenship acting as a fifth column during an invasion had been a popular myth since
Japanese immigration began in the nineteenth century. With invasion expected at any moment in
those feverish December days, the people of living along the west coast were taking no chances
with their enemy alien neighbors.
Nor was it just civilians on the west coast that believed invasion eminent. The
expectation that the attack on Pearl Harbor was only the first step in a general invasion could be
found in the halls of Congress as well. Four days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the House and
Senate District Committees convened a joint meeting to discuss the defenses of Washington DC.
The meeting minutes show the anxieties of the congressmen, all of whom believed an attack was
likely. Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH), said, “I think the Capitol would be the first choice of the
enemy for attack.”90 Senator Pat McCarran, (D-NV) echoed him, saying, “All nations seem to
head for the capitol city. What would we do tonight if an air raid took place?” An unnamed
88
“Civilian Defenders Sign Up Sunday,” Indianapolis Star January 9, 1942. : Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
89
Warren, The War Years, 4.
90
Though a Republican, Bridges was not an isolationist. He, like Willkie, did not support the President, but agreed
with his foreign policy.
68
congressman declared, “We must meet hostile invaders and repulse them, if need be.”91 The
congressmen’s anxieties reflected those of the general population.
One of the biggest causes of fear, among government officials and civilians alike, was
their ignorance of military and civilian defenses already in place. Like so many Americans, the
congressmen had largely ignored civilian defense when attacks seems unlikely and so were
ignorant of the defense preparation already in place. At the joint committee meeting on
December 11th, the congressmen grilled the military men in attendance on the defenses for
Washington. After being assured that the capitol was well protected by both the military and
civilian defense, one of the congressmen (unnamed) asked “What can the Senate and House
District Committees do to further the defense program in the District?”92 The immediate
response was money. All prior requests for civilian defense appropriations had been denied.
Without debate, the congressmen approved all appropriations for the defense of Washington.
Sen. McCarran said, “I don’t think the matter has come so vividly at hand – until last Sunday.”93
At the same time, the press ran stories about the setup and organization of state and local civilian
defense councils to ease the minds of the troubles public.94
In retrospect, it is easy to dismiss the fears of the congressmen and civilians as
unrealistic, overreactions. Direct attacks on U.S. shores proved to be beyond the ability of the
Axis states. However, this viewpoint ignores the circumstances present in 1941. The war had
already demonstrated that both the Japanese and Germans had the ability to turn military doctrine
on its head. In their victory over the French, the Germans had done the impossible, defeating the
most respected army in the world in mere weeks. Their attack on Eben Emael, a Belgian fortress
generally regarded as unbreachable, was a masterpiece of daring and execution. Most
importantly, the German navy was operating throughout the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico,
devastating the shipping of the greatest naval power in the world. Some of the naval battles
between the British and the Germans, such as the sinking of the Graf Spee at Montevideo had
occurred in the western hemisphere, proving that the German navy could reach South American
91
“Review of Plans for Civilian Defense in D.C.” Committee on District of Columbia. Senate; Committee on
District of Columbia. House. 77-1 (1941) December 11, 1941: p. 1.
92
“Review of Plans for Civilian Defense in D.C.” Committee on District of Columbia. Senate; Committee on
District of Columbia. House. 77-1 (1941) December 11, 1941: p. 4.
93
“Review of Plans for Civilian Defense in D.C.” Committee on District of Columbia. Senate; Committee on
District of Columbia. House. 77-1 (1941) December 11, 1941: p. 5.
94
“Defense Council Set Up by Assembly to Co-Ordinate State, Local Authorities,” Indianapolis Sunday Star,
December 14, 1942. Council of Defense State and Local, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
69
ports, not all of which were unfriendly. The Japanese had destroyed the bulk of the U.S. Navy in
a masterstroke. That the carriers of the Pacific fleet had escaped destruction was of small
comfort to a country that, like the rest of the world, regarded battleships to be the most valuable
capital ships. The Axis powers had shown that they were fighting a new war, one in which
conventional wisdom could not be trusted any longer. In circumstances like the one in
December 1941, the fears of American’s were not unjustifiable fantasy.
70
CHAPTER FOUR
OVERHAUL OF THE OCD
In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, civilian defense became a matter of greater importance. In the
outpouring of grief, anger, and nationalistic fervor, every level of government was flooded with
queries about local defense. At the same time that young men flocked to recruiting stations,
many of their fellow citizens were volunteering for civilian defense. It was quickly apparent to
most observers that the OCD infrastructure, still in the process of being established in most areas
of the country, was inadequate. Multiple and often conflicting layers of civilian defense, partisan
politics, lack of supplies, and contentious planning disputes plagued the country’s civilian
defenses. Fearful that Japanese and German attacks were in the offing, most Americans found
the chaos of the OCD intolerable and their ire focused particularly upon its two leaders. The
media, Congressional opponents of the Roosevelt administration, and the public, including the
American Legion, fiercely attacked the OCD’s leadership and functions. As a result, the OCD
underwent a fundamental transformation during the first three months of the war. The Legion
struggled to maintain its powerful position in the OCD while also taking part in the criticism that
could potentially lead to the civilian defense organization it desired.
4.1 Public Criticism of the OCD Grows
One of the first attacks on the OCD following Pearl Harbor came from the influential
social critic and journalist Walter Lippmann. On December 16th, Lippmann took aim at the OCD
in his syndicated column “Today and Tomorrow.” Explaining the context in which the OCD’s
shortcomings were created, he wrote: “The grim business of civilian defense has had…to be
treated as a kind of make-believe, like children playing at war, and it had to be sold to the people
by Mayor LaGuardia’s talents for publicity and by Mrs. Roosevelt’s talent for sugar-coating the
matter with all manner of fads, fancies, homilies, and programs which would have been
approximate to the activities of an excited village improvement society. As a result, the realities
of civilian defense have never been clearly grasped, nor has the business been organized in a way
71
that is remotely adequate.”1 He called for drastic, immediate changes that revealed a belief in
centralized rule during crises: the protective function of civilian defense ought to be home
defense organized on military lines; vulnerable areas should be placed under limited martial law;
a commandant should be given emergency powers to control the police, State troopers, fire
department, home guards, air-raid wardens, public utilities, power to draft for volunteer services.
Lippmann argued that circumstances had gone beyond the competence and authority of
LaGuardia and the First Lady. They issued appeals and statements when they needed the
authority and ability to issue lucid and authoritative commands. They lacked the military
experience, time to devote to the task, and authority necessary to handle the crisis. He also called
for home defense to be place under the War Department and operated by an Assistant Secretary
of War for Home Defense.2 Many Americans shared Lippmann’s belief that the job had grown
too big for Eleanor and LaGuardia. His prescriptions for the ills of civilian defense would be
reflected in the proposals made in Congress during the weeks that followed.
As head of the OCD, LaGuardia was the first to be attacked. He had been dealing with
simmering disapproval for months before Pearl Harbor. Long-time political opponents like
Martin J. Kennedy (D-NY) had disparaged the Mayor since he had taken the job.3 Others had
criticized him for failing to resign his mayoral office when he took the directorship and seeking
reelection when he could not devote himself fully to either position.4 Some of the attacks on
LaGuardia can be attributed to his position within the Republican Party. LaGuardia was a
Progressive and fervent supporter of Roosevelt, the New Deal, and anti-isolationism. He was
often out of step with the GOP, and had even, at times, running for office as the candidate for the
American Labor Party. During the course of Congressional debates on the OCD, his party
affiliation came up several times. When one Congressman remarked, “I care not what the
politics of Mr. LaGuardia is. I do not know whether he is a Republican or a Democrat,” another
interjected “Nobody else does.”5 Joseph L. Pfeifer (D-NY) said of the Mayor, “[He] is not a
member of my party (Democrat) or your party (Republican). He is a member of the Labor
1
Walter Lippmann, “Today and Tomorrow: LaGuardia and Mrs. Roosevelt,” Washington Post (December 16,
1941).
2
Lippmann, “Today and Tomorrow.”
3
“Demands Ouster of La Guardia,” New York Times (November 7, 1941): p. 16.
4
When asked about rumors he will resign to focus on reelection, LaGuardia responded: “As I said when I took this
civilian defense office, the effort and extra labor comes out of me, and not out of the city, and, so far, everything is
normal and I shall continue to function.” “Mayor to Keep U.S. Post,” New York Times (September 3, 1941): p. 12.
5
Civilian Defense Legislation, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess., (January 19, 1942): 469-480.
72
Party.”6 Whatever his party affiliation, both Republicans and Democrats attacked LaGuardia in
the first weeks of 1942.
Some of the criticism of the Mayor came from within the OCD itself. Air raid wardens
criticized LaGuardia for the lack of vital supplies like sirens, whistles, steel helmets, and gas
masks that were basic to their job. OCD information, such as the meanings of siren signals or
recommendations on where to go in event of an attack, was often incorrect or contradictory. To
men and women volunteering in civilian defense, those shortcomings were insufferable.7
LaGuardia’s first response to the attack on Pearl Harbor had been to recommend to Dean
Landis, the Regional Director of the OCD’s First Corps Area in New England, that the OCD
organize parades. Landis responded incredulously, stating that his men did not march. “They
know marching isn’t going to do anything here. They know exactly what their tasks are…”8
That LaGuardia suggested a parade was not so extraordinary. Over the next year, the OCD
would hold many parades to drum up support for the war effort and civilian defense. To suggest
it in the days following the attack on Pearl Harbor, when the American peoples were frantically
preparing for another attack, however, seemed madness. This added to the impression many had
of LaGuardia that he was more interested in pomp and showmanship that real defense.9
Eleanor, too, was convinced LaGuardia had to go. During their West Coast inspection of
civilian defense after Pearl Harbor, Eleanor witnessed the organizational inefficiencies in the
protective services and the frustration and apathy it caused among volunteers and potential
volunteers. It became clear to her that the Mayor could not do the job needed. The loss of
support of the two highest-ranking subordinates in the OCD did much to undermine LaGuardia’s
position. Upon returning to Washington, DC, Eleanor took her views on the Mayor to Harold
Smith, director of the Bureau of Budget and Wayne Coy, in the Office of Emergency
Management.10 Smith met with the President in mid-December informing him that LaGuardia
6
Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., (January 5, 1942), p. 15.
For an example of air raid warden criticism, see Winthrop Parkhurst, “Air Rad Warden Complains,” New York
Times (January 5, 1942): 16.
8
Landis, Oral History Project. Columbia University. Quoted in Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 647.
9
Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st sess., House Vol. 87. (January 2, 1942): 10147-10148; Lash, Eleanor and
Franklin, 640-41. LaGuardia was also well-known for his affection for the spectacular, often riding on the side of
fire engines as they headed for four and five alarm fires and riding shot gun in police cars as they chased after
criminals.
10
The president had asked the two to monitor the OCD. Letter, Wayne Coy to Franklin Roosevelt, December 13,
1941; Harold Smith, Diary, FDRL. Both are cited in Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 648.
7
73
could not handle his task with the OCD on a part time basis. Civilian defense needed full-time
leadership from someone dedicated solely to that job.11
In December and January, Congress got involved. On December 18th, Representative
John Z. Anderson (R-CA) took up Lippmann’s criticisms, entering his column into the
Congressional Record and attacked the Mayor’s work with the OCD as “part-time.” Anderson
asserted “A suitable bill providing for a full-time civilian defense program is absolutely essential
at the present time. We are apt to meet with very fatal consequences in certain parts of the
United States in the near future if something is not done.”12 Like Lippmann, Anderson pointed
out that LaGuardia and Eleanor were severely hampered by the lack of interest in their agency
before December 7th: “Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor various civilian-defense organizations
were attempting to set up some sort of a defense program that would work, but the mayors and
officials of the various cities found there was no turn-out for the meetings. The citizens were
interested, certainly, but before the attack on Pearl Harbor very few showed up for the
meetings.”13 Local newspaper headlines from around the country demonstrated that
communities were moving too slow in their defensive preparations. Anderson asserted “A
suitable bill providing for a full-time civilian defense program is absolutely essential at the
present time. We are apt to meet with very fatal consequences in certain parts of the United
States in the near future if something is not done.”14
Martin Kennedy continued his jabs at the Mayor and unlike his earlier attacks, in the
weeks after Pearl Harbor they were finding their mark. He argued that LaGuardia, as Mayor of
the largest city in the country, Chairman of the Conference of Mayors, and Chairman of the U.S.Canadian Joint Defense Board, already had three major jobs. Devoting sufficient time to the
OCD was impossible for any one under those circumstances.15 Jessie Sumner (R-IL) castigated
11
Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 648.
John Z. Anderson, “Civilian Defense-A Full-Time Job,” Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st sess. House Vol.
87. (December 18, 1941): p. 9990.
13
John Z. Anderson, “Civilian Defense-A Full-Time Job,” Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st sess. House Vol.
87. (December 18, 1941): p. 9990.
14
John Z. Anderson, “Civilian Defense-A Full-Time Job,” Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st sess. House Vol.
87. (December 18, 1941): p. 9990.
15
Martin J. Kennedy, “Director of Civilian Defense,” Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st sess., House Vol. 87.
(January 2, 1942), 10147-10148. Harold Ickes had made the same remark when LaGuardia had been appointed to
the OCD. Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 640.
12
74
the “tea-party atmosphere” that reigned in the OCD.16 Even some of LaGuardia’s friends in
Congress expressed the wish that he pick one job or the other.17 The President began to look for
ways to relieve his friend of his duties without hurting his pride. When he met with Roosevelt,
LaGuardia said that he was victim of unfair media coverage. Roosevelt suggested he appoint an
assistant to handle the administrative side of the OCD. LaGuardia balked at this, but when they
met again on January 2nd, the President insisted on the promotion of Dean Landis to Executive
Assistant; LaGuardia acquiesced.
Landis was the son of Protestant missionary parents. He was born in Tokyo, Japan in
1899 and did not move to the United States until he was thirteen. During the First World War, he
served in the British YMCA. After the war, he went to Princeton and won the Fay Medal as the
member of the graduating class who showed the greatest promise. At 25 he had an LL B
(Bachelor of Laws) from Princeton and at 26 a Doctorate of Juridical Science from Harvard. At
Harvard Law School, he came under the influence of Felix Frankfurter and was one of the first
members of the “brain trust” to come to DC in 1933. He left the Chairmanship of the Securities
and Exchange Commission in 1937 to return to Harvard Law School as Dean. He became
infamous in conservative circles for his role as Special Examiner for the labor department in
1940, where he oversaw the deportation case of Harry Bridges. Bridges was a notorious west
coast labor agitator accused of being a communist and therefore subject to deportation. Landis
found him not guilty, earning him the enmity of extreme anti-communists, which included the
American Legion.18 This played an important role in the way Landis’ appointment and
promotion within the OCD was received.
At the same time that LaGuardia was attacked for his lack of dedication to his job, there
were also powerful challenges for control of the protective services of the OCD. Many
Americans, including a large percentage of Legionnaires, did not approve of a partisan, civilian
organization controlling the protective services. With the prevalent expectation of imminent
invasion, many Americans wanted control of civilian defense to be transferred to the War
Department, where rigid discipline and tight organization would be instilled. The Chairman of
the National Defense Committee of the American Legion in Erie County, New York complained
16
Jessie Sumner on Civilian Defense Legislation, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess., (January 19, 1942):
475.
17
Thomason, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess., House Vol. 88 (January 19, 1942): 478.
18
See “Something About Bridges,” The American Legion Monthly (February 1940): p. 1, 48-49.
75
that lack of cooperation between the different levels of government had severely crippled civilian
defense preparations in the area. When a blackout drill was held, Canadian border towns were lit
up, making a blackout of American border towns useless. At the same time, despite civilian
demands, the military refused to shut off lights at twelve defense plants in Buffalo. The drill was
a failure and it was not hard to see why. The Chairman exclaimed, “This is a job for the Army of
the United States, to make certain that there will be no semblance or claim of politics entering
into the matter.”19 Responding to this story, Fred Bradley (R-MI) said that the lack of
cooperation proved that civilian defense needed to be under military to avoid such conflicts and
to give authority to civilian defense initiatives.20
Although the American Legion National Headquarters stayed neutral on the topic of
civilian defense leadership, other Legionnaires made their preference known. The Executive
Committee of the Department of Missouri issued a resolution to have the Army take over all
protective phases of Civilian Defense.21 Bryce Beard, the National Defense Chairman for North
Carolina, had written a report on the coordination and liaison for civilian defense at the request
of National Commander Lynn Stambaugh. Beard recommended, among other things, that the
Aircraft Warning Service be separated from OCD and put under the War Department. This was,
according to Beard, something most Legionnaires supported.22 Beard sent his report to the
Congressmen of North Carolina and to Landis, so his views were known outside of the Legion.23
4.2 A New Role for the Legion
Like LaGuardia, Landis recognized the importance of the Legion to his task. During his
time as Executive Assistant to the Mayor, Landis worked to establish a strong relationship with
the Legion leadership and to address the major grievances voiced by Legionnaires. Many of the
complaints against the OCD from Legionnaires focused on the right to wear uniforms and be
19
“Civilian Defense Legislation,” Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess., (January 19, 1942): 472.
Fred Bradley on “Civilian Defense Legislation,” Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess., (January 19, 1942):
475-76.
21
“Extract of Minutes of Department Executive Committee Meeting,” St. Louis, MO, January 11, 1942. Office of
Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
22
Letter, Bryce Beard to Lynn Stambaugh, January 7, 1942. Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7003. In replies to Beard’s report, several high ranking members of the Legion expressed their approval of
Beard’s findings. See Letter, Warren H. Atherton to Bryce Beard, February 11, 1942. Office of Civilian Defense,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
23
Letter, Bryce Beard to James Landis, January 16, 1942. RG 171, Box 20: American Legion 080, Folder Two:
January to February, 1942. NARA II; Letter, Bryce Beard to William O. Burgin, January 12, 1942. RG 171, Box
20: American Legion 080, Folder Two: January to February, 1942. NARA II.
20
76
armed during their civilian defense service. The OCD received several telegrams and letters
from Legionnaires suggesting, “modern army rifles and other weapons of defense…be placed in
the hands and under the control of able-bodied male citizens of proven loyalty at government
expense.”24 The OCD was dismissive of such suggestions. Civilian defense volunteers were not
intended to be a militia. Many Legionnaires also balked at serving in civilian defense without
their uniforms and their Legion caps. They felt the Legion hats and uniforms gave Legionnaires
the air of authority to issue orders in an emergency and even allowed them to enter police lines.25
Others felt the sight of Legion apparel would raise the morale and confidence of American
citizens.26 Milt Campbell argued in favor of wearing uniforms saying, “Any of us who have had
experience in disaster work knows that a Legion cap or uniform is better than an official pass.”27
The official policy of the OCD regarding organizational uniforms was that upon completion of
their training, volunteers could wear the OCD insignia and their organization’s uniform.
However, this was only true if they volunteer as part of a unit. Individuals not volunteering as
part of a unit could not wear the uniform of their organization.28 Though Campbell supported
Legionnaires who fulfilled the requirements of the policy wearing their uniforms, other Legion
leaders, particularly Stambaugh, opposed it. The National Commander argued that not all
Legionnaires had uniforms, the uniform would divide rather than unify the public and Legion,
and rather than help the situation it would create problems.29 The Legion did not issue a
directive on the matter, but inquiries made to National Headquarters were usually met with
negative responses.
Perhaps the biggest issues were the perceptions of ill use and continued desire to serve
within the OCD as an organization, rather than as individuals. Following LaGuardia’s letter to
24
Letter, American Legion Deadwood Post #34 to Fiorello LaGuardia, May 21, 1941. RG 171, Box 21: American
Legion 080, Folder Three: May to September, 1941.
25
Letter, Lyle N. Rapelye (Adjutant of Connecticut) to Milt Campbell, January 8, 1942. Office of Civilian Defense,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
26
Letter, Martin A. Blutman to Lynn Stambaugh, December 11, 1941. Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
27
Letter, Milt Campbell reply to Lyle N. Rapelye, January 16, 1942. Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
28
Letter, Henry Dudley to Maurice Stember (Adjutant, Department of New York), January 14, 1942. RG 171, Box
20: American Legion 080, Folder II: January 1 - February 28, 1942. NARA II. See also Memo, Milt Campbell to
Department Personnel and NEC, December 29, 1941. Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7003.
29
Letter, Dr. S. B. Tusi to Lynn Stambaugh, December 29, 1941. Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 91-7003; Letter, Lynn Stambaugh reply to Dr. S. B. Tusi, December 29, 1941. Office of Civilian Defense,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003; Letter, Martin A. Blutman to Lynn Stambaugh, December 11, 1941.
Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
77
the state governors in November 1941, Legionnaires had expected governors would begin to
make use of their expertise. But in a few states, lack of assignments continued to frustrate
Legionnaires. G. H. Stordock in Wisconsin reported that the lack of specific assignments and
responsibilities was affecting Legionnaires and Posts, who were losing interest in civilian
defense.30 In Colorado, the Department Adjutant complained the Legion has been given no job
to do in civilian defense and has been given no opportunity as a recognized organization to have
its members placed in significant defense jobs.31 In Kansas, the Department Adjutant
complained that the Legion had no voice in the State Defense Council, despite the Governor
Payne Ratner and a few other members being Legionnaires. Those Legionnaires present on the
Council were inactive members and had little interest in Legion views on civil defense.32 The
National Commanders and the Legion’s Washington office had been conferring with the
President and with members of the War, Navy and Justice Departments for two years, attempting
to carve out a niche for itself to act and render exclusive service in civilian defense. The
President and each of the departments had repeatedly and adamantly refused.33
Stambaugh and Landis attempted to address the causes of disgruntlement in a meeting
with the President at the White House on January 19th.34 The Legion agreed that individual
Legionnaires, posts and departments would work within their state and local defense councils,
performing whatever tasks they were assigned according to their agreements with the councils.
They would integrate with the state and local setups, not supercede them. In exchange the
Legion finally got the exclusive role it had long coveted: the OCD assigned the Legion the task
of setting up state and local schools for the training of air raid wardens.35 This agreement greatly
30
Telegram, G. H. Stordock (Department Adjutant, Wisconsin), to Lynn Stambaugh, December 16, 1941. Council
of Defense State and Local, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
31
Letter, M. L. Lyckholm to Milt Campbell, January 5, 1941. Council of Defense State and Local, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
32
Letter, Irvin L. Cowger to Milt Campbell, December 23, 1941. Council of Defense State and Local, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
33
Letter, Frank Samuels to Sam Brolund (NEC), February 18, 1942. Council of Defense State and Local, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
34
Letter, Lynn Stambaugh to Franklin Roosevelt, February 4, 1942. Official File 64: American Legion. Box 4. File
I: American Legion 1942. FDRL.
35
Letter, Frank Samuels to Sam Brolund, February 18, 1942. Council of Defense State and Local, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
78
pleased the National Headquarters and was one of the major reasons the Legion largely stayed
out of the Congressional debates.36
There had been several previous attempts to set up civilian defense under the War
Department. In May of 1940, Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH) and Representative Charles A.
Anderson (D-MO) introduced matching bills in Congress that were killed in Committee. John
Anderson, along with Representative John M. Costello (D-CA) again introduced a bill in June of
1940 to establish a home defense organized reserve as part of the Regular Army. Both times, the
War Department reported the bills unfavorably to the committees. The War Department did not
want civilian defense added to its list of responsibilities. The massive mobilization program in
the military was already straining War Department resources. In his December 18th speech, John
Anderson revived his call for civilian defense to be transferred to the War Department.37
The question of which federal agency would control the OCD became the central topic in
the discussions on appropriations for civilian defense in January.38 The President had sent a
request to Congress in December for an appropriation of $100,000,000 for the OCD to purchase
vital supplies for civilian defense forces across the country.39 The cost of materials for civilian
defense was prohibitive for state and local governments. The appropriations bill provided
$57,217,271 for firefighting equipment and training; $7,998,545 for protective clothing, helmets,
etc; $4,890,290 for emergency medical supplies; and $29,893,894 for production of gas masks
and setting up facilities for their manufacture.40 The Senate and House Appropriations
Committees had produced appropriations bills that were virtually identical on all counts except
who controlled the funding. The Senate committee had put it under the Director of the OCD; the
House committee had put it under the Secretary of War. The two committees met to discuss the
differences and agreed to the Senate version, largely because Secretary of War Stimson explicitly
36
Despite this agreement, from time to time individual Legionnaires voiced their desire to have the protective
services transferred to the War Department for the rest of 1942. For example see “Civilian Defense,” The West
Virginia Legionnaire Vol. 18, No. 2, (May 10, 1942): p. 2. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005; Letter, Lynn Stambaugh to Franklin Roosevelt, June 16, 1942. Official File 64:
American Legion. Box 4, File I: American Legion 1942. FDRL. However, as an organization, the question was not
seriously broached again in public.
37
John Z. Anderson, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st sess., House Vol. 87 (December 18, 1941): p. 99909991.
38
Andrew J. May on “Civilian Defense Legislation,” Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess., (January 19,
1942): 471.
39
Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Estimate of appropriation for Office for Emergency Management,” Congressional
Record, 77th Cong., 1st sess., S.doc.140 (December 10, 1941).
40
“Senate Adds Curbs in Passing OCD Bill,” New York Times (February 18, 1942): p. 22.
79
stated in a letter to the committees that he did not want the responsibility of OCD, when he is
already faced with a monumental task.41 The lack of support by the War Department once again
decisively thwarted the efforts to remove the protective services from the OCD and the House
voted to support the Senate version of the Appropriations Bill. Although the protective services
side of the OCD was not put under military control, the OCD did lose control of the bomb
squads.42
One of the reasons Congressmen were willing to leave protective services under the OCD
was the appointment of James Landis to Executive Assistant and LaGuardia’s promise to resign
as either Mayor or Director.43 Landis had been serving as the Regional Director of the OCD’s
First Corp Area in New England. Frank Kent of the Baltimore Sun said Landis was by no means
the ideal man for the job, but he was an improvement over LaGuardia.44 Most people in the
capitol saw his appointment as an effort by the President to appease opponents of LaGuardia in
Congress that were holding up the Appropriations Bill.45 Walter G. Andrews (R-NY) and
Dewey J. Short (R-MO), who were on the House Appropriations Committee and had reluctantly
signed the conference report, declared that Landis’ appointment had altered their view of the
situation and “if given full opportunity, he would administer this act reasonably well.”46
During the Appropriations Bill debates, several anti-New Deal Congressmen portrayed
the OCD as “pink” in an attempt to discredit it.47 Leland M. Ford (R-CA), who, along with
Senator McKellar was the most outspoken of the Congressional critics of the OCD, said of
41
Andrew J. May on “Civilian Defense Legislation,” Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess., (January 19,
1942): 471.
42
Campbell Memo on Bomb squads 042442. Microfilm 91-7003: Office of Civilian Defense. American Legion
Archive, Indianapolis, Indiana.
43
Walter G. Andrews on “Civilian Defense Legislation,” Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess., (January 19,
1942): 471.
44
Frank R. Kent, “Mayor Looks for Chance to Resign Post as Head of Defense,” Baltimore Sun (January 28, 1942.
Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
45
National Publicity Division, Press Release, January 12, 1942. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7005.
46
Civilian Defense Legislation, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess., (January 19, 1942): 471-72.
47
Thomas H. Elliot (D-MA) defended Lash, entering into the Congressional Record an article by PM that makes it
clear Lash was denounced by Communist groups in New Masses, the Daily Worker, Clarity and the Young
Communist Review and had no connection or sympathy with the Communist Party. Communist leaders have
publicly conceded that Lash’s pro-New Deal, anti-Communist campaign made serious inroads into their ranks,
labeling anti-Communist student groups “The Lash Bloc.” In the days after Operation Barbarossa Communist
groups attempted rapprochement with Lash, which he rejected arguing their ultimate aims were irreconcilable,
despite Communist change of line on the war. See “New Deal Foes Hit, Anti-Red Youth Leader,” PM (January 14,
1942). Thomas H. Eliot, “The Youth Division of the Office of Civilian Defense,” Congressional Record, 77th Cong.,
2d sess., Appendix Vol. 88 (January 19, 1942): A160.
80
Landis “you would have a hard time getting somebody ‘pinker.”48 Fred Bradley disparaged
Landis’ lack of military credentials and his exoneration of Harry Bridges.49 Labeling New
Dealers and progressives as “fellow travelers” had been a frequent ploy of the Right throughout
the 1930s (and would remain so to the present). Joseph P. Lash, friend and future biographer of
Eleanor Roosevelt, was denounced by Clare E. Hoffman (R-MI) and Leland M. Ford (R-CA) as
“one of the outstanding Communists of the country.”50 They took as their evidence the reports
of the Dies Committee, which had investigated and interrogated Lash several times.
In the early days of the Great Depression, Lash had been socialist and for much of the
1930s, he worked as a student organizer. Though never a member of any communist groups, he
had connections to them and had often spoken or attended the meetings of communist student
organizations. He had firmly broken with communist group over the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August
1939 and had always been a firm supporter of Roosevelt. It was through his work as a student
organizer that he came into contact with the First Lady and they began a decades long friendship.
His past associations were enough for the Dies Committee to conclude that Lash was a
communist fellow traveler.51 Ford, pointing specifically to such figures within the OCD,
declared “The government is shot through with mealy-mouthed, half-baked, socialistic,
racketeering incompetents.” The OCD, he said, was the ideal machinery for the take over of
society because it reached into the local level and is “ideally suited to become a political
organization with a precinct captain in every block.”52 It is unclear how influential such rhetoric
was on Congressional support for the OCD.
The broad attacks on the OCD and its volunteers continued to pick up the pace in
January. Although he had some supporters in Congress, LaGuardia was at last convinced that he
could not maintain his title as Director of the OCD and remain the Mayor of New York City.53
By mid-January, he was looking for a way out. During a committee hearing he told the
48
Leland M. Ford on Dean Landis, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess., (January 12, 1942): 259.
Fred Bradley on Dean Landis, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess., (January 12, 1942): 259.
50
Leland M. Ford, on the issue of communists and socialists being appointed to high government positions,
“Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., House Vol 88 (January 13, 1942): 292; Clare E. Hoffman, “We Do
Not Need Communist Leaders,” Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., House Vol 88 (January 13, 1942):
310.
51
“Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States,” Special Committee on Un-American
Activities, Congressional Records, 76th Cong., 1st sess., H. Res. 282 (December 1, 1939): 7061-93.
52
Leland M. Ford, “False Philosophy,” Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess., (February 19, 1942): 1499.
53
Joseph A. Pfeifer, On Director of Civilian Defense, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess., (January 5, 1942):
15; Samuel Dickstein, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess., (January 12, 1942): A107; R. Ewing Thomason
on Civilian Defense Legislation, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess., (January 19, 1942): 477-78.
49
81
Congressional panel he would soon resign either one position or the other. On February 9th,
during his regular Sunday radio broadcast “Talk to the People” on WNYC, LaGuardia said he
expected to resign as soon as he completed a report on the state of civilian defense.54
4.3 The Mayris Chaney Episode
If LaGuardia hoped his last days as Director would be without controversy he was sorely
disappointed. On February 4th, the Mayris Chaney story broke, creating a firestorm of media
controversy that would ultimately cost Eleanor her job.55 Chaney was an accomplished dancer,
relatively unknown in mainstream society, that had become friends with Eleanor. She was a
frequent guest at the White House and had even patented a dance move she called the “Eleanor
Glide.” In December 1941, she began to work with the OCD on development of dance activities
to be used in bomb shelters to keep children stuck inside for long hours active and happy. Mrs.
Roosevelt recalled seeing similar programs being carried out in British bomb shelters and
thought it might be of value in her program.56 Chaney’s activities in the OCD began in
December 1941 and were unknown until her promotion to head of children’s activities in the
Physical Fitness Division. She had been working as an unpaid volunteer, but her new position
was reported to carry an annual salary of $4,600. The initial story hit newspapers in
unremarkable fashion on February 5th. However, opponents of Eleanor and the OCD saw that
the story had the potential to be damaging and pounced on it.
The next day Leland Ford and John Taber (R-NY) led the attack in the House of
Representatives. Ford derided the OCD for saying it desperately needed materials and money
while using funds for political and social pay-offs.57 During the discussion of the First
Deficiency Appropriation Bill 1942, Taber, the ranking Republican on the House Appropriations
Committee, heatedly denounced the “parasites” on the federal pay roll, particularly attacking
Harold Ickes and Frances Perkins before going through a list of figures in the OCD objectionable
54
Frank R. Kent, “Mayor Looks for Chance to Resign Post as Head of Defense,” Baltimore Sun 012842; “Mayor to
Quit OCD This Week,” New York Times (February 9, 1942): p.17.
55
“Mayris Chaney in OCD Post,” New York Times (February 5, 1942): p. 2. The story was first reported by
Christine Sadler of the Washington Post. She was a regular attendee at Eleanor’s women only press conferences.
Maurine Hoffman Beasley, Eleanor Roosevelt and the Media (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press,
1987), 144.
56
Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 232.
57
Leland M. Ford, “Employment in Office of Civilian Defense,” Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
(February 6, 1942): p. 1090.
82
to most Republicans. These included Bernard Dyckman, a former Mayor of St. Louis who had
been removed from office for maladministration, and who was on the payroll of OCD as U. S.
Inspector General at $6,500; Melvyn Douglas, he said, earned an annual salary of $8,000; Betty
Lindley, “the radio agent for the Sunday evening broadcast of Mrs. Roosevelt,” earned $6,500;
Mayris Chaney earned $4,600. Taber even went after Walt Disney, who had been allocated
$80,000 to make a Donald Duck film to persuade people to pay their income tax. “We cannot,”
Taber remonstrated, “have promotion of fan dancing and that kind of stuff and moving pictures
and such things to entertain the people at a time when we need the funds for national defense.”58
Unlike Ford, Taber was not an opponent of LaGuardia. He focused his criticisms entirely upon
the voluntary participation branch and noted that all of the questionable appointments had been
made in Eleanor’s branch.
Charles I. Faddis (D-PA) was the next to take aim at the OCD. Faddis had been a part of
the faction wanting the OCD under the War Department. His amendment to create an Assistant
Secretary of War for civilian defense failed by one vote. More importantly, Faddis opposed the
inclusion of those “whose loyalty to the Nation is, indeed, in many cases questionable.”59 Faddis
was outraged that the people hired to work under Eleanor Roosevelt made such exorbitant
salaries. Melvyn Douglas’ salary was as much as “that matchless and heroic soldier,” General
Douglas MacArthur. Mayris Chaney made twice what Captain Colin Kelly made, who gave his
life in the defense of the country.60 Phillip Allen Bennett (R-MO) declared “Mr. Chairman, if
this relatively unknown dancer is worth $4,600 per year, Sally Rand, strip-tease artist from my
own section down in Ozark Hills, near Flemington, Mo., ought to be employed at once because
she would, on this scale, be worth at least $25,000 per year to civilian defense.”61
The reaction to the Congressional barrage against Mayris Chaney was overwhelming.
Faddis reported that he had been “snowed under” by telegrams from air raid wardens
58
John Taber, “First Deficiency Appropriation Bill, Fiscal Year 1942,” Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
(February 6, 1942): p. 1094-95.
59
Charles I. Faddis, “First Deficiency Appropriation Bill, Fiscal Year 1942,” Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2nd
Sess., (February 6, 1942): p. 1094-1110.
60
Captain Colin Kelly was one of the first heroes of the war. From Madison, Florida, Kelly piloted his heavily
damaged B-17 bomber long enough during the Japanese attack on the Philippines for his crew to escape. The
bomber blew up as Kelly and his co-pilot was exiting the plane. His heroic action made national headlines and he
was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. “U.S. Flier Praised as a Hero in Death,” New York Times (December,
13, 1941): p. 6.
61
Phillip Allen Bennett, “First Deficiency Appropriation Bill, Fiscal Year 1942,” Congressional Record, 77th Cong.,
nd
2 Sess., (February 6, 1942): 1110.
83
commending his position.62 An FSA official said he wanted the physical fitness program in the
OCD to be moved to the recreation section of the Health and Welfare Division of the Federal
Security Administration. “But,” he concluded, “this does not mean we are taking on Mayris
Chaney.”63 Editorials throughout the country weighed in on the controversy, mostly opposing
Chaney, Douglas and the whole of the volunteer participation division. The Central Labor
Union, which had raised $82,000 by having each member donate a day’s wage, announced they
did not want any of their wages to be used to pay for “fan dancers.”64 Senator Millard Tydings
(D-MD) said he had received many letter saying they had stopped buying defense bonds and
stamps because of the appointments.65 After seeing the debate in the House the previous day,
three Legionnaires from Peoria sent a wire to Senator Scott Lucas, saying: “We are not directors
of strip tease artists but are available for service. Army preferred but if men not needed for
fighting can you place us on OCD pay roll? Nothing less than $5,000 salary considered if placed
on OCD but will work for beans and coffee in army. Is this a war or a burlesque show? Have
you contacted Gyspy Rose Lee yet?”66
Chaney responded to the harsh media criticism of her position saying she had never
received payment for her work with the OCD and the $4,600 figure was false.67 She also
asserted that it was John B. Kelley, the head of the Physical Fitness Division, not Eleanor who
had appointed her. Kelly supported Chaney on both assertions.68 Chaney told a physical
education sorority at Temple University that “fan dancing” had no place in any national defense
morale project. However, she defended her position arguing that during war the minds of small
children must be kept occupied and steps must be taken to guard against a breakdown in child
62
“Taber Threatened Over OCD Attacks,” New York Times (February 8, 1942): p. 34.
“McNutt Won’t Have Miss Chaney,” New York Times (February 12, 1941): p. 15.
64
Raymond Clapper, “Between You and Me,” Washington Post, February 9, 1942. Office of Civilian Defense,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
65
Frederick R. Barkley, “Landis Bars Plan to Drill Children,” New York Times (February 17,1942): p. 13.
66
“Vets Offer to Join OCD at $5,000 a Year-But No Strip Tease!” Chicago Tribune (February 7, 1942). Civilian
Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005. Sally Rand responded to all the attention by offering to work for
$25,000 or “gratis if the budget won’t stand it.” She even offered to change the name of her “fan dance” to the
“nude deal.” C.P. Trussell, “House Cuts ‘Frills,’ Passes OCD Bill Without Roll-Call,” New York Times (February
10, 1942): pp. 1, 13.
67
According to Landis, this was not entirely accurate. He told Congress that at the time of her resignation, Chaney
had been working on a salaried basis for a month and a half, receiving nearly $1000 in compensation for her work
and travel with the OCD. Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, Congressional
Record, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., Sen. Vol. 88 (February 27, 1942): 1070.
68
“Says Kelly Hired Her,” New York Times (February 7, 1942): p. 9.
63
84
health and morale during possible bombings.69 Douglas issued a statement on Feb 9th that far
from earning the $8,000 salary bandied about by his attackers, he had been working for free on a
volunteer basis.70 None of that seemed to matter to the opponents of the OCD.
LaGuardia, already on the way out of the OCD when the controversy erupted, tried to
distance himself from it. His only comment on the matter was that he had opposed the
assignment of Mayris Chaney to the OCD office in New York in December.71 Landis defended
Douglas’s appointment, made before he took over, but admitted he only knew of Chaney from
the newspapers.72 Eleanor responded to questions about the desirability of having a physical
fitness program within OCD by saying she had no control over such things. The program had
been placed there during OCD’s formation. She had nothing to do with that decision.73 This
was a pattern for her throughout the controversy, where she repeatedly denied culpability in the
decisions of the organization. Her denials did not help her cause, however. Instead, it just made
the OCD look incompetent.
When questioned about Chaney and Lash, Mrs. Roosevelt became distraught and angry
about the attacks on herself and her friends. The women that constituted the regular circle of
journalists in the women-only press conferences held by the First Lady, had noted the change in
Eleanor’s demeanor during the co-ed news conferences held in the OCD offices on Dupont
Circle.74 She responded to the harsh criticism of Congress on Feb. 9th saying that she had no
power to hire or fire in the OCD. She had recommended Mayris Chaney, whose talents would,
she believed, benefit the program. She had neither recommended, nor hired Melvyn Douglas.
Eleanor defended the inclusion of physical fitness programs in the OCD saying “To win the war
on the production side we must cut down the number of man hours lost by illness and accidents.
To win the war on the military side, we must improve the health of our young men.” She
69
“Fan Dancing ‘Frivolous’,” New York Times (February 15, 1942): p. 26.
C.P. Trussell, “House Cuts ‘Frills,’ Passes OCD Bill Without Roll-Call,” New York Times (February 10, 1942):
pp. 1, 13. Landis later explained “the popular error…arose from a curios classification in which the civil service
indulges, which I think is quite justifiable but not quite understandable by the lay public. That is, they classify a
man who works without compensation on a theoretical base-the theoretical case in Mr. Douglas’ case being $8,000 a
year, but he works there without compensation, W.O.C., which means that he is entitled to transportation costs and
$10 a day for subsistence purposes when he is at work.” James Landis, “Joint Committee on Reduction of
Nonessential Federal Expenditures,” Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., Sen. Vol. 88 (February 27, 1942):
1060-61.
71
“Mayor Opposed Miss Chaney,” New York Times (February 10, 1942): p. 13.
72
Frederick R. Barkley, “Landis Bars Plan to Drill Children,” New York Times (February 17,1942): p. 13.
73
Maurine Hoffman Beasley, ed., The White House Press Conferences of Eleanor Roosevelt (New York: Garland
Publishing, Inc., 1983), 264-73.
74
Beasley, Eleanor Roosevelt and the Media, 140-48.
70
85
welcomed the chance to speak before Congress and to meet individually with them to discuss
their opposition to her work with the OCD, an offer none of the Congressmen took up.75
There were many calls for the First Lady to resign. One article entered into the
Congressional Record said “no one can take the agency seriously while she is a part of it.” New
York Assemblyman Malcolm Wilson introduced a resolution calling on the President to have his
wife replaced.76 Frank Kent, ever a critic of the Roosevelts, said that despite “a large volume of
opinion to the contrary,” Eleanor is convinced she is doing a fine job. “The confusion to which
she adds and the resentment she has created altogether escapes her.” No one in the organization
is in a position to tell the wife of the president she is not wanted and she ignores all printed
suggestions as prejudiced by unworthy people. Her critical remarks on segregation of colored
women in the American Red Cross first aid classes have not helped her cause.77
There had been some counterarguments to the attacks on Chaney, Douglas and Eleanor.
Samuel Grafton of the New York Post wrote that “They burnt Mayris Chaney at the stake in
Congress last week.” Chaney’s appointment, he argued, was a well-intentioned mistake.
Chaney was the target of anger because it gave the opponents of the previous ten years
something easy to focus on. “It was wrong of Mrs. Roosevelt to have you appointed, child; an
act of friendship, kindness lacking in reserve and dignity; and they have you there, and they have
Mrs. Roosevelt there. But that is not why they are so furious with you nor why Congress spends
an afternoon debating your name. They need you, girl. For down below, the thing is still
smoldering, the hatred of the last eight years, of the galling march of social change, so intimately
connected with the name of Roosevelt.”78
Some Representatives were angry about the entire charade. John C. Nichols (D-OK), a
former actor, denounced the House for “putting on a burlesque show.” Thomas F. Ford (D-CA),
defended Douglas against the charges laid out by Leland Ford, reading the letter that had brought
the film-maker out to Washington, DC, which stated clearly that he would serve without
compensation.79 Senator Sheridan Downey (D-CA) was particularly vociferous in his defense of
Douglas, whose detractors “relied more on clamor than on clarity, more on accusation than on
75
“Hearing Is Asked For By Mrs. Roosevelt,” New York Times (February 10, 1942): p. 13.
“First Lady Ouster Urged,” New York Times (February 10, 1942): p. 13.
77
Frank R. Kent, “Mayor Looks for Chance to Resign Post as Head of Defense,” Baltimore Sun (January 28, 1942).
Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
78
Samuel Grafton, “I’d Rather Be Right,” New York Post, (February 11, 1942).
79
C.P. Trussell, “House Cuts ‘Frills,’ Passes OCD Bill Without Roll-Call,” New York Times (February 10, 1942):
pp. 1, 13.
76
86
accuracy.” “They have characterized him a Communist,” Downey explained, “when it has been
obvious to any California newspaper reader that he has fought Reds and their policies for many
years past. They have implied he obtained his post because he was one of Mrs. Roosevelt’s
protégés-as if he were some waif in need of a job,” when he made hundreds of thousands of
dollars every year as an actor. He took issue with Congressman Faddis, who had the “temerity
and bad taste” to compare Douglas’ alleged and inaccurate $8,000 salary to that of Douglas
MacArthur. Downey caustically invited the public instead to compare Faddis’ $10,000 salary to
the general’s. “I doubt if the Congressman could stand the comparison quite as happily as could
Mr. Douglas.”80
Clarence Cannon (D-MO), Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, protested that the
fight on OCD activities had been a colossal waste of time when the real enemy was bearing
down on Bataan and Singapore. Perhaps most important was the criticism of Clifton A.
Woodrum (D-VA), who pointed out that the provisions of the amendment were meaningless
because not “one farthing” of the $100,000,000 appropriation could be used for salary anyways.
Their salaries came from an earlier appropriation to the Office of Emergency Management.81
The House passed an amended version of the Appropriations Bill, which specifically
forbid use of OCD funds for “instructions in physical fitness by dancers, fan dancing, street
shows, theatrical performances or other public entertainment.” When the Bill reached the
Senate, the House amendment was upheld. Though the amendment did absolutely nothing for
civilian defense, the furor it inspired led to a reorganization of the OCD. As he promised in
January, LaGuardia resigned his position as director on February 10th, after he finished a report
to the President on the general status of the OCD.82
At the Farm and Home Week exercises at Cornell University, Eleanor announced that
when the participation branch of OCD has been thoroughly organized, a process she expected to
finish within a week or two, she would step down. “I realize how unwise it is for a vulnerable
person like myself to try a government job.”83 She continued to defend Douglas and Chaney and
the job completed by herself and LaGuardia in establishing the OCD. “I don’t know whether
80
Sheridan Downey on Employment of Melvyn Douglas in O. C. D., Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess.,
Sen. Vol. 88 (February 9, 1942): 1126-28.
81
Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess., Sen. Vol. 88 (February 9, 1942): 1147-50.
82
Fiorello LaGuardia, “Report of the Director of the Office of Civilian Defense” (February 10, 1942). RG 287:
Publications of the Federal Government, Beginning Pr 32.4401-Pr 32.4402, Box Pr 272. NARA II
83
Libby Lackman, “First Lady Says She Will Quit OCD,” New York Times (February 13, 1942): p. 1.
87
you are aware of it or not, but when Mayor La Guardia started the people of the country did not
think there was much sense to it. They thought an air raid was about as far from this country as
something that happened in a Jules Verne novel.” By remaining she would only be allowing
those who wished to attack her for her beliefs to take aim at the OCD. “No Individual is more
important than a good program. I feel that [the OCD] is and will be a program vital to the wellbeing of the people of the country.”84 She resigned on February 22nd.
The animosity toward Eleanor Roosevelt within veteran circles did not die down with her
resignation. In April, the First Lady spoke at a large conference for women’s institutions of
higher learning at Wellesley College. One of the topics she discussed, the “Impact of the War on
the Citizen,” allegedly said veterans of World War I were responsible for the new conflagration
because when they returned home they lost touch with their communities and only looked after
their own selfish interests. She warned her listeners to get together in blocs to aid soldiers
returning from this war lest they form a group hostile to the community. Veterans were
outraged.85 Although Mrs. Roosevelt spoke only from notes, to which the press covering the
event did not have access, this version of her words circulated throughout veteran groups across
the country. That her words were taken out of context (she was speaking not about American
veterans but about veterans around the world), did not matter. Like the myth surrounding Jane
Fonda’s trip to Vietnam in the 1960s, it became impossible to eradicate the story that Mrs.
Roosevelt had betrayed American veterans in the minds of Legionnaires and other veterans.
Though veterans as a whole strongly supported FDR throughout the war, they continued to
heavily criticize his wife for years to come.
In her “My Day” column on February 23rd, Eleanor acknowledged the assessments by
the New York Herald Tribune and New York Times, calling the editorials on her resignation
“valid criticism.” She admitted that the spouse of the President could never be an individual in
the eyes of other government workers. Fairly or unfairly, her views and policies were always
tied to the power of the White House, making government employment impossible, even on a
volunteer basis.86 Although she spoke of her resignation as a personal choice, columnist
Westbrook Pegler exclaimed, “she didn’t leave her job, but was stormed out of it by public
84
OCD, Press Release, February 20, 1942. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
“Mrs. Roosevelt Talks,” The West Virginia Legionnaire Vol. 18, No. 2, 051042. Civilian Defense, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
86
Eleanor Roosevelt, My Day: The Best of Eleanor Roosevelt’s Acclaimed Newspaper Columns, 1936-1962, ed. By
David Emblidge (Da Capo Press, 2001), 67-68.
85
88
opinion.”87 While many sympathized with the difficulties she faced as a woman whose every
action and word are scrutinized by the public because of her marriage, there were just as many
who agreed with the public criticism she encountered. Kathy Hogan, a west coast journalist,
whose column “The Kitchen Critic,” was popular throughout the 1940s, argued that the
treatment of the first lady in her role in the OCD was entirely justified. Mrs. Roosevelt had used
an “artificial stimulus”, in the form of Presidential influence, to achieve specific social interests,
where other social reformers had been forced to “take a firm grip on the bottom rung of the
ladder, set their teeth with determination, and start the long slow climb to the top.” Eleanor’s
reflection in My Day that “we are not yet ready to accept the idea of a president’s wife actually
participating in the government,” was met by a stern rapprochement from Hogan.88 She
compared the position of First Lady to that of the Queens of England: the independent views
held by women in both positions, she argued, should be kept to themselves and their intimate
acquaintances.89
However, Eleanor Roosevelt continued to defend her role in the OCD and its foundation
in the ideologies of the New Deal in the weeks following her resignation, castigating the “small
and very vocal group of unenlightened men” who had assailed her.90 Her fear of the privileged
class rolling back the New Deal in the war effort proved well-founded. Congress and the
country were no longer interested in social improvement programs in defense programs.
However, her influence was not entirely erased from America’s civilian defense programs.
Though Mrs. Roosevelt was publicly crucified for her efforts to include morale in civilian
defense, the American Legion’s Air Raid Warden Instruction training program stressed civilian
morale as much a civilian protection. Air Raid Warden instructors were urged to emphasize
purchase of war stamps and bonds and maintaining positive views of the war effort in addition to
instructional duties in their local training programs.91
87
Kathy Hogan, Cohassett Beach Chronicles: World War II in the Pacific Northwest, ed. by Klancy Clark de
Nevers and Lucy Hart (Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press, 1995), 19.
88
Roosevelt, My Day, 68.
89
Hogan, Cohassett Beach Chronicles, 21.
90
Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember (New York: Harper & Bros., 1949), 250.
91
“Texas American Legion Warden Instructors Schools,” undated. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
89
4.4 The American Legion and the New Leadership of the OCD
The day before Eleanor Roosevelt resigned her position, her husband signed the
$100,000,000 Appropriations Bill into law. However, that did not end Congress’ interrogations
of the OCD. The attacks to that point had mostly originated in the House of Representatives. On
February 23rd, the Senate took aim at the new leadership. Senators Millard Tydings (D-MD) and
Bennett Champ Clark (D-MO) independently introduced bills (77 S. 2300 and 77 S. 2301,
respectively) to transfer the protective phases of the OCD to the War Department.92 Clark’s bill
is noteworthy because it included a provision that recommended the Secretary of War avail
himself to the services, as individuals or organizations, of the American Legion, VFW, Disabled
American Veterans, Spanish American War Veterans and any other organization of veterans, to
serve as the nucleus of the new national civilian defense apparatus.
This was not the first time that veterans had been proposed for this role. There were even
suggestions that the American Legion should take over civilian defense entirely. A doctor from
Michigan suggested to the President that the National Commander of the American Legion
should become the head of the OCD. The Legion, he argued, extends “into every city, village
and hamlet of the United States, and which consists of men who are used to working under fire,
used to giving and used to taking orders.” Congressman Roy O. Woodruff (R-MI) endorsed the
idea, and not just perfunctorily, saying, “I believe the American Legion as an organization would
get behind this activity in a most effective and thorough matter.”93 In his assault on the OCD in
the House, Faddis had argued that civilian defense should be staffed by military veterans under
army direction.94 The Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), he said, “would gladly take
directions from retired Army and Navy officers, but they’re not going to be told how to protect
people from air raids by the screw balls and nitwits we have there now.”95 Fred Bradley even
92
“Bills and Joint Resolutions Introduced,” Congressional Records, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., Sen. Vol. 88 (February 23,
1942): 1509-10. Representative Faddis also introduced a similar measure, H.R. 6647 in the House. “Public Bills and
Resolutions,” Congressional Records, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., House Vol. 88 (February 23, 1942): 1531.
93
Letter, Roy O. Woodruff (Congressman, 10th District, Michigan) to Franklin Roosevelt, January 14, 1942. RG
171, Box 20: American Legion 080, Folder II: January 1 - February 28, 1942. NARA II. Roosevelt had LaGuardia
respond to Woodruff. Letter, Franklin Roosevelt to Fiorello LaGuardia, January 16, 1942. RG 171, Box 20:
American Legion 080, Folder II: January 1 - February 28, 1942. NARA II. One can only imagine how galling it
must have been for the Mayor to have to answer a letter to a Congressman who has suggested someone else is better
suited for his job. But the Legion would be the least of his challengers.
94
“New OCD Branch Put Under Daniels” New York Times (Feb 24 1942). Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 91-7005.
95
“Congress Starts Action to Put OCD Under Army,” Chicago Sun (February 24, 1942): p. 3. Civilian Defense,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
90
went so far as to suggest bringing General John J. Pershing out of retirement as head of civilian
defense. Veterans would volunteer, he declared, in droves to serve under their old commander
once more.96 Though these suggestions had been made, Clark’s bill was the first to include it as
a provision of a bill.
The Legion’s position was a difficult one. Though individual Legionnaires and some
departments and posts made their views known, as an organization the Legion tried to stay above
the fray. Since its beginning in 1919, the Legion had endeavored to avoid partisanship and to be
apolitical in all issues not directly related to veterans’ welfare and national defense. Given the
strong opinions of Legionnaires on most political matters and the decidedly conservative nature
of the organization, the American Legion was not always successful in maintaining the image of
non-partisanship. In the OCD’s crisis in January and February of 1942, they found such
neutrality complicated by the fact that many Legionnaires agreed with the Congressional
criticisms of the OCD and many believed veterans should be the predominant corps within
civilian defense.
Warren Atherton, responding to Bryce Beard’s report on the Aircraft Warning Service
(AWS) in North Carolina, told Beard that he “heartily agree[d] with [Beard’s] suggestion that
AWS be divorced from OCD.” He also stated that people prefer to work under military
discipline and would perform better with a straight military line of command. However, the
Legion could not come out in favor of such proposals because at the height of the Congressional
debates, National Commander Stambaugh was meeting with the President and Landis in
Washington DC to secure specific assignments for civilian defense activities for the Legion. The
National Defense Committee did not want to embarrass the National Commander by issuing a
drastic resolution against the OCD leadership, so it tempered its resolutions.97
Frank Samuel, the National Adjutant, worried about the Legion taking a role in OCD’s
destruction. Since Stambaugh’s agreement with Landis and Roosevelt in January, the National
Headquarters had been following a path of mutual cooperation with OCD. Like Atherton,
Samuel believed Legion support of the Tydings and Clark bills would be embarrassing to
96
Civilian Defense Legislation, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2d sess., (January 19, 1942): 469-480. Pershing
was at the time 81 years old and suffering severe heart trouble that had more than once led to deathwatches across
the country. Though nominally on active duty due to an Act of Congress, Pershing spent much of the war in a
special ward of Walter Reed Hospital.
97
Letter, Warren Atherton to Bryce P. Beard, February 11, 1942. Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 91-7003.
91
Stambaugh and the Legionnaires in high-ranking positions within the OCD. It could also be
disastrous to the training program already in place.98 Milt Campbell worried the Legion might
go too far in its support of the Senate bills. In a letter to Atherton, he wrote that there were
benefits and disadvantages to either path the Legion took. However, Campbell was clear that he
wanted to “see them wreck the participation branch of OCD.” He elaborated: “I don’t mean to
transfer the activities, I mean to stop them one hundred percent.”99 Atherton was then on his
way to DC, where he hoped to arrange a meeting with Tydings and Clark and get a bill
introduced that combined their ideas. Atherton had discussed the potential War Department
takeover with Stambaugh and believed the Legion would benefit most from doing all in its
power to help the OCD but if it appeared that in spite of that help the OCD was not working, the
Legion could properly advocate a different setup.100
The caution of the leaders in Indianapolis paid off to a degree. Though they were never
truly satisfied with the civilian defense setup under OCD, they correctly gauged the mood in
Washington. Roosevelt did not seem at all inclined to transfer the protective services from the
OCD and Stimson had repeatedly stated his opposition to the plans in Congress. Without the
support of those two, it was unlikely that explicit Legion support for such measures would have
been beneficial in any way. Instead, the National Commander had focused his attentions on
creating a satisfactory role in civilian defense.
Landis’ efforts to create a constructive, working relationship with the American Legion
had also paid off. Though many Legionnaires continued to harbor resentment about the Bridges
case, Landis’ alterations within the OCD had mollified most of them. Warren Atherton, who
attributed most of his criticisms of the OCD to the lack of definitive line of command, was
hopeful that the promotion of Landis would result in many of the OCD’s problems being
addressed.101 As Luther Huston noted in the New York Times, the “horde of former mayors,
earnest social workers and fumbling ‘do-gooders’” faded from the OCD after Landis took over.
98
Letter, Frank Samuel to Ray Murphy, March 30, 1942. Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7003.
99
Letter, Milt Campbell to Warren Atherton, March 31, 1942. Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 91-7003.
100
Letter, Warren Atherton to Milt Campbell, March 24, 1942. Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 91-7003.
101
Letter, Warren Atherton to Bryce P. Beard, February 11, 1942. Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 91-7003.
92
The turnover had cause turmoil and some inefficiency, but it proved to be temporary and on the
whole, Huston said, was accepted as a necessary inconvenience.102
4.5 The New Look of the OCD
The OCD transformed significantly under the direction of James Landis. During his
administration, most of the programs that were attacked in the press and Congress were purged
or transferred to other federal agencies. Within days of his promotion, he had abolished the
Office of the Inspector General and the “Know Your Government” Divisions of the OCD saying
“they have no further value.”103 He transferred the Physical Fitness Division to the Office of
Health, Defense, and Welfare Services under Paul McNutt.104 Though he did not end youth
activities entirely within the OCD, he eliminated the Division of Youth Activities as a separate
division working exclusively with youth. Many of the people brought in under Mrs. Roosevelt’s
administration left in the days after her resignation. One spokesman for the OCD admitted,
“There were resignations and a terrible turnover. The people had been given distorted pictures of
what the OCD was doing. That was unfortunate from every stand point.”105 One of the first to
leave was Henry Morgenthau Jr.’s wife Elinor. Long a friend of the Roosevelts, she severed her
connection with the OCD at the end of January when the First Lady began her plans to resign.
She had been serving as Assistant to Mrs. Roosevelt on a voluntary, unsalaried basis since
September.106
Mayris Chaney had resigned her own position as well, ending the most “disreputable”
appointment within the OCD.107 Triumphant Republican Congressmen gleefully marked her
departure. Leland Ford said “At no time did I question Miss Chaney’s ability in her own line,
nor did I criticize Mrs. Roosevelt, but OCD should begin to perform the functions for which it
was originally created-namely the saving of life and property.” Clare Hoffman commended
102
Luther Huston, “Barber-Wire Boss of the OCD,” The New York Times Magazine (May 31, 1942): pp. 11, 21.
Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
103
“Landis Abolishes Two Divisions,” New York Times (February 19, 1942): p. 9.
104
Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2nd
Sess., Sen. Vol. 88 (February 27, 1942): 1122.
105
Marcia Winn, “It’s Still the Same Old OCD, Ruled By Bickering, Confusion.” Washington, DC Times Herald
(June 10, 1942). Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
106
On Elinor Morgenthau’s friendship with Eleanor Roosevelt see Maurine Hoffman Beasley, Holly Cowan
Shulman, Henry R. Beasley, The Eleanor Roosevelt Encyclopedia (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group,
2001), 344-49.
107
John H. Overton (D-LA), quoted in Frederick R. Barkley, “Landis Bars Plan to Drill Children,” New York Times
(February 17,1942): p. 13.
93
Chaney for her patriotism, but saw the resignation of Eleanor Roosevelt and her “protégés” as a
great victory. John Taber smugly said “I hope those in charge [of OCD] will confine themselves
only to those things the law permits. If they do that they’ll have enough to do.”108
The Volunteer Participation Division was renamed the Civilian Mobilization Division.
Jonathan Daniels was appointed to replace the First Lady. Daniels was the son of former
Secretary of the Navy and Ambassador to Mexico, Josephus Daniels, and an editor of the
Raleigh News and Observer and Fortune Magazine.109 Though the tasks of Daniels’ division
were significantly reduced under Landis, it still directed community endeavors, such as housing,
nutrition, salvage, home nursing, defense saving stamp sales, and recreation. Though
controversial, Daniels and Landis kept Melyvn Douglas on staff as head of the Arts Council.110
Eleanor publicly supported Daniels, hoping he would keep alive some of her programs.111
Landis proved to be very effective in centralizing power in civilian defense. The greatest
weakness of the organization under LaGuardia had been the lack of power within the OCD to
issue binding orders. That had been one of the reasons many Legionnaires wished to see military
control of civilian defense. The defined chain of command within the armed forces meant that
orders at the top would be carried out, a requisite for effective defense. When he first took over,
Landis inherited the decentralized system originally in place under LaGuardia. State defense
councils were largely autonomous and most OCD suggestions were met with harsh responses.
The $100,000,000 appropriation changed all of that. Landis began to withhold or threaten to
withhold defense supplies from those councils that refused to acquiesce to his demands. The
supplies and funds acquired from that appropriation gave Landis all the authority he needed to
ensure that defense councils followed his directives. This may have been the case in New York
City, where Mayor LaGuardia angrily accused Landis of willfully withholding defense supplies
to gain compliance. The OCD brushed aside the criticism, saying the city had not received the
supplies because of shortages in materials, priorities for supplying the west coast and the WPB is
108
“Landis Abolishes Two Divisions,” New York Times (February 19, 1942): p. 9.
“New OCD Branch Put Under Daniels” New York Times (February 24, 1942. Civilian Defense, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
110
Marcia Winn, “It’s Still the Same Old OCD, Ruled By Bickering, Confusion.” Washington, DC Times Herald
(June 10, 1942). Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
111
“New OCD Branch Put Under Daniels” New York Times (February 24, 1942. Civilian Defense, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
109
94
holding up many of the requests.112 It showed, however, that to get supplies made scarce by cost
and availability, cities and towns had to obey the OCD.
At Landis’ behest, Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9134, in April 1942,
further reorganizing the OCD.113 The 45-member voluntary participation committee, heavily
stocked with people favorable to Eleanor Roosevelt, was replaced with an eight member Civilian
Defense Board. Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of Navy Knox, Attorney General Francis
Biddle, McNutt (representing the Office of Defense, Health and Welfare Services), Norman H.
Davis, (chairman of the American Red Cross), Governor Harold Stassen of Minnesota,
(representing state governments), and Mayor Maurice J. Tobin of Boston (representing the large
cities) constituted the new Board. This gave Landis an advisory board composed of the heads of
all the most important agencies related to civilian defense and allowed all those most interested
with the work of the OCD to have a voice in the organization. It also helped alleviate, though
not entirely avoid, many of the conflicts between government agencies that had hampered the
previous administration.114 The Executive Order also simplified the nationwide volunteer effort
into a single chain of relation with the national government. Federal agencies needing civilian
volunteers were to get them by applying to the OCD, which would then make requests for
volunteers through the state and local councils of defense.115 Commentators within the Beltway
suggested that the expression of the President’s full confidence in Landis by issuing the
executive order he desired greatly strengthened Landis’ position.116 Coupled with his
discretionary power over civilian defense expenditures, Landis had successfully established his
position firmly atop civilian defense.
Landis’ promotion and subsequent gutting of the Voluntary Participation Division did not
end criticism of the OCD. Congressman Faddis assailed Landis as a “White House handy man,”
112
Marcia Winn, “It’s Still the Same Old OCD, Ruled By Bickering, Confusion.” Washington, DC Times Herald
(June 10, 1942). Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
113
Executive Order no. 9134, Federal Regulations, title 7, sec. 2962, (April 18, 1942).
114
Eleanor Roosevelt complained bitterly about the rivalries between government agencies and obstructions they
imposed upon the OCD to protect what their directors believed to be their spheres of power. See Lash, Eleanor and
Franklin, 645.
115
National Publicity Division, American Legion Press Release: “OCD Strengthened,” April 20, 1942. Civilian
Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
116
National Publicity Division, American Legion Press Release: “OCD Strengthened,” April 20, 1942. Civilian
Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
95
and said “His latest housecleaning of OCD was a farce.”117 Landis came under fire for the
continued employment of Melvyn Douglas as coordinator of civilian defense work of writers,
actors, and artists. The Washington Post ran an article saying that Landis “does himself no
favors with part time appointments which give the OCD the air of an unbusinesslike and
amateurishness which harms it.”118 Senator McKellar said Douglas’ appointment made the OCD
seem “a mighty poor kind of civilian defense and I wouldn’t vote for any defense involving it.”
Landis, refusing to back down, retorted: “Then you would be losing this potentially great
contribution to the war effort.” Douglas had been called upon to determine the best uses that
could be made in the defense program of the services of artists and writers who had volunteered
to “portray what this war means and what people should do to win the war.”119
On February 27th, Landis faced even tougher opposition in his testimony before the Joint
Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures. Senator McKellar sat on that
committee and angrily rebuked Landis for what he felt was duplicity in the Director’s earlier
Congressional testimony. At issue was the continued employment of people like Daniel Lang,
whose job it was to go around the country digging up stories about civilian defense to be used in
public consumption. McKellar said Lang’s employment was in direct violation of the law
established Jan. 27th, which prohibited the $100,000,000 appropriation from being used for
educational purposes. Landis replied that the funding paying Lang’s salary did not come from
that appropriation, but from other sources, (presumably the OEM funds that had always covered
the OCD’s salaries). McKellar said Landis misrepresented himself in earlier hearings by not
making clear he would use other funds to continue to pay people like Lang. Landis said he had
stated clearly he would not use the $100,000,000 to pay the salaries and had not mentioned or
implied anything related to other funding sources. Until Congress passed provisions on those
other sources, he would continue to determine his budgets within the confines of the law.120
McKellar was quite put out by Landis’ statements.
117
“Congress Starts Action to Put OCD Under Army,” Chicago Sun (February 24, 1942): p. 3. Civilian Defense,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005. Taber, “First Deficiency Appropriation Bill, Fiscal Year 1942,”
Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., (February 6, 1942): p. 1094-1110.
118
“OCD Shortcomings,” Washington Post (February 5, 1942). Office of Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 91-7003.
119
Frederick R. Barkley, “Landis Bars Plan to Drill Children,” New York Times (February 17,1942): p. 13.
120
Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2nd
Sess., Sen. Vol. 88 (February 27, 1942): 1062-66, 1070.
96
McKellar also assaulted Landis’ interpretation of the OCD’s mandate. The Senator, and
many other anti-Roosevelt Congressmen, believed the sole job of the OCD was to protect against
air raids and bombs and nothing more. Landis, quoting the original Executive Order from May
1941, replied that McKellar was wrong. The order authorized the OCD to “consider proposals,
suggest plans, and promote activities designed to sustain the national morale and to provide
opportunities for constructive civilian participation in the defense program.” The activities of the
Civilian Mobilization Board were within the confines of that statement, he argued. McKellar
warned Landis that he would use all of his power as a Senator to fight Landis’ interpretation of
his job.121
Despite McKellar’s threat and the advocacy of OCD opponents for a transfer of civilian
defense to the War Department, which continued into the summer of 1942, Landis’
modifications within the OCD ended the cacophonous derision the agency faced from December
1941 to February 1942. Landis may not have been the best man for the job, as Frank Kent had
argued, but he had moved with deliberation to eliminate the offending programs and individuals,
had successfully courted the American Legion leadership assuring their neutrality during the
Congressional debates, brought an end to serious consideration of terminating the agency. The
Legion, for better or worse, was firmly devoted to the OCD. It had secured the great role in war
mobilization it had fought so long to achieve.
121
Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2nd
Sess., Sen. Vol. 88 (February 27, 1942): 1121.
97
CHAPTER FIVE
THE AMERICAN LEGION AT WAR
The OCD emerged from its tumultuous reorganization in February 1942 with new leadership, a
limited mandate focused primarily on protective services, and a monumental task of training
millions of civilians to carry out national defense. The agreement between James Landis and
Lynn Stambaugh at the White House in January ensured the Legion would have a major role in
that training. For the next two hectic years the Legion and OCD worked in tandem to set up
civilian defense schools in key areas. They faced a monumental task to train hundreds of
thousands of volunteers as Air Raid Wardens and obtaining supplies to distribute in time to
defense against an invasion or air raid.
First, however, there was tremendous confusion over the role of the OCD in civilian
defense, as well as uncertainty among Legionnaires as to their place within the OCD, which
needed to be cleared up. Because the civilian defense system was so new and its leadership in
chaos in the first months of the war, the American public was often ignorant of which
government agency they were meant to apply to for their supplies. Many Legionnaires believed
the OCD was the government agency in charge of civilian defense. So early in the war the OCD
and War Department received hundreds of requests for instructional materials and defense
supplies from every level of the American Legion and from the defense councils. For example,
Lew Sisselman, the Chief Air Observer in Liberty, New York sent LaGuardia a letter in January
1942 requesting a wide variety of supplies (field glasses, car stickers, arm bands for observers on
duty) for his Legion Post, which had established 24-hour air observation watches.1 Joseph
Squiccairini of Jamaica, New York wrote to Landis in March 1942 declaring that his Legion
Post’s mobilization plan for civilian defense had plenty of manpower, but needed help with
supplies from the OCD.2 Such requests inundated the OCD in the first five months of the war.
1
Letter, Lew Sisselman (Chief Air Observer) to Fiorello LaGuardia, undated, sometime early 1942. RG 171, Box
20: American Legion 080, Folder II: January 1 - February 28, 1942. NARA II.
2
Letter, Joseph Squiccairini (General Chairman, Hillcrest Post No. 1078) to James Landis, March 12, 1942. RG
171, Box 20, Folder I: March 1942. NARA II.
98
Dudley demanded to Campbell that all contact with the OCD go through the Legion’s chain of
command. The only correspondence for material requests from the OCD needed to go through
the National Headquarters and then through Dudley. He also insisted that no post or departments
contact the Chemical Warfare Service or the Signal Corps for school material directly.3 This
went a long way toward streamlining the process of material requests.
Within the Legion too, there was much confusion over the Legion’s role in civilian
defense. Legionnaires knew the Legion had been assigned an important task within the OCD,
but they lacked clarity on what that role was.4 Although the Legion had settled its role in
January, it took quite some time for the agreement to be understood at the postal level. And
although the Legion headquarters were happy with the concession they won to run the Air Raid
Warden schools, not all Legionnaires were happy to serve as individuals in all other civilian
defense activities. By May 1942, however, the confusion about the OCD and Legion’s role seem
to have been resolved. Over 650,000 Legionnaires had enlisted in civilian defense activities by
that point.
Table 5.1 American Legion
Civilian Defense Activities through May 20, 19425
Air Raid Wardens
279,391
Aircraft Warning Service
97,878
First Aid Trained
32,375
Auxiliary Police
30,671
Auxiliary Firefighters
16,554
Volunteers for the FBI and Department of Justice
30,000
Other Civilian Defense Activities
166,853
Total
653,722
The Air Raid Warden Schools was the most important program within the American Legion’s
civilian defense efforts because it was the one task to which they were assigned as an
organization.
3
Letter, Henry Dudley to Milt Campbell, March 16, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder I: March 1942. NARA II.
See for example, Letter, James R. Durfee (Chairman, Department of Wisconsin National Defense Committee) to
All Post Commanders, December 17, 1941; Letter, Sam Brolund (Kansas National Executive Committeeman) to
Harry Keener (Post Commander, Kansas), February 13, 1942. Council of Defense State and Local, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
5
Letter, Lynn U. Stambaugh (National Commander) to Franklin Roosevelt, May 21, 1942. President’s Personal File
350: American Legion, 1942-1945. FDRL.
4
99
5.1 Organization of the Air Raid Warden Schools
In order to train enough volunteers, the OCD set up a three-tiered education program at
the region, state, and county/city levels. The first tier’s initial focus was on training volunteers
who could serve as instructors for their home states. Many of the first instructors received
training at the Federal Chemical Warfare School at Amherst, Massachusetts.6 Subsequent
training classes were held at institutions of higher learning like South Dakota State, Texas A&M,
Stanford University, and Peabody College in Nashville, Tennessee.7 Many of the instructors
trained within the first tier were drawn from volunteers who had experience as college and
university educators. In Tennessee for instance, the State Coordinator for Civilian Defense, Will
Manier, contacted the state’s educational authorities to get the eleven colleges and universities to
each send two to five faculty members to the OCD school at Peabody College in early April.8
The Legion and OCD did not just want people who knew the civilian defense materials; they
needed instructors who would know how to teach the materials to others.9 The War Department,
not the Legion, conducted the school in Amherst and this was true also of many of the initial
training schools held at the regional level. The American Legion and OCD did not have
sufficient numbers of trained personnel to conduct the first tier classes. However, Legionnaires
were heavily represented in those classes.10 At Texas A&M, for example, approximately 60% of
the instructors trained were Legionnaires.11 People applied to be instructors and were brought
into the schools with the express expectation that they would hold classes of their own to train
6
“American Legion Department Questionnaire, Texas,” undated. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
7
“State Report Civilian Air Raid Warden Training Program,” undated. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005; Letter, Guy H. May (Department Adjutant, Tennessee) to Milt Campbell,
March 27, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005; “Tennessee
Training Schools for Civilian Defense,” March 28, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005; Letter, J. D. Mullaney (Department of South Dakota, Adjutant) to Milt Campbell,
April 23, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005; J.D.
Mullaney, “Air Raid Warden School,” June 27, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
8
Letter, Guy H. May (Department Adjutant, Tennessee) to Milt Campbell, March 27, 1942. Civilian Defense,
Training Reports By State, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
9
Will R. Manier, Jr., “Tennessee State Training Program for OCD,” March 28, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training
Reports By State, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
10
Letter, Guy H. May (Department Adjutant, Tennessee) to Warren Atherton, March 30, 1942. Civilian Defense,
Training Reports By State, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
11
Hayward C.Hosch (Field Secretary, Fourth Civilian Defense Region) “Report on State of Texas, American Legion
Air Raid Warden Training Program,” July 25, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
100
instructors at the second and third tiers within each state. Much of the first tier training took
place between March and June of 1942.
There were some problems experienced in the first tier. The Legion wanted their men
trained before non-Legionnaires so they could get their schools established. But they were
having trouble getting Legionnaires into the official training program because the Army did not
necessarily prioritize Legionnaire training over others. The Army Chemical Warfare Service,
which oversaw the courses, restricted the number attending their schools and allocated regional
quotas based on the vulnerability of attack. It did not make exceptions for the Legion’s training
program.12 As Executive Director of the Division of National Defense, Milt Campbell led the
Legion’s civilian defense programs. He met with James Landis on February 28th to resolve the
problem and the OCD chief had agreed to do what he could to get the Legion’s men into Air
Raid Warden training as soon as possible.13 Landis had asked Campbell for a list of the
Legionnaires needing training first, but before Campbell could send the list, Henry Dudley, by
then firmly established as the head of the OCD’s Veterans Division, had advised Landis that the
OCD could not override the Army’s defensive training priorities and the Legion would have to
apply through the regular channels.14
There were a few departments that were not eager to take part in the Air Raid Warden
training program. In Washington, Fred M. Fueker, the Department Adjutant, was reluctant to
send Legionnaires in the state to the training program being held at Stanford University.
Campbell was incredulous that a department in such a vulnerable state would not take part in the
program.15 Fueker defended his actions, arguing that Stanford was too far away from
Washington and would cost $150-200 for each Legionnaire. The Department of Washington did
not have the resources that the larger, wealthier departments of the middle and eastern states had.
The State Defense Council of Washington had refused to contribute to the estimated $2,000 cost
of sending a contingent of Legionnaires to the university in Palo Alto, California. Fueker’s
response to Campbell also reveals the bitterness many Legionnaires felt about civilian defense:
“Personally, to me, [Legion control of the Air Raid Warden schools] is only a crumb which has
12
Letter, Milt Campbell to James Landis, March 9, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder I: March 1942. NARA II.
Referenced in Letter, Milt Campbell to James Landis, March 9, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder I: March 1942.
NARA II.
14
Letter, Milt Campbell to James Landis, March 9, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder I: March 1942. NARA II.
15
Letter, Fred M. Fueker to Milt Campbell, March 18, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
13
101
been thrown our way. In many states Legion is doing all the leg work and making all the
sacrifices and being asked to pay for the instruction too.”16 In his reply, Campbell did not
dispute Fueker’s cost estimation, but said everywhere else they had had no trouble filling spots at
schools and most departments had paid for their men to go.17 Fueker’s replacement, J. J. Long
was much more receptive to the training program and the Department soon became actively
involved in Air Raid Warden Training.18
In Virginia, the Department had also decided not to participate in training Air Raid
Warden instructors.19 Some departments, like Wisconsin and Vermont, had decided not to hold
state schools, but had sent enough representatives to schools held by the Army or other
departments to carry out training programs at the local level.20 However, the Department of
Virginia did not wish to take part in the Air Raid Warden training program at all. W. Glenn
Elliott, the Department Adjutant, believe the Department could not take on the expense of money
and manpower to participate in the training of Air Raid Wardens because their activities in the
Aircraft Warning Service had already exhausted their resources.21 Officially the decision to
participate in the training program rested with the departments and not the national organization.
Frank Samuels stated that the Legion had an obligation to the Air Corps to avoid adoption of an
Air Raid Warden program in states where the result would be a subtraction of Legion personnel
16
Letter, Fred M. Fueker to Milt Campbell, March 18, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
17
Letter, Milt Campbell to Fred M. Fueker, March 27, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
18
Letter, Jack Oakley (Regional Field Secretary, 9th Civil Defense Region) to Milt Campbell, April 28, 1942.
Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005. It is unclear to me if Fueker
was removed because of this issue or if his term as Department Adjutant was over.
19
“American Legion Department Questionnaire, Virginia,” undated. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
20
“Wisconsin Report of American Legion-State Defense Council Training Schools,” June 16, 1942. Civilian
Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005; “American Legion Department
Questionnaire, Vermont,” undated. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7005.
21
“American Legion Department Questionnaire, Virginia,” undated. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005. The Aircraft Warning Service and the Air Raid Warden program are
both a part of civilian defense under protective branch of the OCD. The Air Craft Warning Service focused on
watching the skies for enemy airplanes. They operated in observation towers and in twenty-four hour shifts. Air
Raid Wardens operated as a ground force for ensuring compliance with blackouts, first response teams to gas and
incendiary attacks, first aid units, and block commander tasked with maintaining order during an emergency. The
simplest distinction between the two is that the Aircraft Warning Service handled enemy planes before they dropped
bombs, while Air Raid Wardens dealt with the bombs after they fell.
102
from the vital Aircraft Warning Service, especially in coastal states.22 However, it was clear
from Campbell’s response to Elliott that departments were not given much choice in the matter.
As in Washington, Campbell took Elliott to task for his decision. He congratulated Elliott for the
fine job Virginian Legionnaires had done in the Aircraft Warning Service, but argued that there
would be terrible consequences for letting “untrained Air Raid Wardens attempt to take over.”
“An untrained warden,” he said, “is worse than none at all.” Legionnaires with no civilian
defense jobs, particularly those who were school teachers, needed to be put to work in the Air
Raid Warden training program.23
Once training on the regional level had been accomplished, a second tier of training was
undertaken. The model for the second tier was for each county and major city within a state to
send one representative to the training school.24 In South Dakota there were 68 counties (67
after 1943). By training one instructor for each county, South Dakota’s 400 cities and towns
were represented and the schedule to train 5,000 Air Raid Wardens by the summer of 1942 was
quickly fulfilled.25 Like the first tier, many of the state-wide training classes were held in the
colleges and universities of the states. The Legion again attempted to ensure that Legionnaires
received priority for training in the second tier courses.26
The training courses tended to last for one week, covering 56 hours of instruction over
five to six days, although each state had a unique course plan, so some variation existed.27 The
courses covered the entire OCD program, including technical subjects like gas attacks,
incendiary bombs, and practical demonstrations of the operation of a control room.28 As
22
Letter, Frank Samuels to Sam Brolund, February 18, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
23
Letter, Milt Campbell to W. Glenn Elliott, April 20, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
24
“American Legion Air Raid Warden Training Schools” Kansas State Council of Defense Info Bulletin Vol. 1, No.
1, (April 1942). Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
25
Letter, J. D. Mullaney (Adjutant, Department of South Dakota) to Milt Campbell, April 23, 1942. Civilian
Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
26
American Legion State Defense Council Air Raid Warning Instructor School Bulletin No. 1, (April 9, 1942).
Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005; American Legion State
Defense Council Air Raid Warning Instructor School Bulletin No. 2, April 23, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training
Reports By State, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005; “Successful School Conducted at Mill,” The West
Virginian Legionnaire Vol. 18, No. 2, May 10, 1942.
27
Texas American Legion Warden Instructors Schools. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
28
“Tennessee Training Schools for OCD,” March 28, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
103
mentioned in the previous chapter, the training courses also emphasized civilian morale and
investment in the war effort as a key task of Air Raid Wardens.29
The War Department had established schools of its own for training instructors for Air
Raid Warden schools. Rather than compete for students, the OCD agreed not to set up its
schools in areas where the War Department already had established civilian defense schools in
operation. This happened in Oregon, where a proposed Legion civilian defense school was not
established after it was found out that the War Department already had plans to establish a school
there.30 Placement of the schools also depended upon priority determined by vulnerability to
attack. Like the Chemical Warfare Service of the Army, the civilian defense schools emphasized
training Air Raid Wardens in vulnerable areas first. Coastal regions and areas with large defense
industries like Detroit and Chicago received training before interior areas. This created some
discontent among well-organized Legion Departments who were eager and prepared for training
before some coastal departments but were forced onto lengthening waiting lists.31
There were also obstacles in organizing the second-tier courses. In Texas, for example,
the committee in charge of organizing a training program at Camp Mabry in the first week of
June 1942 had made several mistakes in recruiting applicants, resulting in only twelve students
pre-registering.32 The state plan for Texas was to have 200 Air Raid Warden Instructors trained
during the summer, so that training on the local level could be held shortly thereafter and the
state would have adequately trained Air Raid Wardens by the end of the year.33 In part, the
problem lay with the lack of coordination between the American Legion Department of Texas
and the state civilian defense council. According to the Legion accounts, the proposals for the
first class were accepted by both organizations and awaiting final approval by the governor’s
special committee on civilian defense matters. However, the committee chairman, Col. Homer
Garrison, believed the Legion’s syllabus did not meet OCD standards. He did not call his
29
Texas American Legion Warden Instructors Schools. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
30
Letter, Milt Campbell to Henry Dudley, April 28, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder I: March 1942. NARA II; Letter,
Henry Dudley to Milt Campbell, May 5, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder I: March 1942, NARA II.
31
Letter, Henry Dudley to R.J. Laird (Adjutant, Department of Iowa), March 5, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder I :
March 1942. NARA II.
32
Letter, Claude A. Brown (Regional Secretary Office of the Governor) to Charles Bennett (American Legion
Regional Representative), May 25, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7005.
33
Letter, Fred E. Young (Adjutant, Department of Texas) to Coke R. Stevenson (Governor of Texas), April 22,
1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
104
committee to meet for final approval and the school could not be started in early May as
originally planned.34 The dispute between the Legionnaires and Garrison caused considerable
uncertainty among potential students so that instead of the fifty applicants desired, only thirty
were considered likely to attend.35 In the end, 42 Instructors attended and passed the course;
thirteen of the graduates were Legionnaires.36
After the second tier of instructors had been trained, they would take their training back
to their county or city and hold training courses for local Air Raid Wardens, who were
responsible for an assigned block of territory. It was estimated that it would take sixty to ninety
days to create a large qualified pool of instructors in civilian defense through this system. In
Texas the Legion school at Camp Mabry graduated 42 instructors in the first week of June. By
the end of July, those graduates had held 85 local schools, training 2552 Air Raid Wardens37
5.2 Lack of Resources
One of the greatest challenges the American Legion faced in organizing the civilian
defense schools was the lack of resources. Protective supplies had to be made according to plans
arrived at in cooperation with the War Department. Local and state defense council requests that
were at variance with the plans of the War Department were not considered. The War
Department had set up a danger target area that stretched inland from the coasts 300 miles, which
received first priority. After that, priority was based on the likelihood of attack, then
vulnerability and then importance to national defense. Only after those priorities had been
fulfilled were the non-priority areas to receive defensive supplies.38 The Legion was aided in its
requests by Major General L. D. Gasser, the OCD’s Assistant Director in Charge of Civilian
34
Letter, Fred E. Young (Adjutant, Department of Texas) to Coke R. Stevenson (Governor of Texas), April 22,
1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
35
Letter, Claude A. Brown (Regional Secretary Office of the Governor) to Charles Bennett (American Legion
Regional Representative), May 29, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7005.
36
“Texas American Legion Warden Instructors Schools,” p. 1. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
37
Hayward C.Hosch (Field Secretary, Fourth Civilian Defense Region) “Report on State of Texas, American Legion
Air Raid Warden Training Program,” July 25, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
38
Letter, Milt Campbell to Department Officers, NEC, and NDC, April 3, 1942. Office of Civilian Defense,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7003.
105
Protection, who had important connections within the War Department. Stambaugh had
appealed to him for support in their supplies requests.39
However, even with those connections, training materials for the protective services were
difficult to procure, because the military needed many of those same supplies for their soldiers to
train and fight the war; many of the war materials were scarce because war production was still
getting underway; and the United States was supplying its allies with materials and munitions at
the same time that it was struggling to meet the demands of its own mobilization. These
obstacles made supplying the training courses one of the most difficult tasks for the Legion in
1942.
Although both were Legionnaires, Campbell and Dudley held a long running and tense
correspondence as they dealt with the issues of shortages. As Campbell sent him repeated
complaints, Dudley continually reminded Campbell that the mobilization of resources required
patience. After all, he said, “Rome was not built in a day.” “Sure it wasn’t,” Campbell replied,
“but Nero burnt it down in one night.”40 The correspondence between Campbell and Dudley
show the difficulty Dudley had in balancing his loyalties to the American Legion and his duties
in the OCD. He was often caught in the middle of the Legion’s dissatisfaction with the OCD.
Training films were in short supply throughout the height of the Legion’s training
program. The Legion schools needed hundreds of copies of such films as “The Air Raid
Warden,” “Aerial Bombs,” and “Safeguarding Military Information.” However, the War
Department was trying to mobilize and train millions of men for combat and needed the films
too. Getting a hold of the films proved to be a major headache for the Milt Campbell and the
staff of the American Legion Headquarters. There was a tremendous amount of anxiety in
March and April 1942 that the lack of training films would force some of the Legion’s schools to
be delayed. Campbell worried that if the lack of films held up their school dates it “would be a
great mistake for the Adjutants are now enthusiastic and [they] feel that if allowed to cool off it
will be hard to get [the Departments’ training programs] going again.”41 By the summer most of
the film requests were being filled, but like the helmet fiasco, the inability of the OCD to get the
required films confirmed the low regard Americans had for civilian defense leadership.
39
Letter, Lynn Stambaugh to L.D. Gasser (Major General, Assistant Director in Charge of Civilian Protection,
OCD), March 21, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder I: March 1942. NARA II.
40
Letter, Milt Campbell to Henry Dudley, March 18, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder I: March 1942. NARA II.
41
Letter, Milt Campbell to Henry Dudley, March 18, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder I: March 1942. NARA II.
106
Like training films, pamphlets and books on civilian defense were in short supply at the
beginning of the war. Each training class needed written training materials like the Air Raid
Warden’s Handbook and pamphlets on “Protection from Gas.” With each successive tier of the
training program for Air Raid Wardens, the number of printed materials expanded exponentially.
The Legion’s training program was aided by the many civilian defense pamphlets the Legion had
already produced since its mission to study Great Britain’s home defenses in February 1941. Yet
even those were merely a temporary solution to the problem of supplying training materials for
the civilian defense courses.
Although shortages in paper for the government printing office and the massive task of
printing enough materials for millions of people did cause some delays, the biggest problem
facing the Legion and OCD was in shipment. Rather than have the printed materials delivered to
and distributed from the OCD offices in Washington DC directly to the training schools, the
supplies were first shipped in bulk to the OCD’s regional offices.42 It was not until March and
April that the volunteers in civilian defense were made aware of that arrangement. Campbell
complained to Dudley about the problems the Legion was having getting the printed supplies in
mid-March. It was only then that Campbell was informed he had to apply to the regional offices
for materials.
However, dissemination of the printed materials was further delayed by uneven
distribution of the supplies to the regional offices. Some offices had an overabundance of some
material and very little or none of others. Campbell told Dudley that he wanted to comply with
the system of distribution the OCD had in place, but for it to work the regional offices need to
actually have those supplies. He suggested that the OCD ought to update its inventories of
supplies.43 In a terse reply, Dudley told Campbell that inventories had already been made. The
pamphlets, Dudley said, had been sent out according to a plan based on need. Some pamphlets
were sent out for general distribution, some for instructors, and some only for technicians.44 Yet
even Dudley could not dispute that it often took several weeks to get supplies of printed
materials to training classes because of uneven distributions. Only at the end of April, after
42
Letter, Henry Dudley to Milt Campbell, March 24, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder I: March 1942. NARA II.
Letter, Henry Dudley to Milt Campbell, March 26, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder I: March 1942. NARA II.
44
Letter, Henry Dudley to Milt Campbell, April 2, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder I: March 1942. NARA II.
43
107
several months of hard effort, had every department acquired a complete file of OCD
pamphlets.45
Helmets were also regarded as vital civilian defense equipment early in the war. The
War Production Board had approved an order for 1.4 million steel helmets for the OCD. The
helmets had been made according to OCD specifications and put into production in the spring of
1942. Fortunately, a workman at one of the factories producing the helmets tried one on his head
before delivery. The company reported to the media that the helmet “would be just the thing for
a civilian defense corps of midgets.”46 Such mistakes did nothing to improve the OCD’s public
image. 20,100 helmets were delivered to coastal cities in April 1942 and deliveries continued in
spurts to priority areas as they became available.47
Materials for gas, bombs, and incendiary attacks were the most difficult to obtain. The
most common types of bombs used for demonstrations were magnesium or thermite. Because
the bomb resources were so valuable to the War Department, getting supplies from it for
demonstration purposes were low on the list of priorities. Dudley warned Campbell that
applications would need to be made and defended for the OCD to get any. In this case,
Campbell came up with his own temporary solution: while the War Department was keeping a
tight rein on its bomb supplies, he found that most localities had sufficient supplies of
magnesium and thermite for demonstration purposes in the short term.48
The American Legion and OCD believed that gas attacks were one of the biggest threats
to civilians. There was a lot of support for obtaining sniff-sets, which reproduced the odor of
individual gasses allowing trainees to learn to identify different chemicals used in gas attacks and
apply the correct remedies. The sniff-sets, in conjunction with gas-mask training, were to be
used to train Air Raid Wardens. The Army Chemical Warfare Service immediately balked at the
OCD’s requests for gasses and sniff tests. There was some question of the value of sniff-sets for
chemicals. Several studies argued that individuals identify the smells of gasses differently, so
45
“Advanced Report of the National Defense Committee to the National Executive Committee,” April 30, 1942.
Notes Constitution and Bylaws, 1919-1944. ALA.
46
Marcia Winn, “It’s Still the Same Old OCD, Ruled By Bickering, Confusion.” Washington, DC Times Herald
(June 10, 1942). Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
47
Office of Civilian Defense, “Civilian Defense Review,” (February, 1944). RG 287: Publications of the Federal
Government, Beginning Pr 32.4401-Pr 32.4402, Box Pr 272. NARA II.
48
Letter, Milt Campbell to Henry Dudley, March 18, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder I: March 1942. NARA II. See
also Letter, Lynn Stambaugh to L.D. Gasser (Major General, Assistant Director in Charge of Civilian Protection,
OCD), March 21, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder I: March 1942. NARA II.
108
that the odor would not be the same to everyone.49 More importantly, there was a real danger
that overenthusiastic Air Raid Warden instructors might accidentally poison their students by
trying to simulate a gas attack with real gas. The Chemical Warfare Service said that training
films on gasses were an adequate substitute and simulated gas sniff sets were being developed.50
Campbell agreed that the use of gas in training was too dangerous, saying, “the less state and
local schools have to do with real gas the better.”51 The Chemical Warfare Service also refused
OCD and Legion requests for protective clothing against chemical attacks, citing its secrecy
policy.52
Early civilian defense plans called for gas masks to be produced for all civilians. Such an
effort would have expended tremendous resources and was never fulfilled, largely because as the
war dragged on fear of gas attacks on American civilians dwindled. For the training schools in
1942, however, gas mask production and training seemed vitally important. Campbell wrote to
the Chemical Warfare Service requesting the use of War Department gas masks for training.
Because the production of gas masks for the war was still just getting underway, Campbell had
to resign himself to training for gas attacks without the supplies needed for serious training.
Until manufacturers produced gas masks in large numbers, the Legion relied upon state and local
police forces to lend the civilian defense forces theirs.53
Civilian use of War Department resources was a tricky thing. In December 1941 and
January 1942, while several Congressmen were attacking the OCD and attempting to strip it of
the protective services duties, the Senate Committee on Military Affairs was debating how to
supply the OCD with necessary supplies of a military nature, such as the ones discussed above.
A bill (S. 1936) had been introduced and sent to the committee to make War Department
munitions supplies and equipment available for instruction and demonstration purposes for
civilian defense training.54 Much of the equipment was not available to civilians and the only
49
Letter, Thomas V. Dowd (Coordinator, National Field Secretary) to J. H. Wyse (Coordinator, Virginia Council of
Defense), April 30, 1942. Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
50
Letter, W. A. Brewer (Major, Infantry, Deputy Chief) to L. D. Gasser, March, 26, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder
I: March 1942. NARA II.
51
Letter, Milt Campbell to Henry Dudley, March 18, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder I: March 1942. NARA II.
52
Letter, W. A. Brewer (Major, Infantry, Deputy Chief) to L. D. Gasser, March, 26, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder
I: March 1942. NARA II.
53
Letter, Milt Campbell to Henry Dudley, March 18, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder I: March 1942. NARA II.
54
Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Supplies and Equipment for Civilian Defense Instruction, 77th Cong., 2d
sess., 1942, S. Rep. 905; Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Supplies and Equipment for Civilian Defense
Instruction, 77th Cong., 2d sess., 1942, S. Rep. 952.
109
supplier with access was the War Department. The War Department did not have the legal
authority to lend or sell its equipment to civilians on its own; congressional authorization was
required.
Such authorization had been given in the past. In 1908, Congress had allowed the War
Department to sell small obsolete arms to patriotic organizations like the Spanish American War
Veterans. In 1920, Congress again authorized the War Department to loan arms, this time to
organizations of honorably discharged soldiers of World War I.55 However, such loans had been
more sentimental and ornamental, rather than militaristic and educational. Colonel W. P.
O’Brien, speaking before the Committee on behalf of the General Staff Corps of the War
Department, said that the purpose of the loans was not to arm civilian defense, but to allow them
to train. A home guard already existed in the National Guard and the War Department did not
want to create a guerilla force. Unlike the Congressional bills to remove the protective services
from the OCD to the War Department, S. 1936 had the support of Secretary of War Stimson and
the War Department.56 The Committee reported the bill favorably. On March 6, the President
issued regulations for the distribution of protective equipment. Landis was to notify the War
Department of equipment requirements for regional and local defense councils. The War
Department made the production requests and delivered the equipment to the OCD, which would
distribute it to areas in need. The equipment remained the property of the United States
government and was to be returned upon demand.57
Unlike materials to be used in civilian defense, the training materials used in the
American Legion’s Air Raid Warden schools was paid for by the American Legion. The Legion
used its vast community resources to raise funds for a bond to cover the materials needed.
However, the system established by the Senate Bill did not allow the War Department to sell the
equipment directly to the American Legion. The OCD had to transfer funds to the War
Department for the equipment, which the OCD would then loan to the Legion.58 By May of
55
Senate, Col. W.P. O’Brien speaking for Senate Resolution To Authorize Secretary of War to Use Certain Arms,
Munitions, Supplies, etc., for Instructional Purposes to the Committee on Military Affairs, S. Res. 2167, 77th Cong.,
2d sess., Congressional Record (13 January 1942).
56
Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Supplies and Equipment for Civilian Defense Instruction, 77th Cong., 2d
sess., 1942, S. Rep. 952.
57
Office of Civilian Defense, “Civilian Defense Review,” (February, 1944), p. 3. RG 287: Publications of the
Federal Government, Beginning Pr 32.4401-Pr 32.4402, Box Pr 272. NARA II.
58
Letter, W. A. Brewer (Major, Infantry, Deputy Chief) to L. D. Gasser, March, 26, 1942. RG 171, Box 20, Folder
I: March 1942. NARA II.
110
1942, the Legion had spent $95,297 on its Air Raid Warden Schools, which had held training
courses in 34 states.59 Nearly 300,000 Legionnaires had enlisted as Air Raid Wardens and the
training program carried out by the American Legion was running full-tilt throughout the
summer.
Although the Legion and OCD had to deal with many obstacles in organizing the Air
Raid Warden schools, the Legion’s powerful connections in communities were an important
asset that often helped Legionnaires overcome the obstacles. In Texas, the Department
Commander, Andrew Dilworth, was a close friend of Lieutenant Sylvan Lang, a reserve officer
called onto active duty from the State of Texas and assigned to the regional branch of the OCD
located in San Antonio. Lang had attended the Air Raid Warden school at Edgewood Arsenal
conducted by the Chemical Warfare Branch of the Army at the same time as Henry Dudley.
Lang sent Dilworth and other Legionnaires helpful memos on steps they could take to ensure the
Legion was well-represented in Texas’ civil defense program.60
5.3 Civilian Defense in Action
By the end of 1942, the Legion efforts were approaching their zenith. By the time of the
Legion’s National Convention in September, the American Legion Air Raid Warden Instructor
Schools had trained 7,700 instructors, who had returned to their communities and trained
approximately 700,000 Air Raid Wardens.61 Nearly half of the Air Raid Wardens who had gone
through training were Legionnaires. The greatest growth, however, was in the Legionnaires who
served as volunteer firefighters and police forces in their local communities. As the chart below
shows, Legionnaires participated in war related tasks in incredible numbers. Although many
Legionnaires served in multiple capacities in civilian defense, it is clear that an overwhelming
majority participated. At that point, Landis reported there were almost 12000 local Defense
Councils and more than ten million registered OCD volunteers, of which
59
Letter, Lynn Stambaugh to Franklin Roosevelt, May 21, 1942. President’s Personal File 350: American Legion,
1942-1945. FDRL.
60
Letter, Henry Dudley to Andrew Dilworth (Commander, Department of Texas), January 14, 1942. RG 171, Box
20, Folder II: American Legion 080: January 1 – February 28, 1942. NARA II.
61
Lynn Stambaugh, “Address to the American Legion National Convention,” in Summary of Proceedings of the
Twenty-Fourth Annual National Convention, Kansas City, MO (September 19-21, 1942), 27. ALA.
111
Table 5.2 American Legion
Civilian Defense Activities through December 31, 194262
Air Raid Wardens
337,941
Aircraft Warning Service
98,787
First Aid Workers
330,456
Auxiliary Police
272,306
Auxiliary Firefighters
34,132
Civil Air Patrol
812
Ration Boards
3,570
Draft Boards
9,671
Scrap and Rubber Collections
172,465
Total
1,260,140
8,570,730 had been assigned to definite duty in some form.63
In the eighteen months of Landis’ administration, $87,000,000 of the $100,000,000
Congressional appropriation had been spent. The disbursement of defense equipment began in
April 1942. Twenty thousand helmets and 35,600 arm bands were shipped to the coastal regions.
The OCD was not able to acquire and deliver fire trucks until the autumn of 1942.64 By
September 1943, the OCD had provided American cities and communities with over 25,000
shipments of civilian defense equipment, including: 11,500 fire trucks; 2,000,000 helmets and
hand-pump fire extinguishers; 1,000,000 gas masks, with several million held in reserve; and
medical supplies for first aid stations set up by local defense councils.65
The American civilian defenses were only rarely tested during the war. After the attack
on Pearl Harbor the public hysteria made the abilities of the country’s enemies far greater than
they were in reality. Although Germany seemed unbeatable in their military campaigns during
1941, in retrospect, the Soviet Union had already blunted the Wehrmacht’s strongest advance
toward Moscow. In fact, as the Japanese fleet under Admiral Chuichi Nagumo was making its
undetected approach toward Hawaii from the north, Soviet Siberian forces under General Georgy
62
“Suggested General Address From the National Publicity Division of the American Legion,” undated. Box 4, File
I: American Legion 1942. FDRL.
63
Office of Civilian Defense, “Civilian Defense Review,” (February, 1944). RG 287: Publications of the Federal
Government, Beginning Pr 32.4401-Pr 32.4402, Box Pr 272. NARA II. At the end of 1941, LaGuardia reported
there were 3,516,000 volunteers and 7,031 Defense Councils in OCD. Office of Civilian Defense, “Civilian Defense
Review,” (February 1944), p. 2.
64
Office of Civilian Defense, “Civilian Defense Review,” (February, 1944), p. 3. RG 287: Publications of the
Federal Government, Beginning Pr 32.4401-Pr 32.4402, Box Pr 272. NARA II.
65
“OCD Outlay $100,000,000,” New York Times (September 12, 1943): p. 13. By February 15, 1944, the number of
fire engines had increased to 15,582. Office of Civilian Defense, “Civilian Defense Review,” (February, 1944), p.
11. RG 287: Publications of the Federal Government, Beginning Pr 32.4401-Pr 32.4402, Box Pr 272. NARA II.
112
Zhukov were counterattacking the German forces on the outskirts of the Soviet capital, ending
the threat there. German forces would again make spectacular gains in Soviet territory in the
first half of 1942, but their offensive began to ebb in the summer. The Soviet Union, which had
seemed on the point of collapse when the United States entered the war, had proven far more
resilient than most Americans could have hoped. The eastern front became, to use a term
popular in later American conflicts, a quagmire, sucking up whole divisions of the German army
on a weekly basis.
The ability of the Germans to strike the American home front was greatly reduced, so that
aside from a submarine attack on the eastern port cities, there was no real threat. Even that
threat, which seemed so ominous in the weeks after Pearl Harbor, proved to be beyond German
capabilities. Although the entry of the United States into the war ushered in what German
commanders called “die zweite glückliche Zeit” (the “Second Happy Times”), with 400 ships of
over two million tons sunk by the end of the spring 1942, the technological innovations that
turned the tide of the Battle of the Atlantic in the allies favor, made such a threat miniscule by
1943.
However, isolated attacks on American territory did occur in the Pacific War. The
Japanese used I-boat’s, which were designed to make the round trip from Japan to Los Angeles
without refueling, to harry the West Coast. The I-boats could carry as many as three folding
wing sea planes bombers, making them an aerial and aquatic weapon. One of the hopes of the
Japanese strategists was that I-boat attacks, while minimal in cost and manpower, could pay huge
dividends in creating hysteria among the American public. They believed their attacks would
force the United States military to devote enormous resources to protect its vast western
territories, diverting forces and materials away from the Pacific campaigns.
In early January 1942, an I-boat torpedoed the American freighter Absaroka just outside
of the harbor at Los Angeles. A month later another I-boat fired 25 high-explosive shells into a
Santa Barbara oil refinery, destroying an oil well and pump.66 In one of the only uses of the
folding wing planes during the war, a national forest in Oregon was bombed. Because forest
fires were so common and devastating in the western United States, Japanese strategists believed
66
Although the incident was reported in national media, the assault was labeled “harmless.” However, proving the
Japanese rationale behind the attacks to be accurate, the I-boat’s attack on the refinery resulted in phantom air raids
in Los Angeles the next day, which resulted in two deaths by automobile accidents and damage caused by shrapnel
from anti-aircraft guns and unexploded ordinance. “Los Angeles Guns Bark At Air 'Enemy',” New York Times
(February 26, 1942): p. 1.
113
that an incendiary attack on the west coast woodlands would start a firestorm that would sweep
down the coast and wipe out the major cities. The folding wing plane did not succeed in that
endeavor.67
Despite those attacks, the I-boat campaigns were never successful in their goals. The
Japanese also lacked the numbers necessary to sustain their attacks on the West Coast. They had
only a few of the I-boats, and by 1943, those were needed to transport men and supplies to the
far flung islands of the Empire as they faced the American island-hopping offensive.
One of the common characteristics of these campaigns is the tight military security and
secrecy the United States civil and military authorities practiced on all of them.68 Many of the
attacks were not reported in the media on orders from military and government officials to
prevent hysteria. On May 5, 1945, the Reverend Archie Mitchell went for a picnic with his
young, pregnant wife, Elsye by the mountain streams flowing near Bly, a small town north of the
Oregon-California border. Five teenaged children from their church accompanied them to go
fishing in one of the streams. The children and Elsye Mitchell unloaded the car near the stream
and headed down to the water while the Reverend parked the car. Elyse called to him to hurry
down to the water to see what they had found. As he got out of the car he heard an explosion.
Down by the water, he found all the children dead and his wife barely alive. Her clothes had
caught fire and Mitchell burned his hands to put out the flames. She died soon after. The
children’s bodies were near a three-foot crater; the surrounding trees were littered with shrapnel
and the debris of a large paper balloon.69
Unlike the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo, which was impossible for the Japanese military
government to hide, most of the Japanese attacks on the west coast were small enough, and
isolated enough for the United States to conceal. The government’s suppression of the news of
the death of a pregnant woman and five teens from a church by a Japanese bomb is an impressive
feat. The media had agreed not to print stories of the attacks to prevent hysteria and also to
prevent the Japanese from knowing their tactics had achieved any results. Even so, it could not
have been done without the patriotism of the bereaved community and their willingness to keep
67
Brian Garfield, The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians (New York: Doubleday &
Company, 1969).
68
On military security and secrecy in the Pacific War, see Otis Hays Jr., Alaska’s Hidden Wars: Secret Campaigns
on the North Pacific Rim (Fairbanks, AL: University of Alaska Press, 2004).
69
A full account of the event is found in Archie Satterfield, The Home Front. An Oral History of the War Years in
America: 1941-45 (Playboy Press, 1981), 232-34.
114
the story quiet for several weeks. It was not until May 23, 1945 that the War and Navy
Departments issued public acknowledgements of the Japanese balloon attacks.70 On June 1, the
War Department issued a statement on the six deaths in Oregon.71 They were the first and only
recorded civilian victims of enemy bombing in the continental United States in World War II.
The Japanese did succeed in attacking United States territory with a land force once
during the war. In June 1942, as part of the Midway offensive, Japanese forces attacked Dutch
Harbor on Unalaska in the Aleutian islands. The Doolittle Raid had not just caused civilian
hysteria in Japan; it had also caused tremendous uncertainty among Japanese military leaders.
They were unsure of the origination point of Doolittle’s bombers. Some argued, correctly, that
they must have been launched from carriers; others pointed to the Aleutians, jutting out across
the north Pacific like a scythe directed toward the northern Japanese islands.72 A small carrier
force under Admiral Kakuji Kakuta was dispatched to the Aleutians to take control of the
archipelago at the same time that Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was attacking Midway Island.
The great architect of the Pearl Harbor attack hoped the attack on Dutch Harbor would draw
American forces away from Midway. However, just as at Midway on June 6th, the Japanese
attack on Dutch Harbor on June 3 and 4 would fail because of Japanese intelligence failures.
American military and civilian authorities routinely overestimated Japanese intelligence
abilities during the first months of the war. They incorrectly suspected the Japanese had crucial
knowledge of Alaska’s defensive weaknesses. However, it was readily apparent after the
Japanese attack on the Aleutians in 1942 that they lacked up to date knowledge of the islands.73
When the Japanese attacked Dutch Harbor, they expected to find the small military base an easy
target surrounded by desolate volcanic islands. Prior to 1941, that had been true. However, the
United States had not been idle in the year before Pearl Harbor and two small air bases had been
built on nearby islands to provide air support to the base. Rather than finding an unprepared
enemy with weak air support, the Japanese encountered unexpected American aircraft waiting
for them in sufficient numbers to defend the base. Bombers from the Japanese carriers twice
70
“Japanese Ballons Fall in West,” New York Times (May 23, 1945): p. 1.
“Six Killed In West By A Balloon Bomb,” New York Times (June 1, 1942): p. 3.
72
It was not until after the war that the Japanese would learn that the raid had been launched from the U.S.S. Hornet,
600 miles off the coast of Japan. The President, ebullient from the news of the Raid, told a “sweet young thing” at
the White House, that the planes had originated from a new secret base in Shangri-La. “President Puts Raiders of
Tokyo at ‘Shangri-La’,” New York Times (April 22, 1942): p. 6.
73
Hays, Alaska’s Hidden Wars, xvi-xvii.
71
115
attacked Dutch Harbor and its surrounding environs. Dismal weather and the unexpectedly
strong resistance from U.S. Army and Navy aircraft forced the carriers to withdraw.74
The attack on Dutch Harbor was the first time a civilian defense organization was called
to operate against an actual bombing raid. Mayor John H. Fletcher of Unalaska reported that 85
men of his air raid warden service “deliberately exposed themselves, standing in the open amid
the din of bombs and anti-aircraft fire, to spot possible incendiary bombs.” There was no
hysteria and the civilian defense workers carried out their jobs to the letter. James Landis
praised them and added that their example showed that well-organized American communities
would not become panicky in the face of attacks. Mayor Fletcher reported that they had just
received pump tanks a few days before and so were armed with those and shovels and sand
against incendiaries. They had pre-dug L trenches and shelters for civilians. No civilians in
Unalaska were killed or injured in the raid, although there was significant damage to the island’s
buildings. During the attack, military authorities wanted civilians to evacuate to a nearby valley,
which was safer than the dugout shelters, so the Mayor made half a dozen car trips and shuttled
the six score civilians to the valley. Fletcher said the people in Dutch Harbor knew a Japanese
task force was in the areas and were preparing accordingly. When the bombers arrived at
5:45am on June 3rd the civilian defense and military were ready.75
Despite the congratulatory tone of Fletcher’s story and the victory at Dutch Harbor, the
people of Unalaska could have suffered far more but for the decision of Admiral Yamamoto to
withhold an invasion force. During his reconnoiter of Unalaska before the attack, Admiral
Kakuta had found the division he had been warned was stationed at Dutch Harbor to be a much
smaller force of 5,000 men, mostly service and support personnel. He made a request to divert
his ground troops to take the base, but Yamamoto overruled him. Yamamoto did not think the
Japanese could hold the base once it was captured. It would have been too difficult to supply
and too exposed to counter attacks. Instead, Kakuta’s troop transports landed occupation troops
on unprotected Attu and Kiska Islands. The occupation of the two Aleutian islands, devoid of
human life but for a handful of Aleuts and weather technicians, marked the only occupation of
74
Hays, Alaska’s Hidden Wars, 9-10.
Office of Civilian Defense, “Press Release,” July 7, 1942. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 917005.
75
116
American territory by Japan during the war. It was small recompense for the devastating losses
the Japanese fleet suffered at Midway and both islands were retaken in 1943.76
All of the events described above happened far on the periphery of the country and
involved very few of the men and women who served in civilian defense. For almost all of them,
civilian defense involved waiting for an air raid or an invasion that never occurred. The patriotic
fervor and the fear of unpreparédness that motivated so many Americans to join their state and
local defense councils eventually gave way to boredom, apathy, and even disappointment.
5.4 Winding Down
Perhaps no group was more disappointed than the American Legion. Instead of heroic
defense of the homeland in the mould of the British Home Guard, Legionnaires and their fellow
civilian defenders seemed to be conducting an exercise in futility. Indeed, many Americans
began to chafe at the blackouts and other inconveniences in the name of civilian defense. The
OCD, already unpopular because of the earlier controversies, was soon labeled a waste of time
and resources. Calls to lift civilian defense restrictions and to reduce civilian defense activities
grew as the war turned increasingly against the Axis and its ability to strike the United States
diminished.
Despite its disappointment, the American Legion was not caught unprepared by the shift
in public opinion against civilian defense. In November 1942, the same month that Allied forces
had landed in North Africa, Henry Dudley began to seriously contemplate resigning his position
as head of the Veterans’ Section of OCD. Dudley had received a confidential letter from one of
the officers assigned to the OCD, which warned him that the Veterans’ Section was only being
retained to prevent possible criticism by Legionnaires. Proposals had been made to eliminate the
76
The reconquest of Kiska and Attu were not without the same heavy toll American forces experienced on other
Pacific Islands. For coverage of the Aleutian Campaigns, see: Brian Garfield, The Thousand-Mile War: World War
II in Alaska and the Aleutians (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1969); John Costello, The Pacific War (New
York: Rawson, Wade Publishers, Inc., 1981); Dashiell Hammett and Robert Colodny, The Battle of the Aleutians
1942-43 in the Capture of Attu: Tales of World War II in Alaska as Told By the Men Who Fought There (Anchorage:
Alaska Northwest Publishing Company, 1984); David Bergamini, Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy (New York:
William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1971). Historians often consider the Aleutian Campaigns an afterthought of
the Pacific War because, aside from playing a minor role in diverting Japanese forces from the crucial battle to the
south, it had little impact on the outcome of the war. However, Charles Bradley demonstrates that had the Japanese
home islands been invaded in November 1945, their importance would have grown dramatically. The United States
military used the Aleutian Islands and Alaska to prepare forces for attacks on the Kurile Islands and Northern Japan,
which had similar unforgiving climates and terrains. Charles C. Bradley, Aleutian Echoes (University of Alaska
Press, 1994).
117
positions of Veterans’ Representatives through curtailment of the budget. The elimination of the
Veterans’ Section was, the letter warned, inevitable and the Legion should move first. Dudley,
writing to Waring about the situation, noted that the second, third, and fourth Civilian Defense
Regions no longer had a veterans representative; in the eighth Region, the veterans representative
had been promoted to Property Officer, but had continued to act as liaison officer with veteran
organizations; in the first and fifth Regions, inquiries had been made, asking if there would be
any complaint about promoting the veterans’ representatives out of their position. It was
apparent to Dudley that the Regional Directors had received some previous intimations of the
situation. Should the promotions have gone through, it would have left the American Legion
with representatives in only the sixth, seventh and ninth Regions. Dudley felt responsible toward
the representative because he was the one who had originally selected them for their positions.
He wrote confidential letters to each of the men in those three Regions suggesting they endeavor
to secure transfers to more secure and stable positions if they desired to remain in the OCD.77
At the end of November, National Adjutant Frank Samuel sent a letter to Waring
recommending that Dudley be appointed to the position of Director of Field Service within the
American Legion. Samuel wanted Dudley to have a new Legion job by Jan 1, 1943.78 Dudley
had been in high demand before he took the OCD job and Samuel did not want to lose him to
other bidders. Waring, however, hesitated; he was not willing to lose the valuable influence
Dudley gave the Legion within the OCD, nor the information he could provide the Legion about
OCD policy and administration plans.
On January 14, 1943, Waring, Donald Glascoff and Henry Dudley met with Landis and
General Ulysses S. Grant III (Chief of the Protective Services branch of the OCD since July
1942) at the OCD headquarters in Washington DC.79 Among the things they discussed were the
OCD’s plans for veterans and veteran organizations within the civilian defense apparatus. The
major task assigned to the Legion, training of Air Raid Wardens, would soon begin to wind
down and the need to coordinate between veteran organizations and the OCD was greatly
77
Letter, Henry Dudley to Roane Waring, November 24, 1942. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7005.
78
Letter, Frank Samuel to Henry Dudley, November 30, 1942. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7005.
79
Letter, Henry Dudley to Frank Samuel, January 15, 1943. National Defense Division, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7003.
118
diminished as local and state organizations had fully mobilized and veterans had become
established in the roles which they would take for the duration of the war.
The conferees agree that Dudley’s employment at OCD would end around February 10th,
when he would resume his work with the American Legion’s National Headquarters.80 Dudley
agreed to continue serving the Chief of the Protection Services Branch as a consultant on special
assignments as needed. They also agreed that Dudley would not be replaced as Head of the
Veterans’ Section and the OCD would close its Veterans’ Division. If the OCD at any point
decided to reconstitute the Veterans’ Division, it would only do so in coordination with the
American Legion, who would be given the opportunity to recommend another veteran to occupy
the position.81
In July, the beginning of the government fiscal year, smaller appropriations forced the
OCD to make considerable reductions to its personnel, particularly in the War Services Branch.82
At the end of July, the Civilian Protection Schools at six universities were terminated because
more instructors were no longer needed.83 Attendance at the schools had been shrinking since
the beginning of the year. The Fifth Plant Protection course at Purdue University had convened
on March 1, 1943 with only ten members.84 The schools had produced 10,000 OCD instructors
in less than sixteen months.85 The OCD reached its peak in October 1943, with over 12,000,000
men and women serving as volunteers (though only half were assigned a specific job for which
they had received the required training and certifications).
80
Letter, James Landis to Roane Waring, January 15, 1943. National Defense Division, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7003. In June 1943, Dudley succeeded Donald Glascoff as Assistant Adjutant, after Frank Samuel died of a
heart attack. Glascoff became National Adjutant, holding that position for the duration of the war. Jones, A History
Of The American Legion, 118-19; Rumer, The American Legion, 555.
81
Letter, Roane Waring to James Landis, January 20, 1943. National Defense Division, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7003.
82
The government fiscal year ran from July 1st to June 30th until the Congressional Budget and Impound Control Act
of 1974 adjusted the fiscal year to October 1st-September 30th.
83
The six universities were Amherst College, Texas A&M University, Stanford University, University of
Washington, Purdue University and the University of Florida. James M. Landis, “Testimony on Supplemental
National Defense Appropriation,” 1943, before the Subcommittee on Deficiency Appropriations, Committee on
Appropriations, House, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 18, 1942: 798.
84
Memo, Willard A. Johnston to Graduates of War Department Civilian Protection School at Purdue University,
March 1, 1943. Training for Defense Jobs, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7007.
85
Office of Civilian Defense, “Civilian Defense Review,” (February, 1944), p. 7. RG 287: Publications of the
Federal Government, Beginning Pr 32.4401-Pr 32.4402, Box Pr 272. NARA II.
119
Table 5.3: Major Services of the Citizens Defense Corps86
Service
December 31, 1941
October 31, 1943
Air Raid Wardens
607,307
2,026,220
Auxiliary Firemen
258,967
451,620
Auxiliary Police
149,359
470,407
Emergency Medical Service
136,676
416,977
Citizens Service Corps
N/A
3,370,000
Forest Fire Fighters Service
N/A
185,000
Total volunteers
3,516,000
12,000,000
In September 1943, the calls to abandon civilian defense suddenly became much louder.
The global situation had changed dramatically since December 1941. On the Eastern Front, the
Soviet Union had survived the horrific clash along the Volga River at Stalingrad and had turned
the tables on the Wehrmacht at Kursk. They began an incredible offensive on the eastern front
that would not stop until it reached Berlin two years later. In the Pacific the United States and its
allies had initiated their island hopping campaign. They won a hard fought victory at
Guadalcanal in February and ‘Operation Cartwheel’ was rolling up the Japanese forces on New
Guinea in a campaign to retake the main Japanese stronghold in the southwest Pacific at Rabaul
on New Britain Island.
The most important developments, however, took place in Europe, where the British and
American armies had raced across Sicily and then invaded the Italian peninsula. Benito
Mussolini had been ousted from power in July and on September 3rd, as the Allies were about to
launch their assault on the Italian mainland, Prime Minister Pierto Badoglio signed an armistice
with the Allies. This did not end the fighting in Italy: the Italian government botched the
transition and was forced to flee to Brindisi in southern Italy. Hitler had rushed several divisions
to the peninsula to stave off the Allied invasion and to keep Italy under his control. It turned out
to be one of the best decisions of the war for Hitler: rather than occupying a defeated, but warweary country, the Allies were forced to carry out a long and costly campaign to push excellent
German forces north for the duration of the war. However, although the armistice in September
1943 did not end the fighting in Italy, the surrender of the third member was an important
emotional victory for the American peoples. The Axis partners were cracking under the
tremendous resources and military might of the Allied nations.
86
Office of Civilian Defense, “Civilian Defense Review,” (February, 1944), 2, 8. RG 287: Publications of the
Federal Government, Beginning Pr 32.4401-Pr 32.4402, Box Pr 272. NARA II.
120
The euphoric celebrations that followed the Italian surrender had significant
consequences for civilian defense. On the same day that the armistice was made public, James
Landis submitted his resignation as Director of Civilian Defense to the President and publicly
recommended that the OCD be abolished.87 Roosevelt appointed Landis’ Deputy Director John
B. Martin to Acting Director. The President did not follow Landis’ recommendation for
abolishing the OCD because he and many in his administration worried that it would heighten
the general sense of apathy prevailing among a large portion of the population that the war was
winding down. Many within the American Legion shared this worry.
5.5 The America Alert Campaign
On September 20th, at the National Convention in Omaha, the American Legion
announced the launching of its America Alert Campaign. The America Alert Campaign was
designed to combat unwarranted public optimism and resultant apathy in the war effort. It strove
to increase citizen participation in the war effort and to boost popular enrollment in civilian
defense. The American Legion National Executive Council hoped that the Campaign would
“solidify leadership by the American Legion of active patriotism by practical patriots taking a
positive part in hastening the day of victory.”88 The campaign was a Legion initiative, but it had
strong support from the OCD and Roosevelt Administration. Martin acknowledged that the
American Alert Program was “of great importance to our program.” As apathy for civilian
defense grew, he needed every bit of support he could muster.
The President, also worried about public lethargy for the war programs, wrote in a
message to the National Convention in Omaha: “Nothing can help our enemies more than for us
to relax our efforts of all kinds in the prosecution of the war.” He called for an increase in efforts
particularly in areas like civilian defense where there would be no time to prepare during a crisis.
Using the folksy analogies he was so famous for, he warned, “We do not wait until the house
catches fire to be sure that our community has an up-to-date, active fire department.” He
concluded his message with a reiteration of the position established at the Conference in
Casablanca: “The end of the war is not in sight until unconditional surrender has become a
87
Within days, Landis was appointed to become the American Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East
and Minister at the Middle East Supply Center in Cairo, Egypt. John H. Crider, “Landis Appointed As Economic
Head in the Middle East,” New York Times (September 11, 1943): p. 1.
88
Letter, John B. Martin (Deputy Director of the OCD) to Marvin H. McIntyre (Secretary to the President),
September 16, 1943. President’s Personal File 350: American Legion, 1942-1945. FDRL.
121
reality.”89 The America First Campaign was to be one of the American Legion’s major
initiatives throughout 1943. It was directly related to the organization’s civilian defense work
and national defense programs and indirectly related to the Americanism campaign, which touted
maintaining the war effort as a patriotic duty.
Because the civilian defense activities of the American Legion were so closely tied to the
America Alert Campaign, the greatest difficulty the program encountered was the reduction of
OCD and the civilian defense councils in late 1943 and 1944. In October 1943, the War Dept
placed 600,000 volunteer civilian members of the Aircraft Warning System on a part time basis.
The move was due primarily to the changed strategic situation of the war and to the development
of mechanical detection devices which minimize the importance of individual ground
observation, but was generally interpreted by civilian defense volunteers and by the public at
large as a sign that less effort was required on the home front and was later seen to be
responsible to a considerable extent for a let-down in effort among civilian volunteers.90
The next month, dim-outs, an anti-submarine tactic, were lifted along coasts because the
Navy and War Department no longer deemed them necessary.91 On November 19th, Martin
submitted a proposal on the Civilian Protection Program to the Bureau of the Budget for
recommendation to Congress. Harold Smith, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget,
suggested that the OCD be immediately reorganized and pared down so that the total staff of the
OCD, including military and Public Health Personnel, did not exceed 127 people.92 He further
asserted that all technical staff employed in air raid protection should be located on the coasts,
except for staff required to meet the needs of interior cities that were receiving federal defense
equipment. The major organizational efforts in states and communities had largely been
completed. It was no longer necessary to maintain federal field staffs or department staffs for
further organizational and promotional work as required in past.93 The Bureau concluded
89
Franklin Roosevelt, “Message to the National Commander at the National Convention in Omaha,” September 20,
1943. President’s Personal File 350: American Legion, 1942-1945. FDRL.
90
Office of Civilian Defense, “Civilian Defense Review,” (February, 1944), p. 8. RG 287: Publications of the
Federal Government, Beginning Pr 32.4401-Pr 32.4402, Box Pr 272. NARA II.
91
Office of Civilian Defense, “Civilian Defense Review,” (February, 1944), p. 8. RG 287: Publications of the
Federal Government, Beginning Pr 32.4401-Pr 32.4402, Box Pr 272. NARA II.
92
Letter, Harold Smith (Director, Bureau of the Budget) to John B. Martin, December 7, 1943. Civilian Defense,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
93
Letter, Harold Smith to Donald Glascoff (National Adjutant), December 20, 1943. Civilian Defense, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
122
reductions in personnel would release manpower and resources for the developing offensive
phase of the war.
Reporting on the proposal to Smith, the War and Navy Departments both concurred with
his recommendation to decrease the size of the OCD substantially. Secretary of War Stimson
proposed reducing the Protective Services branch to a skeleton force outside of the coastal
regions. The reduced forces would be able to handle any disasters (he refers especially to aiding
in relief of natural disasters) that might occur and the reduction would free up resources for the
offensive operations in Europe and the Pacific.
Stimson’s remarks on the reduction reveal a wide-spread belief in the administration that
civilian defense was not protecting anything real. The true function of the OCD, according to
Stimson was to develop “proper civilian morale and in maintaining continued support of the war
effort by our civilian population.”94 This harkens back to the function of the OCD envisioned by
Eleanor Roosevelt. The President advocated the primacy of the Volunteer Participation Branch
over the Protective Branch in the OCD as well.95 He emphasized the need for the development
“to the fullest extend the activities of the War Services Branch [Participation Branch] of each
state and local council.96
The reduction to the OCD was a challenging development for the American Legion. The
Legion Headquarters was concerned because the reductions came at a time when Legion was
carrying out its America Alert Program. In a letter to Harold Smith, Donald Glascoff asked how
they were supposed tell the public that “the end of the war is not in sight” and they must keep up
their efforts in national defense if the government was cutting back the protective branch of
OCD. The Legion’s efforts to maintain civilian support for defense and the war effort could
hardly be successful when they were undermined by publicity of reductions.97 Who could
believe there is no reason for a let-down if the War Department and President take actions which
indicate civilian defense is no longer a priority? The Legion, Glascoff argued, had invested
94
Letter, Henry L. Stimson (Secretary of War) to John B. Martin, December 13, 1943. Civilian Defense, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
95
Letter, Franklin Roosevelt to John B. Martin, December 13, 1943. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7005.
96
Letter, Franklin Roosevelt to John B. Martin, December 13, 1943. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7005.
97
Letter, Donald Glascoff to Harold Smith, December 16, 1943. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
91-7005.
123
tremendous man-hours and finances into the America Alert Program, which he said was just
beginning to have an effect.
At the Indianapolis office, Legion officials feared that the OCD staff reductions
suggested by the Bureau of the Budget would practically eliminate the Protective Service
Branch, while retaining the War Services Branch. That would mean the activities of civilian
defense in which the American Legion had always been vitally interested in would soon
disappear.98 In a letter to the National Commander Warren Atherton, Campbell urged the Legion
to take the position that reductions should come not from the protective branches but from the
War Services Branch, where many activities are duplicated by other government agencies or by
organizations like the American Red Cross or American Legion.99
Atherton’s response demonstrates much about the relationship between the OCD and the
American Legion and the objectives of the Legion. Atherton believed that the Legion ought to
remain neutral on the matter. While they had protested certain activities of the OCD as a waste
of public funds in the past, at that stage of the war, the public was not sympathetic to OCD
expenditures. Nor could the American Legion keep OCD theories in operation. When it was
established in 1941, the Legion had sought to run the OCD in its entirety and was turned down.
In spite of the rebuff, they had willingly carried the load on civilian defense, putting in
considerable effort and money, but never received very satisfactory cooperation. “If the Admin
curtails the staff,” he wrote, “I do not think it is our job to protest that curtailment. It is my
opinion that we should cooperate with whatever is left of OCD, and if it is abolished, we can
give thought to making our emergency organization available in its place.”100 Despite the close
relationship, there were Legionnaires who still held a lot of bitterness and resentment toward the
OCD. They had been forced by the Roosevelt administration and the War and Navy
Departments to accept the OCD, but did not feel any loyalty to that agency. If the OCD were
disbanded, there was a chance at last for the Legion to assume control of civilian defense or at
least to work in a civilian defense setup that was run by the military agencies.
98
Letter, Milt Campbell to Warren Atherton (National Commander), December 23, 1943. Civilian Defense,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 91-7005.
99
Letter, Milt Campbell to Warren Atherton, December 23, 1943. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7005.
100
Letter, Warren Atherton to Milt Campbell, December 27, 1943. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7005.
124
Campbell and Dudley agreed that the American Legion should not make any special
protestations against the cut-downs in funding for the protective services of the OCD. However,
Campbell believed it was the War Services Branch where all the expenditures were taking place
and it was there that a threat to the Legion lay.101 Campbell alleged that it was the War Services
Branch that was orchestrating the reduction of the Protective Services Branch. He argued that it
had attempted a similar take over of the OCD while Eleanor Roosevelt was at its head, though
that endeavor failed as long as air raids seemed a real danger.102 Campbell’s arguments are not
supported by the documents covering Eleanor Roosevelt’s administration. At no time was there
an attempt by the Voluntary Participation Committee to take control of Protective Services.
Indeed, the only real threat to the Protective Services Branch’s control of its duties came from
Congress, anti-Roosevelt factions, and many Legionnaires, all of whom sought to move those
duties to the War Department.
The animosity many Legionnaires held for Eleanor Roosevelt during the war since her
service in the OCD had not yet ebbed. In part, Campbell’s enmity for the War Services Branch
was due to that episode and the First Lady’s comments at Wellesley College, but it also stemmed
from competition in duties. Because the War and Navy Departments were taking over the
responsibility for air raids and dangers, the War Services Branch was turning its attention toward
the aid of discharged soldiers in making claims and requests for hospitalization. The American
Legion, and organizations like the American Red Cross and other veteran organizations, already
had similar programs. Campbell argued the OCD programs would create a lot of improper
claims being files and a lot of confusion among veterans.103 He advocated direct Legion action
to undermine the War Services Branch.
The Legion followed Atherton’s proposals, however, and remained neutral. The Legion
continued to publicly support the OCD and maintain its overwhelming presence in the protective
services for the rest of the war. During the last two years of the war, the majority of the OCD’s
work dealt with reductions in force and coordinating the closure of civilian defense forces across
the country. Although the possibilities of attack were considered minimal, there were a few
101
Letter, Milt Campbell to Warren Atherton, December 30, 1943. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7005.
102
Letter, Milt Campbell to Warren Atherton, December 30, 1943. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7005.
103
Letter, Milt Campbell to Warren Atherton, December 30, 1943. Civilian Defense, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 91-7005.
125
periods that led to heightened alerts, particularly after the Germans began their V2 rocket
offensive against Great Britain. The beginning of the rocket age brought a renewed terror of
attacks on civilian populations. Had the German technological breakthroughs that allowed them
to array themselves with long distance rocket occurred earlier in the war it is conceivable that
they could have been brought to bear on the United States. However, that worry was to be
postponed until the next, cold war fought by subsequent generations.
During the decline of civilian defense, the American Legion began to turn its attention to
other weighty matters. While its wartime programs were still at the forefront of the Legion’s
daily programs, Legionnaires were increasingly interested in the plight of veterans returning to
civilian life. Over sixteen million Americans served in the war. Their reintegration into civilian
life had the potential to revolutionize American society in positive or negative ways. The
veterans’ legislation, including the G.I. Bill of Rights and medical treatment in Veterans
Administration Hospitals, and the Legion’s struggle to remain the largest veterans organization,
became the most important campaigns for the Legion.104
In April 1944, the OCD initiated a program to liquidate its assets and staff. General
William N. Haskell had recently assumed the Directorship of the OCD and oversaw the
reductions. Civilian defenses, particularly the protective services, were considered a priority
only in the coastal areas and federal coordination of the interior states ended. In July 1944, the
Regional Offices were closed and a Records Retirement program was established within OCD to
prepare records for the National Archives. On May 4, 1945, a few days before the official
surrender of Nazi Germany, President Harry Truman signed Executive Order 9562, establishing
June 30th as the date of the abolition the OCD. The Records Retirement Unit, with the help of
the National Archives, had been preparing for liquidation so long in fact that it was finished with
104
These topics, particularly the G.I Bill of Rights have been covered extensively by historians and so are not
covered here. See Glenn C Altschuler and Stuart M Blumi, The GI Bill: A New Deal For Veterans (Oxford; New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Jennifer E. Brooks, Defining the Peace: World War II Veterans, Race, and
the Remaking of Southern Political Tradition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Kathleen
Frydl, The G. I. Bill (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Milton Greenberg, The G. I. Bill:
The Law that Changed America (New York: Lickle Publishers, 1997); Edward Humes, Over Here: How the G. I.
Bill Transformed the American Dream (Orlando, FL.: Harcourt, 2006); Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens: The
G. I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Keith W.
Olson, The G. I. Bill, Veterans, and the Colleges (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1974); David H. Onskt,
“‘First a Negro…Incidentally a Veteran’: Black World War II Veterans and the G.I. Bill of Rights in the Deep
South, 1944-1948,” Journal of Social History 31 (1998): 527-532; Mark Van Ells, To Hear Only Thunder Again:
America’s WWII Veterans Come Home (Lexington Books, 2001).
126
its task two weeks before the June 30th deadline.105 The state and local civil defense councils
also closed throughout 1944 and 1945. The civil defense equipment acquired in the
$100,000,000 Congressional Appropriation was transferred to the Department of Commerce.106
Despite the headaches associated with organizing the Air Raid Warden Schools and
coordinating with state and local defense councils which were burdened by the inevitable
partisan and personality conflicts inherent in such enterprises, the Legion, War Department, and
OCD were successful in implementing a training program that grew exponentially. The fear that
an attack would come before American civilians were adequately prepared drove the OCD and
Legion to work as quickly as possible. Even though they were never seriously challenged and in
hindsight the resources used in civilian defense might be regarded as wasted, civilian defense
played an important role in the home front of the United States during the Second World War. If
nothing else, it succeeded in making civilians feel attached to the war in a positive way and made
them feel as though they were doing their part.
105
“Finding Aid Material, Records of the OCD Introduction,” p. 1-5. NARA II.
Mary U. Harris, Significant Events in United States Civilian Defense History: Defense Civil Preparedness
Agency (Washington, DC: 1975).
106
127
CHAPTER SIX
SCRAP CAMPAIGNS AND THE AMERICAN LEGION
Although the civilian defense program was paramount during the war years, the American
Legion also maintained an important position within the United States’ community salvage
programs. Salvage was a major issue for the country as it tried to cope with unprecedented
defense production to meet the needs of its allies and it own burgeoning military. Like civilian
defense, salvage was a war program perfectly suited to the American Legion because of its
presence in nearly every community in America and its strong national organizational structure.
Though studies on scrap metal and salvage drives might not strike historians as
particularly glamorous or terribly relevant to the Unite States’ success in World War II, it was
those drives which fed the steel mills, allowing the United States to establish preponderant
military resources on fronts across the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. In many ways, it was
materialism, so often the defining criticism of detractors of American societies and life styles,
which saved the country’s war-time production. Without the abundance of precious metals,
rubber, and paper littering American homes, farms and roadways, the trappings of a culture that
consumes more products than any other society, America would not have been able to serve as
the world’s “arsenal for democracy.” Scrap metals and rubber, cooking fats, paper, and other
materials were collected in massive campaigns, which bridged the gap when shortages in raw
materials threatened war production.
Of the materials salvaged, aluminum, rubber and steel were the most vital, and it is upon
the scrap campaigns for these three that this chapter is primarily focused. This chapter will
explore the role of the American Legion in those salvage drives, demonstrating the
organization’s tremendous ability to act on local, state, and national stages. It will also show that
once again the Legion found itself working with government officials and agencies that never
quite satisfied Legionnaires with their ability to get the job done, nor to give the Legion the
leading role it sought in American communities.
128
6.1 Origins of the Salvage Drives
As the federal government went through the process of shifting the economy and society
to cope with the tumultuous international environment, experts could see impending shortages of
several vital resources on the horizon. Throughout the 1930s, the United States had been a major
supplier of scrap metals to its future allies and the axis powers, especially Japan. Between 1934
and 1940, American scrap metal dealers had loaded over twenty million tons of scrap iron onto
the ships of Japan, Germany, Italy and Russia.1 To make steel, which was vital for armaments
production, the steel industry often used a ratio of 85% raw iron ore and 15% high-grade scrap
iron.2 Although generally refraining from public protestations, the steel industry vehemently
remonstrated against the scrap metal exports to the Roosevelt administration. Industrialists
understood that unilaterally severing such highly demanded supplies would provoke the wrath of
trade partners, potentially lessening the amount of time the United States had to prepare for war
even more.3 They also could not afford to alienate the junkyard and automobile graveyard
owners who were the ones exporting the resources and who controlled about half of the domestic
supplies of scrap metal. Yet the scrap metal exports made supplies for the mills more expensive
and harder to acquire. Only in 1940, as Japanese and German military victories against United
States allies in China and Western Europe mounted, did the President and State Department
finally begin to clamped down on such exports.
The wartime economy created an insatiable need for scrap metals. In peaceful times,
scrap metal collected in junkyards could be sorted, baled and sent to steel mills, where it would
be rolled into sheets for multiple uses. However, in war, metal would be lost forever when ships
sank and equipment was lost in various theaters. So the scrap metal would need to be entirely
replaced, rather than reworked. Only by keeping the country’s auto graveyards and junkyard
stockpiles supplied could mills avoid shutdowns when the mills’ stockpiles dwindled.4
1
Letter, Hugh W. Wright (Assistant to Director of Personal Relations, American Rolling Mill Company) to Milt
Campbell, January 12, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
2
Letter, Stephen E. Fitzgerald (Director of Information, WPB) to Milt Campbell, April 8, 1943. Scrap Metal,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
3
Letter, Hugh W. Wright (Assistant to Director of Personal Relations, American Rolling Mill Company) to Milt
Campbell, January 12, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
4
Letter, Stephen E. Fitzgerald (Director of Information, WPB) to Milt Campbell, April 8, 1943. Scrap Metal,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
129
6.2 Junkies and the Politics of the Local Salvage Drives
The salvage campaigns brought important rivalries within communities to the forefront of
war-time politics. The most important disputes centered on the figure of the local junkie. This
refers not to pathetic and vilified drug abusers of the late 20th century, but to the men and women
who owned and operated the local junkyards and automobile graveyards. A job that required
advanced skills in mechanics, metallurgy, market economics, transportation, and salesmanship,
nevertheless afforded the junkie a disreputable image in most towns. Junkyards often existed on
the outskirts of town, where land for expansive yards was cheap, but close to the source of
materials, spatially marginalizing operators. The work, while requiring so many areas of
expertise, was inherently a dirty job and therefore entirely unglamorous. Legionnaires, who
during the 1930s and 1940s tended to belong to the higher social classes, adhered to the negative
imagery of the junkie.5
Junkies were often labeled conmen or cutthroat salesmen because they were always
trying to get materials from citizens for the cheapest rate possible to maximize profits. While
from an economic and business point of view this makes perfect sense, local citizens were often
resentful of offers for old cars and farm equipment far below what they deemed fair market
value. To a junkyard, an old automobile was not valued based on its resale value as a car, but on
the amount of money its parts and materials could fetch, which was always far lower. Junkyards
had to deconstruct automobiles piece by piece to strip off any parts that could be sold to repair
stores; then they identified and sorted the hundreds of different grades of metals, composites, and
rubbers that remained. The long process of breaking down a car could take weeks and bring a
profit far lower than market value of the complete car. Shipping of materials to mills, always
one of the junkmen’s highest expenses, was done by the carload (in this case, the car refers to a
railroad car). So for any particular metal type and grade, junkmen had to wait until they had
acquired enough of the material to fill a car. This meant that the stock held in a junkyard often
sat in piles for quite a long time before being moved, giving the impression to the public, that the
junkie was doing nothing with their inventory.
The social position of the local junkie became vitally important during the salvage drives
of World War II. Junkyards and auto graveyards often had the only machinery in a community
5
William Gellerman, The American Legion as Educator (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College,
Columbia University, 1938), 24-24, 270; Ortiz, Rethinking the Bonus March, 19-20; Pencak, For God and Country,
80-83.
130
that could crush and bale large pieces of scrap (such as a car) for transport to smelters. They
were also the only members of the community that had the expertise needed to strip, sort, and
process scrap. The government made a concerted drive to get American men, women and
children to donate their time, energy, and materials to salvage drives. Unlike civilian defense,
where donation of time did not monetarily benefit any person or industry within the community,
the salvage drive had the potential to dramatically benefit the junk industry and the relevant
metal, paper and rubber mills. This created an outburst of anger among important segments of
the population.
Veterans in particular were quick to protest. During the First World War, stories of war
profiteering, many of them true, were rife throughout the military and home front. Soldiers, who
were forced to put their lives and careers on hold during the war years, angrily reacted to war
profiteering rumors. After the war, veteran organizations bitterly admonished those who had
used the conflict as an opportunity to get rich. As academics and politicians began to produce
theories that the United States had been dragged into the war by such profiteers, veterans and
anti-war advocates both swore they would never allow such things to happen again.
Scrap campaigns early in World War II were filled with complaints about scrap dealers.
Milt Campbell, Director of the American Legion’s Division of National Defense and the Legion
Headquarters’ point man on every salvage campaign, reported to the Office of Production
Management (OPM), “our posts are dead set against dealing through the junk dealer. Why
should they perform a patriotic service just to let these junk dealers get a cut?” Another report
stated: “Junk dealers have gone over the territory in the past four years but we have patriotic
farmers who have kept their scrap and are now willing to let the Legion have it if it does not go
into dealers or junky’s hands.”6 Campbell also related the story of an unnamed city in the
northwest, where housewives had collected scrap metal, but refused to sell it to the junkie. The
local American Legion Post went to the committee of housewives and offered to handle it for
them. When the committee found out the Legion post was going to sell the scrap to a junkie and
turn the money over to a local committee they refused to turn over the scrap.7
6
Letter, Milt Campbell to Paul C. Cabot (Deputy Chief, Bureau of Industrial Conservation, WPB), February 24,
1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
7
Letter, Milt Campbell to Lessing Rosenwald (WPB), October 29, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 92-7019.
131
Legionnaire salvage committees bitterly complained that the State Salvage Committees
were under the control of the scrap iron junkies. The OPM repeatedly told Campbell and other
Legionnaires that junk dealers performed a necessary and irreplaceable function in the salvage
drives.8 Rampant rumors that junkmen were making tremendous profits off of goods donated by
the public for the war effort lasted throughout the war. As Campbell remarked, “I know [the
WPB] says that no scrap dealers are getting rich, but the public thinks they are and that pretty
nearly makes it true.”9 Though Campbell would eventually come to grudgingly accept that
junkmen were necessary and cooperating fully with the salvage operations, complaints from
Legionnaires lasted for the duration of the salvage drives.
When the government made its initial pleas for civilians to donate their time and
materials to the salvage drives, many veterans and veteran organizations refused to participate
until the government could assure them that junkies and others of their ilk would see no profits.
Thus, in the first salvage drive in the summer of 1941, junkies were largely cut out of the
operation. The inefficiencies of that initial drive demonstrated the irreplaceable role of the
junkie.
6.3 The Scrap Aluminum Campaign
The earliest salvage drive was for aluminum scrap. Strong, yet light in weight, aluminum
was one of the most important metals for modern militaries, particularly in the production of
aircraft. The German Blitzkrieg, Battle of Britain and Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had
demonstrated the importance of air power to the outcome of the war. The construction of a
modern air force for two theaters was vital to the United States’ war program. Though access to
bauxite, the main raw material source of aluminum, was not as limited as rubber would be in
1942, the tremendous war production demands made acquisition of supplies a major issue in
1941.
The Legion claimed some of the credit for the Aluminum drive belonged to Legionnaire
Edward L. Morey. In January 1941, as the fortunes of war were especially low for Great Britain
and the President was pushing for the Lend-Lease Act (see Chapter Two), Morey wrote to
Congressman Bernard J. Gehrmann suggesting a nation-wide aluminum campaign. At the time,
8
Letter, Paul C. Cabot to Milt Campbell, March 10, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
Letter, Milt Campbell to Norman Damon (Vice President, Automotive Safety Foundation), October 9, 1942. Scrap
Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
9
132
there was no shortage of aluminum, but the expansion of the defense industry required
tremendous amounts of aluminum, which Morey speculated would create a shortage. Gehrmann
entered the letter in the Congressional Record on January 13, 1941.10 The Defense Commission
showed little interest in Morey’s suggestion and instead of action to address the shortage, radio
reports soon came out that there was an abundant supply of aluminum, ostensibly to prevent
subversive groups from taking advantage of the shortage.11
In the months that followed, numerous legionnaires, including Morey, wrote into the
American Legion Headquarters suggesting the Legion organize a campaign for aluminum
collection. In response, Warner said “we were persistently advised [by the government] that the
matter was under consideration, but that several obstacles were present with any plan to collect
scrap metals, including storage places, transportation, distribution or reclamation, and that as
soon as some of these difficulties had been solved, we would be advised as to how the Legion
might help.”12 On May 1st the National Defense Committee recommended that Legionnaires
ought to carry out scrap drives as a local project wherever feasible.13 The federal government
had no organization in place to handle such campaigns and transportation costs to move the scrap
in areas far from mills made a national campaign by the Legion unviable.14
Frank M. Sullivan, Secretary of the National Defense Committee, pursued the issue of
scrap metal campaigns with various offices of the government. He finally had an interview with
Robert E. McConnell, Chief of Division of Conservation and Collection, within the National
Defense Advisory Committee. McConnell informed him that the scrap issue had the interest of
several national organizations and government officials. The biggest difficulty was the role of
junk dealers, who were worried that volunteer collections by organizations like the Boy Scouts
would put 10,000 junk dealers out of business. McConnell said junk dealers “should very
10
Bernard J. Gehrmann, “Salvaging of Old Aluminum for Use in Defense Program,” House, Congressional Record,
77th Cong., 1st sess., January 13, 1941, Vol. 87: A95-96.
11
Letter, Edward L. Morey (Washburn County Veterans Service Office) to Milo Warner, June 4, 1941. Aluminum,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019. After the war, the Department of Wisconsin sought to have Morey
officially recognized for his idea. Milt Campbell believed the federal government would be unwilling to do so and
suggested any citations would have to be done within the American Legion. Letter, Gil H. Stordock (Adjutant,
Department of Wisconsin) to Milt Campbell, June 29, 1945. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
12
Letter, Milo Warner to Edward L. Morey, June 6, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
Letter, Milt Campbell to Gil H. Stordock, July 3, 1945. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
13
Some posts did just that. In Hickory, North Carolina, for example, the local post did hold its own aluminum drive
on June 24, 1941. Aided by the local Boy Scout troops, the post collected 2,500 pounds in a month. Letter, R. C.
Boyd to American Legion Monthly, July 26, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
14
Warren Atherton, “National Defense Committee Report,” National Executive Committee Meeting Minutes, (May
1-2, 1941): p. 45. ALA.
133
definitely” be in the picture for any scrap plans. Problems with scrap include storage,
transportation, distribution or reclamation and related issues.15
In the following months, the American Legion National Headquarters received several
more letters and telegrams exhorting the Legion to lead a national aluminum scrap drive.16
Individual posts were encouraged to take initiative in local salvage operations, but the national
organization was unwilling to undertake a nationwide campaign outside of the government
structure. The national commander believed the Legion had to conduct its salvage drives as part
of the federal drives to prevent competitions, conflicts, and duplication of effort.17
Like the civilian defense test campaigns held by local posts cooperating with the U.S.
military, the salvage drives began with test campaigns supported heavily by individual American
Legion posts. On the afternoon of May 27th, the OPM announced a test campaign that would be
the forerunner of a nation-wide campaign to induce householders to contribute worn out
aluminum utensils and scraps to the defense program.18 Test campaigns were held in Richmond
and Henrico Counties in Virginia and Madison and Dane Counties in Wisconsin from May 30th
to June 6th. Aside from collecting valuable scrap aluminum, the test campaigns were made so
the OPM could gain experience in salvage work and make more accurate predictions of a nationwide campaign on aluminum and other scrap material drives.19
In Dane County, Wisconsin, local Legionnaires took part in one of the first scrap metal
campaigns in the country. In the planning meeting on May 21, 1941, a federal liaison officer and
consultant from Washington, DC met with the American Legion posts and other local officials to
finalize plans. The Legion agreed to have all twelve posts mobilized for the collection efforts,
providing, along with the local Boy Scout troops (several of whom met at American Legion
15
Letter, Frank M. Sullivan (Secretary, National Defense Committee) to Warren Atherton (Chairman, National
Defense Committee), April 2, 1941. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
16
Letter, Paul H. Griffith (Director of National Employment Committee, American Legion) to Charles S. Cook,
(Commander, Department of Pennsylvania), March 17, 1941. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019; Letter, Irvin L. Cowger (Adjutant, Department of Kansas) to Donald Glascoff (Assistant National Adjutant),
June 17, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; Letter, John J. McKeogh (American Legion,
Liberty Post 1073, Brooklyn NY) to Milo Warner, June 9, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019; Letter, Bernard W. Figgin, to Milo Warner, April 16, 1941. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019; Telegram, E. W. Clark to Milo Warner, April 27, 1941. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
17
Letter, Milo Warner reply to Bernard W. Figgins, April 21, 1941. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
18
Letter, Frank M. Sullivan to Donald Glascoff, May 28, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
19
Letter, Frank M. Sullivan to Donald Glascoff, May 28, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
134
posts), the bulk of the manpower for the collection.20 The test campaigns demonstrated the
efficiency of using local patriotic organizations and provided a basic model that was copied in
most communities. The campaigns yielded 80,000 pounds of aluminum scrap, four times more
than anticipated. From that amount, the OPM calculated that a national drive would yield
20,000,000 pounds.21
The local posts cooperated with the campaigns without the knowledge of the National
Headquarters. This is indicative of the decentralization that characterized nearly all of the
Legion’s salvage campaigns. Although the Legion had offered their assistance in any salvage
endeavors, federal agencies involved with the planning of those campaigns, such as the Office of
Civilian Defense (OCD) and the OPM/War Production Board (WPB), did not advise the national
organization about the proposed test campaigns.22 One member of the Legion National
Legislative Committee complained that the OPM’s Division of State and Local Cooperation “do
not intend to allow any civilian activity to get out of their hands and be performed by the Legion,
which could do a decent job.”23 The subordinate role the Legion was to accept was emphasized
in a June 26th letter from the OCD to the heads of national organizations involved in the salvage
campaign, which amended the operational commands regarding the role of organizations from
“Offering as a group to take over the direction of the local committees...” to “Offering as a
group to take part in the aluminum collection, under the direction of the local committees...”24
Any work done by an organization was to be done under the direction of the highest elected
public official in the community.
Many Legionnaires were unhappy with such arrangements. In the Dane County drive,
M.W. Torkelson, the Secretary of the Wisconsin Council of Defense, observed that “the real
20
Letter, M. W. Torkelson (Secretary, Wisconsin Council of Defense) to Milo Warner, June 19, 1941. Aluminum,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
21
The total population of the counties in the test campaigns was 450,000, 1/260th of the national population.
“Aluminum Drive to Start in Nation,” New York Times (June 14, 1941): p. 1; Office of Civilian Defense, “Press
Release,” July 25, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
22
Letter, Milo Warner to Edward L. Morey, June 6, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019. On
January 16, 1942, the President issued Executive Order 9024 establishing the War Production Board. It replaced the
Office of Production Management and the Supply Priorities and Allocation Board.
23
Letter, Frank M. Sullivan to Donald Glascoff, May 28, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
24
Letter, OCD to Heads of National Organizations, July 2, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
135
reliance was on the American Legion.”25 Legionnaires lamented the lack of credit the
organization got throughout the salvage campaigns, saying they had “done all the heavy lifting”
without accolades or appreciation.26
Scrap dealers also angrily voiced their opposition. The Empire Metal Merchants
Association, passed a resolution to be sent to Washington DC, urging the government to allow
established peddlers and scrap dealers to collect the aluminum scrap. Established traders, they
argued, were in a better position than organizations like the American Legion and Boy Scouts of
America to get scrap aluminum. While they could do the job at first, the Boy Scouts and
Legionnaires, not knowing the scrap business would only be able to collect a part of the available
scrap. The drives in Richmond and Madison, were not really successes because the collectors
missed too much.27 Many dealers feared that as the potential supply of heavy scrap dried up,
being cut out of the collection would force them out of their business.28
Despite the complaints of scrap dealers and disgruntled Legionnaires, the test campaigns
were deemed rousing successes. Because defense industry’s demand for aluminum continued to
grow, potential shortfalls in aluminum became major issues for the federal government. Huge
investments were made into opening up new aluminum plants to expand the production capacity
of the two major producers, Alcoa and Reynolds by more than 100%.29 A major trade agreement
with Canada was also finalized, bringing 200,000,000 pounds of aluminum into the United
States.30 Yet even with the doubling of output and the agreement with Canada, at full defense
production, the United States would be short more than 25,000,000 pounds of aluminum every
month.31 When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the United States acquired a
25
Letter, M. W. Torkelson (Secretary, Wisconsin Council of Defense) to Milo Warner, June 19, 1941. Aluminum,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
26
Letter, Frank M. Sullivan to Donald Glascoff, June 19, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
27
“Scrap Trade Opposes Collecting By Scouts: Local Group Asserts Dealers Can Do It Better,” New York Times
(June 17, 1941): p. 36.
28
“Scrap bootlegging Brings Rigid Curbs: Dealers Are Hit Badly,” New York Times (June 19, 1941): p. 33.
29
W.H. Lawrence, “Vast Aluminum Need Is Outlined,” New York Times (May 21, 1941): p. 34; John H. Crider,
“Aluminum Need Slows Arming: Tremendous Expansion of Production Still Fails to Keep Pace With Defense
Needs,” New York Times (June 29, 1941): p. E10.
30
John H. Crider, “Aluminum Need Slows Arming: Tremendous Expansion of Production Still Fails to Keep Pace
With Defense Needs,” New York Times (June 29, 1941): p. E10.
31
John H. Crider, “Aluminum Need Slows Arming: Tremendous Expansion of Production Still Fails to Keep Pace
With Defense Needs,” New York Times (June 29, 1941): p. E10.
136
new, albeit reluctant, ally. Like Great Britain, this new ally faced tremendous supply difficulties,
which only the United States was in a position to alleviate.32
Government plans to make the aluminum campaign nation-wide had been in the works
throughout the spring. The Division of Conservation in the OPM was tasked with developing a
nationwide aluminum scrap drive to help meet the burgeoning demand. However, it lacked the
local reach needed to carry out a salvage drive and a means to process the materials and transport
them to the industrial centers. The OCD, newly formed in May, had the local connections
required for the drives and so it coordinated with OPM. For most defense councils, the
aluminum drive was their first major job.33 LaGuardia became the drive’s most visible
cheerleader, publicizing the drives and urging the state and local defense councils to mobilize
volunteers.34 The civilian defense councils could also benefit from the salvage drive financially.
Any profit made by local communities could be earmarked for specific war-related endeavors
like civilian defense or the USO.35
Just as with civilian defense, the OPM realized its task would vastly benefit from Legion
support. Everett Wilson, who initially supervised the aluminum scrap drive for the Division of
Conservation, was in frequent contact with the American Legion Headquarters in order to secure
their cooperation. Wilson, feared, according to one member of the Legion’s Nation Legislative
Committee, that the mayors and town officials would fail to provide leadership for the local
salvage campaigns and believed the Legionnaires would provide the initiative needed.36
The national campaign was set to begin July 21st and run until the 27th.37 The salvage
campaigns were always sold to the public in terms of specific products that could be made from
a given amount of aluminum scrap. The campaign goal of 20,000,000 pounds of scrap was said
32
“Russia Seeks Aluminum: OPM Approval Sought for Virginia Sale of 2,000,000 Pounds,” New York Times (Aug
3, 1941): p. 32.
33
Letter, Hugh A. Shamberger (State Director of Civilian Defense, Nevada) to Nevada State and Local Defense
Councils, July 14, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; Letter, Fiorello LaGuardia to Milo
Warner, June 26, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
34
“Mayor to Ask for Aluminum,” New York Times (June 22, 1941): p. 21; “Mayor Tells Plan To Get Aluminum:
Says Governors Will Be Asked to Direct the Campaign,” New York Times (June 25, 1941): p. 23; “Mayor To
Outline Aluminum Drive: In Radio Talk to Householders Today, He Will Explain Campaign Starting Monday,”
New York Times (July 16, 1941): p. 9.
35
Letter, Frank M. Sullivan to Donald Glascoff, June 19, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
36
Letter, Frank M. Sullivan to Donald Glascoff, June 19, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
37
The national campaign did not extend to the territories like Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and Puerto Rico. Telegram,
Fiorello LaGuardia to Milo Warner, June 30, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
137
to be the equivalent of 2000 fights or 500 four-engine bombers.38 The campaign was publicly
announced in mid-June, giving organizations and local defense councils only a few weeks to set
up a local salvage committee and prepare the logistics of the campaign.39 Milo Warner pledged
the American Legion’s support.40 Legionnaires, working alongside Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts,
many of whom held their weekly meetings at Legion Posts, served as the nucleus for many of the
drives across America.41
As this was the first major salvage campaign, public enthusiasm was high. Popular
examples of large scrap donations were to spur Americans to participate. Harold S. Vanderbilt
sold Ranger, the defending champion ship of the America’s Cup, as scrap metal for $12,000.42
In Minnesota and Philadelphia, theaters held “aluminum matinees” where the price of admission
was an aluminum donation.43 In Athens, Tennessee, one restaurant proprietor served a
hamburger to anyone who brought in an aluminum donation.44 In New York City, 35,235
baseball fans that brought an aluminum donation got to see the New York Giants beat the St.
Louis Cardinals 3-2 in extra innings.45 At the nearby Rockingham raceway, 12,000 fans gained
free entrance to see the opening day races by bringing in aluminum donations.46 In Norwalk,
Connecticut, an “old aluminum dance” was held to bring in donations.47 The mayor of Syracuse,
New York wore an aluminum saucepan on his head at the front of a downtown parade to open
38
OPM, “Press Release,” July 11, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; American Legion,
“Press Release,” July 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; “Aluminum Drive to Start in
Nation,” New York Times (June 14, 1941): p. 1. Salvage Manuals in 1943 included pictures showing what salvaged
items could be turned into: flat irons into helmets, lawn mowers into anti aircraft guns, wash pails into bayonets,
tires into gas masks. Two pounds of cooking fats can be used to make enough glycerin for five antitank shells.
American Legion Magazine ‘Scrap For Victory’ Manual. 1943 Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
39
Bulletin, Milo Warner to American Legion Departments, July 1, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 92-7019.
40
American Legion, “Press Release,” July 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
41
Bulletin, Milo Warner to American Legion Departments, July 1, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 92-7019.
42
“Ranger Sold For Scrap: America’s Cup Yacht Will Yield Defense Metal-Price $12,000,” New York Times (May
23, 1941): p. 27.
43
OCD, “Press Release,” July 25, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; “When Pots And
Pans Become Theatre Tickets,” New York Times (July 7, 1941): p. 9.
44
“A Hamburger for Aluminum,” New York Times (July 13, 1941): p. 20.
45
James P. Dawson, “White's Third Victory in 3 Days Puts Cards a Half Game in Front,” New York Times (July 25,
1941): p. 19.
46
“Rockingham Collects 3 Tons of Aluminum In Admissions for Opening Race Program,” New York Times (July
22, 1941): p. 25.
47
“Plans 'Old Aluminum' Dance,” New York Times (July 16, 1941): p. 20.
138
the city’s scrap drive.48 The first days of the campaign brought in huge totals, leading to several
reports that the campaign would easily outstrip its goal of 20,000,000 pounds by 50% or even
100%.49
However, the campaign quickly became embroiled in controversy. Too often, the piles of
donations languished in collection centers for months.50 Much of what was donated was not
aluminum but extremely cheap aluminum alloy, which was not much use for airplane
production. The bigger problem, however, lay in the processing and shipping of the aluminum.
The demand by so many local defense councils that junkies be totally eliminated from the
salvage process led to many headaches. Government agencies lacked the knowledge needed to
correctly sort the donated goods into metal grades and so mills were often slow to receive the
correct metals. Local defense councils also found that junkyard often had the only machines
capable of pressing and baling the materials for shipment. By September, only 11,835,139
pounds of aluminum scrap had made it to the aluminum refineries, yielding only 7,000,000
pounds of usable scrap for defense.51 Not only was the goal of 20,000,000 pounds not reached,
but the large piles of donated materials were also conspicuous examples in every community of
the ineffectively managed campaign.
Criticisms of the campaign came from many directions. The most prominent critic was
Senator Gerald P. Nye (R-ND), an ardent isolationist and leading voice of the America First
Committee. In late August, Nye spoke before an America First audience of 10,000 at
Breinlinger’s Park, in the Bronx, New York. He accused the Roosevelt administration of taking
advantage of American patriotism to further “the cause of war-mindedness.” The offense that set
him off was the news that the government was soliciting offers from junk dealers for the
aluminum wares sitting at collection depots.52 Communities already angry that aluminum piles
were lying unused were incensed that the government was now selling their donations off.53
48
“Mayor Leads Aluminum Parade,” New York Times (July 25, 1941): p. 9.
“Aluminum Pours In As U.S. Drive Opens: Huge Response on First Day Leads Officials to Predict Quota Will Be
Exceeded Aluminum Pots, Pans and Skillets Pile Up As Nation Responds,” New York Times (July 22, 1941): p. 1;
“Aluminum Drive Hits Full Stride: Pots, Hair Driers and Other Scrap Items Begin to Fill Bins in City,” New York
Times (July 23, 1941): p. 11.
50
Letter, C. L. Stickler (Chairman of the Constantine, MI Aluminum Collection) to American Legion National
Headquarters, November 26, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
51
“Aluminum Yield is Short,” New York Times (September 25, 1941): p. 15.
52
“Aluminum Policy Condemned by Nye,” New York Times (August 28, 1941): p. 8.
53
An Army base in Brooklyn under fire because it is selling its scrap metal, which the quartermaster said was a
worthless aluminum alloy. “Army Explains Sale Of Scrap Metal Here: It Is Called Junk Unlikely To Reach Axis
49
139
Several Legionnaires wrote angry letters to their National Headquarters demanding to know why
the Legion took part in an activity to financially benefit junkies and the government. One
Legionnaire active in the aluminum drive angrily demanded of the Legion leadership, “is this
just a shrewd move to fill the pockets of the warmongers with money for an easy living?”54
Legion posts began to pass resolutions opposing such actions.55
Although Nye’s prominence gave him a ready audience, his positions did not resonate
within the growing anti-isolationist movement. Many dismissed his attacks because he was an
isolationist. However, those who had a stake in the aluminum drive bristled at Nye’s
accusations. Official at Rock Island Arsenal, one of the depots selling off aluminum, disputed
Nye, arguing that the arsenal lacked the facilities to process scrap metals. While it arranged for
firms to do that work, the arsenal retained control over the materials at all times. And rather than
getting rich, scrap dealers that purchased the metal had to conform to price and practice
regulations dictated by the OPM.56 John H. Caldwell, Associate Editor of Daily Metal Trades,
rebuked Nye for his aspersions against scrap dealers, saying that army and navy yards had
always sold their scrap to dealers who processed it and turned it over to smelters. “There is no
trickery or hocus-pocus about this.”57
Despite these rebuttals many Legionnaires, already leery of junk dealers, worried that
they had been duped. Walter D. Fuller, president of the National Association of Manufacturers
told reporters that although warnings to production centers about potential aluminum shortages
had gone out, none of the twenty aircraft and production centers he surveyed had yet experienced
a shortage. The lack of shortages, he said, could happen in the future as the defense industry
expanded and he cautioned that his statement should not be interpreted as an effort to discourage
the salvage drives, yet that was how many interpreted it.58
Nations,” New York Times (June 17, 1941): p. 11; “Army Holds Auction Of Old Scrap Metal: $8,000 to $9,000 Is
Expected,” New York Times (June 20, 1941): p. 16.
54
Letter, Fred Beighton (Legionnaire, Hampton Roads, Virginia) to American Legion National Headquarters,
October 31, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
55
Letter, David W. Henry (Post Commander, Clay County, Indiana) to American Legion National Headquarters,
undated, (but between August 29, 1941 and September 3, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
56
“No Aluminum Is Sold As Junk, Official Says,” New York Times (Aug 29, 1941): p. 15.
57
“Senator Nye Corrected on Aluminum,” New York Times (Aug 30, 1941): p. 12.
58
One person who misinterpreted Fuller was LaGuardia, who angrily disputed his interpretation of Fuller’s
statement. “Mayor To Outline Aluminum Drive: In Radio Talk to Householders Today, He Will Explain Campaign
Starting Monday,” New York Times (July 16, 1941): p. 9.
140
Articles like one that appeared in Defenders Magazine further exacerbated fears of
chicanery. A critic informed readers that the aluminum donations were a waste of time because
the aluminum alloys used in kitchen products could not be remade for use in airplanes or
motors.59 A similar article, based on an interview with Dr. Francis C. Frary, the Director of the
Aluminum Company of America’s (Alcoa) research laboratory in New Kensington,
Pennsylvania, appeared in the New York Times. Frary said that kitchen utensils are different
alloy mixtures than duralumin, the strong aluminum alloy used in airplane construction.
Although he added that those weak alloy metals would work fine for other aluminum parts
freeing the higher quality aluminum for essential jobs, his statements created an outcry against
the aluminum drives.60
Milt Campbell, as Director of the National Defense Division, headed the Legion’s
national salvage drives and was normally the one who responded to inquiries and complaints
about the salvage drives. In response to Defenders Magazine, Campbell informed Legionnaires
that while it was true that aluminum processed from kitchen utensils could not be used for
airplane sheeting, it was used for some motor parts and other products where tensile strength was
not a great factor.61 He also reassured them that rather than getting rich off the aluminum drive,
“In fact, everyone who has touched it has lost money and while there is a great deal of work
being done to see if reprocessing cannot be cheapened, up to the present time that has not been
possible.”62 However, as in the case with the Frary statements, once the story was out in the
public domain it was difficult to eliminate.
Campbell played an important role in the American Legion’s salvage programs, as both
National Headquarters’ chief liaison with the OPM and OCD, as well as the spokesman for the
Legion’s national salvage programs. The records in the American Legion archive emphatically
portray Campbell as a man with little patience for government bureaucracy. He was frequently
critical of government war program, particularly those he believed to be unnecessary, like the
Eleanor Roosevelt’s civilian defense programs (see Chapter Three). Campbell exemplifies the
general antipathy for civilian run government programs that pervaded the American Legion at all
levels. He sympathized with Legion posts that complained of the ineptitude of government
59
Gerald B. Winrod, “Any Pots, Any Pans?” Defenders Magazine (October 1941): p. 17.
“Old Pots Will Free Other Aluminum: Utensils Are Suitable for Car Parts, But Not For Planes’ Duralumin, Expert
Says,” New York Times (June 26, 1941): p. 25.
61
Letter, Milt Campbell to Fred Beighton, October 16, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
62
Letter, Milt Campbell to Fred Beighton, October 16, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
60
141
programs and officials.63 In every war-time program to which he was connected, he believed the
Legion was the only civilian organization that could handle the job properly and had the Legion
run the programs instead of the government, it would have been done far more efficiently. The
records of individual Legionnaires and posts repeatedly demonstrate that most members of the
American Legion shared this opinion.64
Although widely regarded as a failure, the national aluminum scrap drive provided the
OPM with important lessons that would benefit later drives. Campbell noted to hesitant
Legionnaires that the main lesson learned was that scrap must be handled through the regular
scrap channels that had experience collecting, grading and sorting materials: the junk dealer,
jobber and auto graveyards.65 “There is no way you can contribute the scrap in such a way that
no profit will be made by anyone,” he argued. “It is not a matter of profit. It is a matter of
getting [the materials].”66 He blamed the government agencies like the OPM and OCD for the
ineffective aluminum drive, avoiding the fact that the American Legion was among the most
vocal opponents to including scrap dealers in the collection drives.67 Another important lesson
learned was that to get communities enthusiastic about the salvage campaigns, the campaign
profits had to tangibly benefit the community. Without such benefits, communities had little real
incentive to participate.68 From this lesson came the close associate between salvage drives and
civilian defense.
63
Letter, Milt Campbell reply to C. L. Stickler, December 1, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
64
See for example, Letter, Frank M Sullivan to Donald G. Glascoff, May 28, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; American Legion, “Press Release,” October 15, 1941. Scrap Metal, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
65
Letter, Milt Campbell reply to Herbert N. McDonald (Director, National Defense Committee), August 11, 1942.
Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; Letter, Milt Campbell to Denby R. Boring (Mayor of
Carlinville, IL), August 19, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; Letter, Milt Campbell
reply to Wright Tarbell, August 18, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
66
Letter, Milt Campbell reply to Dr. Andrew J. Aird, August 12, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 92-7019.
67
Letter, Milt Campbell reply to Wright Tarbell, August 18, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
68
Untitled document, December 6, 1941. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
142
6.4 Scrap Metal Drives
Despite government statements that further salvage drives would follow the aluminum
campaign, local committees generally carried out the subsequent drives for materials in 1941.69
The most important of these drives took place in Middletown, Ohio, a small city of 34,000
people. In the first week of August 1941, the American Rolling Mill Company, based in
Middletown, took out a full-page ad in the local papers asking citizens to collect and sell their
scrap to junk dealers. The metal exports, a huge piece in the United States’ diplomatic chess
match with Japan, were causing scrap shortages for the company.70 The Mill suggested to the
local Defense Committee that they undertake a scrap drive, similar to the aluminum drive that
had recently concluded.
The local defense council, made up primarily of Legionnaires, organized and aggressive
two-day campaign to collect scrap.71 They worked in cooperation with the local Boy Scout
troops, together canvassing the community on a house-to-house search. The local Legion
Disaster Relief Committee provided the fourteen heavy trucks and drivers to haul the materials
as it was collected.72 The Middletown campaign sold the scrap to the two area junk dealers, who
then processed and sold the scrap to the American Rolling Mill Company. The Middletown
Defense Committee reported that the local scrap dealers had supported the campaign plan and
cooperated fully.73 At the end, the campaign had collected over 300 tons of scrap, which yielded
a profit of $1630.74 The entire profit went to funding the Defense Committee’s program.
Indeed, the need for funds for a civilian defense operational budget (estimated at $750) had been
the initial impetus for the campaign.75
The tremendous profit immediately made the Middletown campaign attractive to other
organizations and defense councils. As previous chapters have shown, funding for civilian
69
“Other Metals to Be Collected.” New York Times (July 12, 1941): p. 11; “More Drives Due To Collect Scrap:
Plans Studied to Gather Waste Paper, Iron and Rubber,” New York Times (July 31, 1941): p. 24.
70
Many commentators consider the embargos on scrap metals to be one of the major factors in Japan’s decision to
attack Pearl Harbor.
71
Twenty of the thirty Middletown Defense Committee members were Legionnaires. “Middletown Scrap Iron
Campaign,” August 29, 1941. Sent by Martin V. Coffey to American Legion National Headquarters on August 29,
1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
72
“Middletown Scrap Iron Campaign,” August 29, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
73
Letter, Martin V. Coffey (Chairman, Subversive Activities Committee, Department of Ohio) to Ralph Stone and
Floyd Hartpence, (Department Commanders for Department of Ohio), August 27, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
74
Untitled document, December 6, 1941. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
75
Middletown Scrap Iron Campaign,” August 29, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
143
defense activities was a major obstacle until February of 1942, and even after the Congressional
appropriation for equipment was passed, it was often many months before the equipment trickled
down through the OCD bureaucracy to the local communities. By having a substantial budget of
their own, communities could purchase what goods they needed to equip themselves against
attacks. There was also a fear among defense councils and Legionnaires that if they did not
claim scrap campaigns for themselves, others would usurp their program. Martin Coffey, the
Legion Post Executive Secretary in Middletown, warned that the Young Democrats in nearby
Youngstown, Ohio, having noted the success of the Middletown drive, had advertised that they
would be undertaking a campaign of their own.76
The Legion took part in similar scrap drives carried out in Zanesville, Ohio; Ashland,
Kentucky; and New Castle and Butler, Pennsylvania. Although in different states, the
Department of Ohio supplied the man who oversaw the Ashland and Butler collections.77 Each
drive resulted in hundreds of tons of scrap collected, which were sold to scrap dealers and then
sent to rolling mills.78 In Ashland, the Defense Committee conducted a campaign that generated
a profit of $1310 that was donated to the United Services Organizations (U.S.O.). In Butler and
New Castle, the Veterans’ Americanization Association, comprised of The American Legion,
VFW, Disabled American Veterans, and other patriotic groups, realized a profit of more than
$1200. The American Legion in Zanesville conducted a drive in November that brought in
$2457. The proceeds went to a fund to purchase a permanent Legion Home.79 All of these
drives were aided by the Department of Ohio, where Coffey served as Vice-Commander.
With so many successful and profitable drives, Coffey and his department believed their
campaign could be extended across the country, bringing much needed funding to Legion Posts
and civilian defense councils. He lobbied the National Headquarters in Indianapolis to assume
the campaign.80 The Headquarters disappointed Coffey. In his reply, Frank Samuel wrote that
the Legion leadership did not feel that they had the authority to adopt the program on a nation76
Letter, Martin V. Coffey (Chairman, Subversive Activities Committee, Department of Ohio) to Ralph Stone and
Floyd Hartpence, (Department Commanders for Department of Ohio), August 27, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019. Coffey was also the Vice-Commander for the Department of Ohio, so he was not
some nobody in the Legion heirarchy.
77
Letter, Martin V. Coffey, to Lynn Stambaugh, December 31, 1941. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
78
Letter, Milt Campbell to Frank Samuel, January 8, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
79
Untitled document, December 6, 1941. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
80
Letter, Martin V. Coffey, to Lynn Stambaugh, December 31, 1941. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
144
wide basis without first receiving a demand for scrap metal collection from a proper government
authority. The hesitancy of the National Headquarters to mandate the Middletown operation for
the organization followed an unwritten policy that seemed to govern the entire war-time
operation. Only when the Legion was specifically asked by the federal government to undertake
a program for the war effort did the National Headquarters make an operation nation-wide. Why
the Legion had this policy is not entirely clear from the Legion’s records, nor was any light shed
on the matter from communications between the agencies and officials relating to salvage and
civilian defense.
Though he did not make the Middletown program nation-wide, Samuel thought enough
of it to disseminate information on it through Legion publications so that any Departments and
Posts that so desired could initiate the program on their own.81 Immediately after Samuel’s
reply, the Department of Ohio made the Middleton program statewide. Ralph Stone, the
Department Commander urged posts to develop scrap collections immediately, before other
organizations could steal the idea. There was no reason, he argued, that posts throughout the
Department should not see the same profits that were realized in Middletown.82 Other
departments soon took an interest in the Middletown program, especially because, in the words
of Milt Campbell, the government was dragging its feet on scrap collection.83
The Middletown Program was not applicable to every type of community. For instance,
rural communities lacked the easy transport of materials to a steel mill.84 But in a period without
a government salvage effort, the Middletown program was a viable alternative for Legionnaires
and other citizens that believed maintaining scrap levels to ensure maximum war production. It
also provided some important lessons for future scrap collections. First, it showed that scrap
collection could bring in substantial profits for local communities. Second, junk dealers were a
necessary and valuable part of salvage operations. Third, it demonstrated that local communities
could succeed where the federal government failed. Profitable salvage drives were possible if
81
Letter, Frank E. Samuel to Martin V. Coffey, September 3, 1941. Aluminum, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
82
Letter, Ralph H. Stone (Commander, Department of Ohio) and J. J. Saslavsky (Adjutant, Department of Ohio) to
Department Posts, September 3, 1941. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
83
Letter, Martin V. Coffey to R. G. Turner (Director, Game and Fish Division, Department of Conservation,
Tennessee, (January 15, 1942). Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; National Publicity Division,
American Legion Press Release, “ October 15, 1941. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
84
Letter, Edward L. Blake to Martin V. Coffey, January 25, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
145
each community chose the process best suited to its own characteristics. Finally, citizens needed
to see that the collections provided the community with tangible benefits. The aluminum drive
had been for the benefit of war production and fulfilled the needs of scrap dealers and mills.
While that was enough for some people to get on board, it failed to create the feeling of
investment in the campaign goals in communities. The campaigns in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Kentucky were sold to their communities as efforts to fund a specific objective that would
benefit the local community. Volunteers and supporters would see a tangible outcome that the
aluminum drive lacked.
6.5 War Trophies
One of the biggest issues of the salvage campaign for the American Legion centered upon
war mementoes and trophies of veteran organizations, parks, memorials, and municipalities.
Legion records show that although the Legion was answering the call of the government for war
trophies, the American Legion’s national leadership sought the request, believing it would
benefit the country’s war production program and bring positive publicity and a position of
leadership in the salvage campaigns to the American Legion.
The debate over salvaging war trophies is part of a larger question facing civilians and
government official in the salvage campaigns. Aside from industrial supplies and obsolete
infrastructure (like abandoned railroad lines) one of the most conspicuous sources of heavy
metals were memorials and statues. There was heavy discourse on collecting metal from the
statues that adorned parks, buildings, plazas and sidewalks; bells in churches, town centers, and
schools; and even metallic grave markers in cemeteries.85 Society had to determine how much of
their past, embodied in the memorials residing in every community, they were willing to
sacrifice for the war effort. Milt Campbell said “No article is of such sentimental value that it
can be withheld [from the war effort,] for the withholding may mean a lack of equipment in the
85
Letter, Willis H. Magrath (Alliance, Ohio) to OPM, January 24, 1943. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 92-7019; Edward Alden Jewell, “Should We Melt Down Our Heroes?” New York Times (Mar 7, 1943): p.
SM16; Fay Ross suggested the metal placards and grave markers in cemeteries might be salvaged. Fay W. Ross
(Chairman, Department Veteran’s Graves Registration Committee, The Massachusetts Ave Association, Inc.,
Boston Mass.) to American Legion Headquarters, November 7, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019. Don Glascoff responded to Foss, informing him that Mancel Talcott, Director of the American Legion
National Grave Registration, said that such a campaign was almost impossible because permission from next of kin
would be needed and between their opposition and posts’ opposition, it would be too troublesome. Letter, Donald
Glascoff to Fay Ross, November 24, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
146
hands of our soldiers, sailors or marines...”86 Many Americans, including many Legionnaires,
did not completely agree. For veterans and their families, the war trophies were more than
decorations. The war trophies served as symbols of sacrifice and memorials to those who did not
return. Giving them up was a controversial and heated proposition.
Like so many American civilian war programs in World War II, the idea of using World
War I trophies to highlight salvage campaigns originated in Great Britain. A year before the war
in Europe broke out, the King of England sent all of the German and British World War I
trophies from his estates to a national dump for scrap metal. This gesture initiated a nation-wide
movement, resulting in the collection of thousands of tons of valuable metal being salvaged. In
the autumn of 1941, after the United States’ aluminum drive had concluded, American Legion
posts petitioned their national organization to undertake a similar movement to donate
Legionnaire war trophies to spark a nation-wide general salvage campaign.87 Although the
aggregate material value of a trophy campaign could be considerable, the sentimental value of
trophy donations was much greater. The trophies symbolized the sacrifice and victory of the
veterans of the Great War, occupying places of honor in posts and communities. Because the
trophies were accorded such value by veterans, their donation would show how invested they
were in the salvage campaigns and the war effort. One Legionnaire stated, “No one will dare
touch these ‘iron’ memories of the last war unless the American Legion leads the way.”88
The American Legion’s Washington office had unsuccessfully lobbied the federal
government to develop general scrap drives throughout 1941. Those efforts had not succeeded
because the government was loath to move on a war-related issue before there was widespread
popular support. In the aftermath of the aluminum drive, public sentiments regarding scrap
86
Letter, Milt Campbell to Lessing Rosenwald, October, 16, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
87
Letter, James A. Weir, et al., (Oscar H. Cowan Post, Stamford, Connecticut) to Milo Warner, September 12, 1941.
Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; Telegram, E. Lloyd Meyer (Commander, New Rochelle,
New York) to Lynn Stambaugh, January 11, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; Guy H.
May (Adjutant, Department of Tennessee) to Milo Campbell, December 30, 1941. Scrap Metal, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019. These efforts continued throughout the first half of 1942: Letter, Milo Campbell to
Robert S. Roush (West Union, OH), January 28, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019;
Allen B. Hardy (Curtis Publishing Company) to Lynn Stambaugh, January 28, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; M. A. R. Loth (Post Commander, Waynesboro, VA) to Lynn Stambaugh, February
8, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; W. S. Hannan (Pierre, SD) to Lynn Stambaugh,
March 8, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; Carl A. Sawyer (Adjutant of the Theodore
Roosevelt Post, Santa Rosa, CA) to Frank Samuel, March 19, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
88
Letter, Arnold D. Friedman to Boyd B. Stutler (Acting Editor, National Legionnaire), July 28, 1942. Scrap Metal,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
147
drives were not very positive. As relations with Germany and Japan deteriorated in those last
months of neutrality, National Headquarters made inquiries about donating war trophies as part
of a general scrap campaign to government agencies like the OPM/WPB. In every instance,
Campbell told one Legionnaire, the American Legion was informed that there was no need yet
for the posts to give up their old war trophies.89
The outbreak of war in December, and particularly after the President’s message to
Congress about the tremendous production program for war materials in 1942, some OPM
officials “have begun to feel that every effort to secure scrap iron and steel must be made
immediately.”90 In early January, 1942, the Legion’s chief Publicity Officer in Washington DC,
Richard Seelye Jones, met with Paul C. Cabot, Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Industrial
Relations of the OPM, to discuss the salvaging of memorial trophies for the war effort.91 Cabot
was willing to allow the campaign and would even have his director, William S. Knudsen, make
a formal request for the trophies.92 However, as one of Jones’ letters to Samuel demonstrates, by
no means were all Legionnaires on board with this proposed program.93 Paul Griffiths “did not
think much of the idea.” Milt Campbell argued, that in light of the success of the Middletown
campaign, “until the Government really makes an effort to obtain the millions of tons of other
scrap that is around the country they should not ask for the unreplaceable [sic] memorials.”94
Discussions among other national leaders within the American Legion revealed that most agreed
with Campbell.95
The Legion’s National Defense Committee held its quarterly meetings in Washington,
DC from January 19 to 21. Cabot, invited by Samuel, attended the meetings to answer questions
about the OPM/WPB’s position on scrap issues.96 The biggest issue Cabot seems to have
89
Letter, Milt Campbell reply to Guy H. May, January 7, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019; Letter, Milt Campbell to Robert S. Roush (West Union, OH), January 28, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; Letter, Frank Samuel to Carl A. Sawyer (Adjutant, Post No. 21, Santa Rosa, CA),
March 27, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
90
Letter, Robert Seelye Jones (Associate National Publicity Officer) to Frank Samuel, January 9, 1942. Scrap Metal,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
91
Letter, Frank Samuel to Paul C. Cabot, January 14, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
92
Letter, Robert Seelye Jones (Associate National Publicity Officer) to Frank Samuel, January 9, 1942. Scrap Metal,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
93
Letter, Robert Seelye Jones (Associate National Publicity Officer) to Frank Samuel, January 9, 1942. Scrap Metal,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
94
Letter, Milt Campbell to Frank Samuel, January 8, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
95
Letter, Frank Samuel to Paul C. Cabot, January 14, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
96
Letter, Frank Samuel to Paul C. Cabot, January 14, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
It was during this month that the OPM was replaced by the WPB.
148
addressed at the meeting was not the salvaging of war trophies, but the role of scrap dealers in
salvage campaigns.97 But from that meeting came a resolution that “patriotic memorials be not
removed unless expressly requested by our government.”98 According to Campbell, during the
meeting with Cabot, the Committee came to the conclusion that salvaging trophies “would result
in such a small contribution to the great need for scrap material” that the Legion should instead
focus its efforts on the far more rewarding collection of general scrap metal lacking in
sentimental value.99 However, neither the WPB nor American Legion Headquarters discouraged
local salvage committees from receiving such donations, especially when used to focus attention
on local salvage drives.100
It was not until July 1942, as potential shortages of scrap metal threatened to depress steel
production, that the federal government issued the request for the war mementos.101 National
Headquarters immediately responded by issuing bulletins to all departments and posts to turn in
their mementos and to cooperate with other entities to ensure that all similar mementos were also
donated.102 In response to this national directive, posts across the country used their trophies to
highlight local salvage campaign.103 Yet, many posts showed the same differences of opinion
that had divided the national leadership. Not all were willing to cooperate with the resolution of
the National Executive Committee to give up war trophies as salvage. In Michigan, the
Department leadership refused to send Campbell’s bulletin to the posts or to publicize it because
97
Letter, Paul C. Cabot to Milt Campbell, January 30, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
Warren Atherton, “Report of National Defense Council, Digest of Minutes, National Executive Committee
Meeting (April 30-May 1, 1942): p. 78. ALA
99
Letter, Milt Campbell to Carl A. Sawyer (Adjutant, Post No. 21, Santa Rosa, CA), March 27, 1942. Scrap Metal,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019. Campbell noted that there was no dissenting vote on this decision from
the WPB or Legionnaires in attendance.
100
Raymond B. Rosgyn (District Commander, Department of Pennsylvania) to American Legion National
Headquarters, June 12, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
101
Letter, Paul C. Cabot to Milt Campbell, July 28, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
At a Press Conference in Washington, DC, when asked by reporters, Roosevelt agreed that statues and guns used as
monuments would be more useful as scrap. They could be replaced, he said, with “something more artistic” after
the war. “Roosevelt Seeks Statues For Junk,” New York Times (Aug 8, 1942): p. 9.
102
Bulletin, Milt Campbell to American Legion Departments, July 31, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 92-7019.
103
“Campbell County Scrap Drive Article,” Cincinnati Enquirer (August 29, 1942). Scrap Metal, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; Program, “The Scrapping of the World War Cannon,” August 28, 1942. Scrap
Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; Letter, Herbert H. McDonald and Clarence Frenzel (National
Defense Committee, Department of Michigan) to Department Posts, September 16, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; “German Cannon Will Be Scrapped,” Chicago Sun (November 8, 1942). Scrap
Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; Letter, Joseph H. Metcalf (Post Adjutant, Beverly, Massachusetts)
to Frank Samuel, October 24, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; Ernest E. Fries
(Commander, American Legion Post, St. Louis, Missouri) to Milt Campbell, February 3, 1943. Scrap Metal,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
98
149
of the “travesty” of the aluminum campaign and the public testimony of a large manufacturer
saying that in many places warehouses are bulging with steel and scrap. Legion statements on
the desperate scrap needs appeared dubious and the mementos should only be collected “after
every other possible source of scrap material has been exhausted.”104 Some posts refused to send
their trophies to “profiteering” junk dealers.105 A post in Framingham, Massachusetts that had a
large gun taken in a scrap drive “has proudly gone and retrieved same.”106 In California, a post
chaplain had to request that Legion Headquarters intervene with the other members of his post
that refused to donate the post’s memorial cannon.107
The policy of the National Headquarters led some posts to testily inquire about the many
field pieces stationed in the park adjacent to the Legion buildings in Indianapolis.108 In some
cases, posts tried to donate their mementos only to find salvage committees lacked the resources
to handle such large donations. One Legionnaire, the head of the Cincinnati Butchers Supply
Company, had offered a large crane and large flat car, totaling 20 tons.109 As late as September
1942, posts were still inquiring about the Legion’s policy on trophies.110 It was only when the
104
Letter, Herbert E. McDonald (Director of NDC) to Milt Campbell, August 7, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019. Campbell sent a strongly worded rebuttal to McDonald refuting his statements
about the need for scrap and trophies, which prompted McDonald to relent. Letter, Milt Campbell reply to Herbert
E. McDonald, August 11, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
105
Letter, Fred E. Young (Adjutant, Department of Texas) to Milt Campbell, July 16, 19642. Scrap Metal,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; Letter, Andrew John Aird to Department of Illinois, August 8, 1942.
Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019. In all of the cases on file, Campbell replied that he
sympathized, but “There is no way to handle junk except through the regular channels of the junk dealer, jobber, or
to the steel mills.” Letter, Milt Campbell reply to Fred E. Young, July 18, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 92-7019. See also Letter, Milt Campbell to Dr. Andrew J. Aird, August 12, 1942. Scrap Metal,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; Bulletin, Milt Campbell to Department Officers, NEC, and NDC, August
21, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
106
Letter, Milt Campbell to Dr. John H. Hall (Commander, Deptartment of Massachusetts, October 15, 1942. Scrap
Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
107
Letter, Dr. L. J. Snow (Petaluma, CA) to Milt Campbell, September 29, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
108
Letter, Herbert E. Michaels (Executive Secretary, American Legion Post, Cincinnati, OH) to Milt Campbell,
December 16, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019. Campbell replied that the field pieces
on the World War Memorial were property of State of Indiana, not the American Legion. There were originally
eight cannons, and after many letters, the Governor sent six to the local scrap drive. The last two would be scrapped
when and if the WPB directly asked for them. The Legion, he tersely concluded, could only suggest to others what
should be done with their war trophies. It only had the right to demand compliance of its posts. Letter, Milt
Campbell to Herbert E. Michaels, December 22, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
109
Letter, Milt Campbell to Lessing Rosenwald November 4, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
110
Letter, Sim Joe Smith (Acting Commander, New Rochelle Post) to Lynn Stambaugh, September 3, 1942. Scrap
Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
150
National Convention issued a statement supporting trophy collection that the inquiries
stopped.111 However, the resolution did not end controversy on the matter.
Legionnaires, many of them reluctantly, had agreed to give up their cherished mementos
with the explicit understanding that similar trophies, held by municipalities, other veteran
organizations, federal parks, and cemeteries, would also be demanded for the scrap drives.112
The Legion created some bad blood with other organizations, as they relentlessly pressured them
to give up their memorials. Despite assurances by the WPB that federal cemeteries, parks,
arsenals, and proving grounds were expected to give up their mementos, Campbell informed
Cabot that many reported having received no word on such a policy.113 He advocated a meeting
that included representatives from the National Parks, National Cemeteries, Army, Navy,
Department of Interior, American Legion, VFW, etc., in Cabot’s office to ensure universal
understanding of the trophy/memorial salvage issue. Cabot chose not hold the meeting.
More importantly to Legionnaires (and interesting to historians) is the heated dispute
between the American Legion and other veteran organizations over salvaging mementos. Again,
Cabot had assured Campbell that the trophies of veteran organizations for wars prior to World
War I were included in the government’s call.114 However, veterans organizations and
organizations for descendants of veterans of the Civil War at times refused to comply with
Legion demands. In Cincinnati, Campbell’s hometown, the WPB had agreed not to bother the
Civil War trophies of the Sons of Union Veterans.115 In reply to Campbell’s complaints, Lessing
Rosenwald, the Director of the Conservation Division of the WPB wrote,
To my knowledge, no special class or group is excepted from contributing to the
scrap drive, the dividing line in material to be contributed [being] whether or not
the metal...is for real protection purposes or is of particular historic or artistic
value.116
111
Letter, Milt Campbell to Lessing J. Rosenwald, September 25, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 92-7019.
112
Letter, Milt Campbell to Paul C. Cabot August 3, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019;
Letter, Paul C. Cabot to Milt Campbell, August 7, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
113
Letter, Milt Campbell to Paul C. Cabot August 13, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
114
Letter, Paul C. Cabot to Milt Campbell, August 7, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
115
Letter, Milt Campbell to Lessing J. Rosenwald, November 17, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 92-7019. Campbell said that several Cincinnati newspapers quote the WPB office as saying, “such items were
not to be taken.” Letter, Milt Campbell to Lessing J. Rosenwald, December 1, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
116
Letter, Lessing J. Rosenwald to Milt Campbell, November 26, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 92-7019.
151
It is, of course, the last statement upon which organizations like the Sons of Union Veterans
based their decision not to salvage their Civil War memorabilia. Cabot’s Conservation Division
informed Campbell that determination of an item’s historic or artistic value was left up to the
owners of memorabilia. It would be “unfair for a central authority to arbitrarily make a
sweeping pronouncement as to what does or does not constitute an historic trophy.”117
The timing of this statement was important: most Legion posts had already contributed
massive amounts of their trophies before this interpretation by the WPB had been laid out.
Campbell was beside himself with anger. The Legion posts, he argued, had “practically sold
their soul” to get the captured pieces of ordnance from the War Department in the 1920s. To
them, the trophies had tremendous historical and personal value. Though rivalries between
organizations like the VFW and Legion existed, there was great respect between the veteran
organizations of World War I and the Civil War veteran associations. On Civil War relics,
Campbell had written earlier in the year, “I am a son of a Confederate Soldier, a Morgan’s
Raider, but I have a great respect for the Memorials to the G. A. R.”118 He did, however, take
issue with memorials and trophies of the Civil War being exempted from the trophy collection,
particularly those organizations “that exists because their fathers or grandfathers served” who
held trophies, “that may or may not have been fired in defense of the country...” Winning the
current war, he continued, was more important than local feeling “over some old cannon that in
truth has no more historic value than does the knitting needles that grandma used.” In an
incredible argument from a Legionnaire, Campbell stated that the WPB, not some organization,
had to determine the standard upon which decisions for what constituted a historical item were
based.119
In the same period, another dispute centering upon the “historical value” of mementoes
erupted in South Carolina. In response to Department Adjutant Robert Fairey’s request for his
position on scrapping World War I trophies, the Governor, Richard Jeffries said he “sees no real
need at present for turning these souvenirs in as scrap material.”120 The governor explicitly
stated that that does not apply to heavy guns and carriages, but smaller items of historical value
117
Letter, J. Shipley Troth (Executive Assistant, Conservation Division, WPB) to Milt Campbell, December 10,
1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
118
Letter, Milt Campbell to Frank Samuel, January 8, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
119
Letter, Milt Campbell to J. Shipley Troth, December 17, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
120
Letter, Richard M. Jeffries to Robert T. Fairey (Adjutant, Department of South Carolina), October 13, 1942.
Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
152
were not necessary. Campbell sent the letter to Rosenwald (which he later denies), and one
cannot help but wonder if Campbell brought the South Carolina issue up with the Civil War
trophies in mind. In a letter to Fairey, Campbell stated, “...those articles of heavy metal which
are only ornamental, even though they may have historical or sentimental value must go into
channels of production.”121
Fairey reacted angrily to the responses he got from Campbell and Rosenwald chiding the
Governor and Adjutant for not giving everything they had to the salvage piles.122 He accused
Campbell of instigating a controversy between the WPB, The America Legion, and the Governor
of South Carolina.123 Campbell apologized for the controversy, but replied that the National
Executive Committee and National Commander were unanimous and resolute on the trophies
issue and the resolution passed at the National Convention was binding on all departments.124
After that autumn, the trophy controversy died down for the rest of the war. For
Legionnaires, it revived again in 1945, becoming one of the biggest national issues in the Legion
between 1945 and 1949. The belief among many Legionnaires was that the War Department
was dragging its feet. After the war, the Legion portrayed its trophy campaign as an altruistic
sacrifice, responding to an urgent request from the Office of War Procurement. This of course,
ignores the Legion’s repeated attempts to solicit that request. The Legion also portrayed the
drawn out process of replacement as a broken promise: “When the scrap was needed, promises
were made in profusion...Now the need is no longer present and promises are forgotten by those
who made them.”125 Efforts to make good on the promise of replacement required an act of
Congress, funding for transport of the heavy equipment, and a large amount of patience in
121
Letter, Milt Campbell to Leon Rosenwald (Director of Conservation Division), October 16, 1942 Scrap Metal,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019. Campbell denies that he sent the letter to Fairey, stating that a WPB
representative asked to see the letter from the Governor when Campbell mentioned it offhand. “He reported it to
Washington and they wrote your Governor.” Letter, Milt Campbell to Robert T. Fairey, November 6, 1942. Scrap
Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
122
Letter, Milt Campbell to Robert T. Fairey, October, 16, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019; Letter, Milt Campbell to Leon Rosenwald, October 16, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019; Leon Rosenwald to Richard M. Jeffries, October 28, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
123
Letter, Robert T. Fairey to Milt Campbell, November 2, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
124
Letter, Milt Campbell reply to Robert T. Fairey November 6, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 92-7019.
125
Letter, Milt Campbell, to Raymond S. McLain (Lt. General, U.S. Army), February 19, 1948. Trophies, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
153
National Headquarters, which was often blamed by posts as much for the difficulties as the War
Department and Congress were.126
Since Stimson retired and the war was over, the War Department required an Act of
Congress to release the trophies. The Legion followed that suggestion and had Public Law 510
introduced in Congress. Although Public Law 510 passed, it did not include provisions to fund
the transportation of the trophies. Once the War Department procured the needed funds, posts
had to go through the tedious process of bureaucratic paperwork and red tape. In the end, a
steady program by the American Legion National Headquarters and Washington lobby
succeeded in getting the trophies replaced.
6.6 Scrap Rubber
Although the most of the major campaigns in 1941 and 1942 focused on scrap metals,
when the United States entered the war, the shortage of rubber was as potentially harmful as any
of the metal deficiencies facing the war industries. The United States’ mechanized military
required a tremendous supply of rubber. The Japanese offensives in December 1941 had not
only devastated the American and British military forces in the Pacific, it had also endangered
the United States’ access to rubber sources.127 In February and March 1942, the Japanese
captured British Malaya and the Dutch Indies. Only British controlled Ceylon remained as an
important producer of raw rubber.128
Heavy news coverage of the potentials of synthetic rubber in the late 1930s had
convinced many Americans that synthetic rubber production could make up for the shortage of
natural rubber.129 However, the United States’ production capabilities for synthetic rubber
before 1943 were far below projected military and civilian needs. The Office of Emergency
Management labeled the rubber shortage “one of the worst materials shortages we face” painting
a dire picture to impress upon the American people the challenge they faced.130 Efforts to
stockpile rubber imports in 1940 and 1941 in case the war cut the United States off from its
126
Letter, Milt Campbell to John Thomas Taylor, July 18, 1947. Trophies, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019; Letter, Milt Campbell to Kenneth C. Royall, July 29, 1947. Trophies, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
127
OEM, “Press Release,” May 22, 1942. Trophies, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
128
Paul Wendt, “The Control of Rubber in World War II,” in Southern Economic Journal 13, no. 3 (January, 1947):
204.
129
For example: “$ Rubber Factories Authorized by RFC,” New York Times (May 17, 1941): p. 8.
130
OEM, “Press Release,” May 22, 1942. Trophies, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
154
supply resulted in a stockpile that reached 634,000 tons in early 1942, an amount nearly equal to
consumption in 1940.131 However, it was evident to observers that this amount would soon be
depleted and drastic measurers would be needed to keep the war industries supplies.
In the days after Pearl Harbor, the OPM had announced a prohibition on new tire sales.
A new, albeit temporary, industry emerged around extending the life of tires. Recapping tires
could save six pounds of rubber per tire. Old tires could be retreaded for about half the cost of a
new tire and get nearly 80% of new tire mileage. Owners were warned to be selective, as cheap
jobs could cost them a set of tires, with replacements difficult to come by.132
As with the other campaigns, Legionnaires hoped the American Legion would assume
leadership of rubber scrap campaign.133 The National leadership refused to take the initiative
unless they were invited or urged to assume leadership by the President.134 Frank Samuel also
gives insight into the Legion’s decision in a letter to a Legionnaire in June 1942. He wrote that
there were already six government agencies involved in the scrap rubber campaign and gasoline
rationing. They lacked uniformity of view, creating a muddle in Washington. It was not smart,
he asserted, for American Legion to step into scrap collection until some unity was
established.135 This hesitancy may have been related to the chaotic civil defense experiences of
the Legion.
For Legionnaires, many of whom served as air raid observation personnel or in other
civilian defense tasks, tire restrictions presented an obstacle in their ability to perform their
responsibilities. The Legion passed several resolutions demanding personnel of observation
posts be given priority status for sale and issuance of tires.136 The Legion also attempted to get
tire and car rationing boards to allow Legion officials, whose work (it was argued) was largely
devoted to national defense and civilian defense, to be eligible to buy tires and tubes.137 In the
weeks after Pearl Harbor, Hank Dudley made application on behalf of the American Legion to
131
Paul Wendt, “The Control of Rubber in World War II,” in Southern Economic Journal 13, no. 3 (Jan., 1947):
204.
132
OPA, “Press Release,” December 14, 1941. Rubber, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
133
Telegram, Clarence J. Bourg (former Adjutant, Department of Louisiana) to Frank Samuels, June 10, 1942.
Rubber, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
134
Letter, Frank Samuel to Clarence J. Bourg , June 10, 1942. Rubber, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
135
Frank Samuel, “Suggested Reply to Bourg,” undated, but likely 061042. Rubber, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 92-7019.
136
National Publicity Division, “American Legion Press Release,” February 1942. Rubber, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 92-7019.
137
Letter, J. D. Mullaney (Adjutant, Department of South Dakota) to Frank Samuel, March 9, 1942. Rubber,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
155
the automotive priorities authorities in Washington, DC, for a regulation to assist Department
leaders engaged in civil defense work.138 In each of these cases, the appeals were denied.
In May, Donald Nelson (WPB), Arthur Newhall (Rubber Coordinator), Joseph Eastman
(Director of the Office of Defense Transportation), and Leon Henderson (OPA and Director of
the WPB Division of Civilian Supply) issued a joint statement to highlight the desperate situation
the country faced regarding rubber. In particular, the sought to disabuse the public about the
ability of synthetic rubber to replace raw rubber supplies.139 While synthetic rubber production
capabilities were expanding, at their greatest, they would only make up a portion of the rubber
needed to supply the war machine. The new military program announced by President Roosevelt
on January 6 had greatly increased the military requirements for rubber. This, however, came at
the worst time, as the United States’ access to rubber supplies in the south Pacific had been cut
off by Japanese advances into the region. The government agencies stated that enemies of the
United States controlled 90% of the world’s rubber. For civilians, this meant extreme rationing
of tires, travel restrictions to reduce tire wear, and regular scrap rubber drives to bring in as much
scrap to be reused as possible. Normal annual scrap rubber reclamation had been between
225,000 and 275,000 tons. The war industries needed at least 400,000 tons of scrap rubber. Tire
rationing, which drastically reduced the amount of rubber in circulation, made growth of rubber
reclamation more difficult.140
The first major campaign was held in June 1942. The infrastructure of the rubber
campaign was organized differently than the metal campaigns. To get rubber scrap quickly, the
government established a three-tiered system for collection. On top of the tiers was the Rubber
Reserve Company, a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). Congress had
authorized the government agency to buy rubber scrap at a uniform price across the country, high
enough for all salvage dealers and participating organizations to take part in the campaign. This
high price made it possible for communities far from mills to contribute to the drive without
losing money.141 The scrap was to be collected by individuals and organizations and taken to oil
and gas service stations, where they would be paid one cent per pound for all rubber. The rubber
collected there would then be sold to four national brokers, who were appointed by the Rubber
138
Letter, Frank Samuel to J. D. Mullaney, March 12, 1942. Rubber, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
OEM, “Press Release,” May 22, 1942. Rubber, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
140
“Note on Scrap Rubber,” undated. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
141
“Note on Scrap Rubber,” undated. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
139
156
Reserve Company as buying agents.142 The oil companies and gas service stations pledged to
donate all of the profits from the rubber drive to the U.S.O., Army and Navy Relief, and
American Red Cross.143
On Friday, June 12th, the President announced an extensive two-week campaign from
Monday, June 15 to June 30. Immediately after the announcement, the WPB sent a telegram to
the American Legion National Headquarters requesting National Commander Lynn Stambaugh
endorse nation-wide cooperation by all Legionnaires in the rubber campaign.144 The short notice
prevented all but the most basic preliminary planning. To make matters worse, the telegram
reached Indianapolis when the National Commander was away on business in Nashau, New
Hampshire.145 Because of the set up in Indianapolis, others were able to temporarily act on
Stambaugh’s behalf, but they still needed him to sign off on it before the Legion as a whole
could act. As it was, official word of the Legion’s participation only reached posts on Saturday
afternoon.146
The first scrap rubber campaigns did not have to process their materials through junkmen,
removing the great complaint that had rankled Legionnaires in other drives. Yet there was still
much to criticize. The biggest complaint originated with the Rubber Reserve Company’s
decision to limit purchases of scrap rubber to four companies. The four companies, A.
Schulman, Inc. in Akron; H. Muehlstein & Co., Inc. and Nat E. Berzen, Inc., in New York City;
and The Lowenthal Co., in Chicago, all with Jewish sounding names, faced public accusations of
war profiteering. This was, according to Campbell, the story with greatest circulation.147 The
assumption of great profits by the companies fell wide of the mark. Lessing Rosenwald went so
far as to say that rather than profiting, the four companies had actually gone out of business as a
142
“Note on Scrap Rubber,” undated. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
Letter, Leon Rosenwald to Lynn Stambaugh, June 12, 1942. Rubber, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
144
Telegram, Warren Atherton to Lynn Stambaugh, June 16, 1942. Rubber, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019; Letter, Lynn Stambaugh to Department Commanders, June 13, 1942. Rubber, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 92-7019.
145
Letter, Frank Samuel to Lynn Stambaugh, June 13, 1942. Rubber, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019;
Letter, Lynn Stambaugh to Leon Rosenwald, June 13, 1942. Rubber, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
146
Letter, Frank Samuel to Lynn Stambaugh, June 13, 1942. Rubber, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019;
Letter, Lynn Stambaugh to Department Commanders, June 13, 1942. Rubber, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
147
Letter, Milt Campbell to Leon Rosenwald, October 26, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
143
157
result of the campaigns and had become government employees operating on a fee basis.148 The
scrap rubber, from the moment it left the oil companies, until it was sold by the Rubber Reserve
Company to the reclaimers, was at all times government property. “It was absolutely impossible
for any one to make a profit out of it.”149
Campbell stated in several letters his belief that the rubber drives were doomed to fail
from the start. Unless an individual or organization were given the task and made the success of
the drive their own agenda, he argued, “What is everybody’s business is nobody’s business.”150
This reflects his belief that organizations like the American Legion should be given specific task
in the war effort. Whether his belief was correct or the short notice of the campaign and poor
organization doomed the campaign, it concluded with disappointing results. President Roosevelt
was forced to extend the drive ten days to reach the campaign’s goals.151 Even when the
extended campaign ended on July 10, the shortage rubber was still acute and the WPB continued
to recommend collection efforts.
In later campaigns, the Rubber Reserve Company did not set a price ceiling on rubber
scrap, leaving the market to determine the price. Unlike the June campaign, the Petroleum
Industry did not control scrap collection in the later campaigns. The “penny per pound” was no
longer offered, angering many donors expecting that rate. Scrap dealers again became part of the
drives, opening up the campaigns to complaints that the dealers were holding the rubber scraps
for ransom, under bidding for rubber scrap and then selling it at outrageous prices to reclaimers.
The fight against scrap dealers reached new levels. One post passed a resolution
accusing junk dealers of treason: “...whereas, the Junk Dealers of the United States have armed
Japan, it is now the duty of The American Legion to assist in arming the United States of
America.”152 Scrap dealers were also accused of hoarding their rubber inventories, hoping
148
Letter, Lessing J. Rosenwald to Milt Campbell, October 21, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
149
Letter, Milt Campbell to Department Commanders, October 28, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 92-7019.
150
Letter, Milt Campbell to Warren Atherton, July 1, 1942. Rubber, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
151
“Drive For Rubber In Final Flourish: Mayor to Go on Air Today to Ask Strong Wind-Up,” New York Times (July
9, 1942): p. 23.
152
Letter, F. M. Neeley (Post Commander, Lewisburg, WVA) to American Legion National Headquarter, January 9,
1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
158
decreased supply would cause a price increase.153 There was some truth in this, as some scrap
dealers delayed transporting their supply if it too expensive. The large piles of rubber in
junkyards, according to Campbell, had convinced many Legionnaires that “all the talk about
rubber shortage is bunk.”154
In what Campbell called the “most enlightening letter I have ever received from your
office or any other agency in Washington,” Lessing Rosenwald responded to the accusations. He
stated that dealers accused of price gouging the public because they offered less than a penny a
pound for scrap rubber were “doing their best for the war effort.”155 The Petroleum industry had
set the penny per pound figure for their drive only. Unlike the Petroleum industry, which did not
have to operate a business on the basis of their gross revenue from scrap rubber collection, scrap
dealers had to be allowed to make a profit or at bare minimum not be forced to take a loss on
rubber. No scrap dealer could afford to pay more than 0.50 to 0.75 per pound for rubber scrap to
obtain a reasonable profit. Neither they nor the WPB could set prices for dealers to pay for scrap
because supply and demand determines such prices. Dealers set their prices based on what they
can get for the materials.156
Why Campbell felt this statement by Rosenwald was clearer than the previous
statements, which basically said the same thing, is unclear. Certainly the role of the scrap dealer
in the salvage campaigns had been repeatedly laid out in their correspondences. Whatever the
case, Campbell was mollified. Rosenwald hoped Campbell would use the publicity resources at
his disposal to spread his answer through Legion channels to combat the rumors undermining the
scrap campaigns. Campbell complied, sending out memos to the Departments and reminding
Legionnaires that one of the war tasks of the American Legion was to dispel misinformation
undermining the war effort.157
153
Letter, Milt Campbell to Paul C. Cabot, June 10, 1942. Rubber, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019;
Neeley also makes this claim in Letter, F. M. Neeley to American Legion National Headquarter, January 9, 1942.
Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
154
Letter, Milt Campbell to Paul C. Cabot, June 10, 1942. Rubber, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
155
Letter, Lessing J. Rosenwald to Milt Campbell, October 21, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
156
Letter, Lessing J. Rosenwald to Milt Campbell, October 21, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
157
Letter, Milt Campbell to Department Officers, October 28, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
159
6.7 National Scrap Harvest
In the year after the aluminum drive, scrap metal collection remained a local endeavor. It
was not until August of 1942, when the Conservation Division of the WPB inaugurated the
National Scrap Harvest, that another nation-wide metal collection was attempted. The National
Scrap Harvest was a campaign to collect a variety of valuable materials, like rubber, paper,
cooking fats, and metals, like iron, steel, copper, brass, aluminum, and zinc, to meet the
requirements of the defense industries.158 Unlike the previous national campaigns that focused
collection efforts over a week, the National Scrap Harvest was to run continuously. The goal
was 17,000,000 tons of scrap metal before winter.159 Several national organizations, like the Boy
Scouts and Girl Scouts, joined the American Legion as the major volunteer organizations
supporting the campaign (though no other veterans’ organization participated on the national
level).160
This campaign was somewhat more difficult to carry out, because many households,
particularly the households of the campaign volunteers, had already been cleared of salvageworthy metals. The National Scrap Harvest widened the campaign beyond kitchen utensils, pots,
and pans to include “useless items” such as lamp posts, lawn ornaments, metal fences, iron sign
standards, etc, which were abundant, but largely uncollected.161 This campaign also created
more bad blood than the previous ones, because the Legion at least, intended to make surveys of
anything in communities made of iron that they deemed replaceable. Having given up their prize
war trophies, the Legion fully intended to make sure no person or organizations retained vital
materials because of sentimental value. Campbell wanted the WPB to “to make it their [the
Legion’s] business to see that the iron fences of the country get into the scrap.” In Cincinnati, he
noted, United States Treasurer William Alexander Julien had a home in a safe neighborhood,
surrounded by a fourteen feet high iron fence. The same could be found on Lake Shore Dr. in
Chicago.162 Campbell argued in his bulletin to Legion Departments that the “need for defense is
158
American Legion Magazine ‘Scrap For Victory’ Manual. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
Bulletin, Milt Campbell to Department Officers, August 31, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019. See also “The Nation,” New York Times (October 4, 1942): E2.
160
“National Scrap Harvest cooperating organizations,” undated. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
161
Letter, Milt Campbell to Leon Rosewald, September 2, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
162
Letter, Milt Campbell to Leon Rosewald, October 29, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
159
160
more vital than memories.”163 In a letter to Rosenwald, Campbell asserted that “everyone thinks
the drive is meant for the other fellow” and need to be shown that everything they have that can
be replaced should be given.164
In an effort to combat the ever-present antipathy for working with the still-resented
junkies, R.A. Crosby wrote a five-page memorandum in support of the National Scrap Harvest.
Aversion to deal with junk dealers, he said, “must be set aside because to withhold scrap is to
withhold weapons from community’s sons in the army.” The WPB intended to use the memo to
sell farmers on the need to work with the salvage campaign. The circular was published in all
the major farm papers, weeklies, and to every major national organization involved in the
campaigns.165
As the name implies, the National Scrap Harvest was designed with farmers in mind.
Earlier scrap campaigns were held in the summer at a time when farmers were at their busiest,
preparing for the upcoming harvest. The National Scrap Harvest was timed to coincide with the
slow period after the harvests were gathered. As a group, farmers had contributed to scrap
collection for several reasons. As mentioned earlier, farmers did not trust scrap dealers, who had
often sought scrap at prices far below what farmers desired.166 Farmers also tended to be located
far from collection depots and lack the ability to get their scrap to mills cheaply. But farmers
often possessed the very heavy metals, in the form of old fencing, derelict tractors and plows,
which defense industries needed. The National Scrap Harvest relied on the cooperation of the
WPB, civic organizations like the American Legion, 25,000 farm equipment dealers, and the
Automotive Safety Foundation to provide transport aid to farmers unable to move their salvage
materials to depots.167
Despite being organized to maximize farmer contributions, the National Scrap Harvest
sought scrap from non-rural areas too. In New York City, the boroughs held competitions to see
163
Bulletin, Milt Campbell to Departments, August 31, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
164
Letter, Milt Campbell to Leon Rosewald, September 2, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
165
Letter, Herbert L. Gutterson (Chief, General Salvage Section, Conservation Division, WPB) to Participants in the
National Scrap Harvest, September 12, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
166
Letter, Milt Campbell to Paul C. Cabot, February 24, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
167
See “National Scrap Harvest,” New York Times (August 19, 1942): p. 18.
161
which one could collect the most scrap.168 This campaign had better organization and
coordination than the earlier scrap drives, having learned from the many mistakes before. It was
so successful, that junkyards and rolling mills amassed huge stores of scrap, experiencing a
surplus for the first half of 1943.
6.8 The “Jalopy Roundup”
In the midst of the National Scrap Harvest, the American Legion held a salvage campaign
of its own: the “Jalopy Roundup,” which took place from November to December of 1942.
Jalopy was the popular term for old cars that ceased working and had little value other than as
scrap. For the purposes of the campaign, the WPB defined them as old autos which could not be
put into running condition within 60 days and which were not being presently used and were not
licensed.169 Each jalopy could provide 1500 pounds of badly needed scrap, as well as
replacement parts for other cars.170 In October and November salvage committees in twenty
states had held some form of campaign to collect jalopies. In Chicago, a “Jalopies for Victory”
parade had been held, where hundreds of junkers chugged off to become “tanks of war.”171 The
Legion played a role in each of those campaigns, in several cases acting as the chief organization
sponsoring the roundups. The great need for scrap to last through the winter prompted the WPB
to announce a test campaign in Minnesota, North Dakota and South Dakota for November. The
region around the Great Lakes, well-known for its auto industry, was also home to a high number
of jalopies and room in the auto graveyards to accommodate new inventory. From April to
August, graveyard inventories had declined from 20,109 to 6,129, processing over 30,000
cars.172 The arrangements for conducting the roundup were made with the Legion Department
168
Bulletin, Milt Campbell to Department Officers, August 31, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019. See also “The Nation,” New York Times (October 4, 1942): E2.
169
Letter, Val W. Ove, (Commander, Department of Wisconsin) to Department Post Commanders, October 16,
1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
170
Letter, Martin V. Coffey (Commander, Department) to Post Commanders, Department of Ohio, undated, but
between November 1942 and January 1943. Jalopies, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
171
National Publicity Division, “American Legion Press Release,” December 1, 1942. Jalopies, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
172
“Junk to Jalopy,” Minneapolis Star, undated. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
162
Adjutants in each of the participating states.173 Independent campaigns were run in Wisconsin
and Michigan at roughly the same time.174
In each of these campaigns, Legionnaires canvassed communities for jalopies and
attempted to persuade their owners to scrap them. Upon spotting a jalopy, Legionnaires and
other volunteers in the campaign were to file a report that classified the jalopy in one of three
ways: “Scrapped”, “Scrapping Promised”, or “Scrapping Refused.” The Legionnaires had no
power to order owners to send jalopies to auto graveyards, but the WPB did have the authority to
requisition unserviceable cars.175 In cases where scrapping was refused, the volunteer was to
follow up with a letter stating, “Your continued refusal to sell a car which is not essential
wartime transportation at a price based on its scrap value may make it necessary for the
government to acquire this material by requisitioning.”176 The goal of the test campaign was
85,000 jalopies.177
The Legion national leadership was very pleased with the jalopy campaigns.178 On
November 25th, following the successful completion of the campaigns in the Great Lakes states
and Dakotas, Donald Nelson ask the American Legion to conduct a nationwide jalopy
roundup.179 As shown in previous chapters, the American Legion greatly desired tasks that they
173
Letter, R. M. W. Shaw (WPB) to Boyd Stutler (Editor, National Legionnaire), October 12, 1942. Scrap Metal,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
174
R. W. Monk (Chairman of Salvage Section, American Legion Department of Wisconsin, National Defense
Committee), “Jalopy Campaign for All Posts to Start November 2.” Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019; Letter, Guy H. Stordock to Milt Campbell, October 29, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA,
reel 92-7019; Letter, John Jones, (District Chief, Scrap Processors Section) to Auto Graveyard Operators and Scrap
Dealers, October, 30, 1942. Jalopies, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019. A campaign in Ohio was
undertaken in late November. Letter, Donald Nelson (Chairman WPB) to J. J. Saslavsky (Adjutant, Department of
Ohio), November 25, 1942. Jalopies, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
175
Letter, Hugh Wright (Chairman, Department of Ohio Salvage Committee) to Department of Ohio Posts, undated.
Jalopies, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
176
Letter, John Jones (District Chief, Scrap Processors Section) to Auto Graveyard Operators and Scrap Dealers,
October 30, 1942. Jalopies, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019. Robert E. Grimes, District Chief of the WPB
auto graveyard section stated this in: “Junk to Jalopy,” Minneapolis Star, undated. Scrap Metal, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
177
“Junk to Jalopy,” Minneapolis Star, undated. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
178
Campbell was so impressed by the campaign that he touted it as an example of the superlative efforts of the
Legion in a letter to Rosenwald. Letter, Milt Campbell to Lessing Rosenwald, October 30, 1942. Scrap Metal,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
179
Letter, Donald Nelson to American Legion National Headquarters, November 25, 1942. Jalopies, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019. A slightly different version of this message appeared in Campbell’s December 10
Bulletin to Legion Department Officers. Bulletin, Milt Campbell to Department Officers, December 10, 1942.
Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
163
could call their own, and so they embraced the new task with enthusiasm.180 National
Commander Roane Waring immediately directed the National Defense Division to head up the
nationwide campaign, bringing the operation under Milt Campbell.
Almost immediately the Legion encountered problems. Campbell told Nelson that the
Legion had an exemplary record of cooperation with the OCD and hoped to have similar good
relations with WPB.181 Yet Campbell and the American Legion found the WPB shared many of
the same faults as their colleagues in the OCD. Campbell noted that in discussing the program
with two officials in the WPB (one of whom was a Legionnaire), they had distinct visions of the
jalopy drive.182 The Nelson sought to placate Campbell by attributing the disagreement to the
requirements of different localities with varying population densities, frequency of age groups of
cars, and efficiency of collection organizations; no difference exists between the official on the
basic national plan.183 What Campbell took from it, however, was that this was yet another
government institution with less than competent leadership.184
Legionnaires soon found that coordinating a nationwide campaign in areas that already
had jalopy drives caused headaches. In Michigan, the Department Adjutant met with the State
Salvage Committee after receiving instructions from National Headquarters. The Committee
was already conducting a jalopy campaign that would soon conclude. Although there were many
Legionnaires acting in the drive in an individual capacity, the Committee made clear their belief
that there was no need to get the Legion Department involved.185
In Kansas, a brash and abrasive WPB Representative, upon marching into the Department
Headquarters in Kansas City, announced in no uncertain terms that “The American Legion has to
put on a Jalopy Campaign in Nebraska.” Not only was the Department Adjutant immediately
alienated, but the representative also infuriated the state salvage director. The representative so
thoroughly mismanaged the WPB’s responsibilities in the campaign that Legionnaires and the
180
National Publicity Division, “American Legion Press Release,” December 1, 1942. Jalopies, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
181
Letter, Milt Campbell to Donald M. Nelson (Chairman, WPB), December 1, 1942. Jalopies, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
182
Letter, Milt Campbell to Donald M. Nelson (Chairman, WPB), December 1, 1942. Jalopies, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
183
Letter, Stephen E. Fitzgerald (Director of Information, WPB) to Milt Campbell, December 14, 1942. Jalopies,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
184
Letter, Milt Campbell to R. C. “Pat” Patterson (Adjutant, Department of Nebraska), December 22, 1942.
Jalopies, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
185
Letter, Lisle H. Alexander (Adjutant, Department of Michigan) to Milt Campbell, December 16, 1942. Jalopies,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
164
state salvage committee in the state refused to participate further in the jalopy drive.186 Matters
were only made worse when Stephen Fitzgerald, Director of Information at the WPB, dismissed
the complaints about the WPB representative to “a clash of personalities.”187
The Legion and WPB also quarreled over problems on the west coast. At the heart of the
dispute were regional differences in the scrap issue. While much of the eastern part of the
country was experiencing acute scrap shortages, the scrap campaigns in the west had succeeded
in filling the scrap yards to capacity. This was primarily due to the much larger industrial
production capabilities of the east. In any case, Legion Departments in the west believed another
scrap campaign there would make the Legion look ridiculous. Campbell wrote angrily to the
WPB that it was clear the WPB knew nothing of the scrap conditions in the West or it would not
have asked the Legion to hold the campaigns there.188 The different plans within the WPB, its
lack of knowledge about the nationwide scrap situation, and the inability of its officials, like the
one in Kansas, led Campbell to complain that the entire jalopy campaign had been “a headache
ever since it was handed to me.”189
Fitzgerald, responded to Campbell’s complaints saying, “[there] seems to be a
misunderstanding regarding the initiation of jalopy drives by the American Legion in every
state...The Scrap Processors Branch is under the impression that the Legion was not requested to
start jalopy drives in every state.” Fitzgerald argued that the WPB sought nationwide
endorsement of the jalopy drive, not a nationwide campaign.190 National headquarters did not
find that interpretation acceptable. After all, Nelson’s message to them in November had said “I
ask this be made a nationwide activity in your organization and The American Legion in every
state and community be the sponsoring agent in this very needed activity.”191 Fitzgerald’s reply
had once again demonstrated the poor communications and organization within the WPB.
Unhappy as they were with the WPB’s handling of the campaign, the American Legion carried
186
Letter, R. C. Patterson to Milt Campbell, December 15, 1942. Jalopies, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
187
Letter, Stephen E. Fitzgerald to Milt Campbell, December 31, 1942. Jalopies, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
188
Letter, Milt Campbell to Stephen E. Fitzgerald, December 22, 1942. Jalopies, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
189
Letter, Milt Campbell to R. C. “Pat” Patterson, December 22, 1942. Jalopies, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
190
Letter, Stephen E. Fitzgerald to Milt Campbell, December 22, 1942. Jalopies, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
191
National Publicity Division, “American Legion Press Release,” December 1, 1942. Jalopies, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
165
out their self-appointed duty to ensure the engines of production were maintained and the
soldiers at the fronts were provided with the armaments needed to overwhelm their enemies.
6.9 Surplus and National Scrap Bank Campaign
Despite all the headaches and mistakes, the salvage drives of 1942 succeeded in creating
massive scrap metal and rubber surpluses in the spring of 1943. In March, the American Iron
and Steel Institute reported a surplus of 3,831,000 tons of steel.192 Scrap dealers and auto
graveyards were filled to capacity, mostly with poorer grades of metal scrap that were in low
demand from the steel mills. Part of the problem for scrap dealers was that the general, lowquality scrap also tended to be the bulkiest. While the general scrap could be used if necessary,
steel furnaces could not operate at maximum speed and efficiency if the scrap in any one charge
contains more than 15% of general scrap. So steel mills had little inclination to place orders for
general scrap when high quality material was abundant.193 This created some difficulties for the
American Legion and the government salvage agencies. The WPB assured the American Legion
that the steel mill demands for scrap would clear out the dealers’ yards by the time the spring and
summer scrap drives got underway.194 Knowing that the surplus would be temporary, the WPB
was hesitant to publicly recognize it. They feared that it would be difficult to get public support
for further salvage campaigns that would be necessary by mid-year if they acknowledged the
current lack of need.195 The American Legion National Headquarters found high opposition to
continuing their salvage drives while scrap yards were filled with unmoving piles of scrap.196
The need for scrap became more desperate in May because of a series of issues. In
Pennsylvania, labor unrest in the coal industry threatened to slow steel production, which had
reached full capacity in March. The U.S. Bureau of Mines also reported scrap iron and steel
inventories had steadily plummeted since May.197 The tremendous pace of production created
192
“Country Will Need Scrap Steel In 4 1/2 Weeks, Institute Reports,” New York Times (Mar 7, 1943): p. S6.
Letter, Stephen E. Fitzgerald to Milt Campbell, April 8, 1943. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
194
Letter, Stephen E. Fitzgerald to Milt Campbell, April 8, 1943. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
195
Letter, Milt Campbell to John Zurhammer, Jr., March 18, 1943. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
196
Letter, Milt Campbell to Stephen E. Fitzgerald, March 18, 1943. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019.
197
Letter, Linus F. Vorpahl (Chief, Scrap Metals & Rubber Unit, WPB) to Warren H. Atherton (National
Commander), November 17, 1943 Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
193
166
wear and tear on the steel mill facilities and many of the blast furnaces had to be shut down for
repairs and relining, creating fluctuating output levels for much of the year.198 These set backs
came at a time when the demands of the armed forces were growing at tremendous rates.
Between the surplus and campaign fatigue, the WPB created a new scrap drive in the
summer of 1943, the Victory Scrap Bank Campaign. Rather than attempt to run campaigns to
combat immediate shortages, the new campaign endeavored to create a continuously supplied
overhead of scrap from which mills could draw whenever needed. This had the benefit of
eliminating one of the biggest complaints against the salvage drives: the presence of large piles
of scrap that took time to remove. Before, communities had viewed the scrap piles as eyesores
and as a conspicuous reminder of the failings of the government scrap agencies.199 The presence
of large scrap supplies also gave assurance to steel mills that they could run at maximum
capacity without fear of scrap shortages, which was particularly necessary for large war
projects.200
The campaign began in July and was to reach its peak in October. The goal was
15,000,000 tons of scrap iron and steel. The WPB was very cognizant of campaign fatigue in
local salvage committees and volunteer organizations like the American Legion. It held salvage
clinics to revitalize local committees and to combat war optimism which was hurting all civilian
volunteer efforts.201 The Legion was once again one of the largest national organizations
supporting the campaign. In a bulletin to the Legion Departments, Campbell linked the Victory
Scrap Bank Campaign with its America Alert Campaign, saying continued effort in scrap drives
would demonstrate the American Legion’s commitment to the Alert Campaign.202
The Victory Scrap Bank Campaign was closely tied to the invasion of Europe and the
island hopping campaign in the press. As the Allies faced heavy German resistance in the
Apennines and American forces were wrapping up fighting in the Solomons before the jump to
198
“Steel Output Cut By Urgent Repairs,” New York Times (May 10, 1943): p. 25.
Letter, General Salvage Branch to American Legion National Headquarters, September 1943. Scrap Metal,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
200
“Victory Scrap Bank Campaign,” September 1, 1943. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
201
Letter, General Salvage Branch to American Legion National Headquarters, September 1943. Scrap Metal,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
202
Bulletin, Milt Campbell to Department and National Officers, September 21, 1943. Scrap Metal, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
199
167
the Gilberts in November, Under-Secretary of War Robert Patterson issued a statement
connecting the scrap drives and the awesome material requirements of the military campaigns.203
6.10 Other Materials
While aluminum, iron, and steel were the major focus of the nationwide campaigns, there
were also campaigns for paper, tin, and brass. Early requests for paper collection in 1942 created
a lot of acrimony because in many areas scrap paper was not needed.204 Legionnaires in one
town collected forty tons of paper that they could not get rid of because paper mills in the region
were full.205 Campbell boasted that the Legion’s paper drives had been so successful that it
flooded the paper mills so much that the collection had to be halted in several areas.206
In a meeting with the National Defense Committee in Washington DC in February 1944,
Eric Marks, the Director of the WPB General Salvage Division, listed paper as the “#1 critical
item.” Most supplies for soldiers were wrapped in paper. Blueprints alone used to build one
battleship weigh 165 tons. Processed paper was used to make self-sealing fuel tanks in fighters.
Victory Boxes, which hold emergency rations for troops, were made of waterproof laminated
paper. The amount of paper going overseas for military operations was expected to grow 33% in
1944 to 8,000,000 tons. Those huge quantities going overseas to armed forces and allies would
not come back, so scrap paper supplies needed to increase. Marks also reported a shortage of
wood pulp, cause by loss of manpower in lumber industry. Pulpwood supply had decreased by
3,500,000 cords. It took 1,500 pounds of waste paper to replace a cord of wood.207
Another material sought after because of its heavy use by soldiers at the front was tin. It
was highly desired because tin cans were used for packaging the tremendous amounts of military
rations at the fronts and packaging for medical equipment. Tin, which does not corrode from
food acids the way most metals do, was used to line the food containers most soldiers use in the
203
“Scrap Drive Backed: Patterson in a Message to City Emphasizes Its Importance,” New York Times (Oct 13,
1943): p. 26.
204
Letter, Milt Campbell to Wright Tarbell (Post Adjutant), August 18, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 92-7019; Bulletin, Milt Campbell to Department and National Officers, August 31, 1942. Scrap Metal,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
205
Letter, Wright Tarbell, to Lynn Stambaugh, August 10, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
206
Bulletin, Milt Campbell to Department and National Officers, August 31, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
207
Eric H. Marks (Director, General Salvage Division, WPB), Remarks Before The NDC Meeting in Washington
DC, February 3, 1944. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
168
field. Tin was used heavily in packaging and protecting medical supplies. Salvage agencies
advertised their tin campaigns by telling their audiences two tin cans could be recycled to make
one syrette.208 Syrettes, a small single dose needle of morphine, were distributed to all frontline
soldiers for use in emergencies. Tin was also vital to military weapons and vehicles. Battleships
alone contain at least 76 tons of tin.209 Like rubber, the Japanese controlled the tin producing
areas in southeast Asia upon which the United States depended during the war. That the United
States consumed more tin than anyone else in the world without produced any itself, meant that
reclaimed tin was a large part of the supply and made tin drives vital to the war-effort.210 The
greatest secondary source of tin is the 12 to 15 billion tin cans consumed by the US every
year.211
Legionnaires in Omaha, Brooklyn, and Rochester County, New York attempted extensive
drives to collect old badges from the Legion’s state and national conventions. Many
Legionnaires in other areas had the same idea and petitioned the National Headquarters to
undertake a nation-wide campaign.212 At first, the Legion leaders in Indianapolis were receptive
to the idea.213 However, Legionnaires in Omaha, tried a convention badge drive for several
weeks, resulting in less than 100 pounds of metal collected. Despite warnings from National
Headquarters, Legionnaires in Brooklyn, New York also tried a convention badge campaign, and
only got a few hundred pounds of what they thought was brass only to find out it was almost
completely a worthless brass substitute.214 The Rochester County drive similarly failed. Though
208
Bulletin, Milt Campbell to Department and National Officers, February 24, 1944. Scrap Metal, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; National Publicity Division, “American Legion Press Release,” undated. Scrap
Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; “Eight Minute Talk,” undated. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection,
ALA, reel 92-7019.
209
Eric H. Marks (Director, General Salvage Division, WPB), Remarks Before The NDC Meeting in Washington
DC, February 3, 1944. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
210
“Eight Minute Talk,” undated. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
211
Eric H. Marks (Director, General Salvage Division, WPB), Remarks Before The NDC Meeting in Washington
DC, February 3, 1944. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
212
Letter, Quimby Melton (Editor, Griffin, GA Daily News) to Frank Samuel, March 20, 1942. Scrap Metal,
Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; Letter, William H Hottinger Jr. to H. L. Chaillaux (Director, National
Americanism Commission), September 1, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; Joseph H.
Metcalf (Post Adjutant, Beverly, Massachusetts) to Frank Samuel, October 24, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019; Joseph R. Dorfman (Department Commander, Sons of the American Legion,
Illinois) to Roane Waring, November 30, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
213
Letter, Frank Samuel to Quimby Melton, March 24, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel 927019.
214
Letter, Milt Campbell to Joseph H. Metcalf, November 4, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection, ALA, reel
92-7019; Letter, Milt Campbell to Joseph R. Dorfman, December, 11, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm Collection,
169
these campaigns did not result in valuable scrap collections, they demonstrate the enthusiasm
with which the Legionnaires attacked scrap shortages.
The many campaigns discussed in this chapter show the tremendous efforts the American
Legion made to help the war industries overcome shortages in vital materials over the course of
the war. As with civilian defense, the American Legion had a difficult relationship with the
government’s salvage agencies. Often dissatisfied with the leadership and the lack of urgency at
times by the federal government, the American Legion nevertheless continued to devote its
considerable resources to scrap drives until the war’s end. The salvage drives were directly tied
to other areas of the Legion’s wartime agenda as a means of funding and a way to demonstrate
commitment to programs like the American Alert Campaign.
ALA, reel 92-7019; Letter, Milt Campbell to William H Hottinger Jr., September 10, 1942. Scrap Metal, Microfilm
Collection, ALA, reel 92-7019.
170
CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
The Legion’s greatest and most successful wartime program was veterans’ legislation.
Throughout the war, the American Legion and other veteran organizations worked with
Congressional leaders, the Roosevelt administration, and others to draft legislation to ensure
demobilization did not plunge the country into chaos. This legislation, popularly known as the
G.I. Bill of Rights, is the greatest legacy of World War I veterans during World War II. Built as
an answer to the failings of the veterans’ legislation of the Great War, the G.I. Bill ushered in a
period of comprehensive veterans benefits unprecedented in world history. It had long lasting
repercussions in higher education, the housing market, and socio-demographic trends. As such,
it has captivated the attentions of scholars ever since.
Against such blinding significance, wartime civilian defense and salvage programs pale
in comparison. However, to understand the civilian home front during the war and to understand
the relationship between civic organizations and the state during the war, such programs are
significant. Veterans become not just a postwar-phenomenon, but also a unique civilian group in
wartime, whose participation in the conflict is greatly linked to military experiences in previous
wars. They had wartime memories of what life was like on the front lines and tried to use that
experience to better the lives of the new generation of soldiers and to improve home front
support of military personnel. Throughout the war, Legionnaires carried out bond and stamp
drives, record (LP) and playing card collections, and numerous other campaigns to raise funds
for the war and morale of the fighting men and women. To be sure, veterans individually and in
other organizations participated and gave to the war effort every bit as much as Legionnaires did
(indeed, memberships among veterans’ organizations often overlapped, so that veterans
contributed to the war effort for multiple organizations).
But because of its size and reach into
nearly every community, the Legion’s wartime program was unique. It had political influence
171
that no other veteran organization could match and thus uncommon access to power. It wielded
that influence to create an exclusive role in civilian defense.
In both civil defense and salvage programs, Legionnaires were at the forefront of public
pressure on the federal government to enact programs they deemed to be vital to national
security and the war effort. The Roosevelt Administration refused to allow private organizations
to dominate the programs, creating a system that subordinated all organizational efforts. Yet
within this system, Legionnaires held leadership positions at every level. Working so intimately
with the federal agencies afforded the Legion great influence, but also created difficulties,
sometimes even within its own ranks, when the federal system proved to be deficient.
Although the United States’ civilian defense programs languished in the final years of the
war, the defeat of the Axis did not mean the end of civilian defense. After the Office of Civilian
Defense was abolished in 1945, federal responsibility for civilian defense unofficially rested with
the U.S. Army. Neither President Harry Truman, nor his successor Dwight Eisenhower believed
civilian defense was worth investing much capital or personnel resources. As the Truman and
Eisenhower administrations reorganized federal and military agencies to handle the demands of
the early Cold War, civilian defense was regularly shunted aside to minor agencies.215 Yet
important developments in civilian defense occurred. During the postwar reorganization of the
Army, Secretary of War Robert Patterson appointed Major General Harold R. Bull to study the
“civil defense problem.” The Bull Report recommended that the Army should be relieved of its
civil defense responsibilities and a separate, new agency reporting directly to the Secretary of
Defense be created. Some limited discussions of civilian defense planning, such as the Russell J.
Hopley report in 1948 took place, but Truman did not think a permanent civilian defense office
was necessary and little civilian defense planning occurred until the outbreak of the Korean
War.216
Laura McEnaney shows that the Legion’s efforts to shape and lead civilian defense did
not end with the war. The Legion (and other organizations), sought an official relationship with
the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), one of the federal agencies in charge of civil
defense in the postwar (July, 1947 to December, 1950. An NSRB official in Washington, DC
noted there were “hundreds of national organizations listed in the...telephone book and all of
215
Neal Fitzsimons, “Brief History of American Civil Defense,” in Who Speaks for Civil Defense? Ed. by Eugene P.
Wigner (New York: Charles Schribner’s Sons, 1968), 28-46.
216
Fitzsimons, “Brief History of American Civil Defense,” 33-36.
172
them are interested in civil defense and all would like a stake in it.” The NSRB feared that
official relationship or assignment would appear to be government favoritism. McEnaney writes
that when such groups did get involved in civil defense, they tried to steer it in ways that officials
could not always control. The Legion, for example, wanted to run auxiliary police forces, while
the VFW wanted a consulting seat on the NSRB. The tumultuous relationship between the OCD
and voluntary organizations in World War II had taught later civilian defense planners to work
carefully with organizations, encouraging their participation, while keeping them at arm’s
length.217
Legion criticism of federal civilian defense programs also continued beyond victory.
During the first series of Congressional hearings on the NSRB, the NSRB staff prevented the
Legion and others from testifying that the government had been derelict in its duties. NSRB
officials also met with such organizations before public testimony to get them to tone down their
testimony.218 The relatively tame criticism in the public testimony showed that leadership within
the Legion remained receptive to such efforts.
While much of the rest of the country was focused on enjoying the benefits of their
labors, the Legion once again staunchly advocated national defense and civil readiness. Their
platform, which in the 1920s was discordant with the general national mood, found resonance in
the decades after the war. Bombing raids and espionage remained the top concerns, particularly
after the Soviet Union successfully tested its nuclear weapon “First Lightning” in August 1949.
Nicknamed Joe-1 (after Joseph Stalin), the testing of the Soviet nuclear bomb ended the United
States’ nuclear monopoly. That significant research for Joe-1 appeared to come from Soviet spies
in the United States made Joe-1 even more terrifying, reviving the Red Scare of the 1920s.
Coupled with the victory of Mao Tse Tung’s communist forces in China five weeks later, the
communist threat to American interests appeared to be very real.
The North Korea invasion of South Korea reinvigorated civilian defense. Gallup Polls in
July 1950 showed that 57% of respondents believed they were already in the first stages of a new
world war.219 That same year, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory published The Effects of
217
Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home: militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties (Princeton and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 95-96.
218
McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home, 95-96.
219
That number dipped in October, but in December, after the Chinese offensive had crippled U.S. forces in
Northern Korea, Gallup showed 55% of Americans believed they were already in the first stages of a new world
war. Gallup Poll, July, 1950; November, 1950; December, 1950. Retrieved Oct-2-2012 from the iPOLL Databank,
173
Atomic Weapons, providing civil defense planners and activists with information from the
nuclear tests that had been carried out to that point.220 In 1954, nuclear testing in the Pacific led
to public acquaintance with nuclear radiation fall out and greater emphasis on bomb shelters by
civilian defense planners.
Eisenhower was entirely devoted to a domestic national security plan based upon nuclear
deterrence. Between 1955 and 1961, federal civilian defense workers nearly doubled in number
from 900 to 1800, but few other investments were made. A proposal for a massive nationwide
shelter program that would have cost an estimated $22.5 billion was discarded. In 1958, federal
civil defense agencies were streamlined into a single agency, the Office of Civil and Defense
Mobilization (OCDM), whose director had a seat on the National Security Council. Some
important planning and limited shelter construction laid the groundwork for later civil defense
programs, but it was not until Kennedy took over that civil defense really experienced significant
growth. Kennedy, an advocate of civilian defense dating back to his early years in Congress,
openly supported civilian defense in his address to the nation during the Berlin Crisis.
Congressional fiscal restraints limited the shelter drive, but it was in the Kennedy years, when
events like the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of
nuclear war, that civilian defense reached its climax.221
Whatever criticisms there are of the Legion, they created their wartime programs with the
belief that they were protecting America. Yes, they wanted glory and to be the best veterans’
organization, but Legionnaires also genuinely believed that their platform was protecting
America from invasion and sabotage within. Like other voluntary organizations, the American
Legion struggled with the social revolution that transformed the country in the second half of the
twentieth century. Civil rights movements, a revolution in gender rights and roles, and the
evolution of immigration laws to reflect the United States’ new position in the world were
difficult challenges for Legionnaires, whose worldview, in general, put them on the side of status
quo in an era of revolution.
The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html
220
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, The Effects of Atomic Weapons (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press,
1950). Cited in Fitzsimons, “Brief History of American Civil Defense,” 36.
221
Fitzsimons, “Brief History of American Civil Defense,” 33-42; Fred A. Payne, “The Basic Case for Civil
Defense,” in Civil Defense, edited by Henry Eyring (Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement
of Science, 1966), 8.
174
The transformation of the American Legion’s membership during the Second World War
played an important role in the Legion’s response to those challenges. The decision in 1942 to
open up its membership rolls to veterans of the new war radically changed the organization,
broadening its scope of activities beyond the perspective of middle-aged World War I
veterans.222 Within a decade, Legion membership peaked at 5.5 million. The majority were
World War II veterans. This ensured the American Legion would escape the fate of the G.A.R.,
which formally dissolved in 1956 after the passing of its last living member. The American
Legion would be able to continue to shape and influence the country long after its founders
passed away.
Table 7.1 Number of U.S. Men Enrolled in Large Veterans
Associations223
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995
American Legion
5.5
4.5
4.1
3.3
3.3
Veterans of Foreign Wars 2.1
2.2
2.7
2.6
2.3
To achieve that, World War I veterans accepted diminished influence within their largest
organization. Even so, many veterans continued to regard the American Legion as an old man’s
organization, the clubhouse of the previous generation. While no organization surpassed the
American Legion in size, other organizations, notably the VFW, closed the gap considerably
after the war.224
As with so many histories, this dissertation began with something else in mind. I began
my research, intending to write an analysis comparing the role of four veteran organizations in
the wartime mobilization. Like the American Legion, the Catholic War Veterans, Veterans of
Foreign Wars, and Jewish War Veterans each have unique stories to tell. The next phase of the
222
For an unpublished list of pros and cons on whether to expand to include World War II veterans, developed by
the Legion’s National Executive Council, see “Pro and Con Discussion Reflected in Mails Reaching the National
Headquarters of the American Legion with Reference to Possible Inclusion of Veterans of the Second World War In
the American Legion,” Undated (Most likely March or April 1942), “Constitution and Bylaws, 1919-1944” Folder.
ALA.
223
Source: Civic Engagement Project, Harvard University, using data as of January 1999 from Theda Skocpol,
“Advocates Without Members: The Recent Transformation of American Civic Life,” in Theda Skocpol and Morris
P. Fiorina, eds., Civic Engagements in American Democracy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999),
475.
224
Skocpol also attributes the absolute and relative growth of the VFW to its appeal to veterans of the Korean and
Vietnam wars. Skocpol, “Advocates Without Members,” 474.
175
project will likely expand to include those groups as well as veteran groups devoted to specific
ethnicities and memberships (such as the Disabled American Veterans).
One of the great limitations of the sources used in this dissertation (and most of the work
on veteran organizations) is the lack of rank-and-file voices. The American Legion archives are,
as one would expect, largely a repository for the files of the National Headquarters and national
officers. The records found in the Veterans’ Administration files at the National Archives and
the Roosevelt Administration files at the Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park are also almost entirely
focused on correspondence with high-level Legion officials. The history of veterans and
veterans’ organizations will benefit greatly from a focus broadened beyond such a limited group.
We are fast approaching the centennial anniversaries of the great events that defined the
lives of the first Legionnaires and shattered the peace of the world. As the last survivors of those
fading days have passed on, their great legacy has also dimmed. Memorials to the generation of
the First World War, both marble and cinematic, have failed to capture the public imagination in
the way that the “greatest generation” has. This deficit may well decrease to some degree in the
next decade as authors, producers, and civic organizations celebrate the centennial events. While
those celebrations will naturally focus on the events of the First World War, the actions and
devotion of its veterans to their country and the next generation during the events of the Second
World War should not be forgotten.
176
APPENDIX
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE AMERICAN LEGION
In 1919 American veterans of the Great War founded the American Legion. The early
organizers wished to create a national organization for veterans of the war to ensure proper
treatment and access to veteran benefits. The headquarters for the American Legion is in
Indianapolis. The Legion is organized into 55 Departments, based on the fifty states, with
Figure 1. Organizational Structure of the American Legion
National Commander
National Adjutant
National Executive Committee
Elected Representatives from each Department
Subcommittee
Subcommittee
Subcommittees
Department Commander
Subcommittees
Department Adjutant
Departments
(Fifty States, DC, France, Mexico, Philippines, Puerto Rico)
Individual
Posts
Individual
Posts
177
Individual
Posts
additional departments located in Washington DC, France, Mexico, the Philippines, and Puerto
Rico. The Departments oversee the posts within their state or territory. Legion posts have been
established in nearly every community in the United States and many cities have multiple posts.
The national leadership of the American Legion resides in three entities. The chief
executive officer and official spokesman of The American Legion is the National Commander.
His responsibilities include enforcing the organization’s constitution, bylaws and resolutions,
representing the organization in official functions, and issuing statements on behalf of the
organization. Each year, a new National Commander is elected at the Legion’s national
convention. The National Adjutant is the administrative head of the organization and can be
elected multiple times. The National Adjutant oversees operations at the Headquarters and
administration of the policies of the national convention and the National Executive Committee
(NEC). The NEC is the final part of the National leadership. It is comprised of the national
commander, his five vice commanders, and a National Executive Committeemen elected by each
department. The NEC is the legislative body of the Legion. Previous national commanders are
considered life members that can take part in debates, but have no vote.
178
REFERENCES
Archival Sources:
American Legion Archive, Indianapolis, Indiana
“Constitution and Bylaws, 1919-1944” Folder.
“National Defense Committee-1940-1942” Folder
Proceedings of American Legion National Convention, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939,
1940, 1941.
Digest of Minutes, Department Commanders and Adjutants Conference.
Digest of Minutes: National Executive Committee Meeting, May 1937,
November 1937, May 1938, Sept. 1939, March 1941, May 1942,
November 1943.
Microfilm 91-7003: Mission to England, Letters Approving.
Microfilm 91-7003: Mission to England.
Microfilm 91-7003: Office of Civilian of Defense.
Microfilm 91-7003: National Defense Division 1623-1743.
Microfilm 91-7005: Council of Defense State and Local.
Microfilm 91-7005: Civilian Defense, Training Reports By State.
Microfilm 91-7005: Civilian Defense.
Microfilm 92-7007: Training for Defense Jobs.
Microfilm 92-7019: Aluminum.
Microfilm 92-7019: Jalopies.
Microfilm 92-7019: Rubber.
Microfilm 92-7019: Scrap Metal.
Microfilm 92-7019: Trophies.
Microfilm 93-9007: Disasters, American Red Cross.
National Archives II, Washington, DC.
RG 171: Office of Civilian Defense. Box 20.
RG 171: Office of Civilian Defense. Box 21.
RG 287: Publications of the Federal Government. Box No. Pr 272.
RG 287: Publications of the Federal Government. Box No. Pr 273.
Jewish War Veterans Archives, Washington, DC.
Executive Committee Minutes, December 13, 1941.
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY.
Official File 64: American Legion.
179
Box 4. File I. American Legion 1942.
President’s Personal File 350: American Legion.
Eleanor Roosevelt: Recorded Speeches and Interviews, 1933-1962.
Other Primary Sources:
Congressional Reports:
Committee on District of Columbia, Senate; Committee on District of Columbia,
House. 77-1 Dec. 11, 1941.
James M. Landis, Testimony on Supplemental National Defense Appropriation,
1943, before the Subcommittee on Deficiency Appropriations, Committee
on Appropriations, House, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 18, 1942: 798.
Committee of Conference Report on Neutrality Act of 1939, House Joint
Resolution 306, 76th Congress, 2d session, 1939, p. 11.
Committee on Military Affairs, S. Res. 2167, 77th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional
Record (13 January 1942).
Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Supplies and Equipment for Civilian
Defense Instruction, 77th Cong., 2d sess., 1942, S. Rep. 952.
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Christopher Griffin was born in Washington, DC in 1979. He spent his childhood years in
Maryland, where he developed a life-long love of reading, exploration, and history. During his
undergraduate studies at Florida State University, he found to his surprise that other students
responded well to his tutoring and began to pursue a career in higher education. After graduating
from Florida State University with a Bachelor’s degree in History in 2002, Christopher entered
Florida State’s History Graduate Program on a College of Arts & Sciences Teaching Fellowship.
In 2010 Christopher was awarded the University’s Graduate Student Teaching Award for
excellence in teaching. In 2011 he served as an Associate in the Program for Instructional
Excellence.
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